The philosophy of moral necessity & moral freedom, in two parts

Part Second

PRINCIPLES OF HARMONY ; RECONCILING PARTICULARLY MAN'S MORAL FREEDOM WITH lilmu JwtotoUJwj* ani f rttetoiiflti

BY REV. J. LAGRANGE.

AUBURN, N. Y.

WILLI AM V MOSES.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S51, by

J . LAGRANGE,

In th9 Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Northern District of New-York.

STEREOTYPED BY WILLIAM J. MOSE AUBURN, N. Y.

Preface

To all finite minds, the development of truth is progressive. Those portions which are most open to observation, or which are most easy to comprehend, are first perceived; and afterwards those which are more recondite and abstruse. This process may be indefinitely extended; and it may take place in respect to almost or quite, every subject of human belief or knowledge. The facts appertaining to our moral agency, are not exceptions to the general rule. Like natural objects, they are discovered successively; and their true relations are unfolded gradually. Therefore, even at this late and enlightened period, a more complete view of the principles of moral Necessity and moral Freedom, than has hitherto been presented, may perhaps be possible. That it is attainable, very many believe ; and that it should be afforded, if possible, is demanded by the age in which we live. This desideratum, the author thinks, is supplied in the following pages; but whether his opinion be correct or not, must remain for others to decide.

The work at least is not a hasty production. It is the result of reading, reflecting, conversing, and writing, in so far as the duties of the ministry would permit, during about

4 PREFACE.

fourteen years. Its plan is simple, but comprehensive: being a statement of principles, together with their proof, in two parts. In executing it, such language has been employed as is easily understood, if read from the beginning, or in due order. Care has been taken to distinguish those things which differ, to identify those which are not distinct, to analyze ideas which are compound, and to harmonize those relevant Bible truths which appear to conflict.

Bible doctrines are harmonized when they are properly explained; for when they are truly understood, their exact relations are clearly perceived.

In respect to critical differences of opinion, an effort has been made to ascertain the real points in dispute, to distinguish their relevant from their irrelevant bearings, to discriminate between sound argument and sophistry, and to "hold fast that which is good;" but as it was not intended to impart to the following pages the character of a review, the theories of others have not been extensively obtruded on the reader's attention. However, the most important and plausible errors relating to the subject, have been exposed; and the most cogent arguments by which they are attempted to be sustained, have been refuted. What it was thought essential to do, has been accomplished; not in the perfection of which the. subject is worthy, but as the author was able.

PART FIRST. Principles : Page

I. Human beings exercise Agency, .'..., 9

II. Agency is distinguished into Natural and Moral, .... 9

III. Natural Agency is the exercise of natural powers, ... 10

IV. Moral Agency is the exercise of natural powers or facul-

ties, under obligations of Law, 11

V. Moral Agency is two-fold: essential and adventitious, . . 12

VI. Moral Agency implies adequate capacity, 16

VII. Capacity as positive, consists of the faculties of thinking,

feeling, and acting, 16

VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of the availability of the faculties, as enjoyed through appropriate relations, . . 20

IX. Capacity for Moral Agency is moral capacity, 27

X. Moral capacity is enjoyed by mankind in general, .... 29

XI. Moral capacity may vary in degree, 81

XII. In each degree, moral capacity may be either unigenous

power, or diversified power, 32

XIII. Unigenous power admits of distinct proof, 34

XIV. Diversified power admits of distinct proof, 44

XV. Unigenous power implies the predominance of a given

motive or motives, 55

XVI. The predominance of a given motive may have its origin

extrinsic of the agent affected, 57

XVII. When the predominance of a given motive has its origin extrinsic of the agent affected, the agent is subject

to extrinsic causation in a two-fold respect, .... 59

XVIII. Causation by motives is moral causation, 60

XIX. Subjection to extrinsic moral causation is moral necessity, 62

6 CONTENTS.

Principles : Page.

XX. Moral necessity may respect agency in the abstract only,

or also in the concrete, 65

XXI. Moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, may

be either factitious or radical, . 66

XXII. Radical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agency, may be conceived of as being either adventitious

or absolute, 69

XXIII. Absolute radical moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, cannot be proved to exist, 70

XXIV. Moral necessity is a proper necessity, 73

XXV. Diversified power implies the existence and influence

of diverse motives, 84

XXVI. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of moral wrong, may consentaneously affect a sinful agent, 87

XXVII. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of evil, nay consentaneously affect an innocent or holy being, 88

XXVIII. Both good and evil influences were experienced previously to the existence of sin, 90

XXIX. Diversified power implies an equilibrium of diverse motives, 93

XXX. Motive equilibrium admits of distinct proof, .... 98

XXXI. The equilibrium of diverse motives involves exemption from extrinsic causation, 113

XXXII. Exemption from extrinsic moral causation, is moral freedom, 116

XXXIII. Moral freedom may be distinguished into generic

and specific, 122

XXXIV. Moral freedom may be distinguished into essential

and non-essential, 124

XXXV. Moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causation, involves intrinsic causation, 125

XXXVI. Intrinsic causation involves accountability, . • . . 131 XJ XVII. The modus operandi of the soul in causation, is beyond the sphere of philosophy, or of legitimate inquiry, ..... 135

CONTENTS.

PART SECOND. Principles : Page

I. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine foreknowledge, . . 137

II. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predestination, . 167

III. Moral freedom is consistent with election, \ 188

IV. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that salvation

is of grace, 199

V. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that regenera-

tion is a Divine work, 201

VI. The moral quality of a given volition, may differ from the

previous moral state of the agent, 204

VII. Moral freedom is consistent with the agent's susceptibil-

ity of moral suasion, 207

VIII. The ideas of freedom and necessity are correlatives, . . 210

IX. Freedom and necessity arc correlated in the same quality, . 210

X. Moral quality is gencrically natural, 211

XI. Liability to evil and capacity for good are correlatives, . 212

XII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, are primarily cor-

related in the same state, 21G

XIII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, as correlated in

the same state, are equal, 217

XIV. Liability to evil is imposed only for the sake of the cor-

related capacity for good, 219

XV. The correlation of liability to evil, and capacity for good,

is temporal, 221

XVI. The loss of an adequate representation in Adam, and the enjoyment of an adequate representation out of Adam, are correlatives, 222

8 CONTENTS.

Principles : Page.

XVII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, and the salvation of all who die in their infancy, are correlatives, 228

XVIII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, and the possibility that Pagans may he saved, are correlatives, .....% , 233

XIX. Moral freedom consists not in the possession of intellec-

tual and moral faculties, 244

XX. Moral freedom consists not in the exercise of volition, . 245

XXI. Moral freedom consists not in power to execute volition

or choice, 249

XXII. Moral freedom consists not, and is not implied, in ignorance of God's decrees, 265

XXIII. Moral freedom consists not of legal or moral right, . . 267

XXIV. Moral freedom consists not of itself, in deliverance from the bondage of Satan, 268

CHAPTER I ©it t\)t Sa-kjwi 0f gpntj

PRINCIPLES.

I. Human beings exercise agency. That is to say, they act, or exert power : they produce results, or effects.

"The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul ;" and in becoming a living, sentient being, he became an agent or actor. Agency may be either internal, or internal and external conjoined.

II. Agency is properly distinguished into Natural and Moral.

If of a given number of subjects which have properties in oommon, some possess a property which is peculiar, there must obtain between them some difference of quality ; and any distinction which intelligibly expresses this difference, is correct and proper. The 1* appropriate office of language is simply to convey truthful ideas.

But all agencies have properties in common, such as power, limitation, and dependence ; while some possess also a property which is peculiar. Hence, between them must obtain some difference of quality ; and this difference is intelligibly expressed by the distinction of Natural and Moral.

III. Natural agency is the exercise of natural powers.

1. It is the exercise of such powers as preclude the obligations of law. Such is the action of infants, idiots, lunatics, madmen. It is performed on principles of instinct, imitation, education, habit, or illusion ; and it implies a fundamental ignorance, or a radical privation of the use of knowledge. In this sense, Natural is opposed to Moral.

2. In a more extended sense, it is the exercise of such powers or faculties as are not miraculous. As thus defined, it is any action or exercise of any order of innate faculties or endowments ; and hence it may be the deliberate action of a rational and mature mind. What the occasion may be, enters not into the account. It may be superhuman, or miraculous, like the Savior's ejectment of demons, or re-animation of the dead ; but the action elicited from the beholder, being merely the exercise of natural endowments, is natural agency. If the occasion consists of the direct influences of the Holy Spirit, the case is not altered, so long as those influences merely remove obstruction or embarrassnient, by counter working other influences which are adverse ; or so long as they impart no new faculties, and no superhuman vigor. The ability thus secured may in a sense be gracious ; but in contra-distinction from miraculous or foreign, it is natural ; and hence its exercise is natural agency. In this sense, Natural is not opposed to Moral.

IV. Moral agency is the exercise of natural powers or faculties, under obligations of divine law.

Its relation to law constitutes its peculiar property, and imparts its distinctive quality ; for in proportion as we recede from the light of divine law, moral distinctions become confused, and fade away. Every possible moral action, like every other act, requires to be performed by natural powers, because moral agents, as such, possess no other faculties than those which are inherent in their nature ; and every possible moral action requires to be performed under obligations of law, because it must be either right or wrong. Moral agency, therefore, is natural agency of a particular order ; or natural agency under peculiar circumstances. It is a species, of which natural agency is the genu-, That moral distinctions have reference to divine law, is a doctrine of the Bible. It is written, "Sin is the transgression of the law ;" and again, " Where no law is, there is no transgression." 1 John 3 : 4. Kom. 4 : 15. The same thing is implied in what our Lord said on the subject of divorce. According to his teaching, a separation for slight reasons is a moral wrong ; and yet he allows, at least tacitly, that while the permission of Moses on this subject was law, it was not a sin. See Matt. 19 : 3-9.

V. Moral agency is two-fold : essential and adventitious.

1. Essential moral agency is that action in which moral quality has its beginning. This action is volition or choice. As exercised under law, which as moral action it must be, it may be termed moral volition. Independent of moral volition, outward actions, though they may be either favorable or injurious, are neither virtuous nor vicious, right nor wrong. The act of destroying life is not murder, that of taking another man's money is not robbery, and that of burning another's dwelling is not arson, if in each case the act be not willed, or not willed with a sane mind ; whereas the act of deliberately willing murder, or robbery, or arson, with a sane mind, or so as to act under law, is in each case a moral act, involving the agent in guilt, though the volition be not carried into effect. On the same principle, he who utters a falsehood, believing his statement to be true, is not guilty of a lie ; but he is guilty of a lie, who utters what is true, believing his statement to be false.

Therefore, in moral agency, volition or choice is the essential action. Volition, choice, preference, purpose, and determination, are respectively so many acts of essential moral agency ; not in those attributes in which they differ, but in that respect in which they are identical as acts of willing. The difference between them is not generic, but specific ; and perhaps we should say.

merely circumstantial. For example ; a man chooses not to live : lie chooses death. This choice extends itself into a choice of suicide ; and then we call it a purpose or determination. In the interim between the choice and the consummation, he experiences strong influences in favor of life ; but his mind remaining unchanged, we now call his choice, preference : we say, he still prefers death. When the fatal moment arrives, his choice, as extending itself to the method as well as to the end, is denominated a volition. This volition his hand obeys, and he dies. Thus his hand obeys the volition, the preference, the determination, the purpose, the choice ; which is simply saying, it obeys the soul's act of willing, as repeated under different circumstances, and with a variation in its references.

The most important difference obtains between choice and preference. " We always choose in preferring, but we do not always prefer in choosing. To choose, is to take one thing from among others : to prefer, is to take one thing before or rather than another. We choose a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be of itself : we prefer a thing for what it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another. 1 Judgment was wearied with the perplexity of choice, where there was no motive for preference.' " — Johnson. — Cr abb's Synonymes.

Choosing and refusing are likewise specifically different, but generically the same. They are exercises of the same faculty, and are therefore the same in their nature. Indeed, to refuse an object, is but to choose not to have it ; and to choose an object, is to refuse its alternative.

That the exercise of willing is the essential agency, agrees with the following Scriptures. "If there be first a willing rnind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." — 2 Cor. 8 : 12. " Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life."— John 5 : 40.

2. Adventitious moral agency is action which is incidental or contingent. It is action which constitutes a subordinate part of moral agency ; not necessarily or invariably, but conditionally and generally. It is the action of execution : that in which an act of willing is carried into effect. It is not essential, because moral volition or choice may exist without it. The principle has its illustration in the offering up of Isaac. The purpose was accepted for the deed. " By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying, I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is. upon the sea shore, and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies. And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice." — Gen. 22 : 16-18. •

By affirming that the action of execution is not the essential, but the adventitious part of moral agency, we do not intend to convey the idea, that the action of execution is a matter of indifference. It may in some instances be essential to the agent's salvation ; " for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified." Even " faith without works is dead, being alone." In using the term adventitious, our meaning is, that the action to which it applies, is but a duplicate of a primary action which precedes it, and which covers the same subject ; and that this duplicate is not necessary to the existence and moral quality of the primary and internal action.

CHAPTER II ®n % Subject 0f tfapots

PEINCIPLES.

VI. Mokal agency implies adequate capacity.

It implies power, appropriate power, and appropriate power in sufficient degree ; or it implies the existence of adequate faculties, and the requisite conditions of their exercise. It implies, therefore, a capacity which, in its existence, is two-fold : positive and relative.

VII. Capacity as positive, consists of those faculties of a rational being which are exercised in thinking, FEELING, ACTING.

" All the facts which fall under the consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all others. These facts, (which beyond doubt are never in reality solitary, and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life,) these three facts are expressed in the words to feel, to think, to act." — Cousin.

" Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the human mind ? Are these distinctions real? Are all mental phenomena included in these fundamental facts ?" These questions I answer in the affirmative, for the following reasons :

1. jSTo mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or determination ?

2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, not in degree, hut in kind.

How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling on the one hand, and mental determination on the other. Feelings also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove from thoughts, and mental acts, or determinations. So of the class last mentioned. Choice, in every degree or form, makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no approach whatever to thoughts or feelings.

3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the above expressions, as actually existing in human consciousness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. When I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time that I think so and so, at another that I have particular feelings, and at another still that I have resolved or determined upon a particular course of conduct, both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly distinct.

4. In all known languages, there are terms employed to designate these three classes of phenomena ; terms, each of which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. We never use it to designate feelings, or mental determinations of any Mnd. The terms sensation or emotion, are never applied to any but the phenomena oi feeling. In a similar manner, we never apply the terms purpose, willing, determining, &c, to the phenomena of thought or feeling ; but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. The existence of such terms, undeniably evinces that the different classes of phenomena under consideration, are recognized by universal consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct from one another.

5. As. a final reason, I would adduce an argument presented in a work , recently published on the will: "The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying terms in common use, which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It is true that there are such terms, which are promiscuously applied to all classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, must the universal consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distinct from one another — phenomena,, differing not in degree, but in kind.

"The threefold classification of mental phenomena above established and elucidated, clearly indicates a tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities, equally distinct from one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the terms intellect or intelligence, sensibility or sensitivity, and will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes, &e. When I speak of a diversity of mental faculties, I would by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances ; it is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple substance, remaining as it always does, one and identical, is capable of a diversity of functions or operations, entirely distinct from one another. This diversity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words mental faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distinct from each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the intelligence, sensibility, and will, as distinct faculties of the mind.

"The remarks made above, respecting the mind itself, will at once appear equally applicable to the mental faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the intelligence, for example, as a faculty of the mind entirely distinct from those of the sensibility and will, without supposing that the mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak of the different powers or faculties of the intelligence itself, without implying that that faculty is composed of a diversity of parts. The term faculty, whether applied to the whole mind, or to any of the departments of the mind, implies a diversity of functions of the same power or substance, and not a diversity of substances or parts/' — Mohan.

VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of Hie availability of the faculties, as enjoyed by means of appropriate relations.

1. It implies the relation of an object or objects. Capacity for moral agency, as such, cannot exist, except under such circumstances that the exercise of the faculties shall be moral agency. But the exercise of the faculties cannot be moral agency, unless it be a rational exercise ; and it cannot be a rational exercise, unless it be performed in view of something which the agent recognizes as sustaining to him the relation of an object. An utterly aimless action must necessarily be as truly void of moral quality, as the fall of a snowflake, or the devastation of an earthquake.

The object may be considered as two-fold. It comprises something to be obtained or produced, and the result of its beirig obtained or produced. The former is the proximate, and the latter is the remote object.

2. Capacity, as relative, implies also the relation of a motive or motives. The motive is identical with the object, and hence it is also twofold — proximate and remote. The one resides in the other, or is inseparably connected with it, as the result, with its occasion. In other words, the distant motive is some result or results, to be derived from a possession of the object, as such, which constitutes the proximate motive. That in view of which an action is performed, whether it be designated object, or motive, or both, is essential to a capacity for moral agency, because it is that alone by which the action is distinguished from the vagary of lunacy and madness. When we speak of the motive in favor of a volition or action, we may either mean the proximate, or the remote object ; but when we speak of the motive in favor of the object, we mean by object, the proximate object, and by motive, the remote object.

We may further remark, that motives may evidently be as various as proximate objects and their results. The proximate motive may be anything which exists, or which, may exist ; and the distant motive may be the positive or comparative absence of suffering, the enjoyment of happiness, the disinterested performance of duty, or the recognition of intrinsic worthiness. The motives of finite beings are generally recognized in forms of misery or happiness ; but not always.

These results, as relating to themselves, moral agents frequently disregard ; as when they consider only the proximate object, and their own duty to God and man. The motives of the Supreme Being, for his acts of creation, providence, and grace, exist not in any danger of suffering, nor in any susceptibility of greater happiness, nor in any sense of duty to a superior, but in the recognition of his own infinite worthiness.

Because of the contusion which exists in the speculations of some writers, it may be well to remark, in this place, what motive is not ; though after what has been said, it would seem to be scarcely necessary. Motive is not any exercise of the affections. Such exercise is action ; and motives are not action, but only incentives to action. Again, motive is not susceptibility. The sours susceptibilities are simply its adaptations to be impressed by motives. Finally, motive is not identical with an existing state or condition. The state of the mind, as existing, is present, whereas the motive, as such, is an object which is future ; and besides, the state of the mind may be changed by motive, but it cannot be changed by itself.

3. Capacity as relative, implies the relation of subjection to motive influence. Motive influence is necessary to a capacity for moral agency, for the same reason that the object is necessaiy ; or because it constitutes the force or power, which the object exerts on the agent's mind.

It is on account of its influence, that the object is denominated motive ; but the two are not therefore identical. It is on account of his action, that a rational being is called an actor ; but the actor and his action remain forever distinct. That motives and motive influences are distinct, appears in that the latter are experienced^ before the former, as ends are gamed. Motive influence is enjoyed previous to the action, and of course is experienced independently of the action ; whereas the object which constitutes the motive, is enjoyed only in the action, or. after it, and in consequence of it.

4. Capacity, as relative, implies the relation of subjection to extrinsic causation. That is to say, subjection to extrinsic causation in the abstract of moral agency. The existence of motive influences depends not primarily on the agent affected ; nor can he possibly avoid being a subject of such influences. Whether he will or not, he must constantly experience them in some form, and of some kind or other ; and thus, as also by the very nature of his own mind, he is absolutely and irresistibly caused to act : caused to be an agent. As the author of his faculties, and of motive influences, is extrinsic of himself, so the causation is extrinsic of himself ; and as moral agency can exist in no other way, it follows that capacity implies this subjection to extrinsic causation. In so far as the subjection is produced by motive influence, it is implied in capacity as relative.

Having mentioned causation, it may perhaps be well to remark in this place, that we employ the term cause, in itj stiict and proper sense. Metaphysical truth is as exact as mathematical truth, and hence the terms employed to express it, like those of mathematics, must be understood in an exact sense. The lack of exactness in this respect, has brought metaphysics into contempt ; nor could the result very well have been otherwise. Such writers as President Edwards, for example, employ " the word cause, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, or the manner of the event, depends, whether the antecedent has any positive influence or not ;" and hence they give the term cause, at least three or four different meanings in one. This will appear, if we consider for a moment, the antecedents on which depends an accountable human action. Grod is an antecedent, the finite agent is an antecedent, the motive influence is an antecedent, and the medium of that influence is an antecedent, on which a given moral action depends.