The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man

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V

Preface

BY THE EDITOR.

Sir James Mackintosh has said of Mr. Stewart, — " Perhaps few men ever lived, who poured into the breasts of youth a more fervid, and yet reasonable, love of liberty, of truth, and of virtue. How many are still alive, in different countries, and in every rank to which education reaches, who, if they accurately examined their own minds and lives, would ascribe much of whatever goodness and happiness they possess to the early impressions of his gentle and persuasive eloquence ! "

The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man was the last of his publications ; it came from the press in the spring of 1828, a few weeks before the author's death. An unfriendly and severe critic in the Penny Cyclopccdia admits, in respect to this treatise, that it is " by far the least exceptionable of his works. It is more systematic, and contains more new truths, than any of his metaphysical writings; and his long acquaintance with the world and with letters enabled him to suggest many obvious but overlooked analyses." Only two editions of it have appeared in this countiy, — one separately in 1828, the other in a collection

IV PREFACE.

of his works in the following year; the former has long been out of print.

The author begins his Preface by apologizing for " the large and perhaps disproportionate space " allotted by him to the evidence and doctrines of natural religion. This part, making nearly one third of the whole, has been omitted in the present edition, as being out of place here, however excellent in itself. Other retrenchments have also been made in respect to unimportant details, in order to find room, without transgressing the prescribed limits, for some additional notes and illustrations. The latter, which are indicated by brackets, or otherwise, as they occur, consist almost exclusively of extracts from living or late writers, or references to them, and are inserted with a view to mark whatever progress has been made or attempted in ethical speculation since Mr. Stewart's day.

Some changes have been made in the distribution and numbering of the chapters and sections, and sub-sections have been introduced for the first time. The use of the latter in giving a more distinct impression of the successive steps in the argument or exposition, no practised teacher will fail to appreciate. The Latin and Greek citations in the text are translated in the present edition, where this had not been done by the author. The translations are taken, for the most part, from common sources, without particular acknowledgment, the only object being to fit the work for more general and convenient use as a text-book.

Cambridge, August 16, 1849.

Chapter II. Of Our Desires,. - . 16

Sect. I. The Desire of Knowledge, 16

II. The Desire of Society, 20

III. The Desire of Esteem, 28

IV. The Desire of Power, 44

V. Emulation, or the Desire of Supeyiority, ... 49

Chapter III. Of Our Affections

Sect. I. General Observations, 56

II. Of the Affections of Kindred, 61

III. Of Friendship, 66

IV. Of Patriotism, 70

V. Of Pity to the Distressed, 80

VI CONTENTS.

VI. Of Resentment, and the various other Angry Affections grafted upon it, commonly considered by Ethical Writers as Malevolent Affections, 91

Book II. Of Our Rational And Governing Principles Op Action

.CHAPTER I.

OP A PRUDENTIAL REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS, OR WHAT IS COMMONLY CALLED BY MORALISTS THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-LOVE, 102

CHAPTER II.

OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

Sect. I. The Moral Faculty not resolvable into Self-Love, . .115 II. Examination of Hartley's Theory of the Formation of the

Moral Sense by Association alone, . . . . 125

III. The Moral Constitution of Human Nature not disproved by

the Diversity in Men's Moral Judgments, . . . 131

IV. Licentious Systems of Morals, 154

Appendix to Chapter H

Bentham and his Followers, . .171

CHAPTER III.

ANALYSIS OF OUR MORAL PERCEPTIONS AND EMOTIONS, 188

Sect. I. Of the Perception of Right and Wrong, . ... 193 II. Of the Agreeable and Disagreeable Emotions arising from

the Perception of what is Right and Wrong in Conduct, . 217 HI. Of the Perception of Merit and Demerit, . . . 228

CONTENTS. Vii

Chapter V

OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH COOPERATE WITH OUR MORAL POWERS IN THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE CON- DUCT, 243

Sect. I. Of Decency, or a Regard to Character, .... 244

II. Of Sympathy, .245

III. Of the Sense of the Ridiculous, 261

IV. Of Taste, considered in its Relation to Morals, . . 264

Chapter VI. Of Man's Free Agency

Sect. I. Preliminary Observations, 268

II. Review of the Argument for Necessity, .... 274 IH. Is the Evidence of Consciousness in Favor of the Scheme of

Free Will, or of that of Necessity? 300

IV. Of the Schemes of Free Will, and of Necessity, considered as

influencing Practice, 309

V. On the Argument for Necessity drawn from the Prescience

of the Deity, 316

Chapter III. Of The Duties Which Respect Ourselves, . 383

Sect. I. Of the Duty of employing the Means we possess to secure

our own Happiness, 385

II. Of the Different Theories of Happiness, . . . .387

III. Means of promoting and securing Happiness, . . . 399

Sect. I. Sir James Mackintosh's Theory of Morals, . . . 436 H. Jouffroy's Theory of Morals, 449

THE

PHILOSOPHY

ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN

Introduction

1. Connection between the Intellectual and the Active Poivers.] In my former work on the Human Mind I confined my attention almost exclusively to man considered as an intellectual being' ; and attempted an analysis of those faculties and powers which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or his understanding. It is by these faculties that he acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences ; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view ; and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisitions he has made. A being might, I think, be conceived, possessed of these principles, without any of the active propensities belonging to our species, at least without any of them but the principle of curiosity; — a being formed only for speculation, without any determination to the pursuit of particular external objects, and whose whole happiness consisted in intellectual gratifications.

But, although such a being might perhaps be conceived to exist, and although, in studying our internal frame, it be convenient to treat of our intellectual powers apart from our active propensities, yet, in fact, the two are very intimately, and indeed inseparably, con- 1

« INTRODUCTION.

nected in all our mental operations. I have already hinted, that, even in our speculative inquiries, the principle of curiosity is nece&sary to account for the exertion we make ; and it is still more obvious, that a combination of means to accomplish particular ends presupposes some determination of our nature which makes the attainment of these ends desirable. Our active propensities, therefore, are the motives which induce us to exert our intellectual powers; and our intellectual powers are the instruments by which we attain the ends recommended to us by our active propensities : —

" Reason the card, but passion is the gale."

It will afterwards appear, that our active propensities are not only necessary to produce our intellectual exertions, but that the state of the intellectual powers, in the case of individuals, depends, in a great measure, on the strength of their propensities, and on the particular propensities which are predominant in the temper of their minds. A man of strong philosophical curiosity is likely to possess a much more cultivated and inven tive understanding than another of equal natural capacity, destitute of the same stimulus. In like manner, the love of fame, or a strong sense of duty, may compensate for original defects, or may lay the foundation of uncommon attainments. The intellectual powers, too, may be variously modified by the habits arising from avarice, from the animal appetites, from ambition, or from the benevolent affections ; insomuch that the moral principles of the miser, of the elegant voluptuary, of the political intriguer, and of the philanthropist are not, perhaps, more dissimilar than the acquired capacities of their understandings, and the species of information with which their memories are stored. Among the various external indications of character, few circumstances will be found to throw more light on the ruling passions of individuals than the habitual direction of their studies, and the nature of those accom* plishments which they have been ambitious to attain.

When Montaigne complains of " the difficulty he experienced in remembering the names of his servants • of his ignorance of the value of the French coins which he was daily handling; and of his inability to distinguish the different kinds of grain from each other, both in the earth and in the granary " ; * his observations, instead of proving the point which he supposed them to establish (an original and incurable defect in his faculty of memory), only afford an illustration of the little interest he took in things external, and of the preternatural and distempered engrossment of his thoughts with the phenomena of the internal world. To this peculiarity in his turn of mind he had himself alluded, when he says, " I study myself more than any other subject. This is my metaphysic ; this my natural philosophy." A person well acquainted with the peculiarities of Montaigne's memory might, I think, on comparing them with the general superiority of his mental powers, have anticipated him in this specification of the study which almost exclusively occupied his attention.!

Helvetius in his book De VEsprit (a work which, among many paradoxical and some very pernicious opinions, contains a number of acute and lively observations) has prosecuted, with considerable success, this last view of human nature, and has collected a variety of amusing facts to illustrate the influence of the passions on the intellectual powers. " It is the passions," he observes, " that rouse the soul from its natural ten-

* Montaigne's Essays, Book II. Chap. xvii.

f The following remarks of the learned and ingenious Dr. Jortin are not unworthy of the attention of those whose taste leads them to the observation and study of character.

"From the complexion of those anecdotes which a man collects from others, or which he forms by his own pen, may, without much difficulty, be conjectured what manner of man he was.

" The human being is mightily given to assimilation, and, from the stories which any one relates with spirit, from the general tenor of his conversation, and from the books or associates to which he most addicts his attention, the inference cannot be far distant as to the texture of his mind, the vein of his wit, or, we may add, the ruling passion of his heart."— ■ Jortin's Tracts, Vol. I. p. 445.

doncy to rest, and surmount the vis inertim to which it is always inclined to yieJd ; and it is the strong passions alone that prompt men to the execution of those heroic actions, and give birth to those sublime ideas, which command the admiration of ages.

" It is the strength of passion alone that can enable men to defy dangers, pain, and death.

" It is the passions, too, which, by keeping up a perpetual fermentation in our minds, fertilize the same ideas, which, in more phlegmatic temperaments, are barren, and resemble seed scattered on a rock.

" It is the passions which, having strongly fixed our attention on the object of our desire, lead us to view it under aspects unknown to other men; and which, consequently, prompt heroes to plan and execute those hardy enterprises which must always appear ridiculous to the multitude till the sagacity of their authors has been evinced by success." *

To this passage, which is, I think, just in the main, I have only to object, that, in consequence of the ambiguity of the word passion^ it is apt to suggest an erroneous idea of the author's meaning. It is plain that he uses it to denote our active principles in general ; and, in this sense, there can be no doubt that his doctrine is well founded ; inasmuch as, without such principles as curiosity, the love of fame, ambition, avarice, or the love of mankind, our intellectual capacities would for ever remain sterile and useless. But it is not in this sense that the word passion is most commonly employed. In its ordinary acceptation it denotes those animal impulses which, although they may sometimes prompt to intellectual exertion, are certainly on the whole unfavorable to intellectual improvement. Helvetius himself has not always attended to this ambiguity of language ; and hence may be traced many of the paradoxes and errors of his philosophy.

To these slight remarks it may not be useless to subjoin an observation of La Rochefoucauld, which is

* De V Esprit, Discours III. Chap. vi.

equally refined and just; and which, in its practical tendency, calls the attention to a source of danger in a quarter where it is too seldom apprehended. " It is a mistake to believe that none but the violent passions, such as ambition and love, are able to triumph over the other active principles. Laziness, as languid as it is, often gets the mastery of them all ; overrules all the designs and actions of life, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues." *

From the foregoing observations it appears, that, in accounting for the diversities of genius and of intellectual character among men, important lights may be derived from an examination of their active propensities. It is of more consequence for me, however, to remark at present the intimate relation which an analysis of these propensities bears to the theory of morals, and its practical connection with our opinions on the duties and the happiness of human life. Indeed, it is in this way alone that the light of nature enables us to form any reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world : Quid sumus, et quidnam victuri g-ig-nimur.-f It forms, therefore, a necessary introduction to the science of ethics, or rather is the foundation on which that science may rest.

II. Object and Plan of the Work.] In prosecuting our inquiries into the Active and the Moral Powers of Man, I propose, first, to attempt a classification and analysis of the most important principles belonging to this part of our constitution ; and, secondly, to treat of the various branches of our duty. Under the former of these heads, my principal aim will be to illustrate the essential distinction between those active principles which originate in man's rational nature, and those which urge him. by a blind and instinctive impulse, to their respective objects.

In general, it may be here remarked, that the word

# Sentences et Maximes, cclxvi. t Pcrsius, Sat. III. 1. 67.

1* action is properly applied to those exertions which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus, we say the mind is active when engaged in study. In ordinary discourse, indeed, we are apt to confound together action and motion. As the operations in the minds of other men escape our notice, we can judge of their activity only from the sensible effects it produces ; and hence we are led to apply the character of activity to those whose bodily activity is the most remarkable, and to distinguish mankind into two classes, the active and the speculative. In the present instance, the word active is used in its most extensive signification, as applicable to every voluntary exertion.

According to the definition now given of the word action, the primary sources of our activity are the circumstances in which the acts of the will originate. Of these there are some which make a part of our constitution, and which, on that account, are called active principles. Such are hunger, thirst, the appetite which unites the sexes, curiosity, ambition, pity, resentment. These active principles are also called powers of the will, because, by stimulating us in various ways to action, they afford exercise to our sense of duty and our other rational principles of action, and give occasion to our voluntary determinations as free agents.

III. Difficulty of the Study.] The study of this part of our constitution, although it may at first view seem to lie more open to our examination than the powers of the understanding, is attended with some difficulties peculiar to itself. For this various reasons may be assigned; among which there are two that seem principally to claim our attention.

1. When we wish to examine the nature of any of our intellectual principles, we can at all times subject the faculty in question to the scrutiny of reflection; and can institute whatever experiments with respect to it may be necessary for ascertaining its general laws

It is characteristic of all our operations purely intellectual to leave the mind cool and undisturbed, so that the exercise of the faculties concerned in them does not prevent us from an analytical investigation of their theory. The case is very different with our active powers, particularly with those which, from their violence and impetuosity, have the greatest influence on human happiness. When we are under the dominion of the power, or, in plainer language, when we are hurried by pas* sion to the pursuit of a particular end, we feel no inclination to speculate concerning the mental phenomena. "When the tumult subsides, and our curiosity is awakened concerning the past, the moment for observation and experiment is lost, and we are obliged to search for our facts in an imperfect recollection of what was viewed, even in the first instance, through the most troubled and deceitful of all media.

Something connected with this is the following remark of Mr. Hume : — " Moral philosophy has this peculiar disadvantage, which is not to be found in natural, that, in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty that may arise. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up, after the same manner, any doubts in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, it is evident that this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures." *

* Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Introduction.

2. Another circumstance which adds much to the difficulty of this branch of study is the great variety of our active principles, and the endless diversity of their combinations in the characters of men. The same action may proceed from very different, and even opposite, motives in the case of two individuals, and even in the same individual on different occasions; — or an action which in one man proceeds from a single motive may, in another, proceed from a number of motives conspiring together and modifying each other's effects. The philosophers who have speculated on this subject have in general been misled by an excessive love of simplicity, and have attempted to explain the phenomena from the smallest possible number of data. Overlooking the real complication of our active principles, they have sometimes fixed on a single one, (good or bad, according as they were disposed to think well or ill of human nature,) and have deduced from it a plausible explanation of all the varieties of human character and conduct.

Our inquiries on this subject must be conducted in one of two ways, either by studying the characters of other men, or by studying our own. In the former way, we may undoubtedly collect many useful hints, and many facts to confirm or to limit our conclusions ; but the conjectures we form concerning the motives of others are liable to so much uncertainty, that it is chiefly by attending to what passes in our own minds that we can reasonably hope to ascertain the general laws of our constitution as active and moral beings.

Even this plan of study, however, as I have already hinted, requires uncommon perseverance, and still more uncommon candor. The difficulty is great of attending to any of the operations of the mind ; but this difficulty is much increased in those cases in which we are led by vanity or timidity to fancy that we have an interest in concealing the truth from our own knowledge.

Most men, perhaps, are disposed, in consequence of these and some other causes, to believe themselves bet-

INTRODUCTION. S>

ter than they really are ; and a few, there is reason to suspect, go into the opposite extreme, from the influence of false systems of philosophy or religion, or from the gloomy views inspired by a morbid melancholy.

When to these considerations we add the endless metaphysical disputes on the subject of the will, and of man's free agency, it may easily be conceived that the field of inquiry upon which we are now to enter abounds with questions not less curious and intricate than any of those which have been hitherto under our review. In point of practical importance some of them will be found in a still higher degree entitled to our attention.

IV. Division of the Active Principles.] In the further prosecution of this subject, I shall avoid, as much as possible, all technical divisions and classifications, and shall content myself with the following enumeration of our Active Principles, which I hope will be found sufficiently distinct and comprehensive for our purposes.

1. Appetites.

2. Desires.

3. Affections.

The first three may be distinguished (for a reason which will afterwards appear) by the title of Instinctive or Implanted Propensities ; the last two by the title of Rational and Governing Principles of Action.*

* In the above enumeration I have departed widely from Dr. Rcid's language. Sec his Essays on the Active Powers, Essay III., Parts I., II., anil J II. This great philosopher, with whom I am always unwilling to differ, refers our active principles to three classes, the mechanical, the animal, and the rational; using all these three words with what I think a very exceptional latitude. On this occasion I shall only observe, that tfTe word mechanical (under which he comprehends our instincts and habits) cannot, in my opinion, be properly applied to any of our active principles. It is indeed used, in this instance, merely as a term of distinction ; but it seems to imply some theory concerning the nature of the principles comprehended undor it, and is apt to suggest incorrect notions on the subject.

If I hail been disposed to examine this part of our constitution with all the minute accuracy of which it is susceptible, I should have preferred the following arrangement to that which I have adopted, as well as to that proposed by Dr Reid: — 1. Of our original principles of action. 2. Of our acquired principles of action.

The original principles of action may be subdivided into the animal and the rational ; to the former of which classes our instincts ought undoubtedly to be referred, as well as our appetites. In Dr. Reid's arrangement, nothing appears more unaccountable, if not capricious, than to call our appetites animal principles, because they are common to man and to the brutes; and, a-t the same time, to distinguish our instincts by the title of mechanical ; — when, of all our active propensities, there are none in which the nature of man bears so strong an analogy to that of the lower animals as in these instinctive impulses. Indeed, it is from the condition of the brutes that the word instinct is transferred to that of man by a sort of figure or metaphor.

Our acquired principles of action comprehend all those propensities to act which we acquire from habit. Such are our artificial appetites and artificial desires, and the various factitious motives of human conduct generated by association and fashion.

At present, it being useless for any of the purposes which I have in view to attempt so comprehensive and detailed an examination of the subject, I shall confine myself to the general enumeration already mentioned. As our appetites, our desires, and our affections, whether original or acquired, stand in the same common relation to the Moral Faculty (the illustration of which is the chief object of this volume), I purposely avoid those slighter and less important subdivisions which might be thought to savour unnecessarily of scholastic subtilty.

[For later classifications of our Active Principles, see Upham's Elements of Mental Philosophy, Vol. II., Introduction, Chap, ii., and Whewell'g Elements of Morality, Book I. Chap, ii.]

Book I. Of Our Instinctive Principles Of Action

CHAPTER, I.

OF OUR APPETITES.

I. Their Nature, Use, and Abuse.] This class of our Active Principles is distinguished by the following circumstances : —

1. They take their rise from the body, and are common to us with the brutes.

2. They are not constant, but occasional.

3. They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation, which is strong or weak in proportion to the strength or weakness of the appetite.

Our appetites are three in number, hunger, thirst, and the appetite of sex. Of these, two were intended for the preservation of the individual; the third for the continuation of the species ; and without them reason Would have been insufficient for these important purposes. Suppose, for example, that the appetite of hunger had been no part of our constitution, reason and experience might have satisfied us of the necessity of food to our preservation ; but how should we have been able, without an implanted principle, to ascertain, according to the varying state of our animal economy, the proper seasons for eating, or the quantity of food that is salutary to the body ? The lower animals not only receive this information from nature, but are, moreover, directed by instinct to the particular sort of food that is proper for them to use in health and in sickness. The senses of taste and smell, in the savage state of our species, are subservient, at least in some degree, to the same purpose.

Our appetites can, with no propriety, be called selfish, for they are directed to their respective objects as ultimate ends, and they must all have operated, in the first instance, prior to any experience of the pleasure arising from their gratification. After this experience, indeed, the desire of enjoyment will naturally come to be combined with the appetite ; and it may sometimes lead us to stimulate or provoke the appetite with a view to the pleasure which is to result from indulging it. Imagination, too, and the association of ideas, together with the social affections, and sometimes the moral faculty, lend their aid, and all conspire together in forming a complex passion, in which the animal appetite is only one ingredient. In proportion as this passion is gratified, its influence over the conduct becomes the more irresistible, (for all the active determinations of our nature are strengthened by habit,) till at last we struggle in vain against its tyranny. A man so enslaved by his animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and contemptible forms.

As an additional proof of the misery of such a state, it is of great importance to remark, that, while habit strengthens all our active determinations, it diminishes the liveliness of our passive impressions ; — a remarkable instance of which occurs in the effects produced by an immoderate use of strong liquors, which, at the same time that it confirms the active habit of intemperance, deadens and destroys the sensibility of the palate. In consequence of this law of our nature, the evils of excessive indulgence are doubled, inasmuch as our sensibility to pleasure decays in proportion as the cravings of appetite increase.

In general, it will be found, that, wherever we attempt to enlarge the sphere of enjoyment beyond the limits prescribed by nature, we frustrate our own purpose.

A man so enslaved by his appetites may undoubtedly, in one sense, be called selfish; for, as he must ne-

APPETITES. 13

oessarily neglect the duties he owes to others, he may be presumed to be deficient in the benevolent affections. But it cannot be said of him that he is actuated by an inordinate self-love, (meaning by that word an excessive regard for his own happiness,) for he sacrifices to the meanest gratifications all the noblest pleasures of which he is susceptible, and sacrifices to the pleas ure of the moment the permanent enjoyments of health, reputation, and conscience. This is true even when the desire of gratification is combined with the original appetite; for no two principles can be more widely at variance than the desire of gratification and the desire of happiness.

Of the errors introduced into morals, in consequence of the vague use of the words selfishness and self-love, I shall afterwards take notice. What I wish chiefly to remark at present is, that in no sense of these words can we refer to them the origin of our animal appetites; and that the active propensities comprehended under this title are ultimate facts in the human constitution.

II. Acquired Appetites.] Besides our natural appetites we have many acquired ones. Such are our appetites for tobacco, for opium, and for other intoxicating drugs. In general, every thing that stimulates the nervous system produces a subsequent languor, which gives rise to a desire of repetition.