Outlines of moral philosophy

Preface

MY principal object in this publication is to exhibit such a view of the arrangement of my Lectures as may facilitate the studies of those to whom they are addressed. In a course which employs more than five months, and which necessarily includes a great variety of disquisitions, it is difficult for a hearer to retain a steady idea of the train of thought leading from one subject to another ; and, of con sequence, the lectures, by assuming the appearance of de tached discourses, are in danger of losing the advantages arising from connection and method. The following Out lines will, I hope, not only obviate this inconvenience, but will allow me in future a greater latitude of illustration and digression than I could have indulged myself in with propriety so long as my students were left to investigate the chain of my doctrines by their own reflections.

In the execution of this design I have attempted at the same time to state, under each head, a few fundamental principles, which I was either anxious to impress on the memory of my hearers, or which I thought might be useful to them, by relieving their attention during the discussion of a long or a difficult argument.

The branch of Moral Philosophy which relates to the Principles of Politics being less abstract than the others, I have contented myself with a simple enumeration of the most important articles treated of in the third part of my course. It is scarcely necessary for me to mention, that in this enumeration I have not aimed at anything approaching

PHETACE.

to systematical arrangement ; and that in illustrating the titles it contains, I am obliged, by the term prescribed to my academical labours, to confine myself to very general sketches. As soon as my other engagements allow me sufficient leisure for such an undertaking, I shall attempt a separate course of lectures on this very extensive and diffi cult subject.

"With respect to my general plan, those who are in the smallest degree conversant with ethical writers will per ceive, that in its formation I have been guided almost en tirely by the train of my own speculations. In following the order which these prescribed, I was far from proceeding on the supposition that it was likely to possess, in the opinion of the public, advantages over the arrangements already proposed ; but it appeared to me reasonable to think, that a plan resulting from my own habits of thought would probably be better executed in my hands than any one, how perfect soever, suggested by the views of another.

DUGALD STEWAET.

P.S. — Having of late carried into execution (at least in part) the design announced in the foregoing Preface, by a separate course of Lectures on Political Economy, I have omitted in this Edition of my Outlines the Articles which I formerly enumerated under that general title ; substituting in their stead a few others, calculated to illustrate the pecu liar and intimate connection between this department of Politics and the more appropriate objects of Ethics. The observations which these articles are meant to introduce may be useful, at the same time, in preparing the minds of Students for disquisitions, the details of which can scarcely fail to appear uninviting to those who are not aware, of the important conclusions to which they are subservient.

Contents

LIFE AND WETTINGS or THE AUTHOR.

Introduction

SECT,

I. OF the Object of Philosophy, and the Method of prosecuting

Philosophical Inquiries II. Application of the foregoing Principles to the Philosophy of

the Human Mind

III. Causes of the slow Progress of Human Knowledge ; more par ticularly of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and of the Sciences immediately connected with it

PAGB

SUBJECT AND ARRANGEMENT

OF THIS TREATISE.

Part I. Of The Intellectual Powers Of Man

1. Of Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . 7

II. Of the Powers of External Perception . . . . . . 7

ART. 1st. Of the Laws of Perception in the case of our differ ent Senses . . . . . . . . . . 7

ART. 2nd. Of Perception in general . . . . . . 11

JV. Of Conception . . . . . . . . . . . . H

VI. Of the Association of Ideas . . . . . . . . 16

VII. Of Memory 18

VIII. Of Imagination 19

IX. Of Judgment and Reasoning . . . . . . . . 20

1. Of Intuitive Evidence . . . . . . . . 20

2. Of Deductive Evidence . . . . . . . . 21

Of Intellectual Powers or Capacities, formed by particular

Habits of Study or of Business . . . . . . . . 23

CONTEXTS.

SECT. PAGE XI. Of certain auxiliary Faculties and Principles essential to our

intellectual Improvement, or intimately connected with it . . 25

2. Of the Principle of Imitation . . . . . . 27

XII. Of the Intellectual Faculties of Man, as contrasted with the

Instincts of the Brutes 28

Chapter I

Classification and Analysis of our Active and Moral Powers.

I. Of the Active Powers in general .. .. .. ..30

II. Of our Appetites . . . . . . . . . . 31

III. Of our Desires . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1. The Desire of Knowledge . . . . . . 32

2. The Desire of Society 32

3. The Desire of Esteem . . . . . . . . 33

4. The Desire of Power . . . . . . . . 31

5. The Desire of Superiority . . . . . . 36

IV. Of our Affections . . . . . . . . 37

1. Of the Benevolent Affections .. .. ..37

2. Of the Malevolent Affections . . . . . . 40

V. Of Self-love 41

VI. Of the Moral Faculty 44

ART. 1st. General Observations on the Moral Faculty ; tend ing chiefly to show that it is an original principle of our nature, and not resolvable into any other

principle or principles more simple . . . . 44

ART. 2nd. Analysis of our Moral Perceptions and Emotions . . 47

1. Of the Perception of Right and Wrong . . 48

2. Of the Agreeable and Disagreeable Emotions

ai-ising from the Perception of what is Right

and Wrong in Conduct . . . . . . 53

3. Of the Perception of Merit and Demerit . . 55 ART. 3rd. Of Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . 56

VII. Of certain Principles which co-operate with our Moral Powers

in their Influence on the Conduct . . . . . 58

1. Of Decency, or a regard to Character . . . . 53

3. Of the Sense of the Ridiculous . . . . . . Gl

4. Of lastc considered in its relation to Morals . . Gl VIII. Of Man's Free Agency .. .. .. .. ..63

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER II. Of the various Branches of our Duty

SECT. PAGE

I. Of the duties which respect the Deity . . . . . . 65

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION.

ART. 1st. Of the existence of the Deity . . . . . . 65

1. Of the Foundations of our Reasoning from the

Effect to the Cause, and of the Evidences

of Active Power exhibited in the Universe . . 66

2. Of the Evidences of Design exhibited in the

ART. 2nd. Of the Moral Attributes of the Deity . . . . 78

1. Of the Evidences of Benevolent Design in the

2. Of the Evidences of the Moral Government of

the Deity 84

ART. 3rd. Of a Future State . . . . . . . . 85

1. Of the Argument for a Future State, derived

from the Nature of Mind . . . . 86

2. Of the Evidences of a Future State, arising

from the Human Constitution, and from the Circumstances in which Man is placed . . 89

Continuation and Conclusion of SECTION I. . . . . 92

II. Of the Duties which respect our fellow-creatures . . . . 93

ART. 1st. Of Benevolence . . . . . . . . 94

1. Of Candour 97

2. Of Uprightness or Integrity . . . . 99 ART. 3rd. Of Veracity 103

III. Of the Duties which respect Ourselves . . . . . . 106

ART. 1st. General Remarks on this Class of our Duties . . 106 ART. 2nd. Of the Duty of employing the Means we possess to

promote our own Happiness . . . . . . 107

ART. 3rd. Of Happiness . . . . . . . . 109

1. Opinions of the Ancients concerning the So

vereign Good . . . . . . . . 109

2. Additional Remarks on Happiness . . . . Ill

IV. Of the different Theories which have been formed concerning

the Object of Moral Approbation . . • • . . 118

V. Of the General Definition of Virtue . . . . . . 119

VI. Of an Ambiguity in the words Right and Wrong, Virtue and

CONTENTS. 6ECT. PAGE

VII. Of the Office and Use of Reason in the Practice of Morality . . 121 APPENDIX . . 123

SUPPLEMENT.

ART.

XXVII. The Method of Inquiry Moral Philosophy

126 127

PART I.

Self -consciousness .. .. .. .. ..127

The Muscular Sense 128

The Object intuitively perceived by the Various Senses . . 128

Qualities of Matter .. .. .. .. ..129

Our Ideas of the Primary Qualities of Matter . . . . 130

The Various Forms of the Ideal Theory of Sense-Perception 130

The Seeming Deception of the Senses . . . . . . 131

The Relativity of Knowledge . . . . . . . . 132

Unconscious Mental Operations . . . . . . 133

Abstraction and Generalization . . . . . . 134

Association of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . 134

Comparison, or the Faculty of Relations . . . . 135

The Aristotelian Logic . . . . . . . . 135

Classification of the Intellectual Powers . . . . 136

PART II.

Division of the Mental Faculties Springs of Action and Emotions Different Theories of the Nature of the Moral Faculty

The Will

The Theistic Arguments The Infinite

Moral Evil

The Utilitarian Theory of Morals

Justice

Benevolence as the Ultimate End with Deity

QUESTIONS.

Introduction

PART I.— The Intellectual Powers PART II.— The Active and Moral Powers

CHAP. I. — Classification of our Active and Moral Powers CHAP. II. — The Various Branches of Duty . . . .

146 147 150 150 156

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR.

DUGALD Stewart was born in the old College Buildings, Edin burgh, on Nov. 22, 1753. He was the son of the Rev. Dr. Mathew Stewart, an eminent geometrican, and Professor of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh. At the age of eight he entered on his classical studies in the High School of Edinburgh, where he was distinguished for the elegance of his translations, and early acquired that love for the prose and poetical works of ancient Rome which continued with him through life. At the age of thirteen he commenced his studies in Edmburgh University, and among other classes, attended that of Logic under Finlayson, and that of Moral Philosophy under Adam Ferguson. In the former the text books employed were the " Elementa Philosophise "^ of Heineccius, the " Determinationes Ontologicae," of De Vries, and Wynne's " Abridgment of Locke's Essay." By the two first he was made acquainted with the philosophical questions which were discussed on the Continent posterior to the publication of the system of Descartes ; and from the other he caught the fresh observational spirit which Locke had awakened. From Adam Ferguson he acquired a taste for Moral Philosophy, and for the topics lying between ethics on the one hand, and jurisprudence on the other, which Ferguson, and after him, Stewart, were so fond of discussing. But the thinker who influenced him most, who indeed determined his whole philosophic career, was Thomas Reid, who, in a modest and homely manner, but with great patience, shrewdness, and independence, was at that time unfolding the principles of common sense, and thus undermining the scepticism of Hume and laying a solid foundation for philosophy. Reid was Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, and thither Stewart resorted in 1771, after finishing his course in Edinburgh. In 1772, when only nineteen, he became substitute for his father in the chair of mathematics in Edinburgh; and in 1775 he was elected his assistant and successor. In 1778, on Adam Ferguson's tem porary absence, he lectured for him on Morals; and in 1785, Ferguson having resigned, he was appointed to the office for which he was so specially fitted, — to the chair of Moral Philosophy

LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR.

in the University of Edinburgh. Lord Cockburn describes him as a Professor : — " His forehead was large and bald ; his eyebrows bushy, his eyes grey and intelligent, and capable of conveying any emotion from indignation to pity, from serene sense to hearty humour, in which they were powerfully aided by his lips, which, though rather large, perhaps, were flexible and expressive. The voice was singularly pleasing; and as he managed it, a slight burr only made its tones softer. His ear both for music and for speech was exquisite, and he was the finest reader I have ever heard. His gesture was simple and elegant, though not free from a tinge of professional formality, and his whole manner that of an academical gentleman. He lectured standing from notes, which, with their successive additions, must, I suppose, have been nearly as full as his spoken words. His lecturing manner was professorial but gentlemanlike, calm and expository, but rising into greatness, or softening into tenderness, whenever his subject required it ... To me his lectures were like the opening of the heavens ... I felt that I had a soul . . . His noble views, un folded in glorious sentences, elevated me into a higher world."

In his classes of Moral Philosophy and of Political Economy, or in his own house, where he kept boarders, he had under him a greater body of young men who afterwards distinguished them selves than any other teacher that we remember. Among them we have to place Lord Brougham, Lord Palmerston, Earl Itussell, Francis Horner, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Jetfery, Sir Walter Scott, Sydney Smith, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, James Mill, Sir A. Alison, and many others who have risen to great eminence in politics, in literature, or philosophy ; and most of these have acknowledged the benefit which they derived from his lectures, while some of them have carried out the social prin ciples which he inculcated into practical measures.

In 1806 his political friends in the Liberal party procured for him a sinecure office with a salary of £300 a year. In 1809 he was in a precarious state of health, much aggravated by the death of a son, and he asked Dr. Brown to lecture for him. In 1810, Brown, being strongly recommended by Stewart, was appointed conjoint professor, and henceforth discharged all the duties of his office. Stewart now lived till the close of his life at Kinniel House, Linlithgowshire. Henceforth he was chiefly employed in maturing and arranging the philosophical works which he pub lished. In 1822, he had a stroke of paralysis, from which how ever he partially recovered. He died June 11, 1828, and was ouried in the Canongate Church-yard, Edinburgh.

He appeared as an author by the publication of the first volume of his Elements in 1792, and by his Outlines of Moral Philosophy prepared as a text-book for his class in 1793 ; and from that time

LIFE AND WEITINGS OF THE AUTHOE.

till his death, he gave a new work to the press every few years. His philosophical works have had a considerable, though a silent^ influence in guiding and forming the thought of the Three King doms, and we may add the English-speaking parts of America. They have created in many quarters a taste for philosophy where none existed before, and they have helped to keep England from falling under the influence of low sensational, materialistic, and utilitarian views. Sir James Mackintosh, writing to Stewart in 1802, speaks of the want of anything which he could call purely philosophic thinking in England ; and Homer, in 1804, declares that the highest names in the estimation of those in the metropolis who felt any interest in speculative pursuits were Hobbes and Hartley. Such works as the Moral Philosophy of Paley were fitted to lower still farther, rather than elevate, this taste. It was altogether then for the benefit of English thought that Stewart became known in South Britain, where his elegant style, his crowning good sense, and the moderation of his views, recommended him to many who had imbibed as great an aversion as ever George III. had to Scotch metaphysics.

The first volume of his Elements was translated into French by Prevost of Geneva, and the other two by Peisse. His Outlines have been translated into the same tongue by Jouflroy, who pre fixed a preface of great judgment and acuteness. It is a most interesting fact that when the higher metaphysicians of France, including Royer Collard, Cousin, and Jouftroy, undertook in the early part of this century the laborious task of throwing back the tide of materialism, scepticism, and atheism, which had swept over their land, they called to their aid the sober and well-grounded philosophy of Reid and Stewart.

His works, including his Lectures on Political Economy, publish ed posthumously, have been collected in a valuable edition, super intended by Sir W. Hamilton, with an excellent Memoir of the Author, by Prof. Veitch. In this we have first his " Dissertation concerning the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters in Europe," containing a history of modern philosophy, particularly valuable for the account of British Philosophy, but very defective in the review of Kant, whose works he knew only from translations and imperfect compends, and whose philosophy he greatly undervalued. We have next the " Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," in which he unfolds the various faculties of the mind ; in the second volume explaining the nature of the fundamental laws of belief, and giving his views of Logic ; and in the third volume treating of such concrete subjects as the varieties of intellectual character, and of the peculiarities of the metaphysician, the mathematician, the poet, and the sexes. The " Philosophical Essays " follow, and dis-

LIFE ATSTD WETTINGS OF THE AUTHOR.

cuss, among other miscellaneous topics, Locke's Philosophy and the nature of Beauty. The next two volumes are on the " Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers," and are an expansion of his Outlines. We have in other two volumes his Lectures on Politi cal Economy. We have finally his Memoirs of Adam Smith, Robertson, and Ileid, containing the best accounts that we have of these eminent men, with many valuable criticisms and philoso phical reflections.

Among these works the " Outlines of Moral Philosophy," are peculiarly valuable, inasmuch as they contain in a condensed form the principles which he has unfolded and illustrated in his various philosophical treatises. In some of his other works he is deficient in directness of statement, and is too diffuse and general ; but in this little treatise he has compressed his thoughts, so characterized by the ripeness of wisdom, within as brief a compass as is consist ent with clearness, which, I may add, is a pre-eminent excellence of the work. It is one of the best text-books of mental and moral science ever written. It has not been superseded, it has not even become antiquated. To bring it up to the times it needs only a few Supplementary Notes introducing the student to discussions which have been brought into prominence by such eminent men as Kant, Sir W. Hamilton, and Mr. J. S. Mill.

OUTLINES

OF

IDEAL PHILOSOPHY,

TNTBODUCTION,

Section I

Of the Object of Philosophy, and the Method of prosecuting Philosophical Inquiries.

1. ALL the different kinds of philosophical inquiry, and all that practical knowledge which guides our conduct in life, presuppose such an established order in the succession of events, as enables us to form conjectures concerning the future from the observation of the past.

2. In the phenomena of the material world, and in many of the phenomena of mind, we expect with the most perfect confidence, that in the same combinations of circumstances the same results will take place. The laws which regulate the course of human affairs are investigated with much greater difficulty : but even in this class of events such a degree of order may frequently be traced as furnishes general rules of great practical utility ; and this order be comes the more apparent in proportion as we generalize our observations.

3. Our knowledge of the laws of nature is entirely the result of observation and experiment ; for there is no in stance in which we perceive such a necessary connection be tween two successive events, as might enable us to infer the one from the other by reasoning a priori. We find from

2 OTJTLHSTES OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY.

experience that certain events are invariably conjoined, so that when we see the one we expect the other; but our knowledge in such cases extends no further than to the fact.

4. To ascertain those established conjunctions of success ive events which constitute the order of the universe, — to record the phenomena which it exhibits to our observation, — and to refer them to their general laws, is the great business of philosophy. — Lord Bacon was the first person who was fully aware of the importance of this fundamental truth. — The ancients considered philosophy as the science of causes ; and hence were led to many speculations, to which the hu man faculties are altogether incompetent.

5. The ultimate object of philosophical inquiry is the same which every man of plain understanding proposes to himself, when he remarks the events which fall under his observa tion, with a view to the future regulation of his conduct. The more knowledge of this kind we acquire, the better can we accommodate our plans to the established order of things, and avail ourselves of natural powers and agents for accom plishing our purposes.

6. The knowledge of the philosopher differs from that sagacity which directs uneducated men in the business of life, not in kind, but in degree, and in the manner in which it is acquired. 1st, By artificial combinations of circumstances, or, in other words, by experiments, he discovers many na tural conjunctions which would not have occurred sponta neously to his observation. 2ndly, By investigating the general Laws of Nature, and by reasoning from them syn thetically, he can often trace an established order where a mere observer of facts would perceive nothing but irregu larity. — This last process of the mind is more peculiarly dignified with the name of Philosophy ; and the object of the rules of philosophizing is to explain in what manner it ought to be conducted.

7. The knowledge which is acquired of the course of Na ture by mere observation is extremely limited, and extends only to cases in which the uniformity of the observed phe nomena is apparent to our senses. This happens, either when one single law of nature operates separately, or when different laws are always combined together in the same manner. In mo it instances, however, when different laws

are combined, the result varies in every particular case, ac cording to the different circumstances of the combination ; and it is only by knowing what the laws are which are con cerned in any expected phenomenon, and by considering in what manner they modify each other's effects, that the result can be predicted.

8. Hence it follows, that the first step in the study of Philosophy is to ascertain the simple and general laws on which the complicated phenomena of the universe depend. Having obtained these laws, we may proceed safely to reason concerning the effect resulting from any given combination of them. — In the former instance, we are said to carry on our inquiries in the way of Analysis ; in the latter, in that of Synthesis.

9. To this method of philosophizing (which is commonly distinguished by the title of the Method of Induction), we are indebted for the rapid progress which physical knowledge has made since the time of Lord Bacon. The publication of his writings fixes one of the most important eras in the history of science. — Not that the reformation which has since taken place in the plan of philosophical inquiry is to be ascribed entirely to him : for although he did more to forward it than any other individual, yet his genius and writings seem to have been powerfully influenced by the circumstances and character of the age in which he lived ; and there can be little doubt that he only accelerated an event which was already prepared by many concurrent causes.

Section II

Application of the foregoing Principles to the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

10. The reformation in the -plan of philosophical inquiry which has taken place during the last two centuries, although not entirely confined to physics, has not extended in the same degree to the other branches of science ; as sufficiently appears from the prevailing scepticism with respect to the principles of metaphysics and of moral philosophy. This scepticism can only be corrected by applying to these sub jects the method of induction.

11. As all our knowledge of the material world rests ul timately on facts ascertained by observation, so all our knowledge of the human mind rests ultimately on facts for which we have the evidence of our own consciousness. An attentive examination of such facts will lead in time to the general principles of the human constitution, and will gradu ally form a science of mind not inferior in certainty to the science of body. Of this species of investigation, the works of Dr Eeid furnish many valuable examples.

12. The objections which have been stated by some writers of the present age to the conclusions of those metaphysicians who have attempted to apply the method of induction to the science of mind, are perfectly similar to the charge which was at first brought against the Newtonian doctrine of gra vitation, as being a revival of the occult qualities of the Aristotelians. — In all our inquiries, whether they relate to matter or to mind, the business of philosophy is confined to a reference of particular facts to other facts more general ; and our most successful researches must always terminate in the discovery of some law of nature, of which no explan ation can be given.

Section III

Causes of the slow Progress of Human Knowledge; more particularly of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and of the Sciences immediately connected with it.

13. Some of the chief of these may be referred to the following heads.

(1.) The imperfections of language, both as an instrument of thought and a medium of communication.

(2.) Mistakes about the proper object of philosophy, and the method of prosecuting philosophical inquiries.

(3.) A disposition to grasp at general principles, without submitting to the previous study of particular facts.

(4.) Difficulty of ascertaining facts, particularly in the sciences immediately connected with the philosophy of the human mind.

(5.) The great part of life which is spent in making use less literary acquisitions.

(G.) Prejudices arising from a reverence for great names, and from the influence of local institutions.

(7.) A predilection for singular or paradoxical opinions. (8.) A disposition to unlimited scepticism.

SUBJECT AND ARRANGEMENT OP THIS TREATISE.

1. THE object of Moral Philosophy is to ascertain the ge neral rules of a wise and virtuous conduct in life, in so far as these rules may be discovered by the unassisted light of nature, that is, by an examination of the principles of the human constitution, and of the circumstances in which man is placed.

2. In examining the principles of our constitution with this view, our inquiries may be arranged under three heads ; according as they refer,

(1.) To the intellectual powers of man. (2.) To his active and moral powers. And (3.) To man, considered as the member of a political body.

3. Of these articles, the two first coincide with the com mon division of human nature into the powers of the Tlnder-

x^ standing and those of the Will ; a division of great antiquity, , v^and which (abstracting from the effects of political institu tions) exhausts the whole of Moral Philosophy. As man, however, excepting in his rudest state, has been always found connected with a political community, the principles which lay the foundation of this species of union may be regarded as universal and essential principles of our constitution; and, without an examination of them, it is impossible for us to have a just idea of our situation in the world, and of the most important duties we owe to our fellow-creatures. This last branch of the subject has, besides, a more intimate con nection with the other two than might at first be appre hended : for it is in the political union, and in the gradual improvement of which it is susceptible, that nature has made a provision for a gradual development of our intellectual and moral powers, and for a proportional enlargement in our capacities of enjoyment ; and it is by the particular forms of their political institutions, that those opinions and habits which constitute the Manners of nations are chiefly de termined. How intimately these are connected with the progress and the happiness of the race will appear in the sequel.