Philosophical essays

Front matter

Jtv'

« W'V

V fi-

Chapter II. ... . . . 23

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART I.

ESSAY FIRST. — On Locke's Account of the sources of Human Knowledge, and its influence on the doctrines of some of his successors, -.. - - - -"65

CHAPTER I.— Introductory Observations, - 65

CHAPTER II. — Inconsistency of our conclusions in the . foregoing chapter, with Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge, -------73

CHAPTER III — Influence of Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge on the speculations of various eminent writers since his time, more particularly on those of Berkeley and Hume, - - - _ 84

CHAPTER IV.— ^The same subject continued, - 95 ESSAY SECOND.— On the Idealism of Berkely, - 105

CHAPTER I. — On some prevailing mistakes with respect to the import and aim of the Berkeleian system, 105 CHAPTER II.— Section 1— On the foundation of our belief of the existence of the material world, according to the statement of Reid. — Strictures on that

statement, -- 122

Section 2. — Continuation of the subject. — Indistinctness of the line drawn by Reid, as well as by Des Cartes and Locke, between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter. — Distinction between the primary ^lualities of matter, a.nd its mathematical affections, 136

b

X CONTENTS.

ESSAY THIRD. — On the influence of Locke's authority upon the Philosophical systems which prevailed in France during the latter part of the eighteenth century, _ - . 145

ESSAY FOURTH.— On the metaphysical Theories of Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin, - - - - - 166

ESSAY FIFTH. — On the tendency of some late Philological

speculations, - - - - - - - - 181

Chapter IV. 216

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART XL

ESSAY FIRST.— On the Beautiful, - - - - 231 Introduction, .-.- - ---231

Paut First. — On the Beautiful, when presented immediately to our senses, . - - . . . 234

CHAPTER I. — General observations on the subject of inquiry, and on the plan upon which it is proposed to examine it, - - - - . - . 234

CHAPTER II. — Progressive Generalizations of the word Beauty, resulting from the natural progress of the mind. Beauty of colours — of forms — of motion.' — Combinations of these. — Uniformity in works of art. — Beauty of nature, --._..■. 249

CHAPTER III. — Remarks on some of Mr. Burke's principles which do not agree with the foregoing conclusions, - - 262

CHAPTER IV. — Continuation of the critical strictures on Mr. Burke's fundamental principles concerning Beauty. — Influence of these principles on the speculations of Mr. Price, 269

CHAPTER V. — Continuation of the same subject, 280

CHAPTER VI — Of the application of the theory of Association to Beauty. — Farther generalizations of this word, in consequence of the influence of the associating principle, -..,.-, 297

CONTENTS. xi

CHAPTER VII. — Continuation of the subject. — Objections to a theory of Beauty proposed by Father Buffier and Sir Joshua Reynolds, - - - - 315

Part Second. — On the Beautiful, when presented to the power of Imagination - 323 ESSAY SECOND.— On the Sublime, .... 340

Preface, 340

CHAPTER I.— Of Sublimity, in the literal sense of the

CHAPTER II. — Generalizations of the word Sublimity, in consequence of the influence of religious associations, 358

CHAPTER III. — Generalizations of Sublimity in consequence of associations resulting from the phenomena of gravitation, and from the other physical arrangements with which our senses are conversant, 373

I

CHAPTER IV.— .Confirmation of the foregoing theory from the natural signs of Sublime emotion. — Reciprocal influence of these signs on the associations which suggest them, - - 394

CHAPTER V. — Inferences from the foregoing doctrines, with some additional illustrations, ... 400

ESSAY THIRD— On Taste, 410

CHAPTER I. — General observations on our acquired powers of judgment. — x\pplication of these to the subject of this Essay, - 410

CHAPTER II. — Gradual progress by which Taste is

formed, 421

CHAPTER III.— Diff'erent Modifications of Taste.— Distinction between Taste and the natural sensibility to Beauty, ......-- 444

CHAPTER IV. — Continuation of the subject. — Specific pleasure connected with the exercise of Taste. — Fastidiousness of Taste. — Miscellaneous remarks on this power, considered in its connection with character and happiness, -.._..- 457

ESSAY FOURTH.— On the culture of certain intellectual habits connected with the first elements of Taste, - 475 xii' CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I. — Dependence of Taste on a relish foi- the pleasures of imagination. — Remarks on the prevailing idea, that these are to be enjoyed in perfection, in youth alone, ------- - 475

CHAPTER n. — Continuation of the subject. — Reply to an objection founded on the supposed vigour of imagination in the earlier periods of society, - - 495 Notes and Illustrations, - - - . - - 507

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Chapter First

1 HE chief aim of the following dissertation is, to correct some prevailing mistakes with respect to the Philosophy of the Human Mind. In the introduction to a former Work, I have enlarged, at considerable length, upon the same subject; but various publications which have since appeared, incline me to think, that, in resuming it here, I undertake a task not altogether superfluous.

Of the remarks which I am now to state, a few have a particular reference to the contents of this volume. Odiers are intended to clear the way for a different series of discussions, which I hope to be able, at some future period, to present to the public.

I. In the course of those speculations on the Mind, to which I have already referred, and with which, I trust, that my present readers are not altogether unacquainted, I have repeatedly had occasion to observe, that " as our *' notions both of matter and of mind are merely relative; " as we know the one only by such sensible qualities as " extension, figure, and solidity, and the other by such *' operations as sensation, thought, and volition; we are *' certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, consi- ** deredas Objects of Human Study ^ are essentially diflfer^

A

2 rRELIMINAUY DISSERTATION. [Chap. 1.

* ent; the science of the former resting ultimately on ' phenomena exhibited to our senses, that of the latter

* on phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, ' therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism, ' that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate ' to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on

* a misapprehension of the extent and the limits of genu-

* ine science; the difficulty, which it professes to remove, ' being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our facul- ' ties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of ' that principle, which feels, and thinks, and wills, by ' saying, that it is a material substance, or that it is the ' result of material organization, we impose on ourselves

* by words; forgetting that matter, as well as mind, is ' known to us by its qualities alone, and that we are

* equally ignorant of the essence of either."

In the farther prosecution of the same argument, I have attempted to show, that the legitimate province of this department of philosophy extends no farther than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of observation and experiment; and I have, accordingly, in my own inquiries, aimed at nothing more, than to ascertain, in the first place, the Laws of our Constitution, as far as they can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our consciousness; and afterwards to apply these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phenomena of the understanding. It is on this plan I have treated of the association of ideas, of memory, of imagination, and of various other intellectual powers; imitating, as far as I was able, in my reasonings, the example of those who are allowed to have cultivated the study of Natural Philosophy with the greatest success. ThePhysiological Theories

Chap. I] J'KELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 3

which profess to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibrations, and other changes in the state of the sensor turn, if they are not ahogether hypothetical and visionary, cannot be considered, even by their warmest advocates, as resting on the same evidence with those conclusions which are open to the examination of all men capable of exercising the power of Reflection; and, therefore, scientific distinctness requires, that these two different classes of propositions should not be confounded together under one common name. For my own part, I have no scruple to say, that I consider the physiological problem in question, as one of those which are likely to remain for ever among the arcana of nature; nor am I afraid of being contradicted by any competent and candid judge, how sanguine soever may be his hope$ concerning the progress of future discovery, when I assert, that it has hitherto eluded completely all the efforts which have been made towards its solution. As to the metaphysical romances above alluded to, they appear to me, after all the support and illustration which they have received from the ingenuity of Hartley, of Priestley, and of Darwin, to be equally unscientific in the design, and uninteresting in the execution; destitute, at once, of the sober charms of Truth, and of those imposing attractions, which Fancy, when united to Taste, can lend to Fiction. In consequence of the unbounded praise which I have heard bestowed upon them, I have repeatedly begun the study of them anew, suspecting that I might be under the influence of some latent and undue prejudice against this new mode of philosophizing, so much in vogue at present in England; but notwithstanding the strong predilection which I have always felt for such pursuits, my

4 , PllELLAnNAllY DISSERTATION. LCIiap. I.

labour has uniformly ended in a sentiment of regret, at the time and attention which I had misemployed in so hopeless and so ungrateful a task.

Mr. Locke, although he occasionally indulges himself in hints and conjectures, somewhat analogous to those of Hartley and Darwin, seems to have been perfectly aware how foreign such speculations are to the genuine Philosophy of the Human Mind. The following are his own words, in the second paragraph of the Introduction to his Essay: — " This, therefore, being my purpose, to in- " quire into the original, certainty, and extent of human *' knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of *' belief, opinion, and assent, I shall not, at present, med- " die with the physical consideration of the mind, or *' trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence con- " sists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alteration of " our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our or- " gans, or any ideas of our understandings; and whether " these ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, " depend on matter or not. These are speculations, " which, however curious and entertaining, I shall de- " cline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now *' upon." It is much to be wished, that Mr. Locke had adhered invariably to this wise resolution.

I flatter myself it will not be inferred, from the manner in which I have expressed myself with respect to the common theories of physiologists about the causes of the intellectual phenomena, that I entertain any doubt of the intimate connection which exists between these phenomena and the organization of the body. The great principle which I am anxious to inculate, is, that all the theories w^hich have yet been offered on this subject, are entirely

Chap. 1.3 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 5

unsupported by proof; and what is worse, are of such a kind, that it is neither possible to confirm nor to refute them, by an appeal to experiment or observation. That I was all along fully aware of the dependence, in our present state, of our mental operations on the sound condition of our corporeal frame, appears sufficiently from what I remarked, many years ago, concerning the laws of this connection between mind and body, as presenting one of the most interesting objects of examination connected with the theory of human nature.*

I have been induced to caution my Readers against the possibility of such a misapprehension of my meaning, by the following passage in a late publication: " What that *' affection of the brain is," (says Mr Belsham) " which, ** by the constitution of human nature, causes Memory, *' we cannot absolutely ascertain. The hypothesis of Fi- *' brations, which has already been explained, is the most " probable. It is trifling to object, that if the existence of " impressions on the brain could be proved. Memory " would remain as unaccountable as before: all which " this hypothesis pretends to, is to advance a step in tra- " cing the process of the connection between external ob- " jects and mental feelings." — " It is curious to observe," (the same author continues) " that Dr. Reid, after start- *' ing several objections against the commonly received " hypotheses, is obliged to admit, that ' many well-knbwn " facts lead us to conclude, that a certain constitution or ' " state of the brain is necessary to Memory."

On this passage I shall offer only two remaks. The first is, that, notwithstanding Mr. Belsham's zeal for Hartley's

* Philosophy of the Human Mind, pp. II, 12, 3d ed.

6 PKELIMINARY DISSERTATION. [Chap. L

Theory' of Vibrations, he confesses explicitly, that " we " cannot absolutely ascertain, what that affection of the *' brain is, which, by the constitution of human nature, " causes memory;'* and that, " the theory of Vibrations, " though more probable than some others, is still but an " hypothesis." Secondly, that Mr, Belsham, after making this explicit acknowledgment, is nevertheless pleased to insinuate, that all who presume to object to this particular hypothesis, are bound by their own principles to assert, that memory has no dependence wliatever on the state of the brain. Where the inconsistency lies in Dr. Reid's admission, that a certain constitution or state of the brain is necessary to memory, after he had stated some objections against the commonly received theories, I am at a loss to discover. Indeed, I should be glad to know, what philosopher, ancient or modern, has ever yet asserted, that memory is not liable to be injured by such affections of the brain as are produced by intemperance, disease, old age, and other circumstances which disturb the bodily mechanism. The philosophical inference, however, from this concession is, not that the hypothesis of Dr. Hartley, or the hypothesis of Mr. Belsham must necessarily be true; but that, laying aside all hypotheses, we should apply ourselves to collect such facts as may lead us, in due time, to the only satisfactory conclusions we have much chance of ever forming concerning the connection between mind and body — the discovery of some of the general laws by which this conqection is regulated.

In offering these strictures on the physiological metaphysics of the present day, it is proper for me, at the same time, to observe, that I object to it merely as an idle waste of labour and ingenuity, on questions to which tlie human qhap. I] PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 7

faculties are altogether incompetent; and not because I consider any of the theories, to which it has given birth, as standing in the way of my own doctrines. The facts which I wish to ascertain rest on their own proper evidence;— an evidence which would remain entire and unshaken, although a demonstration should be produced in favour of the animal spirits of Des Cartes, or of the Vibrations of Hartley; and which would not gain the slightest accession of strength, if both these hypotheses were to fall into the contempt they deserve. The circumstance which peculiarly characterizes the inductive Science of the Mind is, that it professes to abstain from all speculations concerning its nature and essence; confining the attention entirely to phenomena, which every individual has it in his power to examine for himself, who chooses to exercise the powers of his understanding. In this respect, it differs equally in its scope, from the pneumatological discussions concerning the seat of the Soul, and the possibility or the impossibility of its bearing any relation to Space or to Time, which so long gave employment to the subtility of the schoolmen; — and from the physiological hypotheses which have made so much noise at a later period, concerning the mechanical causes on which its operations depend. Compared with the first, it differs, as the inquiries of Galileo concerning the laws of moving bodies differ from the disputes of the ancient sophists concerning the existence and the nature of motion. Compared with the other, the difference is analogous to what exists between the conclusions of Newton about the law of gravitation, and his query concerning the invisible ether, of which he supposed it might possibly be the effect. — It may be worth while to add, in passing, that the diversity, of opinion among New ton's followers, with respect to the verisimilitude of this query, while they have unanimously acquiesced in the physical conclusions of their master, affords an instructive proof, how little the researches of inductive science are liable to be influenced by the wanderings of Imagination, in those regions which human reason is not permitted to explore. Whatever our opinion concerning the unknown physical or metaphysical cause of gravitation may be, our reasonings concerning the system of nature will be equally just, provided only we admit the general fact, that bodies tend to approach each other with a force varying with their mutual distances, according to a certain law. The case is precisely similar with respect to those conclusions concerning the mind, to which we are fairly led by the method of Induction. They rest upon a firm and indisputable basis of their own; and (as I have elsewhere remarked) are equally compatible with the metaphysical creeds of the Materialist and of the Berkeleian. *

* The hypothesis which assumes the existence of a subtle fluid in the nerves, propagated by their means from the brain to the different parts of the body, is of great antiquity; and is certainly less repugnant to ihe general analogy of our frame, than that by which it lias been supplanted. How very generally it once prevailed, may be inferred from the adoption into common speech of the phrase animal sfiiritu, to denote that unknown cause which " gives vigour or cheerfulness to the mind;" — a phrase for which our language does not, at this day, afford a convenient substitute. The late Dr. Alexander Monro (one of the most cautious and judicious of medical inquirers) speaks of it as a fact which appeared to him to be almost indisputable. " The " existence of a liquid in the cavities of the nerves, is supported by " little short of demonstrative evidence." (See some observations of his, published by Cheselden in his Anatomy.)

The hypothesis of Vibrations first attracted public notice in the writings of Dr. William Briggs. It was from him tlpt Sir Isaac Newton derived his anatomical knowledge; along with which he ap-

-ChaJ). I.] PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 9

II. Intimately connected with the physiological hypothesis of the Hartleian school, is their metaphysical theory of Association, from which single principle they boast to have explained synthetically all the phenomena of the mind. In Dr. Priestley's Remarks on Reid's Inquiry, there is an attempt to turn into ridicule, by what the author calls a Table of Dr. Reid's Instinctive Principles, the application of the Inductive Logic to these phenomena. How far this Table is faithfully extracted from Dr. Reid's book, it is unnecessary for me to consider at present.* Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the Twelve Principles enumerated by Priestley had been actually stated by his antagonist as instinctive principles, or as ^^- nerallaws of our nature^ it is difficult to see for what reason the enumeration should be regarded as absurd, or even as unphilosophical, after the explanation given by Reid himself of the sense in which he wished his conclusions to be understood.

*' The most general phenomena we can reach ^ are " what we call Laws of Nature. So that the laws of na» ** ture are nothing else but the most general facts relating *' to the operations of nature, which include a great many " particular facts under them. And, if, in any case, we

pears plainly, from his Queries, to have imbibed also some of the physiological theories of his preceptor.

In the Monthly Review for 1808, 1 observe the following passage: " For the partiality which he (Dr. Cogan) shews to Dr. Reid, we *' may easily account, as being a just tribute to the ingenuity and " industry of that writer, and to the numerous valuable observations '' which enrich his works, imconnected with his crude hypothesis on " the sxibject of the Human Mind." In what part of Dr. Reid's writings is this crude hypothesis proposed?

* The reader will be enabled to form a judgment on this point? by the Note (**) at the end of t!ws Volume.

B

10 PREUMINAUY DlSSEfelATION. [Chap. I-

** should give the name of a law of nature to a general *' phenomenon, which human industry shall afterwards *' trace to one more general, there is no great harm done, " The most general assumes the name of a law of nature *' when it is discovered; and the less general is contained *^' and comprehended in it."*

In another part of his work, he has introduced the same remark. *' The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the " thread too fine, to be traced dirough all its windings; *' but if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and '' secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm *' done; a quicker eye may in time trace it farther."!

In reply to these passages, Priestley observes, that " the suspicion that w-e are got to ultimate principles, -' necessarily checks all farther inquiry, and is therefore " of great disservice in philosophy. Let Dr. Reid (he *^' continues) lay his hand upon his breast, and say, whe- " ther, after what he has VvTitten, he would not be exceed- " ingly mortified to find it clearly proved, to the satisfac- " tion of all the world, that all the instinctive principles " in the preceding Table were really acquired; and that " all of them were nothing more than so many different " cases of tlie old and well-known principle of Associa- " tion of Ideas y

With respect to the probability of this supposition, I have nothing to add to what I have stated on the same head, in the Philosophy of the Human Mind; " that, in ** all the other sciences, the progress of discovery has " been gradual, from the less general to the more general " laws of nature; and that it would be singular indeed, if,

* Reid's Inquiry, p. 223, 3d ed. t P. \-

Chap.t] PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. li

*' in this science, which but a few years ago Was confesS" " ediy in its infancy, and which certainly labours under *' many disadvantages peculiar to itself, a step should all *' at once be made to a single principle, comprehending *' all the particular phenomena which we know."*

As the order established in the intellectual world seems to be regulated by laws perfectly analogous to those which we trace among the phenomena of the material system; and as, in all our philosophical inquiries (to whatever subject they may relate) the progress of the mind is liable to be affected by the same tendency to a premature generalization, the following extract from an eminent chemical writer may contribute to illustrate the scope, and to confirm the justness of some of the foregoing reflections*

'• Within the last fifteen or twenty years, several new *' metals, and new earths, have been made known to " the world. The names that support these discoveries *' are respectable, and the experiments decisive. If we " do not give our assent to them, no single proposition *' in chemistry can for a moment stand. But whether " all th^se are really simple substances, or compounds *' not yet resolved into their elements, is what the authors ** themselves cannot possibly assert; nor would it, in the *' least, diminish the merit of their observations, if future *' experiments should prove them to have been mistaken, " as to the simplicity of these substances. This remark " should not be confined to later discoveries; it may as '' justly be applied to those earths and metals with which " we have been long acquainted."--^" In the dark ages '* of chemistry, the object was to rival nature; and the

* Elements, &c. p. 398 (3d edition), where I have enlarged on this point at some length .

12 PRELIMINARY DISSERT ATIOJ^. [Chap. I.

'* substance which the adepts of those days were b'^sied " to create, was universally allowed to be simple. In a " more enlightened period, we have extended our inqui- " ries, and multiplied the number of the elements. The *' last task will be to simplify; and, by a closer obser- " vation of nature, to learn from what a small store of *' primitive materials, all that we behold and wonder at " was created."*

This analogy between the history of chemistry and that of tlie philosophy of the human mind, which has often struck myself in contrasting the views of the Alchemists with those of Lavoisier and his followers, has acquired much additional value and importance in my estimation, since I had the pleasure to peruse a late work of M. De Gerando; in which I find, that the same analogy has presented itself to that most judicious philosopher, and has been applied by him to the same practical purpose, of exposing the false pretensions and premature generalizations of some modern metaphysicians.

" It required nothing less than the united splendour of " the discoveries brought to light by the new chemical " school, to tear the minds of men from the pursuit of a " simple and primary element; a pursuit renewed in every " age with an indefatigable perseverance, and always re- " newed in vain. With what feelings of contempt would " the physiologists of former times have looked down on " the chemists of the present age, whose timid and cir- " cumscribed system admits nearly forty different priii-

* Inquiries concerning the nature of a metallic substance, lately sold in London as a new Metal, under the title of Palladium. By Rich. Chencvix, Esq.

"Chap. L] PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 13

" ciples in the composition of bodies! What a subject of " ridicule would the new nomenclature have afforded to ** an Alchemist!"

" The Philosophy of Mind has its Alchemists also;— ** men whose studies are directed to the pursuit of one " single principle, into which the whole science may be " resolved; and who flatter themselves with the hope of ** discovering the grand secret, by Which the pure gold of " Truth may be produced at pleasure."*

Among these Alchemists in the science of mindj the first place is undoubtedly due to Dr. Hartley, who not only attempts to account for all the phenomena of human nature, from the single principle o^ Association^ combined with the hypothetical assumption of an invisible fluid or ether^ producing Vibrations in the medullary substance of the brain and nerves; but indulges his imagination in anticipating an sera, " when future generations shall put *' all kinds of evidences and inquiries into mathemetical " forms; reducing Aristotle's ten categories, and Bishop " Wilkins' forty samma genera^ to the head of Quantity ** alone, so as to make mathematics and logic, natural ** history and civil history, natural philosophy, and philo- " sophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte t''"' If I had never read another sentence of this author, I should have required no farther evidence of the unsoundness of his understanding.

It is however, on such rash and unwarranted assertions as this, combined with the supposed comprehensiveness of his metaphysical views, that the peculiar merits of Hartley seem now to be chiefly rested by the more en-

* De Geramlo, Hist, des Systemes, torn. 11. pp. 481, 482,

14 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION?. [Ch«p T.

lightened of his admirers. Most of these, at least whom I lia^e happened to converse with, have spoken of his physiological doctrines as but of little value, compared with the wonders which he has accomplished by a skilful use of the Associating Principle. On this head, therefore, I must request the attention of my readers to a few short remarks.

III. Of the most celebrated theorists who have appeared since the time of Lord Ba(y)n, by far the greater part have attempted to attract notice, by displaying their ingenuity in deducing, from some general principle or law, already acknowledged by philosophers, an immense variety of particular phenomena. For this purpose, they have frequently found themselves under a necessity of giving a false gloss to facts, and sometimes of totally misrepresenting them; a practice which has certainly contributed much to retard the progress of experimental knowledge; but which, at the same time, must be allowed (at least iii Physics) to have, in some cases, prepared the way for sounder conclusions. The plan adopted by Hartley is very different from this, and incomparably more easy in the execution. The generalizations which he has attempted are merely verbal; deriving whatever speciousness they may possess, from the unprecedented latitude given to the meaning of common terms. After telling us, for example, that " all our internal feelings, excepting our sen- *' sations, may be called ideas;'''' and giving to the word Association a corresponding vagueness in its import, he seems to have flattered himself, that he had resolved into one single law% all the various phenomena, both intellectual and moral, of the human mind. What advantage, either theoretical or practical, do we reap from this pre-