Elements of the philosophy of the human mind

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ELEMENTS

OF THE

Preface

Though Dugald Stewart has not added many new truths to the Philosophy of Mind, and has hardly attempted to solve its more abstruse and intricate problems, he has done much to render it intelligible, popular, and useful. He is a great master of clear, harmonious, and ornate diction, which often rises into eloquence, and never fails to impart interest and animation to the least promising portions of his subject. But refined taste and elegant scholarship are among the least of his merits ; the doctrines which he inculcates are those of vigorous common sense and sound morality, never deformed by a love of paradox, and never compromising the interests of truth by straining after novelty, or by unseasonable attempts to appear ingenious and profound. The principles of social order and good government, and the great interests of virtue and religion, were never more impressively taught, or eloquently defended, than by this professor of Scotch metaphysics, who had the honor to reckon among his pupils many who have since attained the highest distinction in the walks of science, literature, and statesmanship. His writings, though he modestly says of them that they are " professedly elementary," have been more generally studied than those of any English author upon the same subject during the last half century ; and it is a striking proof of their merits, and of the spirit of candor and amiability which is manifested in them, that they have never been assailed by harsh

PREFACE.

or vindictive criticism. Those who controverted his opinions have always spoken of him with much respect, while his disciples appear to have regarded him, especially towards the close of his long and useful life, with affectionate veneration.

His principal work, " The Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," has been frequently republished in this country, and has been much used as a text-book of instruction in metaphysical science in our colleges and schools. When applied to such a purpose, however, it must be admitted that it has many redundancies and some defects. The style, with all its merits, is somewhat diffuse, the digressions are numerous, and the illustrations and citations from other authors, more copious than the subject requires, or than the patience of the reader will always warrant. I have pruned these superfluities with great freedom, my purpose being to leave the statement of doctrine and the course of the argument encumbered with no more extraneous matter than seemed necessary for the entertainment of the pupil. Mr. Stewart's caution in the statement of his opinions may appear excessive, and it occasionally betrays him into vagueness of expression and a kind of indirect style, which leaves his meaning to be ascertained rather by inference, than from the obvious import of the language. He also takes for granted the reader's acquaintance with the writings and opinions of his more celebrated contemporaries and predecessors, thus leaving many blanks to be filled by those who are not particularly conversant with philosophical studies. I have endeavored to supply some of these deficiencies in the notes ; but wishing not to swell the dimensions of the book, and at the same time to make it contain as much as possible of Stewart's own speculations, I have preferred silently to omit those passages which stood in great need of annotation, instead of introducing them with a commentary which should seem disproportioned in amount to the text. But these abridgments have been very carefully made, and I hope it will be found that they do not mar the continuity of the work, or leave any gaps which may create obscurity.

I'KEFACE. V

Whatever I have added to this edition, either in the text or the notes, is inclosed in angular brackets, [ ], so that the reader may easily distinguish Mr. Stewart's words from those of his commentator. For the convenience both of teachers and learners, I have also given a sort of analysis and abstract of the doctrines and arguments of the author, by prefixing to many of the paragraphs a brief statement, in italic type, of the subject to which it relates, or of the point which it is designed to prove. These headings of the sections are not inclosed in brackets, being sufficiently indicated by their nature, and by the change of type. Italics have also been freely used in the body of the work, in order to direct the student's attention to the particular words or sentences which contain the gist of the paragraph ; — a precaution which diffuse and digressive writers may often profitably adopt, in order that their readers may never be at a loss to know what they are driving at.

The first portion of Mr. Stewart's " Elements " was published in 1792 ; and " after an interval of more than twenty years," he presented to the public the second volume. It was less successful than its predecessor, as the subject of which it treats is more abstruse and forbidding than the former theme, and not so well adapted to the author's peculiar tastes and powers. The researches and speculations of later writers, moreover, especially of Sir John Herschel, Mr. J. S. Mill, and Dr. Whewell, have deprived this later volume, in great part, of the interest and importance which it formerly possessed. I have, therefore, made comparatively little use of it in this abridgment, omitting the latter half of it altogether, and striking out large portions of the first two chapters. Mr. Stewart's own annotations, a double tier of which accompanies, and almost exceeds in quantity, the text, have also been diligently winnowed and bolted, so that they are reduced to a small portion of their primitive bulk. Translations are given of the Latin, Greek, and French citations, the original being often removed to make room for them.

The following extract from Mr. Stewart's Preface to his second volume, is a sufficient indication of the pur-

VI PREFACE.

pose for which this abridgment of the whole work has been prepared. The book, he says, " is more particularly intended for the use of academical students ; and is offered to them as a guide or assistant, at that important stage of their progress when, the usual course of discipline being completed, an inquisitive mind is naturally led to review its past attainments, and to form plans for its future improvement. In the prosecution of this design, I have not aimed at the establishment of new theories ; far less have I aspired to the invention of and new organ for the discovery of truth. My principal object is to aid my readers in unlearning the scholastic errors which, in a greater or less degree, still maintain their ground in our most celebrated seats of learning; and by subjecting to free, but I trust, not skeptical discussion, the more enlightened though discordant systems of modern logicians, to accustom the understanding to the unfettered exercise of its native capacities. That several of the views opened in the following pages appear to myself original, and of some importance, I will not deny ; but the reception these may meet with, I shall regard as a matter of comparative indifference, if my labors be found useful in training the mind to those habits of reflection on its own operations, which may enable it to superadd to the instructions of the schools, that higher education which no schools can bestow."

"While these sheets were passing through the press, the second volume of Sir William Hamilton's very handsome edition of "The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart" was received in this country. It contains the first volume of " Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," corresponding to the first seven chapters of the present work. I have examined it with care, in the hope of finding some new matter which might be added to this volume. But this hope was disappointed. The additions are insignificant in extent and importance ; they wouid not fill a page, and consist merely of some additional references and brief citations from other authors. Indeed, Sir William Hamilton says in the Preface, " there has been nothing added by me, in

PREFACE. Vll

the view of vindicating, of supplementing or confirming, of qualifying or criticising, Mr. Stewart's doctrines." He also remarks, that though the volume was often reprinted during the author's lifetime, after the second edition in 1802, " no alteration or amplification, — none certainly of any consequence, has been hitherto incorporated" with it. Some "intended additions were indeed supplied," when the third volume was published, in 1827 ; and he observes that " these have only now been entered in their proper places." Of course, he here refers only to editions published in Great Britain ; as these additions were " entered in their proper places " in an American edition published several years ago, from which the present volume was printed. As the Preface states that Mr. Stewart was not satisfied with the translations of quotations not in English, which were made for the Boston edition of 1821, it is proper to add, that these quotations have been translated anew for this volume. They are not translated at all in Sir William Hamilton's edition.

Cambridge, September 25, 1854.

Contents

PAOS

Part I. Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind 1 II. Utility of the Philosophy of the Human Mind . . .11

CHAPTER I. Or the Powers of External Perception . . . .30

Sect. I. Theories formed by Philosophers to explain the manner in

which the Mind perceives external Objects . . .30

II. Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the Subject of Perception 38

III. Of the Origin of our Knowledge 44

CHAPTER IV. Of Abstraction 92

Sect. I. General Observations on this Faculty of the Mind . . 92 II. Objects of our Thoughts, when we employ general terms 97

III. Remarks on the opinions of some modern Philosophers on

the subject of the foregoing Section . . . .112

IV. Inferences with respect to the Use of Language as an In-

strument of Thought, and the Errors in Reasoning to which it occasionally gives rise . . . .125

X CONTENTS.

Sect. V. Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and

Generalization are subservient 129

VI. Of the Errors to which we are liable in consequence of a

rash Application of general Principles . . . .137 VII. Differences in the Characters of Individuals arising from

different Habits of Abstraction and Generalization . 143

Part I. Of the Influence of Association in regulating

the Succession of our Thoughts . . .151

Sect. I. General Observations on this Part of our Constitution . 151 II. Of the Principles of Association among our Ideas . . 160

III. Of the Power which the Mind has over the Train of its

Thoughts 165

IV. Illustrations of this Doctrine 169

1. Of Wit 169

2. Of Rhyme 173

3. Of Poetical Fancy .177

4. Of Invention in the Arts and Sciences . . . 181 V. Application of the Principles stated in the foregoing Sections, to explain the Phenomena of Dreaming . . 1 88

Part II. Of the Influence of Association on the Intellectual and on the Active Powers . . . 208

Sect. I. Of the Influence of casual Associations on our speculative

Conclusions 208

II. Of the Influence of the Association of Ideas on our Judgments in Matters of Taste 227

III. Of the Influence of Association on our active Principles

and on our moral Judgments 239

IV. General Remarks on the foregoing Subjects . . 248

CHAPTER VI. Of Memory . 254

Sect. I. General Observations on Memory 254

II Of the Varieties of Memory in different Individuals . 269 HI. Of the Improvement of Memory 290

CONTENTS. XI

Sect. IV. Of the Aid which the Memory derives from Philosophical

Arrangement 295

V. Effects of committing to Writing our acquired Knowledge 304

VI. Of Artificial Memory 311

VII. Importance of making a proper Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, in order to derive Advantage from the Acquisitions of Memory . . . .315

VIII. Of the Connection between Memory and Genius . . 323

CHAPTER VII. Of Imagination 330

Sect. I. Analysis of Imagination 330

II. Imagination considered in its Relation to the Fine Arts . 337

III. Relation of Imagination and of Taste to Genius . . 349

IV. Influence of Imagination on Character and Happiness . 351 V. Inconveniences resulting from an ill-regulated Imagination 357

VI. Uses to which the Power of Imagination is subservient . 367

CHAPTER VIII. Of Reason 372

Sect. I. On the Vagueness and Ambiguity of Philosophical Lan

guage relative to this part of our Constitution . 372

II. Of Mathematical Axioms 380

III. Laws of Belief connected with the exercise of Consciot*

ness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning . s±2

CHAPTER IX. Of Reasoning and of Deductive Evidence . . . iOf

Sect. I. 1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between *b ;

Powers d"f Intuition and of Reasoning . . . 40f 2. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction oft#,

mistaken for Intuitive Judgments . . . ilO

II. Of General Reasoning 415

III. Of Mathematical Demonstration .... 423

IV. Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent Truths . 456

Introduction

PART I.

OF THE NATURE AND OBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

Why the Philosophy of the Human Mind has hitherto made little progress. — The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes : First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties ; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life.

The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions ; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics,* there are some, which are essentially

* [The term Physics comprehends the various branches of Physical or Natural Philosophy, such as Chemistry, Mechanics, Astronomy, Botany, etc. It properly denotes the science of things actually existing, whether thone distinguished from the rest, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts ; and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed the little progress which has hitherto been made in the philosophy of the human mind ; — a science so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen.

In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which I propose to investigate ; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applications of which they are susceptible.

things are material or immaterial ; but it is usually confined to things material, and thus signifies the science of the external world. After Aristotle had written books upon various branches of Physics, he composed certain other treatises, to which he gave the name of Metaphysics, Or things coming after Physics. In its widest signification, therefore, the term Metaphysics comprehends every study or science which does not belong to Physics. It is the science of pure ideas, or of abstract and universal truths ; the objects of this science lie beyond the range of the senses, and are not attainable by experience. That every event must have a cause — that qualities or attributes presuppose a substance in which they inhere — that the human will is free, etc., are propositions which belong to Metaphysics. By many writers, however, the word Metaphysics is loosely applied to denote the Philosophy of Mind. Such a Philosophy treats of the Association of Ideas, Memory, Attention, and other phenomena of mind ; and as it consists only in collecting facts and making inductions, it is properly an experimental science, and ought to be ranked under the head of Physics rather than of Metaphysics. Psychology is the latest term in use to denote the science of mental phenomena, while Physics, in its narrower signification, comprehends only material phenomena ; the one is the philosophy of mind, the other is the philosophy of matter.]

Our notions both of Matter and Mind are merely relative. — The notion we annex to the words, matter and mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Eeid, (in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man,) are merely relative. If I am asked, what I mean by matter ? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, colored, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold ; — that is, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses ; but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition ; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being ; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of its organs.

Proof of the separate existence of Mind. — From these considerations, it appears, that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body ; nay, it there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it ; inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness,* and the other merely

* [ Consciousness is usually denned to be the notice which the mind takes of its own operations. If I think or remember, I know, or am conscious, that I think or remember ; if I am pained or pleased, I know that I am so pained or pleased. Thus, Consciousness is the witness or reporter of all mental phenomena, just as the senses witness and report the phenomena of the external universe. Consciousness reports the present phenomena of mind, as memory reports its past phenomena.

By most writers, Consciousness is spoken of as if it were a separate faculty of mind, whose special office it is to take cognizance of whatever is passing within us. But Dr. Thomas Brown, Mr. James Mill, Sir W by the objects of our perceptions : and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engrossed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our animal existence. Hence it is, that these phenomena occupy our thoughts more than those of mind ; that we are perpetually tempted to explain the latter [the phenomena of mind] by the analogy of the former [the phenomena of matter], and even to endeavor to refer them to the same general laws ; and that we acquire habits of inattention to the subjects of our consciousness, too strong to be afterwards surmounted, without the most persevering industry.

If the foregoing observations be well founded, they establish the distinction between mind and matter, without any long process of metaphysical reasoning : * for if our notions of both are

Hamilton, and others, justly object to this doctrine. Having a sensation, and being conscious of that sensation, are not two things ; the thing is one, the names only are two. If I say I feel a sensation, the expression is tautological, for the feeling and the sensation are the same thing ; the sensation is the feeling. And to say lam conscious of a feeling, is merely to say that I feel it ; to have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling. A single perception is simple and indivisible ; it cannot be analyzed into a fact and the consciousness of that fact, for the event itself being an act of knowing, it does not exist, if it be not known to exist. See Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, 2d. ed. p. 47. James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, I. p. 170. Bowen's Essays, p. 131. Dr. T. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, I. pp. 244-261.]

* In stating the relative notions which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word substance, as I am unwilling to furnish the slightest occasion for controversy ; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, desires, etc. That my consciousness of these and other operations is necessarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the same being, is not an hypothesis, but a fact ; of which it is no more possible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own sensations or volitions.

[Substance is the unknown something which underlies and supports all the qualities by which any thing is made known to us. We can define any particular body only by saying, that it is something which is extended, colored, merely relative; if we know the one only by such sensible qualities as extension, figure, and solidity ; and the other, by such operations as sensation, thought, and volition ; we are certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, considered as objects of human study, are essentially different ; the science of the former resting ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to our senses ; that of the latter, on the phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism, that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a misapprehension of the proper object of science ; the difficulty which it professes to remove being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle which feels and thinks and wills, by saying that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words ; forgetting, that matter as well as mind is known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the essence of either.*

The Philosophy of Mind susceptible of cultivation and progress. — It would probably contribute much to accelerate the progress of the philosophy of mind, if, (1.) a distinct explanation were given of its nature and object ; and if, (2.) some genhard or soft, hot or cold, etc. ; that is, by enumerating those properties or attributes, by means of which it manifests itself to our senses. So we can define mind only by saying, that it is something which feels, thinks, remembers, conceives, etc. ; that is, we enumerate the qualities or faculties through which it manifests itself in consciousness. In both cases, this unknown something is called substance, which word, in plain English, means that which stands under, or upholds, its various qualities.]

* Some metaphysicians, who appear to admit the truth of the foregoing reasoning, have further urged, that for any thing we can prove to the contrary, it is possible, that the unknown substance which has the qualities of extension, figure, and color, may be the same with the unknown substance which has the attributes of feeling, thinking, and willing. But besides that this is only an hypothesis, which amounts to nothing more than a mere possibility, even if it were true, it would no more be proper to say of mind, that it is material, than to say of body, that it is spiritual 1* eral rules were laid down, with respect to the proper method of conducting the study of it.

Upon a slight attention to the operations of our minds, they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws.*

* [What are general laws, or laws of nature, as they are generally termed ? Few phrases are more frequently and glibly used than these, yet, in the minds of most persons, they have but a vague and uncertain signification. It is worth while, then, to attempt to gain some clear and precise notions respecting them.

A law of nature is nothing more than a general fact, or rather, a general statement comprehending under it many similar individual facts. A law is the result of a classification, and individual things are classed together on account of some similarity or uniformity that has been discovered between them.

1. Objects that exist are classed together on account of their resemblance to each other. Such classification may consist of several successive steps, and is the proper work of Natural History. Thus, all objects whatsoever are divided into three great kingdoms, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral. The Animal kingdom is subdivided into four classes, Vertebrates, Molluscs, Articulates, and Radiates or Zoophites. Again, Vertebrates are divided into Mammifers, Birds, Reptiles, and Fishes. All the animals ranked under any one of these classes agree with each other in certain respects ; all Vertebrates, for instance, have a vertebral column inclosing a spinal cord ; all Birds have an apparatus, or the rudiments of an apparatus, for flying. The General Fact, that all the animals so classed possess the given organ or property, is called a Law of Nature. It is a Law of Nature, for instance, that all Vertebrates have a spinal cord and a skull inclosing a brain ; it is also a Law, that all Mammifers and Birds have warm red blood, and a heart composed of four compartments. Another Law of Nature is, that every animal is produced from an egg. These Laws are not necessary and immutable truths, but are mere inductions founded on experience ; they hold good only until an instance is discovered to the contrary. Whales were once classed with Fishes ; they are now properly ranked with Mammifers, because unlike Fishes, they suckle their young. It was once supposed to be a Law of Nature, that all Bwans are white ; black swans have since been discovered.

2. Events that take place, also, are classed together on account of their uniformity. Thus, it is a General Fact, or Law of Nature, that pressure on a fluid is propagated equally in all directions, and that a heavy body, if unsupported, falls to the earth. Many of these General Facts are so familiar, that we never think of formally enunciating them ; " no science/

INTRODUCTION.

In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up ; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first, gays J. S. Mill, " was needed to teach men that food nourishes, that water drowns, or quenches thirst, that the sun gives light and heat, that bodies fall to the ground." These laws, also, are not necessary truths, but are founded on mere induction, — often on a not very extensive one. A newly discovered metal, being found, by a single experiment, to be fusible at a certain temperature, it is at once declared to be a Law of Nature, that it does melt, always has melted, and always will melt, at the ascertained degree of heat. It is certainly possible, though not probable, that another piece of the metal should be discovered which will not melt at this temperature ; such an instance would be only a parallel to the case of the black swans. A particular event, comprehended under the statement of a Law, is not properly said to be caused by the Law, but only to be a case, or instance, happening under the Law. A cow does not suckle its calf be* cause it is a Mammifer, but it is called a Mammifer because it suckles its calf. So, it is not a law of Hydrostatics which causes water to remain at the same level in the two arms of a bent tube ; but the fact, that the water stands at this level, is ranked among many other facts, which are comprehended under the general statement, called a Law, of Hydrostatics. Gravitation does not make the stone fall, but the particular fact, that this stone fell, is comprehended under the General Eact, or Law, of Gravitation. In like manner, Gravitation does not make the earth revolve in an elliptical orbit round the sun ; but the fact, that the earth revolves in this manner, is ranked with the falling of a stone, and with many other facts of a similar character, under the general statement, or Law, of Gravitation.