XIX. POLITICS AND RELIGION…

XIX. POLITICS AND RELIGION

1520.

GROWING DISCONTENT AMONG THE MEXICANS—CACAMA’S CONSPIRACY—HE OPENLY DEFIES BOTH MONTEZUMA AND CORTÉS—THE COUNCIL OF TEPETZINCO—SEIZURE OF CACAMA—THE TEZCUCAN RULER DEPOSED—CUICUITZCATL ELEVATED—MONTEZUMA AND HIS PEOPLE SWEAR FEALTY TO THE SPANISH KING—GATHERING IN THE TRIBUTE—DIVISION OF SPOILS—THE SPANIARDS QUARREL OVER THEIR GOLD—UNCONTROLLABLE RELIGIOUS ZEAL—TAKING OF THE TEMPLE—WRATH OF THE MEXICANS.

With their hand so securely on the spring that moved a mighty empire, there is little wonder that these Spanish adventurers became somewhat insolent toward the people they so injured. The Mexicans were not slow to mark this, and there were those among them, and others beside them, who began to think of taking matters into their own hands, of destroying the invaders and releasing the emperor.

Montezuma’s occasional appearance in public, and the assertion that he remained with the Spaniards of his free-will, and because the gods desired it, had for a time satisfied the nobles; but the hard irons on his limbs and the cruel burning of patriotic men had opened their eyes somewhat to the true state of affairs. No one knew when his turn might come. Life was insecure enough subject to the caprice of their own sovereign, but the dark uncertain ways of these emissaries of evil were past finding out. These things were thought of and talked of in high places. Race aversions and the political systems of the tripartite alliance caused more than one party to be formed, each with aspirations that could not be entertained by the others. The most prominent leader at this time was Cacama, who had at first favored the strangers in their character as envoys. And now he began the endeavor to direct the movement of the Aztec nobility, but jealousy of Acolhua influence rose uppermost, and his efforts tended only to create a reaction in favor of abiding by the will of the emperor.[555]

Although there were enough of sympathizers in Mexico for his purpose, Cacama found that he must rely almost wholly on the northern provinces, and in connection with Cuitlahuatzin, Totoquihuatzin II. of Tlacopan, his own brothers, and others, he organized a conspiracy which had for its aim the expulsion of the Spaniards and the release of his uncle. Beneath this was harbored a design upon the Aztec throne, which would probably become vacant; and even if Cacama was not sure of gaining this for himself, he had at least the expectation of assuming the leadership of the Anáhuac confederacy.[556] He presented to the council in the most dismal aspect the purposes of the Spaniards, who evidently sought to become absolute masters and reduce them all to slavery. It was time to rise for religion and liberty. Their honor and welfare demanded it, and this before the Spaniards rendered themselves too powerful by reinforcements and alliances. With heedless confidence he vaunted that Mexico should be his within a few hours after setting out against her, for there were many of her citizens ready to aid in such a work. The Spaniards were overrated, and could effect little, surrounded as they were on all sides, and without other supplies than those provided by the Mexicans.

The motives and the necessity were recognized, though the means proposed met with some objections; but when the question of spoils and rewards came forward there were still greater differences. Among others, the brave and powerful lord of Matlaltzinco advanced pretensions, founded in part on his close relationship to Montezuma, which Cacama above all could not admit. The result was disagreement, followed by the withdrawal of several members.[557]

No attempt had been made to keep the movement, or its ostensible motive, a secret from Montezuma, nor could it have been kept from him who was the still powerful ruler of a servile race; but, even if the deeper lying aim was not revealed him, he could not fail to foresee the troubles that might arise, particularly under such a leader. He still hoped the Spaniards would soon leave, or that his release might be effected by other means, for he dreaded a conflict with the powerful invaders, involving perhaps the destruction of the city and his own death. He sent to tell the conspirators that they need not concern themselves about his imprisonment. The Spaniards had more than once proposed that he should return to his own palace, but the gods had decreed it otherwise. He could not allow his people to be needlessly exposed to war, or his capital to destruction. Remember Cholula. Their stay would not be long.

This message was not without its effect even among the Tezcucans, for, although the fate of the Aztec capital and king may have concerned them but little, there were many who could not forget that the impetuous and proud Cacama had obtained the throne by favor of Montezuma, to the prejudice of an elder brother, Tetlahuehuetquizitzin.Their father, Nezahualpilli, had died in 1515, without naming a successor, and the choice devolving on the royal council, in conjunction with the rulers of Mexico and Tlacopan, Cacama was elected. Cohuanacoch, the third brother, acquiesced, but the youngest, the fiery Ixtlilxochitl, protested in favor of the eldest heir, and denounced the selection as due to Montezuma, who hoped to mould the new king to his own will and so again to control. He even resorted to arms in support of his views, and enlisting the northern provinces in his favor, after a short campaign he obliged Cacama to consent to a division of the kingdom with himself.[558]

His ready success proved that Cacama had no very great hold on the people, and now, when came the warning of Montezuma, more than one chief counselled prudence from other motives than fear. But the king stamped all these objections as cowardly, and appears even to have placed under restraint several of those whose want of sympathy he had reason to suspect.[559] His blood was hot, and relying on the promises of his supporters, he considered himself strong enough to bid defiance to his opponents. He sent word to his uncle that if he had any regard for the dignity of his station and the honor of his person and ancestry, he would not quietly submit to the bondage imposed by a handful of robbers, who with smooth tongue sought to cover their outrages against him and the gods. If he refused to rise in defence of his religion, throne, and liberty, Cacama would not.[560]

This outspoken utterance of the nephew whom he had assisted to rulership amazed Montezuma as much as it wounded his pride, and he no longer hesitated to take counsel with Cortés, who had already obtained an inkling that something was stirring.[561] With characteristic promptness the latter suggested that, since Cacama’s real object was evidently to usurp the throne, a Mexican army should be given to aid the Spaniards in laying waste the territory of the conspirators and in capturing them. The emperor had probably entertained a hope that the news would frighten his guest and make it safe to urge a retreat from Mexico, thus ending the whole trouble. He was therefore somewhat startled by this proposal, the true tenor of which he well understood. He feared a fratricidal war of doubtful result, wherein he would appear as arrayed against the defenders of national religion and liberty; and being now weak and cowed he hesitated to arm at all, preferring peaceful measures. To this Cortés was not averse, for he recognized on second thought that aggressive steps might become the signal for a general uprising which would overwhelm him, since Aztec troops could never be relied on.

He accordingly sent messages to Cacama, reminding him of their friendly intercourse, and representing the danger of offending the Spanish king by proceedings which could only react on himself and lead to the destruction of his kingdom. Montezuma supported this by asking the king to come to Mexico and arrange the difficulty. Cacama had not gone so far to be restrained by what he termed an empty threat, and regardless of the warnings from a timid minority he replied that he knew not the king of the Spaniards, and would never accept the friendship of men who had oppressed his country and outraged his blood and religion. He had had enough of their promises, but would declare his determination when he saw them.[562] To Montezuma he sent word that he would come, “not with the hand on the heart, however, but on the sword.”[563]

There was considerable meaning in this threat, for Cacama had with great energy set about to mass his forces at Oztoticpac, and they in conjunction with those of his allies would make a formidable host.[564] Cortés was aware of this, and seeing that no time was to be lost he firmly represented to Montezuma the necessity of securing the person of the king, openly or by stealth; and when he still hesitated, the significant hint was given that the Spaniards would regard a refusal with suspicion. This decided him, and he promised that it should be done, if possible. Cortés broke forth in expressions of good-will, and again offered him that freedom which Montezuma well knew he would never grant.

In placing Cacama on the throne, the emperor had seized the opportunity to introduce into the Acolhua government offices several creatures of his own, who were paid to maintain Aztec influence in the council[565] and to watch operations. To these men he sent an order, weighted with presents, to seize the king and bring him to Mexico.[566] They accordingly prevailed on their victim to hold a council at Tepetzinco for finally arranging the campaign. This palace was situated on the lake, near Tezcuco, and approached by canals. Here Cacama was seized and thrown into a boat prepared for the occasion, and carried to the Aztec capital.[567]

Ashamed, perhaps, of his share in the transaction, and unwilling to face the taunts of the captive, Montezuma refused to see him, and he was surrendered to Cortés, who, regardless of royalty, applied the fetters as the surest means against escape.[568] This seizure scattered the conspirators and their schemes to the winds, and the demoralization was completed by the arrest of several of the more important personages, such as the king of Tlacopan and the lords of Iztapalapan and Coyuhuacan, who were also shackled.[569] Thus we see that Montezuma’s captivity did not greatly affect his power, since he could so readily place under restraint the confederate kings, in their own provinces; and it was not wholly unwelcome to him to find his misfortune shared by other prominent men, since this made his disgrace less conspicuous.

He now resolved, with the approval of Cortés, to depose the Tezcucan ruler, as a rebel against his authority, and to place on the throne a more dutiful subject, a younger natural brother of Cacama, named Cuicuetzcatl,[570] whom his ill-treatment had driven to Mexico for protection. The nomination was for the sake of appearance submitted for ratification to a convention of loyal Tezcucan chiefs, many of whom hoped no doubt to obtain greater influence under this youth. The new king was escorted to the gates of Mexico by Cortés and Montezuma, and received at Tezcuco with triumphal arches and processions.[571]

* * * * *

And now, with the three confederate rulers and a number of leading caciques in his power, the great king-maker thought the time had come to exact a formal acknowledgment of Spanish sovereignty. He reminded Montezuma of his promises to pay tribute, and demanded that he and his vassals should tender allegiance. Instead of the objections expected, Cortés was surprised to hear a prompt acquiescence. Montezuma had evidently been long prepared for the demand, and said that he would at once convene his chiefs for consultation. Within little more than a week the summoned dignitaries had arrived, and at a meeting, attended by no Spaniards save the page, he intimated to the leading personages, so far as he dared before this witness, that the concession demanded of them was to satisfy the importunate jailers. “The gods, alas! are mute,” concluded Montezuma; “but by and by they may signify their will more clearly, and I will then say what further is to be done.”[572] All declared sorrowfully that they would do as he bade, and Cortés was informed that on the following day the required ceremony would take place.

On this occasion the chiefs mustered in force before Montezuma, who was seated on a throne having on either side the new king of Tezcuco and he of Tlacopan.[573] All being prepared, the Spanish general entered with his captains and a number of soldiers. The emperor now addressed his vassals, reminding them of the relation so long and happily maintained between them—as dutiful subjects on the one side, and a line of loving monarchs on the other. Comparing the Quetzalcoatl myth and other indications with the advent of white men from the region of the rising sun, he showed that they must be the long expected race, sent to claim allegiance for their king, to whom the sovereignty evidently belonged. The gods had willed it that their generation should repair the omission of their ancestors. “Hence I pray that as you have hitherto held and obeyed me as your lord, so you will henceforth hold and obey this great king, for he is your legitimate ruler, and in his place accept this captain of his. All the tribute and service hitherto tendered me give to him, for I also have to contribute and serve with all that he may require. In doing this you will fulfil not only your duty, but give me great pleasure.”[574]

His concluding words were almost lost in the sobs which his humiliated soul could no longer stifle. The chiefs were equally affected, and the sympathies even of the flint-hearted Spaniards were aroused to a degree which moistened many an eye. With some of the lately arrived dignitaries, who had not had time to fully grasp the situation at the capital, indignation struggled with grief at the dismal prospect. Others recalled the prophecy that the empire would terminate with Montezuma, whose very name appeared fraught with evil omen,[575] and were quite reconciled to the inevitable. So were most of them, for that matter, either through belief in the myth or from a sense of duty to their master. One of the eldest nobles broke the oppressive silence by declaring his sorrow at witnessing the grief of their beloved sovereign and hearing the announcement of coming changes. But since the time had come for the fulfilment of divine decrees, they, as devout and dutiful subjects, could only submit. Again their grief broke forth, though many a bitter glance was called up by the allusion to changes in store for them. Observing the bad impression, Cortés hastened to assure them that Montezuma would not only remain the great emperor he had always been, and his vassals be confirmed in their dignities and possessions, but that their domain and power would be increased. The changes proposed were merely intended to stop wars, to enlighten them on matters with which they were as yet unacquainted, and to promote general welfare. One after another, beginning with Montezuma, they now swore allegiance, and gave promise of service and tribute, after which they were dismissed with thanks for their compliance.[576]

The submission of the sovereigns appears to have been quietly accepted throughout the country, and the impunity with which even single Spaniards moved about shows that no hostility had been aroused by the act, in the provinces at least. Evidently the people hovered between fear of men who so few in number could yet perform so great achievements, and awe of divine will as indicated by the prophecies and traditions. Cortés was not slow in making use of his new power by representing to the emperor that, his king being in need of gold for certain projects, it would be well for the new vassals to begin tribute payments as an earnest of their loyalty. Montezuma had expected this, and it was readily agreed that he should send officers, accompanied by Spaniards, to the different provinces and towns of the empire for contributions.[577] These demands were met with more or less alacrity, and in poured gold and silver, in dust, and quoits, and leaves, and trinkets, which formed to a certain extent a medium for trade. Many towns remote from the mines had nothing to offer save a few jewels, which were perhaps heirlooms among the chiefs.[578]

When the collectors returned, Montezuma summoned the Spanish leaders, and surrendered what they had brought. In addition to this, he offered them the treasures kept in his own palace, regretting that he had not more to give; but previous offerings had diminished what he possessed. “When you transmit it to your king,” he said, “tell him that it comes from his good vassal, Montezuma.” He requested that certain fine chalchiuite stones, each valued at two loads of gold, and some finely chased and inlaid blow-pipes, should be given to the king alone.[579] This liberality evoked the most profound protestations of gratitude, as may be supposed, for they had not expected so great an addition to the glittering heaps already in their possession. Tapia and another officer were despatched in all haste with the imperial mayordomo to receive the treasure. It was stored in a hall and two smaller chambers of the aviary building,[580] and consisted of gold, silver, and precious stones, in setting and in separate form, with feathers, robes, and other articles, all of which were transferred to the Spanish quarters.[581]

These valuables, together with the collections from the provinces and the previously surrendered treasures of Axayacatl, were given to Cortés, who placed them in charge of the treasurer, Gonzalo Mejía, and the contador, Alonso de Ávila. The famed smiths of Azcapuzalco were called in to separate the gold and silver settings from the jewels of less delicacy and beauty, which it had been determined to melt. This took about three days. They were then melted into bars, three fingers in breadth, and stamped with the royal arms.[582] Iron weights were made of one arroba and downward, not very exact, it seems, yet suitable for the purpose, and with these the value of the melted gold was found to be somewhat over 162,000 pesos de oro, according to Cortés’ statement; the silver weighed over 500 marcos, and the unbroken jewels and other effects were estimated at over 500,000 ducats, not counting the workmanship.[583] The jewels were set with feathers, pearls, and precious stones, fashioned chiefly in animal forms, “so perfect as to appear natural.” A number of trinkets for the royal share had also been fashioned by the goldsmiths after designs by the Spaniards, such as saintly images, crucifixes, bracelets, and chains, all made with wonderful fidelity to originals. The silver for the same share was made into plates, spoons, and similar articles. The feathers presented a brilliant variety of colors and forms, and the cotton, some of the most delicate texture and color, was both plain and embroidered, and made into robes, tapestry, covers, and other articles. Turquoises, pearls, toys, and trinkets were also among the treasures.[584]

Cortés proposed to defer the distribution till more gold and better weights were obtained; but the men, who with good reason, perhaps, suspected that a delay might diminish rather than increase the treasures, clamored for an immediate division. The troops were accordingly called, and in their presence the partition was made: first of the royal fifth;[585] then of the fifth promised to Cortés when appointed captain-general; after this a large sum was set apart to cover expenditures by Cortés and Velazquez on the fleet and its outfit, and the value of the horses killed during the campaign,[586] and another sum for the expenses and shares of the procuradores in Spain, while double or special shares were assigned to the priests, the captains, those owning horses, and the men with fire-arms and cross-bows.[587] After all these deductions but little remained for the rank and file—a hundred pesos, if we may credit Bernal Diaz.[588] This, many indignantly refused to accept; others took it, but joined in the clamors of the discontented.

* * * * *

It is almost too much to ask of vultures not to quarrel over their prey. The murmur against the royal fifth was loud enough, but the second fifth for Cortés raised quite an outcry. “Are we to have a second king?” they asked. Others inquired, “For whose fleet are we paying?” They further wished to know whether the fame and promotion acquired for the general by his men could not satisfy some of his claims, for the present, at least. They had once before surrendered hard-earned money to please him and to promote his credit with the king, and now, when they had been led to expect reward, it was again snatched from them. Some said that a large proportion of the treasures had been secured by Cortés and his favorites before the distribution began; and the value of the heavy gold chains and other ornaments displayed by them was significantly pointed at as out of proportion to their share.

The suspicion was confirmed by a quarrel which occurred shortly after between Velazquez de Leon and Treasurer Mejía respecting the payment of the royal fifth on certain unbroken jewels found in Velazquez’ possession, and received by him before the apportionment. It was enough, said Mejía, for Cortés to appropriate unassessed treasures. Velazquez refusing to comply, they came to blows, and if friends had not interfered there might have been an officer or two less in the camp. As it was, both received slight wounds, and subsequently shackles. Mejía was released within a few hours; but his antagonist retained the fetters for two days, persuaded to submit with grace thereto by Cortés, it was said, in order to allay suspicions and to show that the general could be just, even when it affected a friend.[589]

Finding that the murmurs were becoming serious, Cortés brought his soothing eloquence to bear upon the troubled spirits. He represented that all his thoughts, efforts, and possessions were for the honor of his God, his king, and his companions. With them he had shared every danger and hardship, and for their welfare he had watched, rendering justice to all. The division had been fairly made in accordance with previous arrangement. But he was not avaricious; all he had was theirs, and he would employ it for them as might a father. He would surrender the fifth which had been assigned him, if they wished it, retaining only his share as captain-general; and he would also help any one in need. The treasure thus far secured was insignificant compared to what lay before them. What mattered a few hundred pesos more or less in view of the rich mines, the large tracts, and the immense number of towns, which were all theirs, so long as they held loyally together? “I will make a lord of every one of you,” he concluded, “if you will but have peace and patience.”[590] And to give greater effect to this harangue he bribed with gifts and promises the more influential to sound his praises; whereupon the murmurs died away, though rancor still remained with many, awaiting opportunity.[591]

A large proportion of the soldiers imitated the example of the heavy sharers in the spoils by converting their allotment, with the aid of Azcapuzalcan goldsmiths, into chains, crosses, and other adornments for their persons, so that the display of wealth became quite dazzling. Others yielded to the infatuation for gambling, then so prevalent, and lost without a murmur the hard-earned share.[592]

* * * * *

But one thing now remained to complete the triumph of the conqueror. The manacled kings were subservient, and the people displayed their loyalty by pouring tribute into his coffers. But his god was not theirs, and this the pious pilferer could not endure. He and his priests had lost no opportunity to preach the faith to emperor and subjects;[593] but the hearts of the natives were obdurately fixed on the idols of the pyramid. He never beheld the temple without being tempted to lay low the effigies of Satan, and it was owing only to Father Olmedo’s prudent counsel that the temptation was resisted. Repeatedly had he urged on the weak emperor to begin the great work by some radical reform, but could obtain only the promise that human sacrifices would be stopped. Finding that even this was not observed, he consulted with his captains, and it was agreed to demand the surrender of the great temple for Christian worship, so that the natives might be made to feel the holy influence of its symbols and rites. Montezuma was prepared with excuses, but the deputation declared with fierce vehemence that if this were refused they would forcibly remove the idols and kill the priests who resisted. “Malinche,” exclaimed the monarch in alarm, “do you then seek the destruction of the city? Our gods are incensed against us, and the people imbittered. Even your lives will not be safe. Wait, I entreat you, till I call the priests for consultation.”[594]

Cortés saw that nothing more could then be attained, but with the indiscreet zeal for religion which often blinded him he determined that there should be no further delay. He apprehended no uprising among a people which had so patiently submitted to all exactions, yet he feared that the priests, if warned, might prevent an entry into the temple, and so he resolved to anticipate them, and to demonstrate the impotency of their gods. Giving orders for a strong force to follow after a short interval, he went forward with hardly a dozen men in order not to arouse suspicion.[595] Entering the sanctuary, and finding that he could not draw aside the costly curtain with its golden pellet fringe which shielded the bejewelled idols from profane gaze, he had it cut asunder. The reason for the obstruction now became apparent. The idol showed traces of fresh human blood. At this evidence of broken promises and disregarded orders Cortés began to rave. “Oh God!” he cried, “why dost thou permit the devil to be thus honored in this land? Let it appear good that we serve thee.”

Turning to the temple attendants, who had followed with apprehensive mien, he upbraided them for their blind adherence to a bloody worship, and compared the evil of idolatry with the saving rites of Christianity. He was determined, he said, to remove the idols and install an image of the virgin. They must take away all within the sanctuary and cleanse it. The priests shook their heads at such an insane idea. All the city and country around adored these gods, and they would die rather than see them desecrated. They further intimated that the deities would themselves know how to chastise the sacrilegious. This reply only fired the fury of Cortés, and unable further to restrain himself, he seized a bar, dashed at the idol, and striking it a blow which caused the golden mask to fall off, he exclaimed, “Shall we not do something for God?” Captain Andrés de Tapia, one of the dozen Spaniards present on the occasion, testifies to the rash proceeding: “I swear by my faith as a gentleman and by God that it is true. It seems as if I now see the marquis springing with excitement and striking at the idol.”[596]

When the real intentions of Cortés had first become apparent to the priests, they sent to warn Montezuma, as emperor and high-priest, that some outrage might be perpetrated. Suspecting that the recent threat was about to be carried out, he despatched a messenger to the general asking permission to come to the temple, and imploring him meanwhile to respect the idols. The message arrived before much damage was done, and with the advice of his followers Cortés was induced to yield. He recognized that the attitude assumed might lead to more serious results than had been at first supposed. The rumor had spread of extraordinary proceedings on the temple summit, and armed and threatening crowds were gathering at the foot, impeded only by the Spanish reserve escort[597] from ascending to defend their gods. Why should not they fight for their religion as well as others? Seeing that the emperors presence was necessary to calm them, Cortés permitted him to come. He soon arrived, under a strong guard, and pointing to the excited masses he reasoned with Cortés upon the uselessness and danger of his hasty project. The latter stubbornly insisted, and after a consultation with the priests it was agreed to surrender both the summit chapels of Huitzilopochtli and Tezcatlipoca to Christian worship,[598] on condition that the idols within might be removed by the reverent hands of priests alone. This was effected while the emperor remained on the summit. The chapels were then whitewashed, a cross was planted, and two altars rose, on which were placed the image of the virgin and of a saint whom Tapia calls San Cristóbal.[599]

* * * * *

Preparations were next made to consecrate the sanctuary, now festive with garlands and flowers. The Spaniards marched in procession through the streets, to the chant of psalms, headed by the two priests who bore the crucifix and images. Crowds of wondering natives lined their path, and remained to watch the cross winding its way round the pyramid in a sanctifying orbit. Cortés was the first to kiss the installed crucifix, while tears of joy rolled down his cheeks. Mass followed the consecration, and with a swelling Te Deum the soldiers rendered thanks to the supreme being for the triumph accorded them over paganism.

It was but a partial victory, however, for in the court the priests were even then gathered in adoration of the chief idol, bewailing their own impotency, and imploring it to rise and avenge its outraged majesty and their humiliation. An old soldier was left as guard to keep the candles burning, and to prevent intrusion from, temple attendants, save to clean the place for the frequent services which were henceforth held here.[600]

Taking advantage of the step thus gained, the priests and their followers sought to impress upon the natives the superiority of their faith,[601] and numbers were convinced, says Tapia, although few accepted baptism out of fear of their countrymen.[602] There was a drought prevailing at the time, and the priests, having in vain appealed for a remedy, ascribed the evil to the anger of the gods at the presence of the worshippers of strange deities and their hateful symbols. A few days after the consecration of the altars a deputation of natives appeared at the Spanish quarters, bearing withered corn-stalks, and demanding that, since the Europeans had removed the idols to whom they prayed for rain, they should ask their god for it, so that the people might not die of hunger. Cortés reassured them,[603] and ordered a general prayer for relief. “The following day,” says Tapia, “we marched in procession to the temple, under a blazing sun.” While mass was being said a cloud might be seen gathering on Mount Tepcaquilla, and “on our way back the rain fell so heavily that we had to wade in water up to our ankles.” The rain continued for several days, and the harvest turned out abundant.[604] Each party claimed the meteorological display as a direct answer to its prayer, for the Mexicans were hardly prepared to yield everything without a struggle. To this insignificant and hated band of intruders they had practically abandoned their country, by acknowledging serfdom with tribute. Daily they submitted to wrongs and indignities. The sacred person of their king had been profaned, their nobles brought to the dust. Now should they submit to this destruction of their gods? If so, the heavens and earth would come together, grinding them to powder!

FOOTNOTES

[555] ‘Visto por el rey Cacama el poco ánimo y determinacion de los Mexicanos, se salió de la ciudad y se fué á la de Tezcuco, para juntar sus gentes.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 298, and Torquemada, i. 459. But it is doubtful whether he remained many days in Mexico after the seizure of his uncle, if indeed he was there then.

[556] Bernal Diaz assumes, naturally enough for a Spanish conqueror, that one of the main objects of Cacama was to rescue the imperilled treasures at Mexico. Hist. Verdad., 79-80.

[557] ‘Aun dezian, que le venia de derecho el Reyno, y señorio de Mexico.’ However that may be, he laid a claim to the Aztec throne, and Cacama replied that to himself alone should that belong. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 79-80.

[558] See Native Races, v. 474.

[559] ‘Mandó echar presos tres dellos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 80.

[560] ‘Cacama le respondio muy agramente, diziendo que si el tuuiera sangre en el ojo, ni estaria preso, ni catiuo de quatro estranjeros,’ etc. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 133.

[561] According to Bernal Diaz and Gomara, Cortés was informed by Montezuma before he and Cacama exchanged the severe messages referred to, and that the Spaniard sent the first remonstrance, but the emperor, as master, and as the person whom the revolt immediately concerned, had naturally to take the initiative.

[562] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 79. He would not hold friendship with him who took away his honor and kingdom. The war was for the good of his subjects, and in defence of their land and religion. Before laying down arms he would avenge his uncle and his gods. He knew not who was the king of the Spaniards, nor would he listen to him, much less know him. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 132.

[563] ‘Con hechizos le teniamos quitado su gran coraçon, y fuerça; ò que nuestros Dioses, y la gran muger de Castilla ... nos dá aquel gran poder.’ In this last he did not err, remarks Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 80.

[564] Over 100,000 men. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 299.

[565] ‘Tenia en su tierra del dicho Cacamazin muchas personas principales que vivian con él y les daba su salario.’ Cortés, Cartas, 97.

[566] According to Bernal Diaz, six chiefs were sent with the imperial signet, which was to be given to certain relatives and dignitaries discontented with Cacama, and they were to seize him and his council. Hist. Verdad., 80.

[567] ‘Tambien truxeron otros cinco presos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 80. ‘Prendieron al Cacama vn dia, estando con ellos y otros muchos en consejo para cõsultar las cosas de la guerra.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 133. According to Ixtlilxochitl, when Cacama left Mexico, partly out of fear lest the Spaniards should seize him for promoting a revolt there, his brothers Cohuanacoch and Ixtlilxochitl, all now reconciled, pretended to fall into his views. Ixtlilxochitl recommended Tepetzinco as the place best suited for beginning operations on Mexico, and while proceeding to the place in a canoe he was carried on to Mexico by his faithless brothers. Without Ixtlilxochitl’s aid Montezuma and Cortés could never have been able to overcome the powerful Cacama, concludes the author. Hist. Chich., 298-9. In his Relaciones, 389, 412, the same author states that Cacama was seized not for plotting, but because Cortés desired to secure so powerful a personage. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows the former version, and believes that Montezuma favored the conspiracy as a means to oblige the Spaniards to depart. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 258. There may be some truth in this belief, so far as the beginning of the plot is concerned, but it must be considered that Montezuma would have preferred not to intrust such a movement to a probable rival, the ruler of a people jealous of Aztec supremacy, and the ally of his most hated enemy, Ixtlilxochitl. If, again, Cacama was his tool, the emperor would not have had him seized, to be executed for all he knew, when he could have warned him to flee or to defend himself. Had Ixtlilxochitl surrendered the king, Cortés would not be likely to give the credit to Montezuma, as he does. Cartas, 97-8.

[568] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 133. Yet Bernal Diaz assumes that Montezuma examined him and the other prisoners, ‘y supo Monteçuma de los conciertos en que andaua, que era alçarse por señor.’ Hist. Verdad., 80. ‘Y à cabo de pocos dias le dieron Garrote secretamente,’ adds Torquemada, i. 470, erroneously. Had Cortés fallen into his hands, the stone of sacrifice would speedily have received him, and the captive must accordingly have regarded himself as mercifully treated. The general knew the value of such prominent hostages. The leniency gained him besides great credit, as Solis rightly assumes. Hist. Mex., ii. 21-2.

[569] ‘En ocho dias todos estuuieron presos en la cadena gorda.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 80. This author includes the lord of Matlaltzinco, who escaped his pursuers the longest, and when finally brought before the emperor spoke his mind so freely that he would have been consigned to the executioner had not Cortés interfered. Duran adds the lord of Xochimilco instead of the last two. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 444. ‘Pigliò ancora il Re di Tlacopan, i Signori d’Iztapalapan, e di Cojohuacan, fratelli tutti e due del Re Motezuma, due figliuoli di questo medesimo Re, Itzquauhtzin Signor di Tlatelolco, un Sommo Sacerdote di Messico, e parecchj altri.’ Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 107.

[570] ‘Se llamò Don Carlos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 80; at a later period, most likely. ‘Surnommé Tocpaxochitl ... bâtard de Nezahualpilli.’ Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 258. Cortés calls him a son of Cacama, Cartas, 98, but this he afterward corrects. The native records, in Sahagun, Hist. Gen., ii. 277, and in Ixtlilxochitl, ignore him. The latter, indeed, assumes that Cacama continued to reign, though captive like Montezuma. Hist. Chich., 299 et seq.

[571] Herrera gives the speeches on the occasion. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. iii. ‘Era mas bien quisto, que no Cacama.... Y Cortes hazia reyes, y mandaua con tanta autoridad, como si ya vuiera ganado el imperio.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 133. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes that Cohuanacoch and Ixtlilxochitl at once managed to obtain control of the weak youth and of the government.

[572] ‘El tiempo andando veremos si tenemos otra mejor respuesta de nuestros Dioses, y como vieremos el tiempo assi harémos ... presto os dirè lo que mas non conuenga.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 81.

[573] The latter had probably tendered his submission in order to retain the throne. Ixtlilxochitl names Cacama as the Tezcucan king present.

[574] Cortés, Cartas, 98-9. ‘Demos gracias a los dioses, q̄ an venido en nuestros dias los q̄ tãto desseauamos,’ et seq. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 134.

[575] ‘Tenia del oraculo de sus dioses respuesta muchas vezes ... q̄ perderia la silla a los ocho años de su reynado, y q̄ por esto nunca quiso hazer guerra a los Españoles,.... Bien que por otro cabo lo tenia por burla, pues auia mas dezisiete años q̄ era rey.’ Gomara, Hist. Max., 134-5; Acosta, Hist. Ind., 502-3.

[576] Cortés, Cartas, 91, 98-9; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv.; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 580-1. The allegiance was tendered before Secretary Pedro Fernandez. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 81. Solis assumes that Montezuma of his own accord offered allegiance and tribute, in the hope that this would fill the measure of the Spaniards’ expectations and cause them to depart. In that case the general grief must have been well counterfeited. He regards this act as giving legality to the conquest. Hist. Mex., ii. 23-32. Prescott supposes that the submission was prompted less by fear than by conscience—conscientious obedience to the myth. Mex., ii. 198. Oviedo looks on the tears as evidence of unwillingness, and thinks that either the emperor was very pusillanimous, or the will of God clearly manifest, iii. 297. According to Ixtlilxochitl the kings and caciques were required to leave hostages for the observance of their oath. ‘Cacama, y con él sus dos hermanos, Cohuanacochtzin y Ixtlilxochitl, segun las relaciones y pinturas de Tezcuco, dieron en rehenes á cuatro hermanos suyos y otras tantas hermanas.’ He names the brothers, and states that Montezuma also had to leave sons and brothers. Hist. Chich., 299-300. Brasseur de Bourbourg supposes, from a resemblance in the surname of the new king of Tezcuco to that of one of his brothers’ hostages, that he had already been forced to abdicate in favor of Cohuanacoch and Ixtlilxochitl, and surrender himself to the Spaniards. One of his sisters, baptized as Doña Juana, became the mistress of Cortés, as Ixtlilxochitl observes, and ‘périt dans la nuit de la retraite, enceinte du fait de Cortès.’ Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 262. The readiness with which Spaniards ventured, often singly, all over the country to exact tribute and to inquire into resources and the condition of affairs, would indicate that the prudent general had taken the precaution of obtaining living guarantees.

[577] ‘Luego mandó que le diese los españoles que queria enviar, y de dos en dos y de cinco en cinco los repartió para muchas provincias y ciudades.’ Cortés, Cartas, 100.

[578] According to the Tezcucan records, twenty Spaniards were sent with two of the king’s brothers, Nezahualquentzin and Tetlahuehuezquititzin, to collect the tribute of that city. As they were leaving Mexico, Montezuma despatched a messenger to the former prince, enjoining him to treat the Spaniards well and to obtain a large sum. This whispered advice was assumed by the Spaniards to hide a plot, and laying violent hands on the prince, the leader carried him to Cortés, who had him hanged at once. The king was of course deeply grieved, but dared not say anything. Guided by another brother, Tepacxochitzin, the Spaniards reached Tezcuco, and behaved outrageously. With the aid of Ixtlilxochitl they seized the contents of the royal treasury, filling with the gold a chest two fathoms in height and length, and one in width. After this they compelled the chiefs to contribute as much more. Ixtlilxochitl assumes that Cacama is the king, and that the deed occurred before allegiance was sworn, and seven weeks after the Spaniards’ arrival at Mexico. Hist. Chich., 298; Id., Rel., 388-9, 411-12. Brasseur de Bourbourg repeats this story in substance, though he corrects it by stating that Montezuma interfered and saved the prince. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 252-3. Herrera writes that ‘the servant’ sent to guide the Spaniards disappeared on the way. He was caught and hanged by order of Cacama, who gave them a more trusty attendant. They were received at Tezcuco with great pomp, and presented with female slaves. A large amount of gold, pearls, and other valuables was obtained, and 80 carriers were sent to Mexico laden with honey, which Cortés distributed, while he kept the treasures, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. i. According to Vazquez de Tapia, 15,000 pesos in gold were obtained from Tezcuco, beside some jewels and cloth. Not satisfied with this, Cortés sent Cacama in charge of Alvarado to exact more. But little being obtained, boiling pitch was applied to the stomach of Cacama before he was sent back to Mexico. Alvarado denies this outrage. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 3, 35-6, 65.

Fernando de Alva Cortés Ixtlilxochitl claims our attention as a native historian who has labored zealously to vindicate the glorious antecedents of his race, particularly the Acolhuas, whose loyal devotion to the Spanish invaders he advocates with an enthusiasm as unblushing as it is inconsistent. The chief hero of the theme is his ancestor and namesake, King Ixtlilxochitl, his great great grandfather, according to Muñoz’ genealogic list. Little good was derived from this calculated zeal, for at Alva’s birth, in about 1568, the family estate had dwindled to small proportions, while the tribute exemption which testified to royal descent expired not many years later. After a course at the Santa Cruz College Alva figured as interpreter to the native tribunal of the viceroy. The death of the eldest brother brought lawsuits which threatened to impoverish him, but urgent representation procured, in 1602, a cedula recognizing him as heir to the family property. Florencia, La Estrella, 103 etc.; Becerra Tanco, Felicidad Mex., 49; Guadalupe, Col., 551; Panes, Teatro Nueva-España, MSS. The requirements of the suit called forth more than one of his writings, which had in view to establish both his own title and the claims of his family. Their research and style attracted the attention of the viceroy, who encouraged him to continue a task for which he was so well fitted, not only by his Spanish and Aztec studies, but as a native to whom his countrymen would readily communicate their views and traditions, and as the possessor of a vast family archive. The command accorded with his inclination and improved fortune, and a number of pieces were produced, which after his death, about 1648, passed to the Jesuit college, Clavigero, Storia Mess., i. 10, and thence to the Archivo General, where they form volumes iv. and xiii.

The most complete list of his works is given in Dicc. Univ., iv.; that by Boturini is nearly as full, Catálogo, 2 etc.; Beristain, Bibl., ‘Alva,’ gives it less so, and Clavigero’s is still briefer, while Pinelo, Epitome, ii. 608, makes merely a general allusion. Kingsborough, on the other hand, offers an almost complete reproduction of the writings in volume ix. of his Mex. Antiq. The longest and most important is the Historia Chichimeca, dedicated to the viceroy, in 95 chapters, of which the first 76 treat of the rise and progress of the Chichimec empire, represented at the conquest by the Acolhuas, and of its glories as inherited by his ancestors, the kings of Tezcuco. The remaining 19 chapters relate to the conquest by the Spaniards, and are incomplete. It is the most carefully written of the series, elaborated partly from previous manuscripts, partly from fresh researches, while the account of the conquest rests also on the testimony of eye-witnesses, reinforced by additions from Gomara and other sources, as he admits on pp. 300, 303. An allusion to Torquemada shows that it could not have been completed before 1615, and it was probably his last work. More than one copy is extant, from one of which Ternaux-Compans printed a French translation, while the best issue, that of Kingsborough, is after a copy from Veytia. The material has been largely used, and Veytia’s Hist. Ant. Mej. may be said to rest upon it. The more important of the other writings are, Sumaria Relacion de todas las cosas en la Nueva-España, y que los tultecas alcanzaron, in 5 relations, which treat of the mythical period from the creation of the world, according to native tradition, to the fall of the Toltecs; Historia de los Señores Chichimecas, in 12 relations, which brings the history down to the Spanish conquest; Noticias de los pobladores y naciones de Nueva España, in 13 relations; the first 12 quite short, and relating to native peoples; the last of considerable length, and dwelling on the conquest. Cárlos María de Bustamante published the 13th relation in separate form, to which, under an excess of patriotic zeal, he gave the abnormal title of Horribles Crueldades de los Conquistadores, Mexico, 1829. Notes were appended, and considerable liberties taken with text, so as to increase the odium against the conquerors. Ternaux-Compans included a French translation of it in his collection. Kingsborough has printed eleven shorter pieces by Ixtlilxochitl, and a few more are attributed to his pen, as a translation of Nezahualcoyotl’s poems, a fragment of the same king’s biography, and a history of the Virgin of Guadalupe; but the last two are doubtful. Several of the pieces are mere repetitions and summaries under different titles, connected with the author’s pleadings, while the 13th relation may be termed a cleverly prepared biography of his great namesake, from the exaggerated prominence given to his services for the Spanish cause. Prescott’s several blunders on this and other points are probably due as much to a want of access to sufficient material as to a hasty study.

Throughout these writings are evidences of the patriotic spirit which prompted Ixtlilxochitl in the study and translation of the painted records of his people; and every now and then gleams forth a very natural hatred of the Spanish oppressor, so marked indeed as once to call forth the condemnation of an official censor. Otherwise the narrative of events connected with the conquerors are closely masked; for the sake of private aims and the common fear of the white masters. As a consequence many troublesome facts are hidden and many questions smoothed to the detriment of history. The narratives are also extremely confusing in dates, and to a great extent in arrangement, while the interest is diminished by trivial details and improbable stories. But these were the faults of his time rather than of himself. He did wonderfully well in grappling with misty traditions, enveloped as they were in the intricate mazes of hieroglyphics. And he is justly entitled to our admiration, and to the gratitude of his countrymen, for rescuing from now unattainable sources so large a mass of material to illustrate the glories of his race. His style indicates a scholar from whom even his Spanish contemporaries might have taken lessons, for the language is exceedingly clear for this period, and full of graceful sentences and striking descriptions, rendering him not unworthy to be called the Livy and the Cicero of Anáhuac, as Prescott and Bustamante respectively entitle him.

[579] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 83, gives a description of these and other presents.

[580] ‘Que se llamaba Totocalco.’ Sahagun, _Hist. Conq._, 26.

[581] Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 581; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 135; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv. Bernal Diaz assumes that the Axayacatl treasures were those now given; but the testimony of the eye-witnesses, Tapia and Ojeda, confirmed and accepted by Gomara and Herrera, shows that they were given on a previous occasion already referred to. Still, Bernal Diaz does mention that after the melting of the rougher jewels new presents came from Montezuma. Hist. Verdad., 82-3. He is very confusing, however, in his account of the treasures generally; and Clavigero, Prescott, and others, have allowed themselves to follow him too closely in this and other instances.

[582] ‘Como de vn Real, y del tamaño de vn toston de a quatro.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 83.

[583] Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 421-2. Cortés, Cartas, 100-1, is not so explicit with regard to the latter figure, saying merely that he had set apart for the king unbroken jewels and other objects valued at over 100,000 ducats; but, since this figure comes in connection with the account of one fifth of all the treasures reserved for the sovereign, it may be assumed that the 100,000 formed also a fifth of the unbroken lot. This, consisting to a great extent of precious stones, pearls, cotton, and other effects, could not have all been reserved for the king. It seems besides improbable that so large a proportion of treasure as 100,000 ducats should a second time have been taken from the soldiers, even if Montezuma had destined them especially for their ruler. All the treasures and gifts acquired were obtained by the efforts of the expedition, and were always regarded as a part of its fund. Yet Gomara, Hist. Mex., 135-6, who had the statements of Cortés and others at his disposal, writes that the 100,000 lot was selected from the treasures, previous to melting, in order to form a present for the king in connection with the one fifth. Bernal Diaz writes confusedly that the heaps of unmelted gold from which feathers and other settings had been removed were valued at 600,000 pesos. ‘This did not include the plates, quoits, and dust of gold, nor the silver and other treasures.’ A few lines further he says that the royal officials declared the gold, melted, and in quoits, dust, and jewels, to be worth over 600,000 pesos, beside the silver and many jewels not valued. From these lots the distribution was made for king and expedition. Many soldiers declared that the original amount was larger, one third having been abstracted by the leaders. Hist. Verdad., 83. The marginal print in this authority calls the above sums pesos de oro, which increases the value three times. Confusing as this version is, it confirms at any rate the supposition that the unbroken jewels were also divided among the members of the expedition. Prescott estimates the whole treasure in the money value of his time at $6,300,000, which may be accepted as sufficiently approximate. See Mex., ii. 202-5. Robertson accepts Bernal Diaz’ last estimate in pesos, which is equivalent to about two fifths of Prescott’s. The small proportion of silver indicates how little the natives understood and resorted to mining, and how insignificant a portion of the metallic wealth of the country was represented by the treasures so far acquired. Gold was obtained from loose and shallow alluvial deposits in and near the rivers, and it was only in the extraction of tin and copper that the Indians exhibited an advance in the art of mining. Robertson is wrong in assuming that gold was not used as a trade medium; still, it was only partly so, and it was chiefly sought for ornaments. The rarity of silver made this metal far more valuable than in Europe, and the stones most esteemed were regarded by the Spaniards as so many pebbles. For an account of mines, metals, and money among the Aztecs, see Native Races, ii. In vol. i. chap. iii. note 8 of the Central American division of the present work is given information on the currency of this period.

[584] For a description, see Cortés, Cartas, 100-1; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 135-6; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv.; Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. iii.; Oviedo, iii. 298-9.

[585] Consisting of 32,400 and odd pesos de oro of melted gold; 100,000 ducats’ worth of unbroken jewels, feathers, etc.; and 100 and more marcos of silver. Cortés, Cartas, 100-1. ‘Lo dieron é entregaron á Alonso de Escobar.’ Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 422.

[586] The expenditures were represented largely by a number of unpaid notes of hand issued by the captain-general to the owners of vessels, provisions, and arms, and held for the most part by captains and leading members of the party. Many of the names and claims are given in Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 411 et seq.

[587] Bernal Diaz appears to say that all these men, from priests to archers, received double rates, Hist. Verdad., 83-4, and Herrera so accepts it, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. v.; but this seems unequal. In the Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 411 et seq., a number of special payments are mentioned, and also wages for sailors.

[588] ‘Soldados huuo q tomaron sus partes a cien pesos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 84. But this sum may mean pesos de oro, which according to the calculation accepted represents nearly $1200.

[589] ‘Cortes, so color de hazer justicia, porq̄ todos le temiessemos, era con grandes mañas.’ It appears that Mejía, on hearing the men complain, spoke to Cortés about missing gold, and thenceforth they were not very friendly. Noticing that Velazquez was in fetters, Montezuma asked the general for the cause, and was told that, not satisfied with his share of gold, he wished to make a tour of the towns to demand more, and perhaps to commit excesses. The emperor asked that he be allowed to go, and Cortés consented with apparent reluctance. A sentence seems to have been passed for the culprit to leave camp, and he proceeded with a Mexican official to Cholula, whence he returned with more gold a few days later. So runs the story of Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 84-5. B. V. de Tapia declares that Cortés kept him ‘muchos dias en una casylla pequeña e con guardas.’ Cortés, Residencia, i. 40-1.

[590] Id., and Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. v.

[591] Among those who took most to heart the disappointing distribution was Juan de Cárdenas, a pilot and sailor of Triana, who had a wife and children in Spain. Tired of struggling with poverty at home he had come to seek a better lot with the conquerors in America. The first sight of the treasures to be divided had inspired him with an ardent hope of being able to return to his family, for an equal division would have given him quite a little fortune. Finding his dream of happiness shattered he became almost raving. Cortés gave him 300 pesos, and promised that he should be sent home by the first opportunity. Cárdenas appeared to be satisfied, but on reaching Spain he came forward as a bitter opponent of the general. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 84. Solis speaks up in behalf of his hero, and condemns the men as avaricious and ungrateful for demanding more than their share. The leaders and best men deserved larger gains. As for Bernal Diaz, ‘Habla mas como pobre soldado, que como historiador.’ Hist. Mex., ii. 35. The share for Villa Rica was sent to Tlascala, says Bernal Diaz, whither rumor had it that large sums were forwarded for Cortés and others, who claimed afterward that they had been lost during the uprising. ‘Las piedras bajas y plumages, todo lo tomaron los Indios de Tlaxcala.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 26.

[592] The cards, made by Pedro Valenciano from drumskins, were as neatly painted as those of Spain. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 84.

[593] Herrera gives lengthy specimens of the warrior preacher’s effusions, occupying more than one chapter. dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. vi.-vii.

[594] According to Bernal Diaz Cortés made a sign that he and Olmedo desired to speak privately to Montezuma. He now proposed that in order to prevent tumult his captains might be persuaded to rest content with a space in the great temple for an altar and cross. Hist. Verdad., 85.

[595] Tapia leaves the impression that he called casually at the temple, and afterward sent for more troops.

[596] In Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 585.

[597] Of 30 or 40 men, says Tapia.

[598] ‘Fice limpiar aquellas capillas ... y puse en ellas imágenes de nuestra Señora y de otros santos.’ Cortés, Cartas, 106. Andrés de Tapia is still more explicit in relating how Cortés insisted on having both chapels cleared of idols. ‘El marques hizo hacer dos altares, uno en una parte de la torre, que era partida en dos huecos, é otro en otra.’ Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 585-6. In testifying to the proceedings in the temple previous to the massacre by Alvarado, B. V. de Tapia states that the Indians intended to restore Huitzilopochtli to the tower, ‘donde solia estar por que lo habia quitado de alli D. Hernando e puesto a nuestra Señora.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36. Alvarado confirms this in different words. Id., 66-7. The only other eye-witness who refers with any detail to the above is Bernal Diaz, and he accords only a space on the summit to the Christian emblems. But his different allusions to the temple are confused and contradictory; yet he has been followed by modern writers: first, because the preceding three testimonies have not been accessible till late years; and second, because they have been content to copy Prescott, who adopts Bernal Diaz in only too many instances. The mistake appears also to rest on the finding of Huitzilopochtli’s image in one of the summit chapels when it was recaptured by the Spaniards during the later siege. It is only natural that the Aztecs, on obtaining possession of their temple, should have reinstalled the war god. Peter Martyr does assume that one image was too large to be removed. dec. v. cap. iv. And Gomara intimates that idols remained. ‘Pusierõ cruzes e imagines ... entre sus ídolos.’ Hist. Mex., 128. The phrase can apply to those in the court, although his statement may be founded on Martyr, as that of Ixtlilxochitl is on him: ‘Y dió [Montezuma] permiso que en la capilla del templo mayor ... se pusiesen entre los dos ídolos de Huitzilopochtli, un crucifijo, una imagen de Nuestra Señora y una cruz.’ Hist. Chich., 297. As regards the casting-down of idols, Prescott, in common with most modern writers, assumes this to be a mere boast on the part of Cortés; but a careful investigation, supported by the ‘solemn’ assurance of Tapia, not accessible to them, confirms this statement in the main. The general probably exaggerates somewhat in saying: ‘Los mas principales destos ídolos ... derroqué yo de sus sillas y los fice echar por las escaleras abajo.’ Cartas, 106. This probably strikes Oviedo, who, while repeating the account, expresses a doubt about its truth: ‘Bien pudo Dios dar lugar á ello; pero para mí yo tengo por maravilla, é grande, la mucha paçiençia de Monteçuma é de los indios.’ iii. 303. Solis even doubts that altar and cross were ever erected in so unclean a spot, amid idols and idolatrous priests: it would have been sacrilege; besides the Mexicans would never have permitted the intrusion. Hist. Mex., ii. 9-12. The doubt expressed against Cortés’ boast rests chiefly with Bernal Diaz, whose faulty account states that Montezuma by mere persuasion sent for the priests, and after consulting with them had a space on the temple summit quietly assigned to the Spaniards. Hist. Verdad., 85. Gomara devotes several pages to the casting down of the idols, which he justly regards as a memorable feat: ‘Mas honra y prez gano Cortés con esta hazaña Christiana, que si los venciera en batalla.’ He applies it, however, to the occasion of the imperial prisoner’s first visit to the temple. Montezuma stops Cortés in the midst of his destructive work and checks the fury of the crowd, which the general thereupon appeases with a long profound speech on theologic mysteries, carefully prepared by Gomara. Hist. Mex., 126-8. The preceding points assume importance when it is considered that the usurpation of the great pyramid by Christian emblems gave the strongest impulse to the uprising soon to follow.

[599] ‘É puso en una parte la imágen de Nuestra Señora en un retablico de tabla, é en otro la de Sant Cristóbal, porque no habie estonces otras imágines.’ Rel., loc. cit. It is generally assumed by the faithful that the virgin’s image is identical with the one now known as the Vírgen de los Remedios, in its celebrated shrine near Mexico. It had been given to Juan Rodriguez de Villafuerte by his brother, an Augustine friar, when he departed for the Indies. During the uprising in June, 1520, the image is believed to have of its own accord taken flight to the site where a shrine afterward rose in its honor. Medina, Chrón. de San Diego de Mex., 30; Cabrera, Escudo Armas, 106-25; Lorenzana, in Cortés, Hist. N. Esp., 138 et seq.; Bustamante, Mem. Piedad Mex. Unfortunately for this belief, Tapia’s testimony describes the image as a picture on a board, while the Remedios image is a little battered doll. The testimony is contradicted by nothing but pious supposition. In preparing the site for altars the Spaniards noticed that the walls were of unusual thickness. Breaking them open they found a number of jewels. Gold was also obtained from tombs on the summit platform, and the curtain pendants and other valuables were of course appropriated. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., 586; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. viii, cap. vi.

[600] Montezuma received the returning procession with a forced welcome, and gave orders to destroy a series of brothels in Tlatelulco, containing over 400 women, whose iniquity, he said, had brought the present evil upon the city. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. vi.

[601] Herrera devotes five columns to Cortés’ sermon. dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. vii.; Torquemada, i. 465-7.

[602] Or perhaps of the teachers of the faith, who appeared with sword in hand to enforce their cruel, rapacious, and immoral demands. Herrera believes Montezuma would have become a Christian had he dared. dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. ix. But Duran states that according to the native records all the three captive rulers were baptized, and that Father Olmedo had told him he believed such was the case, although the rite had not been administered by himself. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 445. This question will be discussed in a later chapter.

[603] ‘Sed ciertos, que de aqui a mañana llouera, y tendreys el mejor año que jamas aueys tenido.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. viii. cap. vi.

[604] Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586; Hazart, Kirchen Geschichte, ii. 520; Torquemada, i. 464.

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XX. THE CUBAN GOVERNOR IN PURSUIT

1519-1520.

THE MEXICANS THREATEN REVOLT—THE CLERGY IN ARMS—THEY DENOUNCE THE CONDUCT OF MONTEZUMA—THE EMPEROR DECLARES HE CAN NO LONGER RESTRAIN HIS PEOPLE—TIDINGS OF VELAZQUEZ’ FLEET—SAILING FROM CUBA OF AN EXPEDITION UNDER NARVAEZ—ARRIVAL IN MEXICO—CONFLICT WITH CORTÉS—INTERCHANGE OF THREATS AND COURTESIES—ATTEMPTED UNION OF FORCES—NARVAEZ REMAINS LOYAL TO VELAZQUEZ—DESERTION OF SOME OF HIS MEN TO CORTÉS.

War now seemed inevitable; for if earthly powers availed not against the invaders, heaven’s artillery should disperse the impious foe. If feeble man by fearful combinations be brought low, surely the gods may yet defend themselves from insult.

Hitherto it had been the higher nobles only who harbored designs against the Spaniards, but, while no longer cemented by the accustomed despotism, they were held in check by their jealousies, their party politics, and fear for their possessions. A stronger influence than these was at hand, however. Now for the first time the lesser nobles and the common people were aroused. The outrage on the idols affected all. And the clergy, who out of regard for their high-priest, the emperor, had remained passive, now felt themselves struck in a vital part. Their influence, supremacy, and means of support were all involved, and the power of the priesthood was as great here as among other superstitious peoples. How far they worked upon the nobles and plebeians is not clear, but their interviews with Montezuma, although held in secret, out of the reach even of the favorite page, became so frequent and earnest as to rouse the suspicions of the guard. It was said that, assisted by influential courtiers, they represented how deeply the sacrilegious act had stirred the people, already incensed by the shameful captivity of their sovereigns. Further than this, oracles had announced that the gods would abandon the city and its inhabitants to their fate if the obnoxious strangers were not quickly killed or driven hence. The masses would rise, and if Montezuma, forgetful of his dignity and duty, still declined to be liberated, preferring the fate of Quauhpopoca, which must surely overtake him, then they would choose another monarch.[605] This last threat struck home. Sorely had Montezuma sighed for liberty, and he had feared for his throne; now his own subjects threatened him with what he dreaded most. In this dilemma he turned to Cortés.[606]

The apprehensions of the Spaniards had been aroused not only by the secret interviews of the priests, but by the somewhat distant manner of the emperor, and at this unusual summons they became seriously alarmed. Even the general could not suppress his misgivings as he hurried to the emperor’s apartments, attended by Olid, then captain of the guard. With solemn visage Montezuma bade him be seated. Then he reminded him of the warnings against his many rash proceedings, particularly the installation of the cross upon the pyramid. The incensed gods at last had spoken, had ordered him to attack and drive the Spaniards into the sea, and the people were stirred almost beyond control. He had only to give the signal; nay, did he delay to do so, they would rise. But he loved Malinche; had he not proved this by his devotion? He wished to save the Spaniards; and now he warned, he implored them to leave the city before it would be too late. They might take all his treasures; nay, he would give each man a load of gold if they would only go.[607]

The tone and manner of the prince convinced them that his words were sincere. Cortés deemed it best to feign compliance. He thanked the emperor for the interest manifested in their safety, and replied that since he and his gods and people so desired it, they would comply; but having no vessels, time must be allowed to build them.[608] This was perplexing, but Montezuma overlooked everything on hearing that the Spaniards were ready to leave. He insisted no further, knowing well enough that he and the other captives would have to follow if a withdrawal from the city was required before the means of transport had been found.[609] He had seen that it did not take long to construct ships, and offered the necessary carpenters to fell and prepare timber, as before. Meanwhile he would endeavor to appease his vassals, pointing out that an uprising would be disastrous also to himself and them. Martin Lopez was at once sent down to Villa Rica with Andrés Nuñez, some chiefs, and a number of Indian workmen, to build three vessels, but with secret instructions to delay the work in every manner.[610]

* * * * *

Cortés had no intention to surrender his hold on the country. It was now more than eight months since the procuradores had left for Spain, and he began to look for their return with a royal commission, if not with reinforcements. Once provided with this worshipful paper he could brave Velazquez and all the world. He could send to the Islands and buy vessels, arms, and supplies; and he could easily enlist all the troops necessary to the achievement of his great project. Meanwhile he hoped to maintain his position, supported by native allies, such as the Tlascaltecs, Chinantecs, Goazacoalcos, and Cempoalans. It needed not the warning of Montezuma to convince the Spaniards that a serious attitude had been assumed against them by the natives, and that the precautions for defence must be redoubled. The attendants appeared less obsequious, and the supplies had materially diminished—owing to the late drought, they said.[611] This was remedied by the commands of the emperor. But even the prospect of a speedy departure of the strangers did not appear to conciliate the people; and less sanguine than their leader, the soldiers of Cortés felt oppressed by gloomy forebodings. In addition to this they were harassed by extra guard duty and by being obliged to sleep in their accoutrements, ready for instant defence.[612]

We must now go back to Cuba for a moment, where long since we left the irate governor cursing. Poor Velazquez! Córdoba, Grijalva, Cortés, all the deputies sent out to conquer for him new lands, had only been a drain on him, bringing back little compensation in slaves and gold. Deeply as he felt these troubles they had not yet affected his obesity, and it was with difficulty that he waddled about his island stirring up avengers. With the aid of Fonseca the chaplain, Benito Martin, whom Velazquez had sent to Spain on his behalf, had obtained for him a royal commission,[613] with the title of adelantado of the lands lately discovered under his auspices to the westward; and October, 1519, saw busy preparations on the island for an expedition as well against Cortés as Montezuma.[614]

There was no trouble in obtaining men. The rumors created by the visit of Puertocarrero and Montejo left the impression that ship-loads of gold had been forwarded from the new region to Spain, and the island was consequently in a ferment with excitement. So great indeed became the desire to enlist that Velazquez would in any case have been obliged to form an expedition to prevent the people from going on their own account to reinforce Cortés.[615] At first it was announced that the governor would go in person, and so prevent further rebellion. But Velazquez never thought of such a thing: he was too corpulent, he lacked courage, and he could not abandon his interests and his post in Cuba, leaving the island scantily provided with defenders. Further than this, he had confidence in the legal right conferred on him over the new country and over any expedition he might send. His announced reasons were the duties of his office, which demanded his presence more than ever owing to the prevalent small-pox epidemic.[616]

Among the many candidates eager for the command were Baltasar Bermudez, a relative, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, and Pánfilo de Narvaez, the first two mentioned already in connection with Cortés’ appointment. With Bermudez the governor could come to no arrangement, and with Porcallo he managed to quarrel after selecting him,[617] so that he was left with no other choice than Narvaez. This was the hidalgo of Valladolid,[618] whom we have met before, who had joined Velazquez shortly after his arrival in Cuba, and had taken a leading part in its conquest. This over, he had married a rich widow, María de Valenzuela, possessing a number of towns, and had accepted civil positions, such as procurador for the island, and contador in the newly discovered region. Narvaez was about forty-two years of age, tall and strongly built, with a long face, ruddy complexion, and sandy beard. To a deep voice might be added agreeable manners, being quite fascinating in conversation. His qualities were such as created favorable impression. Ordinarily he exhibited good judgment, but he was careless, headstrong, and arrogant. As a soldier he was undoubtedly brave, but deficient in discipline and foresight; as a general he was far from being the equal of Cortés.[619]

By virtue of his commission Velazquez appointed this man captain-general and lieutenant-governor of the new country, with orders to send Cortés and any rebellious captain in chains to Cuba, to carry on the conquest, and to administer for the best interests of the settlement.[620] But the friends of Cortés were not idle. They caused representations to be secretly made to the audiencia[621] that a fratricidal war was about to be opened in the new region, ruinous to the interests of God and the king, and legal steps were at once taken by the promotor fiscal.[622] The policy of Cortés in sending procuradores to Spain, with presents and messages to the king, had its effect on the audiencia, which considered not only that his case had passed beyond them, but that he was rendering, and likely to render, greater service to the royal interest than was his rival. By no means predisposed in favor of Velazquez, they moreover sent to Cuba the prudent licentiate Lucas Vazquez de Aillon, a member of their body, with instructions to prevent the threatened danger.

Accompanied by Pedro de Ledesma, secretary to the audiencia, and the alguacil mayor, Aillon met Narvaez at Yagua,[623] preparing with a portion of the fleet to join the rest at Guaniguanico. Placing the captain under injunction not to leave Cuba, he proceeded to the rendezvous and represented to Velazquez the evil which must result from his project, urging that his duty as governor and loyal subject demanded him to forego personal vengeance and interest, and finally forbidding the expedition without express permission from the king. The governor, who appears to have obtained more definite news from Spain regarding the wealth and promises of New Spain, was more determined than ever to carry out his scheme. Relying upon the grant of the country to himself, he considered that he had every right to claim his own and to treat Cortés as an interloper. At first he refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the audiencia in the matter, but pretended finally to fall in with Aillon’s views.

It was accordingly agreed that, in order to promote the interests both of king and governor, by rendering available the costly preparations made, the fleet should proceed to its destination, but without Indians, and with a less number of settlers than had volunteered. Narvaez might present the claims of his principal upon Cortés, but only in a peaceable manner, without landing any forces. If they were not entertained, he must sail onward in quest of new discoveries.[624]

In the presence of Aillon instructions were given to Narvaez in accordance with the agreement, but the former nevertheless resolved to accompany the expedition and watch over their observance, for he suspected the sincerity of both parties.[625]

The expedition was the largest which had as yet been fitted out in the New World, and consisted of eleven large and seven small vessels, with somewhat over nine hundred soldiers, including eighty men with fire-arms, one hundred and twenty with cross-bows, and eighty horsemen. There were also several hundred Indians, a large force of sailors, and a park of artillery, together with ample stores of all kinds.[626]

Sail was set early in March, 1520, and after touching at Cozumel Island to pick up the party which had been left there[627] some time before, they entered Rio de Tabasco to obtain water and provisions. The inhabitants fled from the town on seeing so large a force, but with the aid of an interpreter found there they were reassured, and brought maize and fowl, together with three women, as presents for the captain. Four days after leaving the river the fleet was dispersed by a storm, with the loss of six vessels and a number of soldiers and sailors.[628] The rest of the vessels arrived at San Juan de Ulua in the latter part of April.[629]

Three soldiers, deserters from the exploring expedition[630] of Cortés, came on board, and after declaring allegiance to Narvaez, poured into the ears of their wondering countrymen the story of their general’s brilliant achievements. They told of the vast extent and resources of the country, of the wealth accumulated, the unfairness of Cortés in dividing, and the consequent discontent of the soldiers and the danger of their position.[631] This tended to render the conceited Narvaez over-confident, so that his rival was rather benefited than injured by the story of the deserters. He now told Aillon that he would land, since Cortés was so far in the interior and the vessels in a bad condition. He was also determined to form a settlement, and regardless of the oidor’s protest a town was founded for a second time upon the site of the present Vera Cruz.[632] The governor of Cuetlachtlan hastened to send presents of supplies, as an act of courtesy to a captain whom he supposed to be the friend of Cortés. He was undeceived, however, and told by the deserters that Narvaez was the real envoy and captain sent by the king, while Cortés and his men were fugitive adventurers whom Narvaez would punish. His king had heard of the outrage on the emperor, and had sent him to procure his release, to restore order, and thereupon to return. The governor reported this to Montezuma, who, thinking no doubt that it would be prudent to secure the friendship of so powerful a commander, whether he came as liberator or oppressor, sent him a number of valuable presents, and gave orders to provide his army with supplies. Narvaez kept the valuables for himself, a course which did not tend to increase his popularity, and transmitted in return a few trinkets to the monarch, with assurances of his good-will.[633]

Hearing that Velazquez de Leon was leading a large force not far off, Narvaez sent a message, appealing to him as a relative and old friend to join him with his men; but Velazquez, who was still in the region in and above Chinantla, looking for tribute and gold, deigned not even to reply, but forwarded the letter to his general and asked for orders. Meanwhile he and his lieutenant, Rangel, assembled their men and made them swear allegiance to Cortés, a few suspected of sympathy with the Cuban governor being placed under surveillance.[634] The next step of Narvaez was to demand the surrender of Villa Rica, which the deserters represented as held by less than four score men. This task was intrusted to the clergyman Juan Ruiz de Guevara, accompanied by Notary Vergara, Amaya a relative of Velazquez, and three witnesses,[635] and letters were given them for distribution among Cortés’ soldiers, with a view to gain their allegiance.[636]

Sandoval had been advised concerning the fleet, and suspecting the object he sent to warn Cortés, despatching at the same time two dark-complexioned soldiers, disguised as Indian fruit vendors, to learn further particulars. The spies remained in Narvaez’ camp a whole day, and by mingling with the leaders they picked up valuable information, escaping during the night with two horses.[637] Sandoval now sent off the old and infirm soldiers to a town called Papalote, in the hills, and obtained the promise of the remainder to hold the fort with him, a gallows being erected in a conspicuous site as a warning to the faint-hearted. About this time Guevara appeared before the quarters of Sandoval. No one came to receive him, and he had to find his way to the commander’s house. The priest had been led to believe that little or no objection would be made by the adherents of Cortés to his demands, and confidently he began his harangue, speaking of the claims of Velazquez and the treason of Cortés. The word treason fired Sandoval. His party were the better servants of the king, he said, and were it not for Guevara’s character as a clergyman he would have him chastised for his impudence. As it was, he referred him to Cortés as captain-general and justicia mayor of New Spain. Guevara likewise grew warm,[638] and a war of words followed, which the commander cut short by ordering some Indians to bundle the three principals into net hammocks. In these they were carried to Mexico, under a Spanish guard, to be delivered to the general.[639]

* * * * *

When Montezuma first received news from the coast governor of the arrival of the great fleet, he supposed that these were the vessels which Cortés had said that he expected, and by which it was hoped he would depart. Montezuma at once sent for Cortés to impart the tidings.[640] The Spanish general was not a little surprised at this second unusual summons, and still more when told that his vessels had arrived, and that new ones need not be built. While he was yet puzzling over the words, the emperor produced the painted message showing a fleet at anchor off Chalchiuhcuecan. “You can now leave in safety, and all will be well,” continued the monarch, overjoyed at the thought of release.[641] “Thanks be to God, who provides all things!” was the fervent utterance of the general, while the soldiers sent up shouts of joy mingled with discharges of fire-arms. “Surely,” they said, “Puertocarrero and Montejo have returned in good time.” Further consideration of the matter, however, convinced Cortés that these were not the ships of his friends, but that they belonged to his archenemy of Cuba. His captains thought the same, and talked with calculated effect to the men of the great wrong to them if the hirelings of Velazquez were to step in and reap the results of their hardships.

Anxious to learn something definite, Cortés sent two messengers by different routes to bring news about the expedition, a third being instructed to follow Velazquez de Leon with instructions to await orders before proceeding to Goazacoalco; a fourth messenger was despatched to Villa Rica.[642] Learning meanwhile from Sandoval that the expedition was inimical to him, Cortés sent letters from himself and his regidores to the commander, stating the progress of conquest on behalf of the Spanish king, and demanding his object. If he needed no succor, and came not provided with royal authority, he must at once depart; otherwise Cortés would march against him, supported by the vast forces of the empire.[643] The letters were made the subject of jest among the officers of Narvaez, the veedor Salvatierra declaring that the messages of traitors should receive no attention. He urged the expediency of marching upon them without loss of time, and swore that he would broil and eat the ears of Cortés.

Shortly after the letters had been sent, the approach of Guevara and his companions was announced. And now for more of that deep diplomacy in which Cortés was so skilled. Perceiving the importance of conciliating men of their standing, he despatched an escort with horses to bring them with all honor into the city, and he himself went to meet them, expressing regret at the rude treatment they had received. With smooth tongue and promises he wove his web round them, and “oiled their hands with gold,” as Bernal Diaz expresses it. He showed them the greatness and wealth of the country, and explained to them how it was all in his power; and he sought to convince them of the injury dissension must occasion to God, to the king, and to themselves. Ah, rare talent, the talent of tongue! Guevara, at least, was won over, and went back delighted with his courtesy and liberality, and in full sympathy with his cause.[644] On reaching the camp he told of what he had seen, the great extent of country, its vast population, and the number of well built towns on every side. Nor did he fail to sing the praises of Cortés, and speak of his treasures, of which he displayed specimens. Every captain and soldier under him, he said, could boast of heavy gold ornaments and well filled purses, of numerous servants and beautiful women; and they lived on the fat of the land, having the country and all its inhabitants at their disposal. The general had taken care to exhibit only the attractive features of his position, which as now detailed by the priest captivated the hearts of the listeners, who longed to be with so fortunate and liberal a leader. Even before this many were disaffected, and despised the arrogant and narrow-minded Narvaez; others took an impartial view, and recognized the evil of dissension in a country only half subdued, while yet others were intent only on securing treasures.

The priest brought a letter to Narvaez, wherein Cortés expressed delight at finding his old friend commander of the expedition, although he regretted that hostile measures had been taken against him, who as a loyal servant held the country for the king. If Narvaez carried a royal commission, it had only to be presented to be obeyed; otherwise he was willing to come to a friendly agreement, since hostilities must be prejudicial not only to them both, but to the crown.[645] Guevara supported these expressions by recommending a peaceful arrangement and withdrawal to new territory, for Cortés was evidently loyal, and had hosts of Indians to aid him in maintaining his position. Narvaez not only refused to listen to any overtures, but became indignant with the clergyman and his companions for advocating them. He knew that the forces of Cortés were inferior to his own, and of Indians he had no fear.

Cortés had elicited from Guevara a number of facts regarding the expedition, among them that the arrogance and parsimony of Narvaez had alienated a large proportion of his followers, and that a little gold would have a wonderful effect.[646] Indeed, they had come for gold, and had no desire to raise the sword against their brethren if it could be avoided. This information was not lost on the astute conqueror.

Shortly after the departure of the clergyman, Cortés took counsel with Father Olmedo, that most admirable of friars, whose knowledge of the world, calm judgment, and clear foresight had more than once saved Cortés from himself. Olmedo now undertook the conversion of Narvaez and his men. Laden with instructions and jewels, he proceeded to their camp and endeavored to win Narvaez to peaceful measures. Special letters and presents were given Duero, Aillon, and others, who were supposed to be friendly, with a view of obtaining their active coöperation. Cortés wished especially that Narvaez should understand that he was friendly to him. Dissension would react on both, particularly on Narvaez; unity of action could alone promote their common aim and preserve the country to the king. Cortés had fewer soldiers, but was nevertheless stronger, from possessing interpreters, knowledge of the country, and control of its forces and resources. Were not the kings already his servants?

But Narvaez was stubborn. Olmedo, however, overcame the scruples of a number of his counsellors, who advised him to negotiate with a man so strongly established. Narvaez called them all traitors, and told Olmedo that he ought to be ashamed of himself for promulgating such base sentiments; whereat the priest became indignant, and devoted himself all the more assiduously to the subordinates, among whom he found the way well prepared by Guevara. His arguments found willing ears, and his gold confirmed the arguments. Among his companions from Mexico was one Usagre, an artillerist, whose brother occupied a similar position under Narvaez. This man also did Cortés good service. These doings could not escape notice, and, warned by Salvatierra, the commander would have arrested the friar had not Duero and others interfered. They called attention to his diplomatic and religious character, and the courteous treatment Cortés had given his own messengers. Narvaez hurried him away, however, with a letter for his general, wherein he claimed authority to take possession of the country for Velazquez. If Cortés resisted, it would fare ill with him.[647]

It was an easy escape for Olmedo, for Narvaez had not scrupled shortly before to deal with the royal oidor in a most peremptory manner. Aillon had remonstrated with him about his proceedings, such as forming a settlement, threatening to enter the country, spreading harsh reports among the natives against Cortés, and neglecting to restrain his men from taking property and otherwise abusing the inhabitants. No attention being paid to this, he formally called upon Narvaez to make a peaceful demand for the surrender of the country, and, if refused, to go elsewhere to settle. He intimated publicly that the measures of Narvaez were actuated by malice, rather than by loyal wisdom. This the vain and arrogant commander could not endure. It was to the oidor, he said, that the present growing disaffection among his men was due. He was becoming dangerous, and the municipal officers were directed to seize and carry him on board the same vessel in which he had arrived. His secretary and alguacil were placed on board another, and a day or two after sail was set for Cuba, the captains and crews having been sworn to deliver them to Velazquez.[648] During the voyage, however, Aillon persuaded his jailers to take him to Española, which he reached in the last days of August, after a long and dangerous trip of three months and a half. The consort vessel was separated from him during a storm shortly after leaving Ulua, and the secretary and alguacil did not rejoin the oidor till October. A report of the outrage was promptly forwarded to the king, signed by the whole audiencia, with a request that severe chastisement be inflicted, in order to maintain respect for that august tribunal.[649]

Among others falling under the wrath of Narvaez was Gonzalo de Oblanco, whose advocacy of Cortés and condemnation of Aillon’s arrest brought imprisonment, which so wrought upon him that he died within a few days.[650] These harsh and foolish measures engendered further discontent, and half a dozen of Aillon’s supporters, including Pedro de Villalobos, deserted to Sandoval, who received them with open arms. Others sent to signify their willingness to join Cortés.[651]

After Aillon’s arrest Narvaez had been persuaded to move his camp to Cempoala, as a healthier place, more suitable for head-quarters, and better provided with supplies. The cacique was intimidated to surrender some effects belonging to Cortés and to accord the new-comers a welcome, which seemed to stamp his conduct as desertion. “Oh, well!” said Cortés when told of it, “long live the last victor.”[652] But he could hardly blame the natives for yielding, when even Sandoval himself, on hearing of this approach, abandoned Villa Rica and took refuge in the mountains, where he remained till the general bade him join his forces.[653]

FOOTNOTES

[605] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 136-7; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 85-6. ‘El diablo q̄ muchas vezes le hablaua, le amenazaua.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. ‘Hiço Monteçuma aperçebir çient mill hombres de pelea.’ Oviedo, iii. 507. Others make the number less. To this Clavigero objects: ‘Mi persuado che vi sia stata in fatti qualche truppa allestita, non però per ordine del Re, ma soltanto d’alcuni Nobili.’ Storia Mess., iii. 112.

[606] Solis sees in this determination only a proof of his supposition that the offer of vassalage and tribute was but a bribe to satiate the Spaniards, since he now bids them go. Hist. Mex., ii. 35-6.

[607] ‘Yo os daré para vos dos cargas de oro, é una para cada chripstiano.’ Oviedo, iii. 507; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Herrera increases this to four loads for Cortés and two loads for each horseman. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. And Duran heard that a ship-load of treasures was offered; but the pious Cortés was too intent on converting souls to accept the bribe. Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 91; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. Montezuma had become attached to many of the Spaniards, including the courteous general, and really wished them well.

[608] ‘Dixo a vn Español de los doze, q̄ fuesse a auisar a los compañeros q̄ se aparejassen por quanto se trataua cõ el de sus vidas.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 137-8. This author and others state that Cortés gives thanks for the warning, and offers to go whenever he is bidden. Montezuma, equally polite, tells him to select his own time. When ready to leave he will give a load of gold to each man, and two for himself. Cortés thereupon brings up the question of vessels.

[609] ‘Cortes le dixo ... q̄ por fuerça auia de ir el Mõteçuma con nosotros, para que le vea nuestro gran Emperador.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 86. It is not probable that this was said on the present occasion, however, and it would only have irritated the emperor.

[610] ‘Yd con essos indios, é córtese la madera, y entretanto Dios nos proveerá de gente é socorro: por tanto, poned tal dilaçion que parezca que haçeys algo.’ Oviedo, iii. 507-8; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. Bernal Diaz considers this wrong. He knows not what Cortés told Lopez, ‘mas muy secretamente me dixo el Martin Lopez, que de hecho, y apriessa los labrava.’ Montezuma had demanded that ‘no huviesse mas palabras, sino obras.’ Hist. Verdad., 86. Perhaps Lopez did hurry, from personal fear of remaining in the country; or he may have been instructed by Cortés to say so to the soldiers, in order to calm them.

[611] ‘Comenzó á faltar todo lo necessario para comer y beber.’ To remedy this, strict orders had to be issued to purveyors, and the Tlascaltecs were sent on foraging expeditions, which led to much abuse. Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 25 (ed. 1840), 90.

[612] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138. In speaking of this, Bernal Diaz says that he became so used to sleeping in his clothes, and enduring hardships generally, that he almost discarded the bed during his later encomendero life, and could take only short naps. ‘Esto he dicho, por que sepã de que arte andamos los verdaderos Conquistadores, y como estavamos tan acostũbrados a las armas, y a velar.’ Hist. Verdad., 86.

[613] This was dated Saragossa, November 13, 1518, within a week of Cortés’ usurpation of the fleet, as Las Casas observes, and conceded to Velazquez the position of adelantado not only over Yucatan, Cozumel, and ‘other islands’ discovered by his expeditions, but over any further lands that he might find. In connection with this title was granted, to him and one heir, one fifteenth of the revenue accruing to the king from these lands; and after their conquest and settlement one twentieth of the same revenue, in perpetuity for himself and heirs, from any one island that he might select—the discoveries were supposed to be all islands. All supplies of food, clothes, and arms, introduced by him during his life, were to be free of duty. In support of his expenses a royal plantation near Habana was transferred to him, and an annual salary conferred of 300,000 maravedís. A number of other provisions were made for the promotion of economic, politic, and spiritual welfare in the new region. A synopsis of the commission is given in Las Casas, Hist. Ind., v. 2-5. Prescott misunderstands the Carta de Velazquez of October 12, 1519, in supposing that the governor had not received notice of his appointment by that time, and is therefore wrong in taking Gomara to task for saying: ‘Estando pues en aqueste pensamiẽto [to thwart Cortés], auino que llego a Santiago ... cartas del Emperador, y el titulo de Adelantado, y cedula de la gouernacion ... de Yucatã.’ Hist. Mex., 140.

[614] Carta de Velazquez, October 12, 1519, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 246-51. Solis assumes that the preparations of Velazquez were influenced by the news of the reception accorded in Spain to the procuradores of Cortés. Hist. Mex., ii. 42-4. But this supposition, based partly on a vague expression of Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii., is wrong, for the procuradores reached Spain only in October, and were detained for some time before they saw the emperor.

[615] ‘Conociendo que la gẽte, de vna manera o de otra, se auia de yr, acordò de recogerla.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.

[616] Letter to Figueroa, Nov. 17, 1519, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 400.

[617] It appears that Velazquez’ suspicious nature had led him to cast reflections upon Porcallo, who resented them by throwing up the appointment. Herrera tells the story, which is not very interesting. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.

[618] Bernal Diaz says also ‘Ualladolid, ó de Tudela de Duero.’ Hist. Verdad., 246, 38.

[619] ‘A este Narvaez hizo Diego Velazquez su Capitan principal, siempre honrándolo, de manera que despues dél tuvo en aquella isla el primer lugar.’ Las Casas, Hist. Ind., iv. 4-6; Oviedo, i. 496. ‘Dezian que era muy escaco.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 247.

[620] In a letter to Judge Figueroa, of the Española audiencia, dated November 17, 1519, he gives notice of this appointment, and states that the object of the expedition is to prevent injury to the royal interest and outrages upon the natives. That very day he was leaving for Trinidad and other parts to aid Narvaez in the preparations. Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 399-403. Narvaez’ appointment is mentioned already in the letter of October 12th, addressed to a Spanish dignitary, wherein he is spoken of as contador for the new countries. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xii. 250.

[621] ‘Auiso y relacion dellos les embió desde Cuba el licenciado Zuaço, que auia venido ... a tomar residencia.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87. But we are safe in saying that Duero gave the impulse.

[622] This official, Juan Carrillo, laid the case before the audiencia, December 24th, representing that Cortés had without superior permission made war on the natives of the new lands and conquered them. He had also appropriated Velazquez’ fleet and captured men from Garay’s party, greatly to the injury of both. Velazquez was now preparing an expedition against him. The two parties would meet and fight, giving the natives the opportunity to rise and recover the country. Both Cortés and Velazquez being guilty in undertaking such expeditions without authority, the fiscal prays that they be punished in person and estate. An oidor or his proxy should at once be sent to investigate the case and prevent such war. During the following weeks Carrillo presented letters and witnesses in support of his petition. Proceso por Real Audiencia de la Española, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 404-10.

[623] Fourteen leagues west of Trinidad.

[624] ‘Todo lo qual se asentó desta manera, y lo dió por instruccion en mi presencia al dicho Pánfilo de Narvaez.’ Ayllon, in Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. For fuller text of this agreement see Ayllon, Parecer, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 476-9. By the time the discovery voyage was concluded the king would have decided the case.

[625] This creeps out in his report, to which he adds: ‘Parecióme que, pues yo principalmente habia ido á estorbar que no oviesen debates y escándalos, que debia seguir mi camino hasta los dexar pacíficos.’ Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337. The account of his efforts in Cuba is also given in a special letter to the king, written by him at Guaniguanico March 4th, on the eve of departure for New Spain. This letter was detained in Cuba till August. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xi. 439-42; Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 481-6. Herrera, who is not aware of the agreement with Aillon, assumes that Velazquez and Narvaez answer his protests by mere assurances that they intend no harm, but will take care of the king’s interest, Narvaez ending the discussion by saying: ‘de qualquiera manera se pensaua embarcar dentro de dos horas.’ dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Bernal Diaz also states that Velazquez relied so much on the favor of the bishop that he totally ignored the protests of Aillon. ‘Soldados dixeron, que venia con intencion de ayudarnos, y si no lo pudiesse hazer, tomar la tierra en si por su Magestad, como Oidor.’ Hist. Verdad., 87. Solis supposes that Aillon hoped to prevail on Narvaez when once out of Velazquez’ reach. Hist. Mex., ii. 47; Cortés, Cartas, 117; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 140. The governor evidently feared to oppose Aillon’s distasteful resolution to embark, lest he should induce the audiencia to adopt a more forcible interference; and perhaps he thought that his protests could be more safely disregarded the farther he was removed from the centre of government.

[626] At the review in Cempoala, New Spain, were found 80 musketeers, 120 archers, 600 infantry, and 80 horsemen. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 146. Cortés was told by Guevara that there were 800 infantry, including 80 archers and 120 musketeers. Cartas, 116. Oviedo has only 800 men, but with 200 horses, iii. 508, while Bernal Diaz raises the totals to 19 vessels, with 1300 to 1400 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 90 archers, and 70 musketeers, but not counting the sailors. The artillery of guns was in charge of Captain Rodrigo Martin. Hist. Verdad., 86-7. Clavigero adopts 18 vessels, 800 infantry, 85 cavalry, over 500 sailors, and 12 guns. Storia Mess., iii. 113. Aillon vaguely mentions ‘over 600 Spaniards in sixteen vessels.’ ‘Sin que yo lo supiese, llevaron hasta mil indios.’ Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 337; and Tapia says 1000 and odd men. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. The figures from the review in New Spain must be increased by the number lost with six of the vessels off that coast, and this may be what Bernal Diaz attempts to do, although he evidently makes the estimate too high. Agustin Bermudez was alguacil mayor, and Cortés’ old friend, Duero, managed to join as contador. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[627] Eighty Spaniards had been landed, and a number of Indians, but most of the latter, together with a large proportion of the natives, had died of small-pox introduced by the Cubans. To judge from Aillon’s report he appears to have allowed a number of Spaniards to remain, with a view to make there a calling-place for ships, and which might serve as a base for operations tending to the conquest of Yucatan. He refers to the latter country as an island adjoining Ulua, which he believes is a continent, lying near the land discovered by Solís and Yañez. Carta de Audiencia, Aug. 30, 1520, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338.

[628] ‘Se ahogaron cinqüenta ombres é los demas escapamos con harto riesgo.’ Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 338-9. Montezuma informed Cortés of this shipwreck, ‘é le mostró en una manta pintados diez y ocho navíos, é los cinco dellos á la costa quebrados é trastornados en el arena.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586. ‘Tuuo vn viento de Norte ... y de noche se le perdio vn nauio de poco porte, que dio al traues; Capitan ... Christoval de Morante ... y se ahogó cierta gente.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.

[629] Aillon was among the first to arrive, Narvaez and the other captains coming in during the following two days. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 339. Hence Prescott’s date of April 23d is somewhat too accurate. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes that a landing is effected on April 20th. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 276. Cortés states that the news reached him in the beginning of May. Cartas, 113. Taking four days to travel to Mexico, the fleet arrived eight days after the ship-building party had left the capital. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 138; Alaman, Disert., i. 109. Narvaez’ agent in Spain states that the fleet numbered eleven vessels on arrival. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 437.

[630] Three of the men left in Chinantla, ‘que se dezian Ceruantes el chocarrero, y Escalana, y ... Alonso Hernandez Carretero.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Porras gives several and different names. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 500. Cortés appears to say that they were the men sent by him to bring news of Narvaez and who deserted. Cartas, 115. Aillon speaks of one man who came on board of his vessel. Finding that Cortés had instructed the Indians to regard any foreign arrivals as inimical, this man was sent to reassure them. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 339. It appears probable, however, that Cortés’ expectation of messengers from his king was known to the Indians.

[631] ‘Alçauan las manos a Dios, que los librò del poder de Cortés, y de salir de ... Mexico, donde cada dia esperauan la muerte ... y aũ dezia el Cervantes, ... O Narvaez, Narvaez, que bien avẽturado que eres ... que tiene esse traidor de Cortes allegados mas de seteciẽtos mil pesos de oro, y todos los soldados estan mui mal con el.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 87.

[632] This was speedily abandoned for a camp at Cempoala. Aillon wanted merely a camp to be formed near a well supplied town. The municipal officers were: ‘Alcaldes hordinarios á Francisco Verdugo, cuñado del dicho Diego Velazquez, casado con una hermana suya, é un Juan Yuste, su cuñado é mayordomo, é regidores á Diego Velazquez é Pero Velazquez, sus sobrinos, é á Gonzalo Martin de Salvatierra é Juan de Gamarra.’ Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342.

[633] ‘Conocian en el Narvaez ser la pura miseria, y el oro, y ropa ... todo se lo guardaua.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 87. According to Oviedo’s version Montezuma held a council, wherein some members favored the plan of attacking and killing the Spaniards then in Mexico, so as to prevent a junction of forces. This might frighten the rest into departing. Others, who were more confident, urged that the new arrivals should be allowed to come to Mexico, so as to swell the list of victims for the sacrifices, and this proposition was carried, iii. 509. Oviedo’s informant evidently ignores the declared object of Narvaez; or, like Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 64-6, he does not believe that any communication could have taken place, for want of an interpreter. But Solis forgets the three deserters, and Indian mediums, perhaps. Prescott takes the peculiar ground that for Montezuma to ‘have entered into a secret communication, hostile to the general’s interests, is too repugnant to the whole tenor of his conduct.’ Mex., ii. 236. Cortés states that Father Olmedo had evidence of communication and interchange of presents between Montezuma and Narvaez. Cartas, 120-1. Others confirm this, as: Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 141-2; Carta del Ejército de Cortés, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 428-30. The position of the emperor as prisoner, and the speedy succession of events, did not permit the relationship between the two to develop.

[634] Francisco de Lugo being actually secured with shackles. Tirado, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6; Cortés, Cartas, 118; Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 342. Oviedo reviews Velazquez’ conduct in this instance, and concludes that, since Cortés gave him the men and appointed him captain, he was bound to obey this his immediate principal, unless royal orders to the contrary had been exhibited. ‘Si aquel capitan, Johan Velazquez de Leon, no estoviera mal con su pariente Diego Velazquez, é se passara con los çiento é çinqüenta hombres, que avia llevado à Guaçacalco, á la parte de Pámphilo de Narvaez, su cuñado, acabado oviera Cortés su offiçio.’ iii. 316-17.

[635] ‘Alonso de Vergara, escribano, é con Antonio de Maya.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 439; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, writes Amaya; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 412.

[636] ‘Me trajeron mas de cien cartas,’ wherein the soldiers were told to give credit to the statements of Guevara and his companions, and to rest assured that they would be rewarded on joining. Cortés, Cartas, 116.

[637] While selling cherries to Captain Salvatierra they heard him refer to the treasures of Cortés as a magnificent prize. The designs of Cortés against Montezuma and his subjects were painted in dark colors. One of the stolen horses belonged to this captain, whose raving against the spies afforded great amusement to the camp. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587.

[638] He ordered Vergara to read the provisions. Sandoval declared that none but a royal notary should do so, and threatened him with 100 lashes unless he desisted. Guevara interfered, and was told that he lied, and was a low clergyman. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88.

[639] Alguacil Pedro de Solis was in charge. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88, describes how they wondered at the succession of great cities, etc. The guard consisted of twenty men. Cortés, Cartas, 115.

[640] Gomara describes somewhat minutely the apprehension created among the soldiers by this summons, in face of the threatening aspect of affairs. Hist. Mex., 138-9. Bernal Diaz states that Montezuma kept the news back for three days, while he communicated with Narvaez. He might have delayed longer, but feared that Cortés would suspect something. Hist. Verdad., 87.

[641] While still talking, they received another message, saying that troops, horses, and guns had been landed. In his joy Montezuma embraced Cortés, exclaiming that he loved him more than ever, and saying that he would dine with him. While at table both were in good humor, the emperor thinking of the departure, the general of renewed conquests. After this Montezuma gave daily feasts, in the belief that the task of entertaining would soon be over. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 139. It is more likely that apprehensions prevailed on both sides. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls attention to the fact that no stranger had till then been so far honored as to sit at the same table with the monarch. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 277.

[642] Monjaras gives their names. ‘Fuesen ... tiznados como los yndios,’ et seq. Cortés, Residencia, i. 442-3; ii. 47-49, 134-5. Andrés de Tapia, who had just returned from Cholula, after settling a boundary dispute with Tlascala, was the fourth messenger. He followed by-paths, walking by day and being carried by Indians at night, so that he reached his destination in three days and a half. Finding that Sandoval had already sent messages, he remained with him. Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 586-7. Cortés writes that after being informed by Montezuma he received a letter, by a Cuban Indian, from a Spaniard who had been stationed on the coast to watch for vessels. This announced that a vessel had anchored at San Juan de Ulua, which was supposed to be that of the returning procuradores. The general now despatched his four messengers. Fifteen days passed without further news—this is probably a misprint—after which native paintings were received showing the number of men landed, and with them the report that the messengers from Mexico were detained by the new arrivals. Cartas, 114-15. A man named Pinedo, who fled from the capital, was overtaken by Aztecs, at Cortés’ order, and brought back dead. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440.

[643] Cortés intimates that a friar carried this message, and that one of the questions was the nationality of the expedition. Cartas, 115. The friar appears to have carried a later message. Gomara assumes that Cortés already knew who the commander was, and offered his friendship. Hist. Mex., 142.

[644] ‘A cabo de dos dias ... donde venian muy bravosos leones, bolvieron muy mansos, y se le ofrecieron por servidores.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 88; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 168, 465, 500.

[645] Cortés said that he could not leave Mexico, where his presence was necessary for the preservation of peace and treasures. Cartas, 117-18. ‘Y q̄ se viessen solos.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 142. According to Bernal Diaz a letter of similar tenor had been sent on before, by a swift messenger, to clear the way for Guevara’s recommendations, and Cortés therein intimated that the hostile utterances attributed to Narvaez must be due to the interpreters, for he was sure that so wise and brave a captain would not utter anything to the prejudice of king and comrades. Hist. Verdad., 89.

[646] ‘Porq̄ dadivas quebrantan peñas.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89.

[647] According to Bernal Diaz, Duero persuaded Narvaez, at the instigation of the friar, to invite the latter, and to seek by friendly efforts to win him over. Pretending to yield to his persuasions, Olmedo told him that if the proper persons were sent to confer with Cortés, he could no doubt be brought to terms. It was then agreed that Duero and others should arrange a private interview between the two generals. Hist. Verdad., 93; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.

[648] The reason for this separation of oidor and officers was to prevent the former from issuing authoritative orders. This seizure had been effected just as Guevara returned from Mexico. Cortés, Cartas, 118. Hence, Cortés’ letter failed to reach him; yet Bernal Diaz assumes that he received it, and coöperated accordingly. Hist. Verdad., 89.

[649] This report, embodying Aillon’s, is dated August 30, 1520. A formal statement of the case, prepared on the arrival of the secretary, was forwarded on November 10th. Carta de Audiencia, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 332-48; Ayllon, Relacion, in Id., xii. 251-2; Carta al Rey de los Oidores, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 495-511. The report proved a heavy argument against Velazquez’ case, although Bishop Fonseca at first sought to keep it back. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90; Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v.

[650] Two soldiers were also imprisoned for speaking favorably of Cortés. One of them was Sancho de Barahona who settled in Guatemala. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 89, 100. To Bernardino de Santa Clara, who had aided Aillon in the formal demands upon Narvaez, nothing was done, owing to his many friends in the camp. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xx.-xxi. This man was not actuated by friendship for Cortés, however. He had been treasurer of Española, where his prodigality nearly made him a defaulter. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 166-8.

[651] ‘Villalobos, y vn Portugues, y otros seys o siete se passaron a Cortes. Y otros le escriuieron, a lo que algunos dizen ofreciendosele, si venia para ellos y que Cortes leyo las cartas, callando la firma ... y que publicaua tener en Zempoallã dozientos Españoles.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143. Bernal Diaz says five deserters, relatives and friends of Aillon. Hist. Verdad., 90, 92.

[652] Herrera assumes that he was deceived by Narvaez, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix., but intimidation was no doubt the leading motive, for he could not possibly relish the prospect of Montezuma’s release by the new-comers, nor the licentiousness and greed of the soldiers. ‘This conduct of the men drove the inhabitants to flight,’ says Cortés, Cartas, 119, 125. When the jewels and other effects belonging to Cortés’ party were seized, together with the Indian wives of the conquerors, the cacique became seriously alarmed, exclaiming that he would surely be killed for permitting the outrage. This excited only derision, Salvatierra remarking: ‘Aueys visto que miedo que tienen todos estos Caciques desta nonada de Cortesillo.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.

[653] Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 587. ‘Ellos dejaban la villa sola por no pelear con ellos.’ Cortés, Cartas, 119.

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XXI. THE COUP DE MAÎTRE OF CORTÉS

MAY, 1520.

DISMAL PROSPECTS—EMPIRE TO HOLD, INVASION TO REPEL—THE ARMY DIVIDES—ALVARADO GUARDS MONTEZUMA, WHILE CORTÉS LOOKS AFTER NARVAEZ—THE MARCH SEAWARD—THE RENDEZVOUS—THE CHINANTECS AND THEIR PIKES—CORTÉS SOWS ALLURING WORDS IN THE CAMP OF THE ENEMY—PROPOSALS OF PEACE—DEFIANCE—NIGHT ATTACK—CORTÉS CAPTURES NARVAEZ AND HIS ARMY.

It now behooved Cortés to look well to himself. He might win a score of Marathons, but one Paros would ruin all. When embarking in this enterprise, he was to all appearance little above the common adventurer. But rare talents were constantly appearing as required by occasion. Though sometimes carried away by excess of zeal, he had proved himself an adept in diplomacy. And for one hitherto so sportive and pleasure-loving, his temper was now grave, particularly in times of peril, when his calm self-mastery increased with increasing danger. The rhythm of battle was the sweetest harmony that could stir his soul, and yet he never fought but for a purpose. On gaining an advantage he indulged in no holiday of retrospect or repose; so long as anything remained to be done no time was wasted in self-gratulations. He never turned from danger, but hastened to seek it out, perceiving it even in the darkness, intuitively, and always looking it full in the face. It was while preparing to strike that the enemy received the staggering blow, and the advantage thus gained was followed up to yet greater advantage At no time appears this hero stronger, grander, than now, when, without authority, without the royal sanction, in one sense an outlaw, with the people of the country against him, his own countrymen coming to war on him, his force insignificant as compared with that of any one of his several enemies, he yet holds them all at bay, by his iron nerve and ever ready strategic resources, keeping them asunder, pitting one against another, playing on the foibles of them all as easily and serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.

Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror’s brilliant visions of conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of the opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor and themselves, or to attack the foreigners’ quarters on their own account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the enemy would be to surrender the most important part of the conquest.

To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the capital and meet this new visitation—such a measure would render his already small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its equal in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez’ messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts and promises, to sow discord in the enemy’s camp. The priests Guevara and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at work, and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus would he seduce to his purpose the opponent’s troops, in so far at least as to effect a compromise by which Narvaez might leave him in comparative peace.[654] Who shall say that his good fortune may not still favor him! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer to the enemy, so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to give himself a more imposing appearance by the addition of native auxiliaries. Another reason for this advance was by his presence to counteract the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a superior force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an impostor.

He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious discontent in the enemy’s camp. Hundreds, they said, would be ready to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold front. Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance and secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless Narvaez. With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they could not fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but promptly suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his comrades of their glorious achievements under Cortés, and their probable fate should Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was an unanimous approval of the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon commissioned the captains to represent the matter to the men, and to ascertain who were willing to follow, and who should remain in Mexico.[655]

On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch questioned him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other force. Cortés well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the state of affairs. He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give him pain. He and his men had been sent by their king on this mission, and were from the royal province of Castile, whilst the forces on the coast were a rebellious horde from the outside province of Biscay, and inferior to them, as Otomís, for instance, were inferior to the nobler Aztecs. They had come with the design of injuring the natives, and Cortés as their protector; but with the aid of his patron saint he would have no trouble in chastising them, and in securing their vessels for his speedy departure.[656] Alvarado, the tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico, and him he recommended to the monarch’s consideration, requesting that supplies be provided and peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would react with terrible effect on himself and his people. The emperor promised that this should be done, and offered not only guides, but an army to aid him. The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec troops could not be relied on.[657]

It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with Cortés, should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico, since self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and with the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured. The defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the guns and most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were left with the garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over abundant, owing to the drought, maize and other provisions were brought from Tlascala to serve in case of need. The men were promised wealth and honors if they remained faithful, and their somewhat hot-headed commander was exhorted to prudence. “You are few in number,” said Cortés to them on leaving, “and yet you are strong; finally, have a care of your prisoner.”[658]

About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with seventy Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience.[659] There were also native carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and guides who were to take them by a short southern route through Aztec territory to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the Iztapalapan causeway, and there took his leave with friendly demonstration, while a number of chieftains continued with him for some distance on the way to the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no intention of encumbering himself with heavy war material, for the little he possessed could not avail against the superior armament of the enemy. His must be a light corps, capable of quick movements; stratagem should supply the place of numbers. And now what hopes and fears were theirs as they marched on toward the sea! Surely so brave a little army was never more beset by pitfalls and snares.

On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel, with one hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the expedition. About a score of these, suspected of favoring too strongly the Cuban governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the enterprise might not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder were distributed the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec and adjoining region, in order to encourage loyalty.[660]

Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco Rodriguez, with instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors. He succeeded in enlisting several thousand; but as it became evident whom they were to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly the terrible effect of Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to desert, so that only a few presented themselves before Cortés, and they were dismissed with presents.[661]

During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main road and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not far from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from Narvaez demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for although the latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by holding a review of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the disposition of the men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather disposed to underrate the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of the ludicrous he amused the camp with his description of the vanity and carelessness of the leader, and the arrogant assumption of the officers. When, therefore, at Quecholac[662] they encountered Alonso de Mata,[663] notary of Narvaez, who had been sent with four witnesses to advise Cortés of his commission and demands, he was told first to produce his own credentials as royal notary, and being unable to do so he was refused a hearing.[664] The official mission of the messengers being thus disposed of, Cortés soothed their wounded pride with soft words and hospitable cheer; he gave them presents, and took care before dismissing them to feast their eyes on the gold and jewels which he caused his men to display, and to let them know that thousands of Tlascaltec and other troops were on the way to join him. Their report to Narvaez was a confirmation of Guevara’s statement, and did much to promote the growing disaffection toward Narvaez.

The army now descended from the plateau to Ahuilizapan, and followed the slope northward to Huatusco. This town appears to have been situated on the head-waters of the present Rio Jamapa. Half-way down this river, about ten leagues south of Cempoala, lay the town of Tampaniquita,[665] which was the rendezvous. A number of Indians who here appeared with complaints of outrages by Narvaez were consoled with promises of speedy relief. Sandoval had come by a long and difficult mountain route to avoid the enemy, and had brought with him about sixty able-bodied soldiers, the old and infirm remaining at Papalote.[666]

This addition raised the force to about two hundred and sixty men, according to common statement, including the deserters from Narvaez. Among the number were five horsemen, and a few archers and musketeers.[667] They were poorly equipped, for they brought from Mexico little else than well-worn escaupiles, or quilted cotton armor, shields, swords, and dirks, a miserable outfit in which to meet the well armed troops of Narvaez.[668] But the ready resource of Cortés had found a remedy. He had noticed in the hands of the Chinantecs a spear, twenty feet in length, which struck him at once as a formidable weapon, either in defence or attack. It would be particularly serviceable against cavalry. Immediately on hearing of Narvaez’ arrival he had sent a messenger to that province with an order for three hundred of the pikes, to be finished not with the usual iztli head, but with double points of copper, a metal which abounded in that region. The natives having previously tendered submission to the Spaniards, Cortés also asked them for two thousand warriors, to join him on pentecost day at the rendezvous. Both of these requests were promptly granted, and before the Spaniards were on the ground the messenger had returned with a force of Indians bearing the weapons,[669] with points superior in finish to the models sent. The messenger was Tobilla, a soldier from the Italian wars, and an expert at arms, particularly with the lance. Under his instruction the soldiers soon became expert pikemen, and gained no little praise. Add to this courage, increased by many victories, their admirable discipline, their influence over the natives, and their knowledge of the country, and the little band assumes more formidable proportions.

Under the several influences surrounding him the original fierce design of Narvaez in his dealings with Cortés had cooled somewhat. The calm confidence and caustic wit of Olmedo tended to inspire respect for his commander, which was not lessened by the rumor of vast Indian armies massing under his banner. Nor were his men apparently inclined to turn the sword against their countrymen.

Before the return of Mata he despatched a commission to Cortés demanding the surrender of the country, but offering him liberty to depart for any other region, accompanied by those who wished to follow his fortunes. With this object vessels and stores would be provided. The bearers of this proposal were his old friend Andrés de Duero, Guevara, another clergyman named Juan de Leon, and one or two others.[670]

Duero, it will be remembered, had greatly assisted Cortés in fitting out his expedition from Cuba; in fact, without his intervention Cortés would never have been appointed to the command. Láres was dead, and it was quite natural, after this lapse of time, that Duero should desire to look in on Mexico, and for that reason had joined the expedition of Narvaez. Yet his sympathies were wholly with his partner, and after a warm embrace he came at once to the subject of his ducats. Their interview was private and protracted, and appears to have been satisfactory, Cortés receiving on the one hand valuable information about Narvaez’ plans and position, and Duero, on the other, coming forth with weighted pockets, as an instalment of the larger sum to follow. According to Bernal Diaz it was arranged that Duero should receive valuable grants and offices if he persuaded the alguacil mayor and other leaders so to manage affairs that Narvaez should be captured or killed, and Cortés acknowledged captain-general over all the troops.[671] Whatever may have been the agreement, there is no doubt that Duero promised to promote his friend’s schemes in the other camp.

Guevara and the other members of the commission were also loaded with presents, and confirmed as supporters of Cortés. As for Narvaez’ proposition, he charged them to reply that he would listen to none but a royal mandate, and would hold the country for the king, as was the duty of a loyal subject, and to this he and his followers were prepared to pledge their lives. Still, he was ready to meet Narvaez, each accompanied by ten attendants, in order that their respective claims might peradventure be happily adjusted. It was supposed by the captains of Cortés, who had influenced the proposal, that the result would be a division of territory, and to this they were willing to agree.[672]

Duero had been requested by Narvaez to persuade Velazquez de Leon to visit their camp, in the hope that a personal meeting might win him to their cause.[673]

Velazquez’ disregard of the former summons from the enemy had confirmed the faith of Cortés in his loyalty, and since a visit to the camp of Narvaez might lead to important information, he advised him to go; at the same time intimating that his heavy ornaments might have a happy effect on that gold-thirsty crew.[674] With a view to temporize he was authorized to offer himself as mediator between the two generals, and with a supply of gold for bribes he went over to the camp of Narvaez. There he met a most cordial reception. Gently the commander remonstrated at his adherence to a traitor who had so deeply injured his relatives. “He is no traitor,” replied Velazquez warmly, “there has been no treason either acted or intended.” He would not listen to any overtures, even when coupled with the promise of a command second only to that of Narvaez. “I have sworn loyalty to Cortés,” he said, “and I will remain true.” Nevertheless, that he might not appear ungracious, he promised to use his efforts toward the recognition of Narvaez’ supremacy. A review of the troops was held to impress him with the superiority of the forces with which he might soon have to contend.

A courtier in manner, and with a fine presence, Velazquez quickly won his way among the captains and staff; nor did he fail to improve the opportunity by presenting his general’s cause in the most attractive light. No little weight was given to his words by the heavy gold chain which fell in several coils upon his breast.[675]

Cortés affirms that the proposal for an interview with Narvaez had been accepted, and that he was preparing to attend it when the warning came that advantage would be taken of the meeting to seize or kill him.[676] If treachery was intended, it is more likely to have originated with Cortés, who was by no means scrupulous, as we have seen, while Narvaez appears to have borne the reputation of a man of honor.[677] It is still more probable that Cortés invented the warning in order to be free before his followers, and before Narvaez, to carry out a more momentous project, which, with the increased knowledge of affairs in the enemy’s camp, and with the growth there of his party, had begun to unfold in his mind.

It was a grand conception; yet grander still the execution. It was a different matter with a small force to fall upon a well appointed army of countrymen; different from war on naked savages, to surprise them by night, or otherwise to vanquish them. Yet this was what Cortés now proposed to do. Nor, in adopting this bold measure, does he lay himself open to the charge of rashness or recklessness. His situation was desperate: he must conquer or be conquered. Cortés was no abstract theorist: he dealt mainly in concrete facts; not necessarily demonstrated facts, but facts reached often by intuition alone. With facts, intuitively or practically arrived at, he kept himself well stored. He possessed many noble qualities, but on the whole, as we have seen, his character was not cast in an immaculate mould. He was exceedingly religious; and while, as I have said, he would not let religion stand in the way of his ambition, yet he was more bigoted than any of his followers. Aside from the chivalrous abandonment of himself to fate, and the brilliant achievements thence arising, there was little admirable in him. He knew nothing of lofty magnanimity, although he did many magnanimous acts; he knew nothing of pure disinterestedness, or a generosity of soul, although he was ofttimes exceedingly generous. He had none of that sense of unswerving justness and sensitiveness to wrong which characterized Grijalva. His self-possession never left him. He was a power within himself, and he knew it. Thus it was in Mexico now; and for years afterward when Mexico was all America, he was Agamemnon, king of men, the greatest of Greece when Greece was all the world.

Under the present inspiration, he sent Rodrigo Álvarez Chico and a notary[678] to withdraw the proposal he had made Narvaez for an interview, and to demand of him the production of a royal commission, authorizing his presence there, which commission would be respected; otherwise he must cease meddling with the affairs of the country. The followers of Narvaez were to be formally forbidden to obey his orders; and they were to appear before Cortés within a specified time, and learn from him what the interests of the king required of them. Failing in this, he would have them seized and dealt with as rebels against his majesty.[679]

The cool impudence of this demand, coming from the captain of a little band of outlaws hemmed in between hostile forces, gave rise to no small amusement in the enemy’s camp. Narvaez chose nevertheless to regard the matter seriously, receiving the message as an insolent defiance. He declared he would no longer show forbearance toward the traitor; he set a price on the head of Cortés, announced the estate of his followers to be confiscated, and proclaimed open war against them.[680]

Immediately after despatching his ultimatum Cortés broke camp and followed his messengers at a quick march.[681] At Rio de Canoas, or La Antigua, Velazquez came up with letters from Duero and others. They had probably been written under a preconcerted arrangement, for they were read to the leaders and discussed, the result being a unanimous resolution to advance. So forward they went, Cortés exclaiming, “Death to the ass or to him who drives it!”[682]

Crossing the swollen river with some difficulty,[683] he hurried on to Rio Chachalacas, over a league from Cempoala, where camp was formed quietly and without fires.[684] This sudden movement, coming immediately after Duero’s interview with Cortés, confirms the supposition that a plot had been concocted by them, which was to surprise Narvaez under advantageous circumstances arranged by confederates. There were to be no half-way measures; all must be staked on one cast.[685]

Calling his men round him, he made one of those stirring appeals in which he knew so well how to animate their spirit and touch their heart. He reviewed their right to the conquest, and their promises to hold the country for the king. “And now comes this emissary of Señor Velazquez,” Cortés continued, “full of envy and treacherous design, to appropriate the fruit of your hard-won victories. This pompous Narvaez, while seizing your riches and clothing himself in your glory, would load you with impositions and brand you with dishonor. Will you submit to this? Will you, who have overcome mighty hosts, who have seized empires, who even now hold monarchs in your hands, will you place your necks in the yoke and humbly submit to the unjust demands of this instrument of your ancient enemy? God, who has always been with us, will still fight on our side, if we will be true to him and true to our king. We must fight, and it is for life; ay, and more than life—for honor and glorious inheritance.” Cheer after cheer burst from the men, while the captains hastened to assure Cortés that they would follow him to the death.[686]

Although it was generally understood that coöperation was expected within the enemy’s camp, the prudent general made no mention of the fact, lest it might render the men less self-reliant. He pointed out, however, that their opponents, although more numerous than they, were unused to war, effeminate, disheartened from hardships, and discontented with their commander. He explained the arrangement of Narvaez’ camp, and divided the force into three parties, under the command respectively of Sandoval, Olid, and himself, the position of the former as alguacil mayor and comandante on the coast, and the second as maestre de campo, entitling them to this distinction, young as they were, particularly since Cortés retained the direction of affairs. To the former, aided by Jorge and Gonzalo Alvarado, Alonso de Ávila, and eighty men, was intrusted the task of attacking Narvaez’ special quarters, with the formally worded command to seize him, dead or alive.[687] As a further inducement toward the accomplishment of this important end, rewards of three thousand, two thousand, and one thousand pesos respectively were promised to the first three soldiers who should secure the general.[688] Olid received the important order to capture the artillery, from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended. With him were Andrés de Tapia, Diego Pizarro, and others. Cortés himself was to follow and render aid where most needed, supported by Ordaz, Grado, the brothers Chico, and others.[689] The password was ‘Espíritu Santo,’ suggested by Olmedo with reference to pentecost day, on which all these events took place.

While occupied with their preparations a deserter arrived, sent by Duero, it seems, to warn Cortés that, advised of his approach by the Indians,[690] Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best part of his troops in the field[691] between him and Cempoala. To this he had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains, who had not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival general. This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés not a little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp, protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue, however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was the beginning of the rainy season.[692] Most of Narvaez’ men, unused to military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the camp, found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what they termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe. The friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling by ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters, and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no means relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters before dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain and two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was ‘Santa María.’

Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when informed of this movement. Pointing out to his men the effeminacy and unsoldierly qualities of the rabble with which they had to deal, and the carelessness and inefficiency of their commander, he ordered an immediate advance on Cempoala, where they would now be scarcely expected. “You know the maxim,” he said, “‘upon the enemy at dawn;’ but better still, we will surprise them by night.[693] Let each strive to excel his comrade in valor.” These words were received with hearty approval, for anything was preferable to suspense in a dreary bivouac without fire or comfort. Crossing the creek they marched noiselessly over the plain, through the rain, drenched and hungry. On reaching the brook, near the town, they came upon the two scouts of the enemy, Gonzalo Carrasco and Alonso Hurtado; they captured the former, while the latter, warned by the cry of his comrade, hurried into camp to give the alarm. Carrasco was compelled under threats to answer a number of questions on the position and plans of his party, and was menaced with death if he played false.[694]

A cross had been erected at the ford,[695] probably during the first march to Cempoala, and here the army knelt in all humility to do reverence. Father Olmedo then gave the men the general absolution, and appealed to heaven to bless the efforts now to be made in behalf of their faith and the king, closing with the soul-stirring assurance that victory should be theirs. The men, one and all, felt no doubt that they were about to fight not only for their own rights, but for God and their sovereign; and if the robber could feel encouraged in his lawless pursuit after kneeling at the shrine of St Demas, surely these heroes of a hundred fights were stronger for their religious faith. Therefore it was with renewed confidence that the men buckled tighter their escaupiles, and pike in hand, their main reliance, they resumed the march with quickened steps, leaving the baggage and horses in the care of Marina and the carriers. The horsemen stationed in the field were not encountered, thanks to Duero who was one of them.

It was just past midnight, on the morning of whit-monday,[696] when they entered Cempoala. Owing to the darkness and the presence of troops in the field, together with the recent marches and countermarches, the presence of the intruders was not suspected till they had almost crossed the plaza. The storm was not wholly past, but the moon peered forth at times between the chasing clouds, dimly revealing the buildings occupied by the enemy. These consisted of three conspicuous edifices, rising upon pyramidal foundations, the ascent to which was by a wide staircase along one of the slopes. The highest was a temple, known as Nuestra Señora since the iconoclastic achievement of Cortés therein, and this was occupied by the troops of Diego Velazquez. Next to it was the building held by the captain-general, guarded by the whole battery of guns.[697]

Hurtado had arrived nearly half an hour before and given warning, but instead of immediately calling to arms, Narvaez lost time with questions, which elicited only that his companion had been seized and that he fancied he had heard Spanish voices. Some of the captains, friendly to Cortés, ridiculed the story as a dream, and entertained the general with speculations about the projects of the audacious rebel.[698] While so occupied the alarm of the sentinels was heard. Cortés was upon them.[699] Narvaez at once became the self-possessed commander, and hastened to issue the necessary orders. There was a rush to arms, and the confusion was increased by the appearance of innumerable fire-flies, which the besieged mistook for the fire-arms and spears of a large army.[700]

In order to avoid the range of the guns, Cortés had kept his men along the sides of the approaches, and on finding himself discovered he shouted, “Close with them! At them!” Fife and drum joined in and echoed the cry.[701] Olid rushed on the battery, ranged along a terrace on the ascent to the commander’s house. So sudden was the attack that those of the artillerymen who still remained loyal had time to discharge only one gun, which killed two men.[702] The next instant Olid, Pizarro, and their followers had practically secured the pieces, and were pressing the defenders, who offered little resistance. At the same time Sandoval rushed past and hurried up the stair-way to the summit, where Narvaez stood to receive him.[703] A volley of arrows and bullets was fired at him, but being poorly aimed, out of consideration for comrades below, he escaped unharmed. Nothing daunted, Sandoval’s followers pressed onward in a compact column, and in a moment they were on the summit platform. “Surrender!” shouted their leader with resolute confidence, to which Narvaez responded with a jeer, calling on his men to spare no traitors. But the order was an empty one, for their swords and short Spanish lances availed nothing against the line of bristling copper points on the long pikes of the attacking party, and step by step they were driven backward into the building. What they did with their fire-arms or cross-bows is not stated.

Meanwhile Cortés was doing brave work below. One body engaged the cavalry, unhorsing with the all-effective pike those who had managed to reach the saddle, and cutting the girths. Another body turned their attention to the reinforcements which came rushing from the adjoining quarters to the scene of action, and taking advantage of the confusion and the darkness, relieved only at fitful intervals by the moon, their cool opponents readily disarmed the greater number, so that but a small proportion made their way through the besieging lines.[704] While thus occupied they heard a shout from above, “Victory! Victory for Cortés! Narvaez is dead!”[705] Cortés immediately caused the cry to be taken up by the rest of his men, which added to the confusion of the enemy.

It appears that Sandoval, although reinforced by a portion of Olid’s party, could not effect an entry into the building to which his pikes had driven those who still adhered to Narvaez, a number having passed over to his side before this. After watching the vain skirmishing for a while, Lopez, the ship-builder, bethought himself of setting fire to the dry palm roof of the otherwise substantial building. The besieged now had no recourse but to come out, which they did, headed by Narvaez. No sooner had they appeared on the platform than Sandoval’s men charged them with the pikes, and the commander was the first to receive a thrust, in the left eye, which bore him down as he cried out: “Santa María, save me!” In an instant Pedro Sanchez Farfan was upon him,[706] and he was dragged down the steps and placed in a chapel. Awed by this mischance the rest speedily surrendered.

Alférez Fuentes fought valiantly till overthrown with two pike thrusts. “Our Lady save me!” he cried, still clutching the standard. “She shall!” responded Sandoval, averting the pikes of the excited soldiers.[707]

The cry of victory and the rumor of Narvaez’ death had stayed the stream of reinforcements from the adjoining houses, wherein defence was now alone thought of. Recognizing that a charge on them might meet with more determined opposition, Cortés resolved to bring the enemy’s own battery to his aid.[708] By the time the guns were in position, most of the forces of Sandoval and Olid were free to aid Velazquez de Leon in the task of reducing the quarters in which Salvatierra and Diego Velazquez still held out.

They were summoned to submit to the king and to Cortés, under pain of death, but gave a defiant answer. The guns were now brought into play, and fired first over their heads to frighten them. As the balls came whizzing by, the blustering Salvatierra, who had sworn to eat the ears of Cortés, declared himself sick. His fierceness changed to abject fear, and his men asserted that they never saw a captain behave so contemptibly. The shots, supported by promises, soon brought about the surrender of this pyramid.

The last to hold out was Diego Velazquez, a brave fellow, well liked by his followers; but after a few more parleys, and the loss of three men from well directed shots, his party was also prevailed on to descend and deliver up their arms,[709] the leaders being secured and removed in irons to the chapel, the wounded receiving there the attentions of a surgeon. Cortés looked in to examine their condition, and as the whisper reached Narvaez that the hero of the day was present, he turned and said: “Señor Cortés, you may hold high the good fortune you have had, and the great achievement of securing my person.” With a twinkle of malicious merriment Cortés regarded for a moment his fallen foe, whose insufferable conceit did not desert him even here, and said: “Señor Narvaez, many deeds have I performed since coming to Mexico, but the least of them all has been to capture you.”[710]

FOOTNOTES

[654] ‘Velazquez ... si yua en persona no podia escusar de respetarle, aunque por su buena, y blãda condicion, confiaua que le traeria a qualquier buen partido; pero temia que yendo otro qualquier General.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix.

[655] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 144; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90. ‘Afirman muchos, que en essa saçon estaba tan bien quisto Cortés, que si á todos los quisiera llevar, todos se fueran trás él.’ Oviedo, iii. 509. Which is exaggerated, as we have seen.

[656] ‘Debia ser alguna mala gente, y no vasallos de V. A.,’ is Cortés’ version of the reply, Cartas, 119-20, while his interpreter, Aguilar, gives it more literally as ‘una gente vizcaynos e que no los enbiava el enperador.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 47, 184. Gomara adds that Cortés said he was going to protect Montezuma’s subjects, and to keep the strangers on the coast till he was ready to depart. The emperor probably dissimulated, ‘holgando que vnos Christianos a otros se matassen.’ Hist. Mex., 145. Forgetting that the declared purposes of Narvaez were well known in Mexico, Herrera renders the answer that this captain was a brother of Cortés, sent with a present from their king. Both would come up to the capital and then leave the country. The rumored enmity was due to an order from Spain to avenge any injury suffered at the hands of the natives, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows him.

[657] ‘Aquellos españoles le dejaba encomendados con todo aquel oro y joyas que él me habia dado ... y le dí muchas joyas y ropas á él,’ et seq. Cortés, Cartas, 119-20. ‘Aun prometiò, que embiaria en nuestra ayuda cinco mil hombres de guerra, e Cortes ... bien entendiò que no los auia de embiar, e le dixo, que no auia menester.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 91; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 135. Ixtlilxochitl assumes in one place that Cortés asked for men, and was told that Aztecs dared not fight Spaniards, but would go as carriers. In another version the confederate kings grant the auxiliaries. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Solis assumes that Montezuma is devoted to Cortés; so does Zamacois, who sees a proof thereof in the offer of troops. He could not communicate with Narvaez for want of interpreters, and had he wished to aid the latter he would have attacked the Spanish quarters. Hist. Mex., ii. 70-1. All of which shows that this author is not profound either in investigation or argument.

[658] Bernal Diaz places the force at 83 men, with 10 cross-bows, 14 firelocks, 4 large guns, falconets, 7 horses, and all the ammunition; 150 men were left, and 150 taken, Oviedo; a little over 50 were left, Tapia; all wished to go, but 200 were left and 250 taken, including the men of Velazquez, with 8 to 9 horses, and a force of carriers, Gomara; 150 left, 250 taken, with a number of Indians, Ixtlilxochitl; 150 left, Probanza de Lejalde. B. V. de Tapia, who remained with Alvarado, says 130; Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36. Cortés’ own account distributes the total of his force as follows: 140 left at Mexico, 150 absent under Velazquez, 70 taken by himself, 150 at Villa Rica; but this is more than the original number given on setting out for the plateau. The Villa Rica force may, however, have been reduced by later drafts, for other authorities allow only about 70 men for this fortress. In the Ramusio edition of the Cartas 140 men are given as the garrison left under Alvarado, while 60 are taken by Cortés, Viaggi, iii. 244, but later issues place the former figure at 500, which is evidently a misprint. However much the figures of different writers may vary, it seems to be admitted that war and disease had made a considerable inroad upon them.

[659] ‘Fizo capitan dellos a Alonzo Davila.’ Monjaras and Aguilar, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 48, 184.

[660] ‘Que seria fasta catorze mill castellanos.’ Monjaras, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49. ‘Cinco o seys mill.’ Tirado, in Id., 7.

[661] ‘Porq̄ le pareciò q̄ auia conseguido su intento.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Perhaps in spreading the rumor that he came with Indian auxiliaries. Among the auxiliaries were 400 men from Huexotzinco, under Pedro Gonzalez de Trujillo. Tirado, and others, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 247 et seq.; ii. 7 et seq. It is this expedition of Rodriguez, assisted by Diego Garcia, Alonso de Ojeda, and Juan Marquez, as captains, that has misled Gomara, and particularly Herrera, in supposing that the whole expedition received a grand reception at Tlascala; but, beside the above reference, Cortés intimates clearly enough that he did not go that way, and he certainly did take a more southerly route to the coast than on the previous journey. Cartas, 120. Bernal Diaz also says: ‘embiò Cortes a Tlascala â rogar ... que nos embiassen de presto quatro mil hombres.’ Hist. Verdad., 91. Prescott falls not only into this generally adopted error, but states that 600 troops were asked for, Mex., ii. 243, whilst the chroniclers all say from 4000 to 10,000. ‘La maior parte de ellos se bolviò, porque aquella Nacion no estaba acostumbrada à pelear fuera de su Tierra.’ Torquemada, i. 482. A not very sound excuse, since their troops had already gone to Mexico.

[662] About twenty leagues east of Cholula.

[663] ‘Vezino de la Puebla, que era ballestero.’ _Bernal Diaz_, Hist. Verdad., 90.

[664] ‘Púsole preso en su pié de amigo.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441. But this is not likely. Bernal Diaz says that Narvaez was told to send communications to Tampaniquita. Hist. Verdad., 91; Cortés, Residencia, i. 248, ii. 185.

[665] Torquemada and Clavigero attempt to correct this spelling, but Bernal Diaz is sustained by Orozco y Berra, in Mex., Noticias Ciudad, 244-6. Bernal Diaz also mentions Mitalaguita, which may be Metlangutla, a few leagues farther east. Hist. Verdad., 91. Herrera states that they passed through Cotastlan, by which he means probably the province, and not the town, of Cuetlachtlan. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[666] Herrera, ubi sup., leaves Ircio in command at Villa Rica, which is improbable. Sandoval arrived at the rendezvous the day after us. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 92; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 3-9. Prescott makes him join long before this, on the high plateau, but he misunderstands his authorities, and is quite at sea with respect to the route followed by the forces.

[667] Bernal Diaz and Herrera say 266 in all; Torquemada has 266, beside captains and five horsemen; Cortés, 250 in all; Tapia, about 250.

[668] ‘Por vn peto, ó capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro, dieramos aquella noche quãto nos pidierã por ello.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98.

[669] Thirty-eight palmos long. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.

[670] According to Bernal Diaz this commission was arranged by the combined influence of Olmedo and Duero, during Olmedo’s second visit to the camp. The friar appears, however, to have been there but once, when he was expelled. Knowing Salvatierra to be a blusterer, Bermudez, the alguacil mayor, proposed that he should join the commission, but his intended victim, not caring to trust himself within the power of Cortés, pleaded sickness and a dislike to speak with a traitor. ‘Señor Veedor,’ chimed in Olmedo, ironically, ‘best it is to be prudent, and you may have him prisoner before long.’ Hist. Verdad., 93.

[671] Duero was to receive the share of treasures claimed, a command in the expedition equal to that of Cortés, and after the conquest a grant of towns similar to his own. As a further inducement, sufficient gold was given to load his two Cuban servants. On taking leave of the general, on pentecost morning, Duero asked: ‘What has your worship to say, before I leave?’ ‘God be with you,’ was the reply, ‘and see to it, Señor Duero, that it be done as arranged, or by my conscience [Cortés’ favorite oath] I’ll be in your camp within three days, with all my companions, and the first to receive the lance will be your worship, if I see aught contrary.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 94. Monjaras states that Duero and Leon warned Cortés against opposing Narvaez’ army and commission. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 49.

[672] Cortés to remain governor of the part to be allotted him till the king should decide. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588. According to Gomara, who sends Veedor Álvarez Chico, Juan Velazquez, and Juan del Rio, to carry the message, Cortés proposed a private interview for the discussion of two points, whether Narvaez would leave Mexico to him and go to Pánuco or elsewhere, aided by Cortés with gold and supplies, or whether Narvaez preferred to take Mexico and give him 300 or 400 men wherewith to pass on to new conquests. Hist. Mex., 144. The last proposal could only have been a trap to secure Narvaez’ men. Prescott chooses to omit the proposal for an interview, and sends instead the ultimatum with Duero, a glaring disregard of Cortés’ own text, as confirmed by others. Cortés, Cartas, 121-2; Oviedo, iii. 314.

[673] ‘Dize Narvaez, y en todo su Real ay fama, qui si U. merced [Velazquez] vá allâ, que luego yo [Cortés] soy deshecho.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.

[674] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés made the request in a manner that appeared to Velazquez an attempt to probe his loyalty. He therefore refused to take any valuables with him, but was finally persuaded. Juan del Rio, Cortés’ equerry, kept him company.

[675] Bernal Diaz adds that, these efforts being observed by Salvatierra, Narvaez was urged to seize Velazquez, and this would have been done but for the representations of Duero and others. During the dinner given in his honor, Captain Diego Velazquez, nephew of the Cuban governor, alluded in one of his remarks to Cortés as a traitor. The guest appealed to Narvaez against such expressions. Diego repeated the term, and added that Juan did not deserve to bear the name Velazquez. Grasping his sword the latter retorted, calling him a liar. He would prove himself a better man than either uncle or nephew, if permission was granted. The others had to interfere to prevent the clashing of swords, and Narvaez was persuaded to order the turbulent visitor away. At leave-taking the general showed his annoyance, and said that it would have been better had he not come. Diego Velazquez, who stood by his side, added a threat, to which Juan rashly retorted, with a twirl of his beard: ‘Before many days I shall see if your prowess equals your boast.’ Alarmed at his want of self-control, Duero and other sympathizers hurried him away before he could utter any more indiscretions. He and the equerry had hardly left camp before some horsemen appeared, as if in pursuit, and caused them to increase their pace. Hist. Verdad., 95-6; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[676] Cartas, 122. Bernal Diaz assumes that the proposal for an interview came from Narvaez, through Duero, to whom he also confided the intended treachery. Olmedo, who had pretended to be won over, was also informed. Hist. Verdad., 93. Herrera supposes that Sandoval warns Cortés, who, according to Gomara, is still at Mexico when the proposal comes. Hist. Mex., 144. Solis is more correct in ascribing the warning to Duero. Hist. Mex., ii. 83.

[677] The fact that he allowed such dangerous men as Velazquez de Leon and Olmedo to go free indicates that he harbored no treachery.

[678] Gomara sends them with Velazquez de Leon. Hist. Mex., 144. ‘Chico, é Pedro Hernandez, escribano.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 440. Velazquez having gone on a mediatory mission, Chico must have been sent after his departure.

[679] ‘La respuesta ... fué prender al escribano y á la persona que con mi poder ... los cuales estuvieron detenidos hasta que llegó otro mensajero que yo envié.’ ‘Escribí una carta al dicho Narvaez y otra á los terceros, diciéndoles cómo yo habia sabido su mala intencion.’ Cortés, Cartas, 122-3. The reference to a messenger indicates Cortés’ meaning to be that Chico preceded Velazquez de Leon. Gomara assumes that Cortés’ pretext for withdrawing the proposal for an interview was that Narvaez had declined to entertain the points to be there discussed. See note 19. Chico had warned him of the intended treachery. Hist. Mex., 144. ‘Y que supiesse que no auian de cantar dos gallos en vn muladar, y que aparejasse las manos.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi. Bernal Diaz sends the message with Olmedo, ‘since no royal notary dare carry it,’ and gives Narvaez three days in which to send in any commission he may possess signed by the king. Without such commission he must leave the country, or Cortés will seize him and inflict punishment for the outrage on Aillon and on the Indians. This ultimatum was signed also by the captains and some soldiers, including Bernal Diaz. Hist. Verdad., 92-3. An answer was demanded through the same messengers. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.

[680] ‘Daria dos mil pesos, a quien matasse a Hernando Cortes, o a Gonçalo de Sandoual.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. ‘Traia mandado de Diego Velazquez que á mí y á ciertos de los de mi compañía que ... nos ahorcase.’ Cortés, Cartas, 121. ‘Hizo proceso en forma contra Cortés, y por su sentencia, le condenó á muerte.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 300; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143, 146.

[681] ‘Dende a dos horas que se partiô el Juan Velazquez,’ says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95.

[682] Implying that since Narvaez would not listen to reason, Cortés or he should die. ‘Velazquez dixo al ... Cortés que adonde yva que yva a la carnesceria.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 9, 50, 185-6. On the way to Rio de Canoas, where they arrived the day after leaving camp, two hogs, with navel on the back, were killed, an incident which many interpreted as a sign of victory. Velazquez having arrived with the messenger who carried the ultimatum, the army proceeded. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95. ‘Anduvimos aquel dia casi diez leguas.’ Tapia, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.

[683] Two men were drowned in crossing the stream. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.

[684] ‘Dos leguas de los contrarios.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc.. ‘Fuimos a dormir a vn riachuelo, adõde estava en aquella sazon vna puẽte obra de vna legua de Cẽpoal.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96. Prescott here evidently follows the erroneous topography of Solis, who confuses this creek with Rio Canoas. Hist. Mex., ii. 85; Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 50.

[685] ‘Como yo deseaba evitar todo escándalo, parecióme que seria el menos, yo ir de noche, sin ser sentido ... y prenderlo [Narvaez]; ... porque los demás querian obedecer á la justicia, en especial que los mas dellos venian por fuerza.’ Cortés, Cartas, 123-4.

[686] He also stated that offers had been made favorable to him alone, not to them, hence he had declined them. ‘Muera el asno ó quien lo aguija.’ Any other course will disgrace us, was the concluding remark, whereupon we lifted him upon our shoulders and carried him round. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588-9. ‘Hizo muchas ofertas, y prometimiẽtos, que seriamos todos muy ricos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. It would be his fault, not theirs, if success failed. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.

[687] ‘Gonzalo de Sãdoual, Alguazil mayor desta Nueua España, por su Magestad, yo os mando q prendays el cuerpo de Panfilo de Narvaez, e si se os defendiere, matadle, que assi conviene al servicio de Dios, y de su Magestad, y le prendió a vn Oidor.’ Countersigned by Secretary Pedro Hernandez. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590.

[688] Herrera writes 3000, 1500, and 1000 pesos de oro. Cortés’ acts are said by the men of Velazquez to have been prompted by ‘un diabólico pensamiento é infernal osadía.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441.

[689] The above agrees chiefly with Herrera, who assigns Sandoval 60 men, and names a number of the leading members of each party. The parties were to keep a stone’s throw apart. One of Cortés’ squads was to look to the cacique’s palace, and another to Alcalde Yuste’s quarters. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii. He is evidently confused on many points, and several names are guessed at. Bernal Diaz states that Pizarro, with 60 young men, including himself, was charged to capture the artillery; Sandoval received 60 men; Velazquez de Leon also a force of 60, wherewith to attack Diego Velazquez’ quarters; Cortés remained with a reserve of 20. It is more likely that a higher officer, like Olid, received the order to capture the artillery, rather than the comparatively unknown Pizarro. Velazquez de Leon does not appear to have been detailed for his charge till afterward. Cortés names only Sandoval as the leader of one party of 80 men, he himself following with the remaining 170. Cartas, 123. Solis reverses Herrera’s order. Hist. Mex., ii. 91-2.

[690] The stout cacique had remonstrated with the general on his carelessness, assuring him that Malinche with his Teules was far different. ‘When you least expect it he will be here and will kill you.’ Although the warning was received with laughter, yet the hint was not lost. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96.

[691] Eighty horsemen and 500 infantry. ‘Y llegó casi una legua de donde yo estaba.’ Cortés, Cartas, 123.

[692] Laet, Nov. Orb., 221; Hakluyt’s Voy., iii. 467.

[693] Botello, known as the Astrologer, who had made several successful predictions, had assured Cortés that a night attack would secure him the victory. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.

[694] Cortés rallied him upon his capture, and addressed him as compadre. After obtaining certain information, more was demanded. The prisoner declared that he knew nothing more. ‘Well, then, you will swing,’ said Cortés, half jestingly. The two pikemen who held the rope round his neck took this for a command, and hoisted him. Rangel rode up, however, and saved his life, but the compression of the throat troubled him for some time. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.-iii. Carrasco warned him against attacking the powerful Narvaez. Vetancvrt, Teatro Ecles., pt. iii. 137; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589. Prescott says that he with ‘Spartan heroism’ remained silent, Mex., 257-8; but Prescott has evidently not understood his authorities.

[695] At a cross-road a little farther on, says Herrera.

[696] May 28th. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., 277. Clavigero and others assume it to be the night between Saturday and Sunday, but the authorities are pretty clear in mentioning the following night.

[697] Estimated by various authorities at from twelve to nineteen pieces. Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12, 168.

[698] Expressing the belief that Cortés would be foolhardy enough to attack in the morning. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589.

[699] ‘Llegamos junto á las centinelas sin que nos sintiesen, é iban huyendo é diciendo: Arma, arma!’ Id., 590. ‘Auisado Naruaez, y se estaua vistiendo vna cota: y dixo aqui ẽ le auisò, no tengays pena, y mandò tocar al arma.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.

[700] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99, calls the flies cocayos.

[701] Prescott, following Herrera, makes Cortés shout the password ‘Espíritu Santo,’ which Bernal Diaz says was given as a secret word for mutual recognition.

[702] So say all the original authorities that refer to it, except Bernal Diaz, who claims that four guns were fired, three balls passing overhead and the fourth killing three men. Cortés acknowledges no casualties from it. Tapia even intimates that no discharge took place, owing to the fact that to protect the touch-holes from rain they had been covered with wax and tiles. Confused by the sudden alarm the artillerists applied the match, forgetful of the wax, and ‘we saw that the charges failed to go off.’ Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. Perhaps he would have been more correct in saying that the men were confused by the glittering bribes of Usagre. Bachiller A. Perez testifies: ‘Dixo al artillero poned fuego a estos tiros ... puso fuego e no salieron los tiros e oyo dezir este testigo que avian puesto cera en los dichos tiros.’ Cortés, Residencia, ii. 85. This implies that the wax had been smeared on by accomplices.

[703] With from 40 to 100 men, are the different estimates.

[704] ‘Vinien los contrarios á nuestra gente, creyendo que eran de los suyos, á preguntar, “¿qué es esto?” é así los prendien.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. ‘De las otras dos torres ... no le acudierõ, porq̄ dizen algunos que se hizieron sordos, otros que no pudieron llegar, por el impedimento de las tropas de Cortes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.; Cardona, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 181-2.

[705] ‘Uitoria, vitoria por los del nõbre del Espíritu Sãto, q muerto es Narvaez!’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. Even this authority now shouts forth the password!

[706] Solis assumes that Farfan gave also the thrust. Bernal Diaz’ text leads one to suppose that Narvaez received the thrust before his followers were driven into the building, but the other authorities state clearly: ‘al salir de su camara, le dieron vn picaço.... Echaronle luego mano.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 147; Oviedo, iii. 510. Monjaras states that Narvaez supplicated for his life: ‘Hidalgos, por amor de Dios no me mateys!’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 51, 85, 107; i. 365. ‘Alonso Dávila le sacó dichas provisiones reales de V. M. del seno, teniéndolo preso é abrazado el dicho Pero Sanchez Farfán.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. This occurred some time after the capture. Narvaez called upon his fellow-prisoners to witness the deed, but Ávila shouted that the papers were merely letters. They were given to Cortés. ‘Las avian quemado.’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 345, 365, 250; ii. 52, 187.

[707] He died, however, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera calls him Diego de Rojas, whom Bernal classes as a captain.

[708] ‘Se retrajeron á una torre alta de un ídolo de aquel pueblo casi cuatrocientos hombres, é muchos de los de caballo ... salieron al campo.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., 590. Herrera says that 300 intrenched themselves till the morning. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés reached the battery just in time to prevent a catastrophe, as Tapia relates. A hot-blooded young companion of the latter, carried away by excitement, rushed to powder barrels, eight in number, and shouted, ‘Let us fire the powder and spoil it for the enemy!’ Cleaving a barrel, he cast a brand into it, and threw himself flat upon the ground, commending his life to God. It happened, fortunately, that this barrel contained sandals, which by some mistake had been mixed up with the ammunition. After waiting in vain a while for the explosion, the madcap discovered the reason and began to open another barrel. At this moment Cortés came up, and learning of his intention he rushed forward and snatched away the brand.

[709] Including also Juan Yuste, Juan Bono, and Gomara.

[710] Oviedo, iii. 510. Bernal Diaz lengthens Cortés’ reply: He thanked God for the victory and for giving him such valiant gentlemen and companions to aid him. One of the smallest things he had done in New Spain was to secure and defeat him; it appeared more daring to seize an oidor of his majesty. Las Casas relates that Narvaez had a not dissimilar surprise by night from Cuban Indians, during his campaign for Velazquez, and had a narrow escape. Hist. Ind., iv. 6-8.

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XXII. ALVARADO’S MERCILESS MASSACRE

MAY, 1520.

AFTER THE BATTLE—VICTORY MADE SECURE—CONDUCT OF THE CONQUERED—A GENERAL AMNESTY—DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES—AFFAIRS AT THE CAPITAL—INSURRECTION THREATENED—THE SPANIARDS HOLD A COUNCIL—ALVARADO’S RESOLVE—THE GREAT DAY OF THE FEAST—THE SPANIARDS PROCEED TO THE TEMPLE—THE GRAND DISPLAY THERE WITNESSED—THE ATTACK OF THE SPANIARDS—HORRORS UPON HORRORS.

Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely had his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the whole heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and Mexico! And Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and in some respects his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the outlaw with his grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured the grand army, and was now master of all the ships, and men, and munitions of war, which he so much needed in consummation of his further designs. It seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his solid substance to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.

* * * * *

Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in confinement such persons as might question his rights as victor; the remainder on surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large.[711] In order to make more secure his magnificent prize before the all-searching sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the victors, Cortés seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-colored robe, and ordered the conquered troops to pass before him, and swear allegiance to the king, and fealty to him as captain-general and justicia mayor. This was done by nearly all, some humbling themselves and kissing his hand, while the late hostile leaders and old acquaintances were recognized with friendly greetings and embraces.[712]

Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the captured horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in the field. Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little persuasion was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn the whole cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting vivas for Cortés.[713] High above this noise were heard from a window the voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with their loud philippics. “Villainous Dominicanos!” they cried to the soldiers of their own party, “the distaff would better suit you than the sword. A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate women we to have come to the wars with such men!” Truly might Narvaez exclaim with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen Artemisia, outwit her Athenian pursuers, “My men fight like women, and my women like men.” The Ordaz women, however, fought only with their tongues, and that after the issue of battle. And thus relieved they immediately descended and did homage to the victor. The general did all he could to check this excess of zeal, which he feared might engender ill feeling, and he even seized some of the noisiest enthusiasts, although they were afterward rewarded.

The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded during the battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his previous occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to obliterate their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and hospitality, while many among Narvaez’ men thought it necessary to excuse their tardy surrender by pleading that they had been deceived by their principals, who had assured them that Cortés was a traitor. Great was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how few the victors were and how poorly they were armed. And where were the much talked of native auxiliaries? At the same time they could not but admire a leader who had achieved such results with such means. Narvaez and his supporters declared that the victory was due wholly to treachery, particularly noticeable in the action of the artillerists.[714] In this there was much truth, but the consummate tact and soldierly qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that. And the cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was! Four of his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain, beside a number wounded on both sides; this was all.[715]

In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the occurrence by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it was on both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other falsehoods than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal conflict. He was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his conduct, and could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare every misfortune. He was aware that even to the impartial observer he must appear as a defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal, and in the agreement or partnership which he had formed, and also as the usurper of an expedition fitted out in the name and under the auspices, at least, of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and masterly conquest of a rich country, and on his election to independent command by a party formed on the pretence that the superior interests of the sovereign demanded the immediate subjugation of the country. But his acceptance of that command was a breach of duty and of contract; the right of the party to act as it did was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or perhaps usurped from Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while the commission to undertake the conquest had already been conferred on the latter. Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this coast, and above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it was so far as indicating the situation and extent of territory. He had a right to claim his own; though circumstances had so changed, Cortés claimed, as to render this perilous to the interests of God, the king, and the people, which rose above those of individuals; and in ignoring the orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his countrymen he followed only natural law and justifiable impulse. In this respect Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to yield to the rightful claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king, however, that self-preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had determined to hang him and several of his followers. Here he again hides the fact that favorable terms were at one time offered. “Had Narvaez carried off the victory,” he continues, “it would have been with a great loss, which must have so weakened him as to surely enable the Indians to succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have lost the country to the king and to the faith, and twenty years would not have sufficed to regain it.”[716] In brief, howsoever we admire Cortés, however much we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez or Narvaez, we must admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his side, and that no position in which he could possibly place himself was tenable. He was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor, outlaw, hypocrite; but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable soldier, a rare hero. On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But, though deeply injured, he was disagreeable; though foully wronged, he was vanquished. And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last to smile on iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining, disappointed virtue.

In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had been staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec warriors, two thousand in number.[717] They had reached the rendezvous on pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it convenient to advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended. An imposing sight they presented as they marched by amidst vivas in a file of three abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the centre man with bow and arrows, while his companions on either side carried the formidable pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was fortunate that they had failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed was saved thereby. In fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear that they would have fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was nevertheless delighted with their coming, since this proved not only the sincerity of their friendship, but showed the conquered that he did indeed control native armies. Distributing some beads and trinkets, he bade them return peaceably under the supervising care of Barrientos.

One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet; and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba.[718] Shortly after, when the masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were placed in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels under Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence.[719] The fortress was again garrisoned, with a larger force,[720] and thither were sent Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.[721]

As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days their arms to all except a few leaders, and ordered his men to return the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of war.[722] What with their admiration of the liberality and soldierly qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the terms. But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid veterans. They had seen with envy that rich presents were made to the conquered, while they, whose courage and devotion had achieved such magnificent results, received nothing, and were even told to return what they regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to share with these late comers and intended despoilers the fruits of their years of toil and victories. A general murmur arose, and many soldiers refused to surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila and Father Olmedo being requested to remonstrate, did so earnestly, and told Cortés that he acted like Alexander, who honored more the conquered than those who won the battle. He and all he possessed belonged to his comrades, was the reply, but at present it was necessary to conciliate their invaluable acquisition, whose aid was needed to overcome the threatening danger in Mexico, and who being the more numerous party might otherwise rise against them. Their aims effected, the entire resources of a vast and rich country were theirs. Olmedo was convinced of the wisdom of the course, although he considered that too great liberality had been shown. The headstrong Ávila pressed the point with his natural haughtiness, whereupon Cortés said: “I am for Mexico; those who please may follow; those who do not, may leave it alone. There are yet women in Spain to bear soldiers.” “Yes, and captains and governors,” retorted Ávila. Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy no further words at present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with gifts; but Cortés awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.

With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of the late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under the command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this commission, and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to Jamaica for live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the proposed colony. The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the occupation of Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels were given him to explore the coast.[723]

* * * * *

While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at Cempoala the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater perils. At the time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth month, had begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It was in honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and identified with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily worship of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor deities, whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme divinity, whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The Mexicans had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great temple, which had been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on condition that no human sacrifices should take place.[724] A festival of this prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the natives the indignities to which they and their gods had been subjected. We have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the occupation of the great temple by strange religious emblems was escaped, and how it was restrained only by the promise of the speedy departure of the Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital he saw the smouldering fire, and it was this that led him to strengthen the defences of the fort, to obtain extra supplies from Tlascala, and to enjoin the strictest watchfulness and moderation.

The hostile feeling was by no means diminished by the tidings of another larger host of invaders with doubtful motives. At a meeting of native leaders it was admitted that the promises and statements of the newly arrived Spaniards could no more be relied upon than those of the deceitful Malinche, and the deferred proposition to drive out or to kill the Spaniards was renewed with ardor. A better opportunity for carrying out such a measure could never again be found. The great Cortés with his cunning controlling mind was absent. There remained only a small force in charge of the city, and the troops on the seaboard were divided against each other. On the other hand a multitude of pilgrims were pouring in for the festival; and what better subjects to be worked upon for an uprising than these, and what better incentive than religion? Beside the appeal for vengeance on the desecrators of their altars came the patriotic call for the release of an oppressed sovereign, whose influence was still supreme with many, and the alluring prospect of securing the rich spoils in possession of the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs, the latter still more detested as an inferior race which after years of contest had now assumed the galling attitude of master. The preparations made during the late fermentation required only to be perfected. More arms were made, the people were stirred by passionate appeals, warriors were enrolled, and other measures taken.[725]

The utmost secrecy had been observed by the conspirators, but with so many confidants, actuated by race jealousy, by ties of friendship, by interest, and by one above all others, the love of woman, that the rumor was whispered in Alvarado’s ear.[726] Yet to the mistress, who in her devotion to the lover forgot her duty to home and kindred, must not be charged more than is her due. Sharpened by the remembrance of past wrongs suffered on battle-field and stone of sacrifice, the wits of the Tlascaltecs discovered evidence which their hatred failed not to magnify. Warnings were hardly required, however, to indicate that something unusual was stirring, for the demeanor of the Indians had undergone a yet more marked change. Supplies were further diminished; servants sent to market were abused and ill-treated, and insolence was shown even to the Spaniards themselves.[727] A still more alarming sign was the discovery of an undermined wall,[728] and after obtaining further particulars from a devoted Tezcucan chief,[729] afterward known as Don Hernando, Alvarado resolved to inspect the adjacent temple where the chief celebration was held. Here a number of suspicious circumstances were noticed, which the Castilians readily wrought into threatening realities; among them several victims destined for sacrifice, regardless of the promises given, while some bloody hearts which they saw testified to the work already done by the knife.[730] With the victims Alvarado seized their attendants and certain of the emperor’s courtiers, from some of whom he tortured a confession. In this manner he learned what he already partially knew, namely, that many arms were prepared; that during the Incensing of Huitzilopochtli, as the festival was called, the Christian emblems would be cast out of the temple, and that the uprising was to take place at the conclusion of the feast.[731]

A seeming confirmation of the proposed sacrilege came from Montezuma himself, who sent to request the removal of the Christian emblems from the summit of the great temple, pleading as high-priest that the presence of strange images must prove irritating to the worshippers of other gods. Alvarado indignantly refused; he would rather fight. The Mexicans did not choose to see their festival broken up before the appointed time, and so the point was waived. It was then arranged that the Spaniards should attend the ceremonies, so as to be assured that no indignities would be offered their images.[732]

And now comes another of those diabolical deeds which, done in the name of civilization, or religion, or any other entity or idea, fills us with horror toward the gods and men for whom or by whom such acts are consummated. The lion and the tiger are humane and gentle beside the Spaniard, harboring thoughts born of bigoted zeal or blind apprehension. And what are his thoughts? These: He would enter the sanctuary, the holy temple of his god and their gods, and while all the people, while priests and nobles, the flower of the Aztec race, were celebrating the highest service of the highest festival, he and his men would fall upon them and hew them in pieces! And this because they had tired of harboring and feeding them. They desire to be relieved of the self-invited guests, and since dismissal does not avail they must be driven out or killed. But the intruders do not wish to be exterminated, and if there is striking to be done, they propose to strike first.

Pedro de Alvarado was no such man as Hernan Cortés. He was scarcely fit to be his servant. There were a dozen prominent qualities that combined to make up the great man in Cortés which were absent in Alvarado. Both of them were loyal, brave, and merciless, but there was a method in the excesses of Cortés which those of Alvarado lacked. Cortés was deep, Alvarado shallow; Cortés was patient under affront, Alvarado was violent; Cortés was cool in time of danger, Alvarado was excited—and so on. And yet Alvarado was a gallant cavalier.

The Spaniards now held a council, before which Alvarado placed the information thus far obtained of the plot, and the necessity of prompt measures was at once recognized. They did not believe Montezuma to be taking any active part in the conspiracy, but that swayed by hopes and fears he was allowing himself, with his usual want of resolution, to yield to the stronger will of his courtiers a passive consent to the efforts for his release.[733]

Less prudent than his chief, and less fertile in resources, Alvarado did not look for preventives to check the conspiracy, but to what he regarded as a decisive blow to crush it, such as that administered at Cholula. He had not the foresight of his general with regard to the proper adjustment of means to ends, nor his magic influence over those around him, friend or foe. He remembered only the good effect of the massacre on the effeminate Cholultecs, and felt convinced that so excellent a measure must answer also for the apparently abject Aztecs. It thoroughly suited his rash daring and cruel disposition. To attack is to win, was his maxim. The difference in circumstances hardly entered into consideration, chief among which was the smaller force, unsupported by the neutrality of half the city, as at Cholula, and without allies close at hand. The gathering of so many nobles and military leaders in connection with the war-god celebration provided the opportunity desired, since this would permit the blow to be directed against those who were looked on as the promoters of the revolt; and deprived of their leaders the people would be likely to abandon any further attempt. This plan met with general approval.[734]

The hour[735] having arrived for the visit to the temple,[736] Alvarado selects half the force to accompany him,[737] and proceeds thither, armed with more than usual care. Upon those who remain in charge of the fort, says Tapia, devolves the safer, though even more cruel task of slaughtering the greater part of the courtiers and attendants,[738] who have this day presented themselves in larger numbers than usual.

The Spaniards with their Tlascaltec followers are welcomed at the sanctuary with great demonstrations by the unsuspecting nobles, who see nothing to apprehend in the gleaming arms, since the Spaniards never go forth without weapons. We must remember it is a gala day, and the court presents a magnificent scene with its festive decking of garlands, festoons, and drapery, and its gayly attired audience. A procession of plumed priests and pages march by with swinging censers, chanting weird music before the hideous idols. Behind comes a file of nuns and novices, with red feathers and painted faces, surmounted by garlands of toasted maize, and bearing in their hands flags with black bars. Hidden musicians strike, and the dance begins. Joining the priests, the consecrated women and the tyros whirl round a large brazier, while two shield-bearers with blackened faces direct their motions. A conspicuous figure is the ixteocale, the living representative of the god, for whom he is fated to die, like the more prominent proxy of Tezcatlipoca. Dressed like a warrior ready for the fray, and prepared to lead in the chief dances as is his duty, he seems to impersonate the omen of evil which hovers over the scene.

Presently the Spaniards are conducted to a separate court, wherein are assembled several hundred nobles and leading men, arrayed in rich costumes glittering with gold and precious stones. The centre of attraction is the new image of Huitzilopochtli, of tzoalli dough, its jacket wrought with human bones. Before this image the mazehualiztli dance now begins.[739] Rings are formed round the music-stand, where two leaders direct the movements, the highest nobles and the most aged composing the inner circles, and the younger men the outer. When all is ready the music strikes up lightly to a well known tune, and the dancers move off, chanting a song bearing on the event of the day, and on gods and kings.[740] Forewarned as the Spaniards are, they see treason in every act and word, and many who understand somewhat the Aztec language declare that the songs bear distinct allusions to the intended uprising.

As the dance progresses a few of the soldiers, together with a number of Tlascaltecs, take possession of the different entrances, while the rest distribute themselves in suitable positions and watch for the signal.[741] Instructed by his native allies, Alvarado waits the time when the Indians shall install the war-god image in the chapel. And now the sanguinary moment has come. Falling on the assembly with pike and sword, some strike the idol and some its worshippers. They hew down the priests and drive the cruel steel through the bodies of the nobles. Few of the Indians possess any weapons with which to defend themselves from the sharp Toledo blades. Taken thus by surprise, panic-stricken, they tread one upon another, and then fall helpless under the merciless thrusts of the enemy. Their first impulse has been to rush for the gates, but lines of bristling pikes oblige them to press back against the crowd, thereby increasing the confusion. Some attempt to climb over the high walls, some to hide in the temple buildings, even burrowing beneath the heaps of the slain. Before an hour has passed there is nothing left in sight deemed worthy of Spanish swords, so suddenly has this brilliant assembly been transformed into loathsome masses of mangled bodies. The pathway of the conquerors is everywhere slippery with the blood of their victims.

In this horrible butchery, as we have seen, the lower classes suffered less than the nobles. Desolation was brought home to nearly every prominent family in the city. Their grief, shared by dependants and adherents throughout the provinces, was commemorated in plaintive ballads, by which the people kept alive the hatred of their oppressors long after the conquest. The estimates of the killed vary from four hundred to over three thousand, the most common number being six hundred; and as this generally refers to prominent personages it may be accepted as not too low.[742]

Finding no more to kill, or rather no more worth the killing, the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs proceeded to plunder. The reward was rich, but even in the eyes of their national historians odium attached to every trinket, for by such action, as Herrera observes, they gave currency to the charge that the deed had been prompted by avarice. But this interesting occupation was destined to be interrupted. Shouts from the maddened multitude without were soon heard, roaring in response to the death clamor of their countrymen. Warned by the guard at the gates, the plunderers hastened to regain the fort. Yells of execration greeted them as they issued from the temple, and showers of stones and darts fell thick, while the front ranks of the assailants pressed them with swords and clubs.[743] Short as was the distance to the fort, much time was occupied in reaching it, and hardly a man escaped injury. Alvarado was severely wounded, while one soldier and a number of allies were slain.

FOOTNOTES

[711] Cartas, 124; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12. Bernal Diaz confirms that this was effected long before dawn, while Herrera states that 300 held out till morning; but he is contradictory. Carrasco, whom he assumes to be free, urged them to fall upon the attacking party, who were scattered to plunder. But this was not done for want of a leader. Nor did they favor his advice to plunder the baggage of Cortés, which was protected only by Indians, and to embark with Diego Velazquez. Carrasco accordingly proceeded alone to the baggage camp, and securing a horse and lance he returned and urged them to follow. He had evidently supernatural means wherewith to penetrate the besieging force. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Duran allows Cortés to form ambuscades and leap walls, so that the arms are secured ere the men of Narvaez can form in defence. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 453. Peter Martyr disposes briefly of the matter, and assumes that the chief captains of Narvaez were seduced. dec. v. cap. v.; Castellanos, Varones ilustres de Indias, 71-2; Galvano’s Discov., 144-5.

[712] ‘Cortes se mandò pregonar por Capitan general, y justicia mayor, de ambos exercitos.’ Carrasco was three days in stocks before he yielded obedience. Herrera, ubi sup. ‘Y todo esto era de noche, que no amanecia.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99.

[713] ‘Viua, viua la gala de los Romanos, que siẽdo tan pocos, han vencido a Narvaez!’ to which Guidelo, the negro jester of Narvaez, added, ‘Behold! the Romans never performed such a feat.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera speaks more at length of the sayings of this negro, who was rewarded with a crown of gold worth 600 ducats. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[714] ‘I saw Narvaez in Spain in 1525, and heard him publicly denounce Cortés as a traitor. He asked but royal permission to prove it, face to face with his enemy; furthermore, he was a liar, a tyrant, and an ingrate. Narvaez had been betrayed by those in whom he confided.’ Oviedo, iii. 316. Still, the chronicler cannot excuse his carelessness nor his entering into parley with Cortés; and he told him so. iii. 316.

[715] Bernal Diaz mentions fifteen [a misprint of dos for doce makes it only five deaths among Narvaez’ men, including Captain Rojas, Alférez Fuentes, who was an hidalgo of Seville, and Carretero, one of the deserters from Cortés’ explorers. Cortés lost four. Hist. Verdad., 99. Cortés prudently mentions to the king only two deaths, but leaves it uncertain to what side they belonged. Cartas, 124. Gomara claims them for Cortés, and states that Narvaez lost his eye, his honor, and sixteen men. Hist. Mex., 148. Cortés lost two men and one wounded; Narvaez eleven. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés four, Narvaez eleven, besides many wounded on both sides. Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 138. Solis supposes that two wounded of Cortés’ army died, making four in all, while Narvaez lost fifteen. Hist. Mex., ii. 101. One version claims that Narvaez lost fifteen by arms and six by fire in the burning of the quarters, which is probably an exaggeration. Narvaez lost all his property, including notes of hand. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, i. ii., varies from twelve to sixteen for Narvaez.

[716] Oviedo looks on Cortés’ reasons as insufficient to justify his procedure, such as ordering Narvaez to be seized, and demanding of him to exhibit a royal commission, ‘as if Cortés had been appointed by the king.’ Velazquez, as the principal who sent him forth, had every right to remove him. iii. 316.

[717] Bernal Diaz places the number at 1500, while Ceballos raises it to 3000, under Heredia, and places the arrival a day or two later. Herrera assumes that they came in time to march with Cortés on Cempoala. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[718] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, names Francisco de Lugo as the captain of this party, but Tirado states that he had been sent back to Mexico as an adherent of Velazquez. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6. ‘Dió con los once navios que el dicho mi parte allí tenia, al través, é les fizo quemar.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442. Bernal Diaz also intimates that all but two vessels were destroyed when the army proceeded to Mexico and one afterward. Hist. Verdad., 109. It is not probable, however, that more than a few were destroyed, because unseaworthy. Some were wrecked a few months later.

[719] ‘Por Almirãte, y Capitan de la mar ... al qual dizen que le dió primero buenos tejuelos de oro.’ His baptismal name was either Juan or Pedro. Two vessels were still expected to arrive. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, 113. Caballero was probably an old friend. ‘Pedro de Maluenda criado de Diego Velazquez, que venia por mayordomo de Naruaez, recogio y guardo los nauios y todo la ropa y hazienda.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 148. By Cortés’ order, adds Herrera.

[720] ‘Envié otros docientos hombres á la villa de la Veracruz.’ Cortés, Cartas, 125. Clavigero assumes that Cortés at this time already gave orders for removing Villa Rica southward, but events interfered with the project. Storia Mess., iii. 120.

[721] ‘Cortés le [Narvaez] tuvo preso con muy ásperas prisiones tres años, poco mas ó menos, é con guardias que nadie no le pudiese ver; é aquellos pasados, le quitó las prisiones é le tuvo preso otros dos años.’ So says Narvaez’ agent. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442-3. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, reduces the term to two years, and intimates that several other men were kept at Villa Rica, under surveillance at least. i. 223, 362-3, et seq.

[722] Narvaez claims to have been robbed of 100,000 castellanos’ worth of effects, and it is not likely that his property was restored. See Demanda de Ceballos, ubi sup. Bernal Diaz had to surrender a horse fully accoutred, two swords, three daggers, and other effects. Hist. Verdad., 100. Santa Clara intimates that the horses and arms were not as a rule restored. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 169. If so, compensation was probably given, according to the Relacion hecha por el Señor Andrés de Tápia, sobre la Conquista de México. This is one of the most valuable documents extant on the earlier period of the conquest, but it is unfortunately only a fragment, which takes up the narrative from the eve of leaving Cuba, and carries it to the capture of Narvaez, relating with rather uneven completeness the principal incidents of the voyage to Vera Cruz, the march to Mexico, the stay there, and the operations against the forces of Velazquez. Andrés de Tápia appears from his own statement to have been a poor nephew of Governor Velazquez, to whom he presented himself just in time to join the expedition of Cortés. At this time, says Bernal Diaz, he was about 24 years old, of good build, with a grave face, slight beard, and somewhat ashy complexion. Hist. Verdad., 246. He took an active part in the leading wars and expeditions during and after the conquest, and became one of the most noted among the captains, favored by Cortés, with whom he was frequently associated, accompanying him also on a voyage to Spain. Settling in Mexico, he died there peacefully, long after 1539, to judge from his reference to this date. His narrative, as may be supposed, is a panegyric upon his leader and patron, and some statements have accordingly to be weighed, but this defect impairs the importance of only a few passages, the rest being highly valuable, and many of them unique in their testimony. Guided by a reference in Bibl. de Autores Esp., xxii., Señor Icazbalceta of Mexico obtained, after great trouble, a copy of the apparent original from the Royal Academy of History, Madrid, entitled: Relacion de algunas cosas de las que acaecieron al Muy Ilustre Señor Don Hernando Cortés, etc. This he published in his Coleccion de Documentos, ii. 554-94. The last three pages form an appendix of brief remarks on the inhabitants and resources of New Spain.

[723] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 149. ‘Dos dias después de preso el dicho Narvaez, porque en aquella ciudad no se podia sostener tanta gente ... despaché dos capitanes.’ Cortés, Cartas, 125. Cortés writes that before leaving for Mexico he sent Mexican envoys to obtain the friendship and allegiance of the lord of Pánuco. This was at once offered, and presents were exchanged. Id., 56-7, 125, 144-45. Cortés was either deceived or he invented the story to counteract Garay’s schemes. Bernal Diaz names Ordaz for Goazacoalco and Velazquez for Pánuco; but it has entirely escaped his memory or notes that Velazquez had already been charged to form a colony in Goazacoalco, for which he was also better fitted, while Ordaz was more suited for rough warfare in Pánuco. This author gives to each 120 men, twenty of them from the ranks of Cortés, ‘porq̄ teniã mas experiẽcia en la guerra.’ Hist. Verdad., 100. The 200 allowed by others may include the ship-crews. Herrera places 300 men under Ordaz. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[724] For description of the feast, so as better to understand what follows, see Native Races, ii. 317-21, iii. 422-8.

[725] Oviedo refers the council and its acts only to the time immediately preceding Cortés’ departure, iii. 509.

[726] ‘Esto afirmaron muchas mugeres, de las quales se sabia siẽpre la verdad.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.

[727] ‘Nos quitaron la comida e enbiando por ella no nos la quisieron dar e nos davan de palos a las naborias e estando lavando una yndia de las nuestras la hahogaron e dezian e publicavan que asy avian de hazer a los españoles.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66. This testimony is confirmed by a number of his followers.

[728] ‘Con muchas escalas para subir y matar a los españoles.’ Id., 67. Martin, in Id., 144.

[729] ‘Le prince acolhua Tecocoltzin.’ _Brasseur de Bourbourg_, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287.

[730] ‘A number of poles were raised in the court-yard, destined, as I was told, to impale the Spaniards, one taller than the rest upon the pyramid being reserved for me.’ Alvarado, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66.

[731] Alvarado’s statements with regard to reports and signs of revolt, and to the confession of several natives, is confirmed by a number of witnesses, including the clergyman Juan Diaz. Id., 66, 113, et seq. Tapia, who is arrayed against Alvarado, intimates that torture induced the natives to give the confirmation of the plot as desired by the Spanish captain, and that the interpreter was unreliable. One witness declares that the uprising was understood to be planned to take place within ten days; another says on the day following the torture, intimating that it was to be after the great dances. Id., 37, 150. ‘Alvarado dixo, que luego le auian de venir a dar guerra ... que lo supo de vn Papa, y de dos Principales, y de otros Mexicanos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102.

[732] Tapia’s testimony to this and other criminating points is particularly valuable, as he was a bitter opponent of Alvarado. The latter states that Montezuma declared himself powerless to prevent the premeditated sacrilege to the Christian images. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36-7, 66-7. But this plea, if made, must, according to other accounts, be interpreted to apply only to pagan ceremonies, held almost before the images, and which might be regarded as a sacrilege. Torquemada writes that arms had been collected within the temple and everything prepared for the day when the Spaniards attended by invitation to witness the dance of the nobles. At a given signal an evidently simultaneous attack was to be made on the assembled guests and on the fort, thus taking the Spaniards at a disadvantage. Jars stood prepared, filled with certain liquids, wherein to cook their bodies for the feast. i. 489-90. The general inclination of those who follow the Spanish version, of which Torquemada, usually so stanch for the natives, is here the best exponent, has been to assume that the attack was arranged for the day of the great dances; and this is not unlikely, although the original writers and their commentators appear to be ignorant of or oblivious to certain features of the festival. Another view has been to place the attack during the installation of the new image of the war-god. This ceremony belonged to the preceding day, a fact not as a rule understood, and therefore the source of much confusion. Brasseur de Bourbourg, who is clearest on these points, assumes that the raising of the idol would involve the casting forth of the Christian emblems, and be the signal for attack. But evidences are conclusive that the natives were not ready on that day. They were too occupied with the celebration, and Alvarado, with his small force, was not so negligent as to wait till the last moment, when the enemy was fully prepared. He and several of his men indicate clearly enough that they attended the temple at the installation. The uprising must therefore have been appointed for the following or even a later day. See note 25. Vetancurt, Teatro Mex., iii. 139, is among the authorities who follow the version of Torquemada in general. One of the fervid-minded witnesses of Alvarado repeats the account of pots and jars for cooking the Spaniards. Helps supposes that Huitzilopochtli’s festival had not yet been entered upon, and that Tezcatlipoca’s image is the one in question; but the Spaniards, who knew the difference between these idols, all affirm that the celebration of the war-god was now held. See Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 69, 113, 130, 137, and 150.

[733] This received support from his neglect to interfere when supplies were cut down. Even Tapia refers to a change in his disposition, and to Alvarado’s displeasure thereat, but his words may apply to the stoppage either of supplies or of presents. Id., 36. Want of power could not be pleaded by Montezuma, because a few days later, when the natives were far more embittered both against the Spaniards and against their captive sovereign, the latter was able by a mere appeal to stay their onslaught. The testimony speaks not only of an undermined wall and scaling ladders, but of weapons, ‘porras y otras armas,’ and of conspirators within the fort. Id., 67, 113, et seq. Gomara says that his love for the Spaniards has been denied by some. Hist. Mex., 154-5; but Bernal Diaz will not believe Montezuma guilty of conspiracy. Hist. Verdad., 102. The grief of the Spaniards at his death, and the care taken of his children, indicate that they and the crown regarded him as loyal.

[734] ‘Los españoles lo requirieron al dicho D. Pedro.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 150. Tapia pretends that he objected. Id., 37.

[735] Alvarado and his men in more than one instance indicate the day when the dough idol was raised. Id., 67, 113, 134. Ixtlilxochitl points to the following greater day, which he dates May 19th. Relaciones, 412. Sahagun is not so definite, but his editor accepts the chief day, calling it whitsunday, May 27th. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 99. In another place he says May 25th. Tezcuco en los ultimos tiempos, 274. One of Alvarado’s men states that it was a Thursday. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 131.

[736] The testimony of the conquerors, confirmed by native paintings and records, leaves no doubt that the dance of the nobles and the massacre took place in the great temple adjoining the fort. Ramirez, Proceso, 37 et seq. Acosta writes, however, that they occurred in the palace, Hist. Ind., 522, and he is partly right, since a massacre was carried out here also. Clavigero follows Acosta, and assumes that the fort is meant. He argues that the dance was held there so that the emperor might, as customary, be present, and that a massacre could not have been undertaken by so few Spaniards in the great temple, where the arsenals were situated, and where the concourse of people must have been very large. Storia Mess., iii. 118. The Spaniards had forbidden the use of arms during the festival, and none appear to have been produced in the temple. Among other precautions Alvarado appears to have insisted on a small attendance beyond that of nobles, and most authorities so accept it.

[737] Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom counted.

[738] ‘Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o veynte criados,’ says the charge against Alvarado. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally ignored part of the massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the attendants of Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to punish them for this.

[739] Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412. ‘Este bayle es como el Netoteliztli.’ ‘Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir Merecimiento con trabajo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 150.

[740] See Native Races, ii. 288-9.

[741] ‘Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha gente junta para le subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente los quales comensaron a pelear con nosotros.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 67. This is a mere excuse evidently, which none attempt to support, definitely at least; but it sounded well to say that the actual fight began on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur de Bourbourg’s unique manuscripts states that the first attack by the Spaniards was upon those who were advancing with the idol. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287. ‘Este testigo desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir donde estava Nuestra Señora.’ Nuño Pinto, in Ramirez, 134.

[742] There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs, and an audience of from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from the wording of the accusation against Alvarado it appears that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest, besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets the native painting to signify 400, most likely of the nobles only, Id., 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, Cortés, Residencia, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one hour, Cano, in Oviedo, iii. 550; 600 to 1000 nobles and caciques, Gomara; over 1000 nobles, Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412, and Brasseur de Bourbourg. ‘Fué tan grande el derramamiento de sangre, que corrian arroyos della por el patio como agua cuando mucho llueve.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details of truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of draggling entrails. Father Duran goes to an extreme in his account, according to which Alvarado prompted the deed, and Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men were summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in order to permit Cortés to kill them and thus become master in the country. He places ten soldiers at each gate, and sends in ten to commit the slaughter. Hist. Ind., MS. ii. 456-9. Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but close behind him in the estimate, for he states that the slaughter was carried on in different parts of the city at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young nobles fell. Prescott misinterprets him. ‘Non procul à palatio aberant, duo circiter millia juvenum nobilium.... Ad hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad reliquas urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit, ... non cessabunt celebrare & lamentari ... calamitatem,’ etc. Regio. Ind. Devastat., 32.

[743] Tapia, and others, in Ramirez, 38, 67, 131. Torquemada assumes that the arms used by the assailants were those which had been collected for the outbreak in the houses adjoining the temple, i. 490. As regards the motives for the massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to justify them, while the native accounts are equally inclined to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty. According to Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado, who slaughtered the devotees without known cause. Hist. Conq., 27 (ed. 1840), 100. Duran, who is as prejudiced as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the return of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure the submission of the country by killing all the lords and chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to their death. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 456-7. Las Casas inclines to a similar motive; ‘quo magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis formido illorum crudelitatis.’ Regio. Ind. Devastat., 30. Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed to credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards, and so takes the prudent middle course of casting the blame on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred bred of former wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they invent charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being also avaricious, is readily induced to believe them, and considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain control by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Ixtlilxochitl is not to blame for his assumption, since his admired guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend Alvarado, but merely mentions that he was influenced either by reports of a proposed uprising or by avarice. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly that the latter motive ‘es mas de creer.’ Hist. Conq., i. 281; Benzoni, Mondo Nuovo, 94; Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns Alvarado for acting on insufficient evidence. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139-40. Cortés’ silence respecting the cause may be attributed to his usual prudence in suppressing unpleasant facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated him not to be annoyed at what had happened, since he regretted it as much as the Spaniards. This implies that the Indians were regarded as originators of the trouble. The severity with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico, notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the Spaniards, indicates still more strongly that Cortés was convinced of Mexican treachery. Cartas, 126 et seq. In the letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed to Narvaez’ plots. Carta del Ejército, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 429. Herrera notices the native versions, particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs of having trumped up charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms, ‘la verdad fue, que pensaron matar los Castellanos.’ He thereupon enumerates proofs of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with native accounts, condemns them as unreliable, and states that Sahagun accepted them without investigation, i. 489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice is promptly rejected by Bernal Diaz. ‘No lo creo, ni nunca tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.’ His motive was to inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the Indians from attacking him. That they intended to attack, Bernal Diaz fully believes. Hist. Verdad., 102. Solis is quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled the Spaniards. Hist. Mex., ii. 117. According to Oviedo the intention of the natives was to kill also Cortés on his return. He inserts without comment the version of Cano, married to Montezuma’s daughter, that avarice was the motive, iii. 510, 550. Acosta, who generally adheres to native versions, does not apparently find them reliable in this case, since he merely says that a ‘chastisement’ was inflicted, but that it was excessive. Hist. Ind., 522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who believes that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of a plot, and wished to anticipate it, on the principle that ‘chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la sua condotta non può scusarsi d’imprudenza, e di crudeltà.’ Storia Mess., iii. 119. This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern Mexican historian Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be. Hist. Mex., ii. 339. His confrère Bustamante, as editor of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero’s views and disbelief in Alvarado’s apology. But in expressing his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises some meaningless questions. Mex., ii. 284-6. There is no doubt that the Indians were bent on mischief. A large faction had been hostile to the Spaniards ever since their arrival, as intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading under the threatening attitude assumed by the unbidden guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting tribute, and in assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole population became possessed with a desire to avenge not only the outraged idols, but themselves and their sovereign, and to uphold the tottering throne. The observations of the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were correct in pointing to an uprising, to take place during the gathering of pilgrims for the war-god festival, when the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted by torture or not, confirmed the charges and justified belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent commander ignore them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the protection of his force, and of the interests of his king and the expedition. It might be urged by those who seek to defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims for hostages would have been equally effective and more humane; but from the precedence established by the general himself at Cholula the conduct of the rash Alvarado is scarcely to be wondered at. Cortés’ object had been to strike terror as the only effective lesson for a people who seemed to recognize no other sway, and if this was regarded as necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have held it to be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than that at the former city, for his resources were smaller, the prospect of aid was hopeless, and escape was cut off. He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would apparently have greater effect. It was natural to suppose that the installation of the war-god would be attended by the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to level the blow at this class must be considered as less cruel at least than to strike the multitude, as at Cholula. Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the silence of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor motives prompting a dastardly deed I do not regard as very relevant. I am very sure that the motives of the Spaniards in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for a higher stake, for the whole country, and, in case they won, all in it would be theirs. The present heavy blow was but one of the points in the game.

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