XXXI. PRELIMINARY CAMPAIGNS…

XXXI. PRELIMINARY CAMPAIGNS

MARCH-MAY, 1521.

PLAN FOR THE INVESTMENT OF MEXICO—RECONNOITRING TOUR ROUND THE LAKE—CORTÉS IN COMMAND—ALVARADO AND OLID ACCOMPANY—THEY PROCEED NORTHWARD FROM TEZCUCO—CAPTURE OF CITIES AND STRONGHOLDS—XALTOCAN, QUAUHTITLAN, TENAYOCAN, AZCAPUZALCO, TLACOPAN, AND BACK TO TEZCUCO—CHALCO DISTURBED—PEACE PROPOSALS SENT TO MEXICO—FURTHER RECONNOISSANCE OF THE LAKE REGION—MANY BATTLES AND VICTORIES—QUAUHNAHUAC CAPTURED—BURNING OF XOCHIMILCO—SECOND RETURN TO TEZCUCO—CONSPIRACY.

The arrival at Tezcuco of the brigantines recalled the necessity for planning the investment of Mexico, and this involved a reconnoitring tour round the lake, for which the Tlascaltecs in particular were importunate. Chichimecatl pressed this measure the moment he arrived at Tezcuco. He had come to serve the emperor, to join the Spaniards in avenging their fallen countrymen. Cortés expressed appreciation of his zeal, “but rest now,” he said, “for soon you shall have your hands full.” A few days later the general set out from Tezcuco with twenty-five horse, three hundred foot-soldiers, twenty-five archers and crossbowmen, and over thirty thousand allies, chiefly Tlascaltecs, with a number of Tezcucans. Among the war material were six field-pieces.[1062] Alvarado and Olid accompanied the expedition, and also a number of the Tezcucan leaders, partly as hostages, while Sandoval remained in charge. A northward course was taken, though the aim and destination were divulged to but a few, owing to the distrust still entertained of the Tezcucans.

On the Tecama Plain, four miles from Tezcuco, a hostile force approached, probably by accident. After routing them the army encamped. The following day they proceeded to Xaltocan,[1063] a prominent town situated on an island in the northern end of the lake bearing that name. Once the capital successively of a Toltec, Otomí, and Chichimec principality, it had succumbed to the vicissitudes of political revolution and wars, and was at present one of the chief strongholds belonging to the tripartite power in the valley. It was approached by a causeway provided with breastworks and drawbridges.

The intention of the army had been surmised, so that preparations were made in every direction to resist an entry, and the water swarmed with canoes. In advancing along the causeway a tempest of stones, arrows, and darts came upon them from both sides, while hampered on a narrow road, hemmed in by the waters, and able to do little against the floating enemy, who were comparatively safe behind the bulwarks fitted to their canoes. Advance was soon stopped by the first trench in the causeway, not only wide and deep, but protected on the farther side by strong breastworks. The situation was embarrassing. Falling back a little, with the loss of one man, the guns were brought forward to protect the allies while filling the gap; but at this juncture two Tezcucans informed Cortés that they could guide him across by a fordable passage.

The offer was eagerly accepted, and while a part of the forces attracted the foe to the causeway, and the horses covered the rear, Cortés led another party by the ford. The water reached only to the waist, and though the enemy hastened forward, resistance was in vain, and soon the town was reached, and all who had not escaped immediately surrendered. Good spoils were secured of fabrics and other merchandise, as well as some gold. Since the canoe fleet might attempt a night attack, it was not considered safe to camp on the island, and as the army withdrew to the plain one league beyond, a part of the town was fired, in further warning. Xaltocan had more than once before risen from her ashes, but these were the flames of her funeral pyre. She never assumed importance again, and is now but a pretty village.

The next camp was formed in Quauhtitlan, “a large and beautiful city,” as Cortés calls it, which was found deserted. Thence they followed the route which had been taken after that night of ineffaceable horrors, when the foe seemed to fill the air and beat their faces in the blackness like the birds of Avernus, cutting off the stragglers faint with wounds and hunger, and sending terror to the hearts of the bravest. Now they came in confident strength, yet again the foe hovered round, though only at a distance, along the safe hill slopes, while from the summits rose pillars of smoke to proclaim the coming of the avengers. They passed through Tenayocan, once the capital of the Chichimec empire, and now renowned only for the immense serpent idols in its temple, from which the Spaniards called it El Pueblo de los Sierpes. Thence to Azcapuzalco, the former proud seat of the Tepanec kings.[1064]

No resistance being offered at any of these towns, they were spared the brand, whereat the disappointed sackers felt aggrieved. As the army neared Tlacopan a large opposing body appeared, which was reinforced by warriors from the towns thereabout and from Mexico. The ground being level, the cavalry easily broke through their lines, and the infantry completed the rout, pursuing them into the city. After clearing the greater number of streets from foes, camp was formed in the palace.

There was hardly any evidence of the late ravages to which Mexico and its approaches had been exposed during Spanish occupation, and Cortés saw that it would be no easy matter to besiege such a stronghold, or series of strongholds, as the massive buildings may be termed, held as they were by so obstinate a people as the Aztecs, with whom any trifling or imaginary success seemed to efface the effect of continual defeats.

The prospect was not encouraging, and as he looked at the causeway full of those pitfalls which had defeated his high purposes, gloomy thoughts filled his breast. “Why so sad, your worship?” broke in a cavalier.[1065] “Yours was not the fault, and never will you be compared with heartless Nero.” “I am not thinking of that sorrow alone,” said Cortés, “but of the struggles yet required to achieve the mastery. Still with God’s approval we will soon attempt it.”[1066]

In the morning hostile forces again appeared, only to be driven back, whereupon the allies dispersed to sack and fire, with the determination to avenge the attack made upon them during the flight from Mexico. “And in this they used such diligence,” writes Cortés, “that even our quarters were endangered.” The general was nothing loath to see the flames, for it suited his plans not only to chastise the people, but to render the place less strong in view of later operation; furthermore, it was no easy matter to restrain the Tlascaltecs. Next day the enemy came again in force, but this time they waited not to be routed. They retired steadily to and along the causeway to Mexico, drawing the Spaniards after them. It was the very spot where they had suffered so severely the year before. Cortés had led the cavalry far along the causeway and across one bridge, when the Mexicans with inspiring shouts and doubled force came rolling back on front and flank, from houses and lanes, thrusting with pikes and striking with swords, the roofs meanwhile swarming with slingers. Cortés quickly sounded retreat, and the troops retired, but the onslaught had been tremendous, and it required no small effort to stay themselves. Almost every one was wounded, it is said, and several fatally. In crossing the bridge Alférez Juan Volante was knocked into the water. Several canoe-men seized him, but he was a powerful fellow, and with the strength of desperation he shook them off and sprang back to his comrades with his banner. Cortés made repeated charges with the horses to relieve the pressed foot-soldiers, till open ground was gained and the danger past.[1067]

On the following days the Mexicans sought to repeat their manœuvres, but Cortés was more prudent, and covered his rear carefully as he advanced. Observing this, the Mexicans tauntingly called out: “Enter, O brave ones, and fight! for to-day you will be masters of Mexico. Enter to feast, all is prepared!” And again: “You shall find no Montezuma now to do your bidding. Begone, therefore, to your own!” Others confined themselves to insults directed against the Tlascaltecs. “Rogues,” they cried, “never would you thus dare to approach us but for the Christians, whose concubines you are. But wait awhile; we shall eat you both with chile, for you are not fit to be slaves!” The Tlascaltecs were not slow to answer: “Always have you fled before us like treacherous cowards. We are the men, you the women. Never have you entered our territory as we yours. The Castilians are not men but gods, one of whom suffices to rout a thousand such as you!” This verbal skirmish led in several cases to challenges, the principals being accorded a free field wherein to settle their disputes; and since they were generally men selected from both sides for their bravery, skill, and strength, the struggles were eagerly watched.

On one occasion a solitary warrior of great stature stepped from a canoe to the causeway, armed with sword and shield, and challenged any Spaniard to combat, for he desired to appease the gods with blood. The soldiers gaped in astonishment at this rashness. “What, you hesitate, you cowards!” he cried. The next instant a soldier named Gonzalo Hernandez rushed upon him with sword and shield, whereupon he leaped into the water, pursued by the soldier, who sought to despatch him. A number of canoes stole up, however, and Hernandez was seized by the warriors. His comrades rushed to the rescue, and so beset the canoes as to kill a chief and bring their champion ashore.[1068] During one of the sallies Cortés reached the breach in the causeway where his men had suffered so severely during the Sorrowful Night. The bridge was down, and he appealed to the warriors on the other side: “Why so foolishly court destruction? If there is a leader among you, let him appear, so that I may speak.” “Speak,” was the response, “we are all leaders here; leaders who shall make a banquet of thee and thine!”

* * * * *

Six days had been spent at Tlacopan, and since nothing could be achieved, not even an interview with Quauhtemotzin, for which Cortés ardently longed, he turned homeward. This abandonment of what the Mexicans had probably regarded as the beginning of the siege created no small exultation among them, and eagerly they pursued the retreating army, though repelled now and then with some punishment by the cavalry. The following day the pursuing forces had swelled to larger proportions, and were more daring than ever. Cortés accordingly ordered the infantry to advance, while he, with twenty horses, divided into several parties and formed an ambuscade. No sooner had the unsuspecting Mexicans reached the spot than the cavalry charged into their midst with thundering war cries. The surprise, no less than the execution, caused a panic, and the infantry hastened back to join in the usual chastisement. Molestation ceased.

From Quauhtitlan the army proceeded by way of Acolman to Tezcuco. The presence of so large a body of allies being considered for the moment unnecessary, the greater number, elated with success and laden with spoil, were dismissed to their homes, there to prepare for the gathering to follow the completion of the brigantines.[1069]

* * * * *

The withdrawal from Tlacopan encouraged the Mexicans to attempt the recovery of Chalco and to inflict chastisement for its secession. The place was indeed most important to Mexico, since from its fertile plains came the largest supplies, now more than ever required. The threat had been held over the Chalcans ever since their submission to Cortés, and the two young lords had hardly returned from Tezcuco before they sent messengers to implore aid. This occurred while Sandoval was preparing to leave for Tlascala to convey the brigantines, and no further troops could therefore be detached without great risk, so that the Chalcans were told to wait. As the messengers were leaving with this cold comfort envoys arrived from Huexotzinco and Quauhquechollan. They had seen the signal pillars of smoke of the hostile allies, and had come to ask if they could be of service. The proposals came most opportunely.

The Huexotzincas and Quauhquechollans had long entertained a hatred of the Chalcans, as natives of an Aztec province against whose forces they had often been arrayed, but Cortés represented the true state of affairs and convinced the respective envoys of the important service they could render themselves and their new sovereign, to whom all owed allegiance, by forgetting occurrences for which their oppressors were to blame, and to combine for mutual aid. His arguments were convincing, and both Huexotzinco and Quauhquechollan promised immediately to support the Chalcans with a large force.

The Aztecs do not appear to have gone much beyond threats until after the Spanish retirement from Tlacopan, but two days after their return to Tezcuco, Chalcan messengers appeared with such supplications that Sandoval was despatched to their aid with twenty horse, three hundred infantry, and a force of allies,[1070] largely reinforced at Chalco by Huexotzincas, Quauhquechollans, and Chalcans. On arriving before Chimalhuacan,[1071] he found the enemy drawn up in battle array in three large divisions. A rush at the invaders was made. The cavalry met them, breaking their ranks and throwing them into confusion. Retiring to more broken ground, where they were comparatively safe from the horses, they rallied to face the infantry, but the well directed volleys of fire-arms and cross-bows proved another surprise, which prepared the way for an effective charge from swordsmen and lancers. Now the retreat assumed more the form of a flight, the Spaniards pursuing eagerly. During this operation Gonzalo Dominguez was thrown from his horse, which fell upon him, inflicting such injuries that he died within a few days. In him the army lost one of its most dashing horsemen, and the equal of any in daring.

The troops then retired to the town for the night. Next day they marched to Huastepec, the objective point of the expedition, where fifteen thousand Mexicans, composed partly of the defeated forces, attacked them with such energy that five horses and a number of soldiers were wounded. The Spaniards soon routed them, and chased the fleeing through the town, a number taking refuge in a stronghold. While a portion of the troops, together with the Tlascaltecs, dispersed in quest of the rich spoil, and the cavalry were tending their horses, the fugitive garrison stole back to the town and fought their way to the stronghold near the square, where they took a stand behind some breastworks. Their position was not long maintained, however, after the troops had collected for the assault. The entire force of Mexicans was then driven for over a league, with considerable slaughter. The army now took up their quarters for two days in the palace. A peaceful summons was sent to the lord of the place, without meeting any response; another to Yacapichtla brought an insulting answer. The insolence was due to the confidence of the garrison in its strength, situated as it was on an almost inaccessible height.[1072] The Chalcans implored Sandoval to capture the place and drive forth the occupants, who would otherwise not fail to descend with fire and sword on their land. The proposition was by no means agreeable after so arduous a march and with so many wounded, including himself; but Sandoval never shrank from what he regarded duty, and soon he appeared before the fort to repeat his demands, only to hear taunts and jeers. The ascent was steep, with few points affording cover, and when the Chalcans were urged to begin the attack for which they had pleaded they objected unless the Teules accompanied them. Sandoval unhesitatingly placed some horsemen to guard the rear, and dismounting with Tápia the two took their shields and swords and led the way, followed by a number of soldiers.

The garrison lustily plied their stones and darts, and despite the protecting shields several were wounded, among them Tápia and Osma, while others were overthrown by the concussion and came tumbling down. With cheering Santiagos the soldiers urged one another onward until even the Chalcans joined the assault. The first Spaniard had hardly reached the summit before the occupants attempted flight, only to bring death upon them the quicker. Many were chased over the cliff, to fall into equally relentless hands below; others in their fear and despair cast themselves headlong from the height. So freely flowed blood, the soldiers say, that the creek at the foot of the fortress was stained sanguine, and so remained for an hour, repelling in horror the victors who approached it to quench their thirst.[1073] The Chalcans being now content, Sandoval returned to Tezcuco with considerable spoils and a number of pretty slaves.

Informed of the victorious advance of the Spaniards, Emperor Quauhtemotzin hastened to send reinforcements to his garrisons, and hardly had Sandoval tendered a report to his general before the alarmed Chalcans sent messengers stating that a fleet of two thousand large canoes with numerous warriors were descending upon them. Believing that Sandoval must have been too hasty or negligent, Cortés without deigning to listen to excuses ordered him to return immediately. Meanwhile the Chalcans, encouraged by the allies, had faced the invaders bravely and routed them in a fierce battle, killing quite a number and capturing over twoscore warriors, among them the general and several chiefs.[1074] When Sandoval came up the fight was over, and the proud victors surrendered their captives, who were sent to Tezcuco, the Spaniards following as soon as the danger appeared to be over.

Aggrieved at the brusqueness of his commander, Sandoval sent in his report without presenting himself; but Cortés had by this time recognized the injustice of his treatment, and actuated by policy no less than by affection, he summoned his captain and frankly avowed his haste, thus strengthening the friendship which ever after bound them. The victories in Chalco left secure the entire region between Villa Rica and the Spanish lines, and communication was henceforth regularly maintained, permitting fresh supplies and war material to be brought from a vessel which had recently reached the coast. A great event was the arrival of three vessels with two hundred Spaniards, eighty horses, and a full complement of arms, ammunition, and other effects, partly bought and partly enlisted by the agents whom Cortés had despatched to the Islands during the previous autumn. Among the new-comers were Julian de Alderete of Tordesillas, appointed royal treasurer for New Spain, and the Franciscan Pedro Melgarejo de Urrea of Seville, bearing a supply of papal indulgences for the men who had been engaged in the crusade. That the soldiers were conscious of frequent transgressions may be judged from the suggestive and not wholly reverential observation of Bernal Diaz, that “after patching their defects the friar returned to Spain within a few months, a rich man.”[1075]

Cortés was cheered by offers of submission and alliance, owing partly to the good offices of Tezcucans and other allies. Some came from places quite distant, such as Nautla and Tuzapan, on the coast north of Villa Rica, laden as usual with presents.[1076] Another pleasing evidence of still more devoted loyalty came not long after from the south, from the country of the valiant Chinantecs, of the long pikes. During the great uprising, when Spaniards in small or straggling parties had everywhere been slaughtered, this people faithfully protected the two soldiers who happened to be with them, and were in return aided by their prowess and advice to achieve victories over adjoining tribes. One of these men, Captain Hernando de Barrientos, sent two natives in April with a letter to his countrymen imparting the assurance that Chinantla and its six sub-towns were loyal.[1077]

The recent successes and the arrival of the two hundred men induced Cortés once more to propose peace to Quauhtemotzin. To this end, during passion week, he bade some of the captured nobles proceed to Mexico with a letter as a symbol of their commission, and impress upon their master the superiority in arms and skill of the Spanish forces, their constant and large reinforcements, and their unvarying success in the field. They must point out the generous and humane treatment of the provinces which had submitted, and assure the Aztec leaders that equal forgiveness would be accorded them. Refusal to return to their allegiance would lead to the destruction of themselves and their city. Only two of the captives ventured to accept the commission, for according to Aztec articles of war any noble who returned to his country after having been captured by an enemy was doomed to decapitation unless he had performed some extraordinary deed.[1078]

No answer came from Mexico, and it was afterward learned that the messengers had suffered death. The Aztec ruler had not even given a thought to peace. He was watching his opponents, prepared to take advantage of any neglect or relaxation in their effort. No sooner had Sandoval been induced by peaceful appearances to retire from Chalco than Aztec forces again prepared to invade the province. The Chalcans had due warning, and close upon the heels of Sandoval came two messengers lamenting louder than ever, and exhibiting a painting wherein were named the many towns whose forces were coming upon them, fully fifty thousand strong. These constant menaces and movements were exasperating, and Cortés resolved personally to inflict a lesson which might be lasting. At the same time he proposed to complete his reconnoissance of the lake region and encourage his troops with spoils from hostile localities whereon the Aztecs yet relied for support.[1079]

Cortés selected thirty horse, three hundred infantry, a number of Tlascaltecs, and over twenty thousand Tezcucans, under Prince Ixtlilxochitl, to which twice that number of other allies were added on the way. A large proportion of archers and aquebusiers were taken, together with Alvarado, Olid, Alderete, Melgarejo, and others, while Sandoval was left in charge of Tezcuco, with instructions to watch and promote the completion of the brigantines against which several incendiary attempts had been made.

The expedition left Friday, the 5th of April, and passed through Chalco, Tlalmanalco, and Chimalhuacan,[1080] and crossing in a south-westerly direction into the Totolapan province, they entered the hills which form the southern border of the Mexican valley. By this time the forces had assumed proportions hardly inferior to those of the Iztocan campaign, when over one hundred thousand moved against the foe. Highly picturesque was the spectacle of this army, its naked hordes of warriors relieved by plumage and glittering iztli points which rose above the broad line of gaudy shields; its white adventurers in mail of cotton and metal, surmounted by bright helmets, and armed knights on proudly stepping steeds: picturesque in particular as it wound in almost endless line along the rounded slopes of the cliffs, or climbed in clearly defined file across the hill-tops, only to descend again into gulches gloomy as their own sinister purpose.

Alarmed by the invasion, the inhabitants had abandoned their valley homes, and had sought refuge on the summits, whence they hurled missiles at the passing lines. Little attention was paid these irregular bands, composed as they were to a great extent of women and children. On entering the Tlayacapan Valley, however, and observing on the craggy sides of an almost perpendicular isolated rock, perched there like an eagle’s nest, a place of refuge peopled with more pretentious opposers, in a fit of insensate folly Cortés ordered the place to be assailed. He seemed to think the honor of the army demanded it, and was ready to stake the lives of valuable men on its destruction.

Orders were given to attack from three several sides, the steepest being assigned to Alférez Corral, a brave and spirited leader. Verdugo and Villafuerte were given another side, and Ircio and Monjaraz the third. Each party consisted of about threescore men, and included archers and arquebusiers. At a given signal all rushed forward to the ascent. Soon they were on hands and knees, crawling over projections and pulling themselves up by means of shrubs. All the while stones and darts rattled on helmet and breastplate; and huge rocks came rolling down upon them. In vain they sought shelter in crevices and under crags; they must face the storm. Bernal Diaz followed Corral, and after receiving many a hard knock they gained what was called two turns of the rock. There they paused and looked around, wondering at their success thus far. Supporting himself against a small tree, his face bathed in blood, his banner rent, Corral said, “Señor Diaz, it is useless to advance farther; not a man will survive.” Then they shouted a warning to Pedro Barba, at the head of his archers, not to climb farther. “The order is to advance!” was the reply. The next moment Barba was wounded by a stone, and a soldier at his side was killed. Cortés then sounded the recall, but not until eight brave men had laid down their lives, victims of their commander’s puerility, and of the rest most of them returned wounded.[1081]

The recall was likewise prompted by the approach of a considerable force in the valley. This the cavalry charged and quickly routed, following in close pursuit, though the broken ground soon enabled the fugitives to gain shelter. During this ride some of the horsemen came, a league beyond, to another hill fortress, strong in its natural features, and held by a large force. Near by were some springs. The need of water was pressing, which afforded a plausible excuse for abandoning the scaling of Tlayacapan, and the whole force was moved to the springs. Early next morning Cortés examined the approaches to the new stronghold. It extended over three hills, the central one exceedingly steep and held by the largest force; the others easier of ascent, though higher, and occupied by smaller numbers. In reconnoitring, Cortés advanced toward the centre. This movement led the occupants of the other hills to infer an attack on the central height, and they began to abandon their positions with a view to reënforce the threatened point. Observing this, Cortés ordered Barba to occupy the most commanding elevation with some fifty arquebusiers and archers, while he himself continued to scale the centre as a feint, for there was little hope of capturing a point so steep and strongly held. The stones and darts rained here as previously, and man after man was struck down, some bleeding freely from the wounds sustained.[1082]

Meanwhile Barba’s sharp-shooters had made so effective a use of their weapons that within half an hour the volleys from the fortress ceased, and the women began to wave their robes in token of truce, shouting their submission. Cortés graciously met the advances, and extended full pardon. He also prevailed on the chiefs to induce the Tlayacapans to submit. On the extensive surface of the rock were collected all the inhabitants of the neighborhood, with their effects, which Cortés ordered not to be touched.[1083]

The army remained encamped for two days to refresh themselves after their arduous march, and after sending the wounded to Tezcuco, Cortés proceeded to Huastepec. The report of the clemency extended to preceding settlements had a reassuring effect on this town, whose cacique came forth to welcome them, and tender his palace for their entertainment. This was situated in a garden, celebrated throughout New Spain for its beauty and extent, and the immense variety of its plants, collected partly for scientific purposes. A river with tributary canals flowed through its grounds, which extended over a circuit of nearly two leagues, murmuring its melody in unison with winged songsters hidden in arbors or playing between bush and hedge, mingling their bright color with the green expanse. Adjacent were steep rocks, on whose smooth surface were sculptured the portraits of noted warriors, statesmen, and orators, with hieroglyphic inscriptions of their fame. It was a paradise formed equally for student and idler, and to the weary soldiers no spot could perhaps have proven so grateful. Cortés certainly grows ecstatic in describing it, declaring it “the largest, most beautiful, and freshest garden ever seen.”[1084] Tempting as was the retreat, Cortés tore himself from it the following day, and proceeded in a south-westerly direction to Yauhtepec. Although many warriors were gathered there, they fled on the approach of the Spaniards, and were chased, with some slaughter, for about two leagues, into the town of Xiuhtepec.[1085] The women and effects there found were appropriated as spoils, and rendered agreeable the two days’ stay. The ruler failing to appear, the place was fired, and terrified by this warning the lord of Yauhtepec hastened to proffer submission.

After a day’s hard march the army came in sight of Quauhnahuac,[1086] capital of the Tlahuicas. They were one of the Nahuatlaca tribes, which according to tradition had entered the Anáhuac country to supplant the Toltecs. Coming rather late, they found their brethren already in possession of the lake region, and so they crossed the range to seek a home on the headwaters of the Zacatula, where soon a number of settlements rose round Quauhnahuac. They afterward fell under the sway of the Chichimecs, and finally the Aztecs took advantage of internal discord to establish sovereignty,[1087] maintaining it by a garrison in the capital. This was a natural stronghold, situated on a tongue of land between two steep ravines over forty feet in depth, and through which ran a little stream during the rainy season. It was further protected by strong walls, particularly on the side where a strongly guarded gate opened to a fine stretch of country. Two other entrances faced the ravines, sometimes spanned by bridges, which were now removed.

Situated at the gateway to the tropical southern valleys, between which and the colder lake region interposed a range of mountains, the spot stood as a new Eden in its manifold beauties. A sight even of the pine-fringed mountains that rolled off toward the north, with their green slopes shaded by oak and birch, and bathed in soft though bracing airs, was refreshing to the indolent inhabitants of the burning plain beyond. On the other hand the sturdy toilers of the northern plateaux might in this sunny south seek relaxation in the varied charms of a softer air balmy with the incense of a more lustrous vegetation.[1088]

It was an opulent community that of Quauhnahuac, surrounded as it was by endless resources and advantages, and the people were in no mood tamely to yield their wealth to invaders. And in this determination they were sustained by their lord, Yohuatzin,[1089] who was not only a vassal but a relative of Quauhtemotzin. Confident in the impregnable position of his city, in which supplies were ample, he replied with volleys to the demands of the Spanish forces as they appeared on the other side of the ravines. It seemed almost impossible to effect a crossing and climb the steep wall of the ravine to the city; nevertheless Cortés selected a position and began to open fire so as to occupy the attention of the garrison and cover the scaling parties.

While they were thus busied a brave Tlascaltec reconnoitred and came to a point half a league beyond, where the ravine was steepest and narrowed to an abyss. On the two sides grew two large trees, which inclined toward each other, with branches intertwined, forming a sort of natural bridge, though by no means secure. He called the attention of his party to this and led the way across, followed by several Spaniards. The natives, who were more accustomed to this kind of tactics, found comparatively little difficulty in swinging themselves across; but to the soldiers it was far from easy, and three of them, overcome by dizziness or weight of armor, slipped and fell.[1090]

The attention of the inhabitants being attracted elsewhere, a number of the invaders had gained a secure foothold within the city before they were observed. Even now a few resolute men might have driven them back, but such were wanting, and the sudden appearance of the dreaded white men, as if indeed they had dropped into the stronghold from some cloud made radiant by the sun whose reputed children they were, struck terror to the hearts of the poor natives. All impotent and nerveless, they permitted the daring strangers to lower the drawbridge, and turned to spread the panic. Meanwhile the reports of a formidable army advancing from the rear so wrought on the fears of the garrison that, when the handful who had crossed on the bushy bridge fell on them, they offered no resistance. This also allowed the scaling forces to pour in, so that within a short time the siege was turned into a rout, wherein the cavalry played a prominent part. The zeal of the allies was already indicated by smoky columns in different parts of the city, and the foot-soldiers hastened to share in the rich plunder and intercept the women.

Most of the fugitives had gathered on an adjacent height, and though no attempt was made that day to molest them, yet they began to fear that men who could so readily capture one of the strongest fortresses in the country, would find no difficulty in reaching them anywhere; therefore, after listening to the advice of messengers sent by Cortés, Yohuatzin concluded to surrender, and presented himself on the following day with a large retinue and rich presents. The Mexicans were as usual blamed for the opposition offered. He would have submitted before, but thought it best to expiate the fault of resistance by allowing the Spaniards to pursue, so that after spending their fury they might be more ready to forgive.[1091]

There was no time at present to extend the reconnoissance farther in this direction, and after a brief rest Cortés turned northward to the lakes. The route over the mountains proved far more difficult than before, and after issuing from the pine forest the army entered a desert country terminating in a three-league pass through the Ajuzco Mountains. Here thirst became so intense that several natives succumbed.[1092] This suffering was relieved in a hamlet not far from the pass.

On the following day they passed through a fine and cultivated country toward Xochilmilco, that is to say, Field of Flowers, aptly named, for round almost every house, particularly on the outskirts, was a flower-garden enclosed by canals. Many of them were of the chinampa class, or floating gardens,[1093] the outgrowth of early Aztec weakness, now forming a picturesque border to the lake towns. Altogether the aspect was most pleasing, while the buildings of the central parts were artistic and striking. Besides the strength added by canals and moats, pile buildings were frequent, and intrenchments had been thrown up and drawbridges raised to defend the approach against any enemy of the Aztecs, for its loyalty to the queen city was fully as great as that of Iztapalapan. It was the most important place on the thickly settled fresh-water lake. Bishop Garcés relates that angels were heard to sing praises in the Mexican tongue when it was converted.[1094] The usual summons was issued by the Spaniards, and no heed being given, they attacked in three divisions by different approaches. The enemy fell back behind the raised bridges and intrenchments, whence they kept up a steady volley. The archers and arquebusiers replied briskly, and covered the van as it plunged into not very deep water and waded across to capture the fortifications. This effected, the foe was driven from one retreat to another. Seeing how affairs went, they sought to parley, but the pursuers paid no heed, regarding it as a trick to gain time for the removal of their families and property. Within half an hour the greater part of the city was won, and soldiers and allies were sacking as they advanced. The foe rallied now and then to cover their retreat, and in one instance managed to despatch two soldiers who had allowed avarice to overcome prudence.

Not long after, a body of some ten thousand warriors, reënforced by fugitives from the city, was seen advancing from the rear as if to cut off retreat. They were already close at hand when first observed, and without losing a moment Cortés charged them at the head of a body of cavalry.[1095]

At first they boldly faced the animals, and fought so well as to severely wound four, besides several riders; but the mounted body kept breaking through their ranks and then turned to fall on the rear. This movement proved decisive, and the enemy dispersed in flight, the horsemen scattering in pursuit. Already weakened by the severe march across the mountains, the horse of Cortés became quite exhausted, and while its rider was striking right and left into a large body of fugitives, it fell. No other horseman being near, the enemy gathered courage and rushed upon the general, who had risen to his feet and stood with sword in hand to defend himself. It was a critical moment, and had not a brave Tlascaltec warrior come to his rescue thus opportunely, the career of the Estremaduran would have ended there; for he had already received a severe blow on the head and was about to be dragged away when thus rescued. The general’s body-guard then came up and cut in pieces his late stupid assailants—stupid because they might so easily have killed him, and did not.[1096] The pursuit was not long maintained, tired as the horses were, and remounting his steed Cortés led the way back to camp in the square.

Late as it was he superintended the filling of all the channels which broke the causeways, and the erection of defences, and ordered the soldiers to put in order their arms and prepare arrows. The forces were distributed at three points, and extra guards were posted for the night, together with bodies of troops at probable landing-points. These precautions were prompted chiefly by the evident effort of the last body of the enemy to shut up the army within the city, a movement which boded other attempts, as Cortés rightly supposed.

* * * * *

When Quauhtemotzin heard that the Spaniards had marched against Xochimilco he called a council to consider the course to adopt, and the result was the despatch of reënforcements. Finding that the city had so easily fallen, he became furious. The gods were indignant at the outrages of the strangers. Arms must be employed more manfully, and, these failing, the loyal ones must let their nails grow, as the last means of protection. The first step should be the recovery of Xochimilco. That very night two thousand canoes were sent with some twelve thousand warriors, and a similar force by land, all approaching stealthily, without music.[1097]

* * * * *

The rumor of a probable night attack kept the Spanish camp on the alert, and advised of this, the enemy made no attack. At dawn their canoes were already swarming round the city, the inmates rending the air with loud and repeated shouts, and brandishing their weapons, those of the chiefs being captured Spanish swords. “With your own arms you shall be killed, and we will eat you!” they cried. “We fear you not, for Montezuma is dead!” At the same time the land forces were seen approaching, evidently to assist the fleet in besieging the Spaniards within the city, which would give the Mexicans greater advantage, as they had well learned during the siege of Mexico. Cortés understood the manœuvre, and leaving the greater part of the infantry and allies to guard the city, he sallied with most of the horse, in three parties, a few of the infantry and several hundred Tlascaltecs, breaking through the enemy’s ranks and gaining the foot of a hill in their rear, the Tepechpan.

While the enemy were rallying, Cortés led the horse round to their denser flank, and gave orders to the infantry to allure the Mexicans by climbing the steepest part of the hill and pretending to escape. This succeeded, and the next moment they were attacked in several directions with such effect as to cause a panic and drive them in flight toward a quarter where one division of horse had taken a stand. Five hundred Mexicans covered the field and five leaders were among the captured, while the Spanish loss was only one soldier and a few allies, including three Tlascaltec chiefs, although a number were wounded. During the pursuit the foremost division of horse came upon a further Mexican reënforcement, estimated at ten thousand, which rallied the fugitives and caused the pursuers to halt. Soon, however, the remaining force came up, the charge was continued, and the Mexicans routed.[1098]

Too tired for long pursuit, the Spaniards returned by ten o’clock in the morning to Xochimilco, where their garrison had repulsed the lake force. The fight had been fierce, and the soldiers had exhausted all their ammunition, capturing in return two Spanish swords. These victories brought little satisfaction, however, for the captives gave information that the forces so far sent were but detachments of the armies destined for Xochimilco, which must be recovered, and the Spaniards driven forth, if it cost the lives of all the men in Mexico. The Spaniards might defeat force after force, but even victory must so weaken them that the Mexicans would finally triumph. This seemed to be confirmed by the movements of the fleet, which, though repulsed, was still hovering thereabout.

Cortés now gave orders to burn the city, as a warning to the wilful inhabitants and preparatory to its evacuation. The soldiers, who had been interrupted in their plundering the day before, obeyed with alacrity. Xochimilco was a wealthy city, and not a Spaniard or ally but obtained an abundance of robes, feathers, and other effects, and even some gold, which helped to cheer those whom ordinary merchandise and slaves did not satisfy. The enemy had been watchful, however, and in their canoes they flitted round the city to cut off stragglers. At one point quite a charge was made, wherein several Spaniards were wounded and four carried off alive. This event did more to cast a gloom over the army than many defeats, for all knew the fate of prisoners.[1099]

After a stay of three days, all fraught with hard fighting, the army filed out from Xochimilco, presenting the appearance of a dilapidated caravan rather than of a reconnoitring and fighting expedition, so much so that Cortés thought it necessary to remonstrate, but in vain. The enemy hovered about like vultures, to harass them in what they regarded as a retreat. The march was made in regular fighting order, with cavalry distributed in three sections, in van, rear, and on flank. In order to complete the reconnoissance, a north-westerly route was taken to Coyuhuacan, the centre of a series of inner towns which lay clustered within a radius of a league and a half, along the shores or upon islands in the lake, all picturesque in their pyramidal temples and their white walls, which gleamed amidst blooming orchards and shady groves. Coyuhuacan itself was a beautiful town, and Cortés felt so captivated with it that he afterward made it for some time his favorite residence.[1100] It had been evacuated, but toward and beyond Mexico the lake teemed with canoes, while in every direction spread one continuous extent of farms and hamlets, connected by causeways and roads with busy traffic. To Alderete and friar Melgarejo this was a novel scene, and they could not refrain from expressing their admiration at the enterprise and prowess of Cortés and his followers in undertaking so vast a conquest. God’s aid alone could have enabled them to succeed as they had done.[1101]

The army remained here over the following day, chiefly to examine the place as intended head-quarters of a besieging force. It was found satisfactory; and while arrows were prepared and the wounded tended, the general advanced along the causeway leading to Mexico and expended his remaining ammunition in the useless capture of the temple fortress of Xoloc,[1102] during which a number of soldiers were wounded, though the enemy suffered considerably. After offering to heaven the fiery sacrifice of pagan temple, the army proceeded through Tlacopan without halting, for they had no ammunition, and this place had been examined on the previous expedition. This unexpected haste encouraged the Mexicans to come forth in great numbers and attack the baggage train and rear. Owing to the level nature of the ground the cavalry found no difficulty in repelling them, yet they caused more trouble, and succeeded even in carrying off two of the favorite equerries[1103] of Cortés. He was deeply grieved at the loss, and partly with a view to avenge them, partly to inflict a lesson which should save the army from such annoyance, he formed an ambuscade beside the road with twenty horse. Seeing the other ten horses engaged as formerly in covering the rear, the Mexicans continued their pursuit. At a favorable moment the hidden horsemen appeared, and soon over a hundred of the flower of the Mexicans lay dead upon the ground,[1104] their rich panoplies, dresses, and arms offering a pleasing addition to the already heavy plunder. Freed from further molestation, the army proceeded through Azcapuzalco and Tenayocan to Quauhtitlan, all deserted. Here the army clustered round camp fires of green wood, wet from a recent shower and supperless. Next morning they followed the route already pursued during the flight from Mexico, round Zumpango Lake through Citlaltepec, and thence through Acolman to Tezcuco.[1105]

A mass of booty and slaves being now at hand, a general distribution was ordered, the second in Tezcuco. Again, says Bernal Diaz, Cortés disregarded his promises and secured not only for himself the objectionable fifth, but allowed his favorites to carry off the prettiest women before they were brought forward at auction. Many who remembered the former tricks hid their women and said they had escaped, or they declared them free servants from allied tribes; while a few managed to obtain a private branding, paying the fifth required. A large proportion of the soldiers were so heavily in debt for stores and fifths that their booty left them no surplus.[1106]

While the reconnoitring expeditions had on the whole been fraught with pecuniary benefit and glory, they had nevertheless served to open the eyes of many to the difficulty of the great purpose, the capture of Mexico. This was particularly the case with the Velazquez party, whose adhesion before the Tepeaca campaign had been compulsory, and after it mercenary in its motives. Every obstacle to them appeared terrible, magnified through constant fear of the dreaded stone of sacrifice, on which so many comrades had already been laid. And this they were encountering for what? the advancement of an envied usurper and a pecuniary reward far beneath their expectations. The failure at Iztapalapan, the repeated inroads of the Mexicans, unabashed by constant repulses, and the hardships of the campaigns, particularly the last, all tended to support their arguments against Cortés’ plans as chimerical, involving long delays, constant toil, and waste of life, and with poor recompense save for Cortés and his favorites.

Presently the affair assumed the color of conspiracy, headed by Antonio de Villafañe, a common soldier from Zamora, who is claimed by Herrera to have had the active or passive sympathy of some three hundred malcontents, nearly one third of the army. The professed object was to secure a pliable leader who would consult the wishes of the soldiers, even those desirous of returning. Such a man, and withal of great influence and valor, was Verdugo, the brother-in-law of the all-powerful patron Velazquez, and him the conspirators chose as the new captain-general, unknown to himself, since he might prove too honorable to engage in plots against the commander. As a reward for his own efforts Villafañe claimed the position of alguacil mayor, while other friends and influential men of Narvaez were assured of the remaining offices, from alcalde mayor and maestre de campo downward, now held by the retainers of Cortés, as well as a share in the arms and other effects of the doomed number.[1107] It was arranged that when Cortés was seated at table with his intimate friends, as Alvarado, Sandoval, Olid, and Tápia, a letter was to be handed him, as if coming from his father, and while he was reading, the conspirators should fall on and stab him and his supporters, since all must be removed who might prove troublesome. The new officers were thereupon to be proclaimed, together with the liberal plan agreed on, by which it was hoped to allure even the friends of Cortés.

There were too many in the secret, however, and Cortés was a man of magnetic influence. At the eleventh hour, two days after the return from Xochimilco, says Diaz, an accomplice, struck with compunction, rushed distractedly to the feet of Cortés and implored pardon for having even dared to listen to the vile machinations. He thereupon revealed the plot and stated that Villafañe carried the names and details on a list in his breast-pocket. Cortés quietly summoned his captains. He represented the need for a “remedy, since, besides the scandal, it was evident that all the Spaniards must perish if once they turned one against the other; and to this end not only declared foes but allies would join.”[1108]

Attended by Sandoval and others, Cortés hastened to the house of the accused and found several persons assembled. Some were secured as they sought escape. Villafañe found time to take a paper from his breast and tear it in pieces, but Cortés gathered and arranged them,[1109] and was grieved to read the names of quite a number of promising persons whom he had honored and regarded as friends. Villafañe confessed the details of the plot, which had been forming since the Tepeaca campaign. A court-martial was held, presided over by Cortés himself, and there being no doubt of his guilt, the accused was condemned to death and promptly hanged from the window of his dwelling.[1110]

Cortés had probably no doubt regarding the guilt of the persons named on the list, but the prosecution of so many notable men might not be prudent, and would only widen the breach between himself and the malcontents and gain them sympathy. The day following the execution the general called a meeting. Many were the consciences that pricked their possessors to trembling on that occasion. But the sage Cortés preferred the traitors should risk their necks in winning for him Mexico, rather than himself to break them with a rope.

Napoleon, who in national warfare could open with his sword the veins of the people until there poured forth torrents of blood, shrank in horror from blood shed in civil broils. It was policy with Cortés, however. So, after finishing his narration of the conspiracy, he coolly informed them that Villafañe had refused to reveal his accomplices, and he could not therefore name the guilty. There were no doubt men amongst them with real or fancied grievances which may have induced them to harbor resentment; but let them frankly state their wrongs and he would seek to right them. If he had erred, let the error be named. The conclusion of the affair created general satisfaction. Thankful for their escape, the guilty sought both by words and deeds to prove their devotion, and although Cortés kept his eye upon them, there was no indication that he suspected any. He rather sought to win them back with favors.[1111] So impressed were his intimate followers by the risk to which so valuable a life had been exposed that they insisted on his accepting a body-guard of twelve select men, under the command of Antonio de Quiñones, an hidalgo of Zamora,[1112] who watched over him day and night.

FOOTNOTES

[1062] This is according to Cortés; others differ slightly, and Ixtlilxochitl increases the Tezcucan force to 60,000. Hor. Crueldades, 13.

[1063] From tocatl and xal, spider and sand. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 29. The lake in which it lies is divided about the centre by an artificial causeway about one league long, running from east to west, the southern water being now known as San Cristóbal Ecatepec, from the town of that name, and the northern water as Xaltocan or Tomanitla, San Cristóbal being also the general term for both waters.

[1064] See Native Races, ii. v.

[1065] Bachiller Alonso Perez, afterward fiscal of Mexico. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 135.

[1066] This incident was commemorated by some poetic follower in a ballad which became a favorite with the conquerors:

En Tacuba está Cortés, Con su esquadron esforçado, Triste estaua, y muy penoso, Triste, y con gran cuidado, La vna mano en la mexilla, Y la otra en el costado.

Which may be translated literally:

In Tacuba stands Cortés, With his troopers strong and brave: Sad he was and deeply grave; Sad, and heavily oppressed. With one hand his cheek he pressed; Against his side, the other.

[1067] So runs Bernal Diaz’ account, which appears a little exaggerated, for recently Cortés had shown the greatest caution, and would hardly have allowed himself to be so readily trapped on so memorable a spot. Hist. Verdad., 126. Cortés states that not a Spaniard was lost, though several Mexicans fell. Cartas, 187.

[1068] Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. vii.

[1069] They begged permission to return home, says Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., i. 31. Herrera relates that the efforts of Ojeda, by Cortés’ order, to take from the Tlascaltecs the gold part of their booty so offended them that they began to desert. The extortion was accordingly stopped, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. vii. Clavigero doubts the story. Prescott regards the departure of the allies as distasteful to Cortés; but we have seen that he did not care at present to encumber himself with too many unruly auxiliaries to prey upon the peaceful provinces. The Tlascaltecs would willingly have remained to share in raiding expeditions.

[1070] Including 8000 Tezcucans under Chichinquatzin. Ixtlilxochitl, Hor. Crueldades, 15. On March 12th, says Vetancurt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 154.

[1071] Also known as Chimalhuacan-Chalco, to distinguish it from Chimalhuacan on Tezcuco Lake.

[1072] Lorenzana inspected the position in later times. Cortés, Hist. N. Esp., 214.

[1073] ‘Que todos los que allí se hallaron afirman.’ Cortés, Cartas, 190. The general lauds the achievement with rare fervor for him. Bernal Diaz sneers at the river of blood story; but then he was not present to share the glory. The Roman Mario was less dainty than these Spaniards under a similar circumstance, commemorated by Plutarch; or as Floro more prosaically puts it: ‘Ut victor Romanus de cruento flumine non plus aquæ biberit quam sanguinis barbarorum.’ Epitome, lib. iii. cap. iii.

[1074] Fifteen, says Bernal Diaz. Chimalpain, the Chalcan narrator, states that his tribe lost 350 men, but killed 1500 foes, capturing the captain-general, Chimalpopocatzin, a relative of the emperor, who now became a captain among the Tezcucans, and was killed during the siege. Hist. Conq., ii. 34. Some of these facts are evidently not very reliable. He also assumes that Sandoval lost eight soldiers on again returning to Tezcuco.

[1075] The ‘comissario’ or clerk in charge of the bulls was Gerónimo Lopez, afterward secretary at Mexico. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 129. This author names several of the arrivals, some of whom became captains of vessels. A number also arrived during the following week, he adds, notably in Juan de Búrgos’ vessel, which brought much material.

[1076] Gomara mentions also Maxcaltzinco as a distant place. Hist. Mex., 186.

[1077] The chiefs were awaiting orders to appear before Cortés. The general told them to wait till tranquillity was more fully restored. The name of the other soldier was Nicolás. Cortés, Cartas, 203-5. Herrera assumes that Barrientos arrived in camp during the late Tepeaca campaign, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xvii.

[1078] Of the rank and file none suffered penalty on returning, for captivity was regarded as disgraceful only to a noble. Native Races, ii. 419.

[1079] Bernal Diaz states that the soldiers were tired of these repeated calls, many being also on the sick-list, but Cortés had now a large fresh force only too eager for a fray attended with spoliation.

[1080] According to a native painting the army entered here April 5th, which is a day or two too early, and received a reënforcement of 20,000. See copy in Carbajal Espinosa, Hist. Mex., ii. 523.

[1081] So says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 130, who names four. Cortés allows only two killed and twenty wounded; how many fatally so, he carefully omits to mention. Cartas, 194.

[1082] Twenty fell, says Bernal Diaz. He speaks of two futile attempts on the previous evening to scale the central hill. It seems unlikely for soldiers, tired by repulse and march, to undertake so difficult a feat, and that at the least assailable point.

[1083] Yet Bernal Diaz relates a story to show that the order was a mere pretence.

[1084] Cartas, 196; Torquemada, i. 536.

[1085] Some write Xilotepec. Bernal Diaz mentions Tepoxtlan, which may have been visited by a detachment.

[1086] Place of the Eagle. Corrupted into the present Cuernavaca, which singularly enough means cow’s horn.

[1087] See Native Races, v.

[1088] Cortés was so captivated by the alluring clime and scenery that he made the town his favorite residence in later years. It was included in the domains granted to him, and descended to his heirs. Madame Calderon speaks of his ruined palace and church. Life in Mexico, ii. 50.

[1089] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 311. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls him Yaomahuitl.

[1090] ‘El vno se quebró la pierna ... y se me desvanecia la cabeça, y todavia pasè yo, y otros veinte, ô trienta soldados.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 132. Solis misinterprets the passage, and gives this author credit for leading the party. Hist. Mex., ii. 362. Vetancurt calls the district toward this spot Amanalco. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 155.

[1091] Cortés, Cartas, 196. Ixtlilxochitl assumes that the submission is tendered through his namesake, as prince of Tezcuco, the only capital of the tripartite empire loyal to the Spaniards. Hor. Crueldades, 17-18.

[1092] Also one old Spaniard, believes Bernal Diaz, who relates his own sufferings minutely, and how he followed some mounted scouts in search of water, which he found, bringing a supply to Cortés. Hist. Verdad., 133. Vetancurt names this watering-place Topilejo, now San Miguel. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 155. Chimalpain mentions Quauhxômolco, just before. Hist. Conq., ii. 40.

[1093] See Native Races, ii., 345.

[1094] Lorenzana, in Cortés, Hist. N. Esp., 225.

[1095] Six, says Cortés.

[1096] Bernal Diaz states that a soldier named Olea was the main instrument in saving Cortés, Hist. Verdad., 133; but Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 311, gives the credit to the Tlascaltec lord Chichimecatl, and Chimalpain to a noble named Ocelotzin. Hist. Conq., ii. 41. Cortés says: ‘Un indio de los de Tlascaltecal,’ Cartas, 199, who could not be found the next day, and Cortés accordingly attributed the aid, writes Herrera, to St Peter, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. viii.

[1097] Followed by other bodies. Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 134; Torquemada, i. 537.

[1098] Cortés leaves the impression that the foremost division of six horse defeated the foe. Both Gomara and Herrera are confused, and Prescott and others are led into several mistakes.

[1099] Bernal Diaz names two of them.

[1100] He even willed that his bones should there be entombed, a request which was not carried out.

[1101] ‘No eran cosas de hombres humanos ... que ayan hecho ningunos vasallos tan grandes servicios a su Rey ... y dello harian relacion a su Magestad.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 135.

[1102] At the junctions of the causeways which led from the different shores to the southern avenue of Mexico. The place is also known as Acachinanco.

[1103] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés was preparing an ambuscade with ten horse and four equerries when he fell into one himself and lost the two, whom he names. Alarmed at his delay, Alvarado went back to look for him. loc. cit. This is less likely than the version of Cortés.

[1104] Nobles they are termed, and Herrera doubles the number.

[1105] Prescott and others intimate that they passed between the lakes, from Quauhtitlan to Acolman, but Cortés mentions Zilotepec, which may be identical with Citlaltepec, as mentioned by Herrera, or Xilotzinco, about two leagues eastward, as given by Ixtlilxochitl. Bernal Diaz also appears to indicate the northern route.

[1106] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 129.

[1107] Bernal Diaz assumes that more than one captain-general was to be appointed. ‘Para boluerse a Cuba, y deshazer a Cortes,’ is all the explanation given by Gomara, Hist. Mex., 178.

[1108] Such are in substance the words used by Cortés in his relation to the emperor. ‘E cómo yo vi que se me habia revelado tan gran traicion, dí gracias á nuestro Señor, porque en aquello consistia el remedio.’ Cartas, 269.

[1109] So Cortés intimates, while Herrera states that Villafañe hastened to devour the paper. His throat being pressed, about half of it was rescued. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. i. He further says that Sandoval was sent to make the arrest; but Bernal Diaz asserts that Cortés went in person, which is likely under the circumstances, and took from Villafañe’s breast the paper. Finding thereon so many names of quality he caused it to be rumored that the man had eaten it, or part of it. Hist. Verdad., 136-7. Clavigero assumes that the culprit revealed the names, and that Cortés preferred not to believe him. Storia Mess., iii. 191. Torture failed to extort any names from him, writes Torquemada, i. 528, and those on the list he declared to be merely of men whom he intended to sound.

[1110] ‘Un alcalde y yo lo condenamos á muerte.’ Cortés, Cartas, 269.

[1111] Bernal Diaz states that he frightened many by having them arrested and threatened with trial; probably those seized with Villafañe. Oviedo, iii. 515, mentions Escudero as executed for plotting; but this is doubtful. As for Verdugo, he became regidor of Mexico, and in 1529 alcalde. He afterward joined Guzman’s expedition and settled at Tonalá in Jalisco. Razon, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 363.

[1112] This was Cortés’ own idea, says Bernal Diaz, and he appealed to us to guard him. Hist. Verdad., 137. Quiñones was succeeded by Francisco de Tenesas [Terrazas]. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 313.

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XXXII. INVESTMENT OF MEXICO

MAY-JUNE, 1521.

PHASES OF HEROISM—THE BRIGANTINES UPON THE LAKE—DIVISION OF FORCES BETWEEN ALVARADO, SANDOVAL, AND OLID—DESERTION, CAPTURE, AND EXECUTION OF XICOTENCATL—DEPARTURE OF THE TROOPS FROM TEZCUCO—NAVAL BATTLE—POSSESSION TAKEN OF THE CAUSEWAYS—AT ONE POINT CORTÉS UNEXPECTEDLY GAINS ENTRANCE TO THE CITY—BUT IS DRIVEN OUT.

The ideal heroic character is to be viewed from two standpoints: the effect of heroism on the hero, and on the world. A very bad person may do mankind a great service. An evil-minded man, while sinking his soul yet deeper in corruption, may bring benefactions upon society. But even a fairly good man cannot increase his innate nobleness of character while doing injury to his fellows.

I do not know that the claim of good man was ever advanced for Hernan Cortés, except, indeed, by that strange fanaticism which, dazzled by one object, fails to see other objects, or the terrible means for their attainment. He and his followers formed a sad mixture of good and evil, in which the latter predominated, if judged by the moral standard which they had formed for themselves as soldiers of the cross. The grossest injustice, the most horrible wickedness constituted part of their moral ideal, so that while fighting for the highest morality they were the most immoral of men. Long after the conquest was consummated, under the ministrations of men of piety and ability, it would seem that the weapons used by these conquerors, who at times justified murder as the highest morality, were still instinct with blood, even as the cornel-wood spear with which the king of Thrace transfixed the unhappy Polydorus springs into life instinct with the blood of Priam’s slaughtered son.

Cortés was not an idealist after the manner of Columbus. Both were full of egoism; the spiritual-mindedness of both was essentially selfish. They would both dictate terms to God and their king, that for so much service they must have so much reward. Both were full of the follies of their day; but Columbus displayed a grave, unconscious folly, while Cortés consciously indulged in all the follies of lust and cruelty that prudence admitted or his aim demanded. Cortés abandoned himself to ambition; Columbus to brooding thought. The insanity of reckless adventure was not the insanity of Columbus, who nevertheless was as mad as any lunatic in his own way. Commanding energy and practical daring were as conspicuous in Cortés as in Columbus; but it happened that the aims of Columbus were of greater import to the race than those of Cortés.

How alike, and yet how different, these men! Cortés was impetuous and extravagant; Columbus calm, calculating, and prudent. One was full of joyous activity, the simple exercise of which was his greatest pleasure; obligations of every sort sat lightly on him; the other was but an instrument in the hands of providence. Both were ambitious, both excessively religious; but Cortés, in the main, made religion subservient to advancement, as before noted, while mundane glories to Columbus were hollow indeed beside his heavenly aspirations. Both were exceedingly great men; both became eminent by a selfish adventure of self; but Columbus saw the New World through the glorious haze of immortality, while Cortés viewed Mexico under the lightly woven covering of personal ambition.

Cortés was an Antony rather than a Cæsar, nor did he lack that one great gift of Antony’s, subordination, as we have seen. He was not so greatly in love with himself, stood not so greatly in awe of himself, as Cæsar; he was possessed of finer perceptions and feelings, and with consummate versatility could drop himself out of his plans as occasion required. Nor was Cortés without imagination and the æsthetic sense, though of a grosser and sensual kind; but it is not in great men that we are to look for the swelling harmonies of nature.

* * * * *

A turning-point was now reached in the campaign. The brigantines were completed, and the siege could begin. The day for the entry of the vessels into the lake was a gala day, inaugurated with the communion and festive with the concourse of gayly attired spectators.[1113] After prayer and a discourse the flags with name and royal arms were hoisted on each vessel,[1114] amid salvos and cheers, and the dams being broken, the gallant fleet floated down the canal to the placid lake.

While the mute bunting was thus proclaiming Spanish supremacy over these inland waters, a Te Deum, in which joined a thousand voices, echoed aloud the gratitude of every heart. Each vessel was placed in charge of a captain[1115] with twenty-four Spaniards, of whom about six were cross-bowmen and arquebusiers, some artillerists to manage the bronze gun, and twelve rowers, six to each side. The boats were evidently half-decked.[1116]

Active preparations were now made to begin the siege. Tlascaltecs, Huexotzincas, Cholultecs, Chalcans, and other allies were summoned to send in contingents by Whitsunday, the latter to assemble at Chalco, and the Tlascaltecs at Tezcuco. Though but ten days’ notice was given, the last named presented themselves in the camp before the appointed time to the number of over fifty thousand, which was increased by later reënforcement.[1117]

As they approached Tezcuco under the guidance of Ojeda, and commanded notably by Chichimecatl and Xicotencatl junior, they spread out in one long serpentine file, bristling with iztli points and brilliant with shields and armor covered with variegated devices and flowing plumage, while at intervals waved high the banners of the different corps. Cortés went forth to meet them with grand demonstrations, and as they marched past loud vivas[1118] rent the air.

On the 28th of April Cortés had mustered his forces and found that, with the several reënforcements lately arrived, there were present over nine hundred Spaniards, of whom eighty-six were horsemen and one hundred and eighteen cross-bowmen and arquebusiers;[1119] the rest being armed with swords and shields and the more formidable pikes. They were well protected with cotton armor, many having cuirasses and corselets, and small weapons were not wanting. The artillery consisted of three heavy iron guns, fifteen smaller pieces of bronze, mostly distributed among the vessels, with ten quintals of powder and a quantity of shot, while some fifty thousand arrows had been furnished by the Tezcucan towns, all fitted according to pattern with copper tips.[1120]

Not only had the Spaniards, particularly the new recruits, been well exercised in cavalry movements, target practice, fencing, and pike drill, but the allies had been trained to a certain extent in European tactics. For efficiency and good conduct this army rose far above any yet mustered in the Indies. In the usual speech before the ranks, Cortés pointed out how God had favored them with constant victories and with reënforcements which had nearly doubled their number and resources. They might indeed be hopeful, for holy was their cause. Full of confidence they could march against the only stronghold yet opposed to them, avenge their slaughtered comrades, and win riches and glory for themselves.

On Whitmonday, the 20th of May, an apportionment of the troops was made to Alvarado, Olid, and Sandoval, who led the cavalry in person, but directed the movements of the infantry through captains, and of the allies through native chiefs. Each received from twenty-four to thirty horsemen, and one hundred and fifty infantry, divided into two or three battalions, with a proportionate number of arquebusiers, cross-bowmen, guns, and ammunition, besides from twenty to forty thousand allies. To Sandoval was given the smallest number of horse and the largest number of allies, those gathered at Chalco having orders to await him, while Alvarado received a full half of the Tlascaltec force, with whom the Tonatiuh was a great favorite. To this leader Tlacopan was assigned for head-quarters; to Olid, Coyuhuacan; and Sandoval received orders to complete the destruction of Iztapalapan, and then to advance through Coyuhuacan and along one of the southern causeways, and there to select his head-quarters, under the protection of the brigantines. These appointments and orders underwent several changes during the siege. For himself Cortés selected the management of the fleet, whereon so much depended during the opening of the siege, and in addition to its ships’ companies of three hundred men he was supported by several thousand allies, chiefly Tezcucans under Ixtlilxochitl, who attended in a large number of canoes. This selection hardly pleased the army, which considered their operations the most important and dangerous, and therefore in need of Cortés’ supervision. But he evidently never intended to remain with the fleet except at the beginning.[1121]

The following day the allied forces apportioned to Alvarado and Olid were ordered to march in advance, for greater convenience, to the border of Tezcuco province and there await the Spaniards. Not many hours after their departure a messenger appeared with the announcement that Xicotencatl, the companion general of Chichimecatl, had disappeared. Inquiries revealed that shortly before his cousin Piltecuhtli had been severely and wantonly struck by a soldier during a quarrel over some carriers. In order to save the soldier from the wrath of Cortés, Ojeda, the Spanish inspecting officer over the allied forces, smoothed the matter and sent the injured nobleman home. It was claimed by some that this outrage had so wounded Xicotencatl that he followed his cousin. Others assumed that both chiefs were in love with the same woman, and that Xicotencatl could not bear to leave his rival alone in the field. But the true reason lay no doubt in his dislike to fight for the Spaniards, whom he had never ceased to oppose, openly and in secret, as invaders bent on the enslavement of the whole country. This idea, if faint at first, had become more fixed with every fresh blow against his personal ambition, such as the first series of defeats which plucked from him his just renown; the equal or perhaps superior position assigned in the native army to Chichimecatl, of whom he appears to have been deeply jealous;[1122] and the prospect of a wearisome and unprofitable campaign, wherein he must be content to figure as a subordinate, not only of Alvarado, but subject perhaps to the orders of petty Spanish officers. All this became too galling to his proud spirit, and with a few followers he turned toward his mountain home.

It would never do to countenance desertion, and by so prominent a man, at the very opening of a campaign; and Cortés immediately sent a number of troopers in pursuit, with instructions to represent to the chief the gravity of his offence, which cast a heavy stain on Tlascaltec honor, and to persuade him to return. They speedily overtook him, only to meet with insolence. He would not go back; if his people had listened to him they would not now be tools and servants of a horde of foreigners. With this reply the troops were forced to return. “This cacique is incorrigible,” exclaimed Cortés, “and will ever be a traitor and counsellor to evil. I have had enough of him!” The troopers were at once sent back, accompanied by an alguacil and some trusty Tlascaltec nobles, with orders to arrest the fugitive and bring him to Tezcuco. In a letter to the republican lords, Cortés at the same time complained of the desertion and its grave influence, and declared that according to Spanish law the penalty was death. They replied that the same punishment obtained in Tlascala; and not only do they appear to have actively aided in surrendering the culprit, but they declared all his property, including wives and slaves, confiscated to the crown, against which he had sinned.[1123] Indeed, the arrogance of the young chief does not seem to have endeared him to the other rulers. Instantly on his arrival he was sentenced and hanged on a very high gallows, while the crier and interpreter announced his crime.

The execution of so prominent a chief, heir to one of the rulers among his best allies, was an act which few besides Cortés would have ventured on; but he saw the necessity for a firm observance of discipline, and was not deceived in the salutary effect which it had on the allies.[1124] There were not many Tlascaltecs left in Tezcuco, or a serious demonstration might have occurred; as it was, the mantle and maxtli of the deceased were secured, and an eager contest ensued for them as relics. Axayacatzin Xicotencatl had achieved fame before the advent of the Spaniards.[1125]

Alvarado and Olid had set out from Tezcuco for Tlacopan with their Spanish forces on the 22d of May,[1126] taking the same route by which Cortés had returned from the Xochimilco campaign, and though longer than that north of Tezcuco Lake, yet it was easier and safer. On approaching Acolman, Olid sent a party in advance to secure quarters, and when Alvarado arrived he found every house bearing the green bough on the roof, which indicated occupancy. This raised a tumult between the parties, and even the captains would have come to blows but for the interference of friends. Informed of the trouble, Cortés took steps to reconcile them, although the two leaders never renewed their former intimacy.

On the evening of the fourth day they reached Tlacopan, which was deserted, as were all the towns along the route.[1127] Late as was the hour, forages and reconnoissances were made, involving a skirmish with the Mexicans. The following day, Sunday, Olid proceeded to Chapultepec to cut the aqueduct which supplied the city, a task which involved another encounter wherein a score of Mexicans fell. Meanwhile the canals were filled and other obstacles removed which might impede a free advance, and foraging tours were made. The Mexicans continued to harass the operations with repeated sallies, and finally Alvarado, with characteristic rashness, pursued them until his troops were well advanced between the houses and bridges. The Mexicans, who had retreated on purpose, now rolled back upon his front and flanks. The roofs, hitherto deserted, teemed with slingers and archers, who showered their missiles with terrible effect, while from the lanes and openings between the houses sprang numbers who assailed the cramped soldiers with their long lances, swords, and clubs, and leaped back into their holes and canoes and behind breastworks whenever they were pressed. The allies were ordered back, and the Spaniards slowly retreated, with a loss of eight killed and fifty wounded, glad to be relieved from their strait.

Olid was highly incensed with Alvarado for his rashness, and regardless of all remonstrance he seized the pretext to hasten the departure to his own camp at Coyuhuacan. He established his head-quarters on Corpus Christi day, the 30th of May, and from this date, accordingly, Clavigero and many others date the beginning of the siege. The causeway leading thence to Mexico was broken, and he sought for several days to cover the breaches and gain a footing upon it, but without success. The Mexican warriors displayed great spirit, and their leaders are to be blamed for not energetically assuming the offensive and attacking the two camps.

* * * * *

The Mexicans had not quite understood the drift of Cortés’ delay and preliminary manœuvres. When they found two camps established, the aqueduct destroyed, and earnest preparations in progress for investment, their eyes were opened; but they were then too bewildered to act with promptness and precision. The chronicles relate that Quauhtemotzin held a grand council to consider the situation, and to sound the spirit of the people for peace or war, so that there might be no faltering when necessity came. A number indeed of the elder and wiser lords, particularly of the Montezuma faction, spoke of the formidable enginery and strength of the Spaniards, and their host of allies, and expressed fears of failure. With the occupation of all the surrounding territory, and the influx of people from abroad, the food supply might fall short, and famine and sickness ensue. But the young men and the warriors, as might be expected, would listen to no counsellor whose words implied cowardice; they were enthusiastic for resistance, and formed too numerous a party to allow the entertaining of peace proposals. Quauhtemotzin cautiously refrained from committing himself,[1128] but reminded the assembly that the oracles of their gods and heroic ancestors had above all to be listened to in so important a matter as the preservation of the homes and sacred temples intrusted to their care. He knew well what answer would come from the priests, whose possessions, wealth, and honors depended on the exclusion of invaders, aiming above all at the overthrow of their religion. “My people shall not fear the enemy,” spake the war-god Huitzilopochtli, “for the allied hosts will not persevere long in the siege, and I will scatter the Castilians now as hitherto.” This utterance suited many views, and the declaration for war was solemnized by sacrifices of human beings, including the four Spaniards lately captured.[1129]

Renewed efforts were made to fortify and supply the city, and canoes were collected to aid in the defence. With insolent assurance, derived from the oracles, corps of warriors would advance close to the Spanish camps and vent their feelings with insults and menaces, “Men of evil, you shall pay for your madness! Behold, the gods have already feasted on your bodies!” they cried, flinging in among the horrified soldiers pieces of their sacrificed comrades. “Our snakes shall drink your blood, and our tigers devour your flesh, though they are already satiated therewith. And you, infamous Tlascaltecs, slaves and traitors! you shall atone for your misdeeds; you shall die a bad death, and furnish flesh for our banquets! Behold!” And therewith they threw in disjointed pieces of dusky human bodies. “We shall not rest till your land is desolated, and not a man or woman left to perpetuate your vile race.” Unabashed by this tirade the Tlascaltecs told them not to threaten like women, but to act like men. Still it were better for them to yield unless they wished to be destroyed.

* * * * *

Cortés had been delayed till the fleet should be fully prepared. On the 31st of May, following Corpus Christi day, he was able to despatch Sandoval, who, reënforced by some forty thousand allies awaiting him on the Chalco border, marched against Iztapalapan. Although severely crippled by Cortés’ expedition, this town still figured as a stronghold of too great importance to be left in the rear. Advised of the movement, the Mexicans hurried by road and water to aid in covering the retreat of the inhabitants. Suddenly smoke columns were observed in different parts of the lake, and cries of alarm ran through the town. Yet more and more hurriedly the people fled, and while one body of warriors retired along the causeway to Mexico, others departed in canoes. The Spanish forces pressed onward in close pursuit, and slaughter, pillage, and torch accompanied them. The chief cause of the panic was the appearance of the brigantines, which had set sail shortly after Sandoval’s departure, attended by a large number of Tezcucan canoes[1130] whose object was to coöperate against Iztapalapan. On approaching it the vessels passed close to a steep rocky isle, the Tepepulco, since known as El Peñol del Marqués,[1131] occupied by a large number of fugitives who shouted defiance, and showered stones and arrows. Finding that Sandoval required no aid, Cortés resolved to inflict a lesson on the insolent islanders. The Mexicans appeared confident in the impregnable strength of the rock, and gave so warm a reception to the hundred and fifty men with whom Cortés began to climb it, that fully a score were wounded at the onset. The brigantines turned their guns upon them, however, and under this cover the soldiers speedily gained the summit, there to wreak bloody vengeance. Not a man was spared, only the women and children. “It was a beautiful victory!” exclaims Cortés.

While they were pillaging, a large fleet of canoes, five hundred at the lowest estimate,[1132] was seen to approach from the direction of Mexico, bristling with iztli points, which found a gleaming reflection in the smooth waters of the lake. Cortés ordered an immediate return to the brigantines, and rowed them forward into an extended line. He had longed for an opportunity like this, to meet a formidable fleet upon which the brigantines might inflict a lesson severe enough to open the eyes of the enemy to their invincible power; for “in them lay the key of war,” as he expressed it. Unfortunately the wind was so light as barely to flap the sails. The hostile fleet had already drawn up in good order just beyond range, evidently puzzled at the passive attitude of the monster vessels, yet shouting defiance.[1133] Cortés stood chafing with impatience, for without wind his greatest advantage would be lost, and his position even become precarious. Just then the waters rippled and a breeze came from abaft which speedily freshened. “Ah, God favors us!” he cried, and with a grateful gaze toward heaven he gave orders to advance under full sail. As they came close to the enemy a blinding volley was sent pouring in upon them from the whole line, from guns, arquebuses, and cross-bows, and while the natives were trying to recover from their confusion, from out the smoke burst the ponderous bows, crashing into the lines of canoes, overturning, breaking, and sinking. In the vessels’ wake were wrecks and struggling bodies, while the few canoes which had escaped by passing between the ships struggled to escape the Tezcucan boats in the rear. At the first encounter the canoes in the farther lines turned in hot haste for home, as did a vast number of others which had ventured forth, partly with reënforcements, partly with spectators. But the clumsy-looking vessels sped faster, pursuing their career of destruction for three leagues, into the very canals of the city, whence they turned back to pick up captives. The victory exceeded the wildest hopes of the Spaniards, as Cortés admits, for not only did the Aztecs lose a great number of their foremost warriors and their best canoes, but they surrendered forever to the formidable craft sovereignty over the lake waters, and with it the hope of assistance from trans-lacustrine allies.

Encouraged by this success, Olid advised Alvarado, and both hastened to take advantage of the panic to advance along the causeways and effect considerable execution, impelled as they were with emulation and fresh courage.[1134] Olid had advanced close to Fort Xoloc, which with its stout battlemented walls and towers guarded the junction of the southern causeways, when the brigantines approached it from the eastern side. It was already after vespers; nevertheless Cortés landed to coöperate with his lieutenant and pursue the advantage gained. A breach was made in the wall with one of the heavy guns, and under cover of the fleet’s artillery the place was soon carried. Cortés had intended to make Coyuhuacan his head-quarters, but such were the obvious advantages of Xoloc, in strength and in position, for it lay but half a league from Mexico and was connected in the rear with the mainland by three causeways, that he at once decided to establish his camp there, making it also his naval station.

Enraged rather than discouraged by the several defeats, Quauhtemotzin ordered a night attack on Xoloc, contrary to native custom. They approached both by sea and land, but owing to their noise they were observed, and driven back by the artillery. The fort was not very strong on the northern side, and the force within was small; but in the morning half of Olid’s troops came to reënforce him, together with fifty of Sandoval’s infantry. The addition was opportune, for the Mexicans were advancing in swarms along the causeway as well as by water, this time on the inner side of the road where the vessels could not reach them. The heavy guns soon cleared a space on the roadway, but as the soldiers pursued they suffered severely from the canoes, which not only showered missiles but afforded retreat for the sallying parties. Orders were accordingly given to cut a passage through the embankment, so that the four brigantines might enter to clear the inner basin. By this means the Spaniards were able to advance to the very entrance of the city and inflict some damage, while the remaining vessels explored the waters beyond, and drove back canoes and fired buildings in the suburbs.

Sandoval at the same time advanced along the causeway from Iztapalapan to Coyuhuacan. It was a league and a half in length, and a quarter of a league from shore it passed through an island town, which was captured and burned. Advised of this, Quauhtemotzin directed a fleet to cut the causeway and entrap the Spaniards; but before long two of the vessels were able to relieve Sandoval, who thereupon left a portion of his troops, including the allies, at Coyuhuacan, and joined his chief with the remainder. Nearly a week was occupied in strengthening Fort Xoloc, arranging the camp, and bringing in supplies, during which time desultory skirmishings were maintained, wherein Sandoval among others received wounds. The brigantines roamed incessantly and inflicted great damage, entering on one occasion for a long distance a canal which led into the suburbs.[1135] Canoes no longer ventured abroad when a sail was in sight, and the Mexicans began to protect the water approaches and channels with stakes.

* * * * *

In order to complete the investment of the city it was only necessary to occupy the northern causeway to Tepeyacac, along which the besieged maintained a steady intercourse with the mainland. Advised of this neglect by Alvarado, the general ordered Sandoval to form a camp at that town[1136] with one hundred and forty Spaniards, of whom twenty-three were horsemen, and a full proportion of allies. Alvarado had half as many more infantry and a few more cavalry, while two hundred infantry were quartered at Xoloc, supported besides by a cavalry force in the rear, and by Olid’s party, with whom remained the largest proportion of allies, now over eighty thousand, according to Cortés’ own statement. The fort could not hold them, and they accordingly encamped at Coyuhuacan, which lay more convenient for supplies, and must be occupied to watch the hostile shore and lake towns clustered in this quarter. The brigantines carried at least two hundred and fifty men.[1137]

Everything being prepared, Cortés ordered a simultaneous attack from all the camps, so as to divide the attention of the Mexicans and gain all possible advantage. He himself advanced along the Iztapalapan causeway with the greater part of his infantry, attended by several cavaliers on foot, and by over eighty thousand allies, while a vessel skirted the road on either side. There was more than one breach in the road, behind which were posted large forces of warriors protected by intrenchments of earth and masonry.

Without the vessels it would have cost much time and many lives to cross; but the well-directed fire from the guns and arquebuses on the flanks and rear of the enemy soon wrought disorder, which enabled the sallying parties to obtain a foothold. Meanwhile a number of infantry had swum across the channel and aided to drive the Mexicans beyond the next breach. The same manœuvre was repeated at this and the other chasms, till the army found itself at the very entrance of the city, protected by a wider channel than the preceding, with more extensive fortifications, commanded by a temple tower. This with its swarms of slingers and archers made the capture difficult, and the Mexicans also showed more determination; but the guns and fusillade could not be resisted, and soon the Spaniards stood within the city for the first time since the memorable Noche Triste. Revenge seemed already secured, and the lost treasures almost within the invaders’ grasp. Cortés, however, did not permit himself to be carried away by a momentary success. He saw the main street beyond thronged with warriors fiercely bent on resistance, streets as far as the distant temple of the war-god bordered with buildings, each a fortress in itself, while many a barricaded channel blocked the way.

A large force of allies had been left to fill the chasm and level the ground as the army advanced, using for this purpose the captured intrenchments and buildings, or even material from the causeway itself. This work was under the direction of Diego Hernandez, a man of herculean strength, who could throw a stone with a force and precision, it was said, approximating those of cannon.[1138] This filling of the chasms enabled the horses to be brought forward, and they now led the charge against the dense masses of natives, after the arquebuses had effected the preliminary clearing. Cortés had not underestimated the annoyance to be encountered from the archers and slingers covering the roofs on either side; but the operations of the cavalry left the many arquebusiers and cross-bowmen at liberty to cover the points of approach through which the allies in particular poured in countless numbers with sidearms and fire-brands. The progress so far had surpassed all anticipation; but now the Spaniards came to a canal from which the retreating Mexicans removed the few planks remaining of the bridge, leaving a solitary beam. Here the warriors were massed in greater confidence, free as they were from the attack of vessels and sheltered by strong intrenchments, while the adjoining roofs, equally protected by the canals, teemed with missile-throwers. The soldiers tried again and again to cross the chasm, only to be driven back with injury. The volleys from cross-bows and fire-arms could effect but little damage against the well sheltered warriors, while their arrows and stones came in rattling showers. Finally two cannon were brought forward. This changed the issue, for a breach was speedily made in the intrenchments, and now the small-arms were able to coöperate with great execution.

After a delay of two hours the soldiers were across; and while the allies filled the canal they again pursued their advance along the avenue, though suffering considerably from the roof missiles. They now came to the last channel in the street, close to the main plaza, wherein stood the famous temple of Huitzilopochtli.

The advance of the Spaniards had been so unexpected and rapid that the Mexicans had not thought of fortifying this canal, and little difficulty was met in crossing. But beyond, the plaza was filled with files of defenders, determined to save their deities and that sacred ground. Greatly frightened, the priests cried out to them: “Behold! it was here upon this spot you fought these beings infernal before, and drove them forth in shameful flight; the gods will help you again!” Even the Spanish soldiers were impressed by the words and gestures of the frantic devotees, and noted their effect in the gleaming eyes and pressed lips of the warriors, and they paused. But presently a gun was brought forward and directed against the packed throng. This effected a backward movement. “There is no time for rest or fear!” shouted Cortés, as with shield in hand he rushed forward. With a thundering Santiago the soldiers followed. The charge was irresistible, and already startled by the mowing cannon-balls the Mexicans took refuge within the temple enclosure and in the by-streets.

The Spaniards followed the crowd within the sacred grounds, slashing and thrusting. It seemed a repetition of Alvarado’s massacre, and the war-god, thirsting for blood, might now have his fill. In a few moments not a warrior was left round the temple, only prostrate bodies. Then the soldiers prepared to ascend the pyramid to hurl down the idol and its defenders. But the deity was aroused. The sombre notes of the sacred drum struck their fearful appeal on every heart, “Rouse ye to your imperilled hearths and temples!” It was but now the Mexicans observed that the death-dealing horsemen were not present, for the last channel had not yet been filled to afford a crossing. This lent them courage, and on the foe they quickly rushed from lanes and houses, while down from the temple-top came a doubly inspired avalanche. The shock was overwhelming. The Spaniards were forced to retire, partly in disorder. Cortés made frantic efforts to stay the flight, and at the gate a momentary rally was made by a few; but what availed that handful against the torrent sweeping onward, headed by the renowned band of Quauhtin? Perforce they must yield and join the troops which were in such hasty flight from the plaza that they even abandoned the cannon. Cortés was on foot in the crowd, and his voice was drowned in the tumult. He could but follow with the wild current, which threatened to lead into another disaster. Just then cries of alarm burst from the crowds on the roofs, and there was a lull in the shower of stones and darts, and the pressure of pursuers relaxed. The next moment the ears of the wandering Spaniards caught the clatter of hoofs.

The cavalry had come up; a revulsion set in. They were but a few,[1139] but enough to bring back to the minds of the Mexicans their original and ever present fear of the monsters, for they knew not how many might be coming down upon them.

The infantry followed the horsemen with inspiring cheers, and bore unresisted onward, for the late bravery of the foe was now turned to cowardice. Before long the Spaniards had penetrated through the plaza and occupied once more the temple court. Once more their looks were upward toward the summit of the lofty pyramid consecrated during their former occupation to the holy virgin; and while the main portion of the troops fought the now rallying Mexicans, a sturdy handful undertook the capture of the sanctuary. A dozen chiefs held possession, but naught could stay the fury of the soldiers, and in a few moments the last defender had yielded his spirit in defense of his faith.

The Spaniards looked in vain for any trace of their own altar and symbols, round which they had so oft congregated in prayer. In their stead rose a new idol glittering with ornaments and hideous with devices, while fresh stains of blood spread horror over all. The gleam of gold proved all absorbing, however, and hastily the jewels and the golden mask were torn away, and then the head of the idol was struck off and sent clattering below.[1140]

There was time for nothing more, for on finding so few horsemen present, the Quauhtin knights had again made an effective rally, pressing the troops closely. Fortunately a larger force of cavalry came up again to turn the tide of battle and inflict a severe lesson. As it was late by this time, there remained no choice but that of returning to camp. This movement gave fresh confidence to the Mexicans, who followed in swarms, harassing from roofs and lanes, on front and flanks, rushing forward with renewed fury after every charge by the cavalry which covered the rear. But for the horses the soldiers would have suffered severely; as it was, the retreat proceeded in good order, and as many houses as possible were fired with a view to make the next entry safer. On approaching the causeway the canoe crews, composed of selected warriors, fell on the flanks and created no little confusion before they were driven back. After this no difficulty was experienced in reaching camp, thanks to the foresight of Cortés, who had ordered the channels filled.[1141] The other captains, Alvarado and Sandoval, had performed their share in the day’s work, and although they do not appear to have reached even the suburb, detained by the many breaches and other obstacles on the causeways, yet the diversion created by their attacks proved of great service to Cortés. One reason for their slower advance was the want of coöperation from the vessels, which had been of such great assistance on the Iztapalapan road. This was at once remedied by the detachment of three brigantines each for the Tlacopan and Tepeyacac camps.[1142]

FOOTNOTES

[1113] Several leading authors assume this to have occurred on the 28th of April, when Cortés mustered his forces. He says nothing about the formal launch on that occasion, and it is hardly likely that two such performances could have been effected in one day.

[1114] ‘Las vanderas Reales, y otras vanderas del nombre que se dezia ser el vergantin.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 138. Ixtlilxochitl assumes that the flag-ship was named Medellin, Hist. Chich., 313-14, but this appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Herrera, who places Villafuerte ‘of Medellin’ at the head of the list of captains. Vetancurt believes that the vessels were named after the apostles, to whom Cortés was so devoted. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 156. If so, the flag-ship may have been called San Pedro, after his patron. When all were floated a storm came which threatened to break them one against the other. Torquemada, i. 532.

[1115] Their names appear to have been Juan Rodriguez de Villafuerte of Medellin, Juan Jaramillo of Salvatierra, Francisco Rodriguez Magariño of Merida, Cristóbal Flores of Valencia, Juan García Holguin of Cáceres, Caravajal of Zamora, Pedro Barba of Seville, Gerónimo Ruiz de la Mota of Búrgos, Pedro de Briones of Salamanca, Rodrigo Morejon de Lovera of Medina del Campo, Antonio de Sotelo of Zamora, Juan de Portillo of Portillo, and Miguel Diaz de Auz. Martin Lopez, the ship-builder, also joined, in the character of chief pilot. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. xxi., has Francisco de Verdugo, of Arévalo, instead of Diaz de Auz, but Bernal Diaz names him as one of the company captains under Olid, and he ought to know better in this respect. He also names a second Caravajal, Zamora, a ship-master, afterward settled in Oajaca, Colmenero, Gines Nortes, and Lerma. Hist. Verdad., 138.

[1116] The smallest was soon set aside as useless. There was some trouble in obtaining rowers, owing in a great measure to the employment in Spain of criminals in that capacity. Hidalgos shrank from anything that could be regarded as common labor, and even ordinary sailors refused to handle a branded implement. In this dilemma a list was made of all natives of seaports, and of those known to be able fishermen, and finally the selected number were ordered to take the oar, regardless of caste.

[1117] So says Cortés, Cartas, 208. Bernal Diaz as usual implies a smaller number by stating that Cortés sent to ask for only 20,000 men from the republics. Hist. Verdad., 137-8. The Cholultecs, he says, who had maintained a neutral attitude since the massacre there, sent a small force under their own captain. Gomara allows 60,000 allies to come; Vetancurt 90,000, of whom 60,000 are Tlascaltecs; Clavigero limits the arrival to 50,000 Tlascaltecs, the whole number of allies swelling gradually to over 200,000, while Herrera makes that number arrive within two days; Ixtlilxochitl names thirteen chiefs, who commanded the 50,000 Tlascaltecs (a misprint gives 5000), and some of those leading the 10,000 Huexotzincas; he also allows 10,000 Cholultecs; of his own Tezcucans he claims over 200,000 to have come, 50,000 each being furnished by the provinces of Tezcuco, Otumba, Tziuhcohua, and Chalco, with Tepeaca, Quauhnahuac, etc.; 8000 chiefs or nobles joined besides from Tezcuco, and 50,000 laborers in addition, it seems. Hist. Chich., 313; Hor. Crueldades, 20.

[1118] ‘Viua el Emperador nuestro señor, y Castilla, Castilla, Tlascala, Tlascala!’ Bernal Diaz, loc. cit. It took three days for the auxiliaries to enter, says Ojeda, and great as was Tezcuco, there was not room for them. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. Bernal Diaz reduces the days to hours.

[1119] Cortés, Cartas, 206. Gomara agrees, Hist. Mex., 191, but Bernal Diaz gives the number as 84 horsemen, 650 soldiers with swords, shields, and lances, and 194 archers and arquebusiers. loc. cit.

[1120] Some half a dozen towns furnished 8000 each within eight days. The feathers were fastened by the archers with glue from the cactle root. They kept two strings and as many catches, and maintained their skill by target practice. Id.

[1121] The distribution of forces as given by Cortés stands thus: To Alvarado, 30 horse, 18 arquebusiers and archers, 150 sword and shield men, and over 25,000 Tlascaltecs; to Olid, 33 horse, 18 archers and arquebusiers, 160 sword and shield men, and over 20,000 allies; to Sandoval, 24 horse, 4 arquebusiers, 13 archers, 150 sword and shield men, and over 30,000 allies from Huexotzinco, Cholula, and Chalco. Cartas, 207. Others differ more or less, some giving details that hardly accord with the totals. Bernal Diaz names as Alvarado’s three captains his brother Jorge de Alvarado, Gutierre de Badajoz, and Andrés de Monjaraz, the latter an agreeable, bright-faced fellow of about 32 years, always suffering from a Lotharian disease which prevented him from doing anything. The three captains under Olid were Andrés de Tápia, a growing favorite of Cortés’, Francisco Verdugo, the unconscious fellow-conspirator of Villafañe, and Francisco de Lugo, the natural son of a prominent estate-holder at Medina del Campo. Sandoval had but two captains, the insinuating Pedro de Ircio, and Luis Marin of San Lúcar, a muscular and dashing fellow, of Monjaraz’ age, with an open blonde face, somewhat pitted, and possessed of a voluble tongue. Hist. Verdad., 139, 240, 246. Ixtlilxochitl gives a longer list, which is clearly wrong in many respects, and he adds some names of native leaders. Alvarado kept the Tlascaltecs of Tizatlan and Tepeticpac; Olid those of Ocotelulco and Quiahuiztlan. Hist. Chich., 313-14. He further states that his namesake joined Cortés’ fleet with 16,000 canoes, containing 50,000 Tezcucans, of whom 8000 were nobles. Hor. Crueldades, 21. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows this author in many respects, improving somewhat on the names. Herrera names five of the sub-captains, among them Hernando de Lerma of Galicia. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii.

[1122] ‘Iva a tomar por fuerça el Cacicazgo, e vassallos, y tierra del mismo Chichimecatecle,’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 139, which must be an idle rumor.

[1123] Some time later when Ojeda went to Tlascala for supplies he brought back the confiscated property, including a quantity of treasure, and 30 women, the daughters, servants, etc., of Xicotencatl. Torquemada, i. 558. The Tlascaltec laws were severe, ‘E l’odio particolare, che portavano a quel Principe, il cui orgoglio non potevano più soffrire.’ Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 195. Some Tlascaltecs say his father had warned Cortés against his son, and urged his death. Bernal Diaz, loc. cit. Herrera observes that he could hardly have been seized without Tlascaltec aid. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.

[1124] Ojeda, in Herrera, loc. cit. Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 379, thinks that it would have been hazardous to hang him at Tezcuco, where many Tlascaltecs were gathered; but he forgets that nearly all this people had already set out for Mexico. His supposition is based on Bernal Diaz, who intimates that he was not hanged in Tezcuco. Alvarado had pleaded for his life, and Cortés, while pretending compliance, secretly ordered the alguacil to despatch him. Hist. Verdad., 139.

[1125] Cortés divided the lordship of the chieftain afterward between his two sons, and the name of Xicotencatl has been perpetuated by more than one line, as Camargo shows in his Hist. Tlax. Two officers of that name figured during the American invasion of 1847 in defence of their country. Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 447.

[1126] Most writers say the 10th, misled by an error in Cortés, Cartas, 208; and this error causes Prescott, among others, to fall into more than one mistake, which he upholds with vain arguments. On earlier pages in the Cartas are given dates in connection with religious festivals which show that Whitsunday fell on the 19th of May, and the departure took place three days later. Bernal Diaz gives the 13th, and says that the Xicotencatl affair had detained them a day. He afterward varies the date.

[1127] They passed round Zumpango Lake, through Quauhtitlan and Tenayocan. Cortés, Cartas, 210; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 139.

[1128] ‘Jamàs quisieron Paz [the Aztecs]; y aunque à la postre la recibieron, el Rei no la aceptò, porque al principio, contra su Consejo, la rehusaron.’ Torquemada, i. 572. Gomara says the same, but Duran, the historian of his dynasty, declares that he loved too much to rule and to display his personal valor ever to listen to peace proposals. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 490. On the following pages he gives a speech by this ruler, painting the shame and evil of surrender. Before this, according to the native records of Sahagun, Cortés had invited Quauhtemotzin, under promise of security, to a conference, in order to explain his motives for the campaign. Not wishing to appear afraid, the Aztec monarch came to the rendezvous near Acachinanco, in a state barge, attended by several nobles. Cortés arrived in a brigantine. He reviewed the allegiance tendered to the Spanish sovereign, the revolt, precipitated by Alvarado’s effort to anticipate the murderous plot, and the subsequent slaughter of Spaniards and robbery of treasures. These unjustifiable and inhuman outrages he had come to avenge; and he would not stay his hand till the enemies of his king and God had been driven forth. Quauhtemotzin merely replied that he accepted war, and thereupon returned to the city. Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 147-50. Torquemada, i, 543, and Brasseur de Bourbourg adopt this story, the latter stating that the Aztec ruler proposed to consult his council. But Clavigero rightly assumes that the interview never took place. All other records say that Quauhtemotzin persistently refused ever to speak with Cortés, even from behind his walls.

[1129] Many captives had been secured during recent raids on Chalco and Tezcuco, and other parts, so that there was no lack. The native victims numbered 4000, it is said. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii. ‘All boys,’ says Oviedo, iii. 515. ‘Yo bien creo que fuerõ muchas, mas no tantas.’ Gomara, loc. cit. The limbs of the Spaniards were sent to different provinces to frighten the inhabitants. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 135.

[1130] Ixtlilxochitl states in one place that his namesake remained at Tezcuco to raise troops and to arrange for regular trains of supplies for the Spanish camps. In another relation he allows him to accompany Cortés with 16,000 canoes. Hor. Crueldades, 21; Relacion, 314. The canoes which now attended the fleet appear to have served chiefly as transports.

[1131] Owned even under republican rule by the heirs of Cortés, as a tetzontli quarry.

[1132] Cortés, Cartas, 211. Bernal Diaz raises the number to 4000, Peter Martyr to 5000, while Vetancurt assumes that the 500 were merely the van. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 158.

[1133] Oviedo writes that they were sacrificing boys to propitiate the gods. iii. 516. ‘La flota q̄ les parecio no dar batalla con tan pocas y cansadas,’ observes Gomara, Hist. Mex., 194.

[1134] Alvarado advanced as far as the first wide bridge, but lost three men. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 141.

[1135] Probably behind the great southern levee. See Native Races, ii. 564.

[1136] Gomara calls it wrongly Xaltoca, and Robertson confounds it, singularly enough, with Tezcuco. Hist. Am., ii. 114.

[1137] Cortés, Cartas, 216-17. The greater number of the allies came daily from their camp at Coyuhuacan to join Cortés as warriors and sappers. Digging and similar work was done chiefly by Tezcucans. Herrera states that the vessels of Flores and Ruiz de la Mota were placed at a broken causeway between the camps of Alvarado and Sandoval. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.

[1138] ‘Asserrador ... trabajò mas que mil Indios.’ Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xviii.

[1139] Only three, says Cortés and others.

[1140] Ixtlilxochitl allows his namesake and Cortés to figure in this scene, the former cutting off the idol’s head while the general secured the mask. He states that the temple was captured during the first entry into the court. When the Mexicans rallied, Ixtlilxochitl managed to kill their general, which so enraged them that they rushed madly on and drove back the Spaniards till the horse arrived. Hor. Crueldades, 29-30. His version is adopted in the main by Prescott and others; but there are several discrepancies. The death of a general as a rule discouraged native armies. Cortés, who would not have failed to claim the overthrow of the idol, states that it was effected by four or five Spaniards, after the second capture of the court. Cartas, 218. His presence was needed below to direct operations. Gomara’s text must have misled Ixtlilxochitl and others. Hist. Mex., 197-8. Herrera and Torquemada adhere better to Cortés.

[1141] Cortés speaks of an ambuscade by the horsemen wherein 30 Mexicans fell. Cartas, 218. How many of his own were lost he prudently abstains from mentioning, though admitting many wounded. ‘Dexaron perdido los Españoles esta vez el tiro grueso,’ says Torquemada, i. 548, but this is unlikely.

[1142] Cortés, Cartas, 221. Bernal Diaz states that Alvarado received four and Sandoval only two. _Hist. Verdad._, 141.

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XXXIII. CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE

JUNE-JULY, 1521.

SOMETHING ABOUT QUAUHTEMOTZIN—INFAMOUS PRETENSIONS OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION AND CHRISTIANITY—PROMPT ACTION OF THE MEXICAN EMPEROR—REPETITIONS OF THE ENTRY ASSAULT—SUBMISSION OF THE SURROUNDING NATIONS—DIRE CONDITION OF THE MEXICANS—SPANISH DEFEAT AND DISAFFECTION—RESOLUTION TO RAZE THE CITY.

In their present position, with the advantages of superior civilization, there was equal glory accruing to the Spaniards in winning Mexico, and to the Mexicans in manfully losing their city. Quauhtemotzin as a patriot and a skilful general was fully alive to the perils of his position, but he was prepared to use to best advantage all the resources at his command, and that is all any one can do. Stern as Saturnius, and passionately patient, from the day of the capture of Montezuma his nature had been proof against all pleasure. Of an imperious temper, haughty and overbearing as Coriolanus, yet was he as faithful to defend the city as any Hector or Horatius. I hold that Spaniards of the sixteenth century were no worse than their neighbors. It was a bigoted and cruel age; though for that matter enough of bigotry yet remains, and there is sufficient cruelty in our latter-day fightings to keep us humble. And while we see much to condemn in the motives that brought hither these foreigners, and much in their conduct that was cruel and unjust, yet we are constrained to admit that the work which they accomplished was in the pathway of destiny. The conquest of the county, the destruction of its barbarous and inhuman rites, and the establishment of the religion of Christ in their place were the inevitable consequences of the discovery of America. Once brought face to face with the sacrificial stone, and other brutal atrocities of the Aztecs, and Christianity had no alternative but to eradicate these evils or be itself overthrown.

* * * * *

The victorious advance into the heart of the city had been a pleasant surprise to the Spaniards, while to the Mexicans it was incomprehensible. If such were the results of the first day’s doings, what would the days following bring forth? Quauhtemotzin immediately issued orders to reopen the channels and construct fresh intrenchments and pitfalls. Such were the forces employed, and such their zeal, that when the morning dawned the causeways and streets presented even greater difficulties than before. The allies of the Mexicans were not so easily reassured, however, and several began to waver, among them the Xochimilcans, to the rear of Olid’s camp, who sent in their submission to Cortés, promising not only active aid but much needed supplies. The same offer came from the more numerous Otomís, occupying the western mountain border of the valley, followed by the substantial reinforcement of twenty thousand of their sturdy warriors, with large supplies.[1143] Still larger reinforcements arrived just before these from Tezcuco, where ever since Cortés’ departure the young king and his brothers had been busily engaged in forwarding supplies[1144] and fitting out troops. Fifty thousand were raised and placed under the command of the energetic Ixtlilxochitl, who had great military reputation and possessed far more influence than his ruling brother. He joined Cortés with thirty thousand, and distributed the rest among the other captains. Cortés praises him for his bravery and good traits, a eulogy which serves only to embitter Mexican writers against one who favored aliens against his own race, and aided to overthrow their liberty and religion. During the campaign he was frequently taunted as a renegade, traitor, and fratricide, but he never swerved in his allegiance, and found ready retorts and excuses, the strongest being that he favored the Christians for introducing the true faith. Yet this strange religion he was in no haste, personally, to adopt. “Curses on his odious memory!” exclaims the rabid Bustamante.[1145]

Three days after the last assault a second was made, supported by more allies than ever. Cortés’ Spanish forces consisted of twenty horses, three hundred infantry, with three guns. Although he had noticed the operations of the Mexicans, he was hardly prepared to find his work so completely undone. As before, each channel with its intrenchments had to be captured anew, and while the causeway was readily gained with the aid of brigantines, the advance along the street was slower, although the soldiers were somewhat less exposed to roof volleys since the burning of so many of the buildings during the previous entry. The breaches and channels were filled up as they advanced. In the plaza the houses were yet intact and the missile showers severe, so much so that Cortés found it necessary to apply the torch, among others to the Axayacatl palace, his former head-quarters, wherein he had sustained so fierce a siege, and to the House of Birds, which formed so prominent and admired a feature in the city. It was of vast extent, and devoted almost wholly to the maintenance of beasts and birds of every species, some kept in the gardens, some in courts, others in galleries, rooms, and cages; altogether a collection which must tend to cast a favorable light on the culture of the race. Both palaces were splendid specimens of Nahua architecture, adorned with marble galleries supported on monolith pillars, with elaborate cornices and stucco work, and surmounted by turrets and battlements, while within and around rose groves of rare trees, choice shrubbery, and flowers, refreshed by ever sparkling fountains. Cortés had rightly concluded that the destruction of such monuments, cherished not alone for their beauty and contents but for their hallowed associations, would be a more severe lesson than the loss of numerous lives; and as the flames rose over all that vast area, fed by the roofs, interior wood-work, and other combustible material, lamentations mingled with the maddened cries of burning animals. Around in the suburbs, also, could be seen column after column of dense smoke started by the torches of the cruisers, and settling in dense masses over the city as if threatening to bury her forever from sight. Fortunately for the inhabitants, the houses thereabout were too wide apart to allow the flames to spread far. Even at this juncture the work of destruction might have been stopped for the reason that Cyrus stopped the sack of Sardis when Crœsus said to him: “These are not my goods, but thine, O Cyrus, that thou art spoiling!”

All this time waged the conflict of arms, the Mexicans seeking by repeated charges and sallies to check the advance of the Spaniards and to harass them. The native chronicles relate that during one of the countercharges by the cavalry a horseman pierced a warrior with such force that the lance remained fast in the ground. Regarding it as a disgrace to abandon his weapon he rashly dismounted to unfasten it, only to be surrounded by the foe and cut in pieces. His comrades hastened to the rescue, but could recover only the mangled remains.[1146]

When evening came and the signal was given for return to camp, the Mexicans fell upon the rear with renewed ardor. It seems as if courage came to them in proportion to their misfortunes. For their fury broke forth anew, fed by the dire conditions round them, by the sight of lately enslaved Otomís, Xochimilcans, and Chalcans, now fighting against them under the sheltering wings of the invaders, and exulting over their misfortunes with bitter taunts. “Behold!” they cried, displaying dismembered limbs of Aztecs, “we shall fill our bellies with your braves, and have enough over wherewith to feed the beasts. Do not starve yourselves, for to-morrow we will return for more.” “And in truth they both supped and breakfasted on the limbs,” says Cortés.[1147] Camp was regained without serious trouble.

The following day the entry was repeated, and early as it was, the channels had been nearly all reopened and provided with the usual intrenchments. This involved a repetition of the previous day’s manœuvres, but the Mexicans fought with greater obstinacy, partly because they had become accustomed to the Spanish tactics, and it was one o’clock before the plaza was reached, by which time the archers and arquebusiers had exhausted their quivers and ammunition-pouches. Cortés now advanced beyond the temple along the Tlacopan road, well known to the veterans from the hard fighting there met during the previous siege, and captured two canal crossings, which were filled up, while to the buildings on either side the torch was applied. The object of the movement was partly to open intercourse with Alvarado’s forces, which were advancing less rapidly, owing to the number of intrenched channels. Progress was slowly increased during the succeeding entries, when Andrés de Tápia and Ávila pushed along adjoining streets with detachments.[1148]

* * * * *

One result of the Spanish successes was the submission of all the threatening and neutral lake and island towns to the south and south-west of Mexico, from Iztapalapan and Culhuacan to Cuitlahuac. To this step they had been partly impelled by the repeated raids of the Chalcan confederates, and since their submission was so tardy they were employed chiefly as laborers and purveyors. Gomara now estimates the native auxiliaries at two hundred thousand men, “some engaged intent on fighting, some on eating, some on stealing, and many on gazing.”[1149] These lake peoples, known as Chinampanecs, from their floating gardens and aquatic life, possessed canoes in abundance, and Cortés availed himself of this to reënforce the blockading fleet with a boat flotilla, three thousand in all, which harassed the city on every side, entering into the canals to burn and pillage, and landing sallying parties to carry desolation all through the suburbs.

Allured by the prospect of spoils, the Chinampanec crews arranged a plan whereby a still richer draught might be made. Before their adhesion to the Spanish cause, or knowledge of it had yet come to Quauhtemotzin, they sent to offer him their services against the invaders, with whom they proposed to deal treacherously. They were assigned a post and played their part well. No sooner were the Mexicans occupied with the Spanish forces than they rushed into the dwellings of their pretended allies and began to rob, slay, and carry off women and children. An alarm was given and reënforcements hurried up which speedily overwhelmed the traitorous crews, killing a number, capturing others, and recovering nearly all the booty. The captives were condemned to the stone of sacrifice, those of Cuitlahuac by one of their own caciques, Mayehuatzin, a companion of Quauhtemotzin. The incident cost many lives on both sides, greatly to the delight of the Spaniards, to whom this mutual throat-cutting was the economy of war.[1150]

With so large a hostile fleet upon the lake the Mexican crews never ventured abroad by day, but when darkness set in, their canoes sped across, impelled by the demand for food. Informed of this, Cortés detached two brigantines, under Portillo and Pedro Barba, to cruise all night. This proved a severe blow to the poor Mexicans, although a number of canoes still ran the blockade successfully, and it was resolved to entrap the vessels, since open battle could not avail against them. Thirty of the largest canoes, or piraguas, were accordingly manned with stout warriors and strong boatmen, and hidden amongst the rushes near a heavily staked channel, into which some swift canoes were to decoy the brigantines. This succeeded, and no sooner were they fast on the stakes than the canoes attacked them with such spirit that every Spaniard was wounded, while Portillo fell, and Barba died within three days.[1151] The brigantines managed to escape. Encouraged by this attempt the Mexicans became more brisk in their blockade-running, and stationed forty piraguas to repeat the decoy surprise. Advised of this by two captives, Cortés sent six brigantines by night to hide near the spot, leaving one to cruise about for canoes. Some of these soon appeared, and the sailor pursued them for a distance toward the hiding-place of the Mexicans. Suddenly she turned about as if afraid of stakes. Observing this, the forty piraguas ventured forth and were allured toward the Spanish ambuscade. At the proper moment the six vessels came down upon the pursuers, overturning and sinking a number, and capturing others, together with many warriors. The Mexicans attempted no further naval surprises.[1152]

* * * * *

By the night cruisers and the Chinampanecs, supplies were nearly all cut off, and gaunt hunger began to stalk the streets of the fated capital. The ravages of the fleet and the flotilla along the eastern suburbs had rendered these wholly untenable, and the south-eastern district had been desolated by Cortés’ divisions, compelling the inhabitants to abandon the greater part of Tenochtitlan and concentrate chiefly in Tlatelulco. These two main divisions of the city had been rivals ever since its foundation, with frequent disputes to sustain the flame of discord. Gradually the Tenochtitlans had assumed the sway, honored by imperial presence, while the other division had assumed a plebeian stamp, patronized by the former. During this common misfortune, however, rivalry was forgotten, and the more warlike Tlatelulcans unhesitatingly aided the others and now welcomed them into their quarter.[1153]

Every loss of allies to the Mexicans was a corresponding gain to the Spaniards, less in regard to fresh auxiliaries than to the relief from hostile attitude and to supplies. The Chinampanecs, for instance, were ordered to bring material and construct barracks along the causeway on either side of Fort Xoloc. These afforded shelter for all the Spaniards and two thousand servants, and proved most welcome, for the rainy season had already set in. The same natives were obliged to provide supplies, such as fish and a species of cherry, which together with maize formed the chief sustenance of the army. Frijoles, or beans, cacao, quilite herbs, and nochtli, afforded variety. The maize was ground by hand and made into tortillas, or pancakes, by the slave women and mistresses of the soldiers, either for their individual lords or for the mess to which they belonged. These duties were also assumed by some of the few Spanish and mulatto women who had accompanied their husbands. Although there was little fear of starvation in the Spanish camps, yet the fare was at times not of the best.[1154] The less fastidious auxiliaries were content with a range of eatables which the soldiers would not touch; human meat with them was a bonne-bouche for which they were prepared to risk even their own flesh.[1155] Alvarado’s men enjoyed perhaps the least comfort, for they had moved their camp to a point on the causeway, leaving the auxiliaries at Tlacopan, together with the slaves and tortilla-makers. Nor were their barracks properly constructed, so that exposure to wind and rain was added to poor fare and miry roads, while the situation of the camp added to danger and guard duty.

The camp had been formed round a temple square on the causeway, quite close to Mexico, or rather to Tlatelulco, for Alvarado had tired of having his day’s work destroyed every night, and he resolved at least to protect the approach to the suburb. One deep channel yet intervened, beyond which the camp could not well be moved, but a large force was stationed to guard it at night, so that the crossing should be assured for the morning’s attack.[1156] On the other side gleamed the watch-fires of the Mexicans, behind and between which might be seen the flitting figures of their warriors, signalling to one another by whistling. This and other operations were forced upon them to a great extent by Spanish tactics, from which they had copied many features with no little effect.

From Alvarado’s camp to the Tlatelulco market, the heart of the enemy’s stronghold, the distance was less than from the camp of Cortés, though the first part of the way was more difficult than the Iztapalapan road. The immense stride of the Fort Xoloc party had wholly eclipsed the progress of the others, and Alvarado’s men began to fear that, near as they were to the enemy’s centre, the more distant comrades might reach it before them. It was therefore resolved to make strenuous efforts to penetrate into the suburb. The assault being on Tlatelulco itself, the Mexicans found no difficulty in offering so strong a resistance that hardly any advance could be made. Several vessels were thereupon directed against the suburb to coöperate with a brisk fire, and to divert attention by landing sallying parties. This succeeded for a while, but inspired by the prowess of two Tlatelulcans named Tzoyetzin and Temoctzin, the warriors rallied and drove back the invaders. Another brave who distinguished himself during the repulse was Tzilacatzin. In the guise of an Otomí warrior, and protected by cotton armor and shield, he rushed toward the Spaniards as if bewildered, in advance of his comrades, and threw his stone, knocking down an opponent at each throw. This man appeared in different guise on different days, and did no little to encourage his companions.[1157]

Notwithstanding these rebuffs Alvarado persevered, and the Mexicans resolved to take advantage of his zeal to entrap him. Two or three wide channels intervened between the end of the causeway and the great market, and the first of these was now the point of contention, a chasm of sixty feet in width and over ten feet in depth. By great effort a crossing had here been formed with débris. This the Mexicans undermined one night and covered a part with a false ground. In the morning they attacked the Spanish outpost with great demonstration, but retired as soon as the horsemen charged. Flushed with success, the Spaniards followed in divided parties, and one of fifty with a number of allies pursued across the channel. No sooner were they over than the boatmen below tore away the support, while the warriors turned with overwhelming force upon the band. Resistance was impossible, and they retreated only to fall into the opening, where crews were at hand to pounce upon them. Indescribable confusion ensued. Thick fell the blows off the despairing men, as they sought to beat back the triumphant foe. Bernal Diaz, who was among the number trapped, felt himself seized by stout arms, but although badly wounded he managed to cast off the assailant and spring to the bank, where he fell exhausted. Fortunately Alvarado came up at this moment, after driving back a division in another direction, and so startled the assailants that they retreated, though with four captive Spaniards, one or two more being killed, besides a horse and a number of allies.[1158]

When Cortés heard of the affair he came over to administer a reprimand, but on learning the particulars he could not withhold his admiration for the valiant deeds performed, and merely exhorted his lieutenant to be more cautious.[1159] Great was the exultation of the Mexicans over their success, and tauntingly they hovered round the camp, imitating the cries of the entrapped soldiers. So encouraged did they feel as to make several determined night attacks on the different camps or their advance posts. Alvarado’s being nearest and most exposed had to sustain quite a severe fight, losing several men.[1160]

* * * * *

Although Alvarado had made little advance into the city, the planting of his camp so near it saved much fighting and enabled him to direct daily operations almost at once against the main points. In this he possessed an advantage over Cortés, who was compelled daily to recapture a number of positions already gained. He himself remarks on this loss of time and work. “Your Majesty may blame me for retreating instead of holding what is gained,” he writes, but guards at the bridges, which must be large, would be so harassed as to unfit them for the next day’s work, while to take up a position within the city would draw the whole of the large population upon them, and might lead to the cutting off of communication and supplies, and probably to a repetition of the great disaster of the previous year. Such a position would besides render it possible for the Mexicans to obtain supplies from the mainland, for the Spanish allies could not be relied on to watch them. Cortés’ own officers, however, could not fail to observe that Alvarado’s course might have been followed with some advantage. They began to tire of the slow progress, attended as it was with so much fighting for so little gain; so much exposure to alternate rain and heat; so much discomfort in rude camps with poor diet and want of proper care for wounded or sick men. This was represented to Cortés, with the request that a general storming be attempted with a view to abbreviate the siege. He represented the danger of advancing over so many channels, along streets lined with houses, against hosts of determined warriors, with the prospect of being caught in the rear. Still he was as eager as any one to end the siege, and would call a council to deliberate on the matter. The result was a decided majority for the proposition to attempt the capture of Tlatelulco market and there establish a permanent camp.[1161]

Since Sandoval will not be able to render efficient service on his route for an attack on Tlatelulco, he is ordered to join Alvarado with the weightiest part of his forces, and to take advantage of the movement to entrap the Mexicans. He will pretend to make a general evacuation of his camp, and thus allure the foe to an attack on the baggage-train, during which the ambuscaded cavalry can inflict a lesson which shall also serve to secure the camp against later attack. Sandoval sends another portion of his forces to Cortés, who has more points to cover, and receives instructions to attend in particular to the capture of the channels and their filling, and otherwise to secure the safety of the more impetuous Alvarado.

On the day appointed, the brigantines with their flotillas are sent early to aid in clearing the causeways and approaches. The troops find little trouble in reaching the Tlacopan avenue, from which three long roads give access to the market. It is advantageous to push the advance on each of these, and three divisions are accordingly formed, one to follow the main street under command of the comptroller and treasurer, Julian de Alderete, who has been among the foremost to urge the assault; another under Andrés de Tápia and Jorge de Alvarado, brother of the Tlacopan leader, both dashing and able men; the third and somewhat larger body, swelled particularly by auxiliaries, Cortés himself directs along the most dangerous approach, a sort of causeway, lined with houses but bordered with water.[1162] Two cannon are placed on the Tlacopan road, guarded by eight horsemen, and Cortés leaves his horse at the entrance of the road taken by him, and gives strict orders to all captains for filling every channel behind them.

Cortés at first leads his men on foot, and with the aid of a field-piece readily gains the first bridge and barricade, carrying all before him, while the auxiliaries swarm into the houses and drive slingers and archers from the roofs. The determination of the assaulting party seems to have disheartened the Mexicans, for the advance is quite rapid, so much so that the captain who has taken Cortés’ place at the head of his division soon reports that he is approaching the market and can hear the operations of Alvarado and Sandoval. May he advance? This message reaches Cortés on a section of his causeway to the rear, where he has remained to gain a contested point, and to oppose assaults from the cross-streets. He replies that the captain must first secure his rear and flanks, and look particularly to the channels, of which there are three in that causeway. “They are filled,” was the answer, made without a thought as to its accuracy, for flushed with the success of the advance, soldiers and cavaliers alike cast prudence to the winds, and disregarding common ditches bend their eyes alone upon the goal. Immediately after comes the doleful sound of the teponastli, and a shrill trumpet blast, the alarm signal of Paynalton, the mythic page of the war-god. Struck on the summit of Tlatelulco temple, the sounds float over the contestants, sending a chill into the heart of the Spaniards and allies as they rush onward filled with visions of success. To the Mexicans, on the other hand, it comes as a magic appeal from Huitzilopochtli, stirring their spirit with fresh energy: a resistless appeal to make a supreme effort for imperilled home, and faith, and liberty.[1163]

Cortés also hears the warning, only too deeply impressed since that Sorrowful Night, and with anxious heart he hastens forward to see how matters stand. His anxiety is increased as the jubilant cries of his own men appear to change, while high above them rise the unmistakably triumphant shouts of the Aztecs. Just then he comes to one of the crossings formed by his party at a channel ten to twelve paces wide, and over ten feet deep. It seems insecure, and on looking he finds it constructed of some loosely thrown pieces of wood and reed, covered with a little earth. He at once orders the auxiliaries in his following to rebuild the structure. Scarcely is the order uttered before he sees his forces coming down the causeway in disorderly flight, led by the allies. Cortés makes frantic efforts to stay the current. None heed him. Fears lend wings and drown all appeal. On come the pressing throng, on to the frail bridge, which sinks with its living freight into the deep water. Still onward rush the mass behind, impelled by their mad momentum, tumbling on the heads of these, scrambling and wading, adding their cries for help to the shrieks of despair beneath, while from the rear roll the terrifying shouts of hot pursuers. Already the house-tops teem with slingers and archers; the lanes pour forth their warriors with swords and long pikes to pierce the flanks, and the canals are alive with canoes whose crews secure the struggling fugitives for sacrifice, or deal the more grateful coup de grace. The Spanish soldiers are among the last to come up, and a terrible gauntlet they have had to run. Regardless of the showering missiles or the pressing foe, Cortés stands on the brink to strike back the hungry crew and lend a helping hand to his floundering men. “I was determined to remain there and die fighting,” he writes. But so many are beyond his reach, and there he must stand helpless to watch the struggle; to behold now this soldier felled, now the other carried off; and more, to see the banner torn from the hands of his alférez. Tlapanecatl is the name given by the records to the doughty captor of so esteemed a prize.

Standing there conspicuously on the brink, Cortés becomes the target for hundreds of missiles, though protected by his mail; but soon the foe begin to press round him, and even in his rear, separating him from the men.[1164] The next moment more than one pair of arms had coiled round his body, and, with triumphant shouts of “Malinche! Malinche!” they seek to drag him into the water to the canoes. Alarmed by the outcry, his body-soldier, Cristóbal de Olea, hastens to his side, and with a sabre-blow severs the arm which was well nigh pulling over the bent form of his master. The next instant he himself falls beneath the furious onslaught roused by the magnitude of the prize, “a glorious death in so good a cause!” exclaims Herrera. Another soldier, named Lerma, rushes to the spot and is nearly overpowered; while a stout Tlascaltec, Temacatzin, plants himself in front of the leader, half prostrate with exhaustion and wounds, and wards off the blows till Antonio de Quiñones, captain of the guard, manages to force his way forward and sustains him, followed by a number of men whom the report of their general’s danger has stirred to fierceness.[1165] “Away from here, your worship, and save your person,” cries the captain, “for without you all will be lost!” Cortés refuses, “for I desired rather death than life,” he writes; but finally by dint of pleading and main force he is induced slowly to retire, seeking to cover the rear of the fleeing. And well it was, for a longer stay would have proved fatal. But for the eagerness of the Mexicans to secure as prisoner so magnificent a prize, they could easily have despatched him. Aztecs made it a point to obtain as many prisoners as possible, particularly chiefs and nobles, and white men, who ranked even above these, in order to do honor to the war-god. This effort was prompted by a deep religious obligation as well as by warrior spirit.

Not far from the disastrous channel a horse was brought, upon which Cortés was mounted, though wounded in the leg. Shortly before, his chamberlain, Cristóbal de Guzman, a great favorite, had ridden up with a charger to the relief of his master, only to be surrounded with warriors and cut down, together with the animal,[1166] while another rider was obliged to retreat with a lance-thrust in the throat. On retiring from the section of causeway assigned to the horse, another animal was killed and a third narrowly escaped. Finally the troops reached the broader Tlacopan road, and now Cortés, with the nine horsemen left in his division, was able to take a firm stand against the enemy. Checked in their pursuit, and made timid in their charges by the presence of the bold line of horses and lances, they flung their missiles and insults with increased energy. Suddenly two or three Spanish heads were cast before the horsemen, with the cry: “Tonatiuh!” “Sandoval!” The meaning could not be misunderstood, and as the Spaniards gazed on the gory and disfigured faces a sickening fear crept over them. Could it be that these beloved leaders had fallen! There was no time for deliberation. Finding his own party now comparatively secure, Cortés hurriedly sent messengers to recall the other divisions under Alderete and Tápia.

There was hardly need for this message. The triumphant shouts of the Mexicans in pursuit of the troops of Cortés and the increased attack on their own had already warned these leaders. Still they persevered, although their men manifested some discouragement. It was not long, however, before two or three mutilated, bearded heads were cast before them with the cry, “Malinche is dead!” “Tonatiuh and all their men have fallen!” The leaders saw that farther advance was useless, especially since the Mexicans now attacked with great fury. The leaders kept their men in good order, and were already retiring when the order of recall reached them. The streets there being wider and easier, and the channels all filled, they found no trouble in rejoining their general. Now jointly they retreated through the plaza and down the Iztapalapan road, furiously pursued by the warriors, who showed themselves more reckless than usual on seeing their prey escape. The central temple was filling with a vast throng to watch the onslaught, and on the summit the priests were already burning incense and chanting in honor of victory, while the rabble railed at the humiliated children of the sun.

Alvarado had meanwhile advanced along the road to Tlatelulco from his causeway, leaving Sandoval to coöperate along the flank and to direct the movements of the brigantines and the filling of the channels. The advance was fiercely resisted by the Mexicans from roofs, cross-lanes, and barricades, and hundreds had been severely wounded, chiefly Tlascaltecs, only too many fatally, yet he persevered. He was already near the market, the aim of all efforts, when the drum and trumpet came to startle his men and to encourage the Mexicans to greater resistance. Progress was now almost checked, and soon came the cry, “Malinche is dead!” “Sandoval and the other captains are dead!” “Behold their faces!” And therewith several heads with gory beards were cast before them. “This shall be your fate!”

Alvarado’s men were white with dismay, and but for the intrepid courage of their leader the rout of Cortés’ party might have been repeated. Making a bold stand with his Spaniards, he ordered the Tlascaltecs to fall back and leave the retreat open. They needed no second instructions to this end, for the bleeding heads lent wings to their haste. Then grew the onslaught fiercer than ever, for the retreat of Cortés’ forces enabled a larger number of enemies to turn against Alvarado and Sandoval. The latter also received his cast of bloody heads with a new string of prominent names, all calculated to inspire terror. “By this time they had us all killed,” adds Bernal Diaz, “but, in truth, we were all wounded, and filled with anguish concerning the fate of our chief. Without God’s aid we could never have escaped from the swords and clutches of the Mexicans.” Some pious chroniclers, indeed, assert as usual that the virgin appeared in person, together with perennial Santiago, to save the Spaniards from their greatest peril.[1167]

* * * * *

Encouraged by the victories on land, the Mexicans had ventured forth also in their canoes to harass the vessels which were occupied in protecting the retreat of the armies. Unable in some instances to leave their position, or impeded in their movement by stakes and other obstacles, many of the brigantines were severely pressed, and one, commanded by Briones, in Alvarado’s division, was actually captured, with the loss of four men, one being taken alive. Jaramillo came to the relief of the vessel, however, drove forth the enemy, and kept them at bay.[1168] By this time both the forces of Alvarado and Sandoval had reached the causeway, pursued by a great host, reckless in their endeavor to inflict all the injury possible ere the Spaniards escaped. Some delay occurred in crossing the only partly filled channel to the causeway, and a number of soldiers were detained waist-deep in water, seeking to lift a brigantine over the stakes, for the auxiliaries were already away from the front; and all this time the cavalry were compelled to remain before the causeway to cover the infantry and bear the brunt of the terrible onslaught. Charge after charge they made to keep back the advancing foe, through the shower of blinding missiles, against the line of bristling lances, amidst the whirling swords and clubs, until not a rider but felt his arm droop and his body grow faint with loss of blood. Sandoval himself had a number of wounds. “For God’s sake make haste and retire,” he cried to his foot-soldiers, “or we shall all be lost!”

Finally the passage was clear, and they fell back along the causeway, still fighting, and now exposed to the canoe sallies. On reaching his quarters, Alvarado turned two cannon against the swarm which sought to scale the camp, and this with the fusillade procured a much needed respite.[1169] It was time, for the increasing darkness would soon have added fresh dangers to the retreat. Sandoval had already hurried away with a solitary companion to seek the camp of Cortés and calm his fears.[1170] With a similar object Andrés de Tápia had been sent with three horsemen from Fort Xoloc to Alvarado’s camp, where he arrived with some scars from marauding stragglers. Not wishing to discourage the soldiers, he reduced the losses of his party to quite a small number, and made light of the matter.

By this time the enemy had retired, but from the city rose their shouts of triumph, and every temple was ablaze with fires to celebrate the victory. The summit of the Tlatelulco pyramid, the highest of them all, was the scene of great commotion, and soon the sombre notes of the melancholy drum called it to attention. A number of instruments now added their discordant notes, in clash and blast, and a procession with torches, swinging censers, and religious paraphernalia circled round with imposing ceremony. Then a space was cleared, and a long file of naked men stood revealed. A cry of horror burst from the gazing soldiers. There could be no mistake. Distant as was the temple, the glare of fire clearly revealed the white hue and bearded faces of their comrades, bound for sacrifice, and plumed. Now they were made to march forward, and with blows to dance before the idol to whom they had been consecrated. Ah, to be a helpless looker-on at such a time! Again they formed in line exhausted, and then one was seized by several priests and borne struggling to the stone of sacrifice. He was thrown on his back and held down by the limbs while the high-priest with ceremonious flourish raised the glittering blade. The gazing soldiers clutched each other’s hands in agony, as their eyes followed the instrument and saw it plunged into the breast of the victim. They seemed to hear his stifled cry, to feel the knife in their own heart, and realizing that they were still safe they thanked heaven for their escape.[1171]

Victim after victim was carried to the stone, some with frantic struggles, others resigned, and still others weighed down in helpless fear of what they had beheld. Heart after heart was torn from the gaping breasts and held before the idol, while the bodies were cast down the steps. The skin, particularly of the head and upper body, was removed and used as a dress for festive occasion, and the flesh was hacked to pieces, the limbs for the banquet table, the trunk for the beasts. After a while came darker-hued victims, and now the Tlascaltecs and other allies shuddered. To them the sacrifices were not so terrifying as to the Spaniards, but they could not unmoved behold the cruel death of their countrymen. Then came more processions, music, and idolatrous rites, followed by fresh companies for the sacrifice, white and dark; and so passed the night, until the horror palled on the gazers, and many expressed the opinion that the priests were pretending sacrifice by producing the same bodies upon the stone several times so as to inspire greater fear. This belief was strengthened when they observed similar ceremonies take place on other minor temples, and by the continuance of the sacrifices for several days. The offering at the minor temples consisted chiefly of the lower class of allies. All the pyramids, however, received a quota of heads from Spanish, leading native, and equine victims, wherewith to decorate their summits.[1172]

Aware that the sight of the sacrifice, purposely intensified for Spanish edification, must have stirred deeply the breasts of the survivors, the Mexicans took advantage of this to attack the camp of Alvarado during the night. “Behold the fate in store for you all!” they cried, casting in half-roasted pieces of flesh from white and dusky bodies. “Eat, for we are satiated!” The Spaniards were too well prepared to suffer from the assault, but it added to their sorrows. The lesson had been costly, for about sixty men were lost, with six horses, one gun, and a number of small-arms, while the ranks of the allies had been diminished by from one to two thousand, and this without reckoning the vast number of wounded.[1173]

When Sandoval reached Camp Xoloc and learned the news he burst forth, “Señor Capitan, what is this? Where are the fine counsels and warlike skill which you are wont to exhibit?” With tears springing to his eyes, Cortés replied: “Sandoval, my son, my sins I admit, but I am not so guilty in this matter as I appear. The officer whom I charged to fill the channel failed to obey.” He further intimated that Alvarado might be led by his daring into difficulties, and bade Sandoval watch carefully over the safety of the western and northern camps, particularly for the present, while Cortés was restrained by his wounds.[1174] The injunction was needful in view of the reoccupation by the Mexicans of the channels from which they had lately been driven, and their harassing attacks, chiefly by night, against the camps and fleets. Alvarado’s camp, as the nearest to the city, was the most exposed, and Sandoval with his tried prudence could be best relied on to counteract the recklessness of its commander in repelling these attacks. Knowing the signal for the sallies, usually a shot, the enemy were warned in time to retire, or to form some trap or combination; so that the charge of the soldiers carried little advantage.

On one occasion, it is related, a shield-bearer named Peinado stepped outside the camp gate and found himself surrounded by a horde of marauders. Escape was cut off. In this dilemma he began to rattle his shield and sword, and shout, looking at the same time toward the camp. The enemy assumed at once that he was signalling to some party in ambush, and beat a hasty retreat.[1175] For several days[1176] the Spaniards remained inactive. During this time the Mexicans continued their daily sacrifice of captives, with conspicuous rites and loud demonstrations.

As usual amidst trying scenes, there were here examples of the devotedness of woman. In one of the encounters on the causeway to drive back the prowling Mexicans, Beatriz Bermudez de Velasco, wife of Francisco de Olmos, accompanied the soldiers, in cotton armor, and with sword and shield. Such was the pressure of the enemy that the troops were thrown into disorder and began to turn in flight. With raised sword she planted herself in their path and cried, “Shame upon you, Castilians! turn at once against this vile rabble, for I will kill any man who attempts to pass this way.” So abashed were the men by this resolute demeanor that they again fell upon the Mexicans and defeated them.[1177] Other women of less valor did equally good service as sisters of mercy, to tend and cheer the many disabled. One, named Isabel de Rodriguez, attained quite a reputation in curing wounds, a success attributed chiefly to her holy invocation, for in applying the bandage she invariably uttered the formula, “In the name of the father, the son, and the holy ghost, one true God; may he cure and restore thee!”[1178]

* * * * *

Cortés found it absolutely necessary to resume operations in order to prevent the utter demoralization of his men, although they could advance no farther than the last canal on the Iztapalapan road, which was strongly fortified to protect the plaza. On the Tlatelulco side the channel separating the city from the causeway had been reopened as a barrier. No serious effort was made to pass these points, and the movements were effected with the greatest prudence possible.

For this caution several reasons existed, based on momentous consequences of the late defeat. In their exultation the Mexicans had imprudently published the oracular utterance that within eight days the Spaniards would be destroyed, though many Aztecs would also perish.[1179] Care was taken that this divine proclamation should be known in the Spanish camps, with the intent of disheartening the allies and procuring their desertion. This main object accomplished, it was hoped that neighboring districts might be again persuaded to join in hostile operations, or at least assume a neutral attitude against the isolated Spaniards. Severely harassed by all the strength of the capital and its allies, the Spaniards would be unable to maintain the siege or even to sustain their own position, particularly if supplies were cut off, and so be obliged to retreat. Many indeed looked upon the Spaniards as doomed, and tired besides of the long siege, so contrary to native ideas of warfare, corps after corps of their allies disappeared, in secret retreat to their homes. Others were sufficiently shaken in their belief to lose all ardor, the more so when they recalled the prophecy of disaster uttered by the hanged Xicotencatl. Cortés and his officers did all they could to counteract this influence by referring to previous failures of oracles, to the comparatively small percentage of the late losses, the critical condition of the besieged, and their efforts to gain advantages by spreading lies. Let the allies but abide till the end of the term mentioned by the oracle and they would be convinced of its falsity. The last argument was perhaps the strongest that could be offered under the circumstances, and it was decided to take no risks that might imperil the proof.[1180]

These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality, and might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and army. Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico. Immediately after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of affairs.

* * * * *

To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. “It was now more necessary than ever,” he writes, “to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to hide our weakness both from friends and foes.” Andrés de Tápia was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with a considerable force of allies.[1181] In order to calm the many remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack, assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt an assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed him, and he accordingly returned.

The complaint from Quauhnahuac was followed by a deeper wail from Toluca and adjoining Otomí settlements in the mountain region west of the lake. The Matlalzincas, devoted adherents of Quauhtemotzin, had been induced to openly declare for him and to invade their districts, preparatory to advancing against the Spaniards. This intention had been already vauntingly proclaimed by the Aztecs, and since the Matlaltzincas were both powerful and warlike, the necessity for prompt measures became even more apparent in this case. The tried Sandoval was intrusted with the expedition, composed of eighteen cavalry, one hundred infantry, and a large force of allies chiefly Otomís, which soon grew to about seventy thousand. After a quick march he came to the smoking ruins of some settlements and startled into flight a band of marauders, who left behind them a quantity of plunder and provisions, including some tender children still roasting on the spit. He pursued the raiders, and after crossing a river[1182] came upon a larger force, which turned as he approached, to seek safety within the town of Matlaltzinco, over two leagues distant. The cavalry made terrible havoc among them, and the infantry following in their wake, killed more than two thousand. Those who escaped made a stand at the town to cover the conveyance of families and effects to a fortified hill close by. This was pretty well accomplished before the infantry came up to assist in capturing the town. The defenders now fled, and the place was entered and burned, after being rifled of what remained to take. Since it was late, the assault on the hill was deferred till the morning. There the natives maintained a loud uproar until some time after midnight, when all became quiet. With early dawn the Spaniards prepared to storm the hill only to learn that it had been abandoned. A number of people were seen in the field, however, and eagerly the soldiers revived the fading expectation for a fray. In a twinkling they were among the rabble, and a number were slain before the explanation gained ears that these people belonged to the friendly Otomís. Sandoval now advanced on another fortified town, whose cacique threw open the gates on beholding the hosts before him, and not only offered his own submission, but promised to effect the submission of the allied caciques and those of Malinalco and Cohuixco. Regardless of the insinuations of the Otomís that such promises could not be relied on, Sandoval returned to Mexico, and four days later appeared there the caciques of all these provinces to tender allegiance and aid for the siege.[1183]

* * * * *

Meanwhile the portentous eighth day had dawned on the Spanish camps. Hardly less concerned than the natives, the soldiers could not control their trepidation as they thought of the oracle, although striving to appear indifferent. Nor were they without tangible reasons for their fears. With a daily growing desertion among the much needed allies, and fading enthusiasm among those who remained; with supplies greatly reduced owing to the neutral attitude assumed by surrounding districts; with fresh wars upon their hands, which demanded not only more hardships but a division of their weakened forces; with constant vigils and alarms amid the harassing attacks of a triumphant foe; with a large number of wounded deprived of needful care and comforts, and above all the ghastly spectacle of a daily sacrifice of late comrades, attended by wild and imposing celebrations—with all this gloom and distress it required stout hearts indeed to remain steadfast. Yet they were firm; they believed in the strength and justice of their cause, and in their ultimate triumph, though momentarily dismayed, prayer afforded them relief. It dissipated fear and infused fresh courage.

Thus passed the day, amidst fear and hope, and the Spaniards still existed. The Mexicans do not appear to have made any special effort to support the oracle by a determined attack. Nor had they been able to open any effective communication with the mainland; for although the lake towns had withdrawn their canoe fleet, they offered no aid to the besieged, while the brigantines maintained too strict a guard to permit many boats to gain the capital with supplies.

The ninth day came, and now it was the turn of the Spaniards to exult, for not only did they feel inspired with the belief that providence was protecting them—and nobly the friars helped Cortés to impart that stirring idea—but they were cheered with revived animation among the allies and the early return of most of the deserters. From Tezcuco, indeed, came additional troops under the command of some Spaniards there stationed.[1184] Cortés greeted the returning corps with rather cold forgiveness. He showed them that besides carrying on the siege without their aid he had undertaken victorious campaigns, and needed not their assistance. Nevertheless, since they had served so zealously before, he would not only overlook the grave crime of desertion, due partly to ignorance of Spanish laws, but let them again share in the final reduction of the city, and thus gain both revenge and riches. Cortés could adopt no other course, for the siege could not be carried on without the allies.

Under Spanish training the latter had besides grown very efficient, as the following instance will illustrate: No sooner had the eight portentous days passed by than Chichimecatl, the leading Tlascaltec captain serving under Alvarado, disgusted with the idle fears which had unmanned his people, and eager to retrieve them in the eyes of the Spaniards, resolved to show both them and the Aztecs what he could do. With the aid of the soldiers the first fortified channel was captured, and the chief advanced into the city with his own people only, the flower of his warriors, after leaving several hundred archers near the passage to keep the route clear for retreat. With unwavering columns he advanced along the main street and captured the next canal passage after a fierce struggle. Then he passed onward to the next, maintaining a sharp contest all the day. Finally came the hour for returning, and the Aztecs bore down with doubled fury on his flank and rear. The retreat was performed in good order, partly owing to the foresight of leaving a rear body; and Chichimecatl came back a lauded hero.[1185]

Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to encourage them with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle. Ojeda and Marquez went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the object of procuring certain supplies. They left Alvarado’s camp at midnight with only a few natives, and when about half-way to Tepeyacac they perceived a train of men descending from the hills with heavy burdens, which they deposited in a number of canoes. Information was at once sent to Alvarado, who placed a guard along the shore to check this smuggling that had evidently escaped the cruisers.[1186] Ojeda’s party proceeded to Tlascala and brought a large train of provisions.[1187] In addition to this the camps were cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits with quite a mass of war material, chiefly powder and cross-bows, relics of Ponce de Leon’s Florida expedition.[1188] The war stores were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.

Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up every channel; “not take one step in advance without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the delay.” So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this destruction of the city, “the most beautiful in the world.”[1189] In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.

FOOTNOTES

[1143] ‘Eran esclavos del señor de Tenuxtitan,’ is Cortés’ definition of their vassalage to Mexico. Cartas, 220.

[1144] A service which employed 20,000 carriers, 1000 canoes, and 32,000 convoy warriors, all at the expense of Tezcuco, says Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 314.

[1145] His biographer admits to a certain extent the truth of the invectives, but eager to please his Spanish masters he seeks rather to extol the self-sacrifice and loyalty of his kinsman. He claims that with this reënforcement the Tezcucan auxiliaries reached the improbable number of 250,000 men, of whom 5000 wounded were now sent home. ‘Next to God, Cortés owed to Tezcucan aid the conquest and the planting of the faith.’ He further assumes that Ixtlilxochitl was already king, and had been with Cortés since the fleet set sail, while his brother Ahuaxpictzoctzin remained at Tezcuco to provide supplies. Hor. Crueldades, 21-33. He contradicts himself on several points in his Relaciones, 314 et seq. Duran also, as may be expected from a compiler of native records, extols the hero, ‘à quien dió una espada dorada que Don Hernando Cortes traia y una rodela.’ Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 493. With Ixtlilxochitl came half a dozen out of his hundred brothers. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 198; Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 55. Torquemada, i. 548, sends Cohuanacoch as general of the forces, while Clavigero allows King Fernando Ixtlilxochitl to send his brother Cárlos Ixtlilxochitl. Storia Mess., iii. 202. He is evidently confused with respect to the surname.

[1146] Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 177-8. Torquemada places the incident earlier, i. 547. Cortés admits no losses of Spaniards this day.

[1147] Cartas, 222-3. ‘Los combidauan a çena, mostrando les piernas y braços.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 199.

[1148] Bernal Diaz speaks of a bridge attack which cost the lives of four Spaniards, besides numerous wounded. Hist. Verdad., 145.

[1149] He enumerates also the cities of Mexicalcinco and Vitzilopuchtli. Hist. Mex., 202. Herrera adds Mizquic. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.

[1150] Mazeoatzi, as Sahagun calls the cacique, sacrificed four chiefs, Quauhtemotzin four more; the rest fell by the hands of priests. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 187. He does not speak of a premeditated plan like Torquemada, i. 551-2, and since the account comes from native sources it may be merely an exaggerated version of a flotilla raid.

[1151] This was the lieutenant of Velazquez at Habana, who joined Cortés during the Tepeaca campaign. Portillo was a soldier from the Italian wars. Bernal Diaz adds that one brig was captured, but this is doubtful. Hist. Verdad., 143; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 214; Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 46.

[1152] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 144-5.

[1153] Cortés exultantly claims that three fourths of the city is now captured. Cartas, 227; Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 181; Torquemada, i. 550.

[1154] ‘No se hartauan de pescado, que tuuierõ pocos dias: y demas de la hambre con q̄ peleauan, el sol, y el frio no les dio pequeño trabajo.’ Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.

[1155] ‘Soliti sunt hostes in prælio cadentes intra suos ventres sepelire,’ explains Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. viii., and with some truth.

[1156] Forty soldiers watched till midnight, when a similar number relieved them, and they again were relieved two hours before dawn; all three divisions camping on the spot. Often every man was kept awake by alarms. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 142-3. The old soldier waxes eloquent over the hardships, for he served at this camp.

[1157] The Spaniards tried in vain to despatch him. Sahagun states that during these attacks fifteen soldiers were captured, and shortly after eighteen more, who were sacrificed in a temple of Tlacuchcalco ward, ‘donde agora es la iglesia de Santa Ana.’ Hist. Conq., 183, ed. 1840, 188-9. One repulse took place in Coyonacazco ward. Torquemada, i. 550-2. Spanish versions indicate no such losses, and they may probably belong to the later great defeat.

[1158] Such is in main the version of Bernal Diaz; the other accounts differ greatly. This author states that five Spaniards were captured, nearly all the men wounded, and two rowers killed, for the brigantines in seeking to aid had become fast on stakes and exposed to attack. Had the Mexicans not been so frightened by the horsemen the loss would have been very great. Hist. Verdad., 143-4. Cortés allows three or four captured. Cartas, 228; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 196. Duran places the scene where rose afterward the San Hipólito hermitage. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 500. But for Quauhtlizcatzin, the prince who led the Tezcucan auxiliaries, all the Spaniards would have been lost, exclaims Ixtlilxochitl, Hor. Crueldades, 36. Herrera assumes that the fault lay with Alvarado for neglecting to fill the channel. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.

[1159] ‘No solo no le culpo, mas loole.’ Gomara, _Hist. Mex._, 203.

[1160] The most serious attacks took place on June 24th and 25th, as if oracles had impelled the Mexicans to seek the destruction of the Spaniards on the anniversary of their reëntry into the city after the Alvarado massacre. The Tlacopan camp lost ten soldiers and had a dozen severely wounded, including Alvarado. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 142, 145.

[1161] Bernal Diaz seeks to convey the idea that he or his camp were opposed to the attempt, Id., 146, but had it succeeded, he would probably have declared the truth, that Cortés was urged on all sides to make the effort, as stated in Gomara, Hist. Mex., 203, Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx., and Cortés, Cartas, 228-9. Perhaps the general made objections chiefly to cover his responsibility in case of failure.

[1162] Alderete’s party consisted of 70 infantry, 7 or 8 horsemen, and 15,000 to 20,000 allies, besides a force of laborers to tear down and to fill up; Tápia’s of 80 men and over 10,000 allies, and Cortés’ of 8 horsemen, 100 infantry, and an immense number of allies. Cortés, Cartas, 230-1. Gomara and Herrera differ slightly. Ixtlilxochitl says that his namesake followed Cortés with 8000 Tezcucans. Hor. Crueldades, 37. This insignificant number makes it difficult to account for the 250,000 Tezcucans which he lately introduced into the camps. Chimalpain names the three streets Cuahuecatitlan, Tecontlanamacoya, and the later Santa Ana. Hist. Conq., ii. 62.

[1163] See Native Races, ii. 303; iii. 293 et seq.

[1164] He crossed the channel with fifteen soldiers to sustain the fugitives, says Torquemada, i. 554; but this seems incorrect.

[1165] The claims to the honor of rescuing the general are conflicting. Gomara, followed by Herrera and Torquemada, names ‘Francisco’ de Olea. Bernal Diaz, who states that this soldier slew four of the captains holding Cortés, lets Lerma dispose of the remainder. After this came other soldiers and Quiñones. Cristóbal de Olea was quite young, 26 years of age, a native of Medina del Campo, muscular, and skilled in arms, and a general favorite. Bernal Diaz adds other particulars. Hist. Verdad., 146, 246. Ixtlilxochitl, on the other hand, claims for his namesake the credit of having done what Spaniards claim for Olea, aided by his Tezcucans, who kept the enemy at bay. This, he adds, is proved by a painting on the gate of the monastery of Santiago Tlatelulco. Hor. Crueldades, 38-9. Herrera briefly alludes to Ixtlilxochitl as coming up after Olea, and then relates with some detail that at the same time came the Tlascaltec, Tamaxautzin he calls him, a native of Hueyotlipan. He was afterward baptized as Antonio or Bautista, and became a good Christian, the first native to receive extreme unction. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada, i. 555, copies, but calls the man Teamacatzin. Both evidently prefer Tlascaltec to Tezcucan records. In fact, Ixtlilxochitl adds certain incredible particulars about the prowess of his wounded hero in pursuing the Mexican general into a temple, although such pursuit could not have taken place under the circumstances. See also Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 503, and Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 130. Cortés writes that he would have been lost but for Quiñones, and one of his men who lost his life to save him. Cartas, 233. A small chapel was erected in the convent de la Concepcion to commemorate the escape. See Saavedra, Indio Peregrino, canto 20.

[1166] Bernal Diaz assumes that Guzman rode up after Cortés was mounted, and fell captive into Aztec hands. Hist. Verdad., 147.

[1167] ‘Como lo hallarán pintado en la Yglesia de Tlatilulco, los cuales Indios confiesan haberle visto.’ Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 512. Why these patrons did not give their aid before is a question to which Bernal Diaz answers ‘porque Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo lo permitiò.’ Hist. Verdad., 146.

[1168] Herrera relates how two captains, Flores and Mota, advanced with their vessels up a narrow channel. Flores was severely pressed at one time, and the latter had to sally on the street to relieve him and enable the brigantines to gain more open water. Flores died within a week of his wounds. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada says that Briones’ vessel was lifted through a breach in the causeway. i. 555. Bernal Diaz speaks of several such narrow escapes. loc. cit.

[1169] The artillerists being all disabled or dead, Pedro Moreno de Medrano, afterward a settler at Puebla, took their place. Id.

[1170] Bernal Diaz writes as if Sandoval gained the camp at an early hour, rode over to Fort Xoloc, and came back in time to aid in Alvarado’s retreat. But he would never have ventured to leave his command and his comrade in their danger; nor does it seem likely that he could have ridden the long distance to Xoloc and back in time to join in Alvarado’s conflict, even if Cortés’ defeat took place before ‘misa mayor,’ as he assumes. Hist. Verdad., 146-8. This author is here very confused, assuming, for instance, that Sandoval was fighting from his own camp instead of coöperating near Alvarado.

[1171] So deeply affected was Bernal Diaz, among others, by the sight, and by the fear of himself falling captive—twice had he narrowly escaped—that he ever after had an oppressive feeling before battle. He then had recourse to prayer, and this invariably fortified him for the fight, so that he always maintained his reputation as a good soldier. He enumerates several incidents to prove that he was esteemed a brave man. Hist. Verdad., 157. Oviedo, referring to human sacrifices among the Romans, observes that they could not have been half so fearful. iii. 515.

[1172] ‘Sacrificados los Nuestros, en el Momoztli, y Templo de su Maior Dios,’ observes Torquemada, i. 553, among other points, though all are not exactly true. Huitzilopochtli’s image had been brought with the retreating Mexicans to Tlatelulco. ‘Immediatamente sacrificati,’ says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 212, probably on authority of Gomara; but Bernal Diaz states that the sacrifices lasted ten days, Hist. Verdad., 150; others write eight; one victim is said to have been kept eighteen days. See also Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. Ixtlilxochitl states that three victims were burned. Hor. Crueldades, 39.

[1173] A count revealed the loss of 62 men and 6 horses, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 146, 152, 241, though he in one place leaves the impression that the men were all captured alive. This could hardly be the case, for a ‘count’ would reveal only the missing; none could tell how many fell captive. Yet Prescott boldly assumes this number to have been taken, besides those who fell. Vetancurt divides the figures into 40 captives and 20 dead, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 162, and Clavigero also includes dead and captive in that number, while raising the dead horses to 7. Storia Mess., iii. 212. Solis writes that over 40 Spaniards were carried off alive, and that Alvarado and Sandoval lost 20. Hist. Mex., ii. 410. Bernal Diaz acknowledges only a third of such loss between these two captains. Gomara gives 40 captives, several killed, 3 or 4 horses lost, and over 30 wounded. Hist. Mex., 205-6. Ixtlilxochitl raises the allied loss to over 2000. Hor. Crueldades, 37-9. Fifty-three Spaniards, says Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. In the cédula of March 7, 1525, granting a coat-of-arms to Cortés, 50 are mentioned, but in his letter to the sovereign the general acknowledges only 35 to 40 and over 1000 allies. Herrera and Torquemada adopt these figures. Oviedo, iii. 516, lowers the number to 30. Duran, who confounds the late repulse of Alvarado with the Sorrowful Night and this defeat, allows 4 banners to be captured. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 501-4, 508.

[1174] Bernal Diaz gives this conversation with some detail, and names Treasurer Alderete as the guilty officer who neglected to fill the channel, intimating that Cortés had been heedlessly allured onward by the Mexicans, leaving Alderete to attend to the filling. He even allows the treasurer to retort to the charge, in Sandoval’s presence, that Cortés’ eagerness had been the cause of the neglect. This is probably an invented account, based on Gomara’s statement that the ‘treasurer,’ no name being given, neglected to fill a channel on his route. Informed of this, Cortés hastened thither to remedy the fault, only to meet the fleeing. Herrera adopts this version, as do most writers, including Prescott; but it is evidently wrong, for Cortés writes clearly that the misfortune occurred on his own route, some distance above its junction with the Tlacopan road, to which they soon retreated. On reaching this road he sent to recall the ‘treasurer and comptroller,’ who were leading their division victoriously at the farther end of it. Owing to their care in filling channels ‘they received no injury in retreating.’ Cartas, 233-4. There can be little doubt about this statement, since Cortés would have been only too glad to cast the blame on any other division than his own. He does not even claim to have been at the front, but in the rear, and near the spot where the neglect occurred. The only question then is, who was the guilty officer? The ‘treasurer’ commanded the centre division, and although there were several treasurers, the royal, late and new, and he who acted for the army, yet the new royal treasurer is undoubtedly meant, and this appears to have been Alderete, according to the statement of several authorities. Hence the accusation against Alderete must be wrong; anything besides this must be conjecture.

[1175] ‘Bolviò à la grita, Andrés de Tapia [the captain of his party] matò mas de sesenta Mexicanos,’ adds Torquemada, i. 558-9.

[1176] ‘Esto no fue sino cinco dias.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 149.

[1177] Similar women of courage were María de Estrada, the heroine of Otumba, Beatriz de Escobar, Juana Martin, and Beatriz de Palacios. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. ii. cap. i.

[1178] Oil was the chief remedy. Torquemada, i. 558-60. Bernal Diaz speaks of a soldier named Juan Catalan who performed cures with the sign of the cross and psalm-singing. The Tlascaltecs also besieged the man for his attentions. ‘Y verdaderamente digo, que hallauamos que Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo era servido de darnos esfuerço, ... y de presto sanauan.’ Not twenty of Alvarado’s men were free from wounds at this time. Hist. Verdad., 142. Solis allows this wonderful healing power to be attributed to no woman. Hist. Mex., ii. 412. But then he was a strict priest, who saw woman chiefly as a feeble and adoring supplicant.

[1179] ‘Que de ai a ocho dias no auia de quedar ninguno de nosotros a vida, porque assi se lo auian prometido la noche antes sus Dioses.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 149.

[1180] Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 415, states, and Prescott hastily affirms, that nearly all the allies deserted, and Bernal Diaz enumerates the mere handful that remained; but this must be erroneous, as shown by the course of the narratives in general. Two expeditions were sent forth about this time, and the large number of allies which joined therein may account in part for the gaps which gave rise to the above exaggeration. Cortés, indeed, alludes very indirectly to any defection.

[1181] Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly from Quauhnahuac and other towns subject to Tezcuco. Hor. Crueldades, 40. Herrera and others mention no auxiliaries from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.

[1182] The Chicuhnauhtla, Ixtlilxochitl calls it.

[1183] ‘Y ellos le siruieron muy biẽ en el cerco.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 207. Ixtlilxochitl claims of course that his Tezcucans formed the chief auxiliaries of Sandoval. Bernal Diaz wrongly gives Tápia this expedition, which Cortés intimates to have been sent about three days after the return of the Quauhnahuac party. Cartas, 237.

[1184] Farfan and Villareal came, says Bernal Diaz, and Tecapaneca, cacique of Topeyanco, led the returning Tlascaltecs. Hist. Verdad., 151.

[1185] Cortés leaves the impression that this incident took place during the days when the Spaniards were making desultory entries into the city; but since he does not speak of the oracle or the defection the affair is undecided. Torquemada, i. 557, intimates that Chichimecatl served under Sandoval, but this is wrong.

[1186] Ojeda magnifies the train of men to 4000 and the canoes to 3000. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xxii.

[1187] Fifteen hundred loads maize, 1000 loads fowl, 300 sides venison, besides other effects, including Xicotencatl’s confiscated property and women. Id.

[1188] Herrera intimates that the material may have been a consignment to Leon, for which the disappointed owner sought a market. A vessel of Aillon’s fleet, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 153.

[1189] Some time before he had expressed the same intention, and the fear that little or no treasure would be recovered. Cartas, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that his namesake provided 100,000 men for the task, Hor. Crueldades, 42, and Bernal Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a strict blockade as a safe and sure plan. Hist. Verdad., 150. The result proves that this would have been the best and as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would have been saved from destruction. That the plan was ever seriously suggested among this impatient crew is affirmed by no other authority.

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