Critick of Pure Reason; translated from the original of I. Kant

Front matter

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL OF IMMANUEL KANT SECOND EDITION WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS BY FRANCIS HAYWOOD LONDON WILLIAM PICKERING NOTICE OF THE TRANSLATOR. BORN'S Latin Translation of Kant's Critick of Pure Reason has long been before the literary world : that of Mantovani in Italian has likewise been known for some years ; and recently a French one by Tissot has appeared. An English translation, with all these means now existing for the better comprehending of the original, may therefore seem superfluous to such as have already made themselves in some degree conversant with Kant's views : but to those who may be entirely unac quainted with his principles, the difficulties inseparable from the study of the system itself, are sufficiently for midable to render it desirable to remove, as much as possible, all other impediments to the right understanding of an Author whose influence has produced so great a movement in mental philosophy generally.

In the hope of clearing away some difficulties, and believing that much of what is deemed by many to be unintelli gible in the doctrines of Kant, mainly arises from the obscurity of language in which it is couched, the fol lowing translation has been attempted. It is true, that, besides the foreign publications alluded to, several works explanatory of the system have at different times issued from the press ; but still they do not seem to be all that is required for the full elucidation of the philosopher of Konigsberg. Not that it is intended either to under rate the writings which have appeared in English upon this subject by Nitsch, Willich, or Beck, or lightly to appreciate the French epitomes of Villars, Kinker, or VI NOTICE OF THE TRANSLATOR. Schon, all of which are highly valuable helps to the Student of Kant's Philosophy, but it is evident that these productions, from their very nature, must unavoidably omit much that is essential to a full exposition of so entirely novel and original a mode of philosophizing.

The article in the Encyclopedia Londinensis, upon the Critick of Pure Reason, is the most elaborate interpretation of the system which has hitherto appeared in an English garb : and, from the masterly manner in which the æsthetic portion of the work itself is there rendered, and the mode in which the general subject is handled, it is much to be regretted that the translation of the whole of Kant's treatise, announced many years ago as then in preparation by Mr. Wirgman (the author of the article in question*), has never been laid before the Public. In the following pages the reader will readily perceive that elegance of diction has on all occasions been sacrificed to a faithful cast of the original, and the literal version constantly preferred to circumlocution. Where the nature of the German language, differing as it does from the English in its declinable relatives, &c, has not rendered the repetition of the antecedent necessary, this last has been supplied in the translation, and where, moreover, it might be ambiguous to which of the substantives in a sentence reference was made, that substantive which is the subject has been itself inserted.

Preface

TO SECOND EDIT. OF TRANSLATION. IX his name in the very highest rank of European metaphysical writers. The translator is happy to think that, while the taste for German metaphysics is said to have de clined in this country, he can refer, as proofs to the con trary, to such works as the History of Speculative Phi losophy by Morell, the Syllabus of Logic by Solly, and the Biographical History of Modern Philosophy by Lewes. In France, the recent publication of the Life and Philosophy of Kant by Amand Saintes, and the translation by H. Jouffroy, of a German Analysis of the Critick of Pure Reason, and the Histories of Philosophy by Tissot, Penhoen, &c. and the valuable writings of Cousin (so frequently referred to in the notes on the present work,) are striking indications of the interest still felt in the investigations of the great German Phi losopher, whilst they show that the systems which pre vail in Germany, and which are classed in our own country under the denomination of the German School, are attributable almost exclusively to the writings of Kant, as the founder of what is termed " the Critical Philosophy."

M. Tissot having, in his " Histoire de la Philosophie," stated the name of the English Translator of the " Cri tick of Pure Reason," it might seem to be affectation in him any longer not to allow it to appear in the title page. Had this not been the case, he would, personally, have preferred that the present edition had gone forth as the former did, anonymously; convinced that his name can add nothing to the reputation or value of the work itself, whilst to some it might appear to be an act of presumption on his part, after so many had stated the difficulty of executing the task, that he, with his limited knowledge of the subject, should have ventured to undertake it. BACO DE VERULAMIO. Instauratio Magna . — Prœfatio. De nobis ipsis silemus : de re autem, quæ agitur, petimus : ut hom1nes eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent ; ac pro certo habeant, non sectæ nos alicujus aut plac1ti, sed utilitatis et ampl1tudinis humanæ fundamenta mol1r1. de inde ut suis commodis æqui in commune consulant et ipsi IN PARTEM veniant.

Præterea ut bene sperent, neque Instau- RATIONEM NOSTRAM UT QUIDDAM 1NFIN1TUM ET ULTRA MORTALE FINGANT ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT : QUUM REVERA SIT INFIN1TI ERRORIS FINIS ET TERMINUS LEGITIMUS. OF THE CRITICK OF PURE REASON.* HUMAN reason has the particular destiny in one species of its cognition that it is encumbered by questions which it cannot refuse, since they are proposed to it through the nature of reason itself, but which nevertheless it cannot answer, as they surpass all faculty in human reason. It falls into this difficulty without its own fault. It sets out from principles, the use of which is unavoidably, and, at the same time, sufficiently established, in the course of experience, through this {experience). It ascends with these principles ever higher (as its nature, in fact, carries along with it) to more remote conditions.

But, as it perceives, that, in this way, its labours must always remain uncompleted, because the questions never finish ; it thus sees itself compelled to take refuge in principles which exceed all possible experience-use, and which seem, as it were, so free from suspicion, that even ordinary human-reason stands therewith in accordance. But, it thereby precipitates itself into ambiguity and contradiction, from which indeed it may conclude that concealed errors must lie somewhere at the foundation, which, however, it cannot discover, because the principles which it makes use of, as they extend beyond the limits of all experience, no longer acknowledge any touchstone of experience. Now the Arena of these end less contestations is termed Metaphysick. There was a time in which this was termed the Queen of all Sciences, and, if the will were taken for the deed, * It has been deemed advisable to publish the Preface to the first edition of the Critick of Pure Reason, as it shows the peculiar spirit in which the author undertook the work itself.

This edition, published at Riga, 1781, is now very scarce. It differs materially in some parts from the subsequent editions of the same work. it then certainly deserved, on account of the especial importance of its object, this honourable name. The fashion of the age now carries along with it, to show it all contempt, and the matron, rejected and neglected, complains like Hecuba — Modo maxima rerum Tot generis natisque potens Nunc trahor exul inops. — Ovid. Metam. In the outset, its rule under the administration of the Dogmatists was despotical. But, inasmuch as the Legislation still retained the trace of ancient barbarism, so by degrees it degenerated through intestine wars, into complete anarchy, and the Sceptics, a kind of Nomads who despised all permanent cultivation of the soil, broke up, from time to time, civil association.

But as, fortunately, there were only a few of them, so could they not prevent the former (Dogmatists) ever afresh, although not upon any unanimous plan, from again endeavouring to settle themselves. In more mo dern days it seemed certainly at one time, as if an end were to be made of all these contentions by means of a certain Physiology of the Human Understanding, (of the famous Locke) and the justice of the pretensions of the others were fully decided ; but it was found, that although the descent of the pretended Queen alluded to, was derived from the Populace of vulgar experience, and thereby with justice must have rendered her claim sus pected, still, inasmuch as this genealogy was in fact falsely imagined to her, it (Metaphysick) always maintained its claims, whereby again all relapsed into antiquated, worm-eaten Dogmatism, and thereby fell into that con tempt, whence it had been wished to withdraw the science.

At present, after all modes (as one is con vinced) have been attempted in vain, disgust and total Indifference reign, the mother of Chaos and Nio-ht in Sciences, but still at the same time the source, or, at the least, the forerunner of a new regeneration and elu cidation of the same, if, through all-applied labour, such have become dark, confused, and useless. ■ It is, for instance, in vain to wish to affect indifference in respect of such investigations, the object of which cannot be indifferent to human nature. In fact, the pretended Indtfferentists alluded to, fall back again un avoidably into metaphysical assertions, against which however they profess so much contempt, however much they may think, if they think any thing at all, of making themselves irrecognizable, by the change of the language ot the Schools into a popular form.

This indifference, however, which occurs amidst the bloom of all Sciences, and precisely affects those in respect of the cognitions of which, if the like were to be had, we would amongst all, least give up, is still a phenomenon which deserves at tention and consideration. It is palpably the effect, not of frivolity, but of the ripened Judgment* of the age, which allows itself, no longer to be restrained by pretended knowledge, and to undertake anew an appeal to Reason, the most difficult of all its occupations, namely that of Self-cognition, and to establish a court of judi cature which should secure it in all its just claims ; but, on the other hand, can dismiss all groundless pretensions, not arbitrarily, but according to its eternal and un changeable laws ; and this is none other than the Critick of Pure Reason itself.

But I understand by this expression, not a Critick of Books and Systems, but that of the Faculty of Reason generally, in respect of all cognitions towards which, independently of all experience, it may strive — consequently the decision of the possibility or impossibility of a Meta- * We hear from time to time complaints of the shallowness of the mode of thinking of our time, and the downfall of profound science. But I do not see that those sciences whose foundation is well laid, as Mathematick, Natural Philosophy, &c. deserve this reproach in the least, but rather maintain the ancient reputation of profundity, and, in the last case, even surpass it. The self-same spirit would even now show itself effective in other kinds of cognition if only, first of all, the justification of their principles were provided for.

In default of this, Indifference, and Doubt, and finally rigorous Critick, are rather proofs of & fundamental mode of thinking. Our age is the especial age of Critick, to which every thing must be subjected. Religion through its sanctity, and Legislation through its majesty, are desirous commonly of escaping from the same. But then they excite just suspicion against them, and cannot make claim to sincere respect, which Reason only accords to that which has been able to sustain its free and public investigation. physick in general, and the determination, equally, of the sources as of the sphere and limits of the same, — but all from Principles. This way, the only one which was left, I now enter upon, and flatter myself to have in the same hit upon the removal of all errors which hitherto have set Reason at variance with itself, in use free from experience.

I have not, as it were, evaded its questions, in this way, that I have excused myself through the impotency of human reason, but I have specified them completely, according to principles, and when I had discovered the point of misunderstanding of Reason with itself, I have solved them to its entire satisfaction. Certainly, the answer to the questions alluded to has not turned out as dogmatical-fanatical curiosity might expect, for this could only be satisfied by means of Magic-art, as to which I do not myself understand any thing. But, also, this was not the object of the nature-determination of our reason, and the duty of Philosophy was, to annihilate the delusion which sprang from misconception, even although so highly prized and so agreeable an opinion, should go for nothing. I have let comprehensiveness be my great object in this occupation, and I am bold enough to say that there cannot be a single metaphysical problem that is not here solved, or to whose solution the key, at least, is not here afforded.

Indeed also, pure Reason is a Unity, so perfect, that if the Principle thereof were insufficient only for a single one of all the questions which are presented to it through its own peculiar nature, we might evermore reject this principle, since then, to not any one even of the others would it be suited with complete certainty. I believe, whilst I say this, to perceive in the face of the reader, a dissatisfaction mixed with contempt, as to, according to appearance, such boastful and indiscreet pretensions, and yet they are without comparison more moderate than those of every Author of the commonest Programme, who therein pretends, for instance, to prove the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a first commencement of the world. For this, man makes himself responsible to extend human cognition out beyond all limits of possible experience, as to which I humbly confess, that this wholly transcends my power — in the place of which, I have simply to do with Nature itself, and its purethinking, in respect of whose particularized knowledge 1 need not seek far about me, since 1 meet with it in myself," and as to which, in fact, common Lo gic already gives me an example, so that all its simple operations may be fully and systematically enumerated ; only that here the question has arisen, how much I may for instance hope to effect with the same, provided all matter and support from experience is taken away.

So much then for Completeness in the attainment of each end, and of Particularizing in the attainment of all ends together, which not an arbitrary proposition, but the nature of cognition itself furnishes as the matter of our critical investigation. Certainty and clearness are still to be regarded as two points which concern the Form thereof, as essential claims which we may make with justice upon the author, who hazards upon so slippery an undertaking. Now as to what regards certainty, I have myself stated the Decision, that it was not permitted in any way, in this kind of considerations to opine, and that all therein which only seems similar to an Hypothesis is forbidden goods, which cannot be exposed to sale at the vilest price, but so soon as they are discovered, must be seized. For, every cognition which is to stand firm d priori announces itself — that it will be held as absolutely necessary — and a determination of all pure cognitions a priori, — so much the more, — since it is to be the standard measure, consequently, itself the example of all apodictical (philosophical) certainty.

Nowr, whether I have in this place executed that whereunto I made myself responsible, this remains entirely committed to the judgment of the reader, since it is only fitting for an author to propound the grounds, not to judge as to the effect of the same upon his judges. But, that, somewhat innocently, there may not be cause for weakening the same, it may certainly be permitted to him himself to remark those places that might afford inducement to some for mistrust although they only belong to the sub sidiary end, in order early to restrain the influence which the slightest hesitation of the reader might have in this point upon his judgment, in respect of the principal object. I know no investigations which are* more important to the foundation of the faculty which we call Under standing, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those which I have given in the second division of the Transcendental Analytick under the title of Deduction of the Pure Un derstanding-conceptions — and this has cost me the most, but, as I hope, not unrepaid pains.

This consideration which is something deep laid, has however two sides. The one refers to objects of the pure understanding, and is to prove and render comprehensible the objective va lidity of its conceptions d priori — and just on this account is it essentially appertaining to my design. The other concerns this — to consider the pure understanding itself, according to its possibility and the cognition forces upon which it itself reposes, consequently, it, in its subjective relationship ; and although this elucida tion, in respect of my chief object, is of great weight, still it does not essentially belong to the same, since the leading question always remains, what, and how far, Understanding and Reason free from all experience, can cognise, and not, how is the faculty for thinking itself possible?

As this last thing is, as it were, an investiga tion of the cause for a given effect, and so far has, in itself, something similar to an Hypothesis (although as I shall show upon another occasion, it in fact is not so) it thus appears, as if it were here the case, that I take upon myself the liberty to opine, and therefore it must be free to the Reader, also, to opine differently. In regard of this, I must anticipate the Reader with this suggestion, that in case my subjective deduction may not have effected upon him that total conviction which I expect, still, the objective, with what I have here more particu larly to do, retains its whole strength, and as to which in any case that which is said from page 92 to 93 may alone suffice.* As to what concerns, finally, Clearness ; the Reader has a right to require in concreto, first the discursive, (logical) clearness through conceptions, and then also an intuitive (æsthetic) clearness through Iptuitions, that is, by examples or other elucidations.

As to the first (lo gical) I have sufficiently taken care. That concerns the essence of my project, but it was also the accidental cause that I am not able to afford to the second, (æsthetic) although equitable, still not so powerful satisfaction. I have been almost constantly undecided in the progress of my work how I ought to act in regard to this. Exam ples and elucidations appeared always necessary to me, and so consequently fell in effect at the first attempt into their places. But I very soon saw the magnitude of my problem, and the multitude of objects wherewith I should have to do, and as I was aware that these quite alone would already extend the work itself into dry— merely scholastic propositions, — I thus found it unadvisable to swell it out still further by examples and elucidations, which are necessary only with a popular object, especially as this labour would not by any means be adopted for popular use, and the special connoisseurs of the Science have no need of this facilitation, although certainly it is, at all times, agreeable, but here would carry with it something even contrary to its end.

The Abbe Terras son says truly if we measure a Book not according to the number of leaves but according to the time that we require to understand it, we may then say of many a book that it might be much shorter, if it were not so short. But, on the other hand, when we direct our attention to the comprehension of a diffuse whole, though still con nected by a principle, of speculative cognition, we may then say, with as good a right, many a book were made much clearer if it were not intended to have been so very clear. For the aids to perspicuity are wanting • Page 82 of the present Edition. Passage to the Deduction of the Categories. in fact in Parts, yet frequently are diffused in the Whole, whilst they do not allow the reader to succeed quick enough to a survey of the Whole, and by means of all their bright colours conceal, and render undiscernable, as it were, the articulation, or the structure of the system, as to which, still, it was the most important, in order to be able to judge, with regard to the unity and fitness thereof.

It may, as it appears to me, furnish the Reader not less incitement for uniting his efforts with that of the Author, if he have the prospect of executing entirely and yet lastingly, a great and important work, according to the propounded plan. Now, Metaphysick, ale cording to the conceptions which we will here give of it, is the only one of all the sciences which dares promise itself such a completion, and in fact in a short time, and with less either, but with united effort ; so that nothing remains for Posterity but to arrange in the di dactic mode, every thing according to its views, with out being able thereby in the least to increase the con tent. For, it is nothing but the Inventory of all our pos sessions through pure Reason, systematically arranged. Not anything can here then escape our notice, since what Reason produces entirely out of itself cannot be concealed, but itself is through Reason brought to light, so soon only as we have discovered the common prin ciple of the same.

The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, — and in fact from quite pure conceptions, — without that something or other belonging to experi ence, or yet only particular intuition which is to lead to determined experience, can have an influence upon it, to extend and increase it, — render this unconditioned completeness, not only feasible but necessary. Tecum habita et noris, quam sit tibi curta sapellex.— Persius. Such a system of pure (speculative) Reason I hope myself to publish under the title Metaphysick of Nature, which will require not half the detail, but be of far richer content than at present the Critick, which must first expose the sources and convictions of its possibility, and requires to clean and to level an utterly rank soil. In the present case, I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a Judge, but in the other, the complai sance and the support of a Coadjutor ; for however com pletely all the Principles of the System are exposed in the Critick, there still belongs to the fulness of the System that it shall not be short of any deduced conceptions ; the which we cannot bring into account a priori, but which must be investigated by degrees ; in like manner as, in the other case, the whole Synthesis of conceptions should be exhausted — so would it in this be required that just the same thing also should occur in respect of Ana lysis — -which is quite easy, and is more conversation than labour.

I have only one thing more to remark in respect of the Printing. As the beginning of the same was a little delayed, I could only get to see, perhaps, the half of the proofs, in which I certainly met with some errors, but not altering the sense, except that what occurs page 379 line 4 from the bottom, where specific must be made use of instead of sceptic* The Antinomy of Pure Reason, from page 425 to 461, is arranged according to the manner of a Table, so that all which belongs to the Thesis runs always to the left, but what belongs to the Antithesis to the right, which I thus ordered for this reason, that Proposition and Counterproposition might so much the easier be compared with one another. * Reference is here made to a portion of the work which was much changed from the first edition, where, in treating of the Paralogisms of pure Reason, separate chapters were at first devoted to the considerations of the Substantiality of the Soul, its Simplicity and Personality, together with the Reality of its Existence, and the Doubtful Existence of "Objects.— In the subsequent editions, the reasoning upon these points is embodied in one chapter.

See page 272 of the present edition. The Antinomies are to be found, pages 303 to 324.— Note Trans. WHETHER the elaboration of cognitions which belong to the business of reason, takes the sure march of a science or not, is easily judged of by the result. If, after many arrangements and preparations made, so soon as the object is approached, the elaboration comes to a stand, or, if in order to reach this object, we must go back again, frequently, and strike into another path, and besides, if it be not possible to render different fellow labourers unanimous as to the mode in which the com mon end is to be pursued ; we may then always be con vinced, that such a study is still far from taking the sure course of a science, but is a mere feeler, and it is already a merit, as regards reason, to discover this path, in case it is possible, although much must be given up as vain, which was comprized without due consideration, in the object previously proposed.

That Logic has already proceeded in this sure course from the earliest times, may be seen from this, that since Aristotle it has not been necessitated to retrace a step, un less, perhaps, we may be disposed to reckon the brushing away of some superfluous subtleties from it, or the clearer determination of what had been propounded — but which belong more to the elegance than the certainty of the science — as ameliorations. It is, however, remarkable with respect to Logic, that hitherto it has not been able to make any step forwards, and therefore to all appearance seems to be concluded and completed. For, if some moderns thought to add to it, by this, that they pushed in, partly psychological chapters of the different cognition-faculties (Imagination and Wit), partly, metaphysical, as to the origin of cognition, or as to the different kind of certitude, according to the difference of objects, (Idealism, Scepticism, &c.) partly, anthropological, of prejudices (the causes of the same and reme dies) ; this then proceeded from their ignorance of the particular nature of this science.

It is not augmentation, but disfiguration of the sciences, when we allow their boundaries to run into one another ; but the boundary of Logic is very closely determined by this, that it is a science which fully exposes, and strictly shows nothing but the formal rules of all Thinking (whether this be d priori or empirical — have whatever origin or object it will — meet in our mind with accidental or natural im pediments). That it has thus succeeded so well with Logic, for this advantage it has simply to thank its limitation, whereby it is allowed, nay, in fact, compelled to make abstraction of all objects of cognition and their differ ence ; and, consequently, the Understanding has in Logic nothing further to do than with itself and its form. Much more difficult must it naturally be for Reason to strike into the sure way of science, if it have to do not only with itself, but also with objects — consequently Logic, as Propædeutick, only constitutes, as it were, the outer court of the sciences, and if the question be with respect to cognitions, one certainly presupposes logic for the judgment thereof, but must seek their acquisition in the properly and objectively so called Sciences.

Now, so far as Reason is to exist in these, something then d priori must therein be cognized, and its cognition may be referred in two ways to its object, either to determine simply this object and its conception, (which must be given from elsewhere) or, to make it real. The first is theoretic, the other practical cognition of reason. The pure part of both must alone previously be treated, however little or however much it may contain, that is to say, that part wherein reason determines its object wholly d priori, and what proceeds from other sources must not be mixed up with it ; for it is a bad adminis tration of means, if we spend blindly our income, without afterwards, if those means become straitened, being able to distinguish which department of receipt can bear the expence, and where this must be curtailed.

Mathematick and Physics are the two theoretical cognitions of reason, which are to determine their objects d priori — the first quite pure — the second, at least, in part pure, but, then also, in proportion to other sources ol cognition than those of reason. Mathematick has from the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends, amongst the remarkable nations of Greece, proceeded in the secure way of a science. But, we must not think that it has been as easy for it, as for Logic, to fall upon that royal way, or rather itself to open it, where reason has only to do with itself — I believe rather, that for a long time (particularly amongst the Egyptians), with respect to Mathematick, it remained feeling its way, and this change is to be ascribed to a revolution, which the happy conceit of an individual, by trying, brought about, whence the road which must be taken for the future, could not any more be missed, and the certain path of a science was struck out, and indicated for all ages and to an infinite dis tance.