Critique of Pure Reason

PART ONE—SCIENCE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON = By IMMANUEL KANT

TRANSLATED BY J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN

(ELBSR

La

Sd ap: =

NEW YORK P. F. COLLIER AND SON -MCM-

{j

PRESS OF ¥ P. F, COLLIER & SON

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

BOARD OF EDITORS

¥ SCIENCE

ANGELO HEILPRIN, author of «*The Earth and Its Story,’ etc.; Curator Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia.

RAY STANNARD BAKER, A.B., author cf «*The New Prosperity,’’ etc.; Associate Editor of McClure’s Magazine.

BIOGRAPHY

MAYO W. HAZELTINE, A.M., author of «Chats About Books,’’ etc.; Literary Editor of the New York Sun. JULIAN HAWTHORNE, author of «Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife,’’ «History of the United States,’’ etc. CHARLES G. D. ROBERTS, A.B., A.M., author of «A History of Canada’’; late Professor of English and © French Literature, King’s College.

FICTION

RICHARD HENRY STODDARD, author of ‘The King’s Bell,’’ etc., etc.; Literary Editor of the New York

Mail and Express.

HENRY VAN DYKE, D.D., LL.D., author of «<Little Rivers,’

eter, ete. Proleasot of English Literature at Princeton University.

THOMAS NELSON PAGE, LL.D., Litt.D., author of «Red Rock,”” etc:, te.

ORATIONS

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, A.B., LL.B., author of ««Life of Daniei Webster,’’ etc.; U.S. Senator from

Massachusetts.

HON. JOHN R. PROCTOR, President U. S. Civil Service Commission.

MORRIS HICKEY MORGAN, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor in Latin, Harvard University.

A LIBRARY OF UNIVERSAL LITERATURE

| VOLUME ELEVEN

BACO DE VERULAMIO

INSTAURATIO MAGNA-PRAFATIO

Contents

PRLATISIA OLS UPLOLACh, cwse conkinop to see aesoc heey Pcbiteere seh ebRsiemsavenbeasssye Trnees Preface to the First Edition of the Oritique..i......csscascocsscssceseoscedeeceees EvokacertoO the SSCONd HGitiONishsssccaas ceess etvesee te eats oe setea tea ete pas sece sues INTRODUCTION Bisten = (= the Difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge................ \JI.—The Human Intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in possession of certain cognitions @ Pri0rt.....c.ccssscesesees bikiaddbvemsa che

III.—Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of Human Knowledge

D JOTLOR idonvudsoaaeeseon SWem epi sisdaie'ctaleents sleeseunta sh ines sb hein aa tase apemek IV.—Of the Difference between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments...... V.—In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgments @ priori ALENCOMLAIMEDLAS IPN CIPLC sa .acieiasie> sushi touoswclesoolcanaethosacescdoues VI.—The Universal Problem of Pure Reason............++++ asenatpteevesueiears VIl.—Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under ihe Name of a CrilIqQuesOt wuts cheB SON cn seadsiessucc tears dalsanaeiase ausenessenekoen en

Section II.—Of Time

§ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.........seserereee TW § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time....... 12 § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions......-.-...++seeerreres 73 § 8. Hlucidation.............cccccecceeceeseceececseceeceeeeseanenacensenaanes 75 § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Misthetic........+++++++ 19 § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aisthetic......+..++. 89

PART SECOND—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC Introduction.—Idea of a Transcendental Logic

T.—Of Logic in general........ccccsececceeeecsectececsencsncnerssssescseneenecs 90 Ti Of Transcondontal Topic: .i2...cccc-sssccssecescocedecutees-aucwoaecucaecs 94 III. —Of the division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic...... 96 IV.—OE the division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialechic. ........ssseessecseeeeeseeneeesncsceereeseeseneaes 99

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC—FIRST DIVISION Transcendental Analytic. § 1..........sccsesceencesrosaces eer ee 100

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC—BOOK I

Analytic of Conceptions. § 2.....sscssseesersscsecnsenseesvensencsessneeaeecnens seat LOW Chapter I.—Of the Transcendental Clew to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

Introductory. § Bs cceanbliclaslasedlsdi crue aOR ERED atthe 102 Section I.—Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in general. §4 103 Section II1.—Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judg-

Ger a Beene inocso onc GiGce srnc AccincG: upooensoc Scoourinséc phccicene 104 Section III.—Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Gategorios. .-§ 6.05. yah iyesececteaen cee eeawcesaeeese eee eases naa 109 Chapter II.—Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

Section I.—Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in gen- OPAL, S91... canescens vlanvetiee sot eitealemelecete ean teemrameneeenameemtens 119 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. a | SORE ratte eters hE om oe ee Sn event: 125 Section II.—Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11............. \ cicealeieomtenertaaneaediaeceaerearael a6 Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12........ 130

The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. §13... 133

CONTENTS

What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14............005 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. Si lbineeee wis od Ane BSGE Ce 5 GORE HERECOA TEER Crate Rion ht oe Aen eCRer ERPS All Sensuous Iniuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of them ean be united ansoneiConsciousness. XS, 165... andsscatecesasseeseseseceas sees Observations sd Sa ietiyess. dives bilo. areas tdeeseke eve cdeersAceeaes co veness In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. §.18..........sscssceseecsssssoceecse Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in BE MeNae gua U rc acdescee kansas sGovuoastevs cu vessvesn ewer aeagectoreeh aecens Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICO—BOOK II

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT, OR ANALYTIO

OF PRINCIPLES

Chapter I.—Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Under- SLATE GMI O15 sta cesi di aisweynsiecite ode Waa tical at Ds ct nee7 RAE ORES UTIEE slannos

Chapter II.—System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding............ Section I.—Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgments..... Section II. —Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments..

Section III.—Systematic Representations of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding...........cesseeeeeceneees

L.—Axioms 0f Intuitiony....0.cccic.bcoccencssacecevnsesweseccesssereses TI.—Anticipations of Perception.............ccssececeeessesceesseeene T1I,—Analogies of Hxperience,........sscsesesssseeeesesstesesseeeeess

A, First Analogy.—Principle of the Permanence of Sub-

STANCE. vucccercccsccscsccnrcccesecesceasccssvesssscessssccererseees

B. Second Analogy.—Principle of the Succession of Time.

C. Third Analogy.—Principle of Coexistence........2..+++++ IV.—The Postulates of Empirical Thought..............s.eesseee Refutation of Idealigm..........sccsssecsecserecsscnsusceseecesosceseeeeesaeceesees

General Remark on the System of Principles, ..........:.ssseseesserseeeeenes

6 CONTENTS

Chapter IIT.—Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phenomena AN Noumenas..c...ceccccccsecccsccessceseecsecnssacsccsssisccnseoees 237 Appendix.—Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the Understanding...............-. 251 Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection........ 256

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC—SECOND DIVISION

Transcendental Dialectic—Introduction

T.—Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance........-.sseccesseeeeeceeeecerers 273 II.—Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appear- DANCE, sicets ame slgee.s avai asisee sw ano’ fen teas eienas caeenee ene te teenie ane case 276 Aq Of ReasOm 2) Gren CLA. ...2s.0%s'sije are ste neee ees eae rleeiiaaeeememease 276 B: OF the: Logical: Use of Reasony........ccdecettssansenadeatapbecanases 279 C. Of the, Pure. Use of Reason... ..s.s.<sscamseadeee eesens ease sauedae sas 281 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK I Ofjihe: Conceptions of Pure Reasons wc: acca cscrccueadedcmase soecandeocase saeae eee 284 Section, I. —Of ideas: ti General 0 o2. ci. sssscos dese tuecseceressathsacscigecieens 285 Section II.—Of Transcendental Ideas..............ccssesesscessesseessccsereces 291 Section III.—System of Transcendental Ideas.............csuscesesseeeecees 299 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK II Of the! Dialectical Procedure’of Pure Reason......0.caccscnccsescssesessescoeetees 303 Chapter I.—Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason............csescscsesresseseseesees 305 Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality orPermanence:of, the Soull....c..c.:cceesserseotaen eee ee canes tee 313 Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism........ 321 General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psychology to OOSMOO PY... cdacss nebiacias staxncsiesencelre tt pemuen arene matin deaeee eae cee 322 Chapter II.—The Antinomy of Pure Reason.............scseccsesessesvevsnecvenes 325 Section I.—System of Cosmological Ideas...........ccsccscsscecescecaceececs 327 Section I].—Antithetic of Pure Reason.....c:.00.soceceseesssdaveeusreceseese 334 Hirst Antinom yisniaceeetk acaihecceeeantoe ean 338 Second: A ntinomyocsvecmacte decease eee ee 342 ‘Third tAmtinom yy © jcgsetiwws cet meee eee eae 349 Monn thy An tid Ot yraaitaceccictionacciet ae ce ee oeeee eee eee Poston 354

Section III.—Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-Contradictions... 360 Section IV.—Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems........... (3707 Section V.—Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Provienan ars poe sented in the four Transcendental Ideas............. ye * an) 5

CONTENTS 7

Section VI.—Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of

Pure Cosmological Dialectic...........sccscscssssscsssersees 379 Section VII.—Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problems............ 383 Section VIII.—Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological! Ideas sicsaapterssceessssieasedtekassdsaeese«euvess 390 Section IX.—Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason, with regard to the Cosmological Ideas......... 395 I.—Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.. aes PRES II.—Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality. of ‘the Division of a Whole given in Intuition...............cccceeeee. 400

Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical Ideas—and Introductory to the Solution of the, Dynamical! ldeasiccemestecns soagtsrstecwseraticds«snnceeoosr acces 402 III.—Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the

Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes........... 405 Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal

Mia OL Na turalsNieCessity<j.tstessce.cecesuesramessssbectescecosns 408 Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Har-

mony with the universal Law of Natural Necessity........ 411 IV.—Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the

Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.................sceeee 422

Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason...... 426

Chapter III.—The Ideal of Pure Reason

; Section I.—Of the Ideal in General, nccicic....cesccocecsescnsnsscssscesccoesess \ 4214 Section II.—Of the Transcendental Ideal. nies . 430 Section III.—Of the Arguments Binployed’ oy iaecalntive: Resort in

Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being............... 438 Section IV.—Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of athe Ex.

Istence Of GO. ........ scree 443 Section 42 —Of the Tepossinihiiy ‘of a Gasilesieal. Picob. ‘of ‘tie

Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical iiasion in all Transcendental es for the Existence of a

Necessary Being........... wwe 458 _ Section VI.—Of the Impossibility ofa a Physics: Theplsadal Eigen 462 Section VII.—Critique of all es based upon es Principles Of Reason... 469 Appendix.—Of fie eters. TWiaplopnent as as Ideas of Pure Reason............. 476

Of the Ultimate End of ‘the. Aasuieal! ‘Disisctie- of ae DAT POAC ONE ex deceeetaevesertnceaied eeceresemeaccteocssesesse: LOD

8 CONTENTS

Chapter I.—The Discipline of Pure Reason... Seti Rae ens cree: eae Ae Section I.—The Discipline of Pure "Reason in he Sphere of De matism... pies seeceaeeenn ee Wiajain saignloa snlee saies ev eeeaaioadene Section IJ.—The Dieeiine ‘of Pure Reskags in n Relegues Rar eacnacade's anaes Section III.—The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis................ Section IV.—The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs..... Chapter II.—The Canon of Pure Reason... shila wb e ddas Saas ete Rgsee adeassentvaae Section I.—Of the Ultimate End of the Pars ‘Wise of east maeetedascee Section I1.—Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure Reason................. Section III.—Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief...............6 Chapter III.—The Architectonic of Pure Reason.........ssscccecssecesseccescesneres Chapter IV.—The History of Pure Reason. ..........s.scescecseressscsscressscocecceseee eens

#38

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

THE following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant’s ‘‘Kritik der reinen Vernuntt?”’ intelligible to the English student.

The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years’ meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of a Verba preevisam rem non inyita,gequentur, will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of expression. e wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of- words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often overlaid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it. He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Konigsberg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philosophy, and to enounce ideas that were entirely to revolutionize Kuropean thought. On the other hand, there are many excellences of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought; and, in some of his notes especially, he

10 TRANSLATORS PREFACE sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develop. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly determining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy of comprehension.

A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaintance. with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intel- ~ lect between the author and the reader; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.

Indeed, Kant’s fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent —it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misapprehended, or entirely neglected. Dugald Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy—as he had no proper.

opportunity of making himself acquainted with it; Nitsch’* and Willich*? undertook to introduce him to the English _ philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood ‘‘traduced’’ him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation— a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there is not a single English work upon Kant which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple’s translation of the ‘‘Metaphysic of Ethics.’’ All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapable of understanding him.*

1 A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant’s Principles. By F, A. Nitsch. London, 1796. *

* Willich’s Elements of Kant’s Philosophy, 8vo. 1798.

3 It is curious to observe, in ail the English works written specially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave

PE —— oe ew jutudeabti guia the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant’s philosophy,

TRANSLATORS PREFACE ip

The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS. translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise it, as he had perceived it to be incorrect. After having labored through about eighty: pages, I found, from the numerous errors and inaccuracies pervading it, that hardly one-fifth of the original MS. remained. I, therefore, laid it entirely aside, and commenced de novo. These eighty pages T did not cancel, because the careful examination which they had undergone made them, as I believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.

The second edition of the Kritik, from which all the subsequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, maintains that the author’s first edition is far superior to the second; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlimmbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, ‘‘in the weakness of old age,’’ have rendered it a ‘‘self-contradictory and mutilated work.’’ Iam not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Schopenhauer; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition—whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 546-552, for example,’ are not are merely translators; Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of ‘“Beck’s Principles of the Critical Philosophy,’’ while pretending to give, in his ‘‘Translator’s Preface,’’ his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated his Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The same is the case with the translator of Kant’s ‘‘Essays and Treatises’ <Z vols. 8vo. London, 1798). This person has written a preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant’s works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in them as his own; few being then able to detect the plagiarism, 1 Of the present translation.

12 TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the outcry of prejudiced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the ‘‘sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy,’’ as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant’s own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.

No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Médes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during as after Kant’s lifetime, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the ‘‘third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791,’’ swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying.—Rosenkranz has made a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted. It may be necessary to mention that it has been found requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to represent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost impossible to translate the Kritik with the aid of the philosophical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace’s maxim—parce detorta. Such is the verb intwite for anschauen; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for © das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant’s own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent. Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics—whatever his estimate of

_ the utility of such discussions—the value of Kant’s work, as

“an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the advancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labor. J. M. D. M.

OO eee ee ee Te

Preface To The First Edition—(1781)

HUMAN REASON, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.

It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labors must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experi-. ence, while they are regarded by common-sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.

Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honor. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,

1 Ovid, Metamorphoses. (18)

14 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

At first, her government, under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent . times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims —as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns naught but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill-directed effort.

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much

——

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION IES contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection.. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment’ of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge. It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks—that of self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the Critical Investigation of Pure Reason.

I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience ; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles.

This path—the only one now remaining—has been entered upon by me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of—and consequently the mode of removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought.

1 We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examination.

16 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. (Pate reason is a perfect unity; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others.

While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind.

OOS CO EE

Preface To The First Edition 7

Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.

So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.

The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness. —

As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of a hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon @ priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure @ prior? cognition, and to furnish the standard—and consequently an example— of all apodictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine; it is the author’s business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which

his arguments might otherwise produce—he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgment of the work as a whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.

18 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ; and they have also cost me by far the greatest labor—labor which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides. The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective validity of its @ priort conceptions; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition—that is, from a subjective point of view; and, although this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the grand question is, what and how much can reason and understanding, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the facully of thought itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some semblance of a hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him, that, if my subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.