Selections

Front matter

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Contents

NTRODUCTION—THEODORE Meyer GREENE....... xvii RITIQUE OF PURE REASON “PREFACE! TO THE FIRST EDITION... 2). ae cole sil hdd 1 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.............+6. 8 INTRODUCTION I. Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Kyowledge. esis anwar hm syst: mena ber hen: 26

II. We are in Possession of certain Cognitions a priori, and even the ordinary Understanding is never WALMOUL CREM.) fy endh, y lieben ad Ah Gig See eeNe Ye aia 28 III. Philosophy requires a Science to determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Extent of all Cogni-

[IV.] Of the Distinction between Analytical and Syntheticnl A udoraen bei heey IL eS acts pale als 33

Chapter I. Method of Discovering All Pure Concepts of the Understanding

I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General.

II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in

Judgments

I. Of the Possibility of Connecting in General

1. Of the Synthesis of Apprehension prin e eure: le tase ike icetieivet al a6) ‘elle

3. Of the Synthesis of Recognition

Consciousness of a Connected Manifold, i.e. of Objects.]

{1.] The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the Highest Principle of all Employment of the Understand-

CONTENTS ix [2.] What is the Objective Unity of

Self-consciousness?. . 84 [3.] The logical Form of all Judg-

ments consists in the Objective

Unity of Apperception of the

Concepts contained therein.. 85

[VII. Consciousness of Objects involves the Use of the Categories.].......... 86 [VIII. General Nature of the Deduction.]... 92

[[X. The only Valid Employment of the CAtegOtlcs:)| are aro emcee ce 96

Boox IJ. Anatytic or PRINCIPLES

Chapter I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Wag SUPT AIT IIH 4 ean eigen WC SNC ick wake Nene Meagher ieee 100

Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Under- HANGING TRS ae ROR ci bie ke 106

See. I. Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical SIUC Se ere re Et reroute Sia Whe 107

Sec. II. Of the Highest Principle of all Synthetical RTIOCHUS Ue a ae ne Oa au ences gisth amie ote eel ve At 108 Sec. III. Systematical Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Understanding. ................ 110 T MARIGMerOrIMLUion ct et oc cua eee en 112 II. Anticipations of Perception. .............. 113 IIT: ‘Analogies of Experience.) ............0.... 116

A. First Analogy. Principle of Permanence 118 B. see Analogy. Principle of ProduccP ARE HOVER RIT a) 908, Se ON CR 1h 5) 122 C: Third Analogy. Principle of Com- HUAUTTILE Aone it SNe Ly cy WHS 5 hSle vate cee fd 130 IV. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in Generals wy ie ks ote Rae eee are 135 Retutation: of .dealismry ott. 4c. nees Cass 139 Chapter III. On the Ground of Distinction of all Subjects into Phenomena and Noumena...........00.0.- 145 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTION I. Of Transcendental Appearance (Illusion)...... 155 II. Of Pure Reason, as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion AO Reason iy General A Peh oo AMS 158 C. Of the.Puré Usevof Reason’. 20)... 2020052. 168 Boox I. Or rae Concerts or Pure ReEason....... 161 See. If. Of Transcendental Ideas............... 162

CONTENTS

Boox II. Or trae DiatecticaL, Conciusions or Pure

REASON Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reasons........ 16; The First Paralogism of Substantiality............. 170 The Second Paralogism of Simplicity............... 171 The Third Paralogism of Personality............... 174 The Fourth Paralogism of Ideality................. 176 [Conchisiomap rama es Aen Or ERR 0 Ch ye ee 17, Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason............ 18] Sec. I. System of Cosmological Ideas.............. 182 ecw Lm Antithetic of Pure Reasonese)): sidan dee 188

Sec. III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Conflicts 200 Sec. V. Sceptical Representation of the Cosmological

Questions in the Four Transcendental Ideas... .. 205 Sec. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the

Solution of Cosmological Dialectic. ............ 208 Sec. VIII. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason

with Regard to the Cosmological Ideas......... Q11

Sec. IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with Regard to all Cosmological Ideas

I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenom-

ena in aia Universes peek eens a 212 II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole eivcenin Intiurioniurets 2.) 65 ot Ae 215 Preliminary Remark for the Solution of the Transcendental-dynamical Ideas....... Q17

III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas with Regard to the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmical Events from their (SENISOS pts He Kae UAE ete dale yt 219 Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Connection with the General Necessity of Nature........ 224 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomena, with Regard to their Existence in

Genera lyn ii sss Memes tami ee he 233

Concluding Remark on the Whole Antinomy of Pure CASO re cr en aeRO DYE Lira RMC RRR Ta ee a 236 Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.............. 238 pec. J, Of the Idealan Generaltwd voy 2. 238 Sec. II. Of the Transcendental Ideal............... 239

Sec. III. Of the Arguments of Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being...... 242

CONTENTS

Sec. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God... .....-.- eee e ieee: Sec. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God... .. 2.12562 +e see eee Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectical Hlusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being... 005 ee ee eee Sec. VI. Of the Impossibility of the Physico-theolog- NEAL PROG rs peer eas wage Danae ees Sec. VIL. Criticism of all Theology based on Speculative Principles of Reason. ......--+++ esse eens

THEORY OF ETHICS (I. Tue Nature OF Mora.ity|

1. Moral Laws are Pure, not Hmapiriealitins,2..3.2.6 0565 9. A Good Will is alone unqualifiedly Good........- 3. Knowledge of this Moral Principle is within the

Reach of all Mem 06 Ons i Soe oe iene Refutation of Ethical Empiricism..........---- Refutation of Ethical Hedonism...........------ Formulae of the Categorical Imperative, and the

Kingdom: of (Hinds) 1g neta. 2 5 a kn (7.] The Motives of Pure Practical Reason.........--

_ Tur PropteM oF FREEDOM|

[1.] The Concept of Freedom is the Key that Explains the Autonomy of the Will. ........-.--+--.05: [2.] Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all Rational Beings...........-------- [3.] How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?........ [4. The Relation of Freedom to the Moral Law.]..... [5.] The Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure Practical Reason........---22+e+sserne: [6.] Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical Use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use.....--.5+-+:es:: etc

Tur Summum Bonum, Gop AND ToMMORTALITY |

[1. The Concept of the Summum Progeny. lee eee [2.| The Antinomy of Practical Reason [and its Critical Sohition }) dee ren). Sot eatiaaee teas fee ce (3.] Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the Speculative Reason..........-------> [4.] The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical’ Reason '.G. )onG SEs Gis ee eee - [5.] The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason... 2.2.0... eee ee ee eee xt xii CONTENTS

[6.] The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason in General 368 (7.| Modifications of the Moral Proof of God’s Existence in! Kant’s Opus Postumum del Skt oY. ee... 370

CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT Part I. Cririqur or tHE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT I. ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

[I.] Ananyric or THE BEAUTIFUL First Moment of the Judgement of Taste, according to Quality. §1. The Judgement of Taste is Aesthetical........ 375 §2. The Satisfaction which determines the Judgement of Taste is Disinterested.......... 376

Konds ‘of Satisfaction iil: 2. Yond veut 378 §41. Of the Empirical Interest in the Beautiful.... 380 universal Satislachionteieesienw: Mika) muse, 382 and the Good by means of the above Characteristicdg tae Ra Nie eee 383 §8. The Universality of the Satisfaction is represented in a Judgement of Taste only as mo) F | SMCS BC SAMRAT AD LANE “eich tg deters. so 385 §9. Investigation of the Question whether in the Judgement of Taste the Feeling of Pleasure precedes or follows the Judging of the Object. mate mr. ey ar eed tt Leeks 388 Third Moment of the Judgement of Taste, according to the Relation of the Purposes which are brought unto Consideration in them. §10. Of Purposiveness in General................ 392 §§1l and 12. The Judgement of Taste has nothing at its Basis but the Form of the Purposiveness of an Object (or of its Mode of Representation sult li giaer yal) PS. 393 §§13 and 14. The Pure Judgement of Taste is Inde-

pendent of Charm and Emotion......... 395 §15. The Judgement of Taste is quite Independent

of the Concept of Perfection............ 397

§16. The Judgement of Taste, by which an Object is declared to be Beautiful under the Condition of a Definite Concept, is not Pure. 399 $17. .0f the. Ideal of Beatty fistisde. coe. 40¢

CONTENTS xili

Fourth Moment of the Judgement of Taste, according to the Modality of the Satisfaction in the Object. $18. What the Modality in a Judgement of Taste is. 408 $19. The Subjective Necessity, which we ascribe to the Judgement of Taste, is Conditioned 409 §20. The Condition of Necessity which a Judgement of Taste asserts is the Idea of a Common i) one macaw ae ail i tN tll Bamba atte Oe AM 409 §21. Have we Ground for presupposing a Common ee TA HAREM Ts Wide A MAAN alata leat AS Apogee ANY 410

{I1.] Dxpucrion or Purr ArsTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS. §31. Of the Method of Deduction of Judgements of

Aa Sik oad A vale Sie ldll ti neaaghd Nidan Sa Al] §38. Deduction of Judgements of Taste.......... 413 PST OS A CR CMR Rat Pe EB ALS

[111. Tue Narure or Arr anp GEntus.] §45. Beautiful Art is an Art, in so far as it seems

TkevNa UUre (ke ena) a aaa ae citer, 416 §46. Beautiful Art is the Art of Genius........... A417

$47. Elucidation and Confirmation of the above TEXpraMaliom Of GENAUSt a ch Me vik, aagle rn eve 419 §48. Of the Relation of Genius to Taste.......... 422

$49. Of the Faculties of the Mind that constitute Genie. 0 SY QU OO. Ok ee 425

§50. Of the Combination of Taste with Genius in the Products of Beautiful Art........... 432

II. DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGE-

MENT [I. Tar Antinomy or Tasre anp Its Soxution.]

§56. Representation of the Antinomy of Taste.... 433 §57. Solution of the Antinomy of Taste.......... 435 Remark jon /Genius] 400. Pea A eG 438

(II. Rexation or Beauty to Goopnsss.] §42. Of the Intellectual Interest in the Beautiful... 439 §59. Of Beauty as the Symbol of Morality........ 442 S60:;:Ofthe Methodof Taste. oy. i ee 8 444

Part II. Critique or THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

IX. Of the Connection of the Legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by Means of the

IV. Of Judgement as a Faculty legislating a priori 449 V. The Principle of the formal Purposiveness of Nature is a Transcendental Principle of

VI. Of the Combination of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of INSEUTE Mie. che 7 Yo, can einva sy) 41 Roe es

Il. ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGE- MENT

§61. Of the Objective Purposiveness of Nature... . §63. Of the Relative as distinguished from the Inner Purposiveness of Nature............... §64. Of the Peculiar Character of Things as Natural PULHOSES yon he fear kere nen §65. Things regarded as Natural Purposes are Organised’ Beings. i 2 iu Sa. cas aadh cog ee hs ot §66. Of the Principle of judging of Internal Purposiveness in Organised Beings. ........ §67. Of the Principle of the Teleological Judging of Nature in General as a System of Purposes

I. DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGE- MENT

§70. Representation of [the] Antinomy [of Judgement and its Preliminary Solution.]...... §72. Of the different Systems which deal with the Purposiveness of Nature............... §73. None of the above Systems give what they pretend (jovi! Gatti Feet MOORES, <. §75. [Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Judgement.| The Concept of an Objective Purposiveness of Nature is a Critical Principle of Reason for the Reflective WUCZEMIOME CLAN: bic ier ee wet ee cm et enele pon

IV. METHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT

[I. Tue Fryau Purpose or THE ORDER AND EXISTENCE or NatureE.]

§80. Of the necessary Subordination of the Mechanical to the Teleological Principle in the Explanation of a Thing as a Natural Purpose

§81. Of the Association of Mechanism with the Teleological Priuciple in the Explanation of a Natural Purpose as a Natural Product.

§82. Of the Teleological System in the External Relations of Organised Beings..........

§83. Of the Ultimate Purpose of Nature as a Teleological Syetettia 4 2.6 ocgur ee wate re ake ve

§84. Of the Final Purpose of the Existence of a World, i.e. of Creation itself.......23.....

bo) :2 Nebiletre ie! (ese set le) eo te re [eh 6. fo) Re 1 dle come eee os ®

CONTENTS

§85. Of Physico-theology WeSOO, | CUREJENICO=tNEOLOR Vn Mac Atte. & ai ele eh Wie) Oise _§87. Of the Moral Proof of the Being of God...... §88. Remark [on the Basis of the Moral Proof in Man's Rational Nature.) 0) 2 oe

|III. Rericion anv Farra.] §89. Of the Use of the Moral Argument.......... General Remark [on the Application of the Cate- POPIES, LO GROG Le ever Ei patent Ma TRC ti Da §91. Of the Kind of Belief produced by a Practical Faith

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INTRODUCTION I

Tuer poet Heine once remarked that no life history of Kant was possible for he had neither life nor history. A superficial examination of a biography of Kant and even of his works offers some support for this uncharitable saying. Kant never travelled, but spent his entire life in or near the bleak city of Konigsberg in northeastern Prussia. His life-long poverty deprived him of the cultural environment and opportunities which were the heritage of Plato and Aristotle. His physical frailty and the temperamental seriousness of his outlook on life made the youthful adventures of a Goethe uncongenial to him. As time went on he became more and more studious and his habits of life assumed an ever greater regularity and inflexibility. His chief works reflect the austerity and rigor of his character; indeed, their style is so lacking in imaginative warmth, lucidity and literary charm that the student is often tempted to abandon them in despair.

There is another Kant, however, whom even the nonprofessional student of philosophy can discover if he will—the intellectual adventurer who, in his chosen field of study, instituted a ‘Copernican revolution ; the courageous thinker so critical of his own beliefs that he was willing, as an old man of over seventy, to abandon arguments and doctrines which he had cherished for years and to set out, even then, in search of new and better ones; the eloquent and devoted teacher who held xvi xviii INTRODUCTION large classes spell-bound and offered to generations of students his kindly and inspiring counsel; the witty table-companion and gracious host; and the life-long friend of simple men like the English merchants, Green and Motherby. Kant’s scholarly pursuits, moreover, were by no means as narrow as is supposed by those who think of him solely as the author of the Critique of Pure Reason. In breadth of interest he rivalled the Athenian philosophers, writing with erudition and imaginative insight about science and mathematics, ethics and politics, theology and art. Kant was of course preéminently a philosopher, and his treatment even of these subjects was, for the most part, rigorously philosophical in character. His thinking, however, was saved from the barrenness of abstract intellectualism by having its roots in concrete human experience in one or other of its aspects, and his scholarship was rendered fruitful by his ability to grasp, with imaginative fidelity, those phases of reality which lie nearest to the human heart.

To become acquainted with the real Kant is to see his life and writings in a new light. He disciplined his body and adopted a regular mode of life not from Puritanical motives but because he believed that only thus could he achieve the gigantic task which he had set himself. He refrained from travel and from social life and shrank from active participation in political movements, not because he was unaware of their value but because he felt obliged to sacrifice whatever threatened to tax his time and energy to the detriment of what he conceived to be his life work. Even his philosophical style of writing, whose architectonic and technical abstractness make his books so difficult to read, was chosen deliberately (albeit reluctantly, for Kant knew and loved fine language and apt illustration) as the vehicle best adapted accurately to express his views on ques-

INTRODUCTION xix tions of supreme importance. The student of the ‘Critical Philosophy’ must, accordingly, delve beneath the surface and seek to capture for himself the scope and profundity of the philosopher’s insight. For to master the works of Immanuel Kant is to have the illuminating experience of coming face to face with the main problems of human life and thought under the guidance of one of the most broad-minded, incisive and honest thinkers of Western Europe.

II

“In the year 1724, on Saturday the 22nd of April, at five in the morning, my son Immanuel was born into the world and on the 28rd received holy baptism . . May God preserve him in His Covenant of Grace until his blessed end, for Jesus Christ’s sake, Amen.” This entry in the family Bible symbolizes Kant’s early environment and training. His mother was a woman of little education but considerable natural intelligence and a very genuine piety. His deep respect and admiration for her is shown by the way in which he spoke of her, years later, to his friend Jachmann. “‘My mother was a sweet-tempered, affectionate, pious and upright woman and a tender mother, who led her children in the fear of God by pious teaching and virtuous example. She often took me outside the city, directed my attention to the works of God, expressed herself with pious rapture over His omnipotence, wisdom and goodness, and impressed on my heart a deep reverence for the Creator of all things.”

Kant ultimately attained, however, more nearly to his father’s ideal than to hers. The father, a Scotchman by descent and a saddler by trade, was morally rather than religiously minded. His chief parental inxx INTRODUCTION terest lay in making his children industrious and truthful. The moral atmosphere of the Kant household seems to have influenced the philosopher profoundly in his formative years and to have evoked in him a great reverence for moral value. This moral earnestness increased with the passage of years until the objective reality of moral goodness became finally the central motif of his whole philosophical system, and his life _ grew to be a living embodiment of his own ethical doctrine.

Kant’s attitude to evangelical religion, on the contrary, early became one of suspicion and dislike. This was due in large measure, we may be sure, to his unhappy school experience. In 1732 he was sent to the Collegium Fredericianum, a Pietist academy in the city, which he attended as a day-scholar for the next eight years. The Pietist movement had started in Ko6nigsberg in the last quarter of the 17th century as a protest against the clerical despotism and creed-bound theology of the Lutheran church. Within fifty years, however, success had crystallized its earlier plea for a more genuine and personal religious devoutness into a dogmatic fanaticism and an intolerance of all expressions of the religious life other than its own. These characteristics of the new orthodoxy seem to have manifested themselves in heightened form in the Collegium. The published aim of the school was to “rescue its charges from their state of spiritual corruption and to implant true Christianity in their hearts from their youth up.” Each day opened and closed with devosional exercises and each class hour ended with a “‘rousing’ prayer. The endeavor was made at frequent ingervals to warn the pupils concerning the evil state of their souls and to encourage them to confess their sins. Sunday, a weary succession of sermons and catechiz-

INTRODUCTION xxi ings, ended with an hour of soul-searching in which the truths expounded that day were “lovingly pressed home.” Not unnaturally, most of the students soon became expert in facile professions of piety; Kant’s reac- _ tion, on the contrary, was one of loathing and disgust. The remark attributed to him in later life that fear and trembling overcame him whenever he recalled those days of youthful slavery may well be authentic. His lasting abhorrence of all religious emotionalism and his hatred of prayer and hymn-singing certainly dated back to this unhappy period. And though he was able to evaluate the Pietistic movement quite dispassionately in later years and to praise much in the religious consciousness of the time, he never overcame his deep distrust of evangelical religion and never really understood what is regarded by many as the distinctive religious experience.

At the age of sixteen Kant enrolled in the University of Konigsberg where he soon came under the influence of Kniitzen, an able professor of philosophy and an ardent Wolffian. Wolff, the great popularizer of the Leibnizian philosophy, was probably the most influential thinker in Germany in the first half of the 18th century and dominated the philosophical thinking of the land to an amazing degree. It was natural, then, that Kant should have become, under Kniitzen’s influence, 4 faithful Wolffian. He so enjoyed Kniitzen’s lectures and companionship that he soon gave up his earlier vlan of devoting himself to philology and the classics and applied himself to science and to the study of philosophy. Here he found such abundant scope for his intellectual energy and originality that he soon decided to make these two disciplines his chosen fields of endeavor.

On completing his university course, Kant was obliged xxii INTRODUCTION for financial reasons to serve as family tutor for several years, an uncongenial task which he performed painstakingly and in such a way as to endear himself to the families whom he served. In 1755 he began his teaching in the University of Konigsberg as privat docent. Here he lectured for the next fifteen years not only in logic and metaphysics, mathematics and natural science, but also in subjects as varied as physical geography, anthropology and the science of fortification. Twice during this period he applied in vain for a vacant chair in his own university, and it was not till he was forty-six years of age-that he was appointed professor of logic and metaphysics. Meanwhile he had been applying himself with tremendous diligence to his writing, with the result that by 1785 he had become the most important figure in the university. By the last decade of the century his fame had extended throughout Germany and his philosophy was being taught in all the universities.

So far we have made no adequate mention of the influence of 18th century science upon Kant’s thinking. Newton had died the year of Kant’s birth, and by the time Kant entered the university the Newtonian physics had obtained a firm hold upon the German universities. Like other thinkers of the time, Kant was greatly impressed by the simplicity, adequacy, and self-evident truth of the Newtonian system. His belief in the finality and perfection of the new physics remained unshaken to the end of his life. This belief is apparent in the form which he gave, in the Proiegomena, to his famous contrasting questions regarding science and metaphysics: Is a science of metaphysics possible? he asked, assuming that the answer was by no means self-evident ; but, How is certain and universal scientific truth pos-

INTRODUCTION Xxili sible? assuming that sure scientific truth actually did exist.

His active interest in science is evident from the fact that his earliest writings were purely scientific in character: e. g. his General History of the Nature and Theory of the Heavens (1755) in which he gave an original and correct explanation, in terms of the Newtonian principles, of the origin of the tangential move~- ments of the planets, and his lectures on The Theory of Winds (1756) in which, working quite independently, he laid the foundation for the explanation of numerous meteorological phenomena. Kant never lost his enthusiasm for scientific research and continued to the end to publish occasional articles on biological, anthropological and astronomical subjects. His main attention, however, gradually shifted, as regards science, to the nature of science as such and to the essential characteristics of scientific thought and method. So greatly did this latter problem occupy his mind in middle life that in the Critique of Pure Reason, published when he was fifty-seven, one of his chief aims was to vindicate the work and outlook of the scientist.

His philosophical writing started about 1755, and for the next fifteen years both the titles of his papers and his handling of their subject-matter reveal the profound influence upon him of Leibnizian-Wolffian ration- — alism. It was only gradually that he became able to appraise critically the basic presuppositions of the traditional rationalistic philosophy and to develop his own distinctive point of view.

The Latin Dissertation of 1770, delivered on the assumption of his professorial chair, marks the beginning of Kant’s maturer period. For the next eleven years he published only minor articles of a non-technical nature, for he was pouring all his energy into the Critique

XXiv INTRODUCTION of Pure Reason which appeared in 1781. During these years he seems to have labored successively on the various yet inter-related problems dealt with in that volume, preoccupied now with this argument, now with that, and devoting only the last six months prior to publication to a hurried rearrangement of his notes into book form. This accounts to a considerable extent for the many discrepancies and repetitions which have so endlessly perplexed and annoyed its readers. This, however, is not the whole story. The Critique as it stands makes no pretence of being the finished exposition of a rounded metaphysical system; it is rather a record of Kant’s prolonged struggle to formulate and reconcile more or less divergent points of view none of which seemed to him to be either wholly adequate or wholly lacking in truth. Like Plato, he was dealing with philosophical problems for which he was unable to discover a single completely satisfactory solution, and he refused to make easy sacrifices in the interests of simplicity and consistency, preferring rather to follow the more fruitful method of doing as full justice as he was able to each point of view as it arose in his mind. The richness of post-Kantian thought testifies to the philosophical value of such procedure. Finally, we can understand his unwillingness to devote still more time to the preparation of this volume when we remember that in the year of its publication he was approaching sixty, with the major portion of his larger philosophical system still to be developed.

After the appearance of the first Critique, one important philosophical work followed another in rapid succession. He was so disappointed at the luke-warm reception which the Critique received, and found that so few, even among trained philosophers such as Mendelssohn, gave evidence of understanding or ap-

INTRODUCTION te preciating the book, that in 1783 he published A Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic in which he expounded “for the benefit of teachers of philosophy” the central thesis of the Critique. 'The next five years were devoted to the development of his ethical theory. The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morality, in which the chief characteristics and immediate implications of the moral life are lucidly and simply portrayed, appeared in 1785, and the Critique of Practical Reason, in which morality is more exhaustively and more metaphysically analyzed, three years later. In 1790 came the third volume of the great trilogy, the Critique of Judgement, dealing with two apparently unrelated subjects, the nature of beauty and aesthetic taste, and the significance and inter-relation of the principles of mechanism and teleology. Religion remained to be considered, and in 1793-4 there accordingly appeared the Religion within the Limits of Bare Reason, in many respects the least illuminating of his main works, yet by far the most profound exposition of 18th century deism produced in Germany.

Through this period of literary productivity Kant continued to publish minor articles and essays on subjects whose wide variety indicates once again the breadth of his interests. Even in the last years of his life he continued to struggle with problems for whose solution his waning strength became increasingly inadequate. ‘The masses of manuscript found in his study at his death, and recently edited by Adickes under the title Opus Postumum, give evidence, at once pathetic and inspiring, of the repeated attempts of the aged philosopher to round out his system still further and to reconstruct such portions of it as had been weakened under his own critical scrutiny. “I have undertaken,” he writes in 1802, “to complete my account of

Xxvi INTRODUCTION questions which concern the whole of philosophy, but I am never able to get it done although I am conscious that it is quite possible of accomplishment.” Towards the end he suffered from loss of memory and then of eyesight. He died in 1804 at the age of eighty and was buried in Kénigsberg, the university and city uniting in doing him final honor.

IFT

Before turning to Kant’s philosophical position let us see how he goes about the business of philosophical inquiry. His starting-point invariably is concrete human experience in one or other of its characteristic forms. This experience he regards as a datum, the material for philosophical investigation. Thus, in the Critique of Pure Reason his starting-point is man’s ordinary knowledge of so-called physical objects; in his ethical writings it is man’s moral sense of duty; and in his doctrine of aesthetics it is the appreciation and creation of beauty. If the factual reality of any one of these experiences be denied, Kant’s analysis of it loses at once all point and meaning; if, on the other hand, it be admitted as an existential fact, the importance of his subsequent investigation is apparent.