Kant's critical philosophy for English readers

Front matter

GJontell JtnuiEraUy

Htljaca, Men) Jfnrlt

LIBRARY OF

Preface To The New Edition

The able co-operation of one of my colleagues, together with class-room criticisms of others, has enabled this work to appear in a new edition, not only purged of many defects, but completed by the addition of several chapters on the Dialectic and Methodology of the Pure Reason. It is also offered to the public in a cheaper form, one volume containing the whole Kritik, while the second gives a revised translation of the Prolegomena. Without the help of Mr. Bernard, who has written the whole commentary from p. 237 onward, and who corrected and improved all the rest, it is not likely that this, my third declaration upon Kant, would ever have seen the light ; and indeed I will here add, that I am not responsible for certain Hegelianisms which appear in his notes on the Dialectic. But haec hactcnns. It is my desire to state candidly and unreservedly what my younger colleague has done to help me. For to make such

PREFACE acknowledgment is a duty not always recognised among literary men of established standing.

The plan of this commentary is to adhere much more faithfully than Kuno Fischer, or indeed any other Commentator we have met, to Kant's text, which we have followed paragraph by paragraph, shortening and simplifying, but shirking no difficulties. We have also marked all our own reflections with a 1, which refers only to the paragraph or chapter to which it is prefixed. It seems more advisable to do this than to encumber the book with foot-notes, which interrupt the reader's train of reading.

But though this Commentary claims to be clear and consistent, it is not, and cannot be, either easy or short. It is not easy, because the subject is not easy, and deals with notions exceedingly abstract, and only familiar to those who have made mental science a subject of special study. It is not short, because Kant's book, if worth reading at all, is worth reading and knowing accurately, and no pains are misplaced if they result in a full and comprehensive grasp of the greatest metaphysical system the world has yet seen.

We are too much accustomed to general histories in which a few pages are devoted to each thinker, so

PREFACE that the impressions left on the reader's mind, even if true (which is seldom the case) are at all events vague and misty. The greater lights in the philosophical firmament can only be understood by special study, and should therefore be made the subject of separate monographs. We have endeavoured to do this for Kant, being convinced that of all metaphysicians he is certainly the greatest, and perhaps the most imperfectly understood.

In the preface to the former edition I spoke of the fancy for philosophical novelties in England, and endeavoured to call attention to Kant, as of all modern Germans the greatest philosopher, and certainly the best adapted for practical minds. At all events it is absurd to begin the study of Schelling or Hegel without a prior intimacy with Kant, and how many men are there now in England who thoroughly understand the Critical Philosophy ? It is also a remarkable fact that within the last few years, philosophy even in Germany has reverted, as I ventured to predict, from modern extravagance to the soberness of Kant. His works are being reprinted, illustrated, and attacked, on all sides. The sensual school have discovered that the refutation of Kant alone will give them a lawful victory, and to this task they are applying all their energies.

Preface

The influence of Grote and J. S. Mill, and the constant appointment of Mr. Bain as a State Examiner in Philosophy, brought this way of thinking into undue prominence. All the youth of the country have been crammed with Mr. Bain's handbooks, and have neither time nor inducement to read an antidote. We must therefore look to the Universities for a fair hearing, and trust that there at least enlightened teachers will not accept as true what the State has made fashionable. A polemical chapter on the Association School, which appeared in the former edition of this work, has been omitted, as the controversy may now be regarded as obsolete. The most important contribution to the better understanding of Kant, in my edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary, was the true explanation of Kant's refutation of idealism. A patent absurdity had been universally attributed to him, and I showed that his attitude had been totally misconceived. My argument was candidly accepted by competent critics, and mio-ht now be called a commonplace, did not Prof. Kuno Fischer's recent declaration (a Critique of Kant, 1882) show that it has not yet penetrated into his mind.

As the work is intended for English readers, we have referred uniformly to the translation of Kant's Kritik in Bonn's Library, still the most serviceable

PREFACE and to my own edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary. I may add that my other references are to the following editions of the respective books, viz. the ninth edition of Mr. Mill's Logic, and the third of his Examination of Hamilton, and the fourth edition of Mr. Lewes' History of Philosophy. The references to the Prolegomena of Kant are to the pages of my former edition, which will be indicated in the new edition appended as a second volume to the present. I conclude this Preface as I did the last, seventeen years ago, with the earnest hope that the many readers of my former books on Kant will find in this a maturer and clearer exposition of the same views.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

Trinity College, Dublin, March \6th, 1889.

CONTEXTS

Chapter I The Two Prefaces To The Kritik

PAGE

I."! On Kant's Style . . I

2. Analysis of the First Preface . i

3.5 Contrast of the two Prefaces . 6

4. The Second Preface . .8

$.% Consistency of the Two Editions of the Kritik . 19

Chapter II The Introduction

Preliminary Considerations — The Distinction in Kind between

the Faculties . ... 24

1. Pure and Empirical Cognition . . 27

2. We possess a priori Cognitions, even in Ordinary Ex-

perience . . .28

3. We require a Science to determine these Systematically 3 1

4. Analytical and Synthetical Judgments . . . .32

5. All Theoretical Sciences contain Synthetical Judgments a

6. The General Problem of the Pure Reason . . . 39

7. General Conception of a Science called Kritik of the Pure

8.H History of Kant's Discoveries . . 42

QHAPTER III THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

PAGE

I. Definitions ... 47

2 & 4. Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time . 48

3 & 5. Transcendental Exposition of Space and Time 51

6. Deductions • 54

7. Objections Answered 57 S. General Remarks on the Aesthetic . 60

Introduction To The Transcendental Analytic

I. Of Logic Generally 7°

II. Of Transcendental Logic . 73

III. Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic . 74

IV. Division of Transcendental Logic similarly . 77

Chapter V Transcendental Logic, Part I

The Transcendental Analytic ... 78

Of the clue to discover the Categories .... 79

Of the Logical Use of the Understanding ... 81

On the term Function . . . . 83

9. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments 85

10. Of the Categories. ....... 88

H Note on Mr. Mill's Derivation of the External World 91

Table of the Categories . 94

11. Remarks on the Table . 96

12. Quodlibet ens est unum verum bonum . 98 1i Kant and the Critics of his Categories . 100

Chapter VIII

THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. THE SECOND EDITION OF THE KR1TIK

The Deduction in the Second Edition 123

Nature of Synthesis . . . . 125

The Transcendental Apperception . 127

Production of Objects . . . 129

Application of the Categories .... 130

Office of the Imagination . . . 132

Results . 135

Supplement to the Aesthetic . 137

Chapter IX

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC, BOOK II. THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES

The Transcendental Faculty of Judgment . . 143

Of the Schematism of the Pure Understanding 144

If Schopenhauer Criticised . 15 J

16,

1/

IS,

20,

23'

24-;

Chapter X Second Chapter Of The Analytic Of Principles

PAGE

1. The system of all the Principles of the Understanding . 155 The Highest Principle of all Analytical Judgments 156

2. The Highest Principle of all Synthetical Judgments 157

3. Systematic Exposition of the Principles . 160 Note, Analysis of Combination 162

Chapter XI The Mathematical Principles

1. The Axioms of Intuition ... 1 63

2. The Anticipations of Perception . . 165 Proof of Continuity . 168

Chapter XII The Dynamical Principles

I . Analogies of Experience . 171

A. First Analogy — of Substance 174 Its bearing on Kant's Idealism 177

B. Second Analogy — of Causality . 180 The Empirical Criterion of Substance . 185

C. Third Analogy — of Co-existence 1S9

Chapter XIII The Postulates Of Empirical Thinking Generally

1. The Postulates of Empirical Thinking . 193

2. The Postulate of Possibility . 194

3. The Postulate of Actuality . . . . . 195

I'AGE

4. The Postulate of Necessity . . . .196

5. Relation of Possible and Actual 197

6. General Remarks . . 199

1 CHAPTER XIV

KANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IDEALISM

1. Kant's Attitude on Idealism . . 202

2. Collation of Passages . 203

3. His View of Things per se , 206

4. His Critique of Berkeley . 209

5. His Critique of Descartes . . . 214

6. Refutation of Kant's Critics 219

Chapter XV Third Chapter Of The Analytic Of Principles

1. The Contrast of Phenomena and Noumena . 222

2. The Categories only of Empirical Use 223

3. Cause of the Belief in Noumena . 225

Chapter XVI Appendix On The Ambiguity Of The Concepts Of Reflection

1. The Nature of Transcendental Reflection . 229

2. Identity and Diversity . . 230 Agreement and Opposition . 231 Internal and External 231 Matter and Form . . . . 232

3. The Transcendental Topic . . 234

4. Analysis of Something and Nothing . . . . 235

Chapter XX Synthetical Treatment Of The Paralogisms

First Paralogism — of Substantiality . 260

Second Paralogism — of Simplicity . . 262

Third Paralogism — of Personality . 265

Fourth Paralogism — of Ideality (of external relation) . 267

Discussion in Second Edition . . . 269

Chapter XXIV The Interest Of Reason In These Conflicts

3. Interest on Side of Dogmatism . 3°3

4. Necessity of a Solution . . 3°6

5. Sceptical Account of the Cosmological Questions . 308

6. Transcendental Idealism supplies the Key 3 10

b

Chapter XXV The Critical Solution

I'AOli

7. Critical Decision of the Cosmological Conflict . 312

8. Regulative Principle .... 3>5

9. Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle . . • 3 J 7 Transition from Mathematical to Dynamical Antinomies 319 Possibility of Causality through Freedom ... 321

Chapter XXVI The Ideal Of Pure Reason

1. The Ideal in General . . . 330

2. Prototypon Transcendentale 331

Chapter XXVII Proofs Of The Existence Of God

3. Three Possible Proofs ... . 336

4. The Ontological Proof 338

5. The Cosmological Proof . . . 341

6. The Physico-Theological Proof . 346

7. Kritik of all Speculative Theology . 348

Chapter XXVIII The Regulative Use Of The Ideas

Negative Conclusion of the Analytic . . . . • 3SI

1. The Principle of Homogeneity .... 3c,

2. The Principle of Specification . . . . . • 3 S4

3. The Principle of Continuity of Forms . . . • 3S4 Ultimate Aim of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason . 3 c 7

Chapter XXIX Transcendental Doctrine Of Method

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The Discipline of Pure Reason . . 36 1

1. In the Sphere of Dogmatism . 362

2. In Polemics . 367

3. In Hypothesis . . 371

4. In Proofs . • 373

Chapter XXX Canon, Architectonic, And History

The Canon of Pure Reason . . . -377

1. The Ultimate End of the Pure Use of our Reason . 378

2. The Ideal of the Supreme Good . . 379

3. Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief . 381 The Architectonic of Pure Reason 384 The History of Pure Reason .... . 3^8

Chapter I The Two Prefaces

§ i. IT The philosophical student who has been discouraged from opening the Kritik of the Pure Reason, by its reputation for obscurity and difficulty, will be agreeably surprised by the clearness and the elegance of Kant's first Preface. So easy is the flow of thought, so felicitous the choice of expression, that we can only find stray hints of the arduous task that awaits us. The explanations of a commentator are almost needless, and his analysis cannot do better than adhere as closely as possible to the rich and suggestive language of the great philosopher himself. 1

§ 2. Among the various branches of human knowledge, says Kant, there is one in regard to which our reason is condemned to a very strange lot, being troubled with questions which we cannot decline, seeing that they are forced upon us by our very nature, but which, nevertheless, we cannot answer, since they transcend all our faculties.

Our reason falls into these perplexities unawares. It

1 Mr. Lewes's remarks [History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 458) are, in the first place, too severe, and in the second place unjust, as they omit to mention the genuine and even sublime eloquence of some of Kant's writings. We may notice that Kuno Fischer's Commentary is silent on these Prefaces, the second of which utterly destroys his theory as to Kant's idealism.

I E

2 THE FORTUNES OF METAPHYSIC chap.

commences from principles whose use in the field of experience is inevitable. From these it proceeds, according to its nature, to ascend higher, and to approach more remote conditions. But we soon discover that such a pursuit will never end, because fresh questions are ever starting up. Under these circumstances, nothing remains but to take refuge in first principles, which transcend all experience, and which, nevertheless, excite so little suspicion that even the common sense of mankind does not quarrel with them. These, however, lead the reason into such obscurities and contradictions that we cannot but infer the presence of some hidden errors. Yet the discovery of these errors is impossible ; because the principles adopted by the reason, as they transcend completely the bounds 1 of experience, will neither acknowledge nor submit to any test which originates within it. This arena of endless dispute is called Metaphysic. There was a time when her claims to be called Queen of the Sciences were admitted by all. It is now the fashion to despise her, and, like the mourning Hecuba, she sits forgotten and forlorn ; in the words of Ovid : Modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens — nunc trahor exid inops !

At first her rule, under the administration of the Dogmatists, was despotic. But this barbarous form of government degenerated through internal dissensions into complete anarchy ; and the Sceptics, a sort of nomads who hate all settled conditions, periodically scattered the community. But they were too few in number to prevent mankind from continually attempting a reconstruction, though without any fixed or consistent principle. It seemed indeed once

1 We uniformly translate Grenu, bound, reserving the term limit for Schranke. Cf. Kant's Proleg. p. 154, for the distinction— an important one, though confused in all the translations.

INDIFFERENTISM NO SOLUTION in later times, as if the celebrated Locke's Physiology of the Human Understanding would put an end to the disputes, and settle for ever the lofty claims of Metaphysic. But no sooner had the descent of the pretended queen been traced to the low origin of common experience, and her assumptions accordingly questioned, than this genealogy was found out to be fictitious, and accordingly she persisted in her claims. And so things returned to the antiquated and rotten dogmatism, and to the consequent contempt in which the science was held. Now that men think every path has been tried in vain, disgust prevails, and total indifference, the mother of chaos and of night in the sciences, but the prelude of a better day.

For it is vain to assume an artificial indifference on subjects which cannot be indifferent to human nature ; and the pretended indifferentists, though they may endeavour to disguise it by assuming a popular garb, are ever falling back into the metaphysical assertions which they profess to despise. Nevertheless, this indifferentism is a phenomenon deserving our deepest attention. It is the result of the ripe judgment of our age, which will no longer tolerate insecurity or false pretence. We hear, 1 indeed, complaints of shallowness, and of the decay of sound science. But well-founded sciences, such as Mathematic and Physic, refute this calumny, not merely by holding their ground, but even by making great onward strides. So would other branches of knowledge progress also, were their principles placed on a firm basis. ' In default of this indispensable requisite, doubt, indifference, and severe criticism are rather evidences of a thoroughgoing spirit. Our age is the proper age of Kritik (criticism), to which everything must submit. Religion desires to escape by its sanctity, Legislation by its majesty.' They con- 1 Cf. the first note to this Preface.

PROVINCE OF THE KRITIK chap.

sequently excite just suspicion, when contrasted with those sciences which have freely and fairly met the test.

Reason is therefore challenged to begin afresh that most difficult task, the knowledge of itself, and establish its claims, not by oracular dicta, but according to fixed and unchangeable laws. The court which must decide this issue is the Kritik of the Pure Reason itself.

This does not mean a Kritik of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason, as regards what knowledge it may attain, apart from all experience. It is in other words the deciding of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the determining of its sources, extent, and bounds, exclusively from principles.

This path, says Kant, I have pursued, and flatter myself I have discovered the source of all the errors which divided reason against itself. I have not evaded these questions by falling back upon the impotence of the human reason, but have determined them completely from principles, and, after discovering the point at which reason fell into a misunderstanding with itself, have completely and satisfactorily solved them. I have aimed at completeness above all things, and I venture to say there is not a single metaphysical problem which is not either solved or provided with a key for its solution in this book. Pure reason being a unity complete in itself, any analysis which fails to solve a single question fairly suggested concerning it must be cast aside as perfectly idle.

The reader need not wonder at these pretensions as boastful and impertinent. They are infinitely more modest than the programme of any ordinary system that pretends to prove the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a first origin of the world. For these things far transcend all the bounds of experience, whereas the present work merely analyses the reason and its pure thinking. It is in i ITS' CERTAINTY AND CLEARNESS 5

fact to be compared to common Logic, which analyses completely all the simple operations of thought, 'except that the question here proposed is, How much can we attain through these operations if deprived of all the materials and the assistance of experience ? '

If, then, the matter of the book must be complete and explicit, it may also fairly be demanded that the form of its demonstrations should be certain and dear. Of course all mere opinion is worthless, when we seek to establish a priori knowledge. But it is for the reader to judge whether the grounds advanced by the author are certain, and equal to his pretensions. He has already asserted that he considers this quality absolutely indispensable. Some few points, however, which are not essential to the work might possibly excite suspicion, and may, therefore, be pointed out beforehand. 1

There is no investigation more important, or that has given the author more trouble, than the so-called Deduction of the Pure Categories. This investigation has two sides. The first concerns the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to explain the objective validity of its a priori concepts concerning them. This is an essential part of Kant's plan, since it shows what the understanding and the reason can know, apart from all experience. It stands upon a basis perfectly independent of the second side of the deduction, which considers the understanding subjectively, and endeavours to analyse its faculties. ' As the question, How is the faculty of thought itself possible ? can only be answered by inferring a cause from its effects, my solution,' says Kant, ' may seem (though this is not really the case)

1 As the reader can hardly understand them, before he has mastered the passages in question, he will be reminded of these explanations at the proper places.

c

CLEARNESS to be a mere hypothesis, and the reader may think himself at liberty to differ from me.' But this will not invalidate the former side of the argument. 1

As to clearness, the reader has a right to expect logical and discursive clearness in the arguments, which has been carefully attended to, and sesthetical and intuitive clearness, by means of sufficient examples and illustrations. The length and intricacy of the discussion have compelled the author to dispense with these to an extent he did not originally intend. A general survey of a system is often impeded by these illustrations, and ' many a book would have been far dearer if the author had not endeavoured to make it so clear?

Metaphysic is the only science, as we shall show, which is capable of absolute completion within a short time, by means of united efforts : for it is nothing but the systematic inventory of what we possess by pure reason. Nothing can here escape us ; nor can any experience increase our knowledge. By means of the present Kritik the ground has been cleared and prepared, and here the reader must perform the part of an impartial judge. When we proceed to build up the system of pure reason, under the title, ' Metaphysic of Nature,' he should join us as a zealous co-operator, especially as the investigation of these details is easy, and more a recreation than a difficult task.

§3.H Such in substance, and to a great extent in words, was the remarkable Preface with which Kant introduced his great treatise to the philosophic world. It bears a strong family likeness to the utterances of other intellectual reformers, and suggests the mental attitude of Bacon and of Descartes, of Locke and of Hume. There is the same boldness in

1 The reader should bear in mind that this passage refers to the First Edition of the Kritik.

THE SECOND PREFACE asserting the discovery, and the same modesty in attributing it not to genius, but to method. There are the same hopes of a speedy termination of error, the same conviction that even ordinary minds, when armed with proper weapons, can help in the victory.

In his first Preface, therefore, Kant explained the historical position of the Kritik, and announced that he was about to revolutionise philosophy by a new method. And yet similar claims had often before been made, and had hitherto failed. What was the peculiar novelty of Kant's method which inspired him with such extraordinary confidence ? How did he discover it ? In the Preface to the Second Edition, published in 1787, six years after the First, these questions are fully answered ; and, furthermore, the positive practical results of his apparently negative and speculative system are brought before the reader. This second Preface is therefore a material improvement to the work, and is of peculiar interest, as disclosing to us the line of thought that led Kant to his discoveries. 1

1 Thus, at the very outset, those are in error who affirm that this Second Edition is no improvement on the first.

HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES

§ 4. ' We can easily determine,' says Kant, ' whether we are pursuing any branch of knowledge scientifically by our success in attaining results. If after much preparation, we are constantly coming to a standstill, and are obliged to recommence, and if our fellow-labourers cannot agree with us how our common object is to be pursued, our proceeding is no science, but a mere groping in the dark, which we shall do well to abandon, even with the sacrifice of many lofty aspirations.'

The history of any recognised science will prove this position. Consider Logic. Since Aristotle it has never lost one inch of ground. But what is far stranger, it has never gained anything either, and appears to be complete and settled. If modern writers have attempted to enlarge it by psychological chapters on the human faculties, or metaphysical on the origin of knowedge or the nature of certainty, or anthropological on human prejudices, they have merely shown their ignorance of its nature. ' We do not enlarge, but disfigure the sciences, by confusing their boundaries.' And the boundaries of Logic are strictly determined as the science which expounds the formal laws of all thought, and nothing but thought. The success of Logic is, however, owing to its narrow scope ; for Logic is forbidden to consider any of the objects of knowledge, and must confine itself to the understanding and its form. It is accordingly but the outer court of those proper sciences which add to our real knowledge. With far more difficulty did reason enter upon the strict path of science, when objects also were concerned.

If such sciences are to be rational, they must contain a priori knowledge, 1 and this knowledge of the reason may be related to the object in two ways — either as merely deter-

1 So far as this means power of prediction, no one will dispute it.

THE TURNING-POINT mining it and the concept of it (when given from elsewhere) or as also making it actual. This latter is the practical cognition of the reason [as when it produces from itself, for example, the idea of duty.] The former is theoretical cognition. In either case the direst confusion must result if the pure part, in which the reason determines its object altogether a priori, be not separately treated. 1

Mathematic and Physic are the two theoretical branches of rational knowledge which aim at determining their objects a priori — the former quite purely, the later partly so. Mathematic attained the safe position of a science long since among the Greeks. Yet this does not prove that its safe highway was constructed easily, as in Logic. Kant thinks that for centuries, especially among the Egyptians, it consisted in mere groping, and that the great change was owing to a Revolution, produced by a happy thought of some forgotten genius. He notices that even in later times the discoverers of special principles were remembered though these principles were unimportant ; and this he ascribes to the indelible effect produced by the first great Revolution.

In what did this Revolution consist ? ' Whoever it was,' says Kant, 'that first demonstrated the equality of the [base] angles of an isosceles triangle found 2 new light dawning upon him ; for he found that he could not trace out and learn the properties of the figure from what he saw in it, or from mere thinking about it, but rather from what he had added to

1 Kant in no way implies that these different parts of cognition are given separately, but says that if we confuse them in our treatment, we are like men spending money without keeping accounts, and then unable to ascertain what part of their outlay can be diminished when economy becomes necessary.

2 ' Who first demonstrated the right-angled triangle ' is Mr. Lewes's translation, which makes no sense. He was probably misled by n clerical error (equilateral) noticed by Kant himself in one of his letters.

io THE HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE chap.

the figure according to concepts a priori, and had then represented by a construction. He also found that all the safe a priori knowledge he could attain about it was merely the necessary consequence of what he had himself introduced into it, according to his own concepts." 1 This statement may well be regarded as the very corner-stone of all Kant's discoveries. In natural philosophy progress was far slower, and it is only since the days of Bacon that it has attained the highway of science. But even from an empirical point of view there is a close analogy in its history to Mathematic. When Galileo and Torricelli and Stahl began to make their well-known experiments, the same light dawned upon them also. They comprehended that reason discovers what it produces according to its own plans ; that it must, so to speak, take the initiative, according to fixed principles supplied by itself, and compel nature to reply, instead of waiting upon her for instruction, since chance observations are not connected by such necessary laws as the reason seeks and requires. Those phenomena alone that agree with some fixed principle of the reason can be regarded as the laws of nature. ' Armed with such principles, then, in one hand, and with experiments framed according to them in the

1 Mr. Lewes's translation of this passage (Hist, of Phil. vol. ii. p. 467) appears, through some oversight, not to be even grammatical, and, moreover, obscures the point of the argument. Mr. Meiklejohn's translation would here have afforded him a fair version. His interpretation of the passage is equally erroneous ; for he thinks Kant is insisting on the metaphysical method as opposed to the experimental, and is highly indignant at the proposal to study nature through our ideas. But Kant is really showing the vast superiority of the experimental method over that of mere observation. In the latter case the mind can only note down occurrences ; in the former it approaches the facts with a theory of its own construction, and compels nature to say whether the facts conform to it or not. Surely this just difference is acknowledged by every scientific inquirer. The next paragraph should have made the point plain to any careful critic.