Elements of Psychology: included in a critical examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding [Being lectures 16-25 of the 'Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie.'] Translated ... with an introduction, notes, and additions, by C. S. Henry

Front matter

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY: included in A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. BY VICTOR COUSIN, PROFESSOR OP PHILOSOPHY OF THE FACULTY OF LITERATURE AT PARIS ; PIER OF FRANCE ; AND MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COUNCIL OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES., AND ADDITIONS, BY C. S. HENRY. HARTFORD : COOKE AND COMPANY. 18 34. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1834, by COOKE & CO,, in the Clerk's Office of tiie District Court of Connecticut. P. CANFJELD, PRINTER.

ADVERTISEMENT.

. It may be proper to say a few words in regard to the portion of M. Cousin's Lectures which makes the body of this work, and the form in which it is here presented to the public. In the year 1829, M. Cousin delivered a course of Lectures, which was published in two volumes octavo, under the title of " History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century." Of this course, the second volume contains an extended critical analysis of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. The Lectures, from the 16th to the 25th inclusive, are taken up with this analysis. These are the Lectures of which a translation is here given to the public. This examination of the Essay on the Human Under standing, is pronounced, by the writer of the article on the "Philosophy of Perception," in the Edinburgh Review for October 1830, No. 103, Art.

Chapter 1

5 (Cours de Phil., Legon 16.) General spirit of the Essay on the Human Understanding. — Its Method. Study of the Human Understanding itself, as the necessary introduction to all true philosophy. — Study of the Human Understanding in its action, in its phenomena, or ideaSt — Divisjon of the inquiries relating to ideas, and deter mination of .the order in which those investigations should be made. To postpone the logical and ontological question concerning the truth or falsity of ideas, .and the legitimacy, or illegitimacy of their application to their respective objects; and to concentrate our investigations upon the study of ideas in themselves*, — and in that, to begin by describing ideas as they actually are, and then'to.proc^ecrto theinvestigation of their origin. — Ex amination of the Method of Locke.

Its merit : he postpones and places last the question of the truth or falsity of ideas. Its fault: he entirely neglects the question concerning^the actual character of ideas, and begins with that of their origin. First mistake of Method ; chances of error which it involves. General tendency of the School of Locke. — Recapitulation.

Chapter II

.... 27 (Legon 17.) First Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of Innate Ideas. — Second Book. Experience, the source of all ideas. Sensation and Reflec. tion. — Locke places the developement of the sensibility before that of the operations of the mind. Operations of the Mind. According to Locke, they are exercised only upon sensible data. Basis of Sensualism. — Exam. ination of the doctrine of Locke concerning the idea of Space. — That the idea of Space, in the system of Locke, should and does resolve itself into the idea of Body. — This confusion contradicted by facts, and by Locke himself. — Distinction of the actual characters of the ideas of Body and of Space : 1. the one contingent, the other necessary ; 2. the one limited, the other illimitable ; 3. the one a sensible representation, the other a rational conception.

This distinction ruins the system of Locke. Examination of the origin of the idea of Space. Distinction between the logical order and ■ the chronological order of ideas. — Logical order. The idea of space is the logical condition of the idea of body, its foundation, its reason, its origin, taken logically. — The idea of body is the chronological condition of the idea of space, its origin, taken chronologically. — Of the Reason and Experience, considered as in turn the reciprocal condition of their mutual developement. — Merit of the system of Locke. — Its vices : 1. confounds the meas. ure of space, with space ; 2. the condition of the idea of space, with the idea itself. CONTENTS. VI

Chapter III

41 (Legon 18.) Recapitulation of the preceding chapter. — Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of time.— Of the idea of the Infinite.— Of the idea of Personal Identity. — Of the idea of Substance.

Chapter IV

79 (Legon 19.) General remarks on the foregoing results. — Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of Cause. — Origin in sensation. Refutation.— Origin in reflection and the sentiment of the Will. Distinction between the idea of Cause ar d the Principle of Causality. — That the principle of causality is inexplicable by the sentiment of will. — Of the true formation of the principle of Caus ality.

Chapter V

109 ( L e g o n 2 0. ) «. Examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Under standing, continued. Of the idea of Good and Evil. Refutation. Conclu sions of the Second Book. Of the formation and of the mechanism of ideas in the understanding. Of simple and complex ideas. — Of the activity and passivity of the mind, in the acquisition of ideas. — The most general attributes of ideas.— Of the Association of ideas4 — Examination of the Third Book of the Essay on the Understanding, concerning words. Credit due to Locke. — Examination of the following questions : 1. Do words derive their first origin from other words significant of sensible ideas ? 2. Is the signification of words purely arbitrary ? 3. Are general ideas nothing but words? Of Nominalism and Realism. 4. Are words the sole cause of error ; and is all science only a well-constructed language ? — Examination of the Third Book, concluded.

Chapter VI

141 (Legon 21.) Examination of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understand ing, on Knowledge. — That knowledge, according to Locke, depends : 1. upon ideas ; 2. upon ideas, in so far as they are conformed to their objects. — That the conformity or non.conformity of ideas with their objects, as the foundation of truth or falsehood in regard to knowledge, is not with Locke merely a metaphor, but a real theory.— Examination of this theory of ideas, 1. in relation to the external world, to secondary qualities, to primary qualities, to the substratum of these qualities, to space, to lime, &c. ; 2. in relation to the spiritual world. — Appeal to Revelation. Paralogism of Locke.

Chapter VII

163 (Legon 22.) Resumption and continuation of the preceding chapter.— Of the idea, not now considered in relation to the object which it should represent, but in relation to the mind which perceives it, and in which it is found. The idea-image, idea taken materially, implies a material subject; from hence, Materialism.— Taken spiritually, it can give neither bodies nor spirit — That the representative.idea, laid down as the sole primitive datum of the mind, in the inquiry after reality, condemns us to a paralogism ; since no CONTENTS. vii representative idea can be decided to represent correctly or incorrectly, except by comparing it with its original, with the reality itself, to which, however, by the hypothesis, we cannot arrive but by the idea. — That knowledge is direct, and without an intermediate. — Of judgments, of propositions and ideas. — Return to the question of innate ideas.

Chapter VIII

185 (Legon 2 3.) Examination of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding con tinued. Of Knowledge. Its modes. Omission of inductive knowledge. — Its degrees. False distinction of Locke between knowing and judging. — < That the theory of knowledge and of judgment in Locke, resolves itself into that of a perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas. Detailed examination of this theory. — That it applies to judgments abstract, and not primitive, but by no means to primitive judgments which imply existence. — Analysis of the judgment : I exist. Three objections: 1. the impossibility of arriving at real existence by the abstraction of existence ; 2. that to begin by abstraction, is contrary to the true process of the human mind ; 3. that the theory of Locke involves a paralogism Analysis of the judgments, J think, this body exists, this body is colored, God exists, &.c. — Analysis of the judgments upon which Arithmetic and Geometry rest.

CHAPTER "IX. : ... 211 (Legon 24, ) Continuation of the preceding chapter. That the theory of judgment, as the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas, supposes that every judgment is founded upon a comparison. Refutation of the theory of comparative judgment. — Of axioms. — Of identical proposi tions. — Of Reason and of Faith. — Of Syllogism. — Of Enthusiasm. — Of the causes of Error. — Division of the Sciences. — Conclusion of the examination of the Fourth Book of Locke's Essay.

Chapter X

243 (Legon 25.) Examination of three important Theories found in the Essay on the Hu man Understanding : 1. Theory of Freedom ; which inclines to Fatalism. 2. Theory of the Nature of the Soul ; which inclines to Materialism. 3. Theory of the Existence of God ; which rests itself almost exclusively upon external proofs, drawn from the sensible world. — Recapitulation of the whole Examination of the Essay of Locke ; the Merits and the Faults which have been pointed out. — Ofthe spirit which has governed this Examination Conclusion.

Appendix

. INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL NOTES. Note A, — Consciousness, 283 Note B, — The natural and philosophic consciousness, . . 286 Note C,— Ideology,— M. Destutt de Tracy, .... 289 Note F,- Of Method, 291 Note K, — Royer-Collard, — Origin ofthe conception of Duration, 304 Note L, — The idea of the Infinite, ........ 305 Note M, — Idea of Substance, — Royer-Collard 308 Note N,— Hume,— Kant, 310 Note S, — Cause and Effect, — Brown, 312 Note U, — Moral Principles, ....... CONTENTS. Note V, — Principle of Merit and Demerit, Note AV, — Foundation of Punishment j*J J Note X, — Divine Justice, 31° Note Y, — Divine Government, — Plato, 319 Note Z, — Of Language, 320 Note AA, — Theory of Perception, ....•• **^« Note, BB, — Innate Ideas, 325 Note CC, — Coincidence of Lord Bacon and Plato, . ■ • 327 The true sense of Cogito, ergo sum, .... 328 Note DD, — Leibnitz, — Faith and Reason, 329 Note FF, — Impersonality of Reason, — Inspiration, . . • 331 Note KK, — Doctrine concerning the Will and Freedom, . . 334 Note MM, — St. Anselm 339 Note NN, — The Ionian and Pythagorean Schools, . . . 340 Note OO,— Sankhyra of Kapila, 342 Idea of a System of Metaphysics,

Introduction

. At the time when the influence of the Cartesian philosophy in France was giving way to the new spirit of the 18th century, nothing was more natural than the ready reception of the system of Locke, claiming as it did — and to a certain extent, justly — to be a fruit of the movement of independence, and of the experi mental method. Thus put upon the road of Empiricism, the activity of the French mind continued to develope its principles, and carry out its consequences to their last results. Condillac, exaggerating the already partial and defective, and therefore erroneous principles of the Empiricism of Locke, rejected reflec tion, or natural consciousness, as one of the sources of knowledge ; and analyzed all the phenomena of the mind, into forms of sensa tion. By the admirable logical precision, the clearness and perfect system which he gave to his analysis, he became the metaphysi cian and acknowledged chief of this new school ; while Helvetius, d'Holbach, and others, carried it boldly out to the Materialism, Fatalism, and Atheism, which are its legitimate moral consequences.

From that period, Sensualism, as a philosophical theory, maintained an almost exclusive predominance. Exceptions to this remark are scarcely to be met ; and those that may be regarded as such, were merely the fragmentary or inconsequent outbreak ings of a higher inspiration than Sensualism could supply, not the regular and scientific exposition of a better system. Sensualism was the reigning doctrine.' All knowledge and truth were held to be derived from Experience ; and the domain of Experience was limited exclusively to Sensation. The influence of this doctrine extended throughout every department of intellectual activity, — Art, Morals, Religion, no less than the physical and economical sciences. It became, according to Damiron, "a new faith, which was preached by the philosophes, as its priests and doctors ; and, among all ranks, and first, among the B

INTRODUCTION.

. X higher orders, including the clergy, it superseded the forgotten or ill-taught doctrines of Christianity. It was in all books, in all conversations ; and, as a decisive proof of its conquest and credit, passed into instruction, and for many years before the Revolution, it had taken every where, in the provinces as well as in Paris, the place ofthe old routine of education." Subsequently, the exciting and terrific scenes of the Revolution occupied all minds : the speculations which had, in no small de gree, prepared the way for those scenes, gave place to the absorb ing interest of that period. Philosophy, in its more extended sense, was abandoned : all speculation was directed towards politi cal theories, to the neglect of science, and even of public instruction ; and nothing was done in the cultivation of philosophy, until 1795.

At that time, the reign of violence began to give way to some thing like order and repose. With this return to comparative quiet, the philosophical spirit began to re-awaken. It was natural, however, that this movement should recommence where it had been arrested — namely, with Sensualism. The instruction at the Normal schools, and the organization of the Institute by the Directory, contributed to renew and extend the philosophy of Condillac, and to make it in some sort the doctrine of government, the philosophy of the state. During this period, we have several works produced in the spirit of the Sensual system, — among the most important of which may be named the Rapports du Physique et du Moral of Cabanis, and the Ideology of M. Destutt de Tracy ; and, by a strange fortune, the word Ideol ogy became in France the distinctive appellation of the doctrine of exclusive Sensualism.

From this time to the Consulate, we may trace a lively philosophical activity, though always in the direction of Sensualism. Hitherto, if any opposition to Sensualism had ap. peared, it was indirect and literary, rather than scientific. It may be found in writers of sentiment, such as St. Pierre, rather than in works of reflection. Thus, up to the time of the Empire, there was in strictness no philosophy opposed to the Sensual system. But from this period the tokens of a reaction become more distinct. Still, as is entirely natural, it manifested itself at first and most clearly in works of

INTRODUCTION.

. XI imagination and sentiment, in poetry and eloquence, rather than by scientific exposition. This reaction was favored by Napoleon, though not from any sympathy with the direction which the movement against Sensual ism afterwards displayed. From the cast of his mind and habits of education, and partly also from motives of policy, the Emperor had a strong dislike to all metaphysical and moral speculations, and did all in his power to discredit Ideology, which was then the exclusive form of speculation. When he reorganized the Institute, he excluded that class of studies ; and in every way endeavored to repress their pursuit, and to excite the cultivation of the mathe matical and physical sciences. Thus, under the Empire, the phi losophy of Condillac sensibly declined. It no longer produced important works, its former authorities lost in credit, and there was no longer the brilliant propagation of its doctrines which distinguished the preceding periods.

There was still another cause of the decline of Sensualism. It was in the character of several works written about this period, by writers avowedly belonging to the school of Condillac ; but who, by the distinctions and modifications which they introduced, actually favored a contrary doctrine. Among the most important of these works, may be named the Lectures of M. Laromiguiere. By distinguishing between the idea and the sensation, he makes the latter the matter, and the first the form received ; and this form is given by the intellectual activity. This activity is therefore admitted as an original attribute of the mind, and a co-ordinate source of knowledge ; which is certainly contrary to the exclusive origin in sensation. Laromiguiere, therefore, comes much nearer in this respect, to Reid, and particularly to Kant, than to his mas ter Condillac.

A little subsequently to this time, we come to Royer-Collard. Distinguished by eminent ability in every department, this cele brated man appeared in open and systematic opposition to Sensu alism. From 1811 to 1814, as the disciple and expounder of Reid, he advocated the doctrines of the Scottish philosopher, and annihilated the exclusive pretensions of the Sensual school to be the last word and highest result of philosophy. The able trans. lation of Reid's works, and of Stewart's Outlines of Moral Phi losophy, by Jouffroy, the scholar of Royer-Collard, contributed

INTRODUCTION.

. still further to extend the reaction against the system of Condillac. From the time when Royer-Collard commenced his lectures to the present day, and through the impulse which he imparted, philosophy has been cultivated with the most lively activity, by many ofthe finest spirits of France. Of these, some, carrying the zeal they had imbibed from their master into a still more extended sphere, pursued their investigations into the modern German speculations, which had already attracted some attention, and exerted some influence, through the writings of Madam de St'ael, the expo sitions of Villiers, and others. The reign of Sensualism was thus at an end. It came to be looked upon with as great a degree of aversion and contempt, as it had formerly enjoyed of credit and authority. Its few partizans were almost exclusively to be found among the naturalists and physicians.

In the only important work recently written in the interest of Materialism — Sur I' Irritation et la Folie, by Broussais — the author complains of the injustice and prejudice with which the once predominant doctrines of Sensualism are now regarded. In truth, nearly all the names of eminence and celebrity in every department of intellectual activity, are ranged on the side of a spiritual philosophy. Its influence pervades almost all the cele brated works that have appeared for nearly twenty years, in Art, in History, and in Literature at large. Among those who imbibed and have contributed to extend the spirit of this new activity in philosophy, there is no one who occu pies a more brilliant position, or has exerted a greater influence, than Victor Cousin. This celebrated philosopher was born in 1791.

He received his first instructions in philosophy, it is be lieved, from Royer-Collard, and was for some time his disciple. When, on the restoration of the Bourbons, Royer-Collard was made Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of France, Cousin was appointed adjunct Professor in the same department. At first he confined himself to commenting on the views of his master ; but soon, extending his studies beyond the limits of the Scottish school, he pursued his investigations with indefatigable zeal, through the whole field of philosophical inquiry. The ancient Grecian systems, — the middle ages, — the modern philosophy com mencing with Descartes,— and, finally, the vast mass of the more introduction. XIII recent German speculations, were explored. While engaged in these studies and in the duties of instruction, he was gradually forming the system to which his name is attached, and which has been subsequently developed in his lectures and writings.

About this time he put out an edition ofthe unpublished works of Proclus, in six volumes, from the manuscripts preserved in the Royal Li brary at Paris.* He then commenced a translation of the works of Plato, which is still in progress. Of this work, we have received the first eight volumes, which we believe to be all that have yet come from the press. Though traces of his dependence upon his German predecessor, Schleiermacher, are visible, yet, still this work exhibits admirable original ability on the part of the French translator. We know of no individual who could have made the French language — the most insufficient of all dialects for the higher uses of philosophy — approach so nearly to an adequate representation ofthe infinite variety and delicacy of Plato's Greek. To each dialogue, Cousin has prefixed a philosophical argument ; and the translation is to be followed by a volume containing the Use of Plato, and a regular exposition of his system. — To M. Cousin we also owe the best, and, we believe, the first complete edition ofthe works of Descartes. f During the reign of Jesuit ascendency, under the ministry of M. de Villele, Royer-Collard and Cousin — both obnoxious to the ultra royalists — were prohibited'from lecturing.

This period was passed by Cousin principally in retirement and private studies. In 1826, he published his volume of Philosophical Fragments. About this time he travelled in Germany with the young duke of Monto bello, the son of Marshall Lannes. Silenced in his own country by the ultra-royalists, his brilliant reputation alarmed the Prussian government, which sent police officers into Saxony, and arrested him at Dresden. By the interposition of the celebrated Hegel, Professor of Philosophy at Berlin, and the personal friend of Cousin, he obtained his release. This kindness Cousin acknow- » Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera e Codd. Mss. Biblioth. Reg. Pa risiensis, turn primum edidit, lectionis varietate, et commentariis illustravit Victor Cousin &c, Tom. VI., Paris, 1820—1827. t Oeuvres completes de Descartes, publiees par Victor Cousin, 11 vole., 8vo., Paris, 1824—1826. b2

INTRODUCTION.

. ledges with great warmth, in his beautiful and elegant dedication to Hegel, of the translation of the Gorgias. At length, on the overthrow ofthe Villele administration, Royer- Collard was chosen President of the Chamber of Deputies ; and Cousin, after eight years of silence, was restored to the chair of philosophy. — In 1828, besides giving to the public a volume under the title of New Philosophical Fragments, containing many 'rich fruits of his studies in ancient philosophy, and exhibiting additional proof of his learning and ability, — he commenced a course of lectures, which were published under the title of Introduction to the History of Philosophy. This volume has been given to the American public, in the spirited and faithful translation of Mr. Linberg. The next year, (1829,) Cousin published a translation from the German, of Tenneman's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, (Sketch of the History of Philosophy,) and delivered a course of lectures, which were published in two volumes, under the title of History of the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century.

After the overthrow of the liberal ministry, and the accession of the ultra royalists to power under Prince Polignac, Cousin appears again to have fallen under suspicion. A committee was appointed to inquire into the character and tendency of his lectures. Of the result of this investigation we have never heard, nor whether indeed it ever took place. The revolution of 1830, and the change of the French dynasty, probably left him to pursue his speculations and in structions, free from royalist annoyance. Since then, however, we know nothing of his philosophical labors, except three volumes of the translation of Plato. A new arrangement was made in his Professorship, by which M. Jouffroy received the department of the History of Modern Philosophy, while Cousin retained that of Ancient Philosophy. — Appointed under the new government to a place in the Royal Council of Public Instruction, he proceeded, in 1831, to Prussia to examine the state of education, and institutions for general instruction in that kingdom.

His Report, published on his return, is, we believe, his last work. A translation of it has recently been published in England, and the work appears to have attracted much attention there as well as in France. M. Cousin is still in the vigor of life, and it is to be hoped that he may yet contribute much more to the cause of phdosophy, and to the

INTRODUCTION.

. XV interests of truth and science, to which his life has been devoted. Eminent ability and profound learning, when animated by the pure and noble spirit which has ever characterized and distinguished the labors of M. Cousin, cannot but promote the cause of truth in whatever department they are manifested. It is gratifying here to adduce the testimony of one of the ablest writers in the Edin burgh Review, who appears indeed in oppositisn to Cousin's system, yet concerning the author, remarks : " He has consecrated his life and labors to philosophy, and to philosophy alone ; nor has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and of Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of par tiality in the choice of his pursuits ; whde his two works under the title of Philosophical Fragments, bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author.

Ta king him all in all, in France, M. Cousin stands alone ; nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments, without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from almost every principle of his philosophy." — The principles of philosophy here referred to by this writer, relate mainly to Cousin's solution of the problem concerning the positive knowledge of the infinite and absolute, by the human mind ; or, in other words, the possibility of philosophy, considered as the science of any thing beyond the phenomena of our own minds : this is affirmed by Cousin, and denied by this writer. In regard to the peculiar system of philosophy embraced and taught by M. Cousin, the limits of this introduction will admit only a very brief and general statement. An extended exposition of this system, is not perhaps necessary to the comprehension of the portion of his lectures herewith presented to the public ; inasmuch as the work consists, almost entirely, of special analyses and critical discussions complete in themselves, which may be sufficiently judged of from the reader's general acquaintance with philosophi cal language and systems, and from so much of his system as is exhibited in them.

Indeed, except in his oral instructions, M. Cousin has developed his philosophy rather in its applications, by history and criticism, than in a full and systematic exposition of its principles. Outlines of his system are given in the Programs of some of his courses of lectures published in the Philosophical

INTRODUCTION.

Fragments. They contain, however, barely the briefest indica tions. The reader will find a part of one of these programs printed at the end of this volume. A little fuller exposition ofthe fundamental principles of this system, may be found in the Preface to the Fragments, and also in the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Lectures 4th, 5th, and 6th, to which the reader is referred. The system of M. Cousin has received the appellation of Eclec ticism. By this, however, the doctrines of New Platonism are not to be understood, as has been nevertheless very erroneously stated.* Neither is it a Syncretism, or gross mixture of all sys tems, — the impracticable project of conciliating all doctrines and opinions, which can only result in the confusion of inconsistent principles, without any scientific unity and connexion.

On the contrary, it is a distinct scientific theory, — having its method, its principle, and its consequences. So far from being an arbitrary selecting and bringing together of doctrines and notions on the grounds of taste and preference, its processes are, throughout, * North American Review for July, 1829, p. 70. The statement made by the Reviewer is contradicted by the whole tenor of M. Cousin's criticism of New Platonism, contained in the Histoire de la Philos. au 18me Siecle, (Cours de Philosophic for 1829,) Vol. I. p. 317—332.— —Cousin there shows that the Alexandrine school, with the pretension and name of being a system of Eclecticism, was actually and distinctively a system of Mysticism, one of the four great systems under which he classes all the philosophical schools. As such, he proceeds to subject it to the criticism of his own principles, as distinct and different.

He developes its essential traits, its principle and its consequences ; shows that, as a system of Mysticism, its philosophy is distinctively religious; the heart of the sys. tem is its theodicy, or doctrine concerning the divine nature ; there is its principle ; its analysis, its psychology, and even its physics, are all made for and in the interest of its theology; that its principle " contains a fundamental error,"— involving a perversion ofthe true idea of God, and leading to all those mystical doctrines and practices of theurgy, incantation, magic, &c, which the Reviewer talks of Cousin's having " taken under his peculiar patronage."— It is but fair, however, to state, that the Reviewer could not have seen the work of Cousin which has just been referred to, as it had not probably then been published.

Still, with the other writings of Cousin in his hands, it is scarcely less remarkable that he should have fallen into such an error. It is only another instance of the influence of casual associations. The writer had probably been always in the habit of connecting the word Eclecticism with the doctrines ofthe Alexandrine or New Platonic school.