Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Railroad Riots in July, 1877 Read in the Senate and House of Representatives May 23, 1878 (part 6 of 7)

Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Railroad Riots in July, 1877 Read in the Senate and House of Representatives May 23, 1878 (part 6 of 7)

A. The fire was at Grant and Washington street, immediately in the neighborhood of the depot, and, of course, they used every effort possible, but I do not know, outside of the official departments, that anybody from any other quarter of the city was endeavoring to quell it--the firemen and police department, of course, were there, so far as I can learn, but they were comparatively powerless, on account of the size of the mob, and the area of territory they covered. I wish to make a remark here concerning the expression, "shooting down innocent citizens." That remark was intended to apply, and does apply, from reading the context, to parties on the hill side who were mere spectators, and not active rioters in any sense. If the military had cleared the track, and used proper force in clearing the track, I think they would have been justified, but they didn't even shoot the mob in front of them. They didn't fire into that crowd, but fired into an innocent crowd on the hill side, some of whom were in no sense rioters, and some of whom lived on the hill side. There was a small boy next door to me, was fired at and shot in his lung, who was taking some clothes to his brother, who was in the Fourteenth regiment; a boy about ten years of age, and he was nearly dead for several months. He finally got over it. This class of people here referred to, who were shot at on the hill side, were not rioters or participants in the riot.

Q. You say they were fired at. Were they not hit accidentally?

A. The information at that time, and, I think, the testimony since, showed that they were fired at an angle with the hillside. The hill ran up there rather abruptly, and the volley took effect there where these people were looking down. I remember a few hours before that, parties had said that would be a good place to see the trouble. The appraiser of the port, here, Mr. Chandler, sent his boy there, that day, and says, "Don't you go down on the track, but go on the hillside; you will be out of harm's way." It turned out afterwards that was the very place to be in harm's way.

Q. You speak about trouble. What trouble was there anticipated? Was it anticipated that the mob on the railroad tracks would resist the military, and bring on a collision?

A. There was certain trouble anticipated--there was a conflict anticipated of some kind. Either the mob or the soldiers would have to give way, and it was not known which. Trouble was apprehended.

Q. Was there trouble talked of--rumors in the street that there would be a resistance to the soldiers?

A. No, sir; I didn't think there was any talk of resistance. There was talk of trouble. The rioters seemed to be taking the ground that they had a right to stop there, so long as they did not interfere with the trains, and the military undertook to clear the track; and do not think if the military had cleared the mob who had actively obstructed them, that the trouble would not have been so great as it was. Firing into these people who were on the hillside, and not participating in the riot, I think, considerably aggravated the trouble, from my observation.

Q. You were not there when the firing took place?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know that the mob did not fire--that, at least, the soldiers did not fire on the mob in front of them?

A. That was the information, and I believe that was the fact, that they fired on the hill-side, and not on the strikers.

Q. How many people were killed and wounded upon the hill-side?

A. I think there is a list there that was tolerably accurate at the time. I cannot vouch for its absolute accuracy. You refer to the number killed on the hill-side?

Q. Yes.

A. I could not tell that. This boy, there mentioned, was shot on the hill-side, and I heard of a number of others. I cannot exactly re-call them. That list merely embraces the total number.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were these editorials, with the head-lines, intended to mollify and quiet the mob?

A. They were intended to represent the exact condition of affairs as we understood it at that time.

Q. Regardless of what effect it would have on the mob?

A. It is an exact reflex of the condition of affairs at the time. In the articles below, and in different other parts of the paper, any resort to physical violence was deprecated, further than the act of striking.

Q. In your estimation, did your editorial give a representation of the general sentiment of the citizens here as a reflex of the sentiment of the people?

A. I think it was, as far as I could learn.

Q. At that time?

A. Yes, sir.

* * * * *

Eugene O'Neal, sworn:

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Where do you live?

A. Pittsburgh.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. Connected with Pittsburgh Dispatch.

Q. Are your files here?

A. I sent a file up by your sergeant-at-arms.

Q. Just state what knowledge you have of the occurrences?

A. My knowledge of the occurrences is confined first to the strike and calling out of the military. I was there on the Thursday, Friday, and part of Saturday preceding this bloodshed. I was then called away upon business to Buffalo, and all that I know of the strike reporters brought of the suspension of work of the railroad hands, and I saw a crowd collected around the tracks. I was on the ground on Friday night. I also noticed in some degree manifestations of public feeling in regard to the strike and calling out of the troops. That came from personal knowledge. The entire knowledge I had was derived from reports.

Q. There is an editorial in your issue of the 21st July, entitled "Fruits of a Hasty Step." Did you write that article?

A. Yes, sir.

[The following is the article referred to:]

[Dispatch, July 21.]

FRUITS OF A HASTY STEP.

There was a general feeling in the community yesterday that the sudden and unlooked for ordering out of the troops to adjust the railroad difficulty was not the wisest course that might have been pursued. The actions of the strikers, while in some instances reprehensible, could scarcely be held by any construction to amount to a continuous riot, as there was only one case of violence, (in which the offender, McCall, was promptly arrested by the police,) and while there was a very general trespassing upon the company's road, there was certainly no destruction of property. It was hoped that with a cooling night intervening to both the officers and the men calmly thinking the situation over, an amicable arrangement might be effected, and the inconvenience to the public ended; but the precipitate calling for troops dispelled that possibility, and made the affair assume a really very serious aspect.

One point that must have been lost sight of by the sheriff in his excitement (and perhaps by the company's representatives too) was, that the engineers and firemen, while not themselves striking, were naturally in sympathy with their late associates, and that the stoppage of the trains was done rather upon solicitation than compulsion.

But the question arises whether, conceding there was a riot within the legal acceptation of the term, the usual remedies were exhausted before calling for troops. So far as appears, a small squad of the mayor's police was sufficient to quell the only fight that occurred. It was then supposed that peace was reigning, until sometime after midnight, when Sheriff Fife addressed a party of the strikers advising them to go home, and when a more irreverent person in the crowd replied that he (the mayor) might migrate to a hot climate. This simple circumstance seems to have been the last straw. It was, of course, a very wrong remark to the sheriff who (without waiting, so far as is evidenced, to summon a posse comitatus) hastened off to the telegraph office and apprised the Governor, at lightning speed, that the red planet of war had risen on the banks of the Allegheny. And then flashed back telegrams to the major general in local command, and the major general emitted general order number one, (it must have scared the readers of yesterday morning's Dispatch as it burst upon them with double-leaded significance from our advertising columns,) and troops were hurried out of bed, and amid a great rushing to and fro in hot haste, and sleepy eyes looked sad farewells to other eyes that winked, and mouths that yawned again, the regiments were put in marching order for the battle-field which lay from the Union depot along Snyder's hollow to the East Liberty stock-yards.

There was a sort of general feeling through the community yesterday that there was a good deal of farce about this, that so solemn a matter as calling out the military, spreading broad-cast over the continent the notion that Pittsburgh was on the verge of a civil war, ought not to have been resolved upon before at least all the ordinary police resources were exhausted. It also had the effect of creating an active sympathy for the strikers with many, who before had none. And besides, it incensed the men themselves, made them less open to argument and persuasion, and in so far as it did this, it tended to prolong the strike, and consequently disturb the business interests of the city; and worse yet, it drew hundreds of angry outsiders to the scene and mixed them in the controversy. We do not believe, as some are inclined to fear, that this affair will--ill-advised though it may have been--will occasion a general bitter feeling between labor and capital. The best proof is to be found in the expressions upon the street yesterday, which were not those of labor against capital or capital against labor; but almost unanimously, one of mortification at the eagerness and haste with which the solemn and expensive course of proclaiming a community in a state of insurrection was decided upon. It was hoped all around that the difference between the railroads and the hands would adjust itself inside of forty-eight hours at the furthest, if left to take its course; when or how it will be settled now remains to be seen; but at the best, there will be bitter feeling, and it is to be feared acts from time to time that under moral suasion and under peaceful treatment would not have been thought of. Two hours of calm, candid talk and fair treatment between the officers of the roads and the employés would have done more toward a permanent pacification than a regiment of military. Who would answer for the consequences, supposing that on the head of the hasty turn out of the military blood had been shed yesterday? The law is great and its majesty powerful when administered with cautious solemnity and decorum, but never should it be stripped of its grave and most serious surroundings. To abate one jot or one tittle of them, is to inflame the passions of the multitude, and make them to forget their paramount duty of obedience to the law, and to precipitate the very evils sought to be avoided. It is scarcely necessary to add to aught which has been written, that on the question of the attitude of the strikers or violence by them or obstruction thrown by them in the way of the company, there can be no two opinions among calm people. Yesterday we said, as we believed firmly and as gathered from their conversations, the reasons that led them to quit work. For quitting work, they are certainly not censurable; in fact, considering the lowness of their wages, if by this method alone they could improve their condition, sympathy would attend their effort; but, of course, they have no right to violently interfere with the roads, if the roads can get other men to fill their places. On this point, no two intelligent and unheated persons think of disputing. There is, however, as explained by them, a considerable difference of opinion between the community and the authorities as to the wisdom of trying to knock this principle into the heads of the strikers with the butt end of a gun, instead of exhausting first peaceful methods. Brute force is bad all around, and even threats of it are not always the best or quickest remedy for evils.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the causes leading to the strike?

A. I have no personal knowledge. I had, however, some knowledge of the causes which had been gathered for some months before, and which were familiar in people's mouths about the time--the reduction of wages and the bitter feeling that existed between the employés and officers of the roads. I heard of these things as leading to the strikes. I was very familiar with the reports that Tradesmen's Unions had been formed for the purpose of carrying them out.

Q. For the purpose of carrying out the strike, do you mean?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How did you obtain that information?

A. I obtained it by personal information--partly among railroad men, partly among citizens, and from our reporters.

Q. Did you have any knowledge leading you to suppose that this strike would take place before the 19th?

A. No; the strike had taken place before my attention was directed to it. Of course the information had come from other sections of the country that it had already taken place there.

Q. From your knowledge and information, was there any necessity for calling out the troops?

A. Not the slightest, sir, according to the best of my judgment and belief, at the time they were called.

Q. I believe you were not here after the troops arrived?

A. I was here after they arrived, but not here on the night of the bloodshed.

Q. You say there was no necessity for calling the troops here?

A. None that I could see.

Q. You mean by that that the civil authorities were able to cope with the mob, or with the strikers?

A. I think the civil authorities could have successfully coped with any disorder if it had not been for the introduction of the troops and their want of discipline. I think that the troops helped more than any other cause, so far as my judgment has been able to reach. Their want of discipline, their want of coolness, and subsequently their demoralization, running away, was the prime cause which led the mob, and brought out the bad elements in it, and gave them to suppose they were masters of the field.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You mean to say that there was a demonstration of that kind before the Philadelphia troops arrived?

A. Of which kind?

Q. Of the mob going out to destroy property?

A. It had assumed that which in popular parlance, is termed a mob.

Q. Was there any demonstration of that kind?

A. There was a demonstration to the extent of numbers of citizens assembling at the different points along the road, drawn by curiosity. The first demonstration I saw, was a demonstration of people who went out of curiosity to see the troops.

Q. That was your Pittsburgh troops?

A. Pittsburgh, yes, sir. So far as I could see, there was no disposition to violence, in any shape, manner or form, at that time.

By Mr. Means:

Q. After the arrival of the Philadelphia troops, did it excite the people of the city of Pittsburgh or the mob, to more violence than before they arrived?

A. There had been no act of violence, to my knowledge, in the sense of physical violence. There was no violence, save in so far as the presence of these men as trespassers might be considered violence, and the action of the strikers in their dealings with the engineers towards stopping the cars, so far as that might be considered violence. I do not speak of that. But there was no violence up to Saturday morning, that I heard of, save in the case of the assault upon the railroad officer at the time, which seemed to be an assault and battery, and the party, I think, was arrested, and brought to the station-house.

Q. After the arrival of the Philadelphia troops, was it then demonstrated that the citizens of Pittsburgh or the mob, was determined to clean out the Philadelphia troops?

A. I was not in the city after the conflict occurred, but suppose that of course. I could only judge as you judge, from what you read, that the shedding of blood aroused the feeling of animosity, and as to the feeling among the citizens, I do not think there was any disposition among the citizens of Pittsburgh, to the encouragement of arson or bloodshed--that is, among the respectable and larger portion of the community. After the militia, which was supposed to be able to take charge of the situation had fled, then I have no doubt that the mob took control.

Q. Did you see any demonstrations made to clean out the Philadelphia troops?

A. Not the slightest. The troops arrived here the morning I left. I had arranged for a trip to New York, and I went to Buffalo, and the troops had arrived, and there was a bitter feeling among the people in regard to calling out the Philadelphia troops. There had been mention of that feeling about calling out the Pittsburgh troops, and a great many people thought it was unnecessary, as the civil authorities had been able to cope with disorder for ten years, and would be able to do it on this occasion, and I think the people thought the military force was being used as a police force for the railroad. I think they felt aggravated about it; but there was no evidence of disposition to resist, or tendency towards bloodshed, so far as my observation went, or so far as any reports we heard would lead me to believe.

* * * * *

J. M. Carson, sworn:

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What is your name?

A. Joseph M.

Q. Where do you reside, sir?

A. Pittsburgh.

Q. What is you occupation?

A. Journalist.

Q. Was that your occupation in July last, at the time of the riots?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state any information that you have in regard to the causes leading to the riot?

A. I have none to give of personal knowledge. I was not out of the office that day from three o'clock until the next morning or the next day at one or two. I only know it from reporters that had been out at the scene of the difficulty. I only know it from hearsay, and I do not suppose that is evidence. I am prepared to answer to the queries in regard to the paper. There is an editorial in there. I desire to state that that is mine.

Q. That is in the Critic of July 22?

A. I desire that to be part of my evidence.

Q. "Military Blunder--Uncalled-for Bloodshed."

A. Yes, sir.

[Critic, July 22.]

MILITARY BLUNDER--UNCALLED-FOR BLOODSHED.

Even at the moment of this writing, it is not difficult to perceive that a fearful blunder has been committed by the Governor and his ill-timed military advisers. It is impossible for us to conceive that the action of the railroad strikers, taking the worst view of either side of the case, justified the calling out of the military.

Time should have been allowed for a respectful parley between parties; time for the railroad company to properly consider the grievances complained of in the respectful petition of the strikers, and time for the railroad employés to act in response. There is tyranny in this country worse than anything ever known in Russia, and it is time we should get at the gist of it.

Strikes are common occurrences, but it appears that it is only when the "great monopoly," the hated company, which discriminates against the interests of Pittsburgh and western Pennsylvania, is subjected to one of these strikes, that the military are ordered out, and that, too, without a moment's consideration, us though the Pennsylvania railroad was more important than the peace and order and the lives of half the citizens of this State.

There is no use disguising the matter. The people of this city sympathize with the strikers. They are incensed beyond measure, with the cold, corrupt legislation which has fostered the colder and more corrupt organization known as the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. But we cannot disguise the legal technicalities which appear to brace up that company as against the people. All that we say and care to know is, that a fearful blunder was made by the constituted authorities, who from the Governor down to General Pearson and Sheriff Fife, appeared to be only the willing tools of the giant oppressor.

We hold that the reckless haste of General Pearson and Governor Hartranft makes them the prime ringleaders of what promises to be the bloodiest riot with which the Commonwealth has ever been visited. The insane policy of calling Philadelphia troops to this city to quell a domestic quarrel is reprehensible beyond degree.

Hartranft and Pearson have only added fuel to the flames, that may not be satisfied till the lives of hundreds of militia and citizens are sacrificed. But while we counsel peace, it is only the duty of journalists to fix the blame where it belongs, and therefore we arraign before the board of public opinion General Pearson, Sheriff Fife, Thomas Scott, and Governor Hartranft, and their aiders and abettors for the murder of our fellow-citizens, who were slaughtered by the Philadelphia militia.

Whether the officer commanding was drunk or crazy when he ordered the Philadelphia soldiers to fire into our own Nineteenth regiment, whereby one member was killed, it is a matter that should engage the minds of a military court. But such recklessness and mismanagement is only part and parcel of the great blunder of which we complain.

The railroad magnates claim and protest their inability to carry on their business with profit without the much vexed reduction. All the employés can say is, we must starve at these wages. Now, granting that on one side or the other there must be suffering, which, is it equable, should suffer? But the concession can only be made for the sake of casuistic argument. The railroads affirm that they cannot meet expenses without curtailing salaries to the extent that has caused this present trouble. Let us take the case of the Pennsylvania Company. In this instance, we could show some other method of escaping the difficulty. Look at this:

J. N. McCullough, $12,000 per annum. William Thaw, 10,000 per annum. Thomas D. Messier, 10,000 per annum. John Scott, (solicitor,) 10,000 per annum. H. H. Houston, (in no recognized position,) 10,000 per annum.

Contrast this with the ninety cents of the poor brakeman. But then, what is the poor laboring man? Let the following real occurrence tell:

BABY FOOD FOR LABORING MEN.

While circulating among the strikers at the outer depot, the reporter found a few of the men willing enough to tell their grievances. One said: "When Vice President Cassatt and General Manager Frank Thomson were at the Altoona shop, Cassatt remonstrated with Thomson against any further reduction. 'Why,' said Cassatt, 'the men cannot buy butter for their bread.' 'Butter,' said Thomson, 'what do they want with butter, let them make dip.' The reduction was made," continued the complaining striker, and whether the men have been living on dip or not, it is very evident from the belligerent feeling displayed here to-day, that they can fight on dip. "Yes," continued the man, in a cold, bitter tone, which showed plainly how deeply, how plainly, the cold-hearted insult.... "Mr. Frank Thomson drives his tandem team and draws his big salary, whilst we must do double work at half pay."

The officials can build palaces, the laborer can rent a hovel. The one can roll along in the bustling splendor of a four-in-hand, the other cannot hide the burnt and frost-bitten foot. These railroad authorities can afford salaries that will secure the costliest luxuries and sustain an apish aristocracy, that cannot extend the salary to meet the commonest necessaries of life, to the beggared, starving, crushed laborer and his family. All these magnates will talk of the impossibility of running business without further curtailing the wages of the poor laborer. Arrogant impudence! Unbearable tyranny! Why, it has come to this, that labor is servitude! That a poor man must delude himself to satisfaction at the thought of starving, and respectfully take a pittance called wages. The millions must stand off and die smilingly, and look pleasurably at the outstretched arms of a few like Tom Scott grasping, robbing, paralyzing, crushing our industries, even our lives. Capital has raised itself on the ruins of labor.

The laboring class cannot, will not stand this longer. The war cry has been raised, and has gone far and wide. It will not confine itself to the narrow, nor even long stretch of the railroads. Labor will assert itself. It must have its equality, and that it will, sooner or later, amicably, it is desirable, forcibly, if necessary. Certainly rebellion against lawful authority is never lawful, but the principle that freed our nation from tyranny will free labor from domestic aggression.

The witness: The first page there was our reporters. The head-lines I do not know anything about. I went to bed that morning at half-past four, and those head-lines were put in after.

Q. That is, on the first page, and starts out with "Bread or Blood?"

A. Yes, sir; but the reports themselves I believe to be correct, and I believe as fair a statement as has been made of the occurrences. I regret this; but I believe they are as fair a statement as could be had. I know they were truthful--there was no object in misrepresenting them, and the exasperating state of troubled feeling, after shooting down and killing twenty-two citizens of Pittsburgh--men and women--would have induced any community to have felt the same way as we did.

Q. Who is responsible for these head-lines starting out with "Bread or Blood?"

A. Legally, I am responsible; morally, I am not, but legally I am. I do not shirk any responsibility.

Q. What I mean by that question is, who wrote these head-lines?

A. I did not. I would rather the committee would not press the question as to who did it. It is not material to the issue anyhow. It was done by a young man in my employ at that time, after I had gone to bed. I did not know anything about it. For every line in that paper I am responsible, except these--for everything excepting the head-lines I am responsible for, and nobody else, and I am legally responsible for them. I do not seek to evade any responsibility.

Q. When I ask the question as to the responsibility, I do not mean legal responsibility?

A. I was the real editor. I do not object to the head-lines. They adequately represented popular sentiment at that time. If it was twenty-two citizens of Philadelphia shot down by Pittsburgh troops, I think there would be a feeling of that kind evinced by the Philadelphia papers. That is my judgment.

Q. One part of the head-lines says, "The worthy strikers arm themselves, and assemble thousands strong to compel their rights?"

A. I did not say so. I simply said I was legally responsible, and not morally. I did not write them, but I say this: that if twenty-two Philadelphians had been shot down without orders, as the evidence before your committee proves, that the Philadelphia papers would have had just such head-lines. It is very well now, four or five months after the occurrence, and when we can calmly and coolly review the facts, to say that that is incendiary and improper. That is all right. I agree with you. I agree now that it was perhaps to that extent, but you, as a Philadelphian, if our Pittsburgh troops had gone down there and shot you Philadelphians, you certainly would have felt as I did when that was written. I did not write it, but I do not shirk any responsibility for it.

Q. Do you mean that that expresses the feeling at that time?

A. I believe that it adequately and fully represented that feeling. That is my candid, conscientious conviction.

Q. At the time of the occurrence?

A. Yes, I did. It is no idle thing to come out here and shoot down twenty-two people that were innocent. If they had been rioters or strikers, if they had had any part or lot in this thing and had shot them down, they would have been right. I would not have blamed you. I do not blame the committee, of course, but I do say this: it was no more and no less than murder to shoot down these people as they were shot down. I think that is the fullest and best account of the riot that appeared in any Pittsburgh paper.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Mr. Carson, do you say and do you think, in your opinion--had the press time to deliberate--do you believe they would have written so sarcastic an article as that?

A. There is no paper in the city of Pittsburgh, published on the eventful Sunday morning of that day, that would not have put some such article as that in their paper.

Q. Understand me right. Had the press had time to deliberate, would they have cast these articles broadcast to the world?

A. No, sir; they would not, but that Sunday morning--Monday morning there was a change. I understand you----

Q. This was done, Mr. Carson, on the spur of the moment?

A. It was done when we knew--when we had four reporters out there, when they were bringing in the intelligence of the murder, as we deemed it then, and as the grand jury has since, by their presentment presented, and when they were shot down without orders, we wrote those head-lines. I did not, but I am responsible. That is why we did it.

Q. You say you wrote the balance of the article?

A. No; four reporters did. The head-lines--I am responsible for every line that appears there but the head-line. And that editorial, I dictated that. That is entirely my own, and every word of it--I stand over it to-day, after months have elapsed. The head-lines--I did not know of it until the next morning.

Q. You say in this editorial, "It is impossible for us to conceive that the action of the railroad strikers, taking the worst view of their side of the case, justified the calling out of the military"--what do you mean by that?

A. I mean their action was passive--was not aggressive. They simply were there. They refused to work, and I furthermore believe, that had there been any conciliation, or attempt at conciliation, used by Scott or their pampered officials, that it could have been arranged. That is my candid belief.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Suppose that the railroad officials had agreed to comply with the request of the strikers--is that what you mean?

A. I do not mean that. I mean if there was any attempt made, but there was not any. They assumed the attitude of tyrants--were overbearing, were tyrannical, and they were abusive.

Q. What reason have you to believe, Mr. Carson, that the strikers would have gone to work had the railroad officials not raised their wages?

A. I can only say in reply to that, I believe they could have been conciliated, and there could have been an adjustment of troubles, and more than that I cannot say. I believe it could have been managed.

Q. Without the increase of wages?

A. I do. I believe even that.

Q. You believe, then, that the strikers would have conceded to the ten per cent. being taken off?

A. Yes, I do. But you treat a workingman as a dog, and he will be very apt, like a worm, to turn. It was not so much the reduction as it was they wanted to crush out all the manhood in him, and trample him into the dust. They treated them with no consideration at all. They treated them as just so much machinery. I do not want to interject a speech into my evidence, but if you want a speech I can give it to you on that question.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Had the strikers--had the men sent a committee to the railroad officials?

A. Yes--and how was the committee received.

Q. How?

A. I do not know. If you want me to tell you how I was told they were received, I will tell you; I do not know of my own knowledge.

Q. You must have some grounds for forming an opinion.

A. I will give you that now. They were received with the utmost haughtiness. They were dismissed with a wave of the hand. They said, "We will make no terms, no concessions with you. Go back to your wages--go to work--then we will talk to you. We will have nothing at all to do with you." Now that was the way they were received.

Q. Were they not told that if they would retire from the company's property, and allow the company to enjoy its property and its rights, that they would receive them?

A. No, sir, never heard of it; no, sir. Not the most sanguine man that knows anything about the Pennsylvania railroad officials in western Pennsylvania would ever say such a thing either. I make that a part of my testimony.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you pretend to say that the----

A. I pretend to say that the railroad officials in western Pennsylvania, on the part of the Pennsylvania railroad, are tyrants, and serfs in Russia have better lives to lead than employés on the Pennsylvania railroad. There is no serfdom in Russia--if the reporter will make that correction. Slavery has been abolished in America, and has been abolished in Russia, but there is a modified form of it on the Pennsylvania----

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What do you mean when you say that the "hated company discriminates against the interests of Pittsburgh and western Pennsylvania?"

A. Do you want me to talk on that subject? I can talk for five hours. I say they have systematically discriminated against Pittsburgh, and they have ruined it--that is what they have done. They will carry freight from Pittsburgh--they have systematically discriminated against Pittsburgh to the extent of twenty-five per cent., and when Colonel Scott was here, he said he was horrified. He had not dreamed there was such discrimination. He could not believe it possible; and James Parke, junior, who was one of our most eminent citizens, a Christian gentleman, too, he said it was true. Why, said he, I could not believe it possible. We know it's possible--we know it has ruined Pennsylvania; and the only thing that is going to help us is a competing road, and that, thank God, we will have in the course of three or four months.

Q. Let me ask you, what do you mean by discriminating?

A. it means that they will carry freight from Chicago to Philadelphia cheaper than they will carry from Chicago to Pittsburgh; that they will carry cheaper from Chicago to Albany than they will carry it to Pittsburgh; that Pittsburgh merchants can take goods to Boston, and take them to San Francisco a great deal cheaper--paying the freight to Boston and back--a great deal cheaper than they can ship them direct to San Francisco. There were three thousand tons shipped by Wilson, Walker & Co., to Boston, and from Boston to San Francisco, paying the freight to Boston and back. That is what made trouble in this community. They have been systematically oppressing Pittsburgh. There is no manufacturer unless he has got drawbacks and rebates.

By Mr. Means:

Q. This trouble might just as well have fallen on some other portion of the State as it did on Pittsburgh, would it not?

Q. It could have, and I think would, had we not anticipated the whole trouble here. There was not a community in the State of Pennsylvania, which would have sympathized to the extent that we did. I will answer why: we would have sympathized because we have been systematically oppressed for the last fifteen years. We have been practically ruined.

Q. This thing was as likely to occur at Harrisburg or Scranton or Reading, as it was at Pittsburgh, but, unfortunately, Pittsburgh was the place.

A. We bore the blunt of it. We were the first to receive it, and it found the community in full sympathy with the strikers, because of their sufferings. You systematically oppress a people, and revolution is not only right, but it is a duty.

Q. You say the community--did your merchants give aid and abet in this strike?

A. They did not. They were in sympathy with the strikers; but I was up on Sunday, there at the Union depot, and I saw the people. Saw that they were burning, and all that kind of thing. I did not see a single Pittsburgher. They were all strange faces, and not a face there that was familiar to me, and I am thoroughly familiar with Pittsburgh. They were tramps gathered from all parts of the Union.

Q. That is not the question I asked you. The question I asked you was this: if the merchants of the city of Pittsburgh sympathized with the strikers?

A. They did.

Q. Sympathized with the mob in their violence?

A. No, sir. I went up to the Union depot on Sunday, between one and three o'clock in the afternoon. I saw that mob, and there was not a single Pittsburgh face in it. They were all strangers--tramps, and the strikers had gone away.

Q. No strikers among them.

A. No; I did not see any.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was there any sympathy expressed by the good portions of the citizens of this city after the burning and destruction of property had commenced?

A. On the contrary, the utmost detestation of the ravages of the mob. They sympathized with the strikers in their demand for higher wages. Ninety cents is not much for a man to live on, and I would like to see you gentlemen try to live on it.

Q. Was there any expression of sympathy on the part of citizens with the mob that attacked the troops in the round-house before the burning took place?

A. I rather imagine that the feeling of the community was that the men who had murdered----

Q. I want you to answer the question, whether there was an expression and sentiment to that effect.

A. No; no organized expression.

Q. Was there any individual expression?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of good citizens?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Justifying the attack upon the troops in the round-house?

A. No; not justifying the attack on the troops in the round-house?

Q. Or in their retreat from the round-house?

A. No; but there was a feeling that it was no more than retributive justice--there was no urging that to be done.

Q. There seems to be an article in the nature of an advertisement, commencing, "Attention Citizens," &c.

A. I cannot tell you about that. That is an advertisement. I did not see that, and I do not know who put it in, even.

By Mr. Means:

Q. That part you claim that you are not responsible for?

A. I do not know anything about an advertisement. A man pays for it and he gets them in.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was that paid for?

A. I presume so. I am not business manager. I am responsible for whatever is written there. I assume that responsibility wholly.

Q. Do you know of any articles that were published in your paper that were calculated to arouse and inflame the people that were paid for for insertion?

A. No, sir; I did not.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Have you got any idea who wrote that article, if you were paid for it?

A. I do not know who wrote it. I do not know anything about that.

Q. In writing an article--supposing I was even competent to write an article for your paper, and would wish to suppress my name, would not you require to have my name, so that if you were come back upon you could get it?

A. In regard to that, that is not an article, it is an advertisement.

Q. It might come under that head. I think it would keep you very busy to make that out an advertisement. I do not claim to be a newspaper man, but it would keep me pretty busy to make that out?

A. It was paid for, or it would not have been in, because I have assumed the responsibility for everything that was in there, but I do not assume for that, because I do not know anything about it.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. That was paid for as an advertisement?

A. I have no doubt that our business manager could give you proper information. I am willing to assume any responsibility. I do not shirk that, but that is a matter that is not in my line. That is a business advertisement.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I am not a newspaper man, but, I suppose, if I should write an article for your paper, you would require the name?

A. Look at the position it occupies; it is put among the advertisements, I believe.

Senator Reyburn: No, sir.

Mr. Means: No, sir; it would hardly bear that construction.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Is not the editor of a paper responsible for anything that is published in his paper, whether it is an advertisement or anything else?

A. He is.

Q. And therefore you are responsible, as editor of that paper, for that advertisement?

A. I am.

Q. Now, give us the name of the man that had that advertisement put in?

A. I cannot.

Q. Can you give us any party that can give us the name?

A. Our business manager probably could.

Q. Who is he?

A. E. G. Minnemeyer.

* * * * *

W. F. Aull, sworn:

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. Pittsburgh.

Q. Were you a member of the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania in July last?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What position did you hold?

A. Captain of the Eighteenth regiment.

Q. Did you receive an order from General Latta, ordering General Brinton to take a certain route after leaving the round-house, in case he was driven from the round-house?

A. I received an order from General Latta, after they had left the round-house, to deliver to General Brinton, with instructions to deliver to him at the arsenal. It was then supposed he was located at the arsenal.

Q. Did you deliver that order to General Brinton?

A. No, sir.

Q. Can you give the substance of the order?

A. Yes, sir. On Sunday morning, we were lying at Torrens station. Communication had been cut off, both by telegraph and couriers. We had no communication with General Latta at all, and Colonel Guthrie requested me to go to the Union depot, and endeavor, if possible, to obtain an interview with General Latta, and ask him what orders he had to issue for our regiment. I went to the Union depot, and, on my way there, I passed the Philadelphia troops just coming out of the round-house. I went to the Union depot and reported to General Latta that the troops were out of the round-house, and on their way out Penn avenue--I do not know where. He waited a few moments, and a messenger came in, stating that they had left the round-house, and had gone to the arsenal. Another one came in in a few moments, saying that they were quartered in the arsenal. General Latta, after deliberating for a few moments over the matter, and consulting one or two parties there, requested me to remain a few moments until he would write an order. I did not know what the substance of the order was at all, and, after I had started, he told me to take that order to General Brinton at the arsenal, and, as soon as I left the Union depot, I read the order, which was instructing General Brinton to proceed by way of Penn avenue to East Liberty, and join Colonel Guthrie. I went immediately to the arsenal, and I found that they were not quartered there at all. I made inquiry and was told they had gone on out Butler street. I drove on up Butler street as rapidly as possible, and when I got to Sharpsburg, or two miles beyond there, they told me they were stationed two miles ahead of me, on the other side of the river. There was a gentleman remarked there that they were striking for Butler county. I deliberated a few moments whether I would follow them, or report first to the regiment, and consult Colonel Guthrie. I finally concluded I would go to my regiment, at East Liberty, and, if Colonel Guthrie thought it advisable, after consulting him, I would go across the river, and deliver the order to General Brinton. Upon handing the order to Colonel Guthrie, he instructed me to take command of the regiment, and he would go to town and see General Latta in person, which he did. I never saw the order from that time until this. A day or two afterwards, however, I received a telegram from General Latta, requesting me, for the first time, to report what action I had taken in the matter, and I reported to him by letter, which is published in the Adjutant General's report, I see.

Q. Did you read the order to Colonel Norris, or did he see the order, to your knowledge?

A. Yes; I showed him the order at the arsenal. He overtook me at the arsenal coming up a different route, and started for East Liberty. I hailed him, and told him he was on the wrong road. I told him I had an order here, producing it, I think. I think I told him I had an order for General Brinton, and I was going on to overtake him, and he turned immediately and went on ahead of me. I went back to my buggy and he went on ahead of me, and I did not overtake him. He understood, however, what was in the order. I believe he read the order before it left General Latta, at the Union depot.

Q. Who was responsible for the delivery of that order, handed you by General Latta for General Brinton?

A. Who was responsible for its delivery?

Q. For its delivery or its non-delivery?

A. My instructions were to deliver the order to General Brinton in the arsenal. When I found he was not in the arsenal, and my instructions being to report back to my regiment, I considered my first duty, after I found he had gone away outside of my route, was to report to my colonel and see what he would do. He then advised me to remain where I was, and said he would go with the order to General Latta, which he did. He took the order, put it in his pocket, and left the regiment on Sunday about eleven o'clock, I think, and went in and had an interview with General Latta.

Q. You were at Torrens station?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You know nothing of the movement of the troops during Saturday night and Sunday morning?

A. I received an order on Sunday morning, at two o'clock, to join Colonel somebody, from Wall station, and move to Twenty-eighth street. We went to Torrens station, and received ammunition sent there for them, and waited there until the next morning, and they never put in an appearance.

* * * * *

August Ammon, sworn:

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. City of Pittsburgh.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am insurance agent.

Q. Are you the father of Robert Ammon, known as Bob Ammon during the troubles in July?

A. Yes; I am.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the occurrences during that time in Allegheny City?

A. I have, somewhat. I felt, of course, it was natural that I should feel an interest, seeing that my son was concerned there.

Q. Were you in Allegheny City at the time?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you any personal knowledge of any of the occurrences over there?

A. Not of the occurrences. My aims were directed to inspire Robert as much as possible--to prevent destruction of property. I sent messages and communications to him frequently, almost hourly.

Q. To that effect?

A. Yes, sir.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Your son Robert testified in Philadelphia that he had some communications with some parties that were concerned in the railroad, either the officials of the railroad company and the civil authorities of Allegheny City--have you any of these communications--the originals?

A. Yes, sir; Robert handed them to me in the jail of Allegheny City, and I turned them over to his lawyer. I would have brought them up this morning, but Mr. Miller was sick. I did not go to see them until this afternoon. I have those that I deemed the most important here.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. In whose handwriting are they?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know your son's handwriting?

A. Yes. They were dispatches which he received there.

Q. Just select them in their order?

A. Now here is the first one I present here. I have read them over so often that I am familiar with them, and if you will permit I will read them.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Read that one [indicating?]

A. This dispatch is directed to Allegheny City, at the outer depot, where Robert had his station, reads as follows:

"Operator, do anything to save property, and if engines and freight can be moved out of the city and men enough to do it, and the strikers will permit, run them west on north track far enough to be safe from any damage from Pittsburgh men. Give copy to Ammon. G. S. G."

If you desire an explanation of these, those initials signify "George S. Griscom," whose duty it was to send them. A gentleman by the name of W. A. Routson occupied his place.

Q. What position?

A. The position of Mr. Griscom, during his absence.

Q. What is Mr. Griscom's position?

A. He is a railroad official. Kind of assistant superintendent, Mr. Layng is general superintendent, and those gentlemen are next to him.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. That was not signed by Griscom?

A. Not that. Routson signed these dispatches. I got that information from Robert. There is something on the other side. The operator who signs "K," says, "Ammon wants to know if you want the sixty-eight armed men."

Q. Signed by the operator?

A. Signed by the operator who signs himself "K." The answer of "G. S. G.," "Yes; if he is in good faith to defend the company's property." If it is in order, I might give you a little explanation.

Q. Certainly.

A. On Sabbath morning early, I guess, as early as five o'clock--I live on the south side--I got up, and I got my horse and buggy, and I put Robert's mother in with a younger son of mine, and asked them to drive over. I read in the Chronicle that Bob was among the strikers, and I supposed Bob was in the oil regions at the time; I did not know that he was in Allegheny. I sent Mrs. Ammon over with the request to Robert, that if he thought he would be involved in the strike he had better get in the buggy with his mother and come to Birmingham, and stay until the trouble was over, and I gave the little fellow, who was in the buggy some money to pay his fare in the street car. She informed me that Bob would willingly have complied with my request, but that he could not leave. There was a very great many tramps there, and he and the strikers had to get arms to keep these men away from robbing the cars, and for this reason he could not follow my advice, and go to Birmingham.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know this before you go any further. Are those telegrams that Robert Ammon received from the railroad officials during the time that he had charge of the road?

A. Yes, sir; this is the commencement of them. He had not charge on Sunday. He took charge of it on Monday. The next telegram is directed to Bob. It says:

"Ammon, a large crowd of men going down the Brighton road, where coaches and cars are on the main track, east of Manchester. Can you protect them?

"G. S. G."

Q. Who is "G. S. G."?

A. Assistant superintendent Griscom. Here is one directed to the initials "W. F. R." That means William F. Ross. He was also official of the railroad.

Q. Dispatcher, wasn't he?

A. Yes; I think so.

"Tell Ammon, if the freight cannot be moved, we would like to move the engines any way. Tell him to help the C. & P., too. [That means Cleveland and Pittsburgh.]

"G. S. G."

Q. Were these sent by wire--by telegraph?

A. Yes; he got them.

Q. By telegraph?

A. Yes, sir. Here is an original that is in Bob's handwriting.

"J. D. L.: [That means, J. D. Layng.]

"I have just sent Ed. Compbell and Paisley to Mayor Phillips for twenty-five police to watch cars, as our men are completely prostrated and wish to obtain some rest. They will watch with police. Can you make some arrangement to get victuals for these men on watch?

"AMMON."

They got a little provisions--that came a little previous, that ought to come in afterwards. Here is another addressed to J. D. L.:

"Can you arrange to send me to-day some hundreds of cartridges? Answer me, as I expect to have use for them.

"AMMON."

Here is another one:

"AMMON:

"Have instructed Ross and Parkin to arrange for provisions. See them.

"J. D. L."

That means J. D. Layng.

Q. Who is "J. D. Layng?"

A. "J. D. Layng;" he is general superintendent.

"AMMON:

"C. & P. Shifter wanted to go down to Glendale and back, and take down relief guards and supper to the men. Is it O.K. to run them following 37?

"G. S. G."

Bob's answer is written in his own handwriting:

"Will spare engine 305. Will pick it up and take it down with the relief.

"AMMON."

Here is another one:

"Please hurry engine for 17 over.

"W. F. ROSS."

Q. These are without dates?

A. "AMMON:

"Engine No. 421 will go on No. 17; and engine 97 on No. 37; and engine 325 on No. 39.

"J. G. PARKIN."

Q. Who is J. G. Parkin?

A. He arranged with Ross and Parkin for provisions--he was a regular employé there.

"AMMON:

"Engine, No. 330, will go on 17, instead of engine, No. 421.

"G. S. P." That is Parkin.

Here is a despatch from Mr. Layng:

"AMMON:

"I think a new request on the mayor would give you the cartridges, as he no doubt, has been supplied by this time.

"J. D. L."

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Here is a dispatch:

"D. R. AMMON:

"Of course, you understand that I cannot do anything in the matter of sending, but if you will permit me, as a private individual, to make a suggestion, it would be, that you send to Mayor Phillips and ask him to send you fifty to one hundred men, to protect the property now on the Fort Wayne tracks. I think, that on a proper representation of the facts, he would do this, and it would give the men now in charge of the property, the rest I have no doubt they very much need.

"J. D. L."

"AMMON:

"You had better see Cole, and get matters in shape to talk; but, as I said in former message, what our men want to do, is to let the mob element quiet down and then they can talk calmly. You all want to maintain a record free from violence in any shape. I know you can fully appreciate the force of this.

"J. D. Layng."

The witness: These are all the dispatches which represent the general spirit, and there are a great many more, all in the same strain, and that is all I have to say. They speak for themselves as to their being genuine. If it should come to trial, I think it would be no trouble to prove that. One other matter I desire to call your attention to. As I stated already, that on Sunday, I sent Mrs. Ammon to bring Bob to Birmingham. Mr. Siebeneck informed me on Saturday evening that Bob was over there, and I told him I didn't think it was so. I understood, from Bob's wife, he was up in the oil regions. Bob was living right at the scene where the troubles in Allegheny occurred, and had been an employé of the road, as you are aware. On Sunday, when Mrs. Ammon came home, I felt calm about it. I knew when Bob promised a thing, he generally would, at least, try to carry it out. On Monday morning matters seemed to move along smoothly in Allegheny--what I got was from the newspaper reports. I could not leave my office on Wood street, because our secretary had gone to Bedford, and I was there with one of the clerks and the janitor, and the situation in Pittsburgh then looked very threatening. We have a great many valuable assets there about our safe, and I thought my presence was necessary. Occasionally I would go up on Fifth street and send somebody for Bob, with a verbal message or a few lines. On about three o'clock in the afternoon--perhaps a little before----

Q. On what day?

A. On Monday, I saw Mr. Siebeneck. He says to me, "Ammon," says he, "I have just got word that Bob is in charge of the Fort Wayne road." I, for a moment, didn't know what to say, but Siebeneck assured me that the thing was so. Looking up the street, I saw Mr. Watt, the ticket agent of the Pennsylvania road, at the corner of Fifth and Smithfield street. He came up to me, and says, "My God, squire, has not there been enough property destroyed! Is there any end to this thing! Can you do anything so that property would not be destroyed in Allegheny. Have you any influence with Bob?" I told Mr. Watt, that I thought I had, and if he would go out and see General McCauley, the vice president of the road, for me, and could tell him that I would go to Allegheny, drive over with my wagon, and I was satisfied that Bob would come away with me, if they wanted him away, but that I would not do so unless I had the consent of the railroad officials, and I gave him my reasons. From what I knew, that Bob kept the thing there at bay, there had been no row, no disturbance. If I should take him away, and trouble should accrue in consequence, I would feel that I was indirectly responsible for it. Mr. Watt went out, and in perhaps half an hour or less time, he came back, and I give you his words as near as I can remember. He said, that the general said, "Tell the old squire we are very much obliged for his kindness, and the interest he shows, but the taking away of Bob, would be, perhaps, the worst move we could make." When I heard that, I felt calm--my clerk--one of my clerks, lives in Allegheny. I again wrote a letter to Bob, and implored him, by all that could be dear and holy to him, to see to it, that no destruction of property would take place there. Early next morning, I got an answer from Bob, wherein he assured me that everything was working smoothly, and said all the best citizens, James L. Bennett, and gentlemen who had been before you, and others had been there, and saw him, and they all seemed to be satisfied for the present that he would do the best he could. Shortly after I received that letter, Mr. William L. Jones came in. He lives in Sewickley, is an insurance man, on Fourth avenue, and he told me that Bob was in charge of the road. I told him I was well aware of that, and stated to him that I had communicated with Mr. Watt and General McCauley, and says he, "I know Mr. Layng; will you permit me to go out and make him the same offer." I told him he should go, and I should be obliged to him. He went out and came back with about the same answer. Mr. Layng said he was perfectly satisfied to leave Bob at present where he was. I heard some more afterward, that Mr. McCauley said he hadn't said that to Watt, and I went out. I knew the general well. He says, "'Squire, I only said I didn't remember it, but if it is said that I did say it, I would not take it back, and under like circumstances I would perhaps say the same thing again." I advised Bob, during the day, then, to get out of it just as soon as he safely could for himself and the property. In the evening the Governor came, and you know, you have heard his Excellency; and the next morning the papers reported that Bob had stepped out and things had assumed the usual aspect again. From that time until Bob was arrested the committee of safety, or sub-committee of safety, they took Bob in charge. He stepped out, say on Wednesday morning, and about noon a gentleman attached to the Chronicle office came down and said there was a committee up there with Bob, and they wanted to see me. When I came up there Mr. Jacob Rees, Major Swearinger, Mr. Slagle, of the iron-works on the south side, and some others were present, and they told me they wanted to see Bob and get the blockade raised of the freight which was still on the tracks there, and it seems he was not much acquainted with him and didn't know what to do, and he said he would not say anything to him until his father came, and I told Bob there to follow the advice of these gentlemen, and if, in consequence of their advice, he would get into trouble, I would see him through. These men subsequently got into the secret meetings of the strikers down to Dietrick's hall, in Allegheny, and things came all right again, and on Monday following--it was just one week after--a railroad official came to my office in the morning, I guess about as early as nine o'clock, and said, "Squire, if you don't want to have Bob arrested, get him out of the road," and I told that gentleman that I was obliged to him for his kindness, but if Bob and the railroad company had anything to settle, they had better settle it now. About two o'clock in the afternoon Bob was standing near the corner of Fourth avenue and Wood street, and six detectives pounced on him and dragged him to jail, and he stayed there for eleven weeks. That is all I have to say in regard to Bob. Now permit me to say, in less than a dozen words, in regard to what I read in the newspapers this afternoon, of the testimony of my friend, the mayor of Allegheny. The mayor swears, point blank and positively, that he had but one interview with Bob. If that was all, it must have been a mighty long one--a very long one. The mayor and myself have been personally acquainted for a number of years, and shortly after Bob was arrested he met me on Fifth avenue, and he stepped up to me and said, "Squire, I am sorry, on your account, in regard to the scrape Bob was in." I told his honor that the thing was certainly unpleasant, but that I did not worry much, after all, about it. I did not think it was anything that was disgraceful, like a charge of stealing or murder, or anything of that kind. It had happened in all countries before, and that I would have to be satisfied whatever the law said; and I says to him, says I, "So far as your city was concerned, mayor, there was not a dollar's worth of property stolen." "There was not anything destroyed." Says I, "Supposing, if Bob is tight, and we put you on the stand, what is the worse you could say against him." "Well," says the squire, "I would have to say that, by continuously persuading Bob and his men, I kept them down so that everything passed off quietly." Now, if it was the only one interview with him, it seems to me he must have been most of the time with Bob.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did the mayor of Allegheny City give your son credit for maintaining the peace and order, and saving the destruction of property--did he do that?

A. How is it?

Q. Did Mayor Phillips, to you, give your son the credit for maintaining peace, and of restraining the crowd and rioters from the destruction of property?

A. That is all, sir, that was said between the mayor and myself, what I have recited--what I stated. I asked him what the worst was, if he was on the witness stand, he could say against Bob, and he stated that he would have to say, that, by continuously persuading Bob and his men, he kept them down. That everything went off smoothly.

Q. He went to Bob--when he wanted anything he went to Bob?

A. He said, by continuously persuading Bob and his men. That is the mayor's words. If he has forgotten it, I have not.

Q. In any communication that you had with Bob, did he assure you, or say to you, that he would not allow any property to be destroyed?

A. He said that in the most positive terms, verbally and in writing.

Q. To you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That he would not allow it?

A. Yes; he sent me verbally. Sometimes I would send over a man just to talk to him. That man might bring me back a verbal message, or might bring back a few lines. He said that I should not have the slightest fear.

Q. That he would take care of the railroad property?

A. He would take care of the property, and nothing should be destroyed while he was there. In one of his letters, he said he would rather die than submit to the destruction of property.

Q. Did he intimate to you in these communications that he had control of these men--that they would obey him?

A. They did obey him most implicitly. He said that.

Q. That they would obey him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do what he told them to do?

A. And others told me something similar. I would say--permit me to recur to one conversation--Mr. James I. Bennett, a gentleman whom I believe has testified before you--he is president of the insurance company which I represent as general agent. I went to him after I had these assurances from the railroad officials that they did not want Bob away. I felt dissatisfied; but I thought I would have been more satisfied if he had been away. I went down to his office, at the iron-works, on Water street, and I told him. Says I, "Mr. Bennett, this is the way things stand." Well, says he, "I was down last night." Mr. Bennett lives near, in close proximity to where the trouble occurred. Says he, "I was there last night and saw Bob, and things are working about as smooth as they could under the circumstances," and says he, "Don't you do anything of the kind." Says he, "The strikers put Bob there to run the road, and, if you take him away, they will put some other man there who is, perhaps, not half as well qualified as Bob is." Those were Bennett's words to me.

Q. Is he the president of that road?

A. No; Bennett is president of the insurance company which I represent.

Q. Did the president of that road, or any of the officials of that road, say to you that they were satisfied that Bob should have charge of this road?

A. The vice president, the first vice president, General McCullough, was the man to whom I first went. I heard that Bob was in charge of the road, and agreed to go over and take Bob away, and he sent me back word, through Mr. Watt, the ticket agent, that that would be the worst move he could make.

Q. Taking Bob away?

A. Yes, sir. And when I afterwards heard that it was said that McCullough hadn't said that, I went out and saw him--I am on intimate terms with him, and says he, "Squire, I simply don't remember that I said it; but, under like circumstances, I would perhaps say the same thing again to-day. I do not know what else I could say."

* * * * *

W. C. McCarthy, recalled:

The witness: I read in the newspapers this afternoon, that Mr. Stewart stated to this committee that he had an interview with me on Friday, in which he stated that the railroad company desired to have one hundred men, that they would pay for them. I have to say that Mr. Stewart had no interview with me on Friday, and he did not make that statement to me on Friday, nor did he make that statement to me upon any other day.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did you see Mr. Stewart on Friday?

A. I did not.

Q. At the city hall steps?

A. I did not. I did see Mr. Stewart at the city hall steps on Saturday forenoon.

Q. What was the conversation then?

A. It was simply conveying from Mr. Scott or Mr. Cassatt, as he stated, a desire that I should go up to the Union depot to see Mr. Cassatt. I declined to do so, and gave my reasons for it, which were, substantially, that the troops were brought here unnecessarily; that it was disgracing the city, and that I had an abiding conviction it would end in bloodshed, which would be unnecessary; and I declined to go to see him, as I knew who and what Pennsylvania railroad officers were; that they were imperious and dictatorial, and I could have no influence upon them whatever, and the result verified my predictions.

By Mr. Means:

Q. At that time did this gentleman ask you to swear in a certain number of police officers, and the railroad company would pay them?

A. He never said anything of the kind, either that day or any other day. It is pretty hard to join those two statements together.

Q. It is a little rough, mayor?

A. Well, I swear to that. The fact is, I scared them, and he did not know whether he was standing on his head or his heels. I blowed at him about bringing troops here, and it would result in murder, and I used strong language.

Q. Did you attempt to scare him?

A. No; I just gave the honest convictions of my soul to him in very strong and emphatic language.

Q. Why was it necessary that you should scare him?

A. It was not necessary to scare him, but he was scared. That is the only way I can account for his ideas that he delivered that message.

Q. Why was it necessary for you to use this very strong language to him?

A. Except I felt what I said, that these men had brought the troops here and shot people down unnecessarily, made me tell you over there that the police had broken the back of that strike on Thursday afternoon--utterly broken it, and if they had any gumption about them, with the expenditure of less than $500, they could have moved a train, and the strike never would have been heard of again. But instead of that, they laid down upon their belly like dogs, and cried for troops, and did nothing for twenty-four hours, and allowed the strike to get ahead.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. I think that is in your testimony before?

A. Indeed, I do not know. As I understand, I thought when I was in Philadelphia listening to your proceedings at the St. Cloud, that I heard a gentleman swear that he saw the police, at the station-houses on Penn avenue, fire at them. I was very deaf that day, and I could not swear positively whether he said so, but on that point I have a few words to say. The first that I knew, or rather the first that I heard about the firing by the police upon the troops was contained in this dispatch to Mayor McCarthy:

"One of my men was murdered by your police force as we marched up Penn avenue, en route for Sharpsburg. The murderer can be identified by a dozen men of my command, although several others of your force discharged their pistols shots into my column while we marched out Penn avenue. Are you willing to assist me in arresting this murderer?"

I replied that I am, that I would. That dispatch I did not preserve a copy of. I afterwards received the following, second one from him:

"MAYOR MCCARTHY:

"You seemed to misunderstand my telegraph. I asked you if you were willing to assist me in having your man identified. There is no question about the fact. I can produce the evidence of a dozen respectable citizens of Philadelphia who witnessed the firing. By making the proper inquiries on your part, and by arresting all suspected, I can produce those to identify the guilty party. It was not true that the police of Pittsburgh were hooting and yelling at us openly at nearly every point.

"R. M. BRINTON, Major General"

To this dispatch, of which I preserved a copy, I sent the following answer:

"R. M. BRINTON, Major General:

"I will assist you in identifying or arresting any murderer who is on the police force, or on either side of the struggle."

I said on either side of the struggle, because I believed both sides committed murder, and I may say that I and six or eight of my policemen are now under bonds to answer the charge--a civil charge--for damages for arresting two men who were suspected as being engaged in shooting at the Philadelphia troops as they went out Penn avenue, out Butler street. Then I go on to say:

"By referring to the language of your first dispatch, you will see that the misapprehension was on your part, and not on mine."

Well, gentlemen, when the Philadelphia troops came back here, I sent out orders and got all the police who had been up there at that time together, to meet at nine o'clock in the evening. I saw by a newspaper article--I had forgotten who it was--but I saw by a newspaper article here that it was Lieutenant Cochran that I sent out to the Philadelphia troops, to tell Brinton that at nine o'clock that night the men would be all at the mayor's office, and for him to come with his evidence. Nine o'clock came and no person came--until ten o'clock we waited, and they were dismissed. I dismissed the men with orders to appear at nine o'clock the next morning, and sent word out to camp to General Brinton. If General Brinton requires me to state I will just quote from a little remark I made. I say here Cochran had reported to me that the Philadelphia men, for some reason or other, didn't think they could get here last evening. That was the reply of Cochran. Then I took it back until ten o'clock or nine o'clock next morning, when the police were there, together with a large number of citizens in the neighborhood of the station-houses, who were there at the time that the troops passed. The police unanimously, and the citizens unanimously all joined in the statement that on Penn street, between Twenty-sixth street and Twenty-seventh street, where the station-house is, and where the police were on the pavement, that at the time the troops passed the station-house there was no shooting, no disturbance of any kind whatever. That is the testimony of the police and of the citizens, given and sworn to upon that day, when I found the Philadelphia men didn't come to make good their word.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You say the Philadelphia men did not come to make good their word. What did you expect of the Philadelphia men?

A. I believed the Philadelphia men to be as good as their word, as laid down here by General Brinton. Here is General Brinton's dispatch to me: "One of my men was murdered by your police force as we marched up Penn avenue, en route for Sharpsburg. The murderer can be identified by a dozen men of my command, although several others of your force discharged their pistol shots into my column while we marched up Penn avenue. Are you willing to assist me in arresting this murderer?" I expected General Brinton to come with his men and attempt to identify the murderers, as he alleged we shot at those troops as they were passing the station-house. He did not come with his men. An hour or so after all these parties left, two men came to the office; I did not see them myself, but my man at the office reported to me that two men came there, dressed like officers, who stated that they were officers in the Philadelphia regiment, and they repudiated the statement that the troops were fired on as they passed the station-house.

Q. They said there was no firing on the troops?

A. Yes; these men's names--I heard at the time the names they gave.

Q. Do you know the names now?

A. No, sir; I do not. I might be able to find out--I don't know whether I could or not. I have forgotten the names; but if that circumstance is sworn to at Philadelphia, I can produce one hundred men to disprove it.

Q. Is that all?

A. That is all. I think I have said enough.

At this point the committee adjourned to meet at the call of the chairman.

HARRISBURG, April 11, 1878.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in Senate committee room No. 6. All members present except Mr. Reyburn.

* * * * *

William S. Quay, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Were you present Saturday afternoon, July 24, when the communication was received by General Latta from General Brinton?

A. I was. I was present with General Latta in his room during the entire night.

Q. In the Union depot?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many dispatches were received?

A. I think three, but I am not certain.

Q. What time was the first received?

A. The first one was in the early part of the night. I couldn't fix the time of receiving any telegrams, or, in fact, any of the occurrences of the night.

Q. Can you give the substance of the first dispatch?

A. I cannot give the nature. The first dispatch, however, was very discouraging, I remember that much. It related to the condition of his troops in the round-house, related to the supplies, subsistence, ammunition, and he went on, further, to say, my recollection is, that he considered part of his command as unreliable, and that one of his regiments was disposed to sympathize with the strikers--wouldn't fight with them, anyhow.

Q. Did he state what regiment it was?

A. He didn't use that language, but that was the idea conveyed.

Q. Do you recollect whether he named the regiment?

A. I think he named the Sixth regiment. We understood that to be the regiment referred to. Sometime afterwards, a second dispatch was received, in better character, and we were re-assured. The first one was very bad.

Q. The next dispatch was more encouraging?

A. Yes; decidedly more encouraging.

Q. Do you recollect how the next dispatch reached the Union depot?

A. I think that the dispatches were brought through the lines by Sergeant Wilson of the Jefferson Cavalry. He came out in disguise.

Q. All the dispatches you referred to were brought by him?

A. I think so. I will not be positive about that.

Q. Do you recollect of General Matthews making any remarks when he received the first dispatch?

A. I couldn't say positively, but there was conversation. I was in the room, but didn't pay any attention to it myself.

Q. Did you know whether General Latta contemplated ordering General Brinton's command out of the round-house, prior to receiving that first dispatch?

A. I have no recollection of anything that indicated any such intention.

Q. Was it a subject of conversation at all at his head-quarters, during the night?

A. As to the removal of those troops?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes. There was considerable conversation as to that, when General Latta was dictating his last dispatch to General Brinton. There was a conflict of opinion about it.

Q. Was the question of the expediency of ordering the troops out, for the purpose of stopping the destruction of property and driving the rioters from the ground--from the railroad ground? Was that the subject of conversation?

A. I think not. I don't remember that. There was no conversation amongst us. We had no idea of ordering the troops alone--that detachment of troops. The general plan was to bring on the Philadelphia troops, at Torrens station, unite them with Guthrie, and march them down on the rear of the mob, and attack and disperse them.

Q. How early in the evening did the General adopt that as a plan of action?

A. I couldn't say, as I said before. I couldn't, at this time, say.

Q. Can you tell us anything in relation to the dispatch that was sent by General Latta and General Brinton, Sunday morning, by Captain Aull, what knowledge you have of that dispatch, and what was done?

A. I don't think that I have any personal knowledge of that dispatch--don't think I saw it--and what I would give you would be hearsay about that. I have a recollection of a telegram to direct Brinton, I think, to join Colonel Guthrie.

Q. Were you present when Major Norris started to find General Brinton?

A. I don't think I was present when he left the hotel. I was in the hotel.

Q. Did you hear General Latta give him any instructions?

A. Well, I couldn't say. I know he had his instructions, but whether I heard Latta give them to him, I don't know. I don't know what his instructions were.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Do you know anything about any proclamations issued by the Governor, in relation to this riot?

A. I know very little more than the proclamation was issued. At least, I saw the proclamation signed by the Governor and myself, which, I have no doubt, was issued here, under the seal of the State, but I was not present at the time. I know nothing more, really, than you, gentlemen of the committee, yourself.

Q. That proclamation was issued under general instructions from the department?

A. When the heads of departments leave, they generally leave blanks signed, to be used in case of an emergency, if they are required.

Q. They are issued according to general instructions and custom?

A. Yes, sir. I suppose the facts relating to that proclamation are already before the committee.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you receive any communications from General Latta, or from any person connected with the department, prior to the issuing of the proclamation?

A. I think not.

Q. All proclamations of the Governor are signed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, are they not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The military orders of the commander in chief signed by the Adjutant General?

A. Adjutant General.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Has the Secretary of the Commonwealth, or his deputy, authority, under general instructions, to issue proclamations, in the absence of the Governor?

A. Well, I don't know. I think I would assume that authority without any hesitancy, in case of necessity. Whether it would be ratified or not, I don't know.

Q. Under general custom?

A. Custom; yes, sir. I really don't remember a case where I have done so. I am not certain, but what I have, in a case when the Governor was not here, about the reduction of the sinking fund.

Q. Do you know anything about a request made by the civil authorities of Allegheny county on the Governor, for troops?

A. I received on the morning of Friday, I think the 20th of July--the riots were on the 21st--on the day before, about three o'clock in the morning before, I received a telegram from the sheriff of Allegheny county, including a telegraph to Harrisburg, making the request. He stated that he inclosed it to me for my information.

Q. Was there any request made by private citizens or corporations for troops?

A. I forwarded the telegram to the Adjutant General, stating that I had received it, and I suggested that the major general commanding the Pittsburgh division furnish the necessary troops.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What time did you receive that?

A. I think it must have been three o'clock on the morning of Friday.

Q. What time did you forward it to the Adjutant General?

A. I think by the same messenger. It was from the sheriff of Allegheny county, and I replied to him that I received his telegram.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were you at the Union depot at the time the firing took place?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see General Pearson as he returned from the round-house or that vicinity?

A. Yes; I was in General Latta's room that evening with General Pearson and one or two other gentlemen, and he came in.

Q. Was he relieved from command by General Latta at that time?

A. I didn't understand that he was formally relieved of his command, but I know he was obliged to leave.

Q. For what reason?

A. The mob was said to be in search of him, and surrounding his house, and destroying his property. There was some conversation passed between us. I said I thought he was of no use there.

Q. How long did you remain at the Union depot, Saturday?

A. I was there all night.

Q. All that Saturday night?

A. I was there until in the morning at ten or eleven o'clock.

Q. Did you see General Brown there?

A. Yes, I saw General Brown in the early part of the night, I think. General Brown came in when the Pittsburgh troops were relieved.

Q. Did you know anything about his disbanding his command and sending them home?

A. Nothing, except from hearsay.

Q. Would you consider it justifiable or legal to issue a proclamation in the absence of the Governor in emergencies of this kind?

A. I think so.

Q. Did you regard it proper for the Adjutant General to call out troops or furnish troops for the suppression of the riot in the absence of the Governor?

A. That is a question I was not considering. There was nothing improper here when he had direct telegraphic communication with the Governor, and had authority to do so.

Q. In your estimation, would it require special instructions from the Governor to call out the troops?

A. I think he should act under general instructions. The Governor is the commander-in-chief of the troops.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you receive any general instructions prior to the departure of the Governor for the West, as to what would be done in case of an emergency?

A. No, sir, I think not. I understood such authority was given in relation to troops to the Adjutant General. I didn't feel that I was vested with any special authority.

Q. In forwarding the demand that was made by the sheriff for troops to the Adjutant General, did you say anything to the Adjutant General about issuing any proclamation?

A. Nothing.

Q. Knew nothing of that until it was issued?

A. In my telegram to the Adjutant General was simply a suggestion that the major general commanding the Pittsburgh division--I didn't know who he was at the time--should furnish the troops.

* * * * *

W. W. Jennings, re-called.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may identify those papers, if you will state what they are?

A. This is my proclamation--the first one. Both are proclamations of mine, and this is an order. [Indicating.]

Q. Can you state the date when the first proclamation was issued?

A. The first proclamation was placarded over town--both these proclamations was placarded over town by eight o'clock Tuesday morning, the 24th. I arrived here on the 23d, about seven o'clock in the evening. These were all printed in posters.

Q. And the citizens were all summoned in accordance, or came out in accordance with this proclamation, I suppose--on the demand made by you in this proclamation?

A. Yes, they did, a number of them, in answer to my call. Before this was published I had gathered them up--parties who were excited, and ready to take hold.

Q. This force you collected, did you swear them in as deputy sheriffs?

A. No, sir.

Q. Or special police?

A. I summoned as----

Q. Posse comitatus?

A. Posse comitatus. We didn't stand on ceremony very long.

Q. If there are any statements you wish to make, please make them?

A. I do not know of any, sir.

The following are the proclamations and orders referred to by the witness:

PROCLAMATION.

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, HARRISBURG, PA.

WHEREAS, For the past two days the peace and good order of the county have been disturbed and grave apprehensions exist lest injury be done;

And whereas, The duty rests upon me to preserve the peace and promote tranquillity;

Now, therefore, I, William W. Jennings, high sheriff of the county of Dauphin, do hereby enjoin all persons to remain quietly at their homes or places of business, to avoid gathering upon the streets and highways, thus by their presence keeping alive the excitement which pervades the community, and to further the restoration of good order, I charge upon parents to prevent the half grown lads over whom they have control from frequenting the streets.

And I hereby announce my resolute determination, with the aid of special deputies whom I have appointed, and the posse which I have summoned to preserve the peace and protect the person and property of the people within my bailiwick, and I hereby call upon all good and law abiding citizens to assist me and those acting with me to enforce the law and maintain good order.

Given under my hand this 23d day of July, A.D. 1877.

WM. W. JENNINGS, Sheriff.

NOTICE TO LAW AND ORDER POSSE.

The chief engineer of the fire department of the city of Harrisburg, having issued an order specifying to what alarms the several fire companies shall respond, the following companies of the law and order posse, for the purpose of preserving good order in the event of any fire alarm, will repair to the place designated by the alarm as follows:

Company A to Nos. 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 41, 42 for the Friendship Fire Company.

Company C to Nos. 6, 21, 24, 31, 32, 61 for the Hope Fire Company.

Company I to Nos. 5, 6, 7, 23, 41, 61, for the Citizen Fire Company.

Company B to Nos. 7, 12, 13, 41, 42 for the Paxton Fire Company.

Companies D, F, and G to Nos. 21, 23, 24, 31, 32 for the Good Will Fire Company.

Company H to Nos. 5, 7, 41 for the Mt. Pleasant Hose Company.

The other companies of the posse will hold themselves in readiness for orders.

WM. W. JENNINGS, Sheriff.

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, HARRISBURG, July 24, 1877.

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, HARRISBURG, July 24, 1877.

Joseph F. Knipe, Commanding Co. A. William K. Alricks, Commanding Co. B. Charles Snyder, Commanding Co. C. J. B. Boyle, Commanding Co. D. George G. Boyer, Commanding Co. E. C. A. Wilhem, Commanding Co. F. Isaiah Reese, Commanding Co. G.

LAW AND ORDER POSSE

Will report with their respective commands at the Court-House at two o'clock.

The posse will hold themselves in readiness to respond to two taps of the court-house bell at any time prior to that hour. Other companies will be designated and assigned to duty as the public exigency may necessitate.

W. W. JENNINGS, Sheriff.

Adjourned to meet at the call of the chairman.

HARRISBURG, April 16, 1878.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at eight o'clock, P.M., in Senate committee room No. 6.

* * * * *

James H. Stewart, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State your residence?

A. I reside in Pittsburgh.

Q. Did you reside there in July last?

A. Yes; I was a resident of Pittsburgh in July, 1877.

Q. Were you there during the riots of the 21st and 22d of July?

A. I was.

Q. State whether you accompanied Colonel Norris on Sunday morning, the 22d, to General Brinton's command?

A. I did.

Q. State where you overtook General Brinton?

A. Do you want me to state where?

Q. Yes?

A. We overtook General Brinton north of the Allegheny river--north-east of the Allegheny river--about a mile, I think, above Sharpsburg, on the bank of a ravine running up a hill. I don't know the name of the street. I was trying to remember it this afternoon, but I have forgotten the name of the road.

Q. From what point did you start?

A. From the Union Depot hotel.

Q. At what time?

A. I can't exactly state the time precisely--it was in the morning. We paid very little attention to time, having been very busily engaged all night and through the morning. We started, I suppose, between nine and ten o'clock, if my recollection serves me right--some place about that time.

Q. Had you been with General Latta and Colonel Quay during the night?

A. Yes, sir; with the exception of the time that I had been detailed for service outside of the city limits. Of course, where I went to from the Union depot was under orders of the Adjutant General.

Q. At whose instance did you and Colonel Norris go in pursuit of General Brinton?

A. I was directed by the Adjutant General to accompany Colonel Norris to the office of General Brinton.

Q. Did you hear the Adjutant General give Colonel Norris any orders to tell to General Brinton?

A. I did not.

Q. Verbal?

A. I did not hear any.

Q. Did he give him any written orders to your knowledge?

A. I think not.

Q. When you overtook General Brinton, state what conversation took place between Colonel Norris and General Brinton?

A. After passing through the city--through Penn avenue--we overtook General Brinton at the rear of his command, then marching very rapidly to the north. We drove partially through the left of his command, got out of our carriage, and walked the balance of the way to the front. Then General Brinton ordered a halt of his troops, and Colonel Norris then told him that the Adjutant General requested that he would turn back, and form a junction with Colonel Guthrie at Torrens station. Do you want me to go on and repeat the whole conversation?

Q. Yes?

A. They talked some time. I stayed with them. There were some officers of General Brinton's command with him, whom I was not personally acquainted with. General Brinton replied that his troops had been without food for twenty-four hours. That he had been fired upon from every corner and street car in the city. That he intended to go back into the country until he could get a position in which he could intrench himself and protect his men. And he furthermore added, that he would be God damned if he would go back into the city of Pittsburgh.

Q. Where were you when that conversation occurred?

A. Alongside of him. We were all sitting down. There had been a halt of the command made, and we sat down on the banks of a stream that ran along the public road.

Q. Did Colonel Norris deliver it as an order coming from the Adjutant General, or did he state that Captain Aull had had such an order?

A. Not that I know of. I can go back in my testimony and mention the fact that we met Captain Aull.

Q. Where did you meet Captain Aull?

A. We met Captain Aull at the eastern side of the arsenal, on Penn avenue. He stopped our carriage on, I think, the eastern side--the furthest extremity of the arsenal, on Penn avenue--stopped our carriage, and asked us where we were going. I told him we were after Brinton's troops. He said nothing at all about an order that he had.

Q. Do you know that he had an order?

A. I did not; no, sir.

Q. Did Colonel Norris tell General Brinton that Captain Aull had an order?

A. Not that I know of. 1 have no recollection of him telling him so.

Q. Did Colonel Norris repeat to General Brinton the substance of the order?

A. I do not know that he knew that Colonel Norris----

Q. Let me ask you the question over again. Did Colonel Norris tell General Brinton that Captain Aull had an order for him? Did Colonel Norris repeat the substance of the order which Captain Aull had?

A. Not that I know of. Captain Aull's name was not mentioned, and from the simple fact that we met Captain Aull, and he knew we were on the way to General Brinton--if Colonel Norris knew he had an order from the Adjutant General, it was not my business to know anything about it. I was simply directed to accompany the colonel on business.

Q. Did Colonel Norris state to General Brinton that the Adjutant General had requested him to deliver the order to return and form a junction with Colonel Guthrie?

A. As I said before, Mr. Chairman, Colonel Norris said to General Brinton that the Adjutant General had directed him to turn his column back, and pass the Allegheny river, making a junction with Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens station. Stated that fact, that the Adjutant General requested him to do so.

Q. And requested Colonel Norris to deliver that order to General Brinton--did he inform him--so inform?

A. Of course. He came direct from the Adjutant General, acting under orders of the Adjutant General.

Q. He was delivering the orders of the Adjutant General, as you understood?

A. Yes. That is what he was doing. That is what took me there. The Adjutant General directed me to accompany Colonel Norris. He was going on official business.

Q. We want to get at what Colonel Norris said to General Brinton?

A. That the Adjutant General directed him to turn his command back and form a junction with Colonel Guthrie, of the Eighteenth regiment, at or near Torrens.

Q. Did you return with Colonel Norris?

A. I did; yes, sir.

Q. To the Monongahela house?

A. To the Union Depot hotel.

Q. What time did you go back to the Union Depot hotel?

A. As I told you before, I don't remember anything about time; but when I got back there--when we got out of the carriage--we started upstairs to the room which the Adjutant General occupied, and was then informed that they had changed the head-quarters from the Union Depot hotel to the Monongahela house. I suppose that might have been one o'clock.

Q. In the afternoon?

A. In the afternoon.

Q. Of Sunday?

A. Of Sunday. At that time the fire was coming down the track towards the hotel. Colonel Norris went before I did to the Monongahela house, and I followed him shortly afterwards.

Q. Did you hear him make any report to the Adjutant General?

A. I did not; no, sir.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were you present when Captain Aull received the orders from the Adjutant General?

A. I was not.

Q. Did General Latta order Colonel Norris to proceed with any orders to General Brinton?

A. He did; yes, sir.

Q. Were you ordered to accompany him?

A. I was.

Q. When you reached General Brinton, what reason did he give for not returning to the city of Pittsburgh or Sharpsburg?

A. I stated before that he complained that his command had been without food for twenty-four hours, that he had been fired on from every street corner in the city, that he was anxious to get to the open country, where he could entrench himself, and take up a position to protect his men. He declined to return and make any junction with any troops, or to have anything to do with any troops.

Q. Did Colonel Norris ask him to fall back to Sharpsburg, near the railroad, where he could be supplied with ammunition and food?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he ask him to go to Pittsburgh at all?

A. I think not. If you will allow me to make a remark here, that at that time trains on the Valley road I believe had been stopped. On our road towards Brinton, after we had crossed the Allegheny river, we found the West Pennsylvania road was running, and I then remarked to Colonel Norris that if Brinton would come back to the river, I would see that rations were sent up the West Pennsylvania road, knowing that we could provide his troops with rations.

Q. He was to form a junction with Guthrie's troops where?

A. He was requested to go to Torrens station, or to go as near Torrens station as he possibly could.

Q. That is where Guthrie was stationed?

A. Yes; where the Eighteenth regiment was.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did you see General Loud there?

A. I did; yes, sir.

Q. Was he present during the time that this talk occurred between Colonel Norris and General Brinton?

A. That I cannot say. There were several of General Brinton's staff with him; but when we halted we left the line of the troops, and went down to the banks of this stream I speak of. There was several of his staff officers, and some of the colonels, whose names I am not acquainted with.

Q. Did you see General Matthews with him?

A. I do not remember.

Q. There were several of his staff officers?

A. They were all strangers to me.

Q. How many of his staff officers were present at the time this conversation occurred?

A. I suppose there were five or six gentlemen present scattered around. Whether they were listening to the conversation or not I cannot pretend to say.

Q. What time was Colonel Norris and General Brinton talking this matter over?

A. How long?

Q. Yes?

A. I suppose twenty minutes. I know it was a longer time than I wanted to stay. I was anxious to get back.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was he sitting down?

A. Yes; sitting on the bank of the stream.

Q. Not sitting on a log?

A. Not on a log.

Q. On a rock?

A. I might have been sitting on a log or rock. I know I sat down on the grass. It was very dusty and very hot, and we all took a drink out of the stream.

Q. This conversation took place while they were sitting there together?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A number of the officers sat with them?

A. Yes; sitting scattered around, some standing. You know how it is yourself, colonel, when you have a consultation with officers.

Q. Did Colonel Norris make any other business known to General Brinton, except this one matter?

A. I do not know, they had some little private conversation between themselves.

Q. This one matter was all--the business matter that you heard talked over between them?

A. So far as I was concerned. That was the business that took me out there, that was all I know.

Q. When that concluded, then you turned about and left?

A. Yes; walked back nearly to the Sharpsburg bridge, and found our carriage, and returned through the mob at considerable trouble.

Q. There was a mob following them at that time?

A. No, sir; nobody.

Q. You spoke about a mob--you found the mob after you got back?

A. Yes; Colonel Norris and myself had some considerable difficulty, and were stopped on our road back by a mounted guide, or vidette, or something--I don't know who he was, or what he was after. He followed us for some considerable time, and came up and addressed us.

Q. What was your understanding of the nature of the business that you pursued Brinton? For what purpose did you pursue Brinton?

A. Why we pursued Brinton?

Q. Yes.

A. My understanding was, that he was to go back and form a junction with Colonel Guthrie, and march into the city of Pittsburgh.

Q. Was that your understanding before you left the head-quarters of General Latta?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know how you got that impression?

A. By being in consultation with the Adjutant General and the balance of the staff during the entire night.

Q. And conversation?

A. Yes, sir; we were consulting together, of course, about the most feasible means or measures--what to do with this exigency there. If you remember, we were but a handful of men ourselves, and there all night long. Could not get our troops into Pittsburgh, wires were cut, lines of railroad were stopped, and our great anxiety was to get as many troops as possible into the city to protect the city. The idea was, this first division would make a junction--that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments having disbanded, you might say virtually disbanded. Having left the Eighteenth regiment at three o'clock in the morning, it was our desire to get the First division form a junction with the Eighteenth regiment, and come into the city to protect property which was then on fire.

Q. Where did Brinton say he was going to when he was asked to return, and refused to?

A. He said he was going to the open country, where he would entrench, and take up a position to protect his troops. Whether he was going to Butler county or further north, I do not know. That was his remark--that he was going to the open country. Where he found that open country is more than I know, if he ever did find it. We did hear that he was marching to Philadelphia.

Q. Did General Brinton say anything that would lead you to think that he did not recognize Colonel Norris as an officer?

A. Did he say to us?

Q. Did he make any remarks to that effect, that led you to think he did not recognize him?

A. No, sir.

* * * * *

THURSDAY EVENING, April 18, 1878.

The committee met, at the call of the chairman, in Senate committee room No. 6. All present except Mr. Larrabee. Mr. Lindsey in the chair.

* * * * *

David Branson, sworn:

Q. State your residence?

A. No. 1315, South Broad street, Philadelphia.

Q. What is your business?

A. Coal merchant.

Q. A member of the National Guard?

A. Yes; I was last secretary, and am still quarter-master, of the Sixth regiment of infantry; but during the commotion acted as brigade quartermaster and commissary, on the staff of General Loud, commanding the Second brigade of the First division.

Q. Did you accompany the troops to Pittsburgh?

A. Yes; in the first expedition that started, and remained with the division until it returned in August. Present for duty all the time.

Q. On Saturday evening, state where you were--what your position was, on Saturday evening of the troubles at Pittsburgh?

A. I was on duty with the brigade in the yards of the company, between the Union Depot hotel and the round-house, engaged in overlooking the line of the men, which kept back the crowd from that portion of the company's property.

Q. Were you in the round-house during the night?

A. In the round-house during the whole night.

Q. Did you leave with the troops in the morning?

A. Yes; the last officer to leave the building.

Q. State, if you please, whether the building was on fire or not when you left?

A. The buildings were all more or less afire when I left.

Q. How extensive was the fire in and about the round-house at the time you went out?

A. At the time the troops commenced to march out, there had been considerable burning of the buildings which we occupied, some of which had been put out, and re-kindled by the burning cars that were run down against the building. That happened two or three times. We thought it was impossible to keep the fire from spreading, and decided to abandon the building. At the time the troops were going out, all the buildings were on fire, and in some of them the fire had got very extensive; so much so, that I felt hot when I went through the last door.

Q. You accompanied the troops on their march out Penn avenue, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you at the arsenal grounds?

A. Didn't go into the arsenal grounds, and didn't witness the interview between Brinton and Buffington. At that time, I was engaged in re-forming the troops. They had been broken up by the killed and wounded.

Q. Were you present when Colonel Norris overtook General Brinton?

A. Yes; when Colonel Norris overtook us beyond Sharpsburg, I was between the two brigades, the first brigade was marching in the rear, some of them assisting the men in charge of the Gatlings, dragging them up the hill. The other brigade had halted to give them time to catch up, and Major Norris arrived in a carriage or a hack, accompanied by some other party whom I didn't know, and Norris not recognizing me, stuck his head out of the side of the hack and told his driver to stop, and asked where General Brinton was. I told him a little further in advance, and I would go and show him, and went up with him about one hundred yards further, and found General Brinton sitting beside of the road, waiting for the troops to close up.

Q. You walked with him?

A. Walked with him. Walked hastily to him, found him waiting there, and he expressed great gratification to find the general again, they being old personal friends, and showed a good deal of feeling in the matter, and seemed very much exhausted and excited and worn out, evidently with loss of sleep and over-exertion, and the excitement of the occasion. Seemed almost dazed in his appearance by the state of affairs. He immediately inquired of General Brinton, what he proposed to do, and where he was going, and how much he had suffered. The general told him how he had got along. He had got out that way in order to find a place where supplies could reach us, and feed the men and get some supplies to feed the troops and get a little rest. They were completely exhausted with want of sleep and food. Colonel Norris assented to that, as about the only thing that could be done, and asked Brinton what he wanted him to do. Repeated the question several times in the course of the conversation: what do you want me to do, stay with you or go back and see what I can do outside. The General said there was nothing he wanted so much as provisions. That was the substance of the conversation. There was nothing in the form of an order given. The whole conversation was a discussion as to what had best be done, and what he, Brinton, intended to do, and what he wished Norris to do for him to help him. He had arrived there with the impression that we had suffered much more than we had.

Q. Did the gentleman who was with Colonel Norris get out of the carriage and accompany you up to where General Brinton was?

A. He didn't accompany him. He may have got out of the carriage afterwards. I never noticed, after Norris got out of the carriage. I never saw him, to my knowledge.

Q. Was he present when you met General Brinton?

A. No, sir. He might have been a short distance in the rear, following us up. I didn't see him. He was not close to us. There was a few officers gathered around. I didn't see anybody else.

Q. Officers of----

A. Our division staff officers. And General Loud was there at about the time the conversation commenced. I think General Matthews joined us afterwards. There was several of the staff there, and I was there, by authority of the position which I occupied on the staff, ready to receive any instructions that might be given.

Q. Was the division all right when Colonel Norris and you overtook General Brinton?

A. The brigade that was marching in advance was halted, waiting for the other to close up; the other was staying back in order to give the men with the Gatling guns time to get up the hill--the brigade in the rear wouldn't go on and leave the men with the guns back there unprotected. We had to halt several times, during our march, on that account. Halted the head of the column, and let the others close up.

Q. Did General Brinton and Colonel Norris sit down and have a conversation together, upon a bank or a log? Do you recollect that?

A. I don't think they exactly sat down. I think they surrounded, or stood around, a log or stone, with one foot on it, or grouped together--pretty close together--and four or five of us lounged around, waiting for those to close up. I couldn't specify the exact position I was in. There was nothing said without my hearing it, unless some whispering, and I didn't notice any.

Q. Did the carriage remain back?

A. Some little distance back of where we were. The driver came up close to us, when Colonel Norris went to get in again. The carriage approached us. I don't know exactly the time; and he went away.

Q. Did Colonel Norris say anything about Captain Aull's having an order for General Brinton?

A. I didn't hear Captain Aull's name mentioned. Never heard of such a man until long afterwards.

Q. Did he say anything to General Brinton about returning and joining Colonel Guthrie at Torrens?

A. I didn't hear anything about joining him. General Brinton asked questions about where the other troops were. Talked to Norris, and made inquiries where the other troops were, and why they didn't come to his relief, and how disappointed they were that they didn't come, and matters of that kind.

Q. Did he tell Colonel Norris that General Latta had given an order to Captain Aull.

A. I didn't hear anything of the kind. Didn't hear anything said about orders.

Q. Were you present during the whole of the time that they were together?

A. I was not more than four paces away all the time they were together. If anything was said that I didn't hear, it must have been purposely said in an undertone to avoid being overheard.

Q. Did you know Mr. Stewart, who accompanied Colonel Norris?

A. Didn't know him. Never heard of the man before.

Q. Did you see any person in the group not an officer in the command?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recognize Major Stewart here as being the man who came up with Colonel Norris?

A. No, sir; I didn't recognize him. If that was the man, he looked very different on that occasion.

Q. Did you see him?

A. I don't remember of seeing him before.

Q. Do you remember of seeing any person?

A. I saw a man in the carriage with Colonel Norris.

Q. Did he accompany you, or did he come up afterwards and join the group?

A. He must have kept in the background--might have kept back behind us--didn't crowd up into the group.

Q. But did Brinton and Colonel Norris have any conversation by themselves?

A. Didn't appear to have any.

Q. Or in an undertone that could not be heard by the others?

A. Didn't hear anything of the kind going on. There appeared to be no effort to conceal what they were saying from any of the staff. They talked above an ordinary tone of voice.

Q. Have you given all the conversation that took place as near as you recollect it?

A. I couldn't give the exact wording of the conversation, as I never expected to be questioned about it; but the whole tone and manner of the conversation was as I have stated--asking for information on both sides, and an expression of disappointment on the part of General Brinton, why the troops had not joined him, his intentions as to procuring rest and food for his troops, and his desire, in answer to Colonel Norris' question what he should do, that Norris should go back and assist in getting provisions to him, and if there had been any order given it should certainly have been made known to me at once.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Will you state to this committee what transpired with the troops during that night in the round-house, and what took place there during the night--about their going out of the round-house--you were there. I believe you said that you were about the last man leaving it, didn't you?

A. Yes; the orders given me require me to be the last man to leave.

Q. If you please, just state to this committee what transpired during the night about their leaving the round-house, and what condition the troops were in when they left it, and what condition the round-house was in?

A. Commencing with after we were stationed in the round-house, the mob commenced to gather around, and, in a short time, they began to fire pistols, and throw stones into the windows, smashing all the windows, and breaking the furniture inside with the missiles they threw in. Shot the sentinels at the gate, wounded other men inside, most of them not seriously. We didn't know at that time whether they were seriously injured or not. Finally, a large number made their appearance with muskets, and commenced firing with rifle balls.

Q. That was the crowd outside?

A. The crowd outside. Along about dusk this thing got warm.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was this immediately before retiring from the round-house?

A. Saturday evening about dusk. That had begun to get right hot, balls commenced to come in very thick and heavy, and some of the rioters emboldened by our not returning the fire, which we were ordered by General Pearson not to, had come up to the gates pointing out at the head of Twenty-eight streets, and commenced sticking their pistols through the gates, and shot two sentries stationed there.

Q. Soldiers standing there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they Philadelphia soldiers?

A. Yes; they shot those two men. They were dragged away by their comrades. Still they would not allow us to fire. While this was going on, we staff officers busied ourselves in making preparations for the slaughter of the crowd, which we thought was bound to come, and was the proper thing to do to extinguish the rioters, and stationed soldiers at the different windows, and got the artillery in proper position--brass pieces and two Gatlings--gave instructions to the infantry not to fire until the artillery opened, knowing, of course, the artillery wouldn't fire without orders from proper authority. When the fire got pretty hot and the sentries were shot down, General Brinton got pretty warm about it, and insisted upon being allowed to fire, and went up to one of the offices where General Pearson made his head-quarters.

Q. Did you go to General Pearson?

A. Went to General Pearson. I followed him in, and he explained the necessity of being allowed to open fire on the rioters, that he could not stand this thing any longer, that the men were being shot down in cold blood, and now was the time; and Pearson says, "No, no; we must hold on a little longer; the thing must quiet down a little; don't let us have any more bloodshed"--some such thing as that. General Brinton replied, that it was only getting worse, the longer we put off the worse it would be, and Pearson said, "No; we might kill more innocent people. There might be some innocent women and children killed," and made replies of that kind to justify himself in not allowing the firing, which the staff officers standing by--I think about four in number were present besides the general--they were of opinion it ought to be done, and still he would not allow it, and several of us made some remarks on the subject--several of the staff officers.

Q. Be kind enough to state what those remarks were?

A. They were to the effect, that if we were going to do any shooting, now is the time to do it, and the remark I made to him was, if we were going to kill anybody--at first I said there were no women and children in that crowd.

Q. Was that remark made to General Brinton?

A. I made this to General Pearson, in the presence of General Brinton and some two or three or four other officers.

Q. You were addressing General Pearson?

A. I addressed General Pearson, right over General Brinton's shoulder--alongside of him. My rank did not justify it, but my old army rank did, and I presumed to advise him. Says I, "If we are going to do any killing, these are the men to kill. There are no women and children--they are all active rioters;" and he replied, "No, don't fire. You do not know who you will hurt; the artillery will shoot clear through the crowd." Just at that time the men in charge of the Gatling gun again moved it nearer the gate, and he saw the motion outside, or heard the wheels of the gun, and he jumped up and went to the window and motioned not to fire. "Don't fire, don't fire, don't fire," he said; "if they fire, the balls might shoot some innocent woman on a doorstep a mile away down street." That disgusted me so, I sneeringly remarked, if they were afraid of killing people so far off as that, let us fire with infantry, that won't hurt any a mile away, by shooting out of a second story window; and he said, "No, no; don't fire; it will all quiet down; you will kill some innocent people." Then I turned away in disgust, and left him. He went down stairs, and was about three quarters of the opinion to go down in the shadow of the building and give the command to fire anyhow. I changed my mind, for fear that the Pittsburgh troops might be coming around the corner. I am sorry afterwards that I did not give the order.

Q. Were you in the service during the late rebellion?

A. Yes; five years and one week.

Q. What rank?

A. I went in as a private and came out as a colonel and brigade commander.

Q. As a military officer, what should you have done under the circumstances?

A. I should have opened fire with every weapon we had, at just about dusk, from the most available points at the time that General Brinton asked him to allow him to do so. The mob was so dense at that time they could hardly have got out of each others way. They were composed of very different material from the mob at Twenty-eighth street, where the first conflict occurred, the better class having disappeared, and the worst came to the front. The criminal classes, vagrants, bummers, and tramps of every kind, and such men as we call night owls--never seen in day time, were conspicuous in front, urging each other on. A class of the population that would benefit the community by fertilizing the soil. I think at that time, if we had killed those men, it would have silenced the whole riot.

Q. As a military man and having military experience, do you believe that General Brinton had force enough there to have cleared that track and taken possession of the railroad property.

A. At that time, if we had acted at that time, at dusk, we would had no more trouble.

Q. Do you believe that if General Brinton had the privilege to have let his command fire on that mob, could he have taken possession of the track and of the railroad property?

A. Yes; if General Pearson had allowed us to fire at the time General Brinton wished to do so, we would have destroyed the mob, and could have taken possession of anything around that neighborhood. All that would have been left of the mob would not have made any fight.

Q. I understand you to say in your testimony, that the round-house was on fire before General Brinton's command left it?

A. Yes; all the buildings. We not only occupied the round-house, but several other buildings that form a yard between them.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Wings of the round-house?

A. There were shops. There is a round-house, and engine houses, and machine shops, and there was a wood-working shop, and a car repair shop, and an upholstery shop, and then the company's offices. They are all connected together, and form a small yard in between them.

Q. Were they attached to the round-house?

A. One came in direct contact with the round-house, or within two or three feet of it, and another within ten feet of it, and there was a space wide enough for two teams to pass between them. We had artillery in this yard and in towards the gates, and the different detachments of troops occupied the different buildings--men were stationed at the windows.

By Mr. Means:

Q. One more question, and I believe I am done. What kind of discipline were the troops under while in the round-house?

A. I considered, for militia, uncommonly good discipline. They obeyed every order I heard given. I will say this: very much to my surprise, from the time I left Philadelphia, there never was an officer or soldier under me that refused to obey an order I gave him. Further than that, I would say, their obedience to the order not to fire, under the aggravating circumstances in the round-house and on the street the next day, when they were fired at constantly with pistols, was one of the most remarkable exhibitions of good discipline I ever witnessed in all my military experience. That is a test of discipline.

Q. Do you know of any arrangement, or any effort made, to furnish the troops with provisions at Torrens station, or at any other place, after you left the round-house?

A. The first I knew about the provision business, was what I have said about Colonel Norris and General Brinton talking, and then, again, in the evening, when Major Barr overtook us, near the poor-house. He was sent back to arrange about provisions, and we got provisions in the night. We got some provisions at the poor-house.

Q. What was the messenger's name in the carriage with you--that rode in the carriage with you? Did you not say there was a party rode in the carriage, when you met General Brinton? Who was with Colonel Norris?

A. I do not know who the gentleman was that was with Major Norris. I was not acquainted with him, and never saw him before. Do not know anything about it.

Q. Do you know if he got out of the carriage and walked up with you?

A. Did not see him get out of the carriage. I could not say positively that he got out of the carriage at all. He might have done so. I did not look back to see.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did you say that the troops had orders not to fire upon the men that were following them, firing, on Sunday morning.

A. That was in order not to bring on a conflict as long as we could avoid it--to pay no attention to them. They were firing with pistols, and I did not reply to them, until they commenced to fire with rifles--a number of men.

Q. Did General Brinton give orders to that effect?

A. I do not know who the orders came from. I got orders from my brigade commander, General Loud.

Q. That the troops were not to fire upon the mob that were following on?

A. It was not so much on the mob following, as people on the sidewalk, and in the doors and windows of the houses, firing with small pistols?

Q. At the time there was firing by the troops?

A. After a time, when the rioters in different places, under cover, generally, at the windows, and behind signs, and around corners of buildings, commenced firing with rifles, then we returned that fire. In some cases the men standing on the sidewalk deliberately pulled out pistols, and fired at the rear of the column, just as we got by there. In one case I saw a man standing within four feet of a policeman on one side of him, and a squad of policemen, about ten or twenty feet on his other flank--saw this man, who was in citizen's dress, take a revolver and fire into our ranks, and no reply was made to him.

Q. No effort made by the police to interfere with him?

A. No; they looked on as if it was a dog fight.

Q. Did that shot hit any of the soldiers?

A. One shot I know took effect. They fired just as the rear of the column was getting by.

Q. At the police station?

A. It was right near a police station or an engine-house.

Q. Where the police were standing?

A. A group of them standing there. It was a municipal building. I think it must have been a fire station from the appearance of it. I looked back--we had just got by--and I judge, from the appearance of the building in Philadelphia, that it was a fire station. I was told since that it was. Those policemen were in uniform--quite a number of them--certainly seven or eight. There might have been a dozen of them, and no large crowd near to interfere with them in case they had chosen to arrest the man. I heard other firing at the same time, which, I believe, has been testified to by others as being done by policemen. I did not actually hear a policeman fire. There was more than one man fired--firing from the other side. I noticed this one man, particularly.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Where did this firing come from, parties on the sidewalks or from houses?

A. Some from sidewalks, houses, and doorways and cellars, from down street, in our rear, men from the corners of the streets we had just passed from behind projecting signs, in front of stores, boxes in front of stores. Saw some of them shoot.

Q. By pistols or muskets?

A. Those that fired from the rear were firing with muskets. All that I saw fire from doorways were pistols. Those from the windows were partly muskets and partly pistols.

Q. Were the police drawn up in line as you passed them?

A. Just standing on the curb-stone--that would naturally put them in line--they did not appear to be drawn up purposely.

Q. What was the conduct of the troops as they retired from the round-house?

A. They went out in as good order as from parade--regular formation. The only men out of place were three sharp shooters I had under my charge in the upper story of the building to keep men away from the cannon in the street. I was ordered to keep that gun quiet until the troops got out of the building. I had a detachment of men there that I held until nearly all the troops went out, and then dismissed all but three of them to rejoin their companies, and those three men remained out there Sunday until the last moment, and I got down opposite the passage-way through the building, and as the last file of men marched out of the building--the last file of the division marched out--I signaled for them to fire and come down. I fired at the corner of the building around which the rioters were sharp-shooting, to get at the cannon. It chipped off the corner of the building, and we made a run for it and got off before they made a shot at us, and the building that it was from was blazing at the time.

Q. The round-house?

A. The round-house and this office building, smoke pouring from the building at the time.

Q. Could you have remained in that round-house for any length of time after the time you retired, in your opinion?

A. Ten minutes afterwards every man's clothes would have been burnt off him if he had stayed there. As we marched around we made a sort of half circle. We went out Twenty-fifth street afterwards, went north to Penn street, and then east along Penn street, and as we passed Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth opposite the buildings, a square away, we saw the buildings, and that the fire had made great progress. The buildings were in complete blaze. Could not have stayed there ten minutes.

Q. Was your command supplied with ammunition to hold out against a mob?

A. We had very little ammunition then. During the night or just towards morning, I went around and made inquiry among the men and found most of them had from three to seven cartridges left. Here and there I found a man who had a large number, one man as many as twenty-eight, that had been obtained by some sharp practice--he would not tell me how. He would chuckle over it because he was an old soldier and knew how to take care of it.

Q. Was there a considerable amount of men that followed you as you retired from the round-house out Penn avenue?

A. When we looked back at some of the street corners, quite a crowd would make their appearance. They would not follow directly on the street, they would run down side streets and come up cross streets and come up on the corner at us. If we made a show to fire they would disappear--they would seem to follow the streets parallel with Penn street.

Q. Where did Colonel Norris overtake your command?

A. A short distance east of Sharpsburg, on the hill-side, in the edge of the timber, I think, about a mile from Sharpsburg. I do not know the exact distance.

Q. He got out of the carriage and walked along with the general. How far did he march with your command before he stopped?

A. The head of the column had stopped when he arrived.

Q. Was General Brinton marching at the time or was he walking along?

A. General Brinton was resting at the side, on the slope of the hill overlooking the stream. He sat down on something at the side of the hill. Colonel Norris approached and he got up to meet him. General Brinton had been marching at the head of the column, and halted at the head of the column, in order to get time for the guns to pull up.

Q. Was the entire command at rest when Colonel Norris reached there?

A. The leading brigade was resting. The other was marching to overtake the leading one. On account of difficulty in hauling the guns, quite a gap intervened between one brigade and the other.

Q. Did Colonel Norris walk with General Brinton with his command for any distance?

A. When the brigade with the guns overtook us the order was given for the whole column to move forward. By that time Brinton and Norris closed their conversation, and we walked along a short distance. We all walked along together a little ways talking, and he decided to go back, and the carriage turned around and Norris got in and rode back.

Q. What was the distance he marched with General Brinton?

A. I could not state the exact distance. I do not remember the exact distance. It was not a great distance. Did not pay much attention to that.

Q. When General Brinton and Colonel Norris met, was there any considerable excitement in the party?

A. The only excitement was on the part of Colonel Norris. He was very much excited, and seemed to be full of expressed emotion. We were all very cool. We got over our excitement and cooled off. Got out of the fire, and we were not half as much excited as outsiders.

Q. What was the language used by Colonel Norris at that time to General Brinton?

A. Expressed great gratification at seeing him sound and well--something to the effect that he never expected to see him again, and glad to see him--an expression of great gratification, great friendliness.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did General Brinton say to Colonel Norris he would be damned if he would go back to Torrens and form a junction with Colonel Guthrie?

A. There was no language of that kind used on any one's part, no violent language of any sort, no obstinate language, everything was pleasant, in the friendliest manner, the whole conversation the whole time they were together.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were you present, within hearing distance, during the time that Colonel Norris and General Brinton were together?

A. Yes; the whole time. They could not have said anything unless they had whispered without my hearing, and I saw no sign of whispering. I might add that we were all very much interested in what Colonel Norris had to say, what was going on in Pittsburgh, what was the situation in the city, and Colonel Norris described the events that had occurred, so far as he had seen or heard what was going on in Pittsburgh, and we were intensely interested in listening.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. What errand had Colonel Norris--what specific reasons, if any, did he make known that he came for?

A. I did not hear him specify any particular reason for his coming. I supposed, as a matter of course, he came out to see where we were, and hear what was necessary to be done, the proper thing for a staff officer to do; ascertain the whereabouts and condition of the troops. He seemed to want to know what we wanted and what could be done for us.

Q. Did he say he had been sent there by anybody--been ordered to go out and find General Brinton?

A. Didn't hear him say anything of the kind. I assume, as a matter of course, that he had been sent to see what had become of us.

Q. That you presumed?

A. Yes; that is, military custom did not require any statement. The proper duty of a staff officer, when any troops are scattered is to hunt them up and see what is the matter with them.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you hear General Brinton say what he intended to do, and what course he intended to pursue?

A. He said he wanted to get a place to give the men a chance to sleep, and get his men something to eat. They were entirely exhausted, and remarked that they were fit for nothing until they had that.

Q. Did Colonel Norris ask him to go back to Sharpsburg, where he could be supplied with ammunition and rations near the railroad?

A. Didn't hear anything of that kind said. It would have aroused me if I had. There was no ammunition at Sharpsburg, and no way to get it there. It would have been an absurd suggestion.

Q. The reason I ask that question, there was some testimony heretofore, that he had been asked to go back to Sharpsburg on the railroad, where he could be supplied with rations and ammunition. I want to know whether there was any suggestion of that kind on the part of Norris or any one else?

A. I did not know how we could get ammunition to Sharpsburg if we could not get it to the round-house. They might get it to us in the country just as well. They had to wagon it wherever they took it.

Q. Did Colonel Norris propose to furnish you with ammunition or rations--propose to furnish General Brinton with ammunition or rations for his command, or say anything about ammunition or rations?

A. The word "proposal" hardly covers it. He said he wanted to know of General Brinton if he wanted to go back for supplies, or whether he wished him to stay with him. And General Brinton said he thought it was better to go back for supplies. He particularly needed provisions right away. They might have used the word "supplies" two or three times, but he laid great stress on the fact that the men were nearly starved. That was spoken of two or three times. We were in a pretty desperate condition for something to eat; hadn't eaten anything for twenty-four hours. I know that made an impression on my mind and on my stomach.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. What time was it when Colonel Norris arrived?

A. When Colonel Norris arrived it was along about ten o'clock. It might have been from half past nine to half past eleven.

Q. You had something at the Union depot within twenty-four hours?

A. I had not. I sat down to the meal after the others had had their sandwiches, just before two o'clock, and was called away when I was putting the first mouthful in my mouth. I never got back. I was sorry my politeness kept me from putting it in my pocket.

Q. Where did you get your first provisions?

A. Along in the afternoon a man overtook us in a buggy with some loaves of bread, which General Brinton purchased, and broke up in pieces and gave to the men. Some of the men didn't get any.

Q. Did anybody in Sharpsburg furnish your men with provisions and water as your men passed through?

A. The men helped themselves to the water.

Q. Any of the citizens furnish provisions?

A. Some one came out that evidently recognized one of our captains, and came along to inquire for him, and handed him a bundle of cakes and crackers, which he scattered around among a dozen or twenty men--perhaps it might have been twenty-five. The men that got the crackers and cakes broke them up and passed them around. There was only a few got those.

Q. In marching out Penn street, after you left the round-house, at what gait did the troops march?

A. They marched rather slower than ordinary quick marching time, on account of pulling the guns, which necessitated their moving slow.

Q. Was there any haste at any point in the line of march?

A. There was a sort of break or stampede at one point before they reached the arsenal, where there was an unusual amount of firing. There was a sudden fusillade of musketry and pistols out of the doors, and out of the windows. A great many came from the second story windows at one time, or windows having the ordinary outside blinds.

Q. Shutters?

A. Slat shutters. Most of the houses at that time became two stories high. The shutters were bowed, and there came a volley of pistol balls and some rifle balls, and some from the rear. More than half of all the men that were hit during the commotion, were hit within five minutes, in that block. The firing was so sudden and unexpected, and two men were killed at the time, and one mortally wounded, and several others wounded slightly, that the men instinctively stopped. That was in the second brigade, in the rear. The others were beyond it, immediately where this firing took place. I believe I mentioned that all the attacks were made on the men in the rear. They would wait until we just passed before they fired, and fired from behind, alongside of the rear column. The first brigade continued to march on. Our brigade halted, and the men, by common impulse, without any order, commenced to fire in these windows, from which the smoke came. Of course, it stopped the firing from the windows. Some of the men fired from back down the street, and we opened the Gatling gun and fired down the street. The moment we commenced firing with that, we could not see a living thing down the street. Saw a dead horse, and two or three dead men, some smashed signs, and then we succeeded, by loud talking, in getting the men to cease firing, and just at that moment I noticed that the first brigade, or the first regiment, was double-quicking the men in the rear to their regiment, to close up the gap that had occurred in the straggling marching, and that had an appearance as though they were not marching away. The men at the head of the column were marching; in ordinary quick time, and in marching, the men would straggle out. It is very important, in a fight, that they should be together and touch elbows, and they were closing up, and some men in our brigade suddenly remarked, or raised the cry, that "the first is running away!" in the frightened tone of voice. It had that effect, and several others took it up and looked around, stopped firing, and saw that the first brigade was a block away from them, and with a common impulse, there was a sort of stampede or rush after them. The officers rushed around in front and could not stop them, and when they overtook the first brigade, they ran up into them in confusion. That was all the stampede there was. It was settled in a few minutes and got into shape again.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Do you know of any orders, written or verbal, urging General Brinton during the time he was in the round-house, or after he retired from there, within twenty-four hours, from General Latta, as to his course to be pursued after he left the round-house?

A. I do not know as I am a competent witness on that. I heard it second hand.

Q. Just what you know of your own personal knowledge?

A. I didn't see the order. I was informed through my brigade commander that the orders were to go east out Penn street, that was in reply to my expression of opinion that we ought to go to the Union depot and get our ammunition and supplies there. He told me General Brinton had orders to go east out of Penn street when we left. Of course, like a good soldier, I shut up. I supposed that was sufficient knowledge of the order.

Q. Any orders to General Guthrie to your knowledge?

A. I did not hear of any. All that was explained to me was that the order was to go east at Penn street when we left.

* * * * *

James H. Stewart, re-called:

By Mr. Means:

Q. Were you an officer in command of a regiment or brigade--a field officer or commissioned officer?

A. I was not, sir.

Q. I mean a commissioned officer at that time?

A. No, sir. I was not.

Q. What position did Colonel Norris occupy?

A. I do not know, I understood on the Governor's staff. I don't know whether he held a commission or not.

Q. Do you know whether he was commissioned or not?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Do you know of any arrangement that was made through the colonel to have the troops rationed at any place or at any time?

A. Of the first division?

Q. Of Colonel Brinton's command?

A. Yes; I know something about it. I know we used every effort--do you want me to explain why?

Q. I want to know the whys and the wherefores.

A. Every effort was made to ration Brinton's command, whilst he was opposite to the round-house. We used everything in our power to do that. I myself had secured an engine from Cassatt, the vice president of the Pennsylvania railroad, and some gentlemen communicated with the Governor. Colonel Farr and Colonel Quay, and quite a number of us, carried on some tubs of sandwiches, and I having learned that the fire had taken place on Liberty street, we then telegraphed out, and found it was west of Twenty-eighth street, consequently, we could not get the rations, and we abandoned that. I afterwards went out myself to the general, carried an order, both written and verbal. I then returned to the Union Depot hotel. Every person connected with us, was very anxious to get the general's command furnished with provisions.

Q. Then the sum and substance of it was, you didn't succeed in furnishing them with rations?

A. We could not, it was utterly impossible.

Q. Were there any other arrangements made to furnish General Brinton's command with rations, after they arrived at the round-house, and after they got away from it?

A. We would have furnished him, if we had known where the general was.

Q. I ask the question, and I expect an answer plain, whether you did or didn't?

A. Whether we had sent any rations to them?

Q. Whether you did furnish them, and whether there was an arrangement made to get rations to them?

A. We had made arrangements--if he had turned his column back from where he was, beyond Sharpsburg, we had made arrangements to send rations up by the West Pennsylvania road.

Q. Where to?

A. To Sharpsburg. I supposed we might meet him there.

Q. Then you had no definite place that you expected to furnish these troops rations at?

A. No, sir.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Does the West Pennsylvania road run through Sharpsburg?

A. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Now. Mr. Stewart, in short, what arrangements did you make to furnish them with rations at all?

A. Where do you mean?

Q. At any place after they left the round-house.

A. After they left the round-house?

Q. Yes.

A. We made no arrangements, for the very simple reason, that as I said, we could not find out where General Brinton's command was. You will remember, the telegraph lines were cut. We learned accidentally, that the general was retreating, and we would have used every effort in our power to get the command furnished with rations, and could have done it, if he had turned the head of his column back. And in this connection, I want to just state here, that so far as the First division is concerned, they were a valorous set of troops, and did good service for the county of Allegheny, used every effort that they could. I believe, that so far as my own personal knowledge is concerned, that General Brinton did everything that he possibly could to help along the trouble that occurred. He was posted there in the round-house all night, and I do not blame him, really.

Q. Do you mean just what you said: that General Brinton did all he could to help along the trouble that occurred?

A. Oh, no.

Q. I wish you would explain this; give an explanation.

A. What I want to say is this: the general in command did everything he possibly could to protect the citizens of Allegheny county.

Q. And suppress the riot?

A. And suppress the riot.

By Mr. Means:

Q. And the railroad property?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I would like you to be a little more explicit--a little more definite in regard to these rations. When you intended to transport the rations to these troops, and how you intended to get them there, and if you intended to get them there at all?

A. In the first place, we didn't know where the first division were retreating to. We understood that they had left the round-house, and were going north. We then could have made--did make--some arrangements to send rations to them, as I said before in my testimony.

Q. What arrangements did you make--put them on cars, or take them by wagons--how did you intend to transport them over there?

A. If he had come back south of the Allegheny, we would have sent them out the West Pennsylvania road--if he had made a junction with Guthrie, as we wanted.

Q. As who wanted?

A. General Latta.

Q. Did you say as you wanted?

A. I didn't say as I wanted.

Q. As the commander-in-chief wanted?

A. The Adjutant General; the commander-in-chief was not there.

Q. General Brinton, or who?

A. If General Brinton had come, and made a junction with Colonel Guthrie, we could have fixed the rations for him--could have done so if he had stayed in Sharpsburg.

Q. Now, in what way could General Brinton have made that connection with Colonel Guthrie?

A. How do you mean?

Q. By what road did he or could he have made it?

A. When he left the round-house, it was as easy for him to go to Guthrie's command as it was to march out to Sharpsburg.

Q. As you appear to know something about these arrangements, I would like to know what arrangement was made to get General Brinton's command any ammunition?

A. What arrangement?

Q. Yes; or if any?

A. I do not know that General Brinton's command had been exhausted of ammunition. We could have furnished him with all the ammunition that he wanted; as Colonel Norris told him, if he would turn back the head of his column, and make a junction with Guthrie, we could furnish him with both ammunition and rations.

Q. Now, do you know that Colonel Guthrie had ammunition, and plenty of it?

A. He had enough for his troops.

Q. How do you know that he had?

A. Having been out there in the morning, before daylight, furnishing Colonel Rodgers' command with some ammunition, I happened to know that Colonel Guthrie had plenty of it, and then we had more of it at the Union Depot hotel, and could have furnished the general's command with all the ammunition that he wanted.

Q. Had you any arrangements by which you would transport that ammunition to General Brinton's command--from the round-house, I mean?

A. After he left the round-house?

Q. From the Union depot?

A. O, yes; we could if we knew exactly where General Brinton was.

Q. Did you have any arrangements made to do that?

A. Well, we knew just exactly how we were handling our own stuff there.

Q. You did not know exactly what you were doing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you know from the commander-in-chief that General Brinton was short of ammunition?

A. From the commander-in chief? The commander-in-chief was not there. The Adjutant General was there. I knew from what General Brinton had told us on his route north of the Allegheny that he was short of ammunition.

Q. Did General Latta know that, to your knowledge?

A. Not until we returned from seeing General Brinton.

Q. And when General Brinton had marched north, you say then you supposed him to be retreating, and you gave up all hopes of furnishing any provision or anything else--when General Brinton, you say, went north, out Penn avenue--I believe it is north?

A. North-east; yes, sir.

Q. Then, after you found he crossed the Allegheny river you gave up all hopes and quit making any efforts to furnish him with either provision or ammunition?

A. No, sir; we did not. I believe that every effort was made to furnish his men.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I would like to ask Mr. Stewart in what capacity he was acting?

A. As a volunteer aid of the Adjutant General.

Q. And did what he directed you to do simply?

A. At what time?

Q. While you were acting as volunteer aid?

A. You don't want me to tell everything I know?

Q. No, sir; my question is, you did what he directed you to do?

A. Everything, of course.

Q. That was all?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did not assume to do anything on your own responsibility?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were you a member of the National Guard at that time?

A. I was not. I had been a major on the staff of General Pearson.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Of the National Guard?

A. Of the National Guard.

Q. And you went out with Colonel Norris because you were directed to go out there by the Adjutant General?

A. Directed to go by the Adjutant General.

Q. And all you know about ammunition or provisions is what you were directed to do in relation to it?

A. Of course that is all.

Q. In your testimony heretofore you stated that Brinton made a remark that he would be God damned if he would return to Pittsburgh again. Are you certain he made that remark and used that language?

A. I am under oath, am I not?

Q. Refresh your memory and see whether he made that remark?

A. The general knew Colonel Norris better than he knew me, and of course, was speaking to him.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Mr. Yutzy asks you whether you are certain that he made that remark?

A. I most positively assert that General Brinton made that remark.

* * * * *

Major Lewis D. Baugh, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether you were with General Brinton's command on Sunday morning on their retreat?

A. No, sir; I was not.

Q. State what knowledge you have of the dispatches sent by General Brinton to General Latta during the night of Saturday?

A. I cannot, without my memorandum. I was present when the dispatches came in, several of them, two of them brought in by a scout, I think.

Q. From whom?

A. From General Brinton.

Q. To General Latta?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were in General Latta's office?

A. I was in General Latta's office.

Q. When two of them were brought in?

A. I think one or two, I cannot recollect. I was there when the scout came in.

Q. When the first dispatch was brought in?

A. I think so, yes, sir. I came in the room and found him there. If I had a report here I could talk more plain.

Q. You mean the Adjutant General's report?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you state the nature of the dispatch?

A. If I saw the book I could state which dispatch it is.

Q. Did you see any other one than those that are published in the Adjutant General's report?

A. I don't recollect of seeing any other. I was in General Latta's head-quarters off and on during the evening, being cut off from my division, and naturally went to the next head-quarters, and I was in there during the evening, trying to get my rations out to the troops. I was commissary of the first division, acting quarter-master at the time, I had some ammunition there as well as rations, and I was in the room and out of it until pretty near midnight, and then I attempted to join General Brinton by myself, and went up street in citizen's clothes.

Q. Did you succeed?

A. No, sir; could not get to the round-house, found that I would get shot very likely by our own men as I was in citizens clothes, and looked about as much like a rioter as any of the rest of them.

Q. Did General Brinton complain of being short of ammunition in any of those dispatches?

A. I think he did, short of ammunition and short of provisions.

Q. Do you recollect what he said about it?

A. No, sir; I do not, because it is all written down, and I had the report.

Q. Are all the dispatches that you read or saw, as coming from General Brinton that night, published in the Adjutant General's report?

A. I think they are. There may be some more that I did not see. I read it over, and found it pretty near as I knew. I tried my best to get provisions to him, and I delivered ammunition--four boxes--to somebody, to take out to some other station to some other troops.

Q. Torrens station?

A. Torrens station, I think it was. I recollect going down in the cellar of the hotel and getting them out; it was pretty hard work for some one or two people, besides myself, to lift them up. The elevator was stopped.

Q. You were the commissary of General Brinton's staff?

A. Yes, sir; I am regular commissary of the First division--General Brinton's division.

Q. And as such were in consultation with the general during the night?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know of any supplies being provided to General Brinton's command during the night, or at Torrens station?

A. No, sir; not that I know of. There were some supplies I sent down there, but whether they reached or not I do not know; I don't think they did. Some started out there. The supplies went out in a wagon; I did not send those out--out to the round-house. When General Brinton started, he directed me to remain there and make arrangements to ration the troops in the evening and following morning. I made the arrangements, and after getting through with that arrangement I went on the track, and found there had been a fight.

Q. You say you were not with General Brinton when Colonel Norris reached him?

A. No, sir.

Q. When did you see General Brinton after that?

A. I think about three o'clock in the afternoon, as near as I can recollect, without having any watch on me.

Q. Of Sunday?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did General Brinton say anything about having seen Colonel Norris?

A. I do not know that he did--I do not recollect it.

Q. Did he tell you anything about Colonel Norris having been to see him?

A. I don't think he did. As soon as I found they had left the round-house, I heard they had gone to the arsenal. I heard Captain Breck say to somebody that they had gone to the arsenal. I drove there, and found they were not there, and somebody said they had gone to the right. I followed out, and crossed the railroad track, and came to the hospital, and down to the hotel again. I found they had gone to Sharpsburg. I hired another carriage, and drove out to Sharpsburg; and when I got to Sharpsburg, I was bothered which road to take, and I daresn't ask anybody. I found the mark of the shoes that the column had moved in the road, and I followed up that road some distance.

Q. General Brinton did not mention the fact of Colonel Norris having met him that day?

A. I don't recollect of it.

Q. Did he say anything about having received any orders from General Latta?

A. No, sir; he asked me for orders as soon as I got there. I told him I had none. Then I went back to General Latta for the orders.

Q. Why did you go back?

A. He wanted orders.

Q. Did General Brinton send you back for orders?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did you go?

A. Drove down the river road to the bridge, about opposite to the Monongahela House; crossed there, and went to the Monongahela House, and went to General Latta's room, and found him, and delivered a note to General Latta.

Q. From whom?

A. General Brinton.

Q. What did General Latta say in reply?

A. Asked where General Brinton was, and I told him back on the hills about the poor-house, as near as I could tell, being a stranger there, then he gave me written orders to give to General Brinton.

Q. When did you tell this to General Brinton?

A. When he gave me the written orders, I asked him about provisions, and he says, I was commissary and it was my business to feed them. Says I, "Yes, but it is your business to give me some stuff." They had not time, and they left me there. Major Lazarus, one of the special officers, was in the room all the time, and there was a captain of the first regiment. I took them down with me, and turned around to Lazarus, and says I, "You read these orders. In case I do not reach General Brinton, or you see him first, give him these orders." Then there was two of us, in case one got picked up then the other would deliver the orders. When I crossed the river at the West Pennsylvania depot, he drove down and delivered the orders. As soon as I got out in the morning, I overhauled General Brinton and gave him the written order.

Q. Do you know what those orders were?

A. If I had a report here, I could tell you, sir.

Q. They are published in the Adjutant General's report?

A. Yes, sir. The substance was to proceed to Altoona.

Q. What is the date of the order--can you give that?

A. Sunday night, about nine o'clock, when I received it.

Q. You may give the substance of the order, as near as you can recollect?

A. To proceed to Altoona, and Mr. Creighton would furnish transportation. When I went back General Latta gave me orders that General Brinton should have it to-night. I went out, and jumped in a wagon, and started over.

Q. While you were at the Monongahela house, did General Latta say anything about General Brinton having disobeyed his orders?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did he say anything to you about having sent orders to General Brinton?

A. Not to me. Didn't hear him say a word about it.

Q. Did he mention having sent Colonel Norris or Captain Aull with orders?

A. No, sir; didn't say a word to me about it. I took General Brinton a note in, and handed it to him, and he then dictated an order. The order was written out, and handed to me, and delivered to General Brinton.

Q. Do you know whether Colonel Norris had returned?

A. I don't know anything about him.

Doctor J. E. Mears, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether you were at the Union depot on Saturday morning, when Colonel Norris was sent by General Latta and General Brinton.

A. I was, sir.

Q. You may state what conversation took place between General Latta and Colonel Norris?

A. I don't know that I can state positively the conversation. I came to the hotel about eight o'clock on Sunday morning, went to General Latta's room, and reported that the troops had left the round-house, having learned that fact at the hospital, where I had spent a portion of the night, and said to him that I proposed to purchase some medical stores, and join him at once, and asked him where I should go to join him, and he told me to go to the arsenal. At that time, Colonel Norris was making preparations to join General Brinton also. What their conversation was, I cannot state positively, or what the nature of the instructions given to him were. I knew that he was going to see General Brinton, and, at the time, my impression was that he was going to see him in a friendly way. I knew that he was not officially connected with the National Guard, and the impression I had arrived at, at that time, was, he was simply going out to see him in behalf of General Latta, as a friend of General Brinton, to see what had happened and what condition they were in, but I didn't understand, at the time, that he was going officially to him.

Q. Was Captain Aull there, at the time?

A. That I cannot state positively. I went into the dining-room of the hotel, and had a conversation with Captain Breck. That I remember, but I don't remember of meeting Captain Aull, at the time.

Q. Did you see the major, Saturday?

A. I didn't, sir. I may have seen him not to know him.

Q. Did you see Colonel Norris when he started in the carriage?

A. I didn't; because Colonel Norris started before I did. He took a hack, and I was going to a drug store to get some medical stores, and also going to a livery stable to get a conveyance, and Colonel Norris left the hotel before I had left Pittsburgh. As I said in my testimony before, I met once, after he had seen General Brinton.

Q. State what conversation you had with him?

A. I took with me, at the suggestion of Captain Breck, a man who had acted as scout during the night, a member of Murphy's cavalry, I believe. He went with me on account of my being a stranger in Pittsburgh, and showed me the way to the arsenal. When we reached the arsenal and found the troops were not there, and when I was denied admittance by the guard at the gate, or refused to be permitted to go near the gate or have conversation with him, I drove on, and the crowd knew nothing at all about the country beyond that point, so that the way was ascertained by asking persons, of course very cautiously, so as not to let them know what our object was. I followed the command by watching the road and seeing the foot-marks across the bridge going through Sharpsburg, and got through Sharpsburg and passed into the country, turned to the left, and I should think, not more than a quarter of a mile from the point at which I met Colonel Norris returning to the city. He was in a carriage with another person whom I did not know, and to whom I didn't pay particular attention. I got out of the buggy and halted them. They didn't seem to be very desirous to be halted, because it was not desirable that it should be known who they were in that portion of the country. I asked the colonel where the command was, and he told me it was about a quarter of a mile beyond, on the hill. That was the only conversation I had with Colonel Norris. As I said before, he wasn't desirous of stopping very long to give me any information. His words and manner was such as indicated that it was not desirable that we should be seen conversing together, or holding any communication which would indicate that they were in any way associated or connected with the troops, as there were persons along the road that had followed up the command. I joined the troops, certainly no more than a quarter of a mile beyond. I found them resting in good order.

Q. When you joined the troops and met General Brinton, did he say anything about having received any orders from Colonel Norris?

A. No, sir; he didn't.

Q. Did he say what he intended to do?

A. I asked him the question, and he replied that he was going to the poor-house to get a place to rest his command, and also to get food, and I asked him whether he knew where the poor-house was, and what his information was, and he said that a citizen or some person at Sharpsburg had directed him, and told him to go there, that he could get food there, and get an opportunity to cook his rations.

Q. Did Colonel Norris say anything to you as surgeon of the division about having the column halted at any point?

A. No, sir; he didn't.

Q. To dress any wounds?

A. No, sir; not a word. It was as much as I could do to get him to halt them enough to ask him what I regarded as a very important question, where the command was, that I should join him.

Q. Did he say anything about what his business had been to the command?

A. Not a word; no, sir.

Q. Was there anybody in the carriage with him?

A. There was a person, sir, whom I didn't know. They were sitting--both of them--back in the corner of the carriage very closely.

Q. Would you recognize the person now?

A. No, sir. I didn't see anybody in the room whom I should recognize as being with Colonel Norris. I didn't closely examine the person. My business was with Colonel Norris, because I knew him, and desired simply to get the information from him.

Q. Did you know Colonel Norris?

A. I knew him by sight, having met him with the Governor's staff on one or two occasions. I had seen him at the hotel before.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning, at Reading, Pennsylvania.

* * * * *

READING, April 19, 1878.

The committee met at the Mansion house, at eleven o'clock, A.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair. All members present except Messrs. Reyburn, Larrabee, and Yutzy.

George S. Goodhart, affirmed:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether or not you were coroner in July last, at the time of the difficulties here among the railroad employés?

A. I was coroner; yes, sir?

Q. Still holding that position?

A. Still hold that position. I was elected at the same time that Samuel J. Tilden was elected--elected, I say, that is my opinion.

Q. Can you state what day the first difficulty among the railroad employés broke out here, or commenced?

A. No; I cannot. I cannot state the day. I presume it was within a week or somewheres about the 16th--15th or 16th of July. I would date it about a week anterior to the time these men were killed, which was on the 23d, Monday. The excitement ran very high throughout the day of Sunday.

Q. Will you please give us a history of how it first started, and then trace the extent of the difficulty and troubles along up until you come to the date of the conflict between the strikers and the militia?

A. Well, I don't know that I can answer that question with much accuracy. There had evidently been for some time before considerable contending between these engineers who were suspended and the Reading Railroad Company. It is that, I presume, that led to the difficulty.

Q. What time were the engineers suspended by the railroad company?

A. That is more than I can say.

Q. Was it some time prior to this difficulty--outbreak?

A. Yes; certainly it would be prior to this.

Q. How many of them had been suspended?

A. That I cannot say--a large majority of them, I think, that were on the road were suspended.

Q. Were there a large number of them suspended, and were without employ in and about the city of Reading?

A. It was generally so supposed.

Q. And the first dissatisfaction was among that class of men, was it?

A. Yes; and those who sympathized with them. There were differences of opinion among the citizens here. Many sympathized with the railroad company, and many, also, with these employés, and the feeling during the day of Sunday was very much against the Reading Railroad Company.

Q. That was Sunday, the 22d?

A. Yes; the 22d, and on Monday the general impression was here, with those that I had interviews with, that property and shops would be set fire to that night.

Q. The railroad shops?

A. Yes; during the day of Sunday, there was a good deal of excitement on the street here, on Penn street, and a great many people congregated out about the corner of Sixth and Penn and Seventh and Penn.

Q. What class of people generally gathered?

A. They were mostly workingmen, men thrown out of employment.

Q. Men from the manufacturing establishments?

A. Manufacturing, yes, sir; mechanics and laboring classes, principally.

Q. How large a number assembled?

A. I presume I saw as many as fifty to seventy-five, probably one hundred at times during the day on Sunday.

Q. What day was the railroad bridge across the Schuylkill burned?

A. It was burned that same night.

Q. Sunday night?

A. Yes; sometime during the night, about midnight, I think.

Q. This assembly of men on Sunday, was it composed of railroad men--were they actually engaged in running trains then--or was it men who had been discharged?

A. I am not prepared to answer that question, because I know very few of the engineers on the road. I do not know that I can point out a single man of them.

Q. Did the Reading railroad continue to run their trains?

A. They did on Sunday, I think, and a part of the day on Monday. On Monday, towards evening, some of the trains were stopped here in the city by some parties. It seems some of them were boys. Young men got on to the trains, on to the locomotive. At one time, I understood a boy--however, I don't know that I can say that, either, it was so stated by some of the witnesses, that a certain boy got on to a locomotive, and moved it back and forth, just about as he would a little wagon--made a plaything out of it.

Q. Drove the engineer from his engine?

A. Yes; they got off some way.

Q. You did not see them?

A. No; I did not see them. In fact I did not go on Seventh street at all on that day. I don't think I was on Seventh street on the Monday.

Q. Did the crowd remain together during the night of Sunday night, or did it disperse during the evening?

A. That is more than I can say, but I should suppose that it did not disperse very early--I think it highly probable that they kept up looking round for news.

Q. What street were they on on Sunday?

A. Principally, Penn street--corner Sixth and Penn streets.

Q. What was the character of the crowd, as being demonstrative?

A. Well, they were anxiously looking for news from other quarters, from Pittsburgh and Baltimore, where they had been on the strike, and, as a matter of course, they would congregate in front of the telegraph offices. Well, the news came pretty direct to the Eagle office, and they looked there to the bulletin boards for exciting news, and they came around for that purpose, and there was some of them, no doubt, were hard cases, and ready for any emergency.

Q. Were they noisy and boisterous?

A. I cannot say that they were.

Q. Did you have any conversation with any of them?

A. No; I did not.

Q. What seemed to be their troubles and grievances. Did they make them manifest in any way?

A. Well, the main grievance among them, that I could learn, was the depressed state of things, being out of employment, not able to get any-anything to do, and want generally.

Q. Who did they seem to blame for that state of things?

A. There was a good deal of censure placed upon the Reading Railroad Company, more than perhaps any other.

Q. On Monday morning was that crowd still in the streets?

A. Yes; there were some there on Monday morning.

Q. How large a crowd?

A. Probably not so many. I do not think there were so many there that morning as there were on Sunday evening and during the day on Sunday.

Q. Had the news of the burning of the bridge reached you then?

A. Well, not until during the night. I heard the fire alarm bell, but I did not get up. I did not go out at all.

Q. The fire alarm was sounded, was it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any efforts made to extinguish the fire by the fire companies or civil authorities of the city?

A. Well; yes, sir. They went out, as was stated, before the inquisition--before the inquest; the firemen went out, Chief Boyer was there and a number of others, and it appears they could not do anything towards arresting the fire in any way. Some of the cars, I think, were set on fire, some box cars they had out there. Afterwards, it appears, that the report came that the bridge was on fire--that was stated before the inquest, that the mob was so great that they threatened the engineer, the chief of police, and other parties there that intended to suppress the flames--to put down the excitement.

Q. The mob would not permit the firemen to work?

A. Would not permit them to work--to put any water on the fire at all.

Q. Did they use any violence towards the firemen?

A. Not that I could learn.

Q. Did they make any efforts?

A. Not any that I know of.

Q. Do you know whether the police of the city were there--any of them to protect the firemen?

A. The chief of police was there, and no doubt he had a number of the police with him.

Q. Did you see the crowd during the day? How large a crowd was there during the day on Monday?

A. I suppose it would vary, likely, from one hundred to one hundred and fifty.

Q. Where were they mostly during the day?

A. Between the Keystone house, and the Eagle office.

Q. They still continued to gather around the bulletin boards?

A. Yes; around the bulletin boards. Some of them would come over, occasionally, to look at the Times' office, but most of the news came through the Eagle office, and the consequence was, the most of the crowd were in front of the Eagle office, there and at the Keystone house.

Q. How was it at the railroad depot, and about the railroad offices?

A. I don't know, for I didn't go there at all.

Q. Do you know how large a crowd was there?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether there was any efforts made by the civil authorities of the city to disperse the crowd during the day?

A. Well, there was an effort made, at least it so appeared in the inquisition, that parties went to the sheriff, with a view of getting him to render some assistance. One party, a man by the name of Miller, proffered to suppress the mob with fifty men. Said that if the sheriff would allow him to, that he thought he could procure that number of men. This was sometime during the day of Monday that this statement was made. The proffer was made to the sheriff.

Q. Made by Mr. Miller himself?

A. By Mr. Miller, in company with Mr. Wood.

Q. What reply did the sheriff make to that offer?

A. I don't know the exact words--I have all that testimony down.

Q. Give us the substance of it--of his reply?

A. He did not feel disposed to do anything. They said they would get arms and ammunition, and everything that was necessary, to put it down, if he would give his consent, which, it seems, he declined to do; and when they said they would get the arms or guns, he said the rioters have guns, too; and he also said to them that he would not go to do anything by way of suppressing it, for fear that he would be shot the same as the sheriff was at Pittsburgh.

Q. You had received news, then, that the sheriff of Allegheny county was shot, had you here?

A. Yes; at that time.

Q. Which afterwards proved incorrect. Was that the only reason that he gave for not accepting the proposition of Mr. Miller?

A. I am inclined to think that was the only plausible reason he gave. He didn't believe in going out and being a target to fire at.

Q. Did he make any effort to arrest the parties who were in the disturbance during Monday?

A. None that I can learn.

Q. Did he make any effort at any time?

A. I think not.

Q. Did he call for any posse to assist you in any way?

A. He swore in the next day quite a number of deputy sheriffs, but on Monday I don't think he called on any. He issued his proclamation and called and put it up, I think, in the evening, about five or six o'clock.

Q. On Monday?

A. On Monday.

Q. Now, can you give us the substance of the proclamation?

A. No; I cannot. I didn't see it.

Q. Didn't see it?

A. No.

Q. Was there any call made for the militia to come out, by the sheriff, to preserve the peace?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how the militia happened to come here?

A. Well, it was said afterwards that they came here by the order of General Bolton.

Q. Monday night--go on and describe the situation of affairs, if you will--where the crowd was, and what took place on Monday night?

A. The main crowd was up at the corner of Seventh and Penn, and where there are always quite a number of men congregated, particularly at that hour, shortly before dusk, and about that time. There had been large crowds there for some weeks or so, who frequently congregated there, and on that night, as a matter of course, it would be expected there would be more, in consequence of the transactions that took place during the day. People went there to see the excitement, and so on, and it was with a great deal of difficulty, as I understood from the testimony of Chief Cullen, that they could keep the pass-way clear, to allow people to pass up and down the street. I think, if I mistake not, Mr. Cullen had nearly all his force there. He was chief of police, and once or twice, I think, he stated he got the pass-way cleared. It was soon blocked up again. Just about dusk, or a little after, it appears that General Reeder arrived with some men at the outer depot. Mr. Paxton, in communication with him, told him where the rioters were, and where one of the cars were that they wished to release from the mob. That was at the commencement of the cut there. The general ordered his men right there to release that car, and I suppose, passing through the cut. He concluded to force his men right through. I don't know what acquaintance he had with the surroundings of the cut, but it strikes me very forcibly, even now, and has all along, that if he had sent a dozen men on either side of that cut, and his main body of men through the cut, that there would hardly have been a drop of blood shed. As these troops moved up the cut, they were met with volleys of stones and missiles, pistol-shooting, &c., from above either side, as they were passing along; and, indeed, I cannot see how they got through there and escaped with so little injury as they did. It looks to me almost a miracle. Have you observed the cut--have you been up there?

Q. Only in passing through it.

A. The testimony came in that they would throw stones large enough--well, too large for one man to handle--take two men--at one time two men were seen to get hold of a large stone, and push it right over, apparently on to them. They were treated in that way, until they got to the lower end of the cut, and they marched up the tracks on either side, I think, principally, on the west side. When they got about two thirds of the way through the cut, they fired forward, killing a number of men right at the corner of Penn and Seventh. One man was killed about two squares--better than two squares--below. He was on his way up town, somewhere. A man by the name of Trace, I believe.

Q. A citizen of the city?

A. Yes, sir; a citizen. Two or three men were killed on the southeast corner or near the southeast corner of the street, near the gutter. One or two of them were on the sidewalk. I think it very remarkable, indeed, that these men would come through there, and when they met with these missiles on either side of them, that they would fire forward, and being attacked as they were, it would appear as though they would fire in almost any direction for relief, and get out as speedily as possible.

Q. After they passed through the cut, did they encounter the mob at the end of the cut?

A. Some of them. Those that were throwing these missiles, on either side, I dare say, didn't organize in front of them; but there was some of the parties--some of the same mob--there.

Q. Was there any firing there, after they had passed through?

A. No; not after they had passed through.

Q. What street did they come out on, in passing through the cut?

A. Out on Penn street, and then down Penn.

Q. There was no firing, as they passed through the cut?

A. No; not after they had got on to Penn, west of Seventh.

Q. Did the troops accomplish what they were sent to--started to accomplish--gaining possession of the car?

A. Yes; they did that.

Q. How long did the troops remain in the city, then?

A. Well, during the night, I think. I think they left the next morning.

Q. Do you know where they went to from there?

A. No; I don't; but I learned that they had gone back to Allentown or Easton.

Q. Were any troops left at Reading, at all?

A. Yes; there was some left at the outer depot.

Q. To guard railroad property?

A. To guard the property of the railroad company.

Q. Was there any disturbance occurred after that Monday night?

A. None, that I could learn.

Q. Was the mob dispersed by the firing that took place?

A. Effectually.

Q. Did they ever rally, or come together again?

A. No; no rallying there.

Q. I wish you would give us the number of killed--the number that was actually killed--so far as you can?

A. There were ten killed--then another one subsequently died, about six or eight weeks, I think, afterwards--Corbett--from the wounds received at the same time.

Q. Making eleven in all?

A. Making eleven altogether.

Q. Were these all citizens, or a portion of them soldiers?

A. They were all citizens--no soldiers.

Q. Were any of them actually engaged, or were they citizens who had congregated there out of curiosity?

A. The larger part of them were there out of curiosity. Two of those that were killed were said to have had something to do with this matter, and were not innocent. The others--that is, taking it for granted that they were innocent, by being there, which the law, I believe, doesn't grant, either--may be said to have been innocent. Trace was, perhaps, the least censurable of any of them, for he was far away from the scene where this was transacted.

Q. I understand you to say this: of the killed there were only two who were actually engaged in the riots?

A. I would say, whose record was not altogether clear--free from censure.

Q. Now, how many persons were wounded, so far as you could ascertain?

A. That I cannot ascertain; but I presume there were as many as six or eight more that were wounded--probably more.

Q. Do you know how many of the soldiers were wounded?

A. No; I didn't learn, but I understand--I think that there were but two or three that were in any ways seriously hurt--none mortally.

Q. Now you may state what efforts were made by the sheriff on Tuesday--Monday night and Tuesday to preserve the peace?

A. The only effort that he made then that I know of was that he sent notice to quite a number of the citizens to call at his office and be sworn in as deputy sheriffs. What instructions they received from him I don't know.

Q. Do you know how many offered themselves or responded to his notice?

A. I don't know, but I understood there was some five or six hundred citizens that were sworn in by him or his deputy.

Q. What efforts did the mayor make, if any, to preserve the peace during the entire disturbance?

A. The mayor was not here at the time, but returned the night, I think, shortly before these troops left. He afterwards went out to the depot and was in communication with General Reeder, if I mistake not. I don't think that anything further was done to suppress the mob, for everything was quiet then.

Q. The chief of police was on the ground was he?

A. He was on the ground, and I think manfully did his duty.

Q. How many police were on duty at the time in the city?

A. I suppose there were about twenty-five or thirty, I forget the number.

Q. Do you know what authority the mayor has in case of riot and disturbances, given by the charter of the city or the laws relating to the city?

A. I have never read them. I have never read the charter of the city; but my own judgment would tell me that he had power of suppressing--the same power of suppressing a riot that a sheriff would have.

Q. Was that matter discussed, or taken into consideration by the citizens at the time? Did you hear any expression by legal gentlemen as to what the power of the mayor was?

A. I cannot say that I did; but the matter was discussed pretty freely among citizens, and some seemed to think that the mayor ought to have suppressed the riot. I presume he would if he had been here.

Q. Did he arrive here before the firing took place in the cut?

A. No.

Q. Not until after?

A. Not until afterwards.

Q. Did the chief of police make any arrests, to your knowledge, prior to the conflict between the troops and the mob?

A. No; they made no arrests so far as I could learn. It seems they were under the impression that they were almost entirely powerless with the meager number they had to arrest them.

Q. They didn't feel strong enough to cope with the mob without greater assistance?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were any arrests made that afternoon?

A. Yes; a great many arrests.

Q. By what authority--by whom?

A. Well, by the chief of police--they made the most of the arrests.

Q. Were any arrests made by the sheriff?

A. I think not. I don't know of any.

Q. The arrests then were mostly made by the chief of police on warrants issued by the mayor?

A. I think they were issued by the mayor.

Q. What was done with those persons who were arrested?

A. Some of them were taken up to jail. Others were released on bail.

Q. How many have been tried?

A. I suppose there were between forty and fifty that were tried--they were to have been tried. Whether they have all been or not, I don't know.

Q. How long is this cut?

A. Well, it is nearly two squares.

Q. How soon after the soldiers were in did they begin to attack them?

A. Within about probably fifteen or twenty minutes.

Q. Did they continue to fire on them then until they got down on to Penn street, where the cut runs down level?

A. No, not quite. I don't think there were any stones thrown after they had passed Court street, within just half a square from Penn.

Q. The firing didn't commence until they got on to the cut?

A. No; it was before the firing on the soldiers you mean?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. It was not, I think, until after they passed Court street--about that.

Q. It was still in the cut?

A. Still in the cut.

Q. Then they got out of the cut on to level ground, and then it was that the firing was done, and when the mob was dispersed.

A. Yes; there was firing done there, and at Penn street. They couldn't fire up and down Penn street without being very close to it.

Q. And this stone that took two men to throw down--did that hit anybody?

A. That is more than I know; not directly, evidently, or it would have killed them.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Was the sympathy of the people of the city of Reading with the strikers, the discharged employés of the Reading railroad?

A. Well, there was sympathy on both sides, evidently; and during the day, on Monday, I am inclined to think, quite a number of the people sympathized with the strikers, rather than with the railroad company.

Q. You say on both sides. Now, I would like to know what you mean by both sides?

A. I mean the Reading Railroad Company and the dismissed engineers of the road.

Q. Then, in your opinion, the sympathy of the people of Reading was with the employés of the Reading railroad in striking and destruction of property?

A. No; I couldn't say that.

Q. My question was simply this: that I wanted to know if the citizens of the city of Reading were in sympathy with the strikers, or the discharged employés of the Reading road?

A. I should say no; although they had a good many to sympathize with them here in the city.

Q. Well, then, Mr. Goodhart, were they simply discharged employés of the Reading road that participated in this destruction of property?

A. That question I cannot answer, because, as I stated before, I don't know any of the engineers of the road now.

Q. Did there appear to be any tramps or any strangers connected with this party who were with the engineers or employés of the Reading road?

A. So far as I know they were all strangers to me, and I have very little hesitation in saying, that a good many of them were strangers, coming here from a distance.

Q. From a distance and from other sections of the country?

A. Yes, sir. I think a number of them were strangers, not citizens of the place, nor had they been in the employ of the Reading Railroad Company.

Q. To your knowledge, do you know whether or not, the mayor of the city of Reading ordered out his police to suppress these rioters?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. When the mayor was not here, was there any person in authority?

A. The chief of police. Chief Cullen, he has stated, took his men up to the corner of Seventh and Penn that evening, and I presume did his utmost to clear the pass-way there, and suppress the mob. What effect it would have had upon them had they arrested two or three or half a dozen of these men I am not prepared to say, it might, possibly, have dispersed the mob.

Q. Well, then, Mr. Goodhart, in your opinion, what amount of men would it have taken to suppress this mob and restore order and peace?

A. I should think that one hundred and fifty or two hundred men would have done it, properly armed.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What other property was destroyed beside the destruction of the bridge?

A. There was a few houses that were burned.

Q. Any freight in them?

A. I think there was some, and then there was some property destroyed right on the road here in the city.

Q. Private property?

A. No; that was cars loaded, and there was one car filled with tobacco, that was broken into and a great deal of it being carried away.

Q. Was there any property beside railroad property destroyed?

A. No, I think not; not that I know of.

Q. What day was the other property destroyed--before or after the destruction of the bridge?

A. That was afterwards.

Q. The bridge then, I understand, was the first thing?

A. No. These cars, at this side of the bridge, were the first, I understood, that were burnt, afterwards the bridge, and then, on Monday--this was on Saturday night--and on the Monday, there was some property destroyed on Seventh street; coal trains were arrested, and the coal was dumped down right on the track, at different places. The watchman's house was turned upside down.

Q. Now, I understand you to say that the citizens, some of them, sympathized with the railroad employés who had been discharged, and some sympathized with the railroad company? That is the way you put it, I believe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, now, was there any sympathy manifested by the citizens of Reading for those strikers or employés after they began to destroy property--or, in other words, in sympathy with the destruction of property?

A. None whatever, that I could learn.

By Mr. Means:

Q. There was no disposition on the part of the rioters, Mr. Goodhart, if I understand you, to destroy any property except that which belonged to the Reading railroad?

A. Yes; just so.

Q. Not outside of it?

A. Not outside of it.

Q. Where did you get your information in regard to Mr. Mullin having proffered his services to the sheriff?

A. Got it from his own testimony.

Q. Before you at the coroner's inquest?

A. Before me; yes, sir, and through Mr. Wootten, also. He testified to the same thing.

* * * * *

E. F. Evans, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You were mayor of the city of Reading during the past summer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You may tell us, if you please, where you were when the difficulties in July occurred?

A. On the Friday morning preceding the riot in this city, which occurred on the Monday, or rather the burning of the bridge, took place on Sunday night. What was known as the riot, followed on Monday night, and the firing of the troops, and so forth. I left this city for four or five days, and went down to Ocean Grove, following the example of the Executive of the State, the mayor of Philadelphia, and the mayor of Scranton, to spend a few days there, intending to return the following week, and at that time I did not dream or apprehend of any danger here with a strike or anything of that kind. On the following Monday morning, at the Grove, I received a telegram about half past ten or eleven o'clock, from the chief of police of this city, that a number of cars were on fire. At that time it said nothing of the bridge, in fact that had not been fired, I believe, at that time. I picked up my things, and left in the first train, which was shortly after twelve o'clock. After reaching Allentown that night, at probably seven o'clock, I was informed that the train had been taken off the East Penn road, and I could not reach home. I then telegraphed to Mr. Wootten. I stated my position in the telegram that I could not get home. He then ordered a train to bring me over--a special car and engine was placed at my disposal--and we started out and ran here, probably at half past ten or eleven o'clock. That was on Monday evening--on, I believe, the 23d, if I mistake not; at any rate, it was Monday evening.

Q. Monday evening was the 23d?

A. I reached this city after the firing had taken place, and these men had been wounded. I came in from the depot and came down to my office, issued a proclamation requesting our citizens to uphold the authorities of the city. Had it published that night, or rather in the morning paper. I then went up to the depot and remained there until two or three o'clock in the morning, requesting during that time that if there was any trouble, the military being out there, that they should take charge, my police officers then, five or six of them being wounded, and they had been on duty Sunday night, and all day Monday and Monday night. On the following day, then--I think it was the following day--I swore in probably from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty men, furnishing them with maces, to go on duty if any further danger was apprehended. There was but little occurred after Monday night. I believe the tracks were torn up in some places on Seventh street, but not to any extent. Didn't amount to anything, and that was about the closing of what I--we did everything we could after I returned home--the city authorities--to suppress any further violence or outbreak.

Q. And succeeded in preserving the peace?

A. After that there was nothing occurred.

Q. Did the citizens respond heartily to your call?

A. As a general thing, as I have stated, probably one hundred and twenty-five or one hundred and fifty were sworn in, and they were willing to do duty when called upon.

Q. Was there any question about your authority to call out a posse of citizens?

A. It was voluntary. It was supposed, that the sheriff, having unlimited power, should have acted, whether in my absence or not, particularly in my being absent, and should have called on parties up there. I do not know when he reached here. There was a train or engine sent for him to bring him back to the city. He resides somewhere below the city. Of course, hearsay evidence does not amount to anything, but they said he didn't act as promptly as he should have done. That is what I heard after I reached home. When I reached home on Monday evening, I learned he had issued a proclamation sometime that evening.

Q. Everything was quiet on Friday, as I understand you, when you left?

A. I didn't apprehend any danger at all. There was nothing spoken of riot or any outbreak, or anything of the kind--didn't dream of such a thing.

Q. Was there any larger number of idle men, discharged men, in the city at that time than usual?

A. Not that I know of. I passed around portions of the city, the greater part of it, and I found nothing that would be necessary to call into order the police officers after I returned home.

Q. How large a police force had you at the time?

A. That I cannot exactly tell. At that time it was reduced, either before or after that, I think, however, before that--amounting to some twenty-six or twenty-nine men.

Q. Did you make any arrests after?

A. There were quite a number of arrests made. I think in all to be probably fifty--forty or fifty, or along there.

Q. Did you learn what the cause of the outbreak was?

A. Only from hearsay.

Q. What did the men themselves assign? What did they give as their reasons?

A. I didn't converse with any of the men on the subject.

Q. Did you form any opinion of yourself?

A. In reference to the outbreak?

Q. In reference to the cause of the outbreak.

A. I didn't. Nothing more, than I presume it was stimulated by the action taken in other portions of the country. There was then an outbreak, I believe, in some portions of Maryland, if I mistake not, near Baltimore, and perhaps in Pittsburgh, or near there.

By Senator Torbert:

Q. The bridge was burned down before you returned?

A. Yes, sir; I believe Stokley left the same day I did, and also the Scranton man.

At this point, the committee adjourned till half-past one o'clock, this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

READING, April 19, 1878.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment. All members present, except Messrs. Reyburn, Larrabee, and Yutzy.

* * * * *

Peter Cullen, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State where you reside?

A. I reside 1022, Centre avenue.

Q. Were you connected with the police officers of the city of Reading in July last?

A. I was.

Q. In what capacity?

A. Chief of police.

Q. State what day the first disturbance or assemblage of strikers in any considerable number occurred?

A. That was on Sunday night, July 22.

Q. Had there been any difficulty threatened before that, to your knowledge?

A. There didn't appear to, in a general way, going round the streets--the principal streets. There had been a great deal of talk. Parties gathering, would talk quietly. Some were excited; that is, on the news received from Pittsburgh. That seemed to start them up some, but there was not anything particular done until Sunday night, on 22d, when the mob went out to the outer depot, or the new depot of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and the first intimation I had that a mob had gone out there; in fact, I did not expect anything serious. The first intimation I had, was standing at the corner of Fifth and Penn, and I was informed that the crowd, or mob, had gone out to the depot, and were at the depot. That they were there, hooting and yelling, and throwing stones before the engines, and pulling down engineers, and so forth. I immediately started out this street, to go to the depot, and I got as far as Fifth and Elm, and found that box 35 fire-alarm sounded, and I also saw the flame of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company's property. Saw flames near Fifth street bridge, between the depot and the bridge, just about a square off--not more from the depot; and I took Fifth street route, and then saw the crowd had gone over into the cut, and on to the track of the Lebanon Valley road, and I saw the cars were on fire. As I got to Fifth and Elm, I found Chief Engineer Boyer going out in his usual style, and I proceeded to the fire, and when I got there, I found there were a good many people there. The cabooses were on fire and burning on the tracks at that time. There didn't appear to be any disturbance of any kind, but the crowd was very large. That was Sunday evening, July 22, and the crowd was large, and somewhat excited; but there was no fighting. There was nothing in the way of any disturbance going on at that time, as the work had been done, which it appears the rioters had accomplished--which was intended. That was to burn the cars. I saw Chief Engineer Boyer then, and asked him about the fire department going into service, and he said he had been stopped, companies had been stoned, and were not allowed to go into service. We consulted together, and told him we would do all in our power to get the fire department into service. He was willing to do anything; and then G. A. Nichols, the vice president of the Philadelphia and Reading road, he came there, and myself and Chief Engineer Boyer and Mr. Nichols talked about this matter together, and Nichols asked me how many officers I had there. I looked around, and found I had about six or seven officers, and Mr. Nichols asked me if we had all revolvers and pistols. I told him, I was not so sure about that. I thought the most of the men had. I had, and I thought most of the men had. I came to the conclusion that this matter was a very serious disturbance, and we agreed that I would get the entire police force together, and to go immediately to the scene of the riot, and to get the fire department in the service, and instructed the men on the ground to do all in their power to assist Chief Engineer Boyer, of the fire department, and keep the peace, so far as was in their power to do so, until I could get back with the balance of the force. I got as many of the men together as I possibly could, and instructed them to proceed at once to Chief Engineer Boyer, to render him such aid as was in their power to do so; and we found by the time I had got around, or not quite around--and found a box on Jefferson street had sounded an alarm, and the cry was raised that the Lebanon Valley bridge was on fire, and I saw the illumination, which showed that the bridge was on fire. I proceeded to the telegraph office, and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at once, that the cabooses were burning, and that there was serious trouble apprehended, and the state of affairs at that time was very bad in the city. The whole population was very much excited, and there were a great many of the people in the city, in the confusion, running round in the streets, in all directions. Everything seemed to be confused. When I found the bridge had been on fire, instructed the officers to go to the bridge, and they did so; but when they got out, that work of destruction had been completed, so far as the bridge was concerned. The city that night was in a continual state of excitement, and the property of the Reading Railroad Company seemed to be in danger, if not the city of Reading, and matters went on in that way, and also on the following day, (Monday.) The mob kept together. They stopped engines, and were drinking around and disorderly, and they seemed to have a great many sympathizers in the city at the time. I sent out for two hundred men. There were two prominent gentlemen in Reading, Captain E. P. Boas and Henry S. Eckart, that called upon me at the office, and asked what could be done. I told them I was willing to do anything, but we wanted more help, and this thing done right, and they agreed at once that they would be responsible for two hundred men. They would see that they were paid, and they would equip them and give them all seven-shooters and cartridges, and so forth. I then detailed a number of men--cannot tell the exact number--to go out in the different parts of the city, and to prevail upon parties to come to the city hall, and to go on duty to help squelch the riot. I waited and waited, and all in vain, and the reports that came in by the different officers was that they could not get anybody to assist. They would only laugh, and make different kinds of remarks; they didn't want their heads shot off, and they were going against their friends, and it was a workingman's fight, and all that sort of thing.

Q. What time was that?

A. This was immediately after dinner, on Monday, the 23d, and I only found there was one man I could get in the whole city to respond to the call of two hundred men. I inquired about the sheriff that night.

Q. State what inquiries you made of the sheriff?

A. I first went to the residence of the sheriff, where he lived, on South Sixth street--that was about twelve o'clock, or half-past twelve, Sunday night--and they informed me that he was not in the city. He had been down home, somewheres near or in the neighborhood of Pottstown--a little this side. I didn't know what to do at the moment, so I called on Judge Hagenman and told him the state of affairs, and how the city was, and how the town was in danger of being destroyed, that the torch of incendiaries had been applied to the property, and all that, and I asked what might be best to do under the circumstances. I told him Sheriff Yorgy was not home, and he advised me at once to try to get Yorgy to come to the city as quick as possible. I immediately, then, went to the office of Mr. Paxton, the master machinist of the P. and R. Railroad Company, and I met him at his office. That was on Monday morning, about one or half-past one o'clock. It might have been in the neighborhood of two. I asked him whether he would accommodate me--whether he could send a telegram for Sheriff Yorgy to come on at once to the city, that there was a riot here, and a large mob had gathered here and were destroying the property of the P. and R., and the city of Reading was in danger. Mr. Paxton was willing to do anything, and had the telegram sent. I also asked Mr. Paxton if he would furnish a special engine to bring the sheriff on to Reading, as it was very important. Mr. Paxton did so, and had an engine furnished to the sheriff, and he had also a conveyance from the sheriff's house to the engine. The sheriff arrived, to the best of my knowledge, early in the morning, about daylight, or thereabouts. I went to the sheriff's office on that Monday morning, and found him in his office in the court-house. I went to consult him as regards the situation, and making arrangements to see what could be done. Told him it was necessary to act at once, and act promptly, and to get at least five hundred men if he possibly could. He seemed, at that time, willing, and said he had sent for William B. Albright. He wanted to consult with him as regards the matter, and he showed all signs of willingness to act and perform his duty on that occasion. I told him I was willing to do anything to aid, help, or assist in the matter, and to have this thing wiped out; and I came back to the office, then, on that morning, and waited there with the intention of reporting to the sheriff, and about nine or ten o'clock on that morning Mr. J. E. Wootten, the superintendent, at that time, I believe, of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and he informed me at the city hall that the sheriff had backed out, and was not going to act; that he would not do anything. I was very much surprised to hear that answer, as he had seemed to be willing in the morning, and matters were getting worse all the time. On that Monday evening, at six o'clock, I took the entire police force.

Q. Now, starting with the Monday evening, you give a full history here in this evidence? [Indicating testimony taken before coroner's inquest.]

A. From there on, as to what occurred?

Q. A full history you give here?

A. Yes; it is about correct there as to the trouble.

Q. State whether this is evidence given by you before the coroner's inquest?

A. Yes; that is all correct.

Q. This is your evidence, given under oath?

A. That is evidence given under oath before Coroner Goodhart at the city hall, immediately after the trouble.

Testimony offered in evidence is as follows:

On Monday evening, at six o'clock, I started out with the force for Seventh and Penn streets, where a large crowd had collected. I informed the officers that we would have to go there, and do our duty. I found that nearly all the officers had pistols. Marched them to Seventh and Penn. Saw thousands of people there. Many strangers whom I had never seen before. There were people in all directions. The pavements and walls, as far as I could see along Seventh street, were lined with people, and the crowd extended up and down Penn street; and I got into the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets. I called upon the crowd to disperse, but the people paid but little attention to me. I then ordered the force up, for the purpose of pressing the force back, which they did, and I succeeded in clearing the pavements. Cleared the whole corner and crossings, and I kept the passage open on one side for a certain length of time to allow parties to pass, as also the street cars. A large number were forced up the cut in driving them away, most of whom were strangers, which made the crowd there much larger. I then drew the force up in line from Bechtol's corner over toward the Ubil house. I was expecting an attack at that time from the party in the cut. I noticed then, that they disconnected the engine, and commenced running it up towards us, as also the freight car, and I expected that they intended to attack our police force. They came forward to within sixty or seventy-five yards of us. They saw our lines were firm and solid, and they then stopped. I remained in that position for some time with the force. I found then that the party I had at first dispersed, had come in around me in all directions. Things then became quiet in the cut, and the people remained there. I then formed the force north and south, with the right resting on Breneiser's corner. I had all the police force that was at my command. I had them along the one track. I then detailed men to open the crossings, which they succeeded in doing. That position enabled us to keep the crossings clear, and to allow street cars to pass. The crowd was very large during all this time. There were thousands there. The first disturbance that I heard, was on Sunday evening about nine o'clock. I heard they had stopped a train, and that they had things their own way. There had been gatherings on Saturday evening, but there was nothing of a serious nature. There were no arrests made until Tuesday. I had twenty-six or twenty-eight men on the force at my command. I consulted on Monday with some of the officials of the road, also on Sunday. They made no report to me of threatened destruction of their property. I was at the firing of the caboose on Sunday evening, and had seven or eight men there. I received information of a disturbance at the depot, and went there--the alarm struck before I got there. I saw the light from Fifth and Elm streets. I was not at the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge. I met Howard Boyer at the first fire. He told me his carriage had been stoned, that the mob would not let him put any water on the fire. I consulted with Howard Boyer, and we concluded that it would be best not to interfere. We had no idea who the parties were who were implicated in this matter--they were not all strangers--some of them have since been arrested. I applied for special power. I was authorized by two citizens to raise a special force of two hundred men. I sent the members of my force out to endeavor to enlist men to do special duty up to six o'clock in the evening, but failed to obtain any. There was no person here who had appointing power. Persons laughed at our policemen when they asked for help. Five officers of the force were seriously wounded on Monday evening. I received information on Monday evening, at Seventh and Penn, that troops were coming. Half an hour afterwards heard that troops had arrived at the outer depot. I was not present at their arrival, was not requested to be there, had no communication with them. Did not know who ordered them here, or for what purpose they had come. The first I heard, was two pistol shots from above Court street. I didn't see any bricks thrown, as I had enough to do at Seventh and Penn. I couldn't see anything but the people, as everything was a solid mass. I saw some of the killed and wounded, and helped to carry some of them off. I knew Mr. Weaver, who was killed. The first I saw of the soldiers, was when they passed down Penn. I saw no wounded soldiers then, but have seen several since. During Sunday night and Monday I felt that my force was entirely inefficient, from the large crowds which were gathering and the excitement. I had a consultation with Sheriff Yorgey in his office in the court-house, soon after his arrival. I had telegraphed for him to come at quarter past two o'clock on Monday morning. I telegraphed from the depot, after trying at several other places. I had arranged with Mr. Paxton to furnish a special train to bring him up. He arrived about five o'clock. I informed the sheriff of the condition of affairs at seven o'clock in the morning. Told him it would be necessary for him to summon a thousand men, or thereabouts. He told me he had intended to do it, but it would take some time. I was certain he intended to do it, but he told me had sent for William B. Albright, and was waiting for him. I telegraphed him that I wanted help. Two hours after my interview, Mr. Wootten, of the Reading railroad, called upon me and said that Sheriff Yorgey refused to act, which very much surprised me. There was no force called out until to-day. I placed myself in communication with the mayor, telegraphed to him at a quarter past twelve, A.M., on Monday, July 23. I informed him of the condition of affairs. Asked him to come home at once, that tracks were being torn up, freight cars had been burned, &c. I was told that the telegraph office at Ocean Grove had closed. The mayor arrived in Reading on Monday night. The men on the police force obeyed my commands whenever I asked them to do so.

I heard two pistol shots in the cut, and immediately afterwards I heard a volley. Those balls did not come down our way, of any account. The next volley came into us, as well as the third volley. I realized the situation at once. The people commenced running in all directions. I requested all of them to get out of the way. I was struck by a ball on my left breast, while on duty at Seventh and Penn. I was expecting that the military, upon their arrival, would report to some of the civil authorities. All the information that I received was, that the troops had arrived at the outer depot.

There were shots fired on Penn street. Know that shots were fired down, as I was in the party. At about half past seven in the evening, was informed of the arrival of troops at the outer depot. Things looked very serious that night after the militia arrived. They reported to me at Fifth and Penn. I found the people were greatly excited in regard to the shooting, and I kept them away from the soldiers as well as I could. There were no riotous disturbances in this city after that, except the tearing up of the tracks. I do not know who ordered the soldiers to come here. Was satisfied they were coming, but did not expect that they were coming in the way in which they did.

On being re-called, Chief Cullen said (while the cars were burning) I consulted Mr. Boyer in regard to the situation, and asked him whether it wouldn't be better to attack the party and try to get the fire department into service. I had only seven or eight men with me that evening, and the crowd was very large. When I was there every person was quiet, and the cars were burning on the track. There was no breach of the peace there, so far as I saw. When I asked Mr. Boyer whether it wouldn't be better to make an attack, I believe he answered, "Yes." He told me he was not armed, and I said that under the circumstances I would go into town and get as many men together as I possibly could for the purpose of doing my entire duty; but before I was half way through I noticed that box No. 7 struck an alarm, and immediately afterwards I saw a light looming up along the Lebanon Valley railroad, and I knew there would be trouble, and I told my men to go out and do everything in their power to assist Mr. Boyer to get the department into service. At that time a number of the police were taking lunch, and I had difficulty to get them together. By that time box No. 7 struck again, and I saw the fire looming up at the Lebanon Valley bridge. After I got as many of the force together as I could to go out there, I went to the telegraph office and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at once, telling him of the situation. Then I went to the City hotel to see the sheriff and I was told that he had gone to his home in the country. I then went to see Judge Hagenman at his residence, as affairs were very serious. I told him that neither the mayor nor the sheriff was in town. Judge Hagenman advised me that the best thing to be done would be to telegraph for the sheriff at once. I immediately started out and found the telegraph office closed. I went down to Seventh and Chestnut and saw Mr. Blackman, and asked him where the telegraph operator was, and he told me that he had just gone home. He sent for him then and the operator came to the office, and I telegraphed to the sheriff at once that there was a mob here of about two thousand persons and there was great excitement, that they were tearing up the tracks and burning cars, and so on, and that he shouldn't fail to come. I then saw Mr. Paxton, master machinist, and I asked him whether he would furnish an engine to bring the sheriff up to Reading at once, and he said he would, and he also engaged a conveyance to bring him to the depot, and the sheriff arrived in Reading, as far as I know, at about five o'clock in the morning. I addressed the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets on Monday evening. The feeling seemed to be all one way among the persons who had gathered there. I approached Seventh and Penn with the police, in front of Breneiser's store, and I announced to the crowd to disperse. I appealed particularly to all good citizens to go to their homes so that we would know with whom we had to contend. My voice was loud, so that the people could hear me a considerable distance on Penn and Seventh.

I had no power to appoint persons on the police force or call out a posse. Made an effort to get two hundred and fifty men, but failed to get even two men. Found it difficult to get anybody. Persons who were asked, laughed and said they didn't want their heads shot off. The mayor left on Friday morning previous to the disturbance, when everything appeared to be quiet. The city charter, I believe, empowers the mayor to raise a posse the same as the sheriff. This power, I believe, can not be conferred upon the chief of police. Two hundred men, armed, would have done a great deal towards quelling the disturbance.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the men engaged in the riot, at any time?

A. I had, on Sunday--Sunday afternoon, the 22d of July.

Q. What complaints did they make?

A. They were talking about the Pittsburgh troubles, and that seemed to be all the go on Sunday, seemed to excite them, and they talked about it, and that was all that was done, so far as talking and exciting and gathering in crowds. I did go into one party, and they were talking over these troubles. In Pittsburgh, the riot was going on at the time, and I had said to them that they would be a great deal more thought of and respected by keeping out of difficulties of the kind, and attending to their business, than in gathering, and going into riots, and one party made the remark, "That was not bread and butter," and that seemed to be the feeling generally among the elements that were going around the streets, and gathering in crowds. The sympathy seemed to be considerably in favor of riot, on the Sunday and Monday, and it only commenced to turn about on Tuesday.

Q. What did they appear to complain of--set out as their grievance? Did they seem to have any particular thing?

A. No; they did not seem to say much on the matter, so far as that was concerned, as I know of, but the whole feeling seemed to originate from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the feeling in the city of Reading was very strong in favor of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; at least two thirds of the city, as near as I could calculate, they seemed to sympathize with the men's dispute between the company and themselves, and that feeling seemed to follow in reference to the troubles commencing here.

Q. Do you know what that dispute was?

A. As near as I understand, and so far as I was informed, the Philadelphia and Reading requested the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers that they would have to quit the organization called the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and to apply to something similar of their own, which would be beneficial, and as much derived from it as what they would have received from their own, and that the company would not have them in their employ unless they complied with those terms. I heard that spoken of. I cannot say to that officially, because I don't know it. That seemed to be the general talk.

Q. Had there been a large number of them discharged by the company prior to this disturbance?

A. Well, they were all either discharged or else quit. I believe the men quit. I don't think there were any discharged. I believe the men all quit, that is, the engineers and firemen, and a great many brakemen quit, and I believe some conductors quit.

Q. Was it the engineers that had been discharged--the idle employés of the railroad here that first started this disturbance?

A. It appears so, that is, some parts of them--not all. There were some men of their brotherhood implicated in these troubles from the first start-out, others did not appear to have much to say or do as far as we know.

Q. What class of men, so far as you could judge, were engaged in the actual destruction of property, and burning of the bridge?

A. I have knowledge of two of the party that I had caused the arrest of. One of them was a railroad man employed by the company, and the other man had nothing at all to do with the railroad company, so far as I knew; who used to boat on the canal, and perhaps he would be brought into their employ in that way. I believe he was a boatman.

Q. Was this one employed by the railroad company at the time?

A. He was one of the men that quit the employ of the company.

Q. What in your judgment was the actual cause of the riot here?

A. I do not believe we would have had a riot in Reading, if the troubles had not started in Pittsburgh. That is my opinion of it, and I would judge to the best of my knowledge, and from what I know, that the troubles originated in this city from the dispute between the P. and R. engineers and the company. That seemed to be at the bottom of it, because some of their men participated in private meetings, held in this city previous to the outbreak which we knew of.

Q. And the news from the city of Pittsburgh from the outbreak there stimulated the movement?

A. That stimulated the movement, or give it a start. That seemed to start them up, and made them quite lively on having some disturbance.

Q. Do you know what the damage done to the railroad property was. What it was estimated at, including the bridge and the burning cars?

A. I can't say exactly; but it may have been--it was in the neighborhood of anywheres between $150,000, it may have been more, or a little less, may have gone probably about that. The loss of the bridge was somewheres in the neighborhood of $100,000. I believe there was some ten or twelve freight cars burned, and some cabooses burned. There were telegraph poles cut down, tracks burned up, engines damaged to some extent, and soon. The actual amount, of course, I am unable to say; but I suppose somewheres in the neighborhood of $150,000, may be less and may be more.

Q. I understood you to say that this bridge was on fire before you reached the place with your police?

A. Yes, sir; the party, when they made this start to go to the Lebanon Valley road from the depot, after they had the engine stop there, &c, and committed their depredations, they started out on the tracks going right from us, and they commenced setting the cars on fire right straight along. There were a number of freight cars standing between the Fifth street bridge, where the first cars had burned, and the Lebanon Valley bridge, and they had them set on fire, and they appeared to keep on right straight ahead, until the whole thing was in flames. There did not appear to be any disturbance we know of, in all that movement. It seemed to be a concocted and well understood plan.

Q. Was there any sympathy with the strikers manifested by any of your police force?

A. Well, I can't say about that. To the best of my knowledge there was not. They did not express this in my presence. If there was, I have no knowledge of them expressing themselves as being in sympathy with the rioters, that I heard of.

Q. Did you have any trouble in getting them to obey orders, or do anything you required of them to do to preserve the peace?

A. No, sir; they did just as I told them, I had no trouble whatever. They were willing to just obey any order that was given in the performance of their duty.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you know of any communication between the railroad employés of the city of Reading, and any of the railroad employés of the city of Pittsburgh during this strike?

A. No, sir; I do not. I have no knowledge at all on that subject.

Q. You said in your testimony, that had it not been for the troubles at Pittsburgh, you would not have had any trouble at Reading. Now I want to know how you know that?

A. The reason I know that, is owing to telegrams being brought here to the city of Reading, and posted on bulletin boards.

Q. To whom were those telegrams sent?

A. The telegrams I have referred to, were sent to the Eagle office, they were on the bulletin boards of the Eagle office.

Q. To the editor of the Eagle?

A. I can't tell who they were sent to, but I saw them on the bulletin boards.

Q. What was the import of those telegrams?

A. Well, they were about the trouble there, and about firing--the trouble in Pittsburgh, in a general way, showing a great deal of trouble, and fighting, and riot going on there.

Q. In short, those telegrams were to the effect that the rioters had possession of the railroad property at the city of Pittsburgh?

A. I believe that was about the way it worded, or something like that. I cannot say positively the exact wording of the telegram.

Q. I just want this for information?

A. Certainly, I understand, I will answer all questions.

Q. I just want to know this, that if there was an understanding--did you as an officer, in the absence of the mayor of the city of Reading, believe that there was an understanding between these rioters, in the city of Reading, and the city of Pittsburgh?

A. There may have been, but I do not know it. I have no knowledge of that at all. As regards any understanding between the parties here, and the parties in Pittsburgh, I do not know. The only reference I had in regard to the trouble in Pittsburgh, is, as I stated, that I believed that had it not been for the trouble there, the probability is, we might not have had any here, because the news coming here, seemed to stimulate the matter.

* * * * *

George S. Goodhart, recalled:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether this is the testimony taken before you at the coroner's inquest held here in July last? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is; yes, sir; I took it down.

Q. You reduced it to writing yourself?

A. I did, myself.

Q. The witnesses here were all sworn?

A. Sworn.

Q. This is the testimony of John E. Wootten, as it was taken down by you? [Indicating.]

A. Yes, sir; verbatim.

The testimony of John E. Wootten, taken at the coroner's inquest, offered in evidence, and is as follows:

* * * * *

John E. Wootten, General Manager Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, sworn:

I called at Sheriff Yorgey's office at about nine and a half o'clock on Monday morning, 23d July, and said to the sheriff that I had come to see him for the purpose of asking him to take some means for the protection of the property of the railroad company, and for the suppression of the mob then threatening to destroy not only the railroad company's property but that of the citizens of Reading. The sheriff said, "Well, what can I do?" I asked him if he had learned of the destruction of the Lebanon Valley bridge and of the burning of the company's cars. He said that he had. I replied that he should issue his proclamation, and call out a force for the suppression of violence and incendiarism. "Yes, I know that, but the men when called upon would not come." I then told him that in such an event I would engage to furnish him with a sufficient force to suppress the mob, and if he wished it, the force would be well armed. He replied "Yes, but the rioters also have arms?" I then said, "Do I understand you to say that nothing can be done by you to check the riotous and incendiary spirit that now threatens to destroy so much property, and for which damage the county is liable?" He replied by saying that he did not see that he could do anything. I said, "Suppose you advise with counsel in relation to the matter." He replied that he had had a talk with Judge Sassaman about it. I asked what he said. The sheriff replied that he did not know what course would be taken.

I then left the office, and in the corridor I met Reverend B. R. Miller, who said that the existing condition of affairs at Reading required immediate action, and that he, for one, was ready for any call that might be made upon him to assist in the suppression of the mob. I replied that I was very glad to hear him say so, and told him that I had just called upon the sheriff, who was disinclined to act, and that I would make another appeal to the sheriff if he would accompany me to his office, which he did. I then told the sheriff that Mr. Miller had made a tender of his services for the suppression of disorder, and that I thought there would be no difficulty in getting as many more of our citizens as he might want. To which he replied that he didn't know yet what he would do in the matter, and after somewhat of a repetition of my previous conversation with him, in the presence of Mr. Miller, I left the sheriff's office and proceeded to the office of Chief of Police Cullen. Immediately after the interview with the sheriff I went to Philadelphia and conferred with President Gowen. At the time of my interview with the sheriff, so far as I knew, no one had any intimation that any troops were coming. The troops were sent at the order of General W. J. Bolton. After my arrival in Philadelphia, I telegraphed General Bolton that Reading was entirely without protection.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller, as taken down by you, at the time? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is so.

Testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller offered in evidence, and is as follows:

* * * * *

Reverend B. R. Miller, posse comitatus, said:

My story is a short one. Coming from my home, on Monday morning, July 23, I saw an unsettled state of affairs at Seventh and Penn. Of course, I knew what had been going on the night before, and I stopped, and then passed on about my business. I saw Mr. Wootten enter the sheriff's office, and followed him, and I said, when he came out, "This is a great scare, and if the sheriff will give me arms and ammunition, I will raise fifty men, and quell the riot before night," and he said, "Come in, and we will see him." Mr. Wootten said to the sheriff, "Here is a volunteer, will raise men for you." The sheriff said, "I would rather not do anything about that," and wouldn't entertain the proposition at all, and Mr. Wootten turned around on his heels, perfectly disgusted, and left the office. This was between nine and ten o'clock in the morning. I didn't know the soldiers were coming until I met them on the platform. Don't know who ordered them through the cut. When I offered to raise men, I thought that was the time to work, but the sheriff wouldn't do anything.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Sheriff George R. Yorgey, as taken down by you?

A. It is.

Testimony of George R. Yorgey offered in evidence, and is as follows:

* * * * *

George R. Yorgey, sworn:

I am the high sheriff of Berks county. Noticed no collision between the militia and citizens or disorderly persons on Monday night. Was in my office at the time, and remained in the office until eleven o'clock that night--Monday night. No officer of the militia, nor any person called upon me between those hours at my office to quell this riot. I had no notice, whatever, that any troops would arrive on that night. Was not aware that any troops were here until I heard the firing, and after they told me. I was never consulted in reference to the military at all. I never ordered them nor knew nothing about them being ordered. They never formed any part of my posse. Daniel Francis and the watchman of the court-house were with me in my office. I was waiting for orders which detained me until eleven o'clock. After the firing, I inquired to know the result and what had been done. Was told that the crowd had dispersed. I did not visit the scene of disaster. I was there once on Monday, saw the crowded condition of the streets, and witnessed the riotous proceedings. Saw this when I posted up my proclamations on the four corners. I should have been informed of the coming of the troops, but was not informed. I do not know whose business it was to tell me. I informed the railroad officials where they might find me if they wanted me to call out the posse comitatus. I telegraphed this to Mr. Gowen, Monday afternoon about four o'clock, shortly before I issued my proclamation, and I received no answer from Mr. Gowen. The militia came here without my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with them after they were here. In the forenoon things were middling quiet, and in the afternoon I had my proclamations struck off. I was not in the city on Sunday night, and came up from my Douglass township farm Monday morning at five o'clock. I heard the news Monday morning, and in the evening at five issued my proclamation. I did not think I should have issued my proclamation early on Monday morning instead of waiting until nearly night. In the forenoon of Monday, Mr. Wootten called on me and offered to furnish me with men. I did not issue my proclamation sooner because I could not get ready any sooner.

* * * * *

Peter Cullen, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State what the conduct of the militia under the command of General Reeder was during their stay in Reading, so far as you are able to judge.

A. Well, the conduct of General Reeder and his troops was good, so far as I know. They behaved well, and obeyed the commands of the officers, I know. Immediately after the firing, he marched his command right in front of the Mansion house; and he asked me what was best to be done, or something to that effect, in a general way to inquire about things, and I told him that the Philadelphia and Reading Company seemed to be the property in danger, and I suggested to him that it would be a good idea to go to the new depot, and I furnished a guide to escort his command to the depot. It was then dark, probably half past eight o'clock in the evening, and a great many of the mob followed down. The streets were filled with people at that time, and, undoubtedly, there were a great many of the rioters there--I know there were--and he had his command formed here in front of the Mansion house, Fifth and Penn, and there were some of the men going to attack the soldiers with their sleeves rolled up, and some had brickbats in their hands. One man I had requested one officer to arrest, and he was locked up, and he was going to attack the soldiers of Reeder's command, but Reeder's command was all soldierly, and had a good line of battle when they formed in front of the Mansion house, after their fight in the cut; they seemed to have perfect discipline all throughout.

Q. Were there any other troops here whose conduct was not as good as General Reeder's?

A. The Sixteenth regiment was here. I saw some of the members of the Sixteenth regiment on the streets, walking about loosely, and one of the members I asked him where he was going to, and got into a conversation with him, and I saw he was away from his command, and I asked him why he did not stay with his command, and he told me, he was not going to fire on his fellow workmen--that he didn't come here to do that. He showed me his hand, and says he, "Do you see that I am a workingman myself? I am not going to fire on any workingman."

Q. Who commanded the Sixteenth regiment?

A. I can't say positively about that. I believe Colonel Good is commander, or was the commander.

Q. Did you meet him, or have any conversation with him?

A. I did not come in contact with any of the officers of the Sixteenth regiment then.

Q. Knew nothing of his conduct but what was soldierly?

A. Never heard anything but what was right on the part of the officers of the regiment; and, undoubtedly, a large portion of the Sixteenth regiment was right. And I had received positive information that members of the Sixteenth regiment had been dealing out ammunition amongst the rioters in the crowds on the street during the day time.

Q. Of what day?

A. That was on Tuesday, the 24th of July.

Q. Did you have any conversation with more than one of the regiments?

A. Yes; I spoke to several, as they were walking about, and they did not seem to care about being connected with the military at all. They were walking round independent--didn't seem to care whether they had any duty to perform as soldiers. I did not see very many of them. I saw, probably, five or six in that way; but I heard a number of reports in regard to their giving out ammunition. I have that from worthy sources.

Q. Did you call the attention of the commanding officer to that fact?

A. I had word sent to that effect to the officer at the depot, but whether it was communicated to him, I am unable to say. But I did send word out to the depot that some of the men had been in amongst the crowd of rioters dealing out ammunition. That made the worst feeling of all that occurred--the soldiers giving their ammunition away, and mingling around with the rioters, and being away from their command. I cannot tell whether they were away from their command with leave. I suppose, certainly, they ought not to have leave given in a crisis of this kind, and I judge they must have been absent without leave.

Q. How long was the regiment here?

A. The Sixteenth were here, I believe, about a day and a half, to the best of my knowledge.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know from whom you received the fire--or if you did receive any--at the cut at Penn street, I believe you call it?

A. Seventh and Penn.

Q. You received a volley of musketry, or pistol shots, or something there. Whom did you receive it from?

A. From the military. I had a police force right on our tracks.

Q. It was at Seventh and Penn, if I am rightly informed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is a part I had already forgotten, but it came into my mind a while ago, that while you had that police force there, you received a volley fired by somebody there at that point. I would like to know who it was from?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was from the soldiers.

Q. Of what command?

A. General Reeder's command. The soldiers came down through the cut, and the first firing we heard, there were some parties said they are firing blank cartridges. The first firing I heard was pistol shots, that was the starting of the fire, but the crowd was very large on both sides of the cut, and the cut was pretty well filled with the rioters--with the mob, and the first I heard was pistol shots, and then I heard louder shots that seemed more like gun shots, and rifle shots. There were several of them, and immediately afterwards, there was a regular volley fired right down in the crowd.

Q. Have you ever been in active service in the army?

A. Yes; I have been three years and nine months.

Q. And from what you know of being there, did you consider that this shooting was musketry, or was it pistol shots?

A. It was musketry, it was rifle firing--there was pistol firing and rifle firing. The shots were sharp enough, that I knew they were minie balls.

Q. Could you tell whether there was a volley or skirmishing?

A. First, there were a few shots fired that went over our heads. Then a second volley was fired--a heavy volley, and just took a low range.

Q. You were there at that time, if I am rightly informed, endeavoring to clear that track, and keep that cut open?

A. Keep the crowd open, trying to disperse the crowd at that time.

Q. That is the time you received the volley?

A. That is the time we received the volley. The military did not see the police force, nor did the police force see the military. It was just dusk, and about that time the crowd was very large, and they came marching into the cut, and were at the corner of Seventh and Penn, right on the railroad tracks, and they got very close upon us before we knew it, owing to the large crowd.

Q. If I understand you, the military fired on the party, not knowing who they were firing on?

A. They were brick-batted and stoned, and pistol shots fired on the soldiers in the cut before they fired, and from the best information I have, and in that way I judge they did it in self-defense.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You don't think that they knew, or had any intention of firing on the police?

A. No; I don't believe that. About the place where the military commenced firing was in the cut, between Court street and Washington street bridge, or about there, and the crowd or mob was all up along that place, from Walnut street, for two squares above in the street, and on the sidewalk, and all along the walls of the cut, and it appears the military came in through the cut, and when they got in they were attacked, and the pistol shots fired, and to the best of my knowledge the shots came from the wall of the cut, right above, over the soldiers' heads.

Q. That is what I wanted to know--if you believed that the firing was done in self-defense?

A. That is the way I looked at it. I looked at it in that light. They did it in self-defense, and the pistol shots seemed to come from the wall. That was pretty close--only half a square from the place where the firing took place.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.

* * * * *

HARRISBURG, May 2, 1878.

The committee met at half past seven o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair. All members present.

Colonel A. Wilson Norris, re-called:

Q. Colonel, you may state briefly the facts and details in reference to your visit to General Brinton, on Saturday morning, of July 22?

A. Well, I can only state the substance, probably, of what I stated before. When I discovered in the morning that General Brinton had escaped from the round-house, I believe the information was first brought by Captain Aull, of the Grays, and afterwards we ascertained through Captain Breck. There were no officers, I think, at the time, but Colonel Stewart and myself, and I volunteered to go to find--in fact, I was not an officer. I would like that stated. I volunteered to go and find General Brinton. I was moved to this action out of my regard for General Brinton, personally, and for his command, a great many of whom were my friends, and for public reasons, which I thought paramount to all. I thought it was very necessary to effect the junction with Colonel Guthrie and the other troops that were to join him, and I said to General Latta, that if he would procure me a carriage, I would endeavor to find him. At this time, or a little before, the order that is contained in the Adjutant General's report, and which closes, I believe, with an allusion to me, and with a suggestion to General Brinton to consult with me, was written and handed to Captain Aull, and at the same time was read to me, so that I could understand the purport of it. Captain Aull then left with the same purpose of reaching Brinton. When I volunteered to go, Colonel Stewart said he would accompany me, and rose off the bed where he was lying, and when the carriage came, we started and rode through the mob, which was chiefly on Liberty street--I believe it is called. We passed right up Liberty street, over the hose, and through the mob. There was no other way for us below them at that time, and after going a few squares we passed down to the street below. I do not know what the name of it is--I think Penn street; and we went in pursuit of General Stewart to the arsenal. By that time we had reached the skirts of the mob, and had gotten beyond it, we found numbers of men along the way, but no indications of any great crowd having been there. We then discovered Captain Aull, and he told us that General Brinton and his command had gone on before towards Sharpsburg, I believe, or in that direction. I do not remember distinctly where he said. We continued our pursuit of him; inquired here and there from little groups of men that were discovered along the way.

Q. What was Captain Aull doing at the arsenal?

A. Well, I don't know. He had his buggy there, and had evidently been making some inquiry, I suppose. I didn't know at the time what he was doing.

Q. Did you leave him at the arsenal?

A. Yes; left him near there. We drove on.

Q. Was he driving when you left him?

A. No, sir; I think when we saw him he was out of his buggy. His buggy was a short distance away from him--at least I thought it was his buggy. I don't know whether it was or not; I didn't ask him.

Q. Proceed?

A. We then followed General Brinton across the bridge, and inquired at the end of the bridge if anybody had followed him across the bridge. We thought perhaps the mob had pursued him. He stated that nobody crossed the bridge after him--the toll man. We followed through the town, where everything was peaceful, and there was no indications of any mob, and found General Brinton's command perhaps a half a mile beyond Sharpsburg. The carriage drove up, and I hallooed to some officer, I don't remember who he was, and he directed the command to be opened, and we drove through and I joined General Brinton. We got out of the carriage before he stopped his command, as my recollection is, and then I joined him and continued to walk with him. There were some of his officers around, of course. I couldn't swear positively as to whom were all there, and my first salutation to General Brinton was congratulating him upon his escape, and then made some remarks about where in the name of Heaven he was going, or something of the kind. He was going in the wrong direction, and then the conversation ensued about the order, in which I said that an order had been prepared, signed by Captain Aull. I may have said an officer. I may not have mentioned Captain Aull; but I think I did--pretty sure I did--because very likely when I knew he had gone with the order, and that he had it that, I did say so. General Brinton said that he couldn't take his command back in the condition they were in, and he wouldn't take his command back. He said perhaps if he had a positive order he might go, which implies at once--I don't think he will deny that--that he was pursuing the wrong direction. He then commenced to talk to me about his ammunition and provisions, and I suggested to him to levy mail on the country, to assess the provisions if his troops were in that condition. He said he wouldn't do that, he would have two hundred and fifty thousand people in the country down upon him. That I am positive he said. I then suggested that he should go back to Sharpsburg, saying that he could hold his position there. I didn't say this as an order, perhaps, but it was in our conversation. Of course, I had no right to give it as an order, and I did not. And he said he was not satisfied with the disposition of the people at Sharpsburg. That they were even worse there than they were at Pittsburgh. I thought that rather strange, because I had seen a train standing there, and people sitting in their yards, as we drove through. I am sure he said that. He said, further, that he had been fired on from that train--at least, I so understood it. It may have been from the cars in the city--I may have gotten the two mixed, so far as that is concerned. He said, too, that I told him where he first turned off to unite with Colonel Guthrie. And he said he had been followed by at least a thousand armed men to that point, and they had men over in the direction of Colonel Guthrie. I asked him whether I should go with his command, or go back. He said he would prefer that I would go back, and endeavor to get provisions and ammunition for him. Of course, there had been a running conversation about provisions and ammunition, and his men looked as though they needed it. The most of this conversation passed between us while we were walking along, and I am certain it couldn't have been heard by all of his officers, because Brinton and I went side by side--it could have been heard, a good deal of it. I have no doubt these gentlemen are perfectly honest in saying they didn't hear me say it. I am sure some of them know that what I have stated to-night they did hear. We then had a talk about whether I should stop there, or whether I should go back. And he said he would go on a short distance, and remain there--I think he said about a mile, on a hill. I forgot to say that when I first met him, in speaking about his designs in leaving the city, he said he wanted to get the river between him and the mob, and to reach the hills and entrench; and that was his object in going across the river, so that he could feed his troops and revive them. When I closed the conversation with him, he said then he would go a short distance beyond--and I think he said half a mile--and remain there. That he didn't remain, I only know, of course, from hearsay--that he was not there.

Q. Did you see Captain Aull when he started with the order?

A. Did I see him when he started?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did he go prior to your starting?

A. Possibly half an hour, probably more--may have been more. I couldn't swear to that positively. He started before I did. When Captain Aull started, I suppose he went out with his buggy, and we, in the meantime, had to get a carriage. It simply was an effort to duplicate the attempt to reach Brinton, and I volunteered to go, as I said, simply for that reason. I had no other object in the world.

Q. You saw the order handed to him by General Latta, did you?

A. Yes; I did.

Q. Did you read the order?

A. The order was read to me, sir. The order, as you observe, contained a suggestion to General Brinton to consult with him in regard to the situation in Pittsburgh. Of course, we had a running general conversation about what had happened in Pittsburgh. The general asked him about the hotel--whether it had been burned, and, when I left, he handed me, and several of the officers handed me, their checks, which were afterwards delivered, I believe, by one of the officers of the staff or one of the gentlemen, over to Major Baugh.

Q. When you overtook Captain Aull, at the arsenal, did you have any conversation with him, as to where he was going then?

A. No; I didn't.

Q. Had you then learned where Brinton's troops were?

A. Nothing positive, sir. I don't know whether Captain Aull knew positively. He just, I supposed, had ascertained in some way from inquiries made along the road.

Q. When you reached General Brinton, you say you indicated to him the fact that Captain Aull had delivered an order, or an officer had delivered an order?

A. An officer had an order to effect this junction.

Q. You are not certain whether you named Captain Aull or you named an officer?

A. I am not positive about it, but I feel very sure that I did, because of the fact that Captain Aull had the order that had been read to me, and that he had started in advance of me, and all that, and it strikes me that I would say so. I cannot see why I should not. Of course I may not have done it.

Q. Did you communicate to him the fact of having seen Captain Aull at the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did, sir.

Q. Or that you left an officer at the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did that. I may have done so, without having any recollection of it.

Q. Was any other person with you in the carriage, except Mr. Stewart?

A. No, sir; nobody accompanied us except the driver. It was an ordinary cab, and the driver was on the outside.

Q. When you reached General Brinton's force, did the driver drive you to General Brinton?

A. I think not all the way. I think I got out before we reached him. I may not have done so. I wouldn't be sure about that, but am pretty sure we got out before we reached General Brinton and joined him, walking up to him.

Q. When you left the carriage, did Stewart leave the carriage with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he accompany you to General Brinton?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did General Brinton stop himself?

A. He didn't stop. My recollection is that the general didn't stop his command until his surgeon came up and asked him to stop, to take a ball from the shoulder of one of the men. Then they stopped, and the place where we stopped was along a small ravine, where several of the officers and ourselves sat down.

Q. Then you walked beside him for some little distance before he stopped?

A. Yes; I think I must have walked three fourths of a mile or a mile. I say that, from the fact that we had to go back to find our carriage, and our carriage stopped about the place we left it, and I think it was fully three quarters of a mile or a mile before we joined it. I know we became a good deal alarmed about it, and were afraid that we had lost him, and it was during our walk back we met I think Dr. Mears.

Q. Did you and General Brinton walk side by side?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was Stewart during that time?

A. Stewart was walking by my side, and perhaps on the other side of General Brinton a portion of the time. I am pretty positive he was present during nearly everything that was said.

Q. Were there any officers walking with General Brinton when you overtook him?

A. Yes; I think there were.

Q. Did they continue to walk along?

A. Well, I think probably they did--some of them.

Q. Did you know the officers?

A. I remember General Loud being there. I remember Colonel Wilson being there; but whether they were around when everything was said I didn't know. I remember seeing Mr. Pettit. I remember seeing Dale Benson, but not with them. I think I met him on my way back. I know I shook hands with him.

Q. Do you remember of seeing Surgeon Mears?

A. I recollect about Surgeon Mears directly. I recollect him bringing up some bread, after we had left the command on our way back--that is, the person I took for Surgeon Mears. I have met him since, but I don't think I knew him then.

Q. After you had walked some distance, General Brinton halted, I understand you to say?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain standing there in conversation?

A. Well, I don't suppose we had a ten minutes' conversation there.

Q. Did you remain standing all the time?

A. No, sir; I think we sat down, or sort of lolled on a bank or something of the kind. I don't think we stood, because we were all pretty tired. I know I was dreadful tired. That was the chief cause of my alarm when we went back to find the carriage, because I was satisfied I could never reach Pittsburgh. I had been up for two nights, and was worn out. The ride was a dreadful one.

Q. In communicating to him that an officer had been sent out with an order, you communicated to him the substance of the order you saw?

A. Yes; it was as I explained to him. I didn't say it in those words, probably, simply the substance of those orders, and they were to effect a junction with Guthrie. The whole object was to have the troops concentrated, and it was with that purpose that I went out. There was no earthly purpose for me to go and find General Brinton, other than that.

Q. In communicating that to him, did you tell him that General Latta had requested you to communicate the order to him?

A. Yes; I think I did.

Q. Did you tell him you had been sent for that purpose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he make any reply?

A. Yes; he said what I have said, that if he got a positive order, he would take his command back. I can say, too, without any reservation, that there was no reason under heaven why General Brinton should not have stopped with his command at Sharpsburg. There was not a symptom of the riot within two miles, after we left the skirts of it, at the arsenal. We rode on, and, of course, we met groups of men, but there were none of them that numbered thirty, and he was followed up by nobody from Sharpsburg but a small collection of boys, that were in the rear of his column, more out of curiosity than anything else, and that was the reason I suggested his taking up the position there, because I knew, and I said to him, we could have access to him there very easily, because the trains were then running, and I had seen a train standing there, and it moved off as we passed toward Allegheny, and my idea was, that if he wanted provisions and ammunition we could more easily get it there for him than at any other point, and I said that he could protect that bridge against any force. Any one who knows the bridge would be aware of that. It is an open bridge, and those two guns would have protected it against any force coming in that direction.

Q. Did you meet any officer of General Brinton's command on your return to Pittsburgh?

A. That had been with him?

Q. Any one that had remained in the city during the night?

A. Major Baugh.

Q. Where did you meet Major Baugh?

A. I saw Major Baugh at the Monongahela house.

Q. What time?

A. That night, sir.

Q. Did you meet him when you were returning to Pittsburgh anywheres about the arsenal, or on the way going to General Brinton's command?

A. I don't think I did. I met one officer, and I thought he was Doctor Mears--he had the bread in a bucket--and I don't think we met anybody else, because I cannot remember this circumstance, and if we had met them, I would have recollected it. We were followed, just after the doctor accosted us, by a man on horseback, who endeavored to have us intercepted three or four times--came up to the carriage--and when we got into Pittsburgh, evidently tried to have us intercepted by the mob, and we drove through the alleys to escape him, and we were more concerned about that than anything else at that time, and I think if we would have met anybody, it would have impressed itself upon my mind, and I don't recollect meeting anybody after we crossed the bridge. That I am quite sure. We didn't discover this man until we got across the bridge, and we discovered it by his coming up, and making inquiries, and making some remarks.

Q. After you crossed the bridge, you don't remember of meeting Major Baugh?

A. I don't, sir.

Q. Who made the inquiries of you?

A. Major Baugh?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of that. I think the one officer we took for Surgeon Mears. I think he was pretty nearly where this man accosted us.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel in the evening, did you learn the object of his mission?

A. What--to General Latta?

Q. Yes?

A. No, sir; I couldn't say that I did.

Q. Did you hear any conversation between him and General Latta?

A. I may have heard it without having any recollection of it.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta gave him any orders or not?

A. I really don't know that, sir.

Q. That is all, unless you desire to state something further.

A. I have nothing to say, sir, I believe, except what I have said. I simply would ask these gentlemen to be called who heard me, because when I went back I made a statement which, in substance, is what I said here, and I may have said it a little different, but substantially the same, to Colonel Guthrie; and Captain Aull is here himself, and he knows that I was present when the order was given, and Colonel Stewart was present with me all the time, and I simply would like to have them called for that reason, to show that my two statements are consistent.

* * * * *

Colonel P. N. Guthrie, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state what Colonel Norris stated to you on his return from General Brinton's command, in relation to his conversation with General Brinton?

A. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to start out a little further back than that, because Major Norris stated nothing to me of his own will, only at my request. I would like to state here that when Captain Aull left my regiment to enter the town, he was sent by me with instructions to General Latta, to this effect: that I didn't believe, at that hour, it was possible for the troops from Walls station to reach me; and that it was useless for me to remain at the stock-yards; and to report fully to General Latta the condition in which my regiment was placed; that we were doing nothing, and of no particular service to the railroad or to the public peace, and neither the railroad, at that hour, was threatened, nor the public peace. Captain Aull having gone in and witnessed the departure of General Brinton from the round-house, and conveyed that information to General Latta, receiving an order from General Latta, to be conveyed to General Brinton, one copy of which was to be conveyed to me, and reaching me at an hour of the day--I do not remember what--with the information that he had not reached General Brinton, I deemed it of the greatest importance that I should know, of my own knowledge, what was the intention of the Adjutant General, and what was the condition of the forces. I waited at the stock-yards until I was satisfied by the actual appearance of the troops from Walls station, and from knowledge that I had received by sending one of the men from my regiment out in search of General Brinton, that there was no possibility of that junction. I then came into town fully impressed with the necessity that there should be some understanding between General Brinton's troops and mine, which was the only regiment left in Allegheny county, or in the vicinity of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, after General Brinton had crossed the river at Sharpsburg. I came in there to ascertain information from General Latta. I met Colonel Norris, and I asked him the question. At first he gave me no particular information. Afterwards, when I asked him again, he told me that he and Major Stewart had gone out in search of General Brinton, and had reached him at a point, I understood, across the Sharpsburg bridge. That he had represented to General Brinton that an order had been issued by General Latta, which was an order to him, General Brinton, through Captain Aull, instructing General Brinton to form a junction with me. When that junction was formed, General Brinton was to judge himself of the circumstances, and govern himself accordingly. It was my belief, that if that junction had been formed, the troops could have come into Pittsburgh, and reached the vicinity of that disturbance in time to have saved property. I asked Major Norris, particularly, if he had seen General Brinton and had conversed with him. He said he had. I asked him what the reply was, and he said that General Brinton was not able to come in. I asked him again what General Brinton's reply was. He shrugged up his shoulders, and still did not give me the verbal reply of General Brinton. Sometime afterward, in conversation with Colonel Norris, he told me that General Brinton had refused to form that junction with him, that is, to return from the position that he was then in. There is no "ifs" and "ands" in the matter, in my mind. My impression is distinct and clear that Colonel Norris told me he had met General Brinton and he had had that conversation with General Brinton. He had urged upon General Brinton that he would comply with what were the instructions of this order, though General Brinton had not received it. That General Brinton had refused to comply with that order. I would further state to the committee here, that a copy of that order that was intended for General Brinton reached him on Sunday. I brought it back into the city on Sunday afternoon to General Latta, and I delivered it myself, personally, to General Brinton, at his head-quarters at the hospital, in Pittsburgh, after the return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What day?

A. Well, nearly a week--just a week. I gave it personally to General Brinton.

Q. The 31st of July, was it not?

A. I guess so. It was after General Brinton had gone back to the junction and then returned to Pittsburgh with the Governor. General Brinton told me at that time, that that was the first information he had of that order.

Q. The copy was delivered to you by Captain Aull, was it, colonel?

A. Captain Aull failed to reach General Brinton, for reasons which I will let Captain Aull state to you himself.

Q. I do not quite understand your statement, whether it was the original or a copy that was delivered?

A. The original order. There was one copy of that order, the original order is probably on file in the head-quarters. Copies of the order were given to Captain Aull, one for General Brinton and one for myself.

Q. You brought it into the city and kept it in your possession all the time, until you delivered it to General Brinton?

A. I kept it in my possession until I delivered it, personally, to General Brinton, at the hospital grounds, after the return to the city.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta was notified that General Brinton had not received the order?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember whether I stated that fact to General Latta or not. I do not believe I did. I went into town fully impressed that General Brinton would not join me, and that some other arrangement of troops must be made, and I do not know whether I stated to General Latta that General Brinton would not join me, and that he must make some other arrangement, or whether I stated to him that Captain Aull had been unable to reach General Brinton. At all events, the original order General Brinton never received until the 31st, I believe it was.

* * * * *

Captain W. F. Aull, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Just state, if you please, what your conversation was with Colonel Norris, and why you did not reach General Brinton with the order given to you by General Latta Sunday morning, the 22d July?

A. Colonel Guthrie has stated that he sent me in for a personal conversation with General Latta, and I just state here that in passing Twenty-sixth street, I think it was, that as I approached Twenty-sixth street, I saw the people massed around the corners of the building, looking round up the street, as if something was going on, and I asked two or three parties what it was, and they said the troops were out. I drove across. They undertook to stop me, saying I had better look out, or I would get shot, that they had the Gatling guns up there, and they would shoot down street. I drove across the street and saw no indications of anybody shooting. I drove on and went around the square from there, where I could see the troops more closely, and they passed on out Penn street. I waited until I saw they had the Gatling guns along with them, and I drove then, as rapidly as possible, to the Union depot. I was not aware that General Latta had not yet received the information of their leaving the round-house, until I went in, and, I think General Latta will remember, I was a little slow to tell him, from the fact that I supposed he knew about it, and when I told him they had got out of the round-house, and after getting out upon the street with their Gatling guns, he jumped up and appeared very much pleased, said, "Thank God they are out." I knew then that that was the first information he had received. He then turned to some officers present, and they commenced to congratulate each other that they had got out, and he told me to take a seat and remain. I sat down. A few moments afterwards, a party that I didn't know at the time, but who afterwards turned out to be a man by the name Surgeon Wilson, who had been acting the part of a spy for General Latta, reported that they were out of the round-house, and, I think, reported that they were going to the arsenal. A few moments afterwards another party came in, and reported that they had gone to the arsenal, and were now quartered in the arsenal. That I am positive of. I heard that--that they were quartered in the arsenal. That appeared to afford a great deal of relief to the officers present, and General Latta immediately began to dictate an order to his clerk, Mr. Russell, I believe. I waited until he had written the order, and he either wrote out a duplicate or wrote out two orders, I don't remember which. I am not clear as to whether they were two different orders or duplicate orders. At any rate he gave me an order; but before he gave it to me he had a long talk with Colonel Norris, took him into a private room, or talked with him first. He then read the order in my presence, that he afterwards handed to me, giving Colonel Norris instructions to reach General Brinton. My instructions were to return to my regiment, and that General Brinton being quartered in the arsenal, I should take the order, which I received, to deliver it to him there, then deliver the other order to Colonel Guthrie. When I reached the arsenal, I found the troops were not quartered there, and I went to two or three different parties at the arsenal for fear that they were trying to deceive me, that probably they were in the arsenal. I walked round the fence, and looked in wherever I could see, wherever I had the opportunity to see in, to convince myself positively that they were not there, before I would go any further; but finally, I being convinced that they had gone out Butler street, as the sentinel informed me, I started back to my buggy, and just as I was approaching the street that crosses Butler street at right angles, Colonel Stewart and Major Norris came driving across the street, and I hailed them, and told Colonel Norris that they had gone on out Butler street, that I had information enough to convince me of that, and immediately turned round and started on, without asking for any further information. He drove on out Butler street. I got into my buggy and started after them. I drove on as far as Sharpsburg bridge, and made numerous inquiries of parties along the street how far they were ahead of me, and what the prospects would be of overtaking them. When I reached Sharpsburg bridge I was told they must be at least two miles ahead of me, and they had struck out into the country, towards Butler county. I supposed I stood or sat in the buggy for fully two or three minutes, meditating whether I would follow or take the other order to Colonel Guthrie first. I concluded, at last, that I would first take the order to Colonel Guthrie. I had two orders to deliver, and I concluded I would take the order to Colonel Guthrie, and if he advised me to, to strike across the country, and reach General Brinton with the other order. I drove straight to East Liberty, and reported to Colonel Guthrie what I had seen, and handed him the order that I had been authorized to deliver to him. I also stated to him that I had an order for General Brinton, and stated the circumstances under which I had not delivered it. I asked him the question if I should strike across the country from there, right directly across the river, the direction I knew they were in, or whether I would remain where I was. He replied, "Give me that order and I will go to the city and see General Latta myself," and I handed him the order and I never saw it afterwards. Colonel Guthrie then left the regiment and went to the city, as he has stated.

Q. When did you see Colonel Norris next after leaving him at the arsenal?

A. I am not exactly clear on that. I think I saw him Friday. I saw him at the Duquesne club-rooms.

Q. Well, did you see him within a week?

A. No, sir; it was some time afterwards before I saw him again.

* * * * *

Norman M. Smith re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state the facts in relation to the conversation that occurred between General Brinton and Colonel Norris, or what you know in relation to it?

A. Mr. Chairman, the only evidence I can give is corroborative. I met Colonel Norris immediately after his return from his trip to General Brinton's command. Met him in front of the Union Depot Hotel, immediately after he got out of his carriage, I think. He stated to me that he had carried the orders to General Brinton. That Colonel Norris has already said to you, that he carried, and also said that General Brinton had refused to obey them, and return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What time was it you met him?

A. Well, it is pretty hard for me to give the hour exactly. I had been up for three or four days and nights. I think, though, it was between nine and ten o'clock. I will not be positive about that. It might have been earlier, and it might have been later. I think, though, between nine and ten o'clock in the morning.

Q. Did he state exactly where he found him?

A. He said he had followed him beyond Sharpsburg, and dismounted from his carriage, and had marched on foot with him for some distance. Had communicated the order that he has stated. Had conversed with him for some time, and that General Brinton had refused to return to Pittsburgh.

Q. Did he say anything about his refusal to join Colonel Guthrie?

A. While I said return to Pittsburgh I meant to join Colonel Guthrie--that was implied. That after they joined, that is, it was in our minds, after they had united their commands, that they were to return to Pittsburgh; but when I said refused to return to Pittsburgh, I meant refused to join Colonel Guthrie, or rather to execute the order that Colonel Norris had to carry.

Q. Did he say anything about the condition of General Brinton's troops?

A. Perhaps he may have mentioned it in a general way, but 1 do not recollect that he specified it particularly.

Q. That was not spoken of?

A. I think not. At least that did not impress itself on my mind, if it was mentioned.

Q. Anything said about getting provisions to them?

A. Well, there probably was, but I am not prepared to say what it was--that was a matter that was paramount in all our minds, the matter of provisions for the troops had been concerning me, particularly, from the evening before, and continued to concern me until the next evening, until I secured some provisions and got them to the troops.

Q. Is that all that you know in relation to what occurred between Colonel Norris and General Brinton?

A. That is all, I believe, sir.

Colonel Norris: I would like to say, when I got back to the hotel, Mr. Cassatt was there, and I believe Mr. Bennett, of Allegheny, and we had a conversation then about supplying General Brinton's command with provisions and ammunition, and an arrangement was there made, I myself giving the directions where he was to convey the provisions to him, and that provisions did ultimately reach him. That conversation was heard, I believe, by Colonel Hassinger.

Colonel Smith: If I may be permitted--I was speaking of the time I met Colonel Norris. I was present at that conversation, at the Monongahela house, and can verify what the colonel said at that time.

* * * * *

Colonel D. L. Hassinger, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You understand, I believe, the subject of evidence to-night. Will you go on and state what knowledge you have on the subject?

A. I was at the Monongahela house when Colonel Norris and Major Stewart returned, and I heard just about--he reported that he had caught up with General Brinton on his way out beyond Sharpsburg bridge, that he got out of the carriage and walked along, and had the conversation, and spoke about the order which had been sent to him through Captain Aull, and he said he gave him the substance of the order, and General Brinton had refused to obey him.

Q. Can you give the language of Colonel Norris--the exact words that Colonel Norris used?

A. Well, I don't know that I can, exactly. I do not recollect that part of it.

Q. You don't pretend now, in our statement, to give the language?

A. No. I have not heard any of the evidence at all that was before the committee, except sitting here for a few minutes.

Q. You are a member of the National Guard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What regiment?

A. Assistant Adjutant General of the State.

Q. Had you been at Pittsburgh during the riot--the entire progress of it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you with General Latta?

A. I was with him most of the time that he was there. On that morning I had started out when I heard that the troops were out of the round-house. I went out as far as the arsenal, and when I got there I found that they had gone in another direction. I was afoot, and, I think, returned to the hotel.

Q. You were at the hotel when the colonel arrived?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether Colonel Norris communicated that fact to General Latta that you have just related?

A. Yes; he did. General Latta was in the room at the time.

Q. In your presence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is all you know in relation to the conversation that occurred between them, is it?

A. That is about all, sir; yes, sir.

* * * * *

General James W. Latta re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I would like you to state, general, just what Colonel Norris stated to you on his return from General Brinton's command?

A. I did detail that, sir, about as fully as I recollect it, describing the room and situation and surroundings. I will go over it again if you desire.

Q. I want to ask you one other question. Did you learn on Sunday that Captain Aull had not reached General Brinton with that order?

A. I did not find it out, sir, until nearly a week afterwards.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel on Sunday, was anything said to him by you about whether Captain Aull had reached the command or not?

A. No, sir.

Q. And he did not communicate anything of the kind to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you gave the order to Major Baugh, you had no knowledge whatever of whether Captain Aull had reached General Brinton with the first order or not?

A. I had not, sir. I supposed he had. I took that for granted.

Captain Aull: Will General Latta add that he gave me no instructions to report back?

The witness: I did say that in my report.

* * * * *

Major General R. M. Brinton re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I wish you to state, general, whether at any time during your stay in Pittsburgh any attempt was made by any of the officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to control your movements, or the movements of your troops in any way?

A. No, sir; there was no attempts made by any officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to my knowledge, to dictate or interfere in the slightest with the movements of the troops. I remember at one time, just after the firing occurred at Twenty-eight street, that General Pearson was in Mr. Pitcairn's office, and Mr. Cassatt was there, one of the vice presidents of the Pennsylvania railroad, and I asked permission of General Pearson to clear the streets, and to follow the crowd to the arsenal, and he, more in his manner than anything else, appealed to Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Cassatt said I have nothing to do with the movements of the troops, I know nothing about that whatever. I can say that at no time did they attempt, to my knowledge, to interfere in any way with the movements of the troops.

Q. Will you state from whom, or by whom, the provisions were delivered to your troops, on the hill beyond Sharpsburg?

A. After our arrival in Pittsburgh, or previous to our arrival, I telegraphed to Pittsburgh for provisions, to General Pearson, and he procured them from the Union depot, that is, a sandwich and a cup of coffee. After that, we were in the round-house, and I made repeated appeals----

Q. I speak of the provisions that were brought after you went beyond Sharpsburg, on the hill, when you were encamped there--from whom you received, the provisions, that is, who delivered them to you?

A. I had a note from Mr. Cassatt, about, I should think, ten or eleven o'clock that night, that is, Sunday night, saying that he had procured for us a lot of hams and provisions, &c, and had sent them out. I thought, at the time, that Mr. Cassatt had left Pittsburgh, but I found that he had not, and he had also sent two parties from Sharpsburg, merchants there, who said that they had an order from Mr. Cassatt to give us whatever they had in their stores, and they gave me an inventory of it, and said it was at my disposal, and that Mr. Cassatt had given them orders, and that he would be responsible for it, and I might say the only provisions I did receive from the time we went to Pittsburgh, until we arrived at Blairsville, came through his energies.

Q. Who delivered the line from Mr. Cassatt to you?

A. My impression was, or is, it was Mr. Smith--Colonel Smith, I think--who brought it there that night. There is one point I should like to correct. I won't detail any of the conversation, further than to allude to my evidence, which I gave before. You have, with Colonel Norris, stated that I wanted to cross the river and intrench. That I did not say, and, moreover, it would have been impossible, because I had not any means of intrenching--no tools, or anything of the kind. He said he saw no crowd, at all, following to Sharpsburg, and that we should have remained there, in his idea. I merely refer to a dispatch which General Latta sent to the Governor at that time, and which he must have received information either from Captain Aull or Colonel Norris, as it was sent by telegram. It was directed to Governor Hartranft, dated July 22, p. 36, in which he says, among other things: "The first division, after stiff fighting for about fourteen hours, have retired to a point near Sharpsburg, pursued vigorously by a mob, to the high bridge at that point, under a hot fire pretty nearly all the way, but they effectually checked the attack." Colonel Norris returned, he said that there was no mob following us whatever.

Q. Go on, general?

A. In regard to our not stopping in Sharpsburg, and that ammunition, &c, could reach us, I want to state that we went on a point of the railroad below Sharpsburg, where we could procure provisions, and where we were in direct communication by rail with Pittsburgh, the same railroad which runs through Sharpsburg, and therefore we lost nothing by not stopping in Sharpsburg. In regard to receiving the provisions which Colonel Norris promised us if we would remain there, the provisions never came, except by the hands of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The evidence which Colonel Norris has given in regard to the situation we were in, &c., of course is entirely different from what I have already stated, and from what the officers who were immediately surrounding us when he joined us said. They being on the spot, it was not hearsay evidence on their part, but it was what they actually heard, and they have sworn that they were sufficiently near to hear every word that was passed at the time, but if it is necessary, I can produce those officers to corroborate it.

Q. We have had that.

Colonel Norris: I wish to ask Colonel Smith, whether the provisions were not sent in pursuance of the arrangements made after my conversation with Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett?

By Mr. Lindsey:

You may state that, Colonel Smith.

Colonel Smith: As has already been stated, Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett, and others, had a consultation at the Monongahela house, about noon of Sunday. Mr. Bennett and Mr. Cassatt left the hotel together, Mr. Cassatt, at least, and I think Mr. Bennett with him, went to Allegheny, to arrange with bakers, and other people there, to prepare sandwiches and other provisions to send out. I left the Monongahela house about three o'clock, and had this understanding with Mr. Cassatt, who was to take the road on the north side of the river, with the wagons of provisions. I was to move up on the south side, as stated in my examination in chief. I proceeded by certain routes across the Allegheny river, and at Aetna, I met Mr. Campbell Herron, and I stated the necessities of the troops, and asked him whether he could assist me in procuring provisions for them. I had in mind the conversation and action taken place at the Monongahela house, between Mr. Cassatt and others. Mr. Herron said that the store belonging to their furnace, their property, had some provisions in it, and he sent for his manager, Mr. Chalfant, and with him I arranged to load up whatever provisions they had, as soon as it became dark, and that they should be sent on to the camp of General Brinton's command. My arrangement with Cassatt, was to wait at General Brinton's camp until I heard from him--either saw him or heard from him. After that, I was to proceed to execute the orders I carried from General Latta, which has already been stated here to the committee. I waited there until about ten o'clock, when a man by the name of Bradley, a livery stable keeper--he had charge of hauling the provisions out there--came into camp, and reported two wagon loads within a short distance, and in the meantime, Mr. Chalfant had reported there, that a wagon containing hams, and some other provisions, which we turned over to the commissary of General Brinton's command. I believe there is no question about that, but all these arrangements were made in pursuance of the understanding arrived at between Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Bennett and others, at the instigation of Colonel Norris, after his return from visiting General Brinton's command in the morning.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.

* * * * *

Explanatory Note by the Reporter of the Committee.

Owing to an urgent desire on the part of the committee to have the testimony--taken in shorthand--transcribed and printed as rapidly as possible after the order to print was made by the Legislature, a number of men were put to work on it, each man taking a portion, irrespective of dates. As fast as transcribed, these portions were printed. This will explain the mingling of dates. Furthermore and unfortunately, in the hurry and confusion of such quick work, some of the copy was mislaid or lost before reaching the printer's hands, necessitating a re-dictation by myself from the original notes. This will explain the consequent delay.

SAM'L B. COLLINS, Official Reporter of Legislature.

PHILADELPHIA, September 30, 1878.

* * * * *

F. B. Gowen, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State your residence and official connection with the Reading Railroad Company?

A. I reside at Mount Airey, in the city of Philadelphia, and am president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and have been so since the spring of 1869.

Q. We wish you to state now whether there was any difficulty on the Reading railroad during the riots last July; and if so, give us the circumstances?

A. There was a difficulty at Reading, on the line of the Reading railroad. We did not originate that, nor was it participated in by any one then in the employ of the company, so far as we have been able to ascertain. In other words the riotous attacks on property at Reading, which culminated in the burning of a large bridge over the Schuylkill river, in the city of Reading, were not the acts of any one of the then employés of the company, nor, so far as we have been able to learn, was there any single man then in the employ of the company absent from his post at that time, nor was there then any strike of any kind whatever among any of the then employés of the company.

Q. Did the road continue to run during the troubles?

A. The road was stopped for one day--absolutely for a little over twenty-four hours--the main line of the road was stopped--all the branches were running. The main line was stopped at Reading, by the tearing up of the track, and also the Lebanon Valley railroad was stopped for a long time, in consequence of the burning of the bridge, which took place on the night of the day on which the disturbance occurred elsewhere in Reading.

Q. Was this destruction of property caused by former employés of the road?

A. Almost entirely. It was caused by a mob that was composed principally, I believe, of former employés of the company, or led by them--organized by them--and, of course, participated in, or witnessed by a great crowd of people, many of whom may not have been at all active participants, but merely spectators.

Q. State whether you had reason to believe there would be any difficulty; and if so, what steps you took to prevent it?

A. Early in the spring of the year, as early as March, at least, we had reason to believe that the society called the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was arranging to make some kind of an attack upon the company, somewhat similar to that one which occurred on the Boston and Maine railroad and the Central railroad of New Jersey, and we had also reason to believe that there was then being organized throughout the country, somewhat under the shadow of, or in some way connected with the Locomotive Brotherhood, another society, which was to embrace all the trainmen employed upon the railroads generally, and we thought that the proper way to prevent such action having a disastrous effect upon our company and its property would be to state to those who belonged to this society that they could no longer remain in our employ; and upon a demand being made upon us by a committee of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for an advance in wages of twenty per cent., which we believed to be the preliminary step for testing the question of power, we notified all the engineers and firemen, who belonged to the Brotherhood of Engineers, that they could not remain in the service of the company and be members of that organization at the same time; but, as we understood, that that organization had a beneficial fund from which the members derived some benefit, we proposed to give them a fund of the same kind to which the company also would be a contributor, as well as themselves, so that no man, in leaving that Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, would lose the money value of his membership. When we issued this circular, between three and four hundred men, principally engineers and firemen, and a few others who left in sympathy with them, left the service of the company. That was in the month of April. That has been spoken of as a strike, but it was no strike, because these people who joined it knew that they could not remain in the service of the company, and it was different from a strike where persons simply stop work for the purpose of enforcing a demand for higher wages. A great number of those persons who left the service of the company in April, still, I think, remained under the impression that they could force the company to take them back, and they organized themselves more closely at Reading, and had a series of meetings at which they took in a great many others that didn't belong to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. They had regular meetings in some hall there, and maintained a position or attitude of hostility to the company. Their object being to embarrass the company in the transaction of its business, so that the company would be forced to take them back; but as the company didn't take them back, as they desired, from day to day, and week to week, and month to month, they became very sore on the subject, and I believe that the riot at Reading--indeed, although I can only speak from hearsay evidence; but as I took part as a lawyer in the cases that grew out of it, I derived a great deal of information as to the reason of it. I believe that when the news came to Reading of the general outbreak upon the Baltimore and Ohio railroad at Martinsburg, a number of those former employés of the company assembled at a hall in one of their meetings, and determined that they would have to do something of the kind, such as the burning down of the bridge and the tearing up of the track, and, resulting from that, this attack was made upon the company, which I believe was confined entirely to such employés as had left the service of the company, and among them such followers or sympathizers as could be got into a crowd on such an occasion; but I believe that none of the employés of the company had anything to do with it, or took any part in it.

Q. Prior to the breaking out of the riot, had you filled the places of all those men who had left your services?

A. Yes; their places were filled within two or three or four days of the time. Indeed, there was no interruption in the business of the road resulting from those engineers leaving us in the month of April, except that we stopped the movement of the coal trade one day so that all the engineers who remained in our service connected with the coal trade might be on hand in case we didn't have enough new ones, so that all the trains we call schedule trains, that is passenger trains and freight trains, might be moved promptly. The whole thing was over in two or three days. The places of those who left were immediately supplied. We promoted a great many firemen competent to take the places of the engineers. I am sure that within a week or ten days after they commenced to leave, there was no longer any vacancy in our service not filled.

Q. Was there any difficulty in finding men?

A. None whatever. It was rather remarkable we had them so quickly, so rapidly. Of course, anticipating this disturbance, we were quietly on the lookout for men.

Q. Were the new men you employed experienced engineers?

A. Yes; and it was more remarkable still. Our business is a peculiar one. It is very much more difficult for an engineer from another road to take hold of a heavy coal train on a down grade, than to handle a passenger or a common freight train on an ordinary grade. But there were very few accidents. There were a few such as might result from the inexperience of men unaccustomed to that kind of business; but they were remarkably few. Of course we had to be very vigilant. The company went to some expense in order to guard against accident.

Q. Were any of those new men you got men who had been discharged from other roads?

A. I cannot answer that question positively, for the reason that I don't know it; but I should judge from the habit or custom of the company in that respect, that no new man was taken into the service of the company who didn't bring a certificate of good character. I am sure no one would have been taken that was discharged from any cause that affected his ability or knowledge as an engineer.

Q. Then I understand you to say that you had no difficulty in securing plenty of engineers?

A. None whatever. You will understand, of course, that while quite a number of firemen left our service, a great many other firemen in our service were competent to take an engine, and a number of those were promoted.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the number of new men employed?

A. I think the entire number of engineers and firemen could not have been more than about from three hundred to three hundred and fifty--probably not so many. I think about three hundred or three hundred and fifty would cover all of those two classes--engineers and firemen.

Q. What steps were taken by the company to punish the rioters at Reading?

A. We left that, to some extent, to the civil authorities of Reading. In connection with them, prosecutions were commenced against a great number. Two of them who were known to have actually set fire to the bridge, or participated in the actual burning, who ran away, were arrested at a distance, and plead guilty.

Q. Were they men who had been in the employ of the company?

A. One of them had been at one time.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I think as a brakeman, and he had left the service of the company, at the time the locomotive engineers left, and at this meeting I spoke of as taking place at the hall in Reading, he had been promised by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to be paid so much a month, if he left the service of the company. The other one had never been in the service of the company--not that I am aware of.

Q. Do you know what steps were taken by the civil authorities at Reading to suppress the riot at that time?

A. There was very little done at the time. I think that all disturbance at Reading could have been prevented, if the sheriff of the county had shown the slightest amount of pluck or appreciation of his position. He had full knowledge--in fact, he was informed that it was to take place, but he did nothing practically, except when it was too late, to issue a proclamation that amounted to nothing.

Q. Do you know how long before it took place that this information was communicated to him?

A. Information was communicated to him of the intended rising. He was told of the facts in the possession of the party informing him, and an offer was made to him of men to act as a posse comitatus, about eight or ten o'clock in the morning of the day in which the trouble culminated. He did nothing until late that afternoon. I am quite confident that a determined man, armed with the law, in the position of the sheriff of Berks, at Reading, with twenty men--ten times which number he could have gotten from the citizens--could have prevented the whole disturbance.

Q. Do you know whether he made any call for help from the State?

A. I am not aware that he did, nor am I really aware of the means used to bring the military to Reading, or who first made the call for them. I know the military were sent there by the orders of some one in the military department of the State, who had authority upon that subject, and the disturbance was finally quelled by the action of the military, which unfortunately led to the killing of several persons.

Q. Had there been any reduction of wages on your road prior to July?

A. I think there had been no reduction of wages on the road for months before that. There had been two reductions of wages within the last few years.

Q. Since 1873--the time of the panic?

A. Yes.

Q. How large?

A. Each, I think, was ten per cent. The engineers on the Reading railroad have been for a great number of years paid according to the length of service. We have four grades, the first year the men get the lowest grade, and after they have been in the service of the company four years, they get the highest grade. That was due entirely, not to his knowledge as an engineer, but to his length of service as an employé in the company. It was understood that the men's wages should increase with the length of time they remained with us. When any man left us, and came back, again he had to go down and come up, as the lowest men.

Q. Did that apply to any other employés but the engineers?

A. It applied to the firemen.

Q. Can you give the wages that the brakemen and firemen and engineers were getting per day.

A. I cannot give it exactly. I think at the time of this disturbance the highest grade engineers were paid $2 97 per day. I think the firemen were getting about $1 50 to $1 60 per day. In the coal trade on the Reading railroad there were opportunities for engineers, during the busy seasons, to earn more than six days per week. Since the strike, or shortly after this trouble occurred, in April, as a mark of our appreciation of the fidelity of those who remained with us and resisted the temptation to leave when the Brotherhood of Engineers left--a good many of them, indeed, were members of the Brotherhood that stayed with us--we made a new grade of engineers, which no new men thereafter could enter, except after five years of service, and we put all the faithful men who remained with us in that grade, and gave them $3 23. We have also that system among the conductors of the passenger trains. They are paid according to length of service, and there is an amount of their pay kept back from them, and invested for their benefit which increases with length of time.

Q. What were the wages of the brakemen?

A. I think from $1 50 to $1 60.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Were you at Reading during the riots?

A. I was not there.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did any of those firemen or engineers who left you at that time, ever make application to come back?

A. A great many, and it was a very sad thing.

Q. Was there a man by the name of Clarke who made that application to you personally?

A. I cannot give their names, but a great many have made application personally.

Q. Didn't you tell him that he had done wrong in being led away by the Brotherhood?

A. I know of a great many such cases. A great many I knew expressed a willingness to come back.

Q. And acknowledged to you that they had done wrong, and after their places had been filled by other parties, wanted to be again in the employ of the road?

A. A great many--I can hardly give you the number. The point with the company was this: we had taken on three hundred new men, and the first duty was to them. And most of those new men are excellent men. Some of them went to the expense of moving their families hundreds of miles. Many of the old men have written and asked to come back, saying that they did wrong, and saying that they were threatened. Many of them have been very seriously crippled, by reason of not receiving the pay promised them. I think that they promised sixty dollars a month to every man who quit the service of the company.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. From what source?

A. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The money didn't come?

A. They got very little. From what I understand from a number of them, I don't think they got enough to make more than ten dollars a month--hardly that.

Adjourned, to meet at eight o'clock this evening.

SAME DAY.

FRIDAY, March 22, 1878--8, P.M.

Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at eight o'clock, P.M., and continued the taking of testimony.

* * * * *

Robert M. Brinton, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. I reside at 1301 South Broad street, Philadelphia.

Q. You are a member of the National Guard of Pennsylvania?

A. Commanding the First Division National Guard of Pennsylvania.

Q. What is your rank?

A. Major General.

Q. State where you were when the news of the troubles at Pittsburgh, on the Pennsylvania railroad, reached you, and what your movements were afterwards?

A. I was at my office in Washington avenue about six o'clock in the afternoon, when I received a note from Mr. Thompson, of the Pennsylvania railroad, saying that General Latta had telegraphed me some instructions in regard to the riot at Pittsburgh. I proceeded to my home, where I found a message asking--from Colonel Scott, of the Pennsylvania railroad, saying that he had a message asking me to come to the Pennsylvania railroad office to confer with him. I did so and found him there. He handed me a message from General Latta, saying that troops were needed, and wanted to know how soon I could have a regiment ready to proceed to Pittsburgh. I suggested to him that if any troops were needed the whole division should be sent. I afterwards received a communication from General Latta to put the division under arms and be ready to move at a moment's notice, to report to General Pearson, at Pittsburgh. I telegraphed to General Pearson my instructions from General Latta, and immediately ordered the division to assemble, sending out officers to notify the different commands. It was summer time, and a great many of the men were absent. It was nine o'clock before I received the last message from General Latta, ordering me to report, and about two o'clock we had some six hundred men at the Pennsylvania depot.

Q. On what day?

A. In the morning of Saturday. I received the message on Friday night. I kept up communication with General Pearson, informing him of the number of men I had, and where I was on the road. We had no ammunition with the exception of a few rounds that the First regiment had. At Harrisburg we received some ammunition and two Gatling guns, which we attached to our train. We went through to Pittsburgh in eleven hours, arriving there about one o'clock on Saturday afternoon. There I met General Pearson, who ordered me to disembark the troops. I reported to him and General Latta in the Union Depot Hotel. The troops were rested and given coffee and sandwiches, and I ordered an additional ten rounds of ammunition, making twenty in all.

Q. Distributed?

A. Yes, among the men. General Pearson ordered me to have the troops ready to move to Twenty-eighth street. At that time. I told them in coming up, I had seen the hills covered with people, and I asked them in the event of their ordering me out, to go out with me, and look over the ground. I was an entire stranger there, and I thought they must be misinformed in regard to having cleared the hill, as they said General Brown's brigade had. I also met Mr. Cassatt at the depot, and I said in the event of our going down and clearing the tracks, can you move your trains. He said we can; we have crews already engaged to take out double-headers. General Pearson then ordered me down to Twenty-eighth street. I ordered one brigade to go down Liberty street. General Pearson then told me to go down the railroad, which I did, dragging the Gatling guns. We arrived at the crossing near Twenty-eighth street, going through rows of men, who were hooting and howling at us. Previous to this, while I was yet in the Union depot, I had been approached by several parties, who wanted to know if I would fire on poor workingmen. I didn't give any decided answer, not desiring any conversation with them. I called the brigade companies and several of the regimental companies together, and told them no matter what was done to us--even if they spit in our faces--I didn't want a shot fired, but if they attempted any personal violence, we had the right to defend ourselves, and we should do it. That was the order from which the firing commenced. We got down near to the Twenty-eighth street crossing. There was a large concourse of people there, far back as you could see, back on the railroad, and we were stopped. Sheriff Fife and his posse were ahead of us, and I believe he attempted to read the riot act, at least I heard him saying something; but he disappeared, and I didn't see any more of him or his deputies. General Pearson was with us. We could not force our way through without using some force, and I asked General Pearson whether he had any instructions to give. He hesitated a moment, and then said that the tracks must be cleared. The crowd then had pressed in between the column of fours, and I ordered the fours put into lines backward, and face the rear rank, about to push the crowd back from either side, and form a hollow-square.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. How did you march?

A. The right in front--the First regiment was in front. The crowd gave back. We had a little difficulty in getting them back to the line of the cars. Quite a number of cars were there--the Twenty-eighth street crossing was blocked. The men standing there had evidently made up their minds to stay, saying that the railroad company had nothing to do with it, that they were not occupying anything but public ground. I then ordered two small companies, but finding them insufficient, I ordered up another command with arms aport, and attempted to push the crowd back; but finding it impossible, I gave orders to charge bayonets, which they did, and I saw one or two men bayoneted. The crowd at that time commenced firing on us, not only stones but pistol balls, and the men, acting on the orders already given to defend themselves, commenced firing--firing a few shots at first, which gradually went along the whole line. At that time, I had not over three hundred men. The second brigade had been left back, to guard the yard where the engines were to start from.

Q. Give us the position of your men at that time?

A. At that time, the rear rank was faced about. The Washington Grays and the Weccacoe Legion were in double rank, and were occupying the space between the two ranks of the First regiment facing east, trying to force their way back along the railroad from the Twenty-eighth street crossing, and the First regiment was keeping the crowd back from the railroad from the hill, and also from the car-shops.

Q. Had you the front and rear ranks of any companies on each side of the railroad?

A. Yes.

Q. In open order, one facing to the rear and the other to the front?

A. Yes.

Q. And then a command in front of them in the direction of the railroad?

A. A command on their flank--the right flank--facing eastward.

By Mr. Means:

Q. On the railroad?

A. Yes. The firing lasted about a minute--not over that, and the crowd, the moment the firing commenced, or shortly afterwards, dispersed and went in every direction. I gave the order to cease firing, and my staff officers had the firing stopped, and the ranks, which were somewhat broken, were re-formed, and I sent a staff officer to report to General Pearson. I thought he was on the ground, because it was not certainly--my opinion is, that in three minutes after he gave me the order to clear the tracks, the firing commenced. In the meantime, the Pittsburgh troops on the hill--I had not discovered them before--quite a number of them threw down their arms and left. I went up the hill a very short distance, and I saw what was going on there, and I hunted for General Pearson; finally, I received a note from him, saying he was at Mr. Pitcairn's office at the outer depot, and, that if I wished to communicate with him, to send a staff officer, which I did--Colonel Wilson--and he came back and said that General Pearson desired to see me. I turned the command over to General Matthews, and reported to General Pearson at the office of the Pennsylvania railroad at the outer depot--Mr. Pitcairn's office. I said to General Pearson at the time, that I thought we ought to continue to drive the crowd. I understood that they had gone to the arsenal. Several men came up to me and said that the crowd had gone to the United States arsenal to arm themselves, and I thought, when I found that they had gone away, that they would probably get arms and ammunition, and I proposed to General Pearson that we should follow the crowd. He hesitated some time about it, and finally I grew more imperative in my question, and I said, you must do something, I cannot allow my men to stand on the track with the crowd pushing around me, and not be allowed to fire. We will either have to move from there or attack the crowd. Finally, he said that the Second brigade had been moved into the round-house and machine shops, because he was afraid that they would be burned, and then he told me to move my whole force in, amounting to six hundred men, which I did just at dusk in the evening. We moved in there. They told me to occupy one round-house and the machine and upholstery shops and the lumber-yard, and that General Brown would move into the other round-house at Twenty-eighth street, and I was not aware he was not there until I saw the flames. As soon as I went there, the crowd commenced trying to get into the yard, and I had a guard detailed and put out, and two of them were shot, one through the arm and one other through the leg, while on their beats. I then got down the Gatling guns and prepared to fire them, but thought it would be courtesy to communicate with General Pearson, and tell him what I was going to do; which I did, and he prohibited me from doing so. The crowd were firing pistol balls in at us, and a few rifle balls and a considerable number of stones. I went to General Pearson, and said, "I cannot stand it, we must defend ourselves." He said he would go to the mayor and see him, which would do more good than our bullets would, as he had a great deal of influence over the elements predominant then, and said that he did not want to take life unnecessarily, &c., at the same time we were short of ammunition and rations, only having twenty rounds, and if we were going to be in a state of siege, I thought we ought to have a sufficient amount. General Pearson said he would go and see that we got provisions and also ammunition, and left, saying he would be back in an hour. He went through the lumber-yard, and left us. At the same time he told me to open any dispatches that came for him, and I asked if he had any new instructions. He said, "I want you to hold the place," and after he left I proposed to hold it in the way I thought proper, by firing into the mob at the gates, which drove them away from there, so that presently there were only pistol bullets and a few straggling musket balls. We continued to hold it in that way without receiving any communications from the other world. I expected General Pearson back every moment. I didn't want to take it on myself to move out there, or do anything. About two o'clock in the morning Colonel Snowden, of the Third regiment, called into the round-house, and directed my attention to what he considered a piece of artillery. It was quite dark at the time. We watched it for probably fifteen minutes, when a cloud cleared away, and we decided it was a piece of artillery, around which were quite a number of men who were training the piece. I immediately ordered Colonel Snowden to get fifty men out, and told him to lower their pieces and fire low, and I gave the order. They had got the piece finally into a position to suit themselves, and a man had hold of the lanyard. I gave the order to fire, and when the smoke cleared away eleven of them were lying there.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. The mob had it?

A. Yes; it was a brass field-piece that they had captured from Hutchinson's battery, I believe. During the whole night we had a skirmish with those people. They ran cars down loaded with oil, and attempted to set fire to the building, but fortunately some jumped the track and blocked the others. The next morning they ran down cars from the Allegheny side, which came down with their own gravity, but we finally threw a pile of car wheels on the track, and upset the cars. They were burning. They were loaded with whisky, or the most of them with high wines. We put out those fires by fire extinguishers, and also by a hose that we had there. We finally discovered that the building part of the Sixth division was on fire, and it communicated with the building we were in by the oil sheds. They got on fire, and the building we were in got on fire. During the night I had communication with General Latta, finding General Pearson did not return, and told him my situation, and received orders from him--or suggestions they were afterwards styled--in the first place to hold on vigorously, but in case I was obliged to leave there, to go out Penn avenue east towards Torrens station, and that there would be reinforcements sent to us not later than six o'clock in the morning; that part of the command--three hundred--who had failed to join, were at Walls station, and would join Colonel Guthrie at Torrens, and that they would join us. We waited until ten minutes of eight o'clock, when the smoke got so great that the men could scarcely breathe, and we went through the machine shops. We couldn't go out of the gate, the regular gate, on account of the cars that had been upset there and were burning, and I went out, I think, Twenty-third street--I am not very familiar with the streets--with the intention not to leave Pittsburgh, but to go to the United States arsenal, where I certainly could get ammunition and possibly something to eat, as we had nothing but a sandwich and a cup of coffee since leaving Philadelphia, and through the excitement and the loss of two nights' sleep, the men were very much fatigued and thoroughly worn out. We went out towards the arsenal, and probably had gone a quarter of a mile out Penn avenue, when we were attacked. I was at the head of the column, and didn't see the force that was attacking us, but I sent a staff officer immediately to the rear. The firing was all at the rear, and I think four men were killed and some ten or twelve wounded.

Q. On your retreat from the round-house?

A. Yes; these men were shot from street cars, and from out of houses, and from behind chimneys. There was not any regular organized body, or a body sufficiently large to attack, until we got nearly to the arsenal, when--the Gatling guns I had placed between the two brigades, so that we could use them either in rear or at the front--when we opened with one of them, and dispersed the mob. We got to the arsenal, and I went ahead to see the commandant there, and went inside the gate, and went to his house and saw him, and told him who I was, and that my men were thoroughly worn out, and asked permission to form in the yard. The men were very thirsty, and the grounds were shady, and I thought we would wait there until I had orders from General Pearson. But we received positive orders from the commandant that we could not come in. I did not want any altercation with him, so I proceeded on eastward. I had received a communication from General Latta during the night, saying that he had made every attempt to feed us, and that it had been impossible, and I therefore thought that the best thing to do was to get something to eat. We had arrived within a short distance of Sharpsburg, when they told us if we came over there we could be fed. I concluded to do so, and went over there, and just as we got into the town, we were informed that two of the Fourteenth regiment, who had been on the hill, had been wounded seriously there by our shots, and that the people had no friendly feeling for us, and then I concluded we had better go on and wait for provisions, which I proceeded to do, when we were met by two gentlemen, who joined us, one belonging to the Pennsylvania railroad, I believe, who said we could be fed a little lower down, at Claremont, where they gave us coffee and rations; but the rations they brought were berries--not very suitable things for soldiers to eat. We proceeded to Claremont, and there, awaited orders.

Q. Claremont hospital or the work-house?

A. They are both together--that is the work-house or home they call it--it is the poor-house. We were fed, I presume, from both houses--they both sent us out provisions. It has been said that we were ordered to Torrens, and disobeyed orders in not going there; but the orders I received, in regard to Torrens, came just one week after the orders were sent. I got them one week afterwards from Colonel Guthrie, who handed them to me. Colonel Norris is reported to have given us some orders, which I positively deny. I never received them in any way, shape, or form. On the contrary Major Baugh, whom I left at the Union depot, with General Latta, reported to me out there. I asked him "have you any orders," and he said "no; I have not." I said then you will have to go right back to Pittsburgh, and get me some orders.

Q. Who was it?

A. Major Baugh.

Q. What time did he leave General Latta?

A. I cannot say; but he joined me about two o'clock--two and a half o'clock.

Q. On Sunday?

A. Yes.

Q. In the afternoon?

A. Yes. It has also been said that we marched in a very rapid way out that street. It is about four miles, and I left at ten minutes after eight, and arrived at Sharpsburg a little after ten, which amounts to two miles an hour, and in the army three miles was considered fair marching. The orders we received afterwards from General Latta were to proceed to Altoona, which, as soon as I could procure transportation, I attempted to do, and arrived at Blairsville, where I received a dispatch from Mr. Garner saying, I had better not come there, because he had made some arrangements with the rioters. I telegraphed that my orders were imperative, and that I was coming, provided I could get transportation. I got to Blairsville junction. I could not get transportation any further. I immediately telegraphed General Latta, Colonel Scott, and the Governor. I disembarked my troops, and remained there until I got orders to go back to Pittsburgh.

Q. It was on Saturday night you were ordered by General Pearson to enter the round-house? What time did General Pearson leave you?

A. About half past eight o'clock.

Q. What did he leave for?

A. For the purpose of seeing the mayor, for the purpose of getting us rations and ammunition.

Q. Did he leave you in general command after he left?

A. Yes. His instructions to me were to open any dispatches which might come for him, and hold on until I return, his words were.

Q. Hold on until I return?

A. I think those were his words.

Q. It was a verbal order?

A. Yes. He was standing in front of the company shops--inside the yard.

Q. Did you hear from him again that night?

A. I didn't hear from him until about one week.

Q. In his absence, would you have full command yourself?

A. I didn't consider I had full command, because he said he would be back in an hour, and I was waiting for him to return. When I found he didn't return, I opened communication with the Adjutant General of the State for him.

Q. What orders did you receive from him?

A. I received orders to hold on vigorously, that I would be reinforced by Colonel Guthrie's command, and that Colonel Rodgers' men would certainly join me before six o'clock in the morning.

Q. Did it occur to you to march out with your command at any time--out of the round-house--and disperse the mob gathered there?

A. That was discussed. I talked that over with my staff officers, at any rate, but we were ordered to remain there, and I didn't know--I expected General Pearson's return, and that he would bring us information about what was occurring outside. We had no information of any kind whatever. We couldn't tell whether there were ten thousand armed men in the town, or five hundred thousand. We knew that the force we had there was fully armed and had artillery, and we were outnumbered five to one.

Q. Who was it you sent to the Adjutant General?

A. A man named Sergeant Wilson, of the Jefferson cavalry, who was disguised.

Q. Did he bring you any report as to the number of the mob?

A. He didn't bring me any reports as to how many there were, and even if he had, I couldn't trust to a man simply passing through a crowd, because they were on every side. He said that the mob had vowed that they would burn us out or up--if they couldn't capture the place that they could burn us, and they were making arrangements to do that.

Q. What time did they begin to fire the cars?

A. The first I saw of the fire--I didn't know whether they were cars or buildings--but whatever they were, the first light I saw was about eleven o'clock. I may be mistaken in that, but I think it was.

Q. Could you see anything of the number engaged in the burning--the actual burning?

A. No; I couldn't see anything of the burning, because the buildings were on the other side--the Twenty-eighth street round-house was below us, and the buildings were above.

Q. Above Twenty-eighth street?

A. I mean west--nearer the Union depot.

Q. Didn't they burn east of you, also?

A. They might have burned east, but the first light I saw was there, and it seemed too far down for the cars.

Q. They kept burning down towards the Union depot?

A. I don't know. I couldn't see from where I was anything, except the illumination in the sky.

Q. Nor how many men were engaged in the burning?

A. No; on Liberty street and the street--I don't know the number of it--which would have run through the depot had it been prolonged--we could see men marching up and down that street, and could hear them giving commands along Penn street, which ran parallel with Liberty street, and we could see wagon loads of men coming in all the time.

Q. Did you send out any scouts?

A. I sent out two men of the Hutchinson battery, but they never returned. They said they would carry a dispatch to General Latta, and I wrote a note, but never heard of them afterwards. This scout returned, whose idea was that there were a great many, but he couldn't tell anything more than that, as he walked through the crowd. He could not tell whether there were five thousand or twenty thousand in the city--he could only see the street they were in. I thought if he could get back General Pearson might.

Q. You didn't deem it safe to undertake to attack the crowd during the night?

A. I thought I would be superseding my orders if I attempted it. I was ordered to remain there. At no time was I in command in Pittsburgh.

Q. In the absence of General Pearson, you were the highest in rank, or the senior general, were you not?

A. Yes; but I was ordered by him to remain where I was. It was not left discretionary with me.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Is General Pearson your senior?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. In his failure to return, would you not be justifiable in acting on your own judgment?

A. I communicated then with General Latta, and received a reply from him, saying they had made every attempt to provision us and get us ammunition, and that it was impossible, and knowing there were three regiments in Pittsburgh, and not knowing their demoralization--I didn't know they were so much demoralized as they were--if they couldn't communicate with us, I thought there must be a very strong force opposed to us, and my orders were to remain where I was.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. From General Latta?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What time did you get those orders from General Latta?

A. I received two communications from him by the same man. One of them, I think, about eleven o'clock, and the other about one o'clock. I asked the man to out again, and he said he would not attempt it, that he had been stopped before, and that it was at the risk of his life. He would not attempt to go out again.

By Mr. Means:

Q. As a military man, you received a command from your senior, to hold your position, and you wouldn't have felt like doing anything else but to hold your position--you would have been liable to a court-martial, if you had disobeyed that order?

A. I would.

Q. The responsibility rested with your senior?

A. I told General Latta, in my note, which may have had some influence in his orders to me, that my men were terribly worn out, and had not had anything to eat for over twenty-four hours, and had not had any sleep for two nights, and I didn't think it would have been a wise thing with the amount of ammunition we had to attack that mob that night.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. General Latta had no power as a commanding officer, had he? His duties as Adjutant General were simply to marshal, and bring together the forces of the State--the militia forces, and when General Pearson was relieved or was absent, you would be the next general in command--would you not?

A. That is one way of viewing it. I would be, probably. A staff officer does not command troops; but General Latta was acting under the Governor or in his place, and you notice in the Governor's message, he blames me for disobedience of orders which I never received, saying I had refused to return to Pittsburgh by orders of General Latta.

Q. Did you understand that General Latta was commander-in-chief.

A. I did. I would have obeyed any command that General Latta had sent to me; and not only that, I solicited his commands--I asked him what I should do.

Q. What induced you to leave the round-house on Saturday morning?

A. The round-house was on fire, and the men were choking with smoke when we left there, and it was not more than twenty minutes after we left, when the whole thing was a cinder.

Q. How large a crowd did you encounter when you left the round-house?

A. When we left, we came out in perfect order. The moment we came out the crowd fled, and we had no difficulty until we had gone some three or four squares. The crowd had disappeared.

Q. Couldn't you have formed then, after driving the crowd?

A. There was no crowd to drive at that time. We didn't see any crowd except the crowd which ran. My idea was to go to some place where the men could get something to eat. The Third regiment had three rounds of ammunition, and I thought certainly, at the United States arsenal we could get ammunition, and the men could be fed, or we should certainly get ammunition, and get water.

Q. Did it occur to you that it would be good policy to go to the Union depot?

A. Yes; and two of my staff, Colonel Wilson and Colonel Pettit, both advised me to go; but I told them my orders are to go east out Penn avenue, and I am going to obey my orders.

Q. Those were the orders you received from General Latta?

A. Yes.

Q. But your own judgment directed you to take the other course, and go to Union depot?

A. It did.

Q. If you had been acting on your own judgment, should you have gone there?

A. If I had it to do over again, I should go there.

Q. That was your judgment at that time?

A. Yes; but I thought the next best thing was to go to the arsenal. I would then be carrying out my orders, and would remain where General Latta could further instruct me.

Q. You had gone some distance before the firing commenced on your troops--that firing from the house?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever ascertain who fired--have you ever been able to learn the names of the parties?

A. We ascertained a few. We killed a few, and I think that a policeman fired on us. Mr. Lennig, who was a member of the Washington Grays at the time, and who is a member of the bar here, when he went back to Pittsburgh, identified this man, and talked to him, and the man acknowledged it--that he did fire.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Where did this policeman fire? When you went by the station-house?

A. We went by the station-house, but I didn't see them fire, but Mr. Lennig saw them fire near the cathedral.

Q. Did you see any policeman fire yourself?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. Lennig?

A. He saw a policeman fire, and identified him when he went back to Pittsburgh the second time.

Q. When you arrived at the arsenal, did you enter at the gate?

A. I entered at the gate. The sentry there allowed me to enter, and showed me where Mayor Buffington was to be found, and I went to his quarters and saw him.

Q. Was he up at the time?

A. He was up. He came out of the house.

Q. How was he dressed when he came out?

A. In citizen's dress. I asked whether he was the commandant there, and he said he was. He was in citizen's clothes.

Q. Was he fully dressed?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell him your name?

A. My name and where we had been, and told him I wanted to bring the men in there. He said we couldn't come there, and I asked him where we could encamp.

Q. You are positive about giving him your name?

A. Yes.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. And rank?

A. Yes; I had an officer with me who will corroborate it.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Whereabouts did you meet him?

A. Right at his house.

Q. At the door?

A. He came on to the steps of a little porch and stepped down to the ground.

Q. Whereabouts is his house situated from the gate as you enter?

A. Probably two hundred feet from the gate.

Q. On the right side of the road leading down through the grounds or the left?

A. It is about two hundred yards from the street where we marched out--where the sentry gate is. A path led down, and Major Burlington turned on his heel, and didn't take the trouble to say he was sorry, but immediately turned on his heel and left.

Q. Where did he go?

A. Back to his house.

Q. Did he afterwards come up to the gate?

A. I never saw him afterwards.

Q. Did you have any wounded at the gate?

A. Yes; we had some three or four men carried in there, and Lieutenant Ash had his leg amputated and died there.

Q. Did he tell you that he would take care of the wounded?

A. No; he never made any remark to me of that kind.

Q. Did Lieutenant Lyon make any such remark?

A. I never knew such an officer was there.

Q. How long did you remain inside of the grounds?

A. I don't think I was there over two minutes--maybe I was longer. The firing was quite heavy after I got in there, and I went down to join my command.

Q. How were you dressed when you met Major Buffington?

A. In a blouse and a cap, with two stars on it, and blue pants. One of my shoulder straps during the night had been torn down, and it hung, and I took it off.

Q. Was the other on?

A. No; I had taken both off when I found one of them was torn.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. What request did you make of Major Buffington when you went there?

A. I told him we had been in the company's shops all night, and that we were burned out, and that the men were out of ammunition, and that I wanted something to eat, and wanted to form my men there until I could get some further orders.

Q. You wanted to form your men in the arsenal grounds?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he refuse?

A. Most peremptorily, and said that we could not come there. I asked where I could encamp or could bivouac, and he said that I couldn't come in there, but could go somewhere else. I said I was a total stranger in the city, and wanted somebody to direct me--nothing more than a civil question, and he said he didn't know, that I would have to go away, and turned on his heel and left.

Q. What excuse did he make, if any, for refusing you admission?

A. I think that he had very few men there. The purport was that he was afraid we might draw the fire of the mob. That was the impression left on my mind.

Q. Did he say anything about a large amount of valuable ammunition and stores?

A. Not to my recollection. He might have said so; but I don't recollect. I know he said he had no ammunition for us.

Q. Did he say he had artillery ammunition, but no ammunition for infantry?

A. I do not recollect that he did.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you rap at the door or call at the door, and meet him outside, or did he come out before you arrived at the house?

A. Two men were at the gate, and one ran ahead, and I think, told him. I think he rapped at the gate.

Q. Did you have any conversation with Lieutenant Lyon?

A. I do not remember seeing him.

Q. I understood you to say that you called at Colonel Scott's office, and was there shown the communication from General Latta?

A. Yes; I got my dispatch over the Pennsylvania railroad lines.

Q. Was it directed to Colonel Scott or to you?

A. To me.

Q. It went over their line?

A. Yes; all the time I was away we used their wires.

Q. Did you receive any orders from any one else before you left Philadelphia, than from General Latta?

A. No.

Q. Did you receive any communication from General Latta at Pittsburgh, while you were in the round-house, after General Pearson left you, before you sent a communication to him?

A. There was a communication, which came over the wires, directed to General Pearson. A dispatch which I did not understand, saying something about when the troops arrive, make disposition for them--a dispatch could not understand, directed to General Pearson, from General Latta.

Q. That was from General Latta?

A. Yes; but immediately after that the wires were cut, and we had no other communication.

Q. Did you send a communication to General Latta by a messenger, before you received the orders from him to hold the round-house?

A. I did. It was by the messenger whom I sent to General Latta that I received those orders.

Q. That was in reply to your communication?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no other communication from General Latta?

A. I sent him two. The first communication was--the purport of it was--that General Brinton had left there, and that we were suffering for ammunition and for rations, and also had but two friction primers. I have a copy of this, and one of the Sunday papers, I believe, copied it.

Q. That was the first?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us the original of that?

A. I think I can give the original--I can give you the original of one. The Sunday Republic published it.

Q. What was the second communication--the one you received and replied to from General Latta?

A. I received a reply to both from General Latta.

Q. Give us the nature of the second communication?

A. I cannot remember the exact phraseology of it.

Q. Give it in substance, as near as you can?

A. It was a mere reiteration, asking for ammunition, and asking for rations--saying that we must be provisioned--that the troops were in a terrible state, nearly starved, and suggesting in one of the dispatches, how they could get in there with their engines, that they might run down and we would try to have the gates ready for them to come in, and the engine, I believe, was subsequently loaded, and the engineer refused to take it.

Q. Did you try to convey the idea to General Latta, that your troops were unfit for duty?

A. No; I conveyed the idea, or attempted to, that they were worn out, not being properly cared for or rationed, and that I had no sufficient amount of ammunition. I tried to convey that idea.

Q. That they were demoralized?

A. No--I did not.

Q. Could there have been such a construction placed on your message?

A. No; I don't think so. A few of my men were not in the best condition, morally, but very few. I only placed them in another part of the building. I designated those.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you designate those in your message to General Latta?

A. I probably did.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were they officers or men?

A. A few of the men--none of the officers. But so far as the men were fatigued or worn out, I tried to convey that in the strongest terms.

Q. For the purpose of getting supplies?

A. For the purpose of getting something to eat and ammunition.

Q. Did General Latta say anything in his communications to you that you were left in command of the round-house, and that you were expected to act on your own discretion?

A. No; on the contrary, he gave me specific orders what to do, and when I left where to go.

Q. Did you expect to receive further orders from General Pearson when you received your communications from General Latta?

A. I cannot say that I expected to, although I would not have been surprised to have received them.

Q. Did you consider it your duty to take command of the force and to act at your own discretion after General Pearson had left you and you were not able to communicate with him?

A. No further than I did, because communications should have come the other way. I was ordered to do a certain thing, and it was possibly superseding my duty to send out an officer after orders. It would probably have been more soldierly for me to stay there and receive communications from my superior than to send after them.

Q. Didn't you consider it proper, as a military man, to exercise your own discretion in an emergency of that kind, and take the responsibility of it?

A. No; I do not think I did, nor do I yet. The responsibility rested on me to obey orders, and as I had no means of ascertaining what was going on outside, I resolved to hold that place as far as I could, and didn't move out until the men were nearly choked with the smoke. We held it for two hours longer than we were ordered to hold it.

Q. Was the round-house on fire when you left it?

A. It was.

Q. And the shops adjoining the round-house?

A. Yes; the machine shops adjoining the round-house were entirely on fire. The roof was on fire and the floors were saturated with oil and General Matthews sent to me two or three times saying that the smoke was so intense that they could scarcely stay there. Then I moved them out into the yard.

Q. The floors were saturated with oil?

A. Yes; it was not twenty minutes after leaving the place until it was a cinder.

Q. How did that place become saturated with oil--by the mob?

A. No; the employés of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company put it there while greasing the engines.

Q. Did any whisky or high wines run down into the round-house while you were there?

A. Some whisky ran into the cellar of the office while we were there. It was lower than the pavement, and when they threw the cars off the track there, some barrels got down on the pavement.

Q. Did it run down into the cellar?

A. Yes; into the cellar or basement where the telegraph batteries were stationed.

Q. Was the office connected with the round-house or the building you were in?

A. They were some of the buildings we were in, but not connected although not over three or four feet off them.

Q. Did you see Colonel Norris on your march from the round-house to Claremont?

A. I saw Wilson Norris after we had passed Sharpsburg, between there and Claremont.

Q. Did you receive any orders from him?

A. I have no recollection of receiving any orders from him, and I have questioned my staff who were around me at the time, and they have none.

Q. Neither verbal or written?

A. Neither verbal or written.

Q. Did you receive any orders from any one else before you reached Sharpsburg or Claremont?

A. No.

Q. No orders from any one to go to Torrens station during Sunday?

A. Whilst in the round-house, to proceed east out Penn Avenue, towards Torrens, from General Latta. I did not go there for this reason: Colonel Guthrie was to be at the outer depot at six o'clock in the morning, and we waited there until ten minutes after eight, waiting for him two hours and ten minutes. The suggestions which General Latta gave me were based on Colonel Guthrie's being at Torrens station, but considered I would only be exchanging places with Colonel Guthrie, and for that reason I concluded to go to the arsenal. In the second place, General Latta or the authorities had said it was impossible to ration us.

Q. Did you receive any communication from General Latta, or any other superior officer, before you got to Blairsville?

A. Yes; from General Latta, to proceed to Altoona, which we immediately proceeded to do.

Q. Through whom?

A. Through Major Baugh, whom I sent back to General Latta for instructions--sent him back to Pittsburgh.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. On Saturday afternoon, when the firing commenced--where did it commence?

A. The firing commenced from the Weccacoe Legion.

Q. Facing east?

A. Yes.

Q. It was the first firing from the troops?

A. The first firing came from there.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. From what direction did the stones and other missiles come?

A. They came from every direction.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Was there any pistol firing from the side of the hill?

A. After the firing commenced it was very hard to detect in which direction it came. It seemed to come in all directions, and the stones were striking against the muskets of the men as they held them up. It was very hard to detect where the firing came from.

Q. Was there any positive order given to fire?

A. I didn't hear it, and I didn't give it, and I don't think there was, further than the general order I gave, if we were attacked that we should defend ourselves.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Was General Pearson present when the firing took place?

A. I think he was--not that I saw him, but he gave me the order to clear the tracks, and the time was so short after he gave the order before the firing commenced, that I do not see how he could arrive at Mr. Pitcairn's office before the firing took place, although I didn't see him myself. He gave me those orders, and I ordered the Weccacoe Legion, which had about seventy-five yards to go, and the whole time didn't occupy over two minutes.

Q. How was he dressed?

A. I think in full uniform--my impression is that he was. I think he was.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What do you mean by full uniform?

A. Blouse and cap--regular fatigue uniform.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Suppose he had turned around immediately after giving you the order and gone to Mr. Pitcairn's office, could he have got there before the firing took place?

A. I do not think so, but I may be mistaken.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did he wear a hat or a cap?

A. I cannot tell you, sir. It really didn't make sufficient impression on me, but I think he had a cap on. That is my impression, because I knew him in the army a long time, and he always used to wear a cap there.

Q. Had he a sword and belt on?

A. Yes; a sword and belt on.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Were you in the late war?

A. Yes.

Q. What rank did you occupy?

A. I went out as a private in the Second Pennsylvania cavalry, and afterwards was promoted to different grades to major of a regiment, and brevet lieutenant colonel at Five Forks. I served two years as personal aid to General Griffin, of the Fifth Army Corps.

Q. When did you go out?

A. In September, 1861, and left the army in June, 1866.

Q. What rank did you hold when you left?

A. I was major and brevet lieutenant colonel.

Adjourned, to meet at two o'clock to-morrow.

* * * * *

PHILADELPHIA, Saturday, March 23, 1878.

Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled in the St. Cloud hotel, at two o'clock, P.M., this day, and continued the taking of testimony.

* * * * *

J. Ewing Mears, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. At No. 1429 Walnut street, in this city.

Q. What is your profession?

A. That of a physician.

Q. State whether you were a member of the National Guard, and if so, what position you held at the time of the riots?

A. I was the division surgeon of the First division, National Guard, under command of General Brinton.

Q. State whether you accompanied the command of General Brinton to Pittsburgh, and on what day?

A. I left the city of Philadelphia on the morning of Saturday, the 21st of July, in company with General Brinton, and arrived at Pittsburgh shortly after the middle of the day of Saturday.

Q. Go on and relate just what occurred after your arrival at Pittsburgh?

A. I don't know whether I can state it as you wish, without questions from yourself. After our arrival at Pittsburgh, the troops were disembarked, and orders were given with regard to their march up towards the round-house, and I was ordered by General Brinton to establish the division hospital in the mail-room connected with the railroad station. It was nearly opposite to the outer telegraph station, as the depot existed prior to its destruction. Before the command left the depot, I had assigned to the different brigades and regiments medical officers, taking from some regiments officers who were in access of the needs of the regiments; in other words, I distributed medical officers to the different commands, in accordance with the orders of General Brinton.

Q. Did you accompany the command at Twenty-eighth street?

A. I didn't.

Q. Where were you yourself?

A. I was at the depot. My orders from General Brinton were, to establish the division hospital at the depot, to which the wounded, if any happened to be wounded, could be sent.

Q. Did you send out surgeons with the command--as you distributed them, they went out?

A. Yes; there were two surgeons with the First regiment, one surgeon connected with the Second brigade, and one surgeon who was not acting as such among the other companies.

Q. Did you remain at the Union depot during Saturday night?

A. No; I remained there until ten o'clock, then I left the depot, the object being to join the command in the round-house, if possible. I had, in the meantime, met the surgeon of the Pennsylvania railroad, Doctor Murdock, who was also surgeon of the West Penn hospital, and he informed me that some of the wounded of the division were in the hospital, and offered his services to me to assist, and also on behalf of the staff, the use of the hospital. In view of this fact, and as I had also completed my duty at the depot by sending all of the wounded to Philadelphia prior to ten o'clock, I left the depot to start to join General Brinton in the round-house, but being unable to do so by reason of the mob, I went to the hospital, where I found some of the command.

Q. How many wounded were brought to the Union depot?

A. Fifteen.

Q. Of the militia?

A. Yes.

Q. They were sent to Philadelphia?

A. Yes; I obtained from Mr. Cassatt a special car for that purpose.

Q. How were the different men wounded?

A. The majority were wounded by small Smith & Wesson balls--balls that belong to the ordinary pocket revolver, and the gun shot wounds were all in the lower extremities.

Q. Were any wounded with stones or clubs?

A. They were wounded both with bullets, and also with clubs and stones, the majority being wounded with bullets, and as they stated, the wounds being given to them by persons under the cars, the result of that being that the wounds were in the lower extremities. Some had scalp wounds, received from clubs and stones, and some of the wounds in the lower extremities were also from clubs or stones. I should say that 1 moved the hospital from the mail-room, which I had taken, into the hotel, and took for that purpose the two large reading-rooms of the hotel. There I dressed the wounds of those sent to me, and sent them home when I finished the work.

Q. On Sunday, where were you?

A. On Sunday morning, at seven and a half o'clock, I left the West Penn hospital, and came into the depot. I was aware then that the command had left the round-house, that is, I was so informed, and I came into the hotel for the purpose of getting the medical stores, and also for the purpose of getting means of conveyance to the command. I had received a requisition the afternoon before, from one of the surgeons for lint and medical stores, and I had purchased some the night before in a drug store, at Pittsburgh.

Q. The details we don't care for--just simply the number of wounded, and if you heard the firing, and was with the command at the time?

A. I didn't hear the firing, and there were more wounded than I saw, because some didn't come to the depot.

Q. Do you know the number of the wounded altogether?

A. I have endeavored to ascertain that, but have failed thus far. I understood there were about twenty-eight.

Q. How many were killed?

A. As far as I can ascertain, three were killed, two instantly, and one died from the result of a gun-shot wound.

Q. Did you go with the command when it retreated out Penn avenue, and across the river?

A. I followed the command as closely as I could, and joined them after they had crossed the river.

Q. At what time?

A. Ten and a half o'clock.

Q. Were you dressed in uniform?

A. No.

Q. In citizen's clothes?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any trouble in reaching the command?

A. No; I was not interfered with, although I drove through the mob. I had with me a guide, a member of one of the cavalry companies of Pittsburgh, but he knew nothing of the country after passing the arsenal. I acted on my own responsibility. I had received an order from General Brinton the evening before, about joining the command, and was directed to join him in citizen's clothes.

Q. Did you stop at the arsenal?

A. I did.

Q. Did you see Major Buffington?

A. No.

Q. Or Lieutenant Lyon?

A. No.

Q. Did you see Lieutenant Ash?

A. I didn't see him.

Q. Did you know that Lieutenant Ash was there?

A. I didn't at that time.

Q. You reached your command in safety?

A. Yes; with the stores I had taken with me. I had a wagon and a horse, and I placed them in the wagon, and took them to the command.

Q. Are there any other facts that you wish to state? State whether you heard any orders given by General Latta to General Brinton?

A. I heard orders dictated to his secretary or to an officer in his room--I did.

Q. At what place?

A. At the Union Depot hotel.

Q. At what time?

A. About eight o'clock on Sunday morning.

Q. What were they?

A. As near as I can remember them--I was not the officer supposed to hear them, but they were given in an ordinary tone of voice--the order was congratulatory to General Brinton on his retreat from the round-house, as to his generalship in getting out of the round-house, and upon his march out Penn square to the arsenal. That is a portion of the order I distinctly remember. Further, when I asked General Latta where I should join the command, he told me to go to the arsenal.

Q. Did you have any conversation with General Latta at that time?

A. I asked him where the command was, and how to get there.

Q. Did you hear any other command given by General Latta to General Brinton?

A. I did not. I met Major Norris returning from the command. He had joined them, and I asked him where they were, and he said on the hill, and that they were going to the poor-house. He said to me nothing at all in regard to any other destination. This hill, I suppose, was a quarter of a mile after the bridge had been crossed--after crossing the river.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did you have any conversation with citizens of Pittsburgh, or come in contact with them?

A. I did, on Saturday night. I had taken, fortunately, a letter of introduction to a druggist in Pittsburgh, and I went to his drug store to make a purchase.

Q. Just state whether the citizens of Pittsburgh showed sympathy with the strikers?

A. Yes; most decidedly.

Q. Their sympathies were with the strikers?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were hostile to the troops?

A. Most decidedly. I had conversations with a number of medical men, and I was surprised to hear them, as medical men, express their sympathy with the action of the rioters.

Q. In plain words, they said that the strikers were doing right?

A. Yes; they approved their action.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. In what way did they manifest or express sympathy with the rioters?

A. In this way: they thought they were taking the proper action to redress the wrongs they had suffered.

Q. Did they say that the strikers were taking proper action?

A. They said that they thought they were doing right.

Q. What citizens said that?

A. I do not remember the names. I met one gentleman on the street. He was kind enough to conduct me back to the hotel, it being night, and I not knowing the way. He didn't know who I was or my business, and expressed himself very freely about the matter.

Q. Was he a business man?

A. I do not know that. He appeared to be a gentleman--he was dressed as such.

Q. Living in the city of Pittsburgh?

A. I suppose he did, sir.

Q. At the drug store, did you meet any citizens more than the druggist himself?

A. I didn't, because he advised me not to stay there long--that it would not be desirable for them to know who I was.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The druggist advised you not to stay there long--that he did not want the strikers to know you were in his place of business?

A. Or the citizens even to know it. It was rather out of regard for my safety, than possibly for himself. I went through the streets of Pittsburgh, when they were breaking into the stores and seizing arms, and the citizens looked on that indifferently, and no efforts were made to stop that.

Q. You went through the city of Pittsburgh, in disguise for your own safety, for fear of bodily harm you might receive.

A. I went into the streets of Pittsburgh in citizen's dress, in the first place, because I had been warned by General Latta, in regard to wearing my uniform. He advised me to remove it. He said it was not safe even for himself, or anybody connected with the military, to appear in uniform. That it would probably attract the mob to the hotel. I did it at his suggestion, and also, when I reflected on it, for my own safety.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where was that drug store?

A. I cannot tell you where, it was night.

Q. Do you remember the street?

A. I do not. I can go to it in daytime.

Q. Do you know whether it was the proprietor of the drug store with whom you had the conversation?

A. It was the clerk.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did you get an introduction to the proprietor?

A. I did not.

Q. Who was the letter addressed to?

A. To Mr. Ottinger. I took it, thinking I should possibly want to purchase something.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You cannot give the street?

A. I didn't see it in the daytime at all.

Q. Can you give us the language--what he said?

A. I cannot, because I didn't stop very long at his store. I had sent him an order, and asked that it should be filled, and I went for the order. It was not completed, and it kept us a few minutes. Further, to show the hostility to the troops, when I was taking the wounded to the cars, the mob had got into the station, and were jeering us and making use of insulting remarks, such as to show that they were gratified that they were going home in that condition.

* * * * *

Thomas A. Scott, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State what your official connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company is?

A. I am president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

Q. You have held that position for a number of years?

A. I have been connected with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, in various capacities, over twenty-six years.

Q. State, if prior to the strike that occurred in July last, you had any information that such a strike was to take place, or had any reason to apprehend a strike?

A. We had no information on the subject. I was on that evening up the river Delaware eighteen miles, visiting some friends--my daughters' family--and had gone to bed about ten o'clock, and heard nothing of the strike, or anything connected with it, until about eleven o'clock, when one of our officers from West Philadelphia, came up and advised me that there was trouble on the road, and wanted me to come to West Philadelphia. I did so, and arrived there a quarter before twelve, on Thursday night. At that time I had no intimation of any possible trouble with any of our people.

Q. Had you any knowledge of the existence of an organization called the Trainmen's Union?

A. Yes; I had heard that there was such an organization. There was some discontent about salaries and other matters connected with railroad management, and I had an interview with some engineers and firemen a few weeks before, and went over the whole subject--went over the whole ground with them. I suppose it was a committee of twenty or thirty altogether; and after hearing all that was to be said on both sides, we finally agreed that it was one of the inevitable things that could not be avoided, but would be remedied as soon as the condition of the country got into a more prosperous condition. After the committee retired from the interview, they came back again with a letter directed to me, expressing just what I said, in substance, to you; therefore I had no idea that there was discontent among our people likely to lead to anything like the results attained afterwards--like the difficulty that resulted in Pittsburgh.

Q. What complaints did this committee make when they waited on you?

A. They wanted to have the ten per cent. restored.

Q. What time was that?

A. It may have been three or four weeks before the difficulty occurred.

Q. It was after the 1st of June--after the ten per cent. reduction?

A. After the notice was given.

Q. Did they have any other complaint to make than about the ten per cent. reduction?

A. They discussed the question of privilege to ride over the road, and about being allowed for time when off duty, and several things of that character, all of which were discussed in the most friendly way with the committee, and I supposed that the committee went away perfectly satisfied. They so expressed themselves in writing to me--perfectly satisfied with the action of the company.

Q. Did they make any objections to the classification--what is called the classification?

A. They discussed that question with me, and they wanted to get some changes made in that. That had been agreed upon with the engineers and firemen some years before.

Q. They were satisfied on that point?

A. Entirely.

Q. Had you heard of any dissatisfaction on that point from any other source than from this committee?

A. I had heard nothing about the question at all.

Q. Had there been any complaints made prior to the one made by this committee on that subject?

A. A year or two before the question had been discussed. I have always been in the habit when our people come to state their grievances or supposed grievances to hear them, and discuss the matter, and do what we think right about it. I believe I never have declined to receive our men, and talk over matters connected with the company.

Q. After the order was issued to run double-headers, did you hear of any dissatisfaction?

A. Not until this Thursday night. That that was one cause of dissatisfaction.

Q. How long before that was the order issued to run double-headers?

A. I cannot give the time, but it was, I think, a few weeks--but how long, I don't know. It is a matter of detail management of the respective divisions that scarcely ever comes to me at all.

Q. Do you know what date it went into effect?

A. No; I do not.

Q. From whom did you get the first information that a strike existed there at Pittsburgh?

A. From Mr. Charles E. Pugh, one of our superintendents at West Philadelphia, who came up for me to Andalusia, or near there.

Q. What time did he get there?

A. At a quarter before eleven o'clock.

Q. On the 19th?

A. Yes; on Thursday night.

Q. When did you get the next information?

A. When I got to the depot at West Philadelphia.

Q. What was the character of that?

A. That there was an outbreak among the men on all the roads extending rapidly over all the lines in the country, and that there was not a sufficient police force in the city of Pittsburgh, to manage the matter, and that the sheriff had been called out or called upon by somebody to organize a posse comitatus, and I believe he did make some effort about it.

Q. That he was called upon by some officer of your road?

A. No; but by some authorities of the city of Pittsburgh; but that, I cannot say. I was not there. That they called upon him, but just when they called upon him, I do not know.

Q. That information was communicated to you?

A. Yes; by telegraph.

Q. Were you informed that the city authorities and the sheriff were not able to suppress the strike or the riot there?

A. Yes; I was informed of that fact--that the sheriff had called upon the Governor of the State for aid.

Q. What time did you get that information?

A. Three or four o'clock in the morning.

Q. From whom did you get the information?

A. From our officers at Pittsburgh. I think probably from Mr. Pitcairn.

Q. Had you any communication with the Governor?

A. Yes; I telegraphed to the Governor after he had been called upon and given the general results of the trouble--I telegraphed. I thought it was very important for him to be back in the city at the earliest moment he could come. That I thought the peace of the whole State was threatened.

Q. What time did you send that telegram?

A. I think that was sent the next day some time.

Q. On Friday?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see General Latta before he left for Pittsburgh?

A. Yes. He was there when I got to West Philadelphia. He was very much disturbed. He told me that the Governor, before leaving, had left power and authority with him to exercise his authority in case of disturbance. I asked what he proposed to do about the matter, and he said he proposed to go to Pittsburgh, and be governed by circumstances. If the Governor was called upon, that he would do what was necessary and proper to be done, under the circumstances, to preserve the order of the State. I think it was about a quarter before twelve o'clock on Thursday night when I saw him. I expressed to him the importance of preserving the highways of the country intact, as I understood it and believed it.

Q. When did you first learn that they had ordered the troops out--when the Adjutant General had ordered them out?

A. I understood about four o'clock Friday morning that the sheriff of Allegheny county had called for troops.

Q. And you understood then that General Latta would call them in pursuance of the call of the sheriff?

A. General Latta told me if called on, that he had abundance of troops in the city of Pittsburgh to take care of anything that might arise--under General Pearson.

Q. Did you have any communication with General Pearson?

A. No; if General Pearson asked me any question about transportation of troops, I told him what was proper under the circumstances; but I do not recollect of having any from him.

Q. Had you ever had any strikes on that road prior to this time?

A. We had a strike in 1860, when I was general superintendent of the road--a small affair that didn't last but a few days--principally among some of the engineers and some of the shop men. But I believe we had no strike or trouble with our people from that time up to the occurrences last summer.

Q. What steps were taken at that time to control it by the company?

A. Simply notice to the men engaged in it, that if the wages or arrangements of the company did not suit them, to peaceably go away.

Q. Was there any attempt, at that time, to molest or disturb the property of the company?

A. Nothing at all, except stoppage of the trains.

Q. There never has been any strike before where there was an attempt to destroy property?

A. No.

Q. Can you give us the amount, or an estimated amount, of the destruction of property at Pittsburgh?

A. Well, I think it is in the neighborhood--you mean what property?

Q. Belonging to the company?

A. About $2,000,000--various things we were interested in.

Q. Does that cover the merchandise?

A. Not at all.

Q. Simply the actual property of the company?

A. Yes; and it does not cover the consequent loss from the interruption of our business.

Q. But you include the destruction of cars, and engines, and shops, and tracks?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many cars were destroyed?

A. I have not got the number at the end of my fingers, but it is in the annual report of the company. It is all stated there, sir. I think it is summed up in that report, that the probable loss, by reason of this trouble, was about $5,000,000 to our company and to the community at large in Pittsburgh and the community elsewhere owning property in transit.

Q. In consequence of the riot that existed there?

A. Yes.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. That includes the merchandise?

A. Yes; it is an estimated amount of what we thought about the right thing--as near as we could get at it.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did General Brinton telegraph you at Blairsville Junction that he, General Brinton, could clear the tracks with the force under his command?

A. I think General Brinton did telegraph me; but I do not recollect the details of it at all.

Q. At Blairsville Junction?

A. That he thought with troops properly located he could take care of it.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. In the interview you had with this committee, they stated their views on the reduction of ten per cent.?

A. That and several other questions connected with it.

Q. When did this ten per cent. reduction take place?

A. In June.

Q. Had there been any prior reduction?

A. Yes; in 1873, we made a reduction of ten per cent.--following the panic.

Q. Then in June you made another reduction?

A. Of ten per cent. It applied to everybody in the company--to men on the track, and in the shops, and on the engines, and in the depots, and every officer of the company.

By Mr. Yutzy:

Q. To all the employés?

A. To all getting above a dollar per day.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Was this last reduction made in pursuance of any arrangement with any other road?

A. Not at all.

Q. Was there not a meeting of representatives of the trunk lines in Chicago in May sometime, at which matters were talked over?

A. I don't know--I was not there.

Q. Was there a representative of your company present?

A. There may have been. I don't know nor whether they had up the question of compensation to the men. Our action on the subject was based on the general results of the business of the company, and the necessity of some positive thing being done in aid of the company and in aid of the men as well.

Q. The action of your company, in this reduction, was solely by yourselves, without any understanding?

A. With the other trunk lines?

Q. Yes.

A. None whatever. I think they didn't make any reduction until July.

Q. Didn't the New York Central make a reduction about that time?

A. I think on the 1st of July.

Q. And the Baltimore and Ohio about that time?

A. Somewhere along there. I don't know the dates exactly.

Q. This reduction was arrived at by yourselves without any understanding with other roads?

A. Yes; we thought it proper to be done. I think, and believe now, that we were paying men then twenty per cent. above the average price paid for an equivalent amount of labor anywhere else.

Q. Do you remember the prices paid the trainmen?

A. I don't recollect, but I can get you the data if you want them. I don't recollect the details. Our wages differ a little on different divisions--they are not entirely uniform. There are some places where the living is more expensive, and there the compensation is higher. They are paid according to locality. There are some places where the cost of living is a great deal less than in others, and a difference is made in wages. It is always been so both on the track and roadway and the trainmen also.

Q. Do you know whether arrangements were made at Chicago to pool the earnings of the three trunk lines?

A. An attempt was made.

Q. But never carried out?

A. No.

Q. You don't know whether this question of wages was discussed at that meeting?

A. I don't know.

Q. You had no report made to you by the representative of your road who was there?

A. No.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. To pool the entire earnings of the road?

A. No; the competitive business to avoid disagreements, and to put all the shippers on a perfect equality, and get a fair living compensation for doing the work to be done. Through excessive competition, very often business was done resulting in a loss to the companies. They did the work for a great deal less than cost, and in doing, that with certain kinds of traffic, they did violence and injustice to other people at other points. That was one of the troubles with the city of Pittsburgh--perhaps their chief trouble.

Q. The purpose of it was to secure uniformity of freights?

A. And compensation to everybody.

Q. To shippers, too?

A. To shippers. In the early part of last year, the through business of the company was done below actual cost to every road that did it. During the first six months of last year, not a farthing was made on through competitive freight by any line.

Q. Was that agreed upon at that meeting in Chicago?

A. They made an effort, but didn't succeed in having it carried out practically.

Q. The trouble was in one line cutting down freights?

A. That is the allegation always--that somebody is cheating somebody else.

Q. It was attempted to carry it into effect?

A. Yes.

Q. For how long a time did you work at it?

A. Three or four months, probably, but finally it all broke up. On west-bound traffic we have an arrangement for a division of the business under low established rates, by which everybody is placed on a perfect equality. New York, a certain price, Philadelphia so much below that, and Baltimore, so much below that. Under that arrangement, the lines have been doing very much better than when in open warfare. I believe now that every west-bound shipper is placed on an entire equality.

Q. You have referred to Pittsburgh. Had there been complaints by shippers in Pittsburgh about discrimination?

A. Always.

Q. What were the complaints?

A. That through goods were carried at a less rate per ton per mile than their goods, and that we ought to be able to control that. I think I have tried diligently for the last five years of my life to get an arrangement or an agreement by which all these questions could be adjusted, and these discriminations of every character wiped out, and I went even to this trouble: I met a committee of merchants and manufacturers of the city of Pittsburgh, and went over the whole case with them. I said to them: gentlemen, there are times when it cannot be controlled. If we succeed in making this west-bound arrangement we will put all your interests here, so far as relates to the western markets, on a fair equality with everything that comes into competition with you from the east. I said so far as we are concerned, we have a strong desire to do just what you want done, and to that end we are working, and we will do anything we can do to bring it about; and if it should happen in the future that we must go through other and more violent wars than we have now passed, we will still agree that your trade in competition with like trade--that your manufacturing interests here shall be protected by at least ten per cent. less than the aggregate rates from points east of you. They expressed themselves very well satisfied with that arrangement.

Q. Can you give us any of the methods you have tried for the purpose of preventing those complaints by the people of Pittsburgh?

A. The general endeavor is to agree upon rates, and to adhere to them absolutely. We never charge in any case exceeding the rate charged from a distant point. In this arrangement, I referred to, for the city of Pittsburgh, I told them, in any possible state of things, we would make their rates ten per cent. less than any rate prevailing from any point east of them--Philadelphia, New York, or Baltimore. It sometimes happened that competition ruled so strong that we carried things from New York to Chicago lower than we did from Pittsburgh, and when engaged in one of these little troubles, the rates are frequently changed a dozen times in a day. Our aim always has been to put all the shippers on our road and all the intermediate shippers on rates as low as competition might force at the extremes. We think it is right, and endeavor to do it. There have been isolated cases when it is not done, as it may happen that a shipper from New York to-day will have a low rate on some specific kind of goods, while the shipper from Pittsburgh would be paying the rate that prevailed the day before. But whenever such cases came to our notice we gave a drawback. Sometimes they never came to our notice, but have been nursed up, and made a cause of trouble and complaint. Whenever we found the difference too great we always paid them back.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. By rebates?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. There never has been a time when the price charged from Pittsburgh was greater than from any point beyond?

A. It never was the policy of the company that it should be so, but it has frequently happened in isolated cases that such was the case.

Q. Has that been the case for any length of time?

A. Never--not for any length of time.

Q. For a month at a time?

A. Oh, no--a day or two.

Q. How did freights compare in July last with what they had been for three months preceding that time?

A. They had been extremely low the whole of the year up to that time, and were then extremely low on east-bound business. On west-bound business on the 1st of July that arrangement was made to have a division of the business.

Q. How were freights after the strike was over?

A. On west-bound business, the arrangement that went into operation then is in operation now. On east-bound, every two or three weeks they have the same chronic trouble. After making an agreement, they violate it and break down, but as a general thing, the rates are better now than they were a year ago.

Q. How did rates compare the fore part of last season with the year before, at the same time?

A. Very much lower. Two reasons brought it about. First a short crop in the fall of 1876, when there was very little freight to come east--nothing at all equal to the facilities of the various companies, the result being a scramble and competition to get it, and prices ruled away below the cost of doing the work.

Q. How did the amount of freight or tonnage during the months of May and June, 1877, compare with the months of May and June, 1876?

A. It was not so heavy, but after the harvest of last year--and it was a heavy crop all over the west--and in consequence of the European war, which cause a demand, the roads had better tonnage.

Q. Was there any difference in the local freights?

A. They were greater in quantity all along our line. The crops were better.

Q. How did the local rates compare with the previous year?

A. They were on the same general basis as the previous year. I don't think there was any change, unless we got into those violent competitions, when we would reduce our local as well as through rates.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you ship goods or freight cheaper from New York to San Francisco than from Pittsburgh to San Francisco, such as steel or iron?

A. I think that has occurred a number of times. The rates are made by the Union and Central Pacific roads. At New York they come into competition with the Pacific mail and sailing vessels around Cape Horn, and on account of that competition, the rates are made low.

Q. Less from New York to San Francisco than from Pittsburgh?

A. Yes.

Q. Has it been the custom on your road to get a larger rate from New York than from Pittsburgh?

A. Yes; on our road we get a larger rate from New York than from Pittsburgh.

Q. Do you mean per ton per mile?

A. No. I mean the aggregate rate. The Pacific road fixes its own prices from Chicago west-bound.

Q. Can you not ship freight at a less rate per ton per mile for a long distance than for a short?

A. I think we can. It saves the intermediate handling.

Q. Do you know of any instance where iron or steel has been shipped from Pittsburgh to New York and from there to San Francisco by rail?

A. No.

Q. Because the rates would be cheaper?

A. No. I have understood of one or two cases where drugs were sent from Pittsburgh to New York, and these came into competition with drugs shipped by ocean, and were then shipped on back.

Q. Did the cheap rates at New York arise from competition with water transportation?

A. Yes; at sea. That only applies to heavy articles, about which there is no question of time or of insurance. It may apply to heavy drugs; but it does not apply to dry goods or groceries, or things like that.

Q. Are your local freight rates governed by your through rates in any way?

A. To the extent that whenever through rates come down below the local charges we reduce the local charges.

Q. Proportionately?

A. No; but we do not exceed on our local business the amount charged on other roads.

Q. Do you reduce the rates on local traffic when you reduce them on other traffic in equal proportion?

A. No. Say the rate from Chicago to New York is fifty cents, and the rate from Philadelphia or Harrisburg is fifty cents, and the rate from New York should be reduced to forty or thirty, we reduce the other rate.

Q. To the same per centage?

A. The same gross rate.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Was there any strike in the city of Philadelphia among your employés?

A. There was some striking among the men on our trains.

Q. When did that first break out?

A. Probably a day or two after the trouble at Pittsburgh. I think the trouble occurred here on Friday night or Saturday.

Q. Among what class of your employés.

A. The trainmen entirely.

Q. Did it include the engineers?

A. No.

Q. The brakemen, firemen, and conductors?

A. Yes; the trainmen--on freight trains.

Q. Did they interfere with your property in any way here?

A. They declined to run the trains out, and said their lives were in danger, and the result was the trains didn't go for several days. It didn't apply to the Northern Central road or the New York division.

Q. Did they attempt to interfere with the property of the road?

A. Destroy it?

Q. Yes?

A. Not at all. I think they felt themselves bound by some organization that seemed to have control of them, not to do anything or allow others to take their places, and, therefore, it was simply a stand off policy--the trains didn't go. But they attempted no destruction of property at all.

Q. Did it become necessary for you to call on the civil authorities here?

A. Yes. There was a great deal of threatening all over town in regard to the possibility of serious trouble, and we had some trouble at the yards in West Philadelphia. Engines were taken from trains.

Q. What steps did you take for protection here?

A. I sent word down to the mayor's office about this difficulty on the lines of the road, and that we feared that some effort might be made to destroy our property, and that, therefore, we wanted the protection due to every interest in our State and city--nothing more. He organized a police force. A great many of the people of the city were alarmed about the situation of affairs, and, I believe, they gave the mayor authority to take on additional policemen, which he kept employed for some days, until the threatened trouble was all over. I think his whole action in the management of the police force under him was very efficient and thorough.

Q. Did he respond promptly to that call?

A. Yes; and succeeded in maintaining order entirely.

Q. There was no trouble in maintaining peace and order?

A. No; excepting the exercise of a great deal of vigilance and care with a strong force.

Q. Was it necessary for the policemen to make any attack on the crowd?

A. I think nothing serious. They had several little disturbances. The crowd was armed and threatened trouble and all that.

Q. Did the crowd assemble in very large numbers?

A. I have been told from two to five thousand people; but they persuaded them to disperse. I do not think there was any trouble at any time. The mayor's policy was to prevent crowds from assembling, to prevent disturbance, and in the conduct of the whole matter I think he showed great wisdom and great efficiency.

Q. What day did you start your trains here?

A. From here west?

Q. Yes?

A. I think on the 27th or the 28th.

Q. Did you meet with any trouble in getting men to start them?

A. No.

Q. Was there any resistance made by the crowd?

A. Not here.

Q. Was it necessary to have any guard to protect the first trains that started?

A. Of military?

Q. Or policemen?

A. No. There were men here about the yards and depots to see that the peace was preserved, but they made no arrests, I believe, in connection with people in leaving trains. They did make arrests of some people for destroying some oil cars.

Q. On the Pennsylvania railroad?

A. On the junction road.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you, as president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, at any time, make any requisition on the State authorities for troops to protect your property?

A. Not at all. The State authorities were called out, as I understood, on a requisition from the county of Allegheny.

Q. By the sheriff?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any knowledge of any officer of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company calling on the Governor for troops?

A. None whatever. They, no doubt, suggested to the Governor of the State that it was his duty to put the force in such a position as to preserve peace and order.

Q. Did you understand that you, as president of a railroad company or as a citizen, have the right to call on the Governor for troops, and that the Governor has a right to respond to that?

A. No.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. In the case of an outbreak, such as existed there, to whom would you apply for help?

A. To the civil authorities of the place, and they, in their turn, are obliged, as I understood the law, to make the requisition. I do not understand that I, as president of a company, have the right to make a requisition on the Governor, but I certainly have the right to notify him. I have no right to make a requisition.

Q. You have the right to notify him under the act of 1864?

A. I have no reference to any particular act. I never understood that a railroad company or a mining interest or anything else had a right to make a requisition. I always thought they had the right to state their case, and ask that some action should be taken, letting the mayor or sheriff, as the case may be, make his own requisition.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. It has been charged by some that the troops were ordered by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in their movements?

A. I think if you will ask the military officers--General Brinton--he will tell you that he moved his troops according to his superior officer's directions, and not at the direction of any railroad man. I guess he was careful to do that. I certainly never asked them to move troops to any particular place or to do any particular thing.

Q. But you conferred with the officers or advised them?

A. No; I conferred with the Governor of the State, and he gave his orders through his officers. I didn't give them any orders. I did give them every facility they asked for, just as we did with the Government of the United States when they got into the rebellion, when we stopped all our business for a time, and gave our road completely to carry men and equipments, and whatever they might require for the field or elsewhere. We gave them entire control of our road.

Q. Do you say you never made any requisition on the State authorities for protection?

A. We stated our case to them, and said we are in great danger, and the highways of the State are in great danger, and we want that protection which it is our right to have.

Q. As every other citizen of the State, you would have the right to demand protection?

A. I think we all pay for peace and order to be preserved in the State, and it ought to be.

By Mr. Engelbert:

Q. Then you never did dictate to the Governor, or to any one in his absence, what to do with the military?

A. Not a bit. I was especially careful not to do anything of that kind.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State if you have been able to ascertain or to gather facts sufficient to form a judgment as to what produced the strike?

A. I think the trouble originated through the discontent of men all over the country--not confined to railroads. Every other branch in some how was directly or indirectly connected with the outbreak, looking for compensation of an increased character, without regard to whether parties were able to pay it or not, and altogether, I think that whole movement was made up--either agreed upon or concerted and agreed upon under their own mode of organization. I think they took this abatement of ten per cent. as one pretext for making the outbreak.

Q. What facts have you that lead you to believe it was a concerted movement or agreed upon?

A. Simply their action, and the results spread before us everywhere.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Is the pay of railroad employés less, as a general thing, than that of any other ordinary avocation?

A. No; I think it is greater; and I think it ought to be a little greater, because the men are subject to risks in railroading, that they are not subject to in ordinary work; therefore, I think it is the duty of railroad companies to pay a little more for that service than is paid for an equal amount of labor in the ordinary channels of life. I think we pay twenty per cent. more to-day than men receive in the various other channels of business.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Are they subject to greater expense than others?

A. Yes; by reason of going from their homes, their extra cost of living is something.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. And in one sense you call it skilled labor, in addition to the risks they run?

A. Yes; we want men understanding their duties to run our trains and take care of the property and of the people in their charge. We want that in all the men, and, I think, as a general thing, we have as good a set of men as was ever organized.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Was there any complaint among the men about their not being able to work full time?

A. Yes; when the depression of business came so strong, we undertook to retain more men in our service than were needed to do the work, and we did that very often at the request of men--of the older men, in order that younger men might have an opportunity to get some work and get a living out of the general result. Instead of men getting ten hours work they would probably get an average of six, seven, or eight hours, and in that way the work was distributed among a greater number of people.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You did that instead of discharging them?

A. Yes; the result of that was that it made the average low, and was a cause of complaint, and when this thing was all over, we had simply to compromise and in giving more hours of work, consequently, to do with fewer men.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Looking at the matter from the experience you have, was that plan of retaining more men than you could give full work to a good one?

A. No; it caused dissatisfaction to the men, and caused them to complain, I think unreasonably and unjustly against the company, because the company, so far as it was concerned, was perfectly willing to pay that number of dollars for the service done, but it was distributed among so many that instead of their getting fifty dollars, say, per month, they would get thirty or forty, perhaps. Very many of the oldest men had their sympathies aroused in favor of men, and wanted them retained even if they could not get full time, and asked us to do that thing in many instances; but it resulted just in that discontent I have mentioned. Now we have changed our policy, and endeavor to give our men nearly as full time as we can, and in that give our oldest men and thoroughly loyal men, of course, the preference.

Q. From your experience and knowledge of the number of railroad men in the country, is there a surplus?

A. There is to-day.

Q. There are men out of employment?

A. Yes; the depression in the iron business, and coal business, and lumber business, and everything else, makes less traffic, and a greatly decreased number of trains. This decrease has made a corresponding decrease in the demand for men. We hope one day that it will change, and we can take on all our people and pay them better wages than now; but we cannot do it until the country becomes more prosperous than now.

Q. Did this number of men out of employment have a tendency to produce restlessness among them, and bring on the trouble?

A. There is no question about that. It was the want of employment that made the labor of the country dissatisfied. I think if we could set men to work making a living for themselves and their families, I think there would be no trouble about it. I think it is the best law that can be made.

Q. It was more that, in your judgment, that caused the trouble than low wages?

A. I think so.

* * * * *

George R. Sowden, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. I live in west Philadelphia, No. 1421 Locust street.

Q. What is your business?

A. I am a practicing lawyer.

Q. Go on and state what knowledge you have of the occurrences at Pittsburgh last July, and the movements of the militia?

A. During last summer I was colonel of the Third regiment of infantry, connected with the First brigade of the First division. I was in the brigade commanded by General Mathews. On the evening of Friday, July 20, I got a dispatch from him, asking me to assemble my regiment, and report for duty as soon as possible at the West Philadelphia depot. I got the dispatch at Bryn Mawr. I got to Philadelphia at nine o'clock, and sent out dispatches to my field officers and staff officers and company commanders, and I assembled part of my regiment there, and at two o'clock of Saturday, July 21, I went on the train to Pittsburgh. We reached there about two o'clock on Saturday. There the troops were ordered out of the train, and we moved up the railroad track. I was on the left of Colonel Benson, and in my rear was the Weccacoe Legion and the Keystone Battery. They were dragging the Gatling guns at that time without horses, but it was found impossible to drag the guns over the railroad ties, and men were detailed from the three regiments to assist in hauling the guns. I sent a detail for that purpose. After we got in to the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street--I do not know in the meantime what had become of the Second brigade--I was facing west on the railroad track seventy-five yards below the crossing on Twenty-eighth street, and the rear of my command was towards the hill.

Q. Facing toward the hill?

A. No; I was facing toward the Allegheny river, forming a straight line. Some little time after I was there, the crowd of rioters formed in front of us, and also on my left flank, and, as I was in a straight line, I withdrew my left flank, so as to connect and form an angle with the balance of the brigade, to keep the rioters from coming in behind us. General Mathews approved of the partial change of front. At that time, there was an enormous crowd of people on the hill back of us, and in front of us, and there was a good deal of noise and confusion. After we had been there some little time, there was some firing of pistol shots; and stones, and brickbats, and clubs, and every thing of that sort were fired at us, and, presently firing began among the troops on my right, and also on the other side. The brigade at one time formed three sides of a hollow square. The firing by the people began, as I saw, from the hill. That was the first I saw. That was, the firing at the troops. After some little firing on their part, the troops began the return fire. My men I didn't permit to fire until on Saturday afternoon, as I had received no orders to fire, and didn't see the immediate occasion for firing. I restrained my men from firing. Then, after this general firing on the right, a great many people on the hill were killed, and some of the rioters in front on twenty-eighth street were also killed. In the mean time, we were all surrounded, where I was, by the rioters.

Q. Did you hear any command given to fire?

A. No; I did not. There was no command to fire. I got no command to fire.

Q. Were there any shots fired by the mob before there was any firing by the militia?

A. Yes; a great many.

Q. Pistol shots?

A. Mostly pistol shots, and, I think, there were two or three gun shots from the side hill fired at us.

Q. What other demonstrations were made by the crowd, before the firing took place on the soldiers?

A. I was some distance from what you call the right of the brigade, on Twenty-eighth street. I had my hands pretty full where I was, and didn't pay much attention to what was going on there. In front of me some rioters showed pistols, and wanted to go through my lines. I refused to let them. They threatened what they would do with me and my men, and also tried to seduce the men from the lines. They were saying we are all workingmen, and you won't fire on workingmen. In this way they endeavored to break up the morals and discipline of the command. I drove them away without using violence, so far as I could, and kept them at a distance of from three or four yards.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What was the general conduct of the whole command?

A. Do you mean of the brigade?

Q. Your men?

A. It was very good. For raw troops, it was excellent. I have seen troops in the field that didn't behave nearly as well as the men in my command. Most of them are boys, and, like young colts, were a little skittish at the first fire; but finding they didn't get killed, they stood to their work very handsomely.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Had any of your command ever seen actual service during the late war?

A. Yes; I have seen service, and some of my officers and some of the men.

Q. What proportion of them?

A. I should say ten per cent. on an average. Perhaps more.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What was the general conduct of the division as a whole?

A. I cannot speak of that because I didn't see the Second brigade, and didn't know where it was; but the general conduct of the troops was excellent.

Q. From the commencement of the trouble?

A. Yes; in my judgment there was as good discipline, and order, and soldierly behavior on the part of the officers and men, as there would be in an army in the field, and much better than I have seen at times, in case of disaster. I was in the field about two years, and served under Generals McClellan, and Burnside, and Hooper, and Mead. I joined the army at Antietam, and served in the Pennsylvania Reserves at Fredericksburg, with the Third division, under General Reynolds, and was at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. In what capacity did you serve in the army?

A. First as orderly sergeant, and I was then made first lieutenant and captain. I was on General Doubleday's staff part of the time. After this general firing had taken place on Saturday afternoon, we were moved down into the round-house. Some reason was given that we were sent to guard the property. We went into the round-house about dusk, and a little later--between seven and eight o'clock--I was following Colonel Benson, and was given that part of the house to guard opposite Liberty street, about seventy-eight feet long, and was instructed to put out sentries along the line and inside the house to guard the windows, with orders to keep the mob outside back from the windows, and observe their operations, and not to fire without orders. There was great confusion and tumult outside, and a great deal of yelling and screaming, and some firing, and we could scarcely show ourselves at the windows until the mob outside began to throw bricks and direct pistol shots at us, but my men, owing to the orders I had given, didn't fire at all. Occasionally I went to see if the sentinels were on duty and obeying orders. About one o'clock I was lying on a board, when I heard a sentinel call for the sergeant of the guard on this line of Twenty-eighth street, and I immediately went over, taking a posse with me, to learn the cause of the alarm, when I found a large crowd around a field piece, apparently loading it, and preparing to fire. I immediately sent my adjutant to notify General Mathews--to notify him of the fact, and request his attendance. While my adjutant was going for General Mathews, he met General Brinton, and brought him, and General Mathews turned up at the same time. We held a council. The piece was ready to be discharged, and was pointed toward where I was told the Second brigade was. Then it was determined to disperse the mob. I cannot say now whether any intimation was given to them at the time to leave or we should fire--I am not positive--but I think there was.

Q. Warning you mean?

A. Yes. I am not positive; but they had a light, and were about ready to fire, when, by General Brinton's or Mathew's orders, I drew some men up inside of the windows, and we opened fire on them. They immediately dispersed, a number being killed and wounded. After an interval they came up again, and we let them come up; but as soon as they came up to the piece, and attempted to fire, we ordered them back, and when they didn't go back, we opened fire. After that time notice was always given. I suggested the propriety of going out for the piece and bringing it in, and volunteered to go with my men and bring it in and spike it; but our commanders thought it was not worth while, as we had it covered. After the crowd had withdrawn from the piece, they got back of board-piles and small houses, and kept firing at us all night. One man fired an explosive bullet. Every now and then it would come in over the heads of the men and strike something large--such as the stack of a locomotive--and immediately explode. A number of them had muskets and rifles. In the meantime some cars out on the right of us had been fired, and a number of these burning cars were sent down towards the buildings where we were, and lodged against some building not filled with troops, and in a little while the flames rushed through the window of the first floor and struck the ceiling of the second floor, and in the course of half an hour or so everything was on fire, and about six o'clock everything was on fire all around us, and cinders were falling as long as my hand--large cinders from this building--and the roof of this outside building was entirely on fire, and it had communicated to the roof of the round-house, so that we were enveloped with a great deal of smoke, and in danger of being enveloped entirely in flames.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How far was this cannon stationed from the position you held?

A. About as far as from here across the street--about eighty feet.

Q. In what direction?

A. It was facing about the direction of the grain elevator--in that direction.

Q. Down the track?

A. Not exactly, but sort of angularly, so as to strike the machine shops. It was on Liberty street.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Below you then?

A. Yes; but right opposite to us. After we were almost smothered in smoke, and these heavy cinders were falling, we fell in for the purpose of marching out--where, of course, I had no means of knowing--it was not proper for me to inquire. In the meantime we took the ammunition out of two or three guns there and dampened them with water so that it could not be used against us. We turned out the first street and went towards the Allegheny river and then we struck for Penn street, I think, and as soon as we struck that street and got opposite those men, who were firing all night, they turned about face and fired into our flanks. The firing began as soon as we got on Penn street, and they kept firing into our flanks all the time until we got to the arsenal.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where did the firing come from?

A. From door-ways, and alley-ways, and second story windows, and doors of houses, and telegraph poles, and from every place where a man could get behind--where he could fire without being in any danger. I saw men standing along the side-walks with large navy revolvers in their coat tails waiting for us to get past a sufficient distance to fire into us.

Q. For what distance was the firing kept up?

A. I can only give an estimate. I should say a mile.

Q. Firing out of houses--was there much of that?

A. A great deal of that? I saw repeated cases where a man's arm would be out of a window firing at us; and generally when we would pass a corner there would be a crowd there apparently peaceable, but when we got past they would immediately fire into us.

Q. How many men were wounded in going out?

A. I don't know. I do not remember the number of men wounded.

Q. Was there any jeering of citizens from the houses as you passed along?

A. A great deal.

Q. And participated in by women?

A. I think I heard several women abusing us and a number of men stating, that we had killed their brothers and sons and so on, and that they would kill us.

Q. When you arrived at the arsenal, did you go into the grounds?

A. No.

Q. You do not know what took place?

A. Not of my own knowledge.

Q. What was the conduct of the troops there under General Brinton, taking them all, during Saturday in the round-house?

A. In my judgment, it was excellent, and, as we marched out of the round-house in the morning, I think the men all kept perfect order. The men were dressed in regular files, and no officer, that I saw, was not in his proper place. There was no confusion among the troops until as we got near the arsenal, when there was a movement made, coming from the right, to close up on a double quick, and that brought the Second brigade in the rear up on us, and that sort of huddled up the First brigade, and made some confusion there.

Q. Where was that?

A. Somewhere in the neighborhood of the arsenal--probably two squares from the arsenal. That confusion lasted two or three minutes, probably, and the Second brigade was just put on the right, and order was immediately restored. At one time there was a little difficulty about drawing the Gatling guns, and I know I assisted myself in pulling a gun some distance with my men.

Q. Was there any demoralization during the night in the round-house?

A. Not a particle--so far as I saw--not a particle.

Q. The discipline was good at the time you were in the round-house?

A. Yes; I had sentinels on front, and they observed their duty perfectly, and my whole command was in excellent condition.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was there any disobedience of orders on the part of the officers or men?

A. No; occasionally there would be a man that didn't have any experience in the field, as there will always be men who will shirk their duty. Once in a while there would be a man indifferent to his duty, but that was simply in isolated cases just as you would see in the army. I saw it in the army of the Potomac. As a whole the discipline of the troops in the round-house was excellent.

Q. You state you thought there was some musket firing or rifle firing from the mob at Twenty-eighth street.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any musket firing?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any muskets or rifles in the hands of the mob?

A. I cannot say that I saw--yes I did. I saw it on Saturday morning after leaving the round-house, as we were going up the street. I saw these men firing into us all night. I saw them have muskets. On Saturday afternoon I saw firing that must have come from muskets. I know the difference, and I judged from the sound and the smoke. The firing couldn't have been done with pistols.

Q. Were any of the military struck by pistol or rifle shots before they commenced firing on the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear any command given to fire?

A. On Saturday afternoon?

Q. After this firing from the mob--following the stones thrown at the military.

A. No; I cannot say that I did. I am positive I did not; therefore I didn't fire nor order my men to fire.

Q. Did you hear a command from any officer to cease firing?

A. I do not remember any command to cease firing.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did you see General Pearson at that time?

A. I saw him once that afternoon. That is the time we were going up from the Union depot to the Twenty-eighth street crossing; at least I saw a major general I took to be General Pearson.

Q. Did you hear any general give a command in this way: "Order your men to fire?"

A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. How was General Pearson dressed?

A. If this was General Pearson, he had a military coat on with shoulder straps, and no sword.

Q. A cap?

A. I think he had a cap on.

Q. You saw no belt?

A. I think he had no sword nor belt.

Q. After you left the round-house and were marching along Penn avenue, did you see any police officers fire at you?

A. No; I didn't see any firing. I saw them in front of a police-station, and I saw them with pistols; but I know a man that did see them fire.

Q. Did they make any hostile demonstration?

A. Yes--no; I cannot say that I saw any hostile demonstrations, except in their manner. They looked at us with a forbidding sort of manner.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did they have pistols in their hands?

A. Yes.

* * * * *

E. Wallace Mathews, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. In Philadelphia--No. 4105 Walnut street.

Q. What is your connection with the National Guard--what is your rank?

A. At present I am not in the National Guard. During the July riots I occupied the position of brigadier general, and was in command of the First brigade, First division.

Q. State whether you were at Twenty-eighth street on Saturday, the 21st, when the collision occurred between the troops and the mob?

A. I was in the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street, near the railway crossing, in command of my brigade.

Q. State what occurred prior to the firing?

A. The troops had been marching in column of fours, preceded by a gentleman in citizen's dress, who was pointed out to me as the sheriff of the county, and directly in advance of us was General Brinton and an officer dressed in fatigue uniform--a major general--who was pointed out to me as General Pearson. We marched toward Twenty-eighth street, in which was a dense crowd. The crowd was pressing upon both flanks, and was very dense in front, on Twenty-eighth street, at the crossing.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You marched with the right in front?

A. Yes. The order of the troops was as follows: The First regiment, under command of Colonel Benson; next the Third regiment, commanded by Colonel Snowden; third an independent company, the Weccacoe Legion; then followed the Gatling guns, with a detachment from some of the different commands to haul them, including one of my independent companies, the Washington Grays. We marched in this order, and we marched into the crowd until we couldn't march any further on account of the pressure ahead of us. Then, by direction or command of General Brinton, when the crowd in the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street became so dense that we could not penetrate it, the fours were wheeled into line, facing our left flank, that is, facing the Allegheny river. Then, by order of General Brinton, the brigade was marched directly to the front, and across the tracks slowly, the men with their pieces at a carry, thus backing the crowd off from the tracks, the purpose being, as I was informed, to clear the tracks. The crowd was pushed gently back, until they were pushed entirely off the tracks that were free from cars; but there were several open cars in the vicinity, and we saw that in attempting to clear the tracks we had already cleared, perhaps, four tracks. Then, by direction of General Brinton, the front rank was left in this place, and the rear rank was brought to about face, and marched to the rear, thus clearing the few men gathered in the rear.

Q. How far did you march to the rear?

A. About twenty feet.

Q. Across the tracks?

A. Yes--twenty or thirty feet--facing the hill so that the front two ranks were facing outward, opposite each other. Their backs were towards the center. The crowd on our right, that is on Twenty-eighth street, were very demonstrative and noisy, and began to press in between the open ranks. By General Brinton's orders, the Washington Grays were brought forward to drive out the crowd between the two ranks. They proved to be insufficient. They were only nine men beside the officer, and the Weccacoe Legion was brought forward to assist them, and General Brinton actively superintended the effort to drive the crowd out. That is where the first mélée occurred in driving out the men who had intruded between the two ranks. As the general took direct command, I didn't interfere. During that trouble some of the crowd, I believe, were hurt by bayonet thrusts, and then commenced pistol firing, and then almost simultaneously from every direction came pieces of coal and stones and all sorts of missiles, in a great measure from the hill and also from the cars--I think some were loaded with coal--and from Twenty-eighth street, mingled with pistol shots and shouting, so that it was a scene of confusion I never saw equaled. We were without orders, and I saw nothing of General Pearson there at that time. General Brinton I saw occasionally moving about in different places. I watched the crowd, because I saw they were very much incensed, fearing for my men. I saw them in several instances seize the muskets of the men, and I knew that many of them were young men, and I feared if such a movement as that became general, they would disarm my men. Consequently, I watched very closely the temper of the crowd, until I became convinced we couldn't temporize any longer, and I gave the command to load.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. How long before the firing did you give the command to load?

A. Not more than one minute, I should judge; and there had been pistol firing.

Q. From the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Before you ordered your men to load?

A. Yes. Then, before I could take decided action in the matter, the firing commenced somewhere on the right, as near as I could judge, in the ranks of the Weccacoe Legion, or the artillery corps, Washington Grays. I heard no order to fire, and I gave no order to fire. The firing commenced first, a single piece, and then one or two near together, and then it became general on the right of the First regiment, and ran down as far as the center of the regiment, and as far as the close. Immediately all the officers, from all I saw--I remember Colonel Benson and his lieutenant--Colonel Clark--together with the staff officers and myself, attempted to stop the firing. We rushed among the troops in order not only to make ourselves seen, but felt and heard, and gave orders to cease firing. The crowd scattered entirely as soon as the firing commenced. We then moved immediately to the right, covering Twenty-eighth street, and took possession of that, in other words, brought up the Gatling guns, by order of General Brinton, and placed them on the street. One to command twenty-eighth street, and the other to command the tracks eastward. Then a company of the First regiment were brought--as the crowd attempted to cross on to Twenty-eighth street--were brought entirely across that street in the rear, and stretched across the street, in that direction, to keep the people back. Gradually the crowd began to get together in knots, and assemble in our front, and some of the more violent among them, who seemed to be under the influence of liquor or partially intoxicated--some of them came up to within three or four feet, and shook their fists in our faces, and called us vile epithets, in order to break our lines. I saw no disposition on the part of the troops, not even the privates, to hurt anybody, except in self defense. In some cases they allowed the rioters to push through their lines, and get inside. In this way the crowd gathered in little knots, and came nearer, and got more and more bold, until I gave directions for one or two companies commanding Twenty-eighth street to bring their pieces to a ready, when the crowd immediately dispersed, showing that they still feared any application of lead. We then held this position until about dusk, when, by direction of General Brinton, I brought the brigade, marching left in front, into the round-house. There was no explanation given me at the time, so far as I remember, why we were taken into the round-house; but it being night, I presumed we were to be quartered there.

Q. By whose command?

A. I received my commands from General Brinton. We marched into the round-house, and around the circle, nearly covering the entire circle, the Third regiment, under Colonel Snowden, being stationed, as they had followed in line, opposite the Liberty street windows of the round-house. General Brinton and some of his staff and myself, with some of my staff, then went around the building, looked at the windows, and determined to put on a strong guard, and I gave the orders accordingly. The detail was made, and the guard was stationed at those windows, and I then attempted to get a little rest, but, after a few hours, about ten o'clock, some firing commenced, and, after the firing once commenced, there was no such thing as rest. I spent almost the whole night in the round-house proper. Where I attempted to rest was in the building that had been occupied as the telegraph office at the outer depot.

Q. In the round-house?

A. Immediately adjoining--three or four feet from the round-house. We had to increase the guard after the firing commenced. Had to put men at each window on the Liberty street side, and on the side of the yard on that side of the building towards Twenty-eighth street. I think we increased the guard, perhaps, twice during the night. At one time during the night, about one o'clock, I received information that a piece of artillery was in Liberty street, and I immediately hastened to the window, and saw a brass piece, which I judged to be a Napoleon gun.

Q. What time was that?

A. About one o'clock on Sunday morning. Several men were standing about it, and General Brinton was there, and Colonel Snowden. I asked if I should send out a detachment to capture the gun, and bring it in, but he didn't give me direct permission, but gave me some encouragement, and I went immediately to Colonel Benson to consult him about it, and asked for a detail----

Q. Who was Colonel Benson?

A. The commander of the First regiment. While consulting him about this matter, the Third regiment opened fire, as I understood, by direction of General Brinton, on the crowd surrounding the piece, and from that time on there was more or less firing. As the mob would come forward and make a demonstration as if they were going to fire the piece, the men at the windows would fire on them, but, after a time, they restrained firing, and ordered them to go back; and that became a by-word through the division, "Go back, go back, one, two, three," and then discharge.

Q. Was there any firing at that time from the mob outside on the troops?

A. Yes; pistol firing and gun firing--from some sort of guns. From that time until morning there was a good deal of firing. There was one party that was firing an explosive bullet, which would come through the windows and strike and explode.

Q. Explode after they came into the round-house?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean explosive shells, fired from a rifle?

A. Yes; small things. One struck on a column not more than four feet from where I was. I happened to be looking in that direction, and I saw it. First there was a sharp crack, and then I saw the smoke and some white ashes drop down from that spot. From that I knew very well that it was an explosive bullet. Further on towards morning, some burning cars were run in between our troops and the cannon, and from that time on we had very little firing there. Then some cars were stopped on the next building from the round-house, towards Twenty-eighth street, and that building took fire. General Brinton had organized a fire brigade, and had the fires put out. I didn't witness it myself, but understood it. He had put out those burning cars, so the round-house was not set on fire by the burning cars; but the machine-shop next took fire, and we could not find any means to put that out. The burning of that decided our case, for the round-house was connected with that by buildings filled with light kindling wood used by locomotives for firing up, and the burning of that building also sent columns of smoke down into our open round-house and cinders, and after a time the building itself took fire. I was then called after day light into a council, by General Brinton, who stated that he had received orders from General Latta, in case of moving out to go out eastward to Penn avenue--I understood it. There was a young man there from the Jefferson Cavalry, and he told where Penn avenue was--and for that matter, I knew myself--and when it was decided, the general gave me orders to take my brigade out first. I formed with Colonel Benson, of the First regiment, and Colonel Snowden, of the Third, and the Weccacoe Legion, and the Washington Grays, with the Gatling guns, and we issued out upon Liberty street.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. The round-house was on fire?

A. I think the building itself was on fire. At any rate it was only a question of a few minutes. After those other buildings were fired it could not have been saved.

Q. Would it have been possible for your troops to have remained there?

A. It would not have been possible--not many minutes more.

Q. Was the round-house filled with smoke?

A. The whole building was so filled with smoke--the smoke was so dense that it was difficult to see.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Before you left?

A. Yes.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. After coming out and manoeuvering in the street, your troops were steady and kept in good order?

A. I was at the head of the line, where I thought my services were most required--at the very head of the line, in advance of the First regiment, nothing being ahead of me, excepting a small skirmish line of a dozen men stretched across to clear the street, and on looking back I never saw a regiment march in better condition, even in the streets of Philadelphia, or march in parade in better order. They had their arms at right shoulder, and were in perfect order. After we had been besieged there and harassed all night, it nerved me, when I looked back at that sight, when I saw those men come out in such gallant style, after being harassed all night, and unaccustomed as they were to fighting. We went down Twenty-fifth street to Penn avenue, and out Penn avenue to the arsenal. From my position at the head of the line, I didn't see any firing in the street. As we went along, people on either side were looking at us, and I was quite anxious about this little skirmish line, and was keeping my eye on them to see that they didn't get nervous, and on that account may not have seen as much as the others. I didn't see any firing from our flanks or in any direction, until we arrived at the arsenal. We halted there, and I saw the guard let General Brinton in, and I think one or two pressed in with them; but after a time they came back again. During that time there was some firing in the rear. We heard them hallooing there, and I distinctly heard firing in the rear, which increased, and then I noticed that the troops in our rear had become somewhat confused, and did not keep their alignment, and some of them came up into my brigade. My brigade then took the left, and Colonel Benson put his regiment in the rear, putting his command on the two sides of the street, so that they could command the windows. Those on the right side of the street commanding the windows opposite, and vice versa.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you march in that form?

A. Yes; and after that we were not disturbed. We marched to the Sharpsburg bridge, and crossed it, and in Sharpsburg we received a few pieces of bread, and passed on over the hill.

Q. From whom?

A. From citizens, I think.

Q. Of Sharpsburg?

A. I think so.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Were your troops exhausted by want of food?

A. Very much. I didn't get even a piece of bread, but I saw some that had that. I received nothing personally until we passed a mile and a half, perhaps, beyond Sharpsburg, and there I obtained a little buttermilk.

Q. Just state in this connection what rations the troops had received from the time they left Philadelphia to the time that you reached Sharpsburg?

A. After leaving Philadelphia, received nothing until we got to Altoona. There the men were served with sandwiches and coffee--one or two sandwiches and a cup of coffee to each man. These provisions were handed in to the men. Then on arriving at Pittsburgh they were served with similar things--sandwiches and coffee.

Q. During the night of Saturday you had nothing?

A. We had nothing after marching to Twenty-eighth street.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. At what time did you get the last rations?

A. About three o'clock on Saturday afternoon.

Q. And you did not get anything after that until you reached Sharpsburg?

A. Nothing at all--excepting once in a while a soldier had put into his haversack an extra piece of bread.

Q. And this was three o'clock on Saturday afternoon, until that time on Sunday?

A. Nine o'clock, Sunday morning; and there was no serving of rations in Sharpsburg.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. It was every fellow for himself?

A. Yes: each one foraging for himself. Rations were not served until that night. So far as I saw, everything was paid for that was received. I know that I paid for the buttermilk I received.

Q. Did you know or hear of any order being given to General Brinton by Colonel Norris to move to Torrens station?

A. I heard of no such order.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Or from any one else?

A. No; I asked General Brinton frequently what his orders were, and so far as I know, he told me the orders he had. I heard of no such orders.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. If these orders had been given, do you think that General Brinton would have obeyed them and communicated the fact to you? You consulted together?

A. We did. I think he would have told me certainly if he had such orders. There was hardly any occasion to consult after we left the city.

Q. But during Saturday night?

A. I frequently saw him, and had he received such orders I would have heard of them.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you consult with him during the march from the round-house to Sharpsburg?

A. During the march, until my brigade was put on the left, I frequently saw General Brinton.

Q. Did you see Colonel Norris?

A. I didn't see him--to know him.

Q. Do you know him?

A. No; I saw a barouche later in the day in the vicinity of the arsenal, and I heard it stated that Colonel Norris was in the barouche.

Q. You stated that some cars were run between you and this gun?

A. Yes.

Q. What became of the gun after that?

A. I saw it from the windows--from the higher windows--I went up once for that purpose to look after that gun--and I found that provision had been made by General Brinton in regard to it. I think he had stationed some men of the Second brigade in the upper windows of the office of the building near the round-house, and towards which that gun was pointed.

Q. To pick off the gunners?

A. I understood that.

Q. Did you see any one with a lanyard in his hand fire that gun at any time?

A. I didn't. It would have been too dark up to daylight to see a lanyard.

Q. Did you see a light with the gun?

A. I didn't. I was with Colonel Benson consulting, at that time.

Q. Do you know it was a Napoleon?

A. No; I judged it was. I could see the gun distinctly, yet Colonel Benson could not see it at all. I would like to corroborate the testimony of Colonel Snowden in regard to the discipline of our troops in the round-house--of both brigades, so far as I saw them.

Q. In short, was the conduct of your troops commendable?

A. Perfectly so.

Q. Of officers and men?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had experience in the army?

A. Yes. I entered the army early in 1861, in the infantry--the three months' service--and at the end of that time I raised a battery, and served as captain of that battery for a year and a half. I was then on detached duty for awhile, and then, in the spring of 1863, I rejoined the army of the Potomac as major of the First artillery--the same regiment my battery was connected with--and served on General Doubleday's staff, and was in active command of three batteries in the field, and was with my command in the beginning of Chancellorsville, and later on in the battle I served as chief of corps, and after that battle had command of eight batteries in the artillery reserve of the army of the Potomac.

Q. With the rank of major?

A. Yes.

Q. Of artillery?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know of any communications sent by General Brinton to General Latta while in the round-house?

A. I heard him say repeatedly that he had sent messages and received messages from General Latta.

Q. Did you see the communications from either one?

A. I saw one, but didn't read it.

Q. Do you know the nature of those communications?

A. Nothing except as I have stated that in case of leaving--this was near morning, I think--in case of leaving, to march out Penn avenue--whether it stated march east, or go by way of Penn avenue, it was something about Penn avenue. I knew where that was.

Q. From your experience as a military man, do you consider that it was a prudent move to go into the round-house with the troops at that time?

A. It is very easy to see mistakes after they are made. I can say, however, on general principles, it seemed to me at the time, as it has seemed since, that the first thing to be done was to disperse the mob. Until that was done, there was no safety in going into the round-house. That the troops needed rest, there can be no question. Standing in the sun, many of them had fallen from sheer exhaustion and the heat of the sun. Several of the men were lying about there, and they were applying water to them, if they could get it. There was complaint from all quarters that the men were exhausted, and some seemed to be sunstruck. In that condition, they needed rest, and their commanding officers wanted to give them rest, but it was evident that the mob must be dispersed before there could be much rest for them.

Q. Was not the mob already dispersed?

A. It was on the crossing, but they were continually gathering.

Q. They were re-assembling?

A. Yes; and some were very demonstrative and very violent.

Q. Did you see General Pearson in the round-house, after you retired there?

A. Yes; he was in the telegraph office, which was immediately adjoining the round-house. A building some four or five feet from the round-house. I think they called it the dispatcher's office. It was the office where the wires centered. It was a square building, directly opposite Twenty-sixth street. I saw General Pearson sitting at a desk writing, when I entered.

Q. In this telegraph office, adjoining the round-house?

A. Yes.

Q. How was he dressed?

A. There was not much light and I could not tell, except that he was dressed in the fatigue uniform of a major general. He had straps on his shoulders, with two stars.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did he have a blouse on?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Did he have a cap on?

A. I don't know. He may not have had any anything on his head in the house. When I saw the officer pointed out as General Pearson, on the tracks, I cannot tell whether he had a cap on or not, but it was something not unmilitary.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. But do not remember whether it was a hat or cap?

A. No. But if he had a silk hat on, with a soldier uniform, I should have noticed it.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you know of any telegrams passing between General Brinton and Colonel Scott in regard to General Brinton clearing those tracks?

A. I do not know of any communications whatever, between them; but I am very confident, I am positive, I heard General Brinton say--we said to each other during the afternoon, we have possession of those tracks, and why don't they send out their trains.

Q. Then, in your opinion, they could have sent out trains, so far as you had possession of the tracks?

A. So far as the tracks were cleared up to the point where we were. But we understood the reason to be that the men would not serve.

Q. That they refused to run?

A. That was the excuse we heard; but there was no time during the afternoon, after the first firing, when the crowd were cleared from our immediate neighborhood, and no time, only during the night, that I did not feel as a military officer, that we had command of the position, and were competent to deal with the crowd. The only thing was, that we were lacking rest, and were greatly reduced in strength from hunger.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did you hear General Pearson give such an order as follows, to the officers: "Order your men to fire," before the firing took place?

A. I did not--nothing of the kind. I heard nothing in relation to firing, except the first fire.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You suppose that the troops fired in self-defense?

A. I supposed at that time, and I don't know that I have any reason to change my impression, that it was an actual shot--the first shot--and there was so much confusion at the time that it would have been very natural for others to suppose the order was given.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You stated that you saw pistol shots fired from the crowd?

A. It would be more correct to say that I heard them.

Q. Did you see stones and missiles thrown?

A. I did.

Q. Did you consider that an assault on your troops?

A. I did.

Q. Did you not then consider the order to fire justifiable?

A. I did.

* * * * *

Robert A. Ammon re-called:

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. What day and what time of the day was it you got word that the Governor was coming to Pittsburgh?

A. I think it was on the 24th. I think it was early in the morning, but won't be positive about that. That is my recollection.

Q. Where did you learn he was at the time?

A. He had left Chicago.

Q. What time did you expect him?

A. I cannot state, as the rioters at that point were not aware when he had left Chicago. I telegraphed along to the different trains, and found he was coming on No. 4.

Q. Did you have any communication with him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do when you learned he had come in?

A. I knew some men were lying along on the road, and more especially in Ohio, and I had heard the talk indulged in by the men. Some were in favor of stopping the train, and putting the Governor off. So I telegraphed to the men not to do anything to get the Governor down on us. I asked them to do that to please me, and they telegraphed back that they would.

Q. Did you telegraph them to more than one point?

A. No.

Q. To what point?

A. Latonia, Ohio. I then telegraphed to the Governor, extending a welcome back to the State, and guaranteeing him a safe passage. I won't be positive whether he got my message at Latonia or Salem.

Q. Did the Governor communicate with you?

A. No; but the conductor answered "O.K."

Q. Did you telegraph more than once to the Governor?

A. I believe not.

Q. Where were you when the train arrived?

A. At the outer depot, Allegheny city.

Q. Did you see him immediately on his arrival?

A. Yes; in a Pullman car.

Q. You went in and saw him?

A. Yes; I talked with him about five minutes, I suppose.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What was the nature of the conversation?

A. I went into the car, and as I went in the Governor got up and extended his hand, and I sat down alongside of him. He asked what do you men propose to do. I told him what we had done--that we will behave ourselves. He said that he was glad of it, that he wanted the peace of the State preserved, and that he was glad to see us disposed to save property. He wanted to know if he could do anything for me, and I said nothing, but I would be glad if he would come out on the rear platform, and say something to the boys. He did so, and made a little speech.

Q. How did you introduce him?

A. I just said "boys, this is Governor Hartranft." I pulled the bell cord, and we went up as far as the round-house, and had the train stopped there, and Mr. Perkins, the master mechanic, jumped aboard, and I spoke to him for a while.

By Mr. Means:

Q. How did the boys take the remarks of the Governor?

A. They gave a cheer. I went on to Federal street with him, and a delegation from Pittsburgh met him with carriages, and took him across the river.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you go across the river?

A. Yes.

Q. With the Governor?

A. No; in the crowd that went over. Before I left, I had his car switched over on the West Penn road.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. What is your age?

A. Twenty-five years.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Were you at Torrens station on Thursday?

A. No.

Q. On Friday?

A. I came by there on Thursday night or Friday morning.

Q. Were you there when the sheriff came out?

A. I was not.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. At what time were you arrested?

A. I was arrested on the 30th of July, about three and a half o'clock in afternoon.

Q. Was there any preliminary affidavit made?

A. I was arrested on a bench warrant, issued by Judge Ewing.

Q. Who made the information?

A. Chauncey McCoy.

Q. Of what road?

A. Of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago.

Q. Have they ever taken any steps to bring on your trial?

A. No. I have asked for my trial repeatedly, but have never got it.

Q. Have you asked for your discharge?

A. No; because I don't want a discharge.

Q. Have you demanded a trial?

A. My attorney has asked for my trial. That is what I wish.

Q. Are you under bail now?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you go to Pittsburgh and renew your bail every time?

A. When my bail expires my bond is sent to New York, and I take it to a notary public and sign it, and he puts his seal to it, and I send it back to Pittsburgh.

Q. What is the amount of it?

A. Fifteen hundred dollars.

Q. What are the charges made against you?

A. Misdemeanor, under your own railroad act of March, 1877.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I wish you would state once more just what is the object of the Trainmen's Union?

A. It was to resist this reduction of ten per cent., and to see if we couldn't bring the company to terms, and get them to look into our condition, so that anything of the kind should not occur again. We thought our labor skilled labor, and we were running great risks, and we thought we ought to earn more money, that instead of reducing it they ought to increase it. The object was to get up a union so strong that the railroad magnates would have to listen to us.

Q. Did you intend to strike?

A. We did, if they did not accede to our demands.

Q. What is a strike?

A. It is a body of men acting together for the purpose of quitting work in a body--to strike, and leave the work alone--as we understood it in the Trainmen's Union. We understood it that every man should leave his work at a given day and hour, and go to his home.

Q. Go to your homes?

A. Yes.

Q. You claimed no right then to interfere with those who desired to work?

A. No; but we claimed the right to use moral suasion. We didn't think we had any right to use any violence at all.

Q. Did you claim any right to interfere with railroad property?

A. No; it didn't belong to us.

Q. Prior to the organization of the Trainmen's Union, did you have any conversation with the officers of the railroad company in relation to this reduction of wages?

A. No; because we didn't think it would be advisable.

Q. Why not?

A. We thought it better to go ahead, and when we were in shape, if they refused we were ready to act.

Q. On the 27th day of June, you sent out forty men to notify all the lodges to get ready for a strike?

A. On Sunday, the 24th of June. Unless our demands were acceded to.

Q. Had you notified the railroad companies of your demand that the ten per cent. should be restored before that?

A. We drew up these resolutions--that is what Mr. Cassatt spoke about--and submitted them by a committee of five to the officials in Pittsburgh--to the local authorities there. They said they did not concern them, and they didn't want anything to do with them.

Q. When was that done?

A. I think on the 25th.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. You mean the railroad authorities?

A. Yes. We then asked for passes to come to Philadelphia to see Tom Scott. They wouldn't give us passes, and the boys didn't think they had enough money, with the ten per cent. reduction, to come to Philadelphia. They thought they could quell us by discharging some of the ringleaders, and they discharged a couple hundred of the boys, and this committee were all discharged, and they got around among the men, and said that they did not want them to have anything to do with those men, and they closed the telegraph wires against us, and everything of that kind. So, on the morning of the 27th day of June, we sent a request for them to meet us in the hall.

Q. To whom did you send it?

A. To the local authorities--Lang, Barrett, Scott, Pitcairn. They didn't come. We found we could not get hold of the telegraph wires to work them. On the night of the 26th, on the last train that night they sent out men on the train--thoroughly loyal men, as they called them--men that belonged to the Union, and we thought all right. They carried the news west and east that there would be no strike in Pittsburgh, and we knew nothing of that, but found it out afterwards. On Wednesday, June 27, one of our men jumped over the traces, and brought the word he was going out, and he told us what instructions his conductor had received in regard to the strike. Mr. Barrett, the superintendent of the Pan Handle road, had told him with the other trains he had sent word that night to the men that there would be no strike in Pittsburgh on the 27th. They told all the men to stay at work, that the thing would be arranged later; but it never was arranged. All were under the impression that the bubble would burst sooner or later. When the railroad officials say they had no notice of it, and did not know anything about the strike, why we tried everything in the world to let them know.

Q. In what way?

A. Why they discharged three or four hundred of us, and they certainly discharged us for cause. I received a letter myself from Mr. Thaw stating that I had lost the situation on account of being a member of the Trainmen's Union. I was discharged somewhere near Sunday the 24th of June.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Were you discharged before you organized Trainmen's Union lodges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in Virginia?

A. I traveled all over the Baltimore and Ohio, and I came back to Pittsburgh--part of the way over the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern and the Cleveland and Pittsburgh. Mr. Thomas had been watching for me, and he stopped me. I had not been paying railroad fares, so I came into Pittsburgh on a freight train.

Q. Were you still an employé?

A. Yes; at that time.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Who was running in your place?

A. An extra man. I got back and reported for duty. I went west and thought I would lay off at Alliance and go out to Chicago, but while at the breakfast table, notice came that the superintendent of the road wanted to see me at his office, and I went over there and had a talk with him, and the consequence was that I was discharged.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. And he gave you that letter you spoke of at that time?

A. Yes; or a few days afterwards, I don't remember which. I don't remember whether it was at that time or a few days afterwards.

Q. Did you ask for the letter?

A. No; but a pass to Chicago. It is customary, when they discharge a man, to give him a pass to where he wants to go.

Q. How did he come to give you that letter?

A. I don't know. I guess he thought he could use me.

Q. Did you ask him for it?

A. No. I guess he thought he was doing me a favor, and that I would return him the favor, if he gave me the letter.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Have you a family?

A. Yes; a wife and two children.

Q. How long have you been married?

A. Four years the 13th day of last September.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Why did you select Pittsburgh for the strike?

A. The 19th of July?

Q. Yes?

A. I don't know. The strike did not originate there. It was not our idea at all. Our idea was to have it all over on the 27th day of June--all over the country--to just stop the traffic all over the country. We thought the public would look at it as we did, unless they could get enough pumpkin rollers and snake hunters to run their roads.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Was that the day the strike took place at Martinsburg?

A. No; It took place there on the 16th of July.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. In making arrangements for this strike, did you talk about Pittsburgh being a suitable place, or a better place, for a strike, on account of the sympathy of the local authorities?

A. No.

By Mr. Means:

Q. How long were you railroading?

A. Between nine and eleven months--about nine months altogether.

Q. Didn't you think you were managing that western road pretty successfully, with the experience you had?

A. I didn't claim credit for it. If I had not had the men I had, I could not have done it.

Q. But were you not the man who run it? You laid out your plans the same as a military officer, and your men carried them out?

A. After Mr. Lang put the road in my possession, I tried to do the best I could for it--for the stockholders.

Q. Did you have the interests of the stockholders at heart? Did you take into consideration their interests more than the interests of the employés of the road--the men you represented?

A. I thought the stockholders were in about the same pew with us. I thought they were about swamped, and that we were.

Q. But I mean the question?

A. I was looking at the stockholders interests when I turned over all the money, and I wanted the boys to get back their ten per cent. I don't know that I made any distinction between them.

Q. But answer my question?

A. I think my sympathies did lean a little towards the boys, because I was one of them myself.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you act as general superintendent of the Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad, while you were in charge of it?

A. I was supposed to be.

Q. Who acted as dispatcher?

A. A particular friend of mine. I saw that all trains went off, and came in.

Q. Had you a dispatcher acting in that capacity?

A. I had three telegraph operators, but I acted in the capacity of dispatcher myself. I gave the orders.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. While running that railroad as general manager, what would you have done if your men had struck?

A. I would have increased their wages.

Adjourned to Monday morning, at ten o'clock.

PHILADELPHIA, Monday, March 25, 1878.

Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at ten o'clock, A.M., this day, in the St. Cloud hotel, and continued the taking of testimony.

* * * * *

R. Dale Benson, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where is your residence?

A. No. 260 South Fifteenth street.

Q. Were you a member of the National Guards in July last?

A. I was colonel of the First regiment of infantry.

Q. And you accompanied General Brinton's division to Pittsburgh?

A. Yes; I left with them from Philadelphia.

Q. Did you go with them to Twenty-eighth street, on Saturday?

A. Yes; my position was the right of the First brigade--the right of the division. I have heard General Mathews' and Colonel Snowden's testimony in regard to the details, and my testimony is pretty much the same.

Q. Their testimony in that respect was correct?

A. Yes; the only difference I would notice is in regard to what they testify in regard to my right. My right was impeded by a crowd of citizens at Twenty-eighth street. The column was halted on account of moving the Gatling guns, and I went ahead and told the crowd to leave my front, and some citizen came back to me agitated and excited, and said it was the sheriff's posse. I told him that it didn't make any difference what it was, that they must leave my front. He asked me whether my men would do their duty, and I told him it was not his business, and I ordered them to disperse. Two or three others came back and said they were ordered to march there, and I declined to allow them to march in my front. General Mathews was in the rear, attending to the Gatling guns, and I turned the party over to him, who turned out to be the sheriff of Allegheny county. General Mathews afterwards came and said they were instructed to march there, and so they were permitted.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Was it the sheriff himself that you stopped?

A. I was so informed afterwards.

Q. You knew it was the sheriff afterwards?

A. Yes; I didn't know him, and don't now. I never met him after that.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether there was any order given to fire at Twenty-eighth street?

A. I never received any order, and gave no order to fire, nor do I believe any order was given to fire. The firing at Twenty-eighth street commended by the men in the rear rank of the Weccacoe Legion. The company had been brought to a charge bayonets when the crowd seized this man's musket. I saw them take hold of it. He drew back and fired. The firing extended then towards the right--towards the Washington Grays.

Q. Did he draw his musket away?

A. He stepped back about a pace, and fired.

Q. Did he fire at the man?

A. I cannot tell, but he fired into the crowd. The firing then extended to the right. My regiment was crowded into--the crowd overlapping my right, which I suppose was the cause of the troops being ordered from my right to push the crowd back. The firing was desultory file firing, and I think that the responsibility for it rests with the authorities who put the troops into that perilous position.

Q. Had there been firing by the crowd before that?

A. Yes; there had been shots from the hill, and stone firing and firing also took place from Twenty-eighth street and from under the cars on my front.

Q. What time did this occur--this firing?

A. I should judge about three and a half or four o'clock. I didn't refer to my watch. Its only a calculation of mine--a guess at it.

Q. Did that disperse the crowd?

A. Entirely--from our immediate front and from the hill.

Q. Where did you remain after the firing?

A. In the same position.

Q. Until what time?

A. Until towards seven o'clock--six and a half or seven o'clock--I didn't refer to my watch during the afternoon.

Q. Then you retired into the round-house?

A. Yes.

Q. State what the condition of the round-house was when you left it in the morning?

A. I considered it wholly untenable. During the morning, General Brinton came to me, and we were talking over some matter, and I called his attention to the fact that we would have to leave the building very soon. From the windows we could see that the machine shops adjoining were on fire. At the time the fire was very close, and cars were burning on Liberty street. I told him that the building could not be saved, and some hour or two after that the building was entirely on fire adjoining us, and the smoke was so dense we could not breathe. Shortly after that we were moved out.

Q. Did the troops move out in good order?

A. In perfect order.

Q. In what direction did you retire?

A. Out Twenty-fifth street to Penn avenue, and down Penn avenue.

Q. Did your troops keep good order during the entire retreat out Penn avenue?

A. Pretty much so, until we got to the arsenal. There was some confusion there.

Q. What caused it?

A. I judge--I was on the extreme right--I suppose it was the firing in the rear. My position on the extreme right prevented me from seeing what took place; but I have no question that the troops were fired into, though I could not see it myself.

Q. Did you see any firing along the route from the round-house?

A. I didn't, though I heard shots.

Q. You heard shots?

A. Yes.

Q. State what the conduct of the men was in the round-house during the night?

A. My observation was almost entirely confined to my own corps. I never left my regiment, except to visit the detachments on duty, and so far as my regiment was concerned they were entirely under my control. The troops in the other buildings I didn't see.

Q. Was there any demoralization discoverable?

A. None that I saw. I never saw men more patient or under better discipline.

Q. How long did you halt at the arsenal?

A. I judge a very few moments. Probably five minutes.

Q. Did you know or see where General Brinton went?

A. I didn't.

Q. Did any of your men leave you at the arsenal?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. I think five or six--an officer and five or six men.

Q. Where did they join you?

A. Some at Blairsville Intersection and some at Pittsburgh.

Q. How long afterwards?

A. Two or three men joined us in two or three days, and the officer in six or seven days. One of the men never reported at all. He was court-martialed--and the officer, too--all the men that left.

Q. A regimental court-martial?

A. No; it was ordered by brigade head-quarters.

Q. Was the officer discharged from the service?

A. He was not discharged.

Q. What was done by the court-martial?

A. The verdict was absent without leave, without criminal intent.

Q. That was the officer?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his rank?

A. Major and surgeon.

Q. If you know the reasons that induced that verdict you may state them?

A. My opinion is pretty much hearsay. I was not a member of the court. The proceedings were reviewed by General Brinton, and he can give you better the facts that led to the verdict. His order didn't approve of the action of the court.

Q. It didn't?

A. No.

Q. Were the men discharged?

A. The result of the court-martial has not been promulgated as yet.

Q. Had you any men that refused to report for duty when you first got the call to proceed to Pittsburgh?

A. I don't think there was any instance of that kind. My regiment had on duty four hundred and sixty-four men out of a roll of about five hundred and sixty, and some of these men who were absent had made efforts to report, but were unable on account of lack of transportation, or on account of being sent back after they started.

Q. Did any of your men who were not able to join you the night you left undertake to come to you at Pittsburgh afterwards?

A. Quite a number. One detachment reach Altoona and went back.

Q. Which regiment?

A. I refer to the detachment of my own regiment.

Q. Do you know why they went back?

A. My information is--I demanded a statement from the lieutenant--that General Beaver allowed the troops to do as they pleased at Altoona--to remain or to return.

Q. Was that detachment the one that marched on foot part of the way, and was escorted over the bridge at Harrisburg?

A. No.

Q. Did they get back to Philadelphia?

A. Yes; they made a march and detour near Harrisburg, but they got to Philadelphia. They were on the same train with the First City Troops.

Q. Was there any court-martial of those troops?

A. No; they reported to the regiment afterwards.

Q. What was done about them?

A. The case was scrutinized by me. It didn't go up any higher than myself, because I thought that the officer was justified under the circumstances. He merely followed the direction that most of the other troops took.

Q. Could he have gone on to Pittsburgh at that time?

A. I judge not--for want of transportation.

Q. How many days was it before the road was opened so that the detachment could have gone to Pittsburgh?

A. I cannot give the exact day. I think the road was opened about the 27th or 28th.

Q. What day was it they returned from Altoona?

A. They reported at Blairsville intersection--that detachment with others.

Q. When did they report to you at Blairsville?

A. I judge it was about the 26th, probably.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you think the troops could have remained any longer in the round-house than they did?

A. No; and I didn't see what the necessity was for their remaining there anyhow.

Q. What was the condition of your command, in regard to rest and want of food?

A. The men were very much exhausted. They had been taken away during the night from their homes, and, of course, had very little sleep, and little or nothing to eat, and, of course, they were very much exhausted. Still, as they demonstrated on their march, they could do their duty. I would like to state to the committee, that at no time, from the hour when my regiment left Philadelphia until it returned, was there any moment, in my estimation, when the men were not prepared for any duty, that they were called on to do.

Q. You had some army experience?

A. I served about three years and six months in the army.

Q. Your troops were as ready to do service as those in the United States army?

A. I never saw any difference.

* * * * *

Walter G. Wilson, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State your residence, and what position you held in the National Guard in July last?

A. I live at No. 2323 Green street, Philadelphia, and I was major and acting assistant adjutant general with General Brinton, during the July riots.

Q. Did you hear the testimony of Generals Brinton and Mathews?

A. Yes.

Q. In the details as to what occurred at Twenty-eighth street. State whether their testimony was substantially correct?

A. Their testimony was entirely correct, so far as my knowledge went. I was on the ground constantly with General Brinton, during that afternoon, and reported to General Pearson, of my arrival with him. General Pearson was then at the Union depot. The formation of the column and line of march was stated by both Generals Brinton and Mathews, and is substantially correct.

Q. State whether at Twenty-eighth street you heard any command given to fire?

A. I did not.

Q. By any officer?

A. I did not.

Q. State what the action of the crowd was there, prior to the firing by the troops?

A. The action of the crowd was such as to induce me to believe that a conflict was inevitable. I was satisfied they had made up their minds to have a row. There was jeering and insults in every direction, but the men bore it all patiently. I heard General Brinton, on leaving the Union depot, state, if I am not mistaken, to General Mathews and General Loud, that he wanted them to endure, and pay no attention to anything the mob might say or do, even if they spat in their faces--simply, if they were attacked, to defend themselves. At Twenty-eighth street it was absolutely impossible to move on account of the crowd. The Gatling guns were brought in between the ranks, and, when the crowd were pushing in and surging in at the end, the Washington Grays were formed across, but were found insufficient to keep the crowd back. General Brinton then sent me with instructions to bring up other men, as the mob were pressing in between the ranks of the First regiment, which I did. I heard no order given to fire, and saw distinctly, not only pistol shots, but stones and missiles of various kinds thrown from all directions. I saw, after the firing--in fact, it seemed to me that the firing had hardly commenced before the crowd scattered in every direction. I saw, immediately, Generals Brinton and Mathews and Colonel Benson, if I am not mistaken, give the command to cease firing, and go up and down the line endeavoring to stop the men. The crowd had dispersed in every direction.

Q. How long did you remain in that position before you moved into the round-house?

A. I should judge it was about two hours, probably three hours. The firing had hardly ceased, when General Brinton got a note from General Pearson, to which he sent me to reply in person. Upon reporting to him the state of affairs at Twenty-eighth street, he directed me to return, and inform General Brinton that he would like to see him personally. I did so, and accompanied General Brinton back to the outer office, where General Pearson was.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the second story in the office at Twenty-sixth or Twenty-seventh street, at the outer depot.

Q. How was he dressed?

A. He had on a fatigue uniform and cap, and sack coat or blouse--an officer's blouse--and dark pants, and, if I am not mistaken, a white vest. He had on shoulder straps, and the mark of his rank on the cap.

Q. Did he have on a belt?

A. No; I think not.

Q. State what the conduct of the troops was during the night in the round-house?

A. The conduct of the troops was unexceptionable. I was up and around during the entire night, from one part of the building to the other, and I saw no instance where the men refused to obey any order given to them, although they were, of course, rather exhausted, and rather hungry; yet, at the same time, any command that was given was obeyed at once, cheerfully and willingly. The slight disturbance that General Brinton spoke of in his testimony was so slight that I never knew anything about it until long afterwards, and I suppose I had probably as much opportunity to know what was going on as anybody.

Q. State whether you had notice of the orders received by General Brinton from General Latta or from General Pearson?

A. Yes, sir; I had.

Q. Of all the orders?

A. Yes.

Q. State whether General Brinton received any orders from General Latta before leaving the round-house?

A. He received two dispatches during the night from General Latta.

Q. State what they were?

A. The first one was complimenting him very highly.

Q. Were they telegraphic dispatches?

A. No; they came by the hand of a scout whom General Brinton sent to communicate with General Latta.

Q. Named Wilson?

A. Yes--of the Jefferson Cavalry. The first were sent off with members of the Hutchinson Battery, and they never returned. Wilson brought back an answer regarding the situation in which we were placed, stating we understand the situation thoroughly, and an effort would be shortly made to provision the troops--that ammunition had been sent to Guthrie, and that the troops at Walls station would join Guthrie, and that Guthrie would be on the way, and certainly ought to be with us by six or seven o'clock, and stating also that there was no chance for friction primers. The second dispatch--Sergeant Wilson went out again and returned about two o'clock--maybe three o'clock--and brought another dispatch from General Latta complimenting the division very highly upon their conduct, and stating that the ammunition had reached Colonel Guthrie, and that he would be on his way shortly, and certainly would reach the round-house not later than five or six o'clock, and to hold on vigorously, or if compelled to leave, that we should do so by way of Penn avenue or eastward, and take Penn avenue.

Q. What time was that dispatch received?

A. I should judge in the neighborhood of two or three o'clock.

Q. Did General Brinton stay as long as he could in the round-house?

A. He stayed as long as he possibly could stay--as long as it was possible to stay. I think it was ten minutes of eight o'clock when the order was given for the troops to fall in for the purpose of leaving. At that time the roof of the round-house was on fire, and the building was full of smoke, and the only part that was not on fire was the office building of the upholstery shop, through which we went out. The piles of lumber in the direction of the Union depot--I don't know whether east or north from that--were all afire. Shortly before leaving, I went to the upholstery shops, and could see nothing but a mass of flames to the Union depot.

Q. Were any guards thrown out to guard the approaches to the round-house during the night?

A. Yes; as far as it was prudent or possible to throw them.

Q. Were any attacks made on the guards during the night by the mob?

A. There was no attack. It was a desultory kind of firing during the entire night from every direction. Men would conceal themselves behind piles of lumber, and in the windows of the houses, and behind chimneys, on roofs. The firing came from every direction.

Q. At what distance were guards placed from the round-house?

A. It was probably as far as from here to Eighth street--probably two hundred yards.

Q. Did they remain out all night that distance?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any of them wounded there?

A. No; it was on the track side, towards the Union depot. The building was not defensible at all from that side.

Q. From the side towards the depot no attack was made?

A. No.

Q. How far were the guards out on the side towards Philadelphia?

A. There were no guards there. A part of the Sixth division was supposed to be in the Twenty-eighth street round-house.

Q. You had no guards on the street leading to Penn street?

A. There was no occasion for them. Everything was in perfect view, as far as that was concerned, from the building itself.

Q. State in what kind of order the troops marched out?

A. The order was perfect.

Q. Was there any firing along the route?

A. There was considerable firing along the route.

Q. Were you present when General Brinton met Major Buffington at the arsenal?

A. I was present when he met a person, supposed to be the person commanding the arsenal.

Q. Where was he?

A. It was at his house inside the arsenal grounds.

Q. How far from the house?

A. Right on the steps--right on the porch.

Q. What took place between them?

A. Well, General Brinton introduced himself, and told him who he was, and requested substantially--that was he requested permission to bring the men inside, and, if possible, to get ammunition and provisions for them, or if not, to allow them to remain there until he could communicate with General Latta, and get some orders. Buffington immediately ordered him to leave the place as rapidly as possible, and leave no men inside. He did that in an abrupt manner, as much as to say, if you don't go out, I will throw you out.

Q. Had you been directed to Major Buffington's house by anybody?

A. My impression is that Captain Murphy took us there. It may have been that some person just at the door, or the sentry at the gate, may have said so.

Q. You accompanied General Brinton to the house?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you meet him before calling at the door or ringing the bell?

A. We met him right at the porch. I think there was a lady standing there, and the question was asked if Major Buffington was in, and at that moment he came out. I know that nobody went for him.

Q. You turned then and----

A. Went to the gate as rapidly as possible.

Q. Did Major Buffington come up to the gate before you left?

A. No.

Q. Did you see anything more of him?

A. I didn't. He turned on his heel and went into the house.

Q. Did you see anything of Lieutenant Lyon?

A. I don't know the lieutenant at all. I will state this much, I think there was some one in citizen's clothing, when the wounded were brought to the gate, who said allow them to come in, and I suppose from what I heard afterwards that it may have been Lieutenant Lyon.

Q. Describe the appearance of the man you met at the house, supposed to be Major Buffington?

A. I cannot do that.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Was he in uniform?

A. No; in citizen's clothes. I don't know that I would know him if I saw him. It was all in a moment, and the excitement, as a matter of course, was great, and I paid no particular attention to the man's appearance.

Q. Do you remember whether he wore a mustache or not?

A. I think he had hair on his face; but whether a mustache or not I won't be certain. I think he had hair on his face.

Q. Some gentleman was there?

A. There was somebody who said he was Major Buffington.

Q. There was some person who permitted you to bring the wounded inside?

A. Yes; that was afterwards. After we were ordered out.

Q. State whether you were present when Colonel Norris overtook General Brinton?

A. I was.

Q. What orders did he give, if any?

A. None; he gave no orders.

Q. Did you hear anything or all of what took place between them?

A. I did. I heard the entire conversation.

Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received any orders after leaving the round-house or not during that day?

A. Not until late in the afternoon.

Q. What were they, and who communicated them?

A. Those orders came out by the hand of Major Baugh, who reported to General Brinton at Claremont, and was immediately sent back by orders from General Latta--I think it was him--but they were received late that afternoon, directing the general to bring the entire division to Altoona by rail.

Q. That was a written order?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a man by the name of Colonel Smith reach you during the day, Sunday?

A. Norman Smith?

Q. Yes.

A. He reached us on Sunday. I saw him--the first time I saw him to know him--he may have reached us an hour or so before--it was after the division had encamped on the hills overlooking Claremont. He was there, and stayed for some hours.

Q. Do you know what his mission was?

A. I don't know that it had anything to do with any military matters, and I think he said he had an appointment with somebody to go across the country. I didn't ask him who.

Q. Do you know whether General Brinton telegraphed to Colonel Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad?

A. He sent a number of dispatches to Colonel Scott during the time we were out, in relation to various matters, for the purpose of urging the necessity of endeavoring to procure us ammunition, and provision, and blankets, and clothing, &c. And I know he also sent a note. I am under the impression it was in response to an inquiry as to the condition of the men, and he stated that, if he was allowed his own way, he could open the entire road from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh with the First division.

Q. When did he send that dispatch?

A. While we were at Blairsville Intersection.

Q. Do you know on what day?

A. I cannot state the day. We got there, I think, on the afternoon of the 23d, and it may have been the following morning. It was just in response to an inquiry as to the morale of the division.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Was there one or more sentinels at the gate when you reached the arsenal?

A. There was but one. There may have been one or two in the box; but one was patrolling the beat.

Q. Didn't the sergeant there point out to you and General Brinton the gate to Major Buffington's quarters?

A. No. There may have been somebody who pointed out the house, but nobody went for him.

Q. No one went on with you to the house?

A. No. He may have pointed it out to General Brinton, in response to a question. I don't recollect that he did or didn't.

Q. Did the major come out of the house there, and stand on the steps?

A. He came out of the house--out of the entry way--on to the steps.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did Major Buffington give any reason for refusing admission into the arsenal grounds?

A. I don't think he said anything, except that there was a large amount of property there, or something.

Q. Did he say it would be endangered by bringing on a conflict with the mob?

A. I think not. I have no recollection of it.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did he tell General Brinton there was no small ammunition there?

A. I have no recollection of his saying anything of the kind. He may have told him that he could not get any; but I have no recollection of his saying there was none.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. How were your troops supplied with ammunition? Did you have sufficient?

A. No; not at that time. The next morning--Monday morning or afternoon--the ordinance return showed that the Third regiment had about three rounds to a man, and the First regiment, I think, an average of ten.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How many did you have on Saturday afternoon when you went out to Twenty-eighth street?

A. We were supposed to have twenty rounds to a man. Ten were issued at Harrisburg, and ten at Pittsburgh.

Q. State whether General Brinton received orders from General Latta to go to Torrens station; and, if so, when he received them?

A. He received orders from General Latta to go to Torrens station on the night of the 3d of July.

Q. What kind of an order was it?

A. A written order, and sent, as I was afterwards informed, by the hands of Captain Aull, and delivered by him to Colonel Guthrie, and by Colonel Guthrie to the general, at the reception of the Duquesne club, the night before we left Pittsburgh.

Q. When was the order dated.

A. On the morning we left the round-house. It was a very congratulatory order, directing him to go to the stock-yards, and entrench himself there, and congratulating him on the movement of the morning, and stating he was glad to hear he was safe.

Q. What per centage of the men of the First division were soldiers of the late war? Do you know?

A. No; that is pretty hard matter to tell.

Q. From your acquaintance with them could you form an estimate?

A. I should judge probably fifty per cent. of them--taking the strength of the division right straight through--probably more than that.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You stated you heard no command given to the troops to fire.

A. No.

Q. Didn't you consider the men justifiable in firing?

A. Yes; I consider it would not have been half a minute before the command would have been given. It would have been necessary.

Q. Was there a consultation among the officers as to the position you should take after the firing took place?

A. The only consultation was between--or a conversation--it was hardly in the nature of a consultation--was between General Brinton and General Pearson. General Pearson sent to know of General Brinton--stating he had heard the firing--whether there were any killed or wounded, and requested him, if he desired to communicate, to send a staff officer. General Brinton sent me, and I immediately returned and reported that General Pearson desired to see him and went back with him.

Q. Where did you find General Pearson?

A. In the second story of the outer office.

Q. Mr. Pitcairn's?

A. I don't know. He was in the telegraph room. There was no consultation about it. It was an absolute order from General Pearson to move the troops in there.

* * * * *

E. DeC. Loud, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Please state your residence?

A. No. 3741 Spruce street.

Q. State whether you are a member of the National Guard now?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were in July last?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your rank?

A. Brigadier General, commanding the Second brigade.

Q. You accompanied General Brinton to Pittsburgh?

A. Yes.

Q. State whether you went out with his command to Twenty-eighth street?

A. I did not.

Q. On Saturday?

A. I did not. When we started from Pittsburgh, or rather from Union depot, a portion of my command was then ordered to guard the passenger trains that were going to be run out, and when we got about the center--from the western half to the center of the round-house--I was ordered to take that position, and to keep the tracks clear, and see that nobody came into my line excepting those that had authority--to keep out all citizens--that the trains were ready to be run, and that I should keep things clear, in that shape, until they could open the road at Twenty-eighth street. I held that position until the firing began at Twenty-eighth street; but, I think, perhaps a little before that I sent an aid to General Brinton and asked him, if possible, to return to me the troops that had been detached, as the ground I had to cover was too large to be covered by the troops I had. He sent them back. Shortly after that, I saw the firing at Twenty-eighth street. It was about a square and a half, and I could see the firing. I had stationed a line across east to keep the crowd back from that side, and when the rioters broke around from the rear of the First brigade, and came back, I ordered the line doubled, and turned the crowd through the yard out on to Liberty street, instead of letting them come on the tracks. So far, as I saw, the trains were all ready, with nobody interfering with them, and if they had had men to run them--engineers and firemen--I think they could have run those trains out after Twenty-eighth street was cleared.

Q. Were the engines fired up?

A. I think so.

Q. Were there engineers with them?

A. There seemed to be men about the engines that seemed to have authority. They seemed to be train hands--engineers.

Q. And brakemen?

A. They seemed to be. The most trouble I had was with young men that claimed to be clerks in the railroad office, who broke through the lines. While I was there, two or three passenger trains were run in from the west, coming in off the Pan Handle and Fort Wayne road, going east. They were some little while getting along; but they went on east. There was some trouble with the passengers on them, because they wanted to see what was going on. I held that position until some time after the firing at Twenty-eighth street, when I got orders from General Brinton, through Major Pettit, to move into the railroad shops connecting with the round-house. I knew the ground, as I had been there several times before, and I supposed we were going through this yard out to Liberty street, and going back to Pittsburgh; but when I got inside, General Brinton ordered me to take possession of the shops there on the left or on the west, and put one regiment in there and some other troops in the office, and put a guard over the gate. There was a double wagon gate there. I had no time to detail a regular guard, so I instructed Captain Ryan, of the Fencibles, to take charge of the gate. In the meantime, Breck's Battery came in, and the First brigade went into the round-house and took possession of that. In about ten minutes, a train was going to run back on the Allegheny Valley road, which runs besides this railroad office or repair shop. When the cars came back--it was some local train--they were just filled with rioters, who were brought back right into Pittsburgh, and they were yelling and hooting and hallooing, and then this crowd gathered around the gate. We had no orders to fire on them at all, and we paid no attention to what was said by the mob. Along about dark, I was talking to General Brinton, when a man pushed himself in, and we ordered him out, and eventually pushed him out. Then a row began, and a couple of pistol shots were fired, and two men were shot, and Captain Ryan came to me and said that my men cannot stand this to be fired at, and without returning the fire. I told him I could not give an order to fire; but that I would ask General Brinton; but he said he could not give an order, that he was under the orders of General Pearson, and that we must first ask General Pearson if we couldn't open fire on the rioters. We run the Gatling guns, in the meantime, so as to command the gate. General Pearson said no, you must not fire a shot, and of course, when he said no, we had nothing else to do. He left about nine o'clock, and when he left General Brinton gave orders if anybody came near the gate to order them away, and if they didn't go, to fire on them. We remained there until they began to run the cars down on us. At first we supposed they ran the cars down to shoot this field-piece off--we supposed that was their idea--but we soon found it was on fire. The general then ordered me to take a detail of men up into the third story of this office, which had windows facing east, and we went up there, and put guards in the second and third stories, and in that way covered the field-piece. We stayed around there until daylight. During the night I think I saw pretty near every dispatch that General Brinton got, and I don't think I was away from him ten minutes at any one time during the night. I saw every dispatch, and was cognizant of their contents. I passed the scout in and out through my lines--this man that carried the dispatches to General Latta--and I know the instructions from General Latta were to hold the position as long as we could, and I know of the dispatch to move east out Penn avenue. When the eastern buildings had got afire, they came and told me that it was necessary to vacate, that the fire had got so hot that they couldn't stand it, and when the First regiment formed, we could hardly see the lines for the smoke and cinders. There had been some cars filled with corn whiskey that had run down and got afire. We got the fire out; but they had blocked the gate so that we couldn't get the field-pieces out. The general then instructed me to have the brass guns spiked, to have them dismounted, and to destroy the powder. The powder was taken into the round-house and soaked in water, so that it couldn't be used, and the ammunition was thrown away, and the pieces were spiked. The Gatlings being much lighter, we found an entrance on the west of this repair-shop, and we moved the Gatlings through the repair-shop out to Twenty-sixth street. When we marched out I was at the head of my brigade. We must have got a half a mile or so, and there was some firing into the lines, and one or two men were wounded. I then went back, and you couldn't see any great number of rioters anywheres near us. I suppose within one or two Philadelphia blocks you could not see anybody; but you could see the crowd back that far. Every now and then there would be a shot coming from a doorway or a window as we passed along the street. Nobody would fire directly at us from a window as we passed along--either from the corners of the streets or the windows; but the firing was all after we passed, after we got by half a block or a block--then they would let into us. About this time a street car was coming up the street, and I don't know why, but I was looking at it, wondering whether it was going to try to get through the lines, when the first thing I heard was two rifle shots from the car, and two men of the Sixth regiment fell dead, one on top of the other. The shots were fired by two men apparently lying on their stomachs--lying on the cushions, and firing out the windows.

Q. Did the street car stop after they fired?

A. That I cannot say. I recollect, at that time, that the Gatling gun was opened, and I ordered my men to separate, so that they could fire into it, and they did fire. Just before that the driver of the street car had uncoupled the horses, and left the car standing. I have heard since that those two men were killed; but, of course, I cannot testify to that.

Q. Those two men in the car?

A. Yes; along about that time this man they called the bad angel--he would fire and then run into a house, and run back through the yard, and come out again and fire. He would fire coolly. I saw him twice drop on his knee and fire, just the same as if he were firing at a target. I heard Captain Ryan hallooing "shoot that man," and they fired at him, but, as he was firing out of door-ways or from behind trees, it was almost impossible to hit him. We were moving all the time. I cannot say positively whether Lieutenant Ash was shot previously to that time or not, but I recollect seeing him stagger. I suppose I noticed it more particularly because he was a personal friend of mine. I saw him stagger and fall into the gutter on the north side of the street, and throw up his hand and say, you are not going to leave me, and I ran back with three or four men, and carried him ahead apiece, until some men of the regiment ran their pieces under him, and brought him on, and he was carried on the limber of the Gatling up to the arsenal. By that time I concluded my brigade had enough of that, and I sent word to General Brinton, asking him if I could not change places with the First brigade, and he sent word back, yes, and I changed places at the turn of the street. The reason why I asked to be relieved was, that every man in the brigade had been on duty all night--every man. We had the lumber-yard to cover, and the railroad offices, and the repair shop, and the men had been up all night. I took the right of the line then, and I don't think that there was a shot fired after we changed position in the line.

Q. Where was Lieutenant Ash wounded?

A. In the leg. He bled very freely. I didn't suppose that he was mortally wounded, and I think if there had been anybody there to take care of him, he might have got through.

Q. He was left at the arsenal?

A. Yes; that is about the story, until we got to Sharpsburg. We had nothing to eat all the way along. When we got to Sharpsburg, along about ten and a half o'clock, Major Wilson then, Colonel Wilson now, went into a store and bought a couple of boxes of crackers. I recollect it, because he gave one to my brigade, and one to the First brigade. That was all we got until about twelve o'clock.

Q. While you were down at the round-house, guarding the trains that were to move out, was there any attack made upon your line by the rioters?

A. No.

Q. Was there any firing by your men?

A. No; there is not a shot fired--they were rather troublesome. There was a considerable crowd there, but Captain Ryan kept them back. I might say that my orders were to keep all citizens off. I met a gentleman coming through, and told him to get out, and had some considerable difficulty. He said he was the sheriff of Allegheny county. That was away back at Twenty-sixth street. He was all alone--no posse with him or anything.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You say no posse was with him?

A. No; and he didn't seem to want a posse.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. That was after the firing at Twenty-eighth street?

A. I think it was right after the firing.

Q. The sheriff was going towards the depot then?

A. Yes; and making pretty good time.

Q. State whether there was any insubordination on the part of the troops during the night in the round-house?

A. I heard that some of the troops were dissatisfied--that they wanted something to eat, and didn't think they were treated right, and all that. I didn't see anything of it, and I was among them all night long.

Q. Was there any refusal to obey orders?

A. No; no man refused. There was, perhaps, a little hesitation when I asked some men to do a little piece of business, but they went and did it.

Q. What was that?

A. I wanted some car wheels put across the track. It was a rather open space, and they didn't seem to like it much, but they went and did it.

Q. Have you anything else to say?

A. I might say that I saw the scout going out all night long, carrying messages back and forward.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did you consider the firing by the troops justifiable?

A. I can only say that if I had had command I would have fired sooner than they did.

Q. You would have given the order?

A. Yes; I gave the order to fire going out Pennsylvania avenue. I always considered when attacked you have the right to return the fire.

Q. You have had some experience in the army?

A. Some little.

Q. How much?

A. Four years.

Q. And you think that most any troops would have fired under such circumstances without orders?

A. I have my own opinion, and I think if I had been in the lines, I would have fired.

Q. If struck with a brick, you would have fired?

A. I think so. I will say simply this: I think if the troops had been sent to Pittsburgh three days sooner, it would have been a great deal better. They had been playing with the Pittsburgh troops before we got there.

Q. Did you see Colonel Norris when he joined General Brinton's command?

A. I did.

Q. Did Colonel Norris give General Brinton any orders?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear the conversation between them?

A. I did.

Q. If he had communicated any orders to General Brinton, you would have heard them?

A. I certainly should. I might say that I was standing with General Brinton, when Colonel Norris drove up. He jumped out of the carriage, and he seemed very glad, indeed, to see General Brinton and all hands, and we went over and sat along side of the road, and I heard all the conversation. I would have been very apt, if any orders had been given, to pay some attention, because I was anxious about the situation myself, and particularly as I was personally acquainted with Colonel Norris.

Q. You are certain he gave no orders to go to any point from where he was then?

A. Not that I know of; and I think if such orders were given, I would have heard them.

Q. Were you present during the entire conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. All the time?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you know of any orders having been received by General Brinton from any one or by the hands of any one to make any movement in any direction?

A. Yes; we had one about going out of Pittsburgh, to go east.

Q. After you left the round-house?

A. No; I saw the orders that night. I heard or read all the orders that came. The orders were, as I understood, to take a train down at the work-house, and join the command at Blairsville Intersection. I know we got an order after we were in the round-house, or rather an instruction that Colonel Lyle--we supposed that colonel, and the detachment under Colonel Rodgers, were with Colonel Guthrie, and would join us about daybreak.

Q. Did General Brinton receive any orders to move his command to Torrens station?

A. Not that I am aware of.

Q. Or to join Colonel Guthrie?

A. Not that I am aware of.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. The brass guns at the round-house--whose command did they belong to?

A. To General Pearson's.

Q. Couldn't you have saved those guns, and taken them with you?

A. If we had any way of getting them out, and if we had horses to haul them.

Q. It was not possible to take them out where they were, and take them along by hand?

A. It might have been done, but under the circumstances, no. If there had not been any firing there, we might have cleared the track, and got the gate open.

Q. Couldn't you have taken those guns out of the same gate you took the Gatling guns out?

A. No; it would have taken a long while, because the shop was full of timber and all kinds of material, which would have had to be cleared out of the way, and it is not much of a joke to run a twelve pounder by hand. We might have taken a crowd and have dragged them a short distance, but not a long distance. It was as much as the men could do to drag the Gatlings.

Q. No horses were provided for those guns?

A. Not that I saw.

Q. Did Captain Breck have charge of those pieces?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he turn them over to General Brinton?

A. Of course, he was under General Brinton's command.

Q. Do you know whether Captain Breck's command retired to the round-house with your command?

A. I don't know, but I suppose they did. I cannot say positively.

Q. Did many of your men--the rank and file--have experience in the army as soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. About what proportion of them?

A. I suppose thirty-three per cent. of them, anyhow. I should judge so.

Q. What character of men were the balance of the troops composed of generally?

A. I would just as lief depend on them, I think, as regular soldiers.

Q. You would depend on them just as soon?

A. Or a little sooner, I think.

Q. In what business were those men before they went out with you, as a general thing?

A. Most of them were mechanics.

Q. And some clerks?

A. Some.

Q. Professional men?

A. Very few.

Q. Men accustomed to manual labor?

A. Yes; and accustomed to three square meals a day, too.

Q. Could you expect men, taken from their homes as those men were, to be as efficient, so far as endurance is concerned, as men accustomed not only to military discipline, but to service in the field?

A. Why certainly not. If you have ever been in the service, you know how long it takes to break men in, before you get them into shape.

* * * * *

Louis D. Baugh, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. In Philadelphia, No. 2009 Chestnut street.

Q. State what your rank was in the National Guard in July last?

A. I was commissary of the First division, with the rank of major. I was then and am yet.

Q. Did you accompany the troops under General Brinton to Pittsburgh?

A. I did. I went with the first detachment.

Q. Were you at Twenty-eighth street during the firing?

A. No.

Q. What was your particular duty?

A. It is the duty of the commissary to feed the men--to supply them with rations.

Q. Where were you during Saturday?

A. When the column was ready to move to Twenty-eighth street, General Brinton ordered me to remain to procure subsistence for the men.

Q. When did you re-join the command?

A. On Sunday afternoon, about three o'clock.

Q. At what point?

A. At the work-house.

Q. Of Allegheny?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any orders for General Brinton?

A. I had none, sir.

Q. Did you have any conversation about orders with him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he say?

A. The moment I arrived, he asked me for orders, once or twice, and I told him I had no orders, or had received none, and he sent me back for orders.

Q. To whom?

A. General Latta.

Q. Did you go back?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you find General Latta?

A. At the Monongahela house.

Q. What orders did you get?

A. Do you want the order?

Q. Yes.

A. I took him the following order:

"Major General R. M. Brinton, commanding First division National Guard of Pennsylvania, bivouacked near Claremont station, West Pennsylvania division, Pennsylvania railroad:

"You will move your command by rail to Altoona, where the rest of your division now is, and there remain for further orders. I leave, via Erie, for Harrisburg to-night. Will be at Erie to-morrow night, on the rail Tuesday, and Harrisburg Wednesday. Have ordered Mr. Creighton, superintendent of the West Pennsylvania division to furnish transportation. Make requisition for more ammunition on Harrisburg by telegraph, and communicate further as to transportation with Mr. Gardner.

"JAMES W. LATTA, Adjutant General."

Q. What time did you take that to General Brinton and deliver it to him?

A. The written order?

Q. Yes?

A. I read that order to another officer, who reached him early in the morning, one or two o'clock. I reached him about eight o'clock.

Q. What morning?

A. Monday.

Q. With that order?

A. Yes.

Q. And delivered it to him?

A. Yes; I handed him the written order. When the order was given to me, I asked for it in writing. There were two of us together, and I gave the other staff officer the contents of the order, and told him if he reached him first to give it to him.

Q. Who was that staff officer?

A. Major Lazarus.

Q. Where did you find him on Monday morning?

A. On the railroad.

Q. Where?

A. I don't know the place, but I guess it is a little off Claremont.

Q. A major of whose staff was Major Lazarus?

A. General Brinton's. He was in the room when I got this order. I read it to him, and, as the mob was very great, I said if you reach him first, give him this order, and if I reach him first, I will carry it with me.

* * * * *

E. DeC. Loud re-called:

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. On your retirement from the round-house, did you cover the retreat a part of the way?

A. I had the left of the line as long as there was any firing going on.

Q. Did you, on your march, see any policemen on the street?

A. I did.

Q. Tell us what you saw them do?

A. I saw, I suppose, at least fifteen or twenty-five of them standing on a kind of low porch that looked to me something like a station-house, or as if it might be, as we went out, and they seemed to make no effort to keep the peace whatever. They were standing there, and after we passed, I heard the crack of a pistol. I cannot say positively that they fired it; but they certainly made no effort whatever to preserve the peace there. They were in full uniform, too.

Q. Did the sound seem to come from that direction?

A. Yes; right behind me. At that time I was on the right flank.

Q. How far were you from the police when you heard the shot fired?

A. Half a block I suppose--perhaps not that far. They were standing on a porch elevated, perhaps, two or three feet.

Q. You judge from the sound that the shot came from the police?

A. If it didn't come from them, it came from very near them.

Q. Did you see any arms in their hands?

A. No.

Q. Did you see any pistols in their hands?

A. No; I was in the street and they were just the width of the pavement from me.

Q. Is that the only place where you saw police?

A. That is the only place where I saw police.

Q. And you say that they made no effort to arrest any of the parties following you?

A. Not that I saw, and I would have been very apt to see it. I think there were enough of them there to have stopped it.

Q. Did you hear them make any remarks as you passed?

A. No; but they didn't seem to be very particularly pleased over the troops being there.

Q. But they said nothing?

A. No; but I could judge from the expression of their faces that their remarks were not at all complimentary. That was the inference I drew.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did you have any communication with the citizens of Pittsburgh--did you go out into the crowd among the rioters at any time?

A. No.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Do you know of any citizens' committee that waited on General Brinton or that waited on your command to have a conversation in relation to this riot?

A. No; I heard that a committee came out to see General Brinton while we were at the hospital, when we got back a second time, and I understood that they just came out to pay their compliments to him.

Q. It was after you got back to Pittsburgh?

A. Yes; the first time nobody came near us--not a soul. In Sharpsburg some men came out, and said they were very sorry that so many were killed, and they seemed to be very kind.

Q. Is there anything you know that you have not yet testified to of interest to us or that might be important in the making up of a full history of this affair?

A. No; I don't know of anything more that I can say about the matter. I only had my own brigade to look after, and I can only tell what happened there. I can only say this, that I was very much surprised when we were put into the round-house and those shops.

Q. Surprised at your being stopped in the round-house?

A. Yes; a question has been asked that perhaps I can throw some light on. It was about what kind of a cap or head-covering General Pearson had on. He had a blue blouse on with a fatigue cap.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did he have soldier straps on?

A. I think so, but cannot say positively--I know he had.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Did he have a sword or belt?

A. I didn't see any.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Did he have a white vest on?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Could you have seen a white vest if he had had one on?

A. If he had turned right around to me I could have seen it. We all had white vests on, as we didn't have time to get anything else. He might have had no vest at all on. It was hot weather, and it was dark.

Q. How close were you to him?

A. About as near may be as to this gentleman here, [indicating a party in the room sitting near by.]

Q. Almost touching him?

A. I could have touched him if I had wanted to. He walked out with me to the wash-stand, I recollect. I don't know what he had on when he went out. All of his staff with him had fatigue suits on.

* * * * *

Louis D. Baugh re-called:

By Mr. Means:

Q. Were you dressed in uniform when you went to Pittsburgh?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you wear that uniform all the time?

A. No; I took it off, by orders of my superior officer.

Q. Did you mingle with the crowd after you dressed yourself in citizen's clothing?

A. Yes. I attempted to get to the round-house to General Brinton, and I started up from Union Depot hotel.

Q. Did you have any conversation with citizens of Pittsburgh, or with the rioters or the strikers?

A. I had no conversation with them, because I kept myself very quiet, listening to what they said.

Q. What did they say?

A. They wanted every damned Philadelphia soldier to go home in a box. That they would tear them to pieces. Then I went on apiece. I didn't want to get into that crowd.

Q. Who were they?

A. People of Pittsburgh.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What people?

A. Part of the crowd along the street.

Q. In the vicinity where the riot was going on, or down in the city?

A. In the street running from Union depot to the round-house.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Parallel with the railroad?

A. Yes. I was trying to get to General Brinton, to make arrangements about feeding the soldiers. When I found what affection they had for us I would move on again. They wanted every damned one sent home in a box.

By Mr. Means:

Q. You looked upon that as the disposition manifested towards the Philadelphia soldiers?

A. Yes; indeed, it was--all Saturday night and Sunday morning when I left town.

Q. Did they go for you once in the depot?

A. In the West Pennsylvania depot they did, or I thought they did, and I got out. I knew what they were from the night previous.

Q. For your own safety, you thought it better to get away?

A. Yes.

* * * * *

George Francis Leland, sworn with the uplifted hand:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. 1622 Chestnut street.

Q. You were a member of the National Guard in July last?

A. I was adjutant of the Third regiment of infantry.

Q. Colonel Snowden's regiment?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you with him at Twenty-eighth street when the firing occurred?

A. I was. Just below Twenty-eighth street.

Q. Did you hear any orders given to fire?

A. I didn't. I heard Colonel Snowden distinctly say that no one was to fire until they received orders, and they received no orders from him to fire.

Q. Were you in the round-house during that night?

A. I was.

Q. State what the conduct of the troops was during the night, as to discipline?

A. It was very good, I think as far as I am a judge.

Q. Was there any insubordination?

A. No; none whatever.

Q. What was the condition of the round-house when you left in the morning?

A. It was on fire, I should judge from the amount of sparks and smoke and flame about us. Some of the troops attempted to put the flames out, but did not succeed.

Q. Was it safe to remain in the round-house any longer?

A. It was not.

Q. How did the troops march out--in good order?

A. In excellent order.

Q. Where were you in the line of march?

A. With the right of our detachment part of the time, and part of the time in the rear. We only had about forty-three men in our regiment.

Q. Was there any firing along the line in the street?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did it come from?

A. I should judge from citizens of Pittsburgh.

Q. Did you see any firing?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any person when they fired?

A. Yes; one or two I could pick out if I should see them again.

Q. What class of citizens were they?

A. The ordinary class of citizens--mechanics and workingmen; and I saw some policemen fire, too.

Q. Where were they?

A. At a station-house, evidently, from the number of men grouped around it.

Q. A police station-house?

A. Yes.

Q. How many of them?

A. Twenty-five or thirty of them.

Q. Did they fire as you passed them?

Q. They fired after we passed. I should judge the firing they did was intended for General Loud's command. They were in our rear.

Q. They fired on the rear of the line?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see them when they fired?

A. Yes; I think I did. I looked back--I was attracted by the noise--and I turned my head, and I distinctly heard not only the noise, but saw the smoke and the raising of their arms among this crowd of men that I took to be policemen.

Q. Were they in uniform?

A. Yes; or in dark looking hats and blue sack-coats, I think. I am not familiar with the uniform of the police of that city.

Q. Did you see any pistols in their hands?

A. Yes; as I passed I saw one with a pistol by his side. One of them stood by the curbstone, as if he was reviewing us.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did they have their maces?

A. I think not, but I am not positive about that. I didn't notice any belts.

Q. Did you see a uniform on any one policeman--a full uniform?

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