Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Railroad Riots in July, 1877 Read in the Senate and House of Representatives May 23, 1878 (part 3 of 7)
A. In the vicinity of Twentieth street, the police came along the wall that holds the embankment the tracks are laid on, and drove parties away from the cars. Just as the fire would catch a car, the rabble, composed of all parties, not rioters, but thieves or whatever you choose to call them, they would break into a car and commence carrying the things off--men, women, and children. The police drove the parties off the wall. Some of them fell down, and one, I noticed, got hurt, and, apparently, the police at that time had possession, and I thought it was going to stop, but in a short time I noticed smoke starting up below, further down, and the police went down that way.
Q. How many policemen were there?
A. I am not positive of the number, but there must have been twenty or thirty, the mayor at the head of the police.
Q. The mayor at the head of them?
A. That is my recollection. I am almost positive of that, because I know the mayor by sight when I see him.
Q. Did they succeed in clearing the track and driving them away from that point?
A. There was five or six tracks in that vicinity. They entirely cleared them on the side next to Liberty street, but there was at least six tracks there, and most of the tracks had trains laying on them. Smoke started over a little further amongst some of the other cars.
Q. Did the rioters make any resistance to the police?
A. Not any that I noticed. Some, according to their creed or nationality, held on longer to their goods.
Q. What nationality seemed to hold on the longest?
A. I must say that the Germans carried the heaviest loads. I noticed that, and commented on it coming up in a street car, that the Germans had the heaviest loads. I mean no disrespect to anybody.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. About what time was it that the police cleared the crowd off the wall?
A. It might have been half-past ten or eleven.
Q. On Sunday?
A. On Sunday, but I could not be positive; during the excitement there I was paying more attention to what I could see, and wondering what would turn up next.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you remain there during the entire day?
A. I remained on the Pittsburgh side until probably six o'clock in the afternoon. I then heard they were organizing in Allegheny, and that is the side I lived on, and that there was likely to be trouble over there, and I went over to the other side. The elevator was partially burned down when I left the ground.
Q. Did you see any further efforts of the policemen after eleven o'clock to stop the riot and stop the fire?
A. After that time the police appeared to be scattered in squads. I did not see them in one body after that. I believe they were distributed around after that. I seen a few policemen after that, but not in a body. At the time I lost sight of the policemen I started to go up to see the condition of the round-house. From there I went up to Thirty-third street--I had formerly lived up in that neighborhood--and then down to what they call Lawrenceville, and back down to the Union depot in that direction. I will just say that I met Captain McMunn on Twenty-sixth street coming down, and inquired of him if there was any effort being made to stop it, and my recollection is that he said they had made a proposition to try and organize the employés and try to stop it, but it had not been entertained. I would not say that on oath, but I think so.
Q. Captain McMunn?
A. Yes; he was one of the strikers. Another employé standing looking at the engine in the morning was Robert Aitchison, known on the road as old Bobby Aitchison. He was lamenting about the destruction, and finding fault, and said it was wrong, and he told me he was sure the railroad men had nothing to do with it.
Q. What is Mr. Aitchison's first name?
A. Robert.
Q. That is the old man?
A. That is the old man. At the time I speak of seeing Aitchison, he was standing where he could see the engine he had formerly run--engine 281. I was acquainted with him, and had fired the engine myself at one time. This act was rather impressed upon my memory more than any other things that occurred.
Q. Did you go close to the men that were engaged in the arson and riot during the day, Sunday, so as to ascertain who they were--that is, the leaders in the burning, I mean?
A. I could not recognize any man, but they were what I would call roughs--hard cases, desperate men, most of them. I was told that some, I think, were men that had been--I do not know what the best word is--proscribed, or whatever you choose to call it, been discharged from one railroad, and got a situation on another, and been discharged from there, by this last company receiving a letter. There are a great many men in this country now, that, if they are discharged on the Fort Wayne road, they come to the Pennsylvania railroad, and that company will discharge them, and give no reason for it. There are a great many of this kind in the country to-day, that are desperate men, ready to do anything at all. I have no doubt that some of the leaders in this movement were men of that kind, because the men that were engaged in the riot, were used to railroading, because they could not have run these cars in and burned the round-house as they did. If they had been men belonging to the Pennsylvania railroad, I would have recognized them. I was standing by the elevator when the firemen attempted to throw water on there. I was close by the hose when somebody cut the hose, and the water went over the crowd. I received some of it myself.
Q. When you got back to Allegheny City, you said they were organized there--how large was the crowd there?
A. It was probably six or half past, when I got back there. There was no complete organization--they were just gathering.
Q. At what point?
A. The center appeared to be, that I noticed, near the round-houses of the Fort Wayne road. I noticed parties there that were employés in the shops, and probably there might have been some on the road, but some that I knew belonged to the shops.
Q. Did the crowd increase there?
A. The crowd increased there, but I did not stay there. I kept on down to my own home.
Q. Remained at home during the night--Sunday night?
A. I remained at home all night--was not outside.
Q. Monday morning did you return?
A. Monday morning I reported at the works, and we organized there, and I was placed in charge of a patrol or guard we had round the company's works.
Q. For protecting the works?
A. For protecting the works and do what we could for the whole neighborhood.
Q. Did your men all join in that organization?
A. Just what was asked. They did not make an indiscriminate thing of it. We just selected men and placed them on guard, and kept them on all night, and let them off in the morning, but were ready for a call at any time.
Q. Were the men all willing to unite in such a scheme of protection?
A. All that I seen--I heard no objection.
Q. If there is anything else you can enlighten us on state it? I do not think of any further question to ask.
A. I will just say that the first night we were on we arrested two different parties down there. The first one was on Pike street, Pittsburgh. We found him skulking around the works. I inquired what his business was, and he said he heard there was going to be fun down there, and he came down to see it, and gave no excuse--said he didn't intend to do anything, but he heard there was going to be fun; and there was a lot of freight cars laying full of freight. We put the fear in him a little, and let him go--didn't keep him.
By Mr. Means:
Q. There were two arrested?
A. I arrested another--that was a boy about sixteen or eighteen. I found him laying in a metal pile. He gave the same excuse. He heard there was going to be fun down there, and he came down to see it. We found out that he lived a mile or two back in the country from our neighborhood.
Q. The first man lived in Pike street?
A. He said so. He gave his name there, and the young man, too.
Q. How far is that from the destruction of the property?
A. It is right in the vicinity--down a little. Pike street and Sixteenth street, I think that is in the vicinity of Zug's mill, out along Penn, between Penn and the river. The city was full of men at that time, that, while the excitement was up, they wanted to see what was going on. There was a great many outsiders that were tramps, I suppose. They appeared to be strangers. It appears this strike had been talked of for sometime, and the tramps appeared to understand it, and they appeared to be gathered in for the spoil.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you observe, during the time of this destruction, whether there were two separate classes of individuals, one destroying the property and breaking up cars, and the others carrying away?
A. I noticed that there were men destroying that appeared not to do it for personal gain. Just appeared fonder of destruction than anything else.
Q. Did you think that either of these two parties--the parties carrying away, and the parties breaking up the cars, were citizens?
A. The parties carrying away were citizens, but just appeared to be carrying away because it was there to be had, and wanted to get it.
Q. Those who broke up cars, did they appear to be citizens, too?
A. I could not say about that. The reason that I suppose these parties that carried away were citizens was because they were all making for different localities, and I have every reason to believe they were citizens from some of the things they were carrying away, such as rolling away barrels of flour, and rolling away barrels of lard.
Q. Looked as if they had a place to put it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would these goods have been consumed by the fire, had they not been carried off?
A. That was the excuse which some of them gave for it. There were some that would be ashamed to steal that were carrying the things off.
Q. Because they were being destroyed by the fire?
A. Because they would be destroyed any way.
Q. You said you had no difficulty in getting citizens to volunteer and organize into bodies to assist in suppressing the riot or keeping the peace?
A. There was no riot in Allegheny.
Q. You said they were willing to organize?
A. They were very ready.
Q. Did the citizens generally express a willingness to go elsewhere, where there was riot or lawlessness besides in their own locality?
A. That question I do not think was brought up at all. I heard nothing of the kind mentioned. I know citizens of Allegheny, that they were in Pittsburgh, and took an active part in organizing to put down this riot.
* * * * *
Captain W. J. Glenn, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I reside at Mansfield, about five miles out of the city--west of the city.
Q. You belong to the National Guard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Captain of a company?
A. I command company K, of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. When were you called upon--called out?
A. I received an order to report my company at head-quarters from Pittsburgh on the 20th day of July. I think was the date--on Friday.
Q. To report your company in Pittsburgh?
A. Yes; at the head-quarters of the regiment.
Q. From where did you receive the order?
A. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn, commanding the regiment, in the absence of Colonel Gray.
Q. Did you report as ordered?
A. I did, sir.
Q. At what time did you report at head-quarters, and with how many men?
A. I reported at the Union depot at seven o'clock--I think it was about seven o'clock--with twenty-one men.
Q. How many men composed your company?
A. I had forty men on my roll--thirty-nine men.
Q. Did you have any difficulty in getting your men together?
A. I had difficulty in getting them together from the fact that they are scattered. I live in a country town. The majority I got word to reported promptly. There was a few exceptions that I knew of that were restrained from coming by their friends that thought differently.
Q. Restrained from coming by friends who were opposed to putting down the riot?
A. As they said, they were opposed to fighting the workingmen; that is it.
Q. What was done Friday night after you reported at the Union depot?
A. The first thing we did was to partake of a very excellent supper in Union depot, and then staid at the Union depot until sometime early in the morning. Two o'clock, perhaps, at the Union depot.
Q. What time in the morning?
A. Until about two, I think. I would not say for certain.
Q. Where did you go then?
A. We marched to Twenty-eighth street, by a circuitous route, by the way of Wylie avenue and Webster avenue, I think, are the streets, and then down on the hill to Twenty-eighth street--to the hill above Twenty-eighth street, right opposite.
Q. Were you joined by any other companies; if so, state what?
A. We there met our regiment--we there found the Nineteenth regiment, and a battery called the Hutchinson battery, that I understood had gone out on the train.
Q. How long did you remain there?
A. We remained in about the same position all day, with the exception of details that were made to go down to the crossing, until about five o'clock in the evening, I think it was. We marched to the transfer station--perhaps later than that.
Q. What was done then, after you arrived at the transfer?
A. We stayed there until ten o'clock at night, then we were ordered to the Union depot, and about eleven o'clock--I think it was near eleven o'clock--we were ordered to go to our armories.
Q. Where were the armories?
A. Our armory is at Mansfield.
Q. Did you go?
A. There was an eleven o'clock train--11.02--which starts for Mansfield. I took that train and went to Mansfield.
Q. How long did you remain there?
A. I remained until Monday.
Q. Called into action again Monday?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Reported, where?
A. I reported at the Central armory, Pittsburgh.
Q. During the day on Saturday, while occupying the hill, you had a view of the track, and the scene of the riot, did you not?
A. Yes, sir; I had.
Q. How large was the crowd during Saturday--and what was their--were they demonstrative or not?
A. Very much so, and the crowd was very large. They seemed to increase after three o'clock.
Q. Was any attempt made by the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments during Saturday, to drive the crowd from the tracks?
A. Yes; I was, with my company, several times ordered to go down to the track, and clear the crossing at Twenty-eighth street, which I did, and it was immediately filled up again by some on the other side. My company being small, would, of course, sweep but a small space of the ground.
Q. Tell us in what manner you cleared the crossing.
A. I marched company front across the track towards the river, and then I would wheel from the left to right, and marched back again, asking the crowd to get off the track, which they would do reluctantly, but I had no trouble.
Q. At a charge bayonet?
A. I do not think I came to a charge bayonet at all.
Q. Just simply marched through and back?
A. Yes; at a carry.
Q. In what order was your company drawn up--in two lines?
A. Sometimes in double rank, and sometimes in single rank.
Q. Would you sweep the track the width of your company?
A. There was generally two companies detailed. One would be passing, perhaps east, keeping the crowd towards East Liberty, and the other would face the river.
Q. Were there any other companies of your own regiment there?
A. Where--on the track?
Q. Yes?
A. My regiment was on the hill, with the exceptions----
Q. Was your regiment on there?
A. I believe I said in my testimony, that the Fourteenth regiment marched that way in a circuitous route, while the Nineteenth went out the other way. I reported to my colonel, who was then in command--Colonel Gray.
Q. Was there any resistance to your attempt at clearing the track?
A. There was some little said. They were obstinate, some of them, and considerably mean about it, and would not go away, as we were marched up, but a few words would make them go away, but they would go round, and get on the track again.
Q. Were they stopping trains?
A. No, sir; I did not see them stop any trains there.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. During the time while you were not engaged in clearing the crossing, in what position were the companies of the Fourteenth regiment stationed, up on the top of the hill?
A. We were in what I would call line of battle, on the face of the hill.
Q. Was the crowd mingling with the regiment--mixed up with the regiment?
A. With very few exceptions. I mind, during the day, talking to several citizens, but I did not consider them rioters.
Q. While you were stationed in line of battle, on the brow of the hill, where was the Nineteenth regiment stationed?
A. The Nineteenth was to our front and right in advance, on the road that leads up to the hospital.
Q. What position were they in during the day?
A. My recollection is, they were in line the same as we were, with the exception of this: that we were detailed a guard.
Q. There was something said by some of the witnesses about the mob and the troops being mixed up indiscriminately. Did you see anything of that kind?
A. I do not think I would say that.
Q. There seemed to be a friendly feeling?
A. There was no picket line out, to keep it entirely clear. The orders were to keep the crowd away, and not to mingle with the men. Still there was no pickets put out, and no driving them away. I heard some remarks made to the men: "You won't shoot workingmen."
Q. Were there any efforts made that day to form any line, by either of the regiments, or both of them, to form a line, so as to keep the mob off from the tracks? What I mean is, to occupy the vicinity of the track, so as to keep the crowd off from it?
A. I have said, already, that my company----
Q. You were marched down and marched back, and took your position with the regiment again? There was no effort made to keep the track clear at any place, except the crossing?
A. No, sir; because they would go right on the track again.
Q. There was no effort made to string out a line, so as to keep the crowd from the track?
A. Only at the crossing, sir.
Q. Where were you at the time General Brinton's troops came up there?
A. I was a very short distance from that little watch-house at Twenty-eighth street, at the foot of the hill--the base of the hill. Perhaps twenty-five yards from where the company was.
Q. In full view of what was going on?
A. Yes; Colonel Gray, I heard him get the order from General Brown to send a company down to support Breck's battery. He turned around and ordered me to take my company out, and also ordered another captain to report to me, and we went down the hill and supported the battery.
Q. The battery was near the crossing at that time?
A. Yes; very near the crossing.
Q. What did you see as General Brinton came up the track? Were there any deputies in advance of them?
A. Yes; the sheriff and his posse was there, and General Pearson, I believe.
Q. State the occurrence as you saw it, just immediately preceding and including the firing on the mob?
A. There was a company came up the track--at least one company, I say--there were, perhaps, two. They came up company front. The regiment--the First Pennsylvania regiment, I believe--came up by flank, the sheriff in front. The railroad came this way [indicating] and they met the troops and the sheriff.
Q. Advanced to meet them part way?
A. Yes; they were going out to see. The troops were stopped--the sheriff was--and I saw him talking, but could not state what he said, be cause there was a very loud clamor and talk from the hillside then, about that time. There was quite a crowd accumulated on the hill, immediately in my rear and right and left. The crowd ran that way to see what was going on--men, women, and children--and it became very noisy; they were crying to the mob, as I call it, to hold the fort.
Q. Men, women, and children, that were spectators, crying to the mob to hold the fort?
A. Yes; "Stand to your post, &c.," and they appeared to obey the command, for they stood pretty solidly, and the sheriff appeared to become so mixed up with the crowd that I could not tell where he was. The only front I saw was these Black Hussars, I think they call them, came right up and told them to go back and came to an arms port, and finally to a charge bayonet, and in the meantime Colonel Benson got his regiment to a front about faced his rear rank, and marched out across the railroad with the rear facing my company, and they formed, what some have termed, a hollow square. It was simply the front facing one way and the rank about facing and marching across the railroad, and that cleared the tracks, and the rear was protected by another battalion, and these troops in front tried to come on through--that was their order as I understood it--they were to forward, and it was hard work for them to go forward very fast. Just about that time, demonstrations became very lively, clubs were flying, stones, coal, and pieces of iron ore. There was a difficulty about this time over some soldier, that some man had got the bayonet, or something, and at least one pistol shot was fired from the mob into the troops, and somebody there--some soldier--he was carried away--I do not know whether he was shot or not, but just then there was firing commenced on the right of the third rank of the First regiment.
Q. How far distant from you was that first firing by the troops?
A. It was not very far--I suppose twenty yards.
Q. What order did you hear given by any of the commanding officers there?
A. I heard no order, except this captain commanding the front company to forward.
Q. That is all the orders you heard given?
A. That is all I heard given.
Q. Heard no order to fire?
A. There was not any order to fire, to the best of my knowledge. I was paying strict attention and I could have heard it if the battalion had heard it.
Q. What was the effect of the firing--what was the result?
A. There was a general clearing out of that mob for about ten minutes--five or ten minutes.
Q. They scattered and left that neighborhood?
A. Yes, sir; the firing commenced, and the troops appeared not to understand exactly where their enemies was. They fired too much towards where your humble servant was, I thought, and I undertook to help them to stop the firing, and the companies were fronted down Twenty-eighth street.
Q. The time this firing commenced, was the crowd all about, on each side of this body of troops that were coming up the track--they were each side of them--the crowd was all about on each side of your company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were scattered all about there?
A. Yes; they became very thick in a very short time.
Q. Then the crowd scattered after the firing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there any attempt made to prevent their gathering again there by any of the troops?
A. Nothing more. When they would go to come up again they were ordered to right and prepare to fire, and that scattered them. Some of the mob kept on throwing stones and clubs from behind cars until this company wheeled to the left and faced the river, so as they could see behind the cars.
Q. How long before General Brinton's command left the ground there?
A. After the firing; 1 do not think it was over half an hour. I cannot remember the exact time.
Q. After his command left the ground you stayed there some little time--your regiment?
A. My regiment did. I went up on the hill to my regiment.
Q. Was there any effort made by the Fourteenth or Nineteenth regiment, after General Brinton left, to keep the crowd from the crossing?
A. My regiment was not at the crossing at all.
Q. Was any effort made by either of the commands to prevent their gathering there again?
A. Yes; the troops from Philadelphia went that way, and they would go up above, further towards East Liberty, and congregate in the street again--in Twenty-eighth street--immediately after that and would make demonstrations.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. That is not answering the question. Did the Fourteenth or Nineteenth make any effort?
A. I said no--the Fourteenth regiment did not. I do not know about the Nineteenth. I did not see them. We were not down on the track; we were on the hill.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You kept your position on the hill. After the firing you went back there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On Monday you say you came back to the city and reported with your command. Where were you sent then--on what duty?
A. We stayed at the central armory for several days, then we were ordered to the court-house.
Q. There was nothing of any importance occurred?
A. No, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Was your company the only company of your regiment at the crossing at Twenty-eighth street and the railroad?
A. No, sir; there were others.
Q. Was the whole regiment there at any one time?
A. No, sir; at no one time.
Q. How many companies were there of your regiment at one time?
A. I think mostly we had two companies at a time.
Q. And the balance of the regiment were up on the hill?
A. Or if there was only one company the cavalry company would support us.
Q. What was the strength of your regiment about that time?
A. I do not remember the figures. There were two or three companies had not yet reported.
Q. Never did report?
A. Yes; they had not yet reported on Saturday. One company had reported, and was still at the Union depot, up the river. Another company was kept up the Allegheny railroad by orders.
Q. Can you form an estimate of the strength of your regiment on Saturday?
A. I did know the figures. I think there were two hundred, perhaps, or one hundred and fifty.
Q. After the firing on the Philadelphia troops, you rejoined your regiment on the hill--your company?
A. Yes; General Brinton relieved me, and told me he would support that battery, and I could be relieved, and I reported to my colonel by my sergeant, and he ordered me up on the hill again.
Q. Bid you take the battery with you?
A. No, sir; General Brinton said he would support the battery. Company C, Captain Nesbitt, was ordered to go down the hill with me.
Q. Did you get any order after this firing, and after the Philadelphia troops had entered the round-house, to clear the tracks with your regiment?
A. No, sir.
Q. There was no effort made?
A. We marched down through the crowd to the transfer station, after the Philadelphia troops left to go to the round-house.
Q. Where is this transfer station?
A. It was two hundred yards or so outside of the round-house. That is my recollection of the distance--perhaps two hundred yards.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. From there you went to the Union depot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was the track clear down to the Union depot?
A. No, sir; there were parties of men standing along here and there.
Q. They gave way so that you could march through?
A. Yes; they didn't molest us. Some remarks made that we were not the Philadelphians, etc.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Did the mob appear to discriminate between the Philadelphia troops and the Pittsburgh troops.
A. There appeared to be a feeling against the Philadelphia troops.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did there appear to be any feeling on the part of your regiment men against the Philadelphia troops?
A. No, sir; I heard no such remarks made.
Q. That feeling was expressed in the mob?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Means:
Q. The one soldier would respect another?
A. We knew they were soldiers and obeyed orders.
Q. That was our training in the army?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Were you in the late war, captain?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What position did you hold there?
A. I was captain of company E, Sixty-first Pennsylvania regiment.
Q. Served how long?
A. Three years.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. If you had deployed your regiment, or probably both your regiment and the Nineteenth, too, along the line of the railroad forming a line on each side of the track, could you have kept the crowd and mob away from the railroad with the force you had there?
A. If I had been ordered to do so, I think so, certainly. We would have tried hard anyway.
* * * * *
General Joseph Brown, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. Pittsburgh.
Q. What is your business?
A. Hardware merchant.
Q. A member of the National Guard?
A. No, sir; not a member of it now. My time expired on November 1st or 2d.
Q. 1877?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you in July, 1877?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what position did you hold?
A. Brigadier General.
Q. What regiments were under your command?
A. The Fourteenth and the Nineteenth.
Q. Did you receive any orders, and if so, what were they in relation to the riots of July?
A. Yes; on the Friday morning I came to the city, about ten o'clock, I presume, and passing by the city hall, I saw the troops.
Q. Friday morning, the 20th?
A. Yes. I went into the city hall, and found that the Eighteenth regiment, of my brigade--one of the regiments of my brigade--had received orders to go out to the depot, that there was trouble there. I went up with them, as far as the depot, and they went out to the end from there. General Pearson ordered me to get out my other two regiments, and I did so as quickly as possible.
Q. What regiments were they?
A. The Fourteenth and the Nineteenth. About three o'clock I got about one hundred men--I do not remember now which companies they were--which regiments--but I started to go to the outer depot with a battery of two guns, and after I started, about three squares, or two squares, I suppose, I got orders to return, that the force was not strong enough.
Q. From whom?
A. From General Pearson. I returned and saw General Pearson. The idea was to get more troops before they could do anything. We were ordered to lay by until during the morning of the next day, and go out to the outer depot--to this place where the rioters were supposed to be.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. What time was this?
A. This was along in the evening about five o'clock.
Q. What hour did you get the orders to remain at rest until morning?
A. About that same time--about four o'clock. We considered which would be the best way to get the upper hand of the rioters. I supposed they were in full force. About four o'clock, I suppose, I went out with the Fourth regiment, up through the city.
Q. About four o'clock in the evening?
A. Four o'clock in the morning--Saturday morning--and we occupied the ground immediately back of the depot.
Q. Of the Union depot?
A. No, sir; at this outer Twenty-eighth street crossing. We there met General Pearson, with Hutchinson's battery and the Nineteenth regiment, and I deployed them--placed the battery fronting on Twenty-eighth street and the regiment up on the side of the hill, in front of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. Define fully the position of the battery--was it on the railroad track?
A. The battery was right at the railroad track, on a space probably as wide as this room.
Q. At the side of the track?
A. Yes; and pointing down toward the depot--towards the other depot.
Q. How many pieces?
A. Two pieces. I placed two companies on the crossing at Twenty-eighth street there, and kept them there for an hour at a time, I believe, to keep the track clear--to keep everything in order.
Q. You had one company to relieve the other?
A. Two companies to relieve each other from each regiment--two companies from each regiment.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Alternately from each regiment?
A. Yes; alternately from each regiment.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Well?
A. We cleared the ground every time that there was any gathering, apparently, upon the track. There might be a few persons--fifteen or twenty persons, probably--on the track at that time. The companies would move across--probably there might be more--they would move across the track and clear it off entirely. At about the time the Philadelphia troops came through, I had the place cleared off thoroughly, and had Doctor Donnelly make a speech to the people there, and tried to tell them about the trouble that they were getting into. He made a few remarks there, and while he was making the speech I cleared the whole place off thoroughly. Then I remained about there. I was in my citizen's clothes all this time.
Q. You were in citizen's clothes?
A. Yes. I came up to the city--I live about a mile and a half below the city--my uniform was at home. I was in citizen's clothes and, of course, they did not know me so well--the men who were about me. I suppose there was one hundred and fifty to two hundred men.
Q. You mean of the mob--the crowd?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you cleared the track completely, before the Philadelphia troops arrived at the crossing--by what means or disposition of your troops did you do so?
A. The two companies of one of the regiments.
Q. Tell me how you did that?
A. By forming in line and moving them back down the street, back of the crossing.
Q. Threw your companies across the street, and across the railroad track, and drawing them down Twenty-eighth street?
A. Yes; across over the railroad track, and passed on back to where these brick houses came up. Part of the column was there, the other was across the other way. Therefore we had them all on this side, except what was on the hill.
Q. In your efforts to keep the crossing clear, what course did you pursue?
A. Just merely to march--whenever I would see a few men on the track, I would move these troops across there.
Q. March across company front?
A. Yes; division front, and clear the track off.
Q. Then march back?
A. March the other side of the track again--up on the track all the time. They were on the track next to the hill--they were in line from this brick building across all the way, and whenever they would get in the rear of the soldiers they would fall back.
Q. During this time, the balance of your regiment reserved, was up on the hill--how far from the crossing?
A. Probably seventy-five yards.
Q. The whole brigade?
A. The two regiments.
Q. Not over seventy-five yards away from the crossing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They were not on the brow of the hill?
A. The Fourteenth regiment was up on the brow of the hill, probably seventy-five or eighty yards from the railroad track, and the Nineteenth regiment was down on the road, within twenty yards of the track. At about half past one to two o'clock, I went into the Union depot to see General Pearson, what he was going to do. The Philadelphia troops were in there lunching at the time. I thought that they were so long in there, I would go in to see what was going on, and make calculations what I should do. I saw General Pearson, and he told me we would do nothing at all, except to go out on two trains, that they were there ready for us to go out on.
Q. He said you were not to do anything at all, except to go out with those trains?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What time was this?
A. It was, I suppose, one or two o'clock. I cannot tell the time. While I was in there, he told me this was all he had to do--to get on these two trains to go out there.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you make any further effort to keep the track clear?
A. Yes; the track was kept clear, until the Philadelphia troops came out, and there was such a rush of people, and gathering when they arrived at the depot, that it was utterly impossible to keep them from surrounding.
Q. Did you understand, from what Pearson said to you then, that he had countermanded the order to keep the track clear?
A. Oh, no; the track was being kept clear.
Q. To do nothing but that--to take out these trains?
A. To take out these trains.
Q. Were you in the immediate vicinity, when the firing took place?
A. Yes; I suppose twenty or thirty yards--well I was at the guns at the time--five or ten yards away from them.
Q. Was General Pearson there?
A. I did not see him.
Q. Who was in command of the troops that came up--the Philadelphia troops--at that time?
A. General Pearson, I thought, was in command of the troops--he was in command.
Q. Was he present?
A. That I could not say.
Q. Was Brinton present?
A. Yes; all I know is--I was watching everything as close as I could--the general outline of thousands of people at the time, and I was trying to watch it as much as I could, to see how the thing was going to get on, and the first things I saw was the firing, when the stones were thrown.
Q. The first thing you saw was the firing after the stones were thrown?
A. Yes; after the stones were thrown.
Q. Did you see the sheriff in front of the military?
A. I saw him there.
Q. With a posse?
A. Yes; with twelve or fifteen men.
Q. Were they assaulted by the mob?
A. Not that I saw.
Q. Any stones or missiles thrown at them?
A. Oh, no; they were thrown at them--the stones were thrown at the military.
Q. Were any of the military injured before the firing took place?
A. There might have been. I do not know. They say there was. I do not know.
Q. Did you hear any command given to fire?
A. No, sir; the first I heard was the firing.
Q. Were you in a position where you could have heard the command to fire if there had been one given?
A. I guess the noise was so great, the hooting and yelling was so great, I could not have heard.
Q. What was the effect of the firing?
A. The people all ran.
Q. Scattered?
A. Scattered in every direction--there was not a man about at all, except one man I saw standing there, and he did not seem to pay any attention at all to us.
Q. Did you make any effort after this firing to keep the track clear?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there any effort made by any of the military to keep the track clear?
A. They rested a short time on the track, and whilst they were resting Colonel Glenn showed me an order, signed by General Pearson, for his regiment to move down to some place at the depot--one of the sheds.
Q. You saw an order from General Pearson to Colonel Glenn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was it directed to colonel or to you?
A. It was directed to Colonel Glenn and Colonel Howard, the same.
Q. That was the 19th?
A. Yes; I received one, may be six o'clock.
Q. You did receive an order from General Pearson?
A. Yes; at six o'clock.
Q. There was no effort made then to prevent the crowd or mob from re-assembling?
A. They did assemble two or three times, and the soldiers would raise their guns.
Q. They were persuaded away by military persuasion?
A. Yes; by military persuasion.
Q. Was any effort made by your brigade to rescue the Philadelphia troops while they were in the round-house?
A. They were very nearly three to our one, I suppose. Two to one anyhow.
Q. You mean there were three times as many of the Philadelphia troops?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would not your force have added to the strength of their force if you had re-inforced them?
A. We did not receive any such orders to relieve them.
Q. Who was in chief command during all this time of your troops?
A. General Pearson was chief in command of the round-house until I found out after dark some time that he had left.
Q. You found he had left? Had you any superior officer present then?
A. Nobody except General Brinton.
Q. Did you receive any orders from him?
A. No, sir.
Q. And if he had been disposed to give you orders----
A. I do not know whether he could have got out or not. There was no trouble until after he fired and killed those citizens. Then there was a great feeling against him, of course.
Q. In the absence of any superior officer, did you consider yourself chief in command of your troops, or the brigade?
A. No, sir; I did not. I commanded what troops I had.
Q. You considered yourself justified in exercising your own discretion in any military movement after that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then what did you do?
A. About ten or eleven o'clock I received word that the crowd was so very great, and the excitement so terrible, that it would be hardly worth my while to do anything.
Q. You got such information?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who did you get this information from?
A. Different persons.
Q. In your judgment, did you think it was useless to attempt to drive away the mob?
A. It was at that time with what troops I had.
Q. How many troops had you then?
A. I suppose I had one hundred and fifty or one hundred and seventy-five.
Q. Of the two regiments?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What had become of the balance of your troops?
A. Some of them had left.
Q. By orders?
A. No, sir; not by orders.
Q. By any orders that you know of?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that they had deserted?
A. They left. There was quite a large number left.
Q. Were they missing?
A. They were among the missing.
Q. That was not more than about one fourth of your command--one hundred and fifty men?
A. One hundred and seventy-five men was not much more than one fourth.
Q. Any of your officers missing--subordinates?
A. No; I could not say that.
Q. How many hours had you been in active service and on duty?
A. From the morning previous--say ten o'clock--until Saturday evening.
Q. From ten o'clock Friday until ten o'clock Saturday evening?
A. I was up continuously until Sunday at noon.
Q. Your troops were in active service all that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they provisioned regularly?
A. They were to a certain extent. Grub was brought to them in baskets. It was regular feeding.
Q. Not regular rations?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not suffer from want of rations, however?
A. They did not to a certain extent.
Q. How did you account for the absence of the names of your men?
A. I suppose it might have been in sympathy with the movement.
Q. With the mob movement?
A. Yes, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. It was not out of fear the desertion took place?
A. No; I do not think it was.
Q. Did you regard the conduct of your subordinate officers commendable during those troubles?
A. They all did their duty. I do not know of any to-day but what stayed there.
Q. Rank and file, do you think their conduct commendable as soldiers?
A. There were some few that left. There was not a full gathering of the command at the first start of it.
Q. Those that deserted you or left, was their conduct commendable?
A. I did not say it was.
Q. The conduct of those that remained was good as soldiers?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Had a great portion of your command seen service?
A. Well, yes; I think a good many of them--quite a large number of them had seen service.
Q. What experience had you in active military service during the last war, or any other war?
A. About nearly three years.
Q. Active service?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what capacity?
A. I was captain adjutant, major, lieutenant colonel.
Q. What regiment?
A. The One Hundred and Second and One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania.
Q. Heavy artillery?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did you remain at the Union depot with your command?
A. Until about, I suppose, it was eleven o'clock.
Q. On Saturday night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then what did you do?
A. I received messages from different persons who came there to see me. They stated to me that they thought I had better disband my command. That was on Saturday evening about eleven o'clock, I suppose.
Q. Will you name some of those persons?
A. No, I could not.
Q. Gave you gratuitous advice?
A. Yes; just talked to me.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Were they citizens?
A. Yes; citizens and military besides.
Q. What military men?
A. Captain Macfarland was one military man that I remember distinctly.
Q. Was he under your command?
A. He was not out with his command.
Q. Any other military men?
A. I do not know, there was quite a number of persons there. We talked the matter over.
Q. Did you receive any orders from General Pearson, or from any of your superior officers?
A. No.
Q. You took the responsibility of disbanding them without orders from your superiors?
A. Yes.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You considered yourself supreme in command at that time?
A. Yes; I considered I was in command of all the troops that were there.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Why did you think it was best to disband your troops at that time--what reasons?
A. We did not have enough to compete with the crowd that was surrounding us--that was about the whole thing.
Q. Was that all the reason that was given?
A. That we were not sufficient.
Q. Not able to compete with the crowd?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And therefore you should disband entirely?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. You said you considered yourself superior in command at that time?
A. Of the post where I was.
Q. Where was General Pearson?
A. That I could not tell you.
Q. Had you any communication with him?
A. I heard that General Pearson had left.
Q. You heard he had left?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you receive the last communication from him?
A. The last communication I received from him was at the Union depot when I went in there--noon sometime, or near two o'clock.
Q. Where was Adjutant General Latta at that time?
A. I suppose he was at the Union depot hotel.
Q. At what time?
A. At all this time I suppose he was there.
Q. Eleven o'clock Saturday night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you receive any communication or order from him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you send for any?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you understand that he was acting commander-in-chief of the forces?
A. I only understood he was acting adjutant general, and that the orders emanated from him as from some higher authority.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you know at that time that the adjutant general was in the Union depot?
A. I had an impression that he was.
Q. Did you make any effort before you disbanded to see him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Knowing him to be there, or believing him to be there?
A. No, sir; I did not make any effort to see him. At this time I suppose that the mob was gathered in such great crowds it would be advisable for the military to be out of the road of the mob so as not to get their ill will.
Q. In your military experience, in your judgment, could you have taken a position and intrenched yourself and held your ground against the mob during the night?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Nowhere in the vicinity?
A. No, sir; unless I had been in the round-house.
Q. Could you not have marched out away from there and held your body?
A. They would have suffered great loss to have marched away.
Q. You did march to the depot, did you not, the Union depot?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Were you interfered with in any way?
A. No, sir; not much.
Q. Marched all the way down the track?
A. Yes, sir. It would not have been advisable to march down the street.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Could you have taken a position in the Union depot, and used it as a fortification to defend yourself against the mob?
A. There was no mob at the Union depot.
Q. Why could you not have held the position then?
A. At the Union depot, the idea was to get away so as we would not get the ill will of these men; that they would probably disperse at this time.
Q. Did I understand you, that you disbanded for fear of exasperating the mob?
A. Yes--with this number of troops that I had.
Q. Was it your opinion that that was the way to disperse the mob, by the military disbanding?
A. I thought it was probably the best way.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you receive any order from. General Pearson, after the firing at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I received one order.
Q. What was that?
A. For to adjourn these two regiments to this depot.
Q. The transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you to take your regiments to the transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir. The colonels of the regiments had already received the orders sometime previous, and they did not want to move until they saw me, and they showed me the order.
Q. In that order, did he tell you to hold your position?
A. As long as possible, I believe.
Q. To take your regiments to the transfer depot, and to hold that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at eleven o'clock you marched down?
A. We marched down as a command down there.
Q. You disbanded at the transfer depot?
A. We disbanded, and the men got away the best they could.
Q. Left the transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Were these orders addressed to you, or to the colonel?
A. Addressed to me, and the orders addressed to the colonels of the regiments, too.
Q. Of the same purport?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you consider that they had superceded you by the order?
A. I did not know what was the matter.
Q. Did it not look to you like it?
A. Yes; it did look to me very strange for them to receive a written order.
Q. You, as a military man, of course, felt aggrieved at that?
A. No, sir. I said that they could obey the order cheerfully, and I marched down to the depot with them.
Q. You did not consider that under your order?
A. Things were mixed up so I did not know.
Q. Which way which?
A. Which way which, and I obeyed the order. Afterwards I received this order.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Received by the same order?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you left the transfer depot, did your men go in a body, together, or did they strike out?
A. Each came away by himself.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Were you called--did you call your men together after that?
A. Yes; we did on Monday morning, and I reported to the mayor whatever he wished me to do. I took one company up on Second avenue, and dispersed a crowd that were coming here on boats in large crowds. There must have been towards three hundred.
Q. How long did you remain in service?
A. I remained in service then half a month, or three weeks. On Wednesday night Governor Hartranft passed through here, and he gave me an order to assume command of the troops here, and I did so. I went over to the Union depot in Allegheny, and I had them turn over the property to me at the Fort Wayne road.
Q. Maintained order there, did you?
A. I had no troops there. I only went over as a citizen, and I put on my citizen's clothes, and went over there and talked to them. The second--I believe they turned over their property to me. I called out Mr. Cassatt, I think--not Mr. Cassatt, but the agent of the Fort Wayne road.
Q. Pitcairn?
A. Not Pitcairn. The agent of the Fort Wayne road--I forget his name now. I told him the cars and property were there, and he could do as he pleased with them. That the crowd had given them to me. That I turned them over to him.
Q. There was no further trouble here about the city?
A. No, sir; there was no further trouble.
* * * * *
Henry King being duly affirmed, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where is your residence?
A. In Allegheny City.
Q. And what is your business?
A. Furnace man, engaged in the manufacture of pig iron, interested in the manufacture of pig iron.
Q. I wish you would state, Mr. King, all the facts in relation to the riot here, that came under your observation--that you know personally yourself?
A. On this side of the river I do not know so much about what was going on. I was over here, of course, every day attending to my business, and I got glimpses of this matter once in a while. I think probably that I had better first state as to the origin. I think that is what my testimony probably would have the most weight in.
Q. That is what we called you to find out about?
A. At one time, from 1849 to 1855, I was engaged in railroading. First as a civil engineer; next as a mechanical engineer; and had made acquaintance of many railroad men--pretty extended--a great many were of the men who are railroading at the present day, and were railroading previous to this strike and during the strike, and for a length of time previous to the strike were men I was acquainted with, and I, perhaps, knew as much about their grievances as they did themselves, or what they considered their grievances. They talked to me very freely, most of them, and I told several of my acquaintances in the city here that I thought there would be a great deal of trouble amongst railroad men; that there seemed to me to be a great deal of dissatisfaction.
Q. When was that?
A. This was in the early part of last summer, commencing in May perhaps. These men talked to me a great deal. I traveled a great deal on the railroad, and these men talked freely to me. I felt pretty confident from what they told me that there would be a great deal of trouble; there appeared to be a great amount of dissatisfaction.
Q. You communicated that to your acquaintances in the city?
A. Yes; my business connections.
Q. Business men?
A. Yes; business men. Some believed and some didn't believe, of course. I felt very confident there would be a great deal of trouble, and was satisfied, too, that it was not going to be a local matter, but would be very general, and it proved so.
Q. On what did you base your opinion, if anything?
A. As to whether it would be general?
Q. Yes?
A. From the manner in which these men spoke about what they considered grievances. I didn't wholly agree with them on that.
Q. What did they consider as their grievances?
A. Reduction of pay; that seemed to be the chief complaint.
Q. They complained of the reduction?
A. Complained very bitterly about that.
Q. Did you talk with the men on different roads--did you converse with men on different roads?
A. Yes; on several different roads.
Q. What roads?
A. There were some on the Pennsylvania railroad; some on the Pittsburgh and Fort Wayne road; some on the Cleveland and Pittsburgh run, and also some men on the Atlantic and Great Western road.
Q. Did you ever converse with any of the employés on the Baltimore and Ohio road?
A. No, sir; I had no acquaintances amongst these men. That is a road I travel on very little. Didn't go out of my way to hunt up any information; it all came to me incidentally.
Q. Were all these roads reducing the wages of their employés?
A. It was so reported to me--it was so talked among the men.
Q. How was it throughout the country? Did you know, of your own knowledge, that the leading railroads throughout the whole country were reducing the wages of the employés?
A. Speaking of it in a general way, I have no authority, except newspaper account, that wages were being very generally reduced.
Q. Speaking then of your own knowledge, you simply speak of roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh?
A. My knowledge in this particular is from the employés of the road.
Q. And your conversation was with the employés of the roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh?
A. Mostly roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh. I may say wholly so, with the exception of the Atlantic and Great Western.
Q. In conversation with these men did they mention, or did you find out from them, that there was any organization among them?
A. Oh! yes; I knew of an organization--the Trainmen's Union--I knew there was such an organization as that.
Q. As the Trainmen's Union?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you know the object and purpose of that organization?
A. Yes; they talked to me that there were several objects they wished to accomplish by that organization. We had a great many discussions about the thing. The only object they had, of course, was to make an organization that they thought would be sufficiently strong to enable them to have something to say about the rate of pay. Another was to re-instate some men who had been discharge for cause.
Q. Did you gather from these conversations that their object was to force the railroads to pay them the wages which they demanded?
A. They expected to put it to that as a finality. They expected to resort to that before giving it up.
Q. Did you talk with them--did they state to you how they intended to force the railroad?
A. Well, by stopping work and stopping business.
Q. Themselves only?
A. They talked about it, that they would stop themselves, and they would stop others. Of course, I expressed my opinions. Everybody said what they pleased. I told them it was every persons right to stop work. If the work did not suit them they had a perfect right to quit, and to go off; but whatever they did, not to do anything they would be sorry for afterwards, because the matter would be settled, undoubtedly, sooner or later, and they had better not do anything they would afterwards have cause to regret. As I said before, they would have a perfect right to stop work, but they had no right to interfere with others.
Q. Did they claim that they had the right to interfere with others?
A. They did not claim they had a right, but they claimed the ability to do that.
Q. And their purpose of doing it?
A. Well, they expected to do that.
Q. Did they say anything to you or did they expect to ally other classes of laboring men with them?
A. No; they did not care about having any help from outside parties; at least if they did, there was no intimation of that kind to me. They expected to accomplish it themselves. I have no knowledge of their making any effort whatever to induce other trades unions--I do not know that they made any effort to have others coöperate with them; if they did, I do not know of it.
Q. This intercourse you had with the men, and from talking, led you to be apprehensive of the results?
A. Yes; I felt very confident----
Q. Did you communicate that very freely to your acquaintances here?
A. With my more intimate business acquaintances the matter was talked over pretty freely.
Q. Did you have any communication with the railroad officials in regard to it?
A. No; I supposed them capable of taking care of their own business. I fortified myself in regard to the strike. I have occasion to have a great deal of freight moved, and I put myself in a condition against any strike.
Q. In what way?
A. In getting in a good supply. If the strike had continued a month it would not have hurt me, anything more than I could not have shipped anything away. I had plenty of raw material on hand--it answered a very good purpose, too.
Q. Did you communicate these facts and your apprehensions to the city officials, any of them, of Pittsburgh?
A. No, sir.
Q. Or the county officials?
A. No, sir; I only talked with parties who were interested in the same manner that I am myself and others, perhaps, I am well acquainted with, in the same line of business, by fortifying in the way of getting in plenty of raw material. I was so certain it would come to pass, that I advised it all the time.
Q. Did you gather facts enough to enable you to determine when this strike would probably take place?
A. Yes; I had a very good idea when it would come. I do not know that I could see that my idea was so clear upon that, that I could fix the hour or perhaps the day, but I think I could have named a time of ten days that it would have occurred within that time. I could have done that, perhaps, twenty days before the strike occurred.
Q. Did you, in any conversation with these railroad men, have any talk with them about the wages they were receiving, and whether it was adequate for their support?
A. Yes; that was talked about considerably.
Q. In the business that you are engaged in you employed a large number of laborers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did their wages compare with the wages of your men?
A. If they had steady employment--if they had been employed each and every day--the wages they had would have been sufficient, and would have compared very favorably with the employment in other lines of business--in other departments. As I looked upon it, the prime cause of the trouble was that there were more men than there was work for, and they undertook to make a little work divide around amongst a great many men, and that, of course, made a small amount of pay for each one. In many other businesses, an employer so situated would have--I know I should have discharged my men down until I had full employment for those that were retained.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. From that I would infer that it was not the pay, but it was the time they were making?
A. They did not make enough time.
Q. Had they made full time they would have made ample pay?
A. Perhaps satisfactory.
By Mr. Englebert:
Q. Has not that been the case in all business for the last year?
A. I think that some employers have made the same mistake as the railroad men. It was out of the goodness of their hearts that they kept men about that they had not employment for. I would either give them work or not give them work.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In your opinion, it is bad policy to keep men working on half time?
A. It is very bad policy.
Q. That was the policy adopted by the railroad company?
A. It seems to have been.
By Mr. Means:
Q. I simply want to know this: Did the railroad officials believe that half a loaf was better than no bread?
A. I have heard them talk that way. I think the railroad officials took that view.
Q. That half a loaf was better than no bread?
A. Yes, sir; but as opinions are going, I would say, a man had better go and try to make a whole loaf somewhere else, than hang around and make a half loaf.
Q. Suppose he could not get the work?
A. There is a way where there is a will. I never kept a man half employed.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you visit the scene of the riot at any time during its progress?
A. Yes, sir; Sunday I was up in that part of the city. I did not go up to where it was said to be the worst, but far enough to see all that I cared about seeing.
Q. What class of men were engaged in the actual burning and pillage so far as----
A. So far as I observed, and judging by appearance, it was about the class of men you see going backwards and forwards on the railroads and thoroughfares, known as tramps.
Q. Did you see any of the railroad employés with whom you had conversations before and were acquainted?
A. I saw some there; yes, sir. They appeared to be lookers-on only.
Q. Not engaged in the actual arson and riot?
A. No, sir; I did not see one of them that had anything except what appeared to belong to him.
Q. Were any engaged in burning and setting afire?
A. Not that I saw--none that I had any acquaintance with.
Q. Did you meet any of them to have conversation with them on that day?
A. Yes; Sunday I saw a great many of them.
Q. How did they talk then?
A. They appeared to regret very much that there was any destruction of property.
Q. Have you talked with them since any?
A. Yes: I talked--I believe three days out of six I am more or less on the railroads, and acquainted with a great many railroad men. It has pretty much ceased to be the subject of conversation now, but for a time afterwards it was the principal topic.
Q. Did you ascertain from them, or from any reliable source, whether they had anything to do with the attack that was made on the Philadelphia troops at Twenty-eighth street on Sunday, when the firing took place?
A. I have never seen any of them that acknowledged having anything to do with making that attack on the troops. They spoke of it as the attack having been made by--well, tramps and roughs they called them. There was a pretty strong organization among the men on the north side of the river to prevent any force coming over to shoot the Pennsylvania boys, or, as they termed them, P.R.R. boys. That is the way they talked about it. They did not propose to have anybody coming in there to shoot them down. That was a pretty thoroughly organized force.
Q. That is, to stop the trains having troops in?
A. Yes; and they were expected in with troops. That occurred in the immediate neighborhood where I live. The whole region was patrolled.
Q. Patrolled by the railroad men?
A. By the railroad men; yes, sir.
Q. Did you learn from these men where the first strike was to be made?
A. No. They talked of it as though it would be a general uprising throughout the whole country. They did not designate any particular place.
Q. You did not get the particulars?
A. I never heard the particular place designated as to how it would start, but simply it would be a strike; that they would all quit work; not work themselves nor allow others to work, and block travel and traffic in that way, expecting as the result it would bring the managers of railroads to their terms.
Q. You travel on the roads a great deal you say, and have a great deal of shipping?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From your knowledge was there a less amount of work to be done on the railroads by the men than there had been formerly?
A. There appeared to be a very decided falling off in through traffic; the local traffic is holding its own, perhaps; furnace work and mineral traffic appeared to be about the same as it had been.
Q. It was in the through traffic that there was a falling off?
A. Principally in the through traffic.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Who was in command of this armed force you speak of that was on the other side of the river?
A. I never heard the commander's name mentioned. Those men whom I met in the street in my neighborhood said that their commander says so and so, and requested citizens to keep away--that the trains were about due--that the commander says so and so. I do not know who the commander was.
Q. They had apparently an organization?
A. They had apparently an organization, and obeyed instructions, perhaps, as well as the soldiers on this side.
Q. What train had that reference to?
A. The Erie train.
Q. With troops?
A. The train that was expected to arrive with troops.
Q. What steps did this armed force take to prevent trains from coming from Erie to assist the military?
A. The plan that they had proposed was to give the signal to that train and stop it.
Q. But if that was not heeded?
A. They had a rifle pit shortly above there, and if the train had not heeded the signals they would have undoubtedly fired into it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was the man who was called Boss Ammon--was he in command of that force?
A. I did not hear Ammon's name mentioned in connection with the matter to any extent until the day following. I know that Ammon was not installed in the dispatcher's office on that side until the Sunday. This attempt to stop the Erie train was on Saturday night, and Sunday afternoon Ammon was installed as head man in the dispatcher's office. I did not hear that name. I have no recollection of hearing his name mentioned in connection with the matter at all, until some time during the forenoon of Sunday. I had heard of a man of that name; but did not know he was in this part of the country at all. I did not know who their commander was Saturday night. The name was not mentioned, except as I spoke of, as our commander says so and so, and requested people to keep out of the way in a certain locality in the immediate vicinity of the station.
Q. What time did that organization first show itself in Allegheny to stop trains with troops?
A. That was on Saturday night.
Q. When was the first freight train stopped?
A. Friday; I think it was Friday morning.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. Did you see any trenches dug along the road?
A. Strawberry lane; yes, sir.
Q. What was the object of that?
A. To intercept the Erie train in the event of their disobeying the signal.
Q. Were they along the road, or across the road?
A. Parallel with the road.
Q. Where is Strawberry lane?
A. It is in the Ninth ward of Allegheny City--one of the lower wards.
Q. Who put in the rifle pits?
A. The railroaders--strikers.
Q. This mob?
A. It did not partake of the nature of a mob over there. It was a very thoroughly organized force--armed and equipped.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. How many railroad men did you converse with, do you think, that led you to form your conclusions?
A. On the different roads, perhaps fifty men.
Q. What class of men principally?
A. They were conductors and engineers, chiefly, I talked with.
Q. Any brakemen?
A. With many brakemen.
Q. Fifty men on the different roads that you have mentioned before--you mentioned the roads?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did that restlessness begin to show itself among the men?
A. Began to manifest itself in the latter part of May.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. The persons that dug that trench, were they Allegheny railroad men or were they tramps? What do you suppose they were?
A. Most of them were railroad men. There did not seem to be many tramps connected with those men over there. These men were acting on their own account, and did not ask anybody to help them. They said they were working for the right, and appeared to be very earnest. They were very orderly.
Q. Things were done systematically?
A. Things were done very systematically.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Were these men in the employ of the railroad company or were they discharged men?
A. There were a few discharged men. Of course I do not know how many of them were discharged, but from their talk I got the impression that there were some six or eight that had been discharged.
Q. That was a part of the grievances?
A. Yes; that was the object--to have them re-instated. They made that one of the conditions--of those men going to work again. I was amongst these men a great deal during the time that they were discharging them and reducing the work. I was very desirous that they should go to work, for as long as they were not at work it brought a class of people in our part of the city that I did not want to have around there. I knew if they went to work, and the trains were moved--I talked with them whenever I could--they would all gather about me.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You say you thought you could have named within ten days of when the strike would take place. Did you hear anything about the proposed strike of the 27th of June that was talked about by the Trainmen's Union?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You heard them talk about that?
A. I heard them talk about that.
Q. Did you hear the railroad men fix that time or talk about that time as there would likely be a strike?
A. There seemed to be a difference of opinion in their views as to that being the right time. They would talk of it in that way--some thought it would be a good time, and others did not.
Q. Did you ever hear them name any special day, or any particular time when there would likely be a strike, or when there would probably be a strike?
A. After the 27th of June they felt pretty certain that it would be sometime not far from the middle of July. They talked like this. They wanted the money for the work that had been done during the month of June before they struck. If they had their money in their pocket it would be fortifying themselves.
Q. What time was the pay day of the railroad company?
A. I believe the usual pay day--of course it varies along the line of the road--I think on most of the roads they commence paying sometime from the seventh to the tenth, and go along various places until they get paid.
Q. You supposed from that that probably if the strike occurred it would probably occur pretty soon after they got their pay?
A. As soon as the men along the line of the road had been paid off.
Q. Was there anything done by the railroad men on your side of the river that you know of towards organizing for the strike, or committing any overt act until after the strike occurred here?
A. I think the trains had been moving regularly up to that time.
Q. It did not really break out there--no overt act was done nor any trains prevented from going out until the Saturday after the Thursday it broke out on this side?
A. It broke out here on Thursday, and I think the first there was Friday morning.
Q. Were you talking or did you talk on this Thursday or Friday with those classes of railroad men you had previously had conversation with, in regard to what was going on?
A. On Friday I had some talk. I went out on a train that leaves here at nine o'clock in the morning, on the Fort Wayne road, and had considerable talk with some of the freight train conductors.
Q. What did they say about the difficulties that had occurred here?
A. There is a schedule of quite a number of freights following immediately after that passenger train, and of course they talked about the strike being in fact over here, and talked with some of the men at the station before the train left there. I was on the lookout to see whether the trains were moving out, and the trains appeared to be ready to go out. When I got some thirty-five or forty miles up the road, the conductor on the train I was on told me that the freights that would follow immediately after the nine o'clock train, had been intercepted, and that the strike had organized.
Q. As this strike finally did take place, there was no general understanding on all the roads that it should take place on each railroad on a certain day, that you found out. It did not actually take place on the different roads on the same day?
A. No; I do not think the strike became general throughout the country until, perhaps, three--it may have been four--days after its first commencement. The first general demonstration was on the Baltimore and Ohio road.
Q. You heard nothing in any of these conversations of any fixed day after the 27th of June--any date named?
A. As I said early in my testimony here, I do not know that I could fix the hour or the day, but I think I could have named the time within ten days, from the information I had in talking with the various employés, and that was, to wait until the payments had been pretty generally made on all the roads throughout the country--that seemed to be the time.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did the railroad strikers in Allegheny City, on the Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, show any disposition to destroy property or commit any violence or illegal acts except stopping the trains?
A. No, sir; there was a great effort made upon their part to preserve all property--railroad property and private property.
Q. They made efforts to prevent the destruction of property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Private property and railroad property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what way or what efforts did they make?
A. On Sunday afternoon the report became current over there that these destructionists--I do not know what else to call them--were coming to Allegheny, and the railroad men talked amongst themselves like this: That this is the employment we are living on, and it shall not be destroyed; we will take care of it. The trade of the road is such there that from the upper end, or what is known as the outer depot, cars and locomotives and everything--I suppose they run twenty miles up--laying on the tracks, and within a very brief space of time there was some fourteen or fifteen miles of locomotives taken entirely out.
Q. By the strikers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To protect them?
A. Yes; and they did protect them most effectually. Many of those cars were loaded with very valuable merchandise, and there was an armed force of these strikers who protected these cars--regularly stood guard over them--fourteen or fifteen miles of cars--every day and every night, relieved regularly.
Q. Did you see them or any of them commit any illegal acts--railroad men?
A. I suppose that would have been an illegal--would have been considered an illegal act to stop that train.
Q. Didn't they stop other trains--freight trains?
A. The regular trains were stopped.
Q. Forcibly?
A. Not forcibly. They seemed to be stopped at the dispatcher's office. If they got a permit they would allow them to pass. If a train went out with a permit they would not trouble it.
Q. Did they take forcible possession of the dispatcher's office?
A. I do not know whether it was forcible or not, they seemed to have possession of it.
Q. Did they use any violence towards men that were willing to run trains?
A. I did not hear of an instance of intimidation.
Q. Do you know of any effort being made to have trainmen take out trains?
A. I do not think there was any effort made. They appeared to be all of one mind about that.
Q. Did the strikers say they would prevent them from going out by violence?
A. I think I heard some talk that would amount to about that. Passenger trains were allowed to come and go as they had done before. A good many of the passenger trains stopped at the dispatcher's office to get a permit that would enable them to pass other localities where the strikers were congregated.
Q. That would be called, in railroad parlance, orders?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was the dispatcher during the riots there?
A. Ammon was known as dispatcher.
Q. He took possession of the dispatcher's office?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was he the man that issued these orders?
A. I think the orders were signed with his name. I never saw any of the orders. I heard the passenger train conductor speaking of them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. He was general superintendent and dispatcher both?
A. Yes; he seemed to be the principal man on that side. I have thought of that matter frequently since then, and it appeared to me that it was a fortunate circumstance that these men were willing to recognize some man as a head, if they had not done that matters would have been worse than they were.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. Did the mayor of Allegheny City send a relief guard?
A. I heard that he did. I do not know that I ever saw it.
Q. You do not know that as a fact?
A. No, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Was not the force that he organized in other parts of Allegheny City at the bridges?
A. I suppose that is where his force was employed chiefly.
Q. Was there a general disposition manifested on the part of the citizens to quiet the troubles?
A. Yes; all the talk was with a view to get to work again.
Q. I am speaking of the citizens?
A. All the citizens desired to have these men go to work, so far as I talked with any of them.
* * * * *
Colonel P. N. Guthrie, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I reside at East Liberty, Pittsburgh.
Q. What is your business at the present time?
A. I am a book-keeper in the Exchange National Bank.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. About twelve years.
Q. Are you a member of the National Guard?
A. I am Colonel of the Eighteenth regiment.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. Since 1874. I think my commission dates 1874.
Q. Just state to us now what orders you received, and when you first received them, and from whom, in relation to the riot last summer?
A. Well, on Friday morning, about half past four o'clock, I was awakened by a knock, and received an order, a telegraphic order, from General Pearson, informing me that by orders of the Governor, my regiment was ordered out for service, and ordered me to report at seven o'clock, at the Union Depot hotel. I have one company whose head-quarters is at East Liberty, where I reside, some five miles out. I notified them by hunting up the captain, and then came into town, sent off, the best way I knew how, to get my officers together, and notified them. They notified their subordinate officers, and assembled the regiment. It was too late to get any orders in the newspapers, they had all gone to press. It was too early to find messengers, and the work had to be all done by carrying messages from man to man, by the corporals and sergeants of companies. My command was ready at half past eleven o'clock, and by a little after twelve I was at the Union Depot hotel.
Q. With how many men?
A. I had then about two hundred and twenty-five men.
Q. How many men have you in all the regiment?
A. I have about three hundred and twenty-six uniformed men. Well, the regiment was formed in my armory. There was present, Major General Pearson, commanding the division, and the sheriff of the county. When I deemed that I had sufficient men for service, I marched down to the Union Depot hotel, accompanied by the sheriff. At that time I thought that my regiment was the only regiment ordered into service, and had the direction of military affairs, and so far as my regiment was concerned was with me. I had my own ideas what should be done, but when I got to the Union Depot hotel, Major General Pearson had ordered out the division, which made me a subordinate officer. My regiment was then ordered out to the stock-yards, five miles and a half from here, where I remained until Sunday night on duty.
Q. What time did you arrive at the stock-yards?
A. Torrens station--that is the stock-yards. I arrived there about half past one o'clock. We remained at the Union Depot hotel, waiting there for a consultation between General Pearson, the railroad officials, and myself, as to what was the best course to be pursued. My regiment was finally ordered out to the stock-yards, with the understanding that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments would soon report, and they be sent to Twenty-eighth street. Upon their arrival at Twenty-eighth street, trains were immediately to be started. Sending me to the stock-yards was to secure the passage of trains through and beyond the stock-yards.
Q. That was the result of your consultation there at the depot?
A. That was the result of the decision of Major General Pearson. My opinion was that I should go to Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth and Nineteenth go to the stock-yards. I believe no interference with the trains had been made at the stock-yards, and up to that time. If there had been, I don't know it, and there certainly had been interference at Twenty-eighth street.
Q. You desired to stop at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I desired to stop at Twenty-eighth street. I could have taken possession there without any trouble, I think, at that time.
Q. In going out to Torrens, were you interfered with on the route?
A. Not at all. There were about two hundred or three hundred men at Twenty-eighth street--I guess twelve hundred or thirteen hundred when I got there.
Q. You went out on the train, did you?
A. Went out on the train.
Q. Did you have any trouble or meet with any resistance in disembarking your command?
A. I had one company at East Liberty that I had ordered at once to Torrens station, and they had taken possession of the platforms there, and we disembarked from the cars without any trouble whatever, or any demonstration of any kind--not even noise. Everything was quiet and still.
At this point the committee adjourned until three o'clock, this afternoon.
AFTERNOON SESSION.
PITTSBURGH, Thursday, February 21, 1878.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at three o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair, and continued the taking of testimony. All members present except Senator Reyburn.
* * * * *
Colonel P. N. Guthrie, resumed:
Q. When we adjourned you had got at Torrens station. I wish you would state to us how large a crowd you found there, what the appearance of the crowd was, and so on, and give your movements from that time?
A. When I got to Torrens station I found at least twelve hundred men there, composed of strikers, and the crowd and mob--not a mob--lookers on. I had no trouble in getting into position, no trouble of any kind. Was not greeted with hisses, noise, or demonstration of any kind whatever. As soon as I got my command in the position I wanted them in, I brought them to a rest. Then I went around on the tracks to see what the condition of affairs was. I found, as I stated before, that the mob contained two elements there--strikers and lookers on. I sent for the man who was represented to me to be a leader among the strikers, had him brought down to my position, and had a long conversation with him. I informed him that I had been sent out there with orders from General Pearson to see that all trains passed through the stock-yards. It was my duty to keep the tracks clear, and keep the crowd from interfering with the passage of trains, &c. I didn't want to have any trouble or any disturbance of any kind; but the moment a train approached there it was going to go through. He told me that the strikers had no intention, no disposition to interfere with the passage of the trains, that the Pennsylvania railroad might send all the trains through they had got. He said they could not send any through because they could not get the men to man them; but if they could, they could send them through; they didn't intend to interfere. I told him I was glad to hear that, that it would probably make things a great deal easier, because if the crowd interfered outside of the strikers a man would have less hesitation in dealing with them. This conversation with this leader of the strikers occurred immediately after I got there, as soon as I got my command into a position and gave the command rest. Almost immediately after, and during my conversation with this man, a train came up to the stock-yards from Pittsburgh. That was a freight train or a passenger train--I have forgotten. I did not probably look at that time; but I think it was a freight train; but that train was loaded down with roughs on the cars, and platforms of the cars, the engine, cow-catcher, and every available space. I think the train was crowded with the most infernal lot of scoundrels that a man ever saw. I do not think that they were strikers entirely, though. There were a great many men from Pittsburgh that I recognized; but there was a large element on that train I could not account for at all. They became very noisy and offensive. All of them got off that train and crowded on to any trains that were stationary there--cars standing on the track, which brought them within a very few feet of my regiment. Their remarks became so offensive to me that I was afraid that if it was allowed to continue it might bring about trouble. I had the bayonets fixed on my guns, and I charged bayonets on this crowd. They broke and fled away, and got some distance off. In the interval I formed my men in another position more satisfactory to me--got them on the street, and in what we call column of companies. Before, I was in line of battle. I remained in that position for some time. I would say here that the understanding between General Pearson and myself, when I went to the stock-yards, was that the trains would be sent out immediately. I urged it upon General Pearson. I believed it was the best thing then, and I believe so now, that a train should have been started, that if one train could have got through, all the rest would have followed, and even one train would have broken the force of the strike; but I waited and waited and waited in position there until the men could stand it no longer. The crowd three times during my stay at the stock-yards annoyed me, and crowded close on my lines, and became somewhat demonstrative, so much so that I was afraid to allow the thing to continue, and I charged bayonets. Every time I charged bayonets the crowd dispersed, and twice I loaded the guns in the presence of the mob, and the moment the guns were loaded the crowd fled and dispersed; but would return almost immediately after. As soon as the crowd would go away from my front I would take the cartridges out of the guns to prevent the men from recklessly firing and bringing about any conflict between the troops and the crowd. That continued time after time during my whole stay at the stock-yards. These men were easily driven away by me. At any appearance I would make of a disposition to fire upon them or use force against them, the mob would disperse--the crowd would disperse, because it was hardly a mob. I could not see that they were armed at all. If they were armed they had pistols--they had no guns of any kind.
Q. Had they thrown any missiles?
A. The second time I charged on them, they began throwing, but it didn't amount to anything--no more than five or six men were engaged. One man who stood on the top of the cars--a man known as Monkey John, a man who has since been tried by the courts here--was the most offensive in the whole crowd. He expressed a great desire on his part to split my head open, but he didn't try it. He was within a few feet of me, and I was strongly tempted to split his head open, but I thought I had better not. During the time I remained at the stock-yards, I was frequently visited by General Pearson, and to all of my inquiries, why trains had not started out, his answer was, the troops were not ready in the town, and hadn't been able to get possession of Twenty-eighth street, which brings me back to my original assertion, that, if the first troops had gone to Twenty-eighth street, we might have had the trains moving. General Pearson, every time he came out, was accompanied by some of the railroad officials, and all of them seemed to be very anxious with regard to my ability to hold that place; but I told them there was no mob in front of me, only a crowd, that might become a mob if they got the upper hand, and so long as they didn't have the upper hand they were a crowd. That was the state of affairs until the arrival of the troops from Philadelphia. At the time they arrived, General Pearson informed me that as soon as they got into the Union Depot hotel they would be disembarked, and brought out to Twenty-eighth street, and placed in position at Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth, and Nineteenth, and Breck's battery would be sent out to me, and the trains moved. I waited until nearly two o'clock that night, (Saturday,) waiting for trains, and waiting for information. Not a train appeared, and not a word of official information reached me until Sunday morning. On Sunday morning, about half past two o'clock, I received a communication from James W. Latta, Adjutant General, which was the first information I had that General Pearson was not in command, and that General Latta was directing affairs--informing me that ammunition would be sent out to me by wagon, under the charge of an officer of the staff. Upon the arrival of that ammunition, I would be joined by troops from Walls station, and, when that junction was formed, I was to march into town to the relief of General Brinton, besieged in the round-house. I prepared my men for marching, and waited the arrival of the ammunition. Sometime after that the ammunition arrived, and I am not able to state the time exactly, because my watch had run down, and everybody else's around. When the ammunition reached me, an order also came with it, stating that the troops at Walls station were without ammunition, that the engineer was unable to bring the train in, and they could not make a movement until they had ammunition. That all the approaches to the city from Walls station were crowded by rioters. That all points along the railroad, suitable for their purpose, was in possession of the rioters--a fact which I demonstrated afterwards by sending men out of my own command to determine whether that was the case or not. I received orders also to send ammunition by wagon out to these men. As soon as that ammunition was received, they were directed to continue to march in to me, and, when they joined me, I was directed to complete the movement as ordered in my first dispatch. I hired a wagon, and sent a squad of men out with it. They had to take a roundabout way to get there. I sent, I think, five thousand rounds of ammunition out to these men. Time was passing away very rapidly, and it was nearly ten o'clock before these men got to Walls station with that ammunition.
Q. Ten o'clock on what day?
A. On Sunday morning. In the meantime I had made up my mind that the Walls station troops could not get in. About five o'clock I had made up my mind that the troops from Walls station could not get in to me in time to make the junction and march in to the relief of General Brinton, and I sent Captain Aull, of my regiment, in to General Latta, with instructions to tell him that, in my opinion, these forces couldn't join me, and to countermand the order so far as Walls station troops were concerned, and order me into the city. On the way in to General Latta, Captain Aull witnessed the leaving of the round-house by General Brinton's command. He conveyed that information to General Latta. General Latta then sat down and wrote an order to General Brinton, ordering him to unite with me at the stock-yards, and sent a copy of that order out to me. Of course that prevented me acting on my own responsibility, and I was compelled to remain at the stock-yards. The order reached General Brinton, and General Brinton refused to join me--at all events he didn't join me. I waited there until about twelve o'clock, and I was satisfied then that it was not General Brinton's intention to come to me--that he had left the city, and he didn't intend to return. I then made up my mind I would go into town and see myself what was going on. In all this time I hadn't one word of official information concerning what was going on in town. Colonel Smith came to my camp on Sunday morning, and gave me the first information of the state of affairs in Pittsburgh. Of course I could see a dim light in town, but the extent of what had occurred I didn't understand--I could hardly believe--and I could hardly believe that the large force of well drilled men under General Brinton could not control any mob that might be brought against them. At twelve o'clock and about ten minutes, these troops from Walls station came down to Torrens station.
Q. Twelve o'clock Sunday night?
A. Twelve o'clock noon on Sunday. At that time I knew, from the officers I had sent out after Brinton, that Brinton was not going to come back to Pittsburgh. I had official information from the staff of the Sixth division that the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth had been disbanded by General Brown, and there was no military force in the city of Pittsburgh. I didn't deem that the troops from Walls station were of any assistance to me whatever, at that time. I thought they were a great hinderance to my efforts. I ordered them back to Walls station, and to go from there to Blairsville, which would be, I thought, almost necessary that Brinton should make a junction. 1 didn't see how he was to get home unless he did go to Blairsville in some way or another. I then came into town to see how affairs stood. I went to the Union Depot hotel; reached the Union Depot hotel just about the time it had been fired--it was then in a blaze, commencing to burn, though the fire was not thoroughly under way. I went to the end of the building, and I saw some fifty or sixty men on the tracks engaged in burning and pillaging. I think at that time that twenty-five good men could have checked that whole business. There was a large crowd in the open space in front of the Union Depot hotel, and a large crowd on Liberty street. I went through the crowd in front of the hotel, and went through the crowd on Liberty street, and I am satisfied there were not men enough in the Sixth division to stop that burning. The crowd on Liberty street and in the space in front of the Union Depot hotel was merely lookers-on, but it only needed a demonstration of some kind against them to have made every one of those men, or nearly every one of those men, part and parcel of that mob engaged in pillaging and burning. They would have gone to the defense of those men without any question. I satisfied myself of this matter pretty thoroughly. I was not hasty about it--calmly went through that crowd and heard them talk, and knew exactly what they meant. They were men that were not disposed to take upon themselves to burn or pillage, because there was no necessity, since they had other men to do it for them.
Q. Were you in military uniform?
A. No, sir; I was not. I could never have got into town with a military uniform on. I came into town not only disguised, but in a great measure hidden. I did that for the reason that men that joined my command, within a few moments of leaving, had told me of being stopped on the way themselves. They had to take a roundabout way to go out to the camp. I saw on my way in there were crowds of men everywhere who would have put a stop to any person coming into town in uniform. I went to the Union Depot hotel for the purpose of finding General Latta, and discover what was being done and what had been done. The moment I got there I saw for myself what had been done by the rioters, but what the military authorities were doing, of course, I couldn't ascertain until I had found General Latta. 1 hunted around through the town and found General Latta at the Monongahela House. He was regretting very much, at that time, that General Brinton had gone out of the city instead of going out to me or coming into the city. He was powerless to do anything, he had no troops under his command except my own regiment. I went to my armory, and I sent out to Colonel Smith and the adjutant general of the Fourth brigade instructions to my regiment to march into town. Through some delay on the part of Captain Aull, the regiment was delayed about two hours. They reached here about dark.
Q. By what route?
A. They came in on Fifth avenue, the only route they could have gotten into town. The crowd was very large on Penn avenue. Notwithstanding, they came into town, I believe, without any demonstrations of any kind against them whatever; marched down to the armory. We remained there on duty continually. Colonel Howard came in and he brought his regiment together. Colonel Gray, of the Fourteenth, got his regiment together. On Monday morning the three regiments were here in the city of Pittsburgh ready for duty, and on Monday morning, the three regiments, I believe, paraded through the streets. Colonel Howard's and my own regiment paraded together. I think I remember, after going back to the armory, seeing Colonel Gray's regiment return to the armory after their parade. I am not certain about that, but I think I did. Those two regiments returned to their armory, were ready, and could have been assembled had anybody taken the trouble to order them--could have been assembled in a very short time. On Monday morning, I believed that I was in command of the troops of the Sixth division. I certainly was in command of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth regiments, because Colonel Howard was then in my armory with his regiment and had agreed to obey orders under me. General Brown came in and assumed command on Monday morning, and I refused to recognize or obey any orders from him. He remonstrated, but I insisted that I wouldn't obey his orders. I was in command of the troops, and I intended to handle them, and he went out and various men came in and thought it was a very serious thing to have dissensions in the military at that time--the city was apparently in the hands of the mob, and it would be better for the military to proceed as a military body, without any dissensions in rank. After listening to them, I agreed to serve under General Brown, and I so notified him. From that time until the troops were ordered to Luzerne, and until we returned, I served immediately under the command of Brigadier General Brown. That is the outline of my service.
Q. Did you receive any orders from General Brown to disband your regiment at any time?
A. On the 31st of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, General Brown sent an officer of his staff to my head-quarters, requesting my presence at his head-quarters. I think it was the 31st of July. I went up to General Brown's head-quarters, and he gave me a verbal order to dismiss my regiment. I asked him by what authority the regiment was disbanded. He said he had just come from the Governor's head-quarters, or he had received an official communication from the Governor's head-quarters, I have forgotten which. At all events, the orders were from his superior officers that my regiment, and also Colonel Gray's and Colonel Howard's were to be disbanded. I think he had sent to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray also. I determined that I wouldn't disband my regiment, and I couldn't see why the Sixth division should be dismissed when the Governor was rapidly assembling all the troops of the State in this city. Could not understand it, and felt there was a mistake of some kind about it. I went back to the armory. That afternoon I paraded my regiment, and before I got through the parade I had official knowledge that the Sixth division was to go to the coal regions, which demonstrates fully to my mind that there had been a mistake made somewhere, or there never was a communication of the Governor's that the Sixth division should be dismissed at all. So far as official knowledge of what took place in the city of Pittsburgh on Friday after half-past one o'clock, and on Saturday until six o'clock, I know nothing at all. I was not present with my regiment and knew nothing at all about it, except on Sunday afternoon, when I came in myself. With the burning of the elevator on Sunday afternoon, I think all danger of a mob had passed. The men had got all the whisky they could get hold of, and the whisky had worked its effect on these men. The burning and pillaging of this city was stopped by the giving out of whisky, and with the natural working of the whisky on the human body. The men were dead drunk. On Monday morning there was no mob in the city of Pittsburgh that I could see, though the railroad property and trains were in the possession of the strikers, and remained so until the arrival of Governor Hartranft with the national guard.
Q. What day was that?
A. I do not remember what day that was; that was probably the 25th or 26th of July--it was later than that. I cannot state the date of his arrival. They were here on the 31st of July. I remember that, because I went to out to see General Brinton on that day.
Q. Did you have any trouble in assembling your regiment--in getting them together?
A. When they were first ordered out?
Q. Yes.
A. Oh, I had a great deal.
Q. What I mean is, were the men willing to serve?
A. Oh, yes; no trouble of that kind in my regiment whatever. The only trouble was in getting hold of the men.
Q. Was there any disposition among your men to aid or sympathize with the strikers?
A. Not a bit, sir.
Q. Could you have depended on them, do you think, for any emergency?
A. Depended on them for any emergency whatever. I had no trouble of that kind. I never gave a thought of trouble of that kind. I had no personal worry or annoyance with the men in my regiment. I do not believe there was much of that thing in any of the other regiments.
Q. How much, or under what circumstances, would you deem it proper for an officer under command, in the face of a mob, to give the order to fire. That is, how much resistance on the part of the mob, or demonstration on their part, before an officer would be justifiable in firing, or giving the word of command to his men to fire?
A. I would hesitate some before I would give an order to fire, unless there was a shot fired. The firing of a gun or pistol into the ranks of my men would, I believe, justify me in giving an order to fire, and I would at once do it. A man in command of troops has to judge a good deal of the disposition of the crowd, as he can see it. I can hardly tell you exactly what I mean. Sometimes you find a crowd in front of you good-natured, meaning no harm, and you generally find among the crowd a lot of men who are working the mischief--see an element of that kind in a crowd. I do not think an officer is justified in hesitating at all, because these men can soon influence a crowd to do as they want to. If a crowd attempted to seize hold of the guns of my command, I should certainly give an order to fire. I would not give the order recklessly to fire. I would give the crowd time to get out of the way, by simply announcing to them that I would fire if the crowd did not disperse. If they had been firing into me, and committing acts imperiling the lives of my men, I do not know that I would give them that warning. These are little things a man would have to judge of as they occurred. I believe an overt act committed by a mob justifies the officer who commands the troops to fire.
Q. Would the hurling of missiles into your men by the mob be a provocation sufficient to justify the commander giving an order to fire?
A. I believe it would, but the commander would consider the previous acts of the mob and all the conditions of it, the character of it, and the character of the people in it, &c. I believe whenever a mob in the presence of the military does damage to the military that the military are justified in doing damage to the mob, and doing it right quick.
Q. And use the necessary efforts to disperse the mob?
A. Yes; fire at them, and do it quickly, and do enough of it to prevent them ever coming back. I do not believe a man in command of troops has any right to act rashly, and would hesitate some before he would do a thing of that kind. My idea of the military has always been that they are subordinate until the sheriff is satisfied he can do nothing--that then they step in and act quickly. Probably there would be no demonstration against the military if the military officer would inform the mob that if they did not disperse within a certain time, he would fire upon them, and if necessary, load in the presence of the mob, and ninety-nine times out of one hundred, I believe, there would be no mob by the time they got loaded.
Q. Did the mob flee or disperse before your men every time you gave the order to load?
A. They scattered every time. I had no trouble at all with the mob--I did not consider that I had a mob in front of me. I simply had a large crowd, which I believe would have been a mob if they could have got the upper hand in any way.
Q. You ordered to charge bayonets once or twice?
A. Three times.
Q. In the charge bayonets, did the crowd stand until your men came close to them?
A. No, sir; they fled in a good natured way. Laughed--no trouble at all to get rid of them. My object only was to prevent them coming too close. If the men get close enough some men in the crowd might feel like taking a musket away, and that would bring about a disturbance. It is better to prevent anything of that kind than to allow it to come and then act afterwards.
Q. Your object was to preserve the military character of your regiment?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Keep the troops and the mob separate?
A. Yes. I never let the mob in with my troops at all, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You were in active service during the last war, were you not?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity?
A. I went out in the service as second lieutenant, and came back a major--filled all the intermediate ranks.
Q. How long were you in the service?
A. Three years and seven months.
Q. You were speaking about taking command of the three regiments--the regiments commanded by Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray--did you take command by virtue of your seniority over them?
A. I would, but I do not think I spoke of taking command of the three regiments, as I had not seen Colonel Gray. I do not know what he would do if he had been dismissed by General Brown. I suppose he would think General Brown had his reasons for that. Colonel Howard had voluntarily offered to join with me, and I did assume command. I had no conversation with Colonel Gray at that time, nor for weeks afterwards. I did say that on Monday, when Colonel Gray and myself were parading the streets, that, to the best of my knowledge, as we were returning, I saw Colonel Gray out with his regiment doing the same thing. That continued during the time we remained in our armory afterwards. In other words, I am satisfied that the Fourteenth regiment was organized and ready for duty on Monday.
Q. After they had been dismissed by General Brown?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you refused to receive orders from General Brown on Monday?
A. I did.
Q. Give us the reason for that?
A. My reason for that was, that General Brown had dismissed his command, and when he dismissed his command, his authority ceased over them until he re-organized. The act of re-organizing or bringing together the Nineteenth regiment, was a personal matter on the part of Colonel Howard; General Brown had nothing to do with that; it was between Colonel Howard and myself, until General Brown got a brigade together. He could not command me. One regiment does not need a brigadier general and a colonel to command it; there would be a conflict of authority at once; those were my reasons.
Q. Did you not regard him as your superior officer, if you were the only man in his brigade?
A. I would regard him as my superior officer. I believe I could have done better service than he. I was willing to take the responsibility. I think that is the trouble with all the National Guard--there are too many officers.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. And not enough men?
A. And not enough men.
Q. Was there any reason you had for disobeying his orders or receiving orders from him?
A. There was. I believe that General Brown has been suffering from sickness more or less. He was physically weak, and I did not believe was fully equal to the fatigues and annoyance of the command. I had no disposition to ignore General Brown, but I did think that in the great excitement of that day I could have handled my regiments better without being hindered by orders from brigadier generals.
Q. In other words, you regarded him incapacitated for his position in consequence of his illness and mental distress?
A. I did.
Q. And that would justify you?
A. That would have been my defense if I had got into any trouble.
Q. If it had not been that, as a disciplinarian and a military man, you would have considered it your duty to obey?
A. I would. I considered General Brown, under ordinary circumstances, was fully competent for his command; a braver man, I know, never breathed than General Brown--possesses every quality for bravery. His military capacity can hardly be doubted, when a man has filled the various commands that he had in the army.
Q. That is, when he is in good health?
A. When he is in good health, he is a good man.
Q. Did you see anything of General Brinton's command during this trouble, up to the time the collision occurred at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I saw nothing of any troops, except my own regiment, until Sunday night or Monday morning, when I came to town. I saw the troops of General Brinton in the cars, as the passed the stock-yards on their way to Pittsburgh. That is all I saw of them.
Q. As an officer of experience in the army and active service, did you think it was prudent for General Brinton to retire to the round-house when he did?
A. I would not like to have done it. If I had had command enough to have guarded every approach to the round-house, and to have had a guard around the round-house, for the purpose of allowing one portion to sleep while the other was on duty, I might have taken the round-house.
Q. For the reserves?
A. Yes, for the reserves; but under no circumstances would I go into the round-house, without I was certain that every approach to the round-house was thoroughly and properly guarded, and, if it was going to take too many men to guard the approaches to the round-house, I would not go into it then.
Q. Where would you have stationed your men?
A. The hill side there furnished an excellent position. Men could have slept there, and with a small portion of them guarding it, and been free from attack. They could have been free from danger. I like to be out in the open air myself, where I can swing free and clear.
Q. Could you have intrenched yourself on the hill side, so as to make the position secure and safe?
A. I do not think it needed any--it is naturally a strong position. If it was necessary they could have gone to the top of the hill, and nothing could have come in there. A very small force would have guarded any approach. It would not be likely that anybody would have crawled up there.
Q. If there would have been an assault made, would not the troops have been exposed without entrenchments?
A. Not to any extent. Men could have hidden behind a house here and there, and might have taken advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and no large body could have got there.
Q. That hillside is terraced with ravines and wash-outs, which would have given your men as much protection as the enemy?
A. Just as much, and with the advantage that a man in command of the troops would have the selection of the ground. I never walked over the ground particularly--I walk by there twice a day, and I am familiar with the appearance of the hill. What the number of inequalities of the ground are, I do not know, but it is a hill, at all events, and the mob would come from below.
Q. The hill would have been the most eligible position for the force From your knowledge of the Union depot, would that have served as a fortification for General Brown's command to repel the mob, in case they had made an attack on the depot?
A. To go down to the Union depot?
Q. For instance, if they were in the depot?
A. Oh, no; I think not. I do not think that depot was a desirable place for any defense, because there was too much space between there and the transfer station, where General Brown was, but the Union depot was certainly the only place where these troops could get supplies, and it would have been a good thing to have kept that space open, between the Union depot and General Brown. I do not think that the force could have scattered them to the extent that you speak of, defending the Union Depot hotel and transfer station and the round-house. I do not think they had enough men for it.
Q. Was there any available position between the transfer station and the Union depot, where he could have entrenched himself and secured a position?
A. The hillside was there. I think there was too much space between Twenty-eighth street and the Union depot for General Brinton to have attempted to protect all that line of property. He had not enough for that.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Could he, with his men stationed at the Union depot, have gone out and driven off any crowd of men that might attempt to set fire to the cars and thus keep the space clear by sallying from the Union depot.
A. I think he could; and, if it was necessary for him to go into any house, I would have preferred taking the whole command down to the Union depot, than going into the round-house and transfer station.
Q. And then guarded it as far out as you could?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The reason for that would have been that the supplies were all at the Union depot?
A. All at the Union depot.
Q. And the ammunition?
A. The ammunition was there. However, I do not think that General Brinton knew anything about the ammunition, where that was, or anything about it, when he went into the round-house, and neither do I believe that General Brinton anticipated any trouble when he went into the round-house. Firing upon the mob and dispersing it, he was left without any disposition for some time, and then he went into the round-house.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received the order from General Latta, to join you at the stock-yards?
A. No; I can only answer that by hearsay.
Q. Did he report that he received that order?
A. Yes, he does. The adjutant general in his report states that Colonel Norris and Colonel Stewart went out to deliver an order to General Brinton. General Brinton in his report states that at a certain time, Colonel Norris did join; he did not state whether Colonel Norris gave him, or what answer he gave Colonel Norris; but the two put together, demonstrate pretty clearly that he did receive an order.
Q. Was there anything to prevent General Brinton from joining you at the stock-yards?
A. Nothing at all, except, probably he might have not known the way out, but he could have found that by inquiring. There was not even that excuse, because he had an officer of the Sixth division with him, I believe, showing him the way.
Q. In his retreat or march from the city to Blairsville, how far did he pass from you, from the stock-yards, how near?
A. He was going away from me within fifteen minutes of the time he left the round-house--about fifteen minutes' march from the round-house he came to the junction of the Sharpsburg and East Liberty roads. The East Liberty led to the right and the Sharpsburg road to the left. He took the road to the left, so he was going away from me all the time after he got to where these two roads united. General Brinton did not get this order that General Latta speaks of in his report and that Colonel Norris carried to him--he did not get that order, and Colonel Norris did not join him until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge.
Q. Until he got to it--he received it before he crossed the river?
A. I think he did. This is only hearsay on my part. I do know that General Brinton had not received that order until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge, because Captain Aull of my regiment had a copy of the order. He had the written order. Colonel Norris had a verbal copy. Stewart and Norris reached General Brinton. Captain Aull did not. Captain Aull was in uniform, and had not the same facilities for passing through crowds that the other two men had who were in citizens' clothes.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, who is the senior?
A. The next officer of the line, the senior officer?
Q. Who is he--what person would be the next?
A. In these troops out here I believe General Pearson would be in command.
Q. Of the troops of the State who would be?
A. The Governor is the commander-in-chief. After the Governor, the next senior major general. I believe the senior major general was General Dobson or General Osborne. I have forgotten which. After him comes General Pearson in order of seniority, and after all the major generals had been exhausted the brigadier generals would come in; then the colonels.
Q. Is there any other person except the Governor as commander-in-chief who has authority to call out the militia?
A. I think not. That is a matter of law, and that I am not exactly able to give an opinion upon. My understanding as a military officer is that no one but the Governor can call the troops out. I certainly would hesitate a long time before I would obey an order from anybody else.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. In the absence of the Governor from the State is there any one that could call out the troops?
A. Unless he left orders with his adjutant general.
Q. Can he delegate that power as commander-in-chief to any person?
A. That is another fine legal point. I will say this: That if the Governor is absent and an order came signed by order of the commander-in-chief, James W. Latta, Adjutant General, I should obey it. It is not my business to know whether the Governor is present or not. The order the official----
Q. He might exercise his powers as commander-in-chief out of the State, and without the exercise of the power from him, could any other person exercise that power of commander-in-chief?
A. No, sir; there is no power can order out the militia but the Governor.
Q. Is there such a thing as a Governor pro tem. in the absence of the Governor?
A. I do not think there is such a thing as a Governor pro tem.
Q. The Lieutenant Governor, would he exercise the functions of Governor in case of the death of the Governor?
A. Of course in event of his death he becomes Governor at once. I do not understand that anybody can exercise the functions of the Governor but the Governor. That is a little bit of teaching I learned in the Democratic party when I was a very little bit of a fellow, and never forgot it. We have a respect for law and authority in our party.
Q. Is there anything else you can enlighten us on in regard to the military movements of the mob that you can think of?
A. There is nothing that I can say, except to give an opinion about the character of this mob, and the sufficiency of the military, and civil authorities, &c. I looked around very closely into this matter, and I am perfectly satisfied, in my own mind, that this mob was not to be dealt with by a trifling force. I do not believe it was in the power of the civil authorities to have put it down. I do not believe it was within the power of the small military force that was first called out to have put it down. It ceased to be a riot and got to be an insurrection almost instantly. The time was very short that intervened between the mob and the insurrection.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What distinction do you make between a mob and an insurrection?
A. I believe that a mob is an uprising in a locality, either here or anywhere else--a small uprising that is within the power of the sheriff to look after. The sheriff, with what posse he might get together, may attempt to restore peace, and, failing in that, call out the local military. I make the dividing line as to when it becomes an insurrection when the executive of the state is compelled to interfere. If the sheriff and the Eighteenth regiment and the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth regiment had put down that thing and restored peace and order, and placed the cars of the railroad in the hands of the company, I would have called it a riot.
Q. And then the difference between a mob and an insurrection is in strength and power?
A. Strength and power. If they overcome the local authorities and the State authorities have to interfere, then it is an insurrection. The sheriff is one arm of the executive. If he cannot quell it, then the executive himself has to come in.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. When you first arrived at the Union depot, that was on----
A. Friday, at noon.
Q. Would it have required a large force to disperse the mob then?
A. It would not--not at Twenty-eighth street. I did not get off the cars at Twenty-eighth street; and I did not go up to Twenty-eighth street; and I did not know what the disposition of the crowd was; and I do not know what was back there--what could be seen--but those that could be seen certainly did not appear over two hundred or two hundred and fifty men.
Q. If there had been active measures taken on Friday or Saturday, could not that mob have been dispersed and the rioting suppressed?
A. I believe it could on Friday. I do not believe it could on Saturday. On Friday it could, because the strikers were determined themselves not to go to work, and some of them were rioters. There is no doubt about it; because some of them had interfered with the civil authorities, and a great portion of them were simply determined that they would not work, and they would not furnish any assistance to the Pennsylvania railroad in running their trains. For that reason, I believe the trains ought to have been started at once. I believe if a train had been started, the backbone of the thing would have been broken. I believe so to-day; but it was impossible to move trains, because you could not get men to man them. They were afraid of the strikers. It was not necessary for a striker to go up and stick a pistol at a man's head, or say, "I will shoot you." Some of them would give a wink and lift a finger, which would be just as effectual as if they had shot at you. I saw one striker go on the back part of an engine tender of a locomotive and take hold of a brake that was there. The engineer attempted to start the train. He just lifted his finger and the engineer never moved that train.
Q. If these trainmen that were willing to run had received the protection either of the military or civil authorities, could they not have run out these trains, and do you not think they would have been run out?
A. I think everybody got all the protection it was possible to give them. The Pennsylvania railroad were not prepared to run these trains, and they knew what the riot was, and what it would amount to more than we did. I knew no reason why troops should be called out on the morning I was called out. Never heard of a disturbance of any kind. After the military had been called out, then affairs had progressed so far that to have started a train from Twenty-eighth street would have required to place upon that train a large force of military to protect it. You could have moved it, probably to the stock-yards, and through the stock-yards, because there was a military force to protect it there, but as soon as they got a little west, why something might be thrown upon the track--a demonstration made of some kind that would block the cars up. There was no certainty it could go very far after it had started. But for the reason that there had been no demonstration made at any point, I believe if the train had been started, it could have gone through; not that it was in the power of the small force, civil or military, to put down the strikers, had they determined to resist, because there were too many of those strikers and fellow helpers in the mob.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You think there was a necessity for calling on the military?
A. Oh, undoubtedly. There is no question about it in my mind. The only thing I find to regret was that the military did not have proper information as to what it meant. I am but an humble citizen of the city of Pittsburgh, and I know nothing about the strike on the Pennsylvania railroad, and what led to it, and what it meant. I went down to Union depot, and until I met General Pearson, or the sheriff, I knew no reason why the military should be called out. When I got back I could see why. There was a demonstration against law and order.
Q. There was a necessity?
A. There was a necessity, for the evidence proved that.
* * * * *
Colonel Joseph H. Gray, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside, Colonel?
A. I reside in Pittsburgh, East End.
Q. What is your official position in the National Guard?
A. I am colonel of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. Were you in the war of the late rebellion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What rank did you hold?
A. I was orderly sergeant of a company in the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania regiment.
Q. How long were you in the army?
A. I went in in 1861, and remained in the service until the battle of Fair Oaks, where I was laid up from service.
Q. State when you received the orders calling you into service in July last--what day it was and what time?
A. I was not present. I had left Thursday morning and gone to the country, fourteen miles, and on Friday the order reached head-quarters for Colonel Glenn to assemble the regiment, about noon or after dinner some time.
Q. Was he lieutenant colonel?
A. Yes; lieutenant colonel. About Friday evening I heard that there was trouble in the city, and that the military was called out, and I also heard that the men could not be depended on--that they were not going to respond. Citizens from East Liberty came up. I jumped in my buggy and started to the city, and I met one company at East Liberty. I stopped there and, to my astonishment, found that the company had been assembled, and that a large majority of the company had responded to the call, and were ready for service, in their armory. I spoke a few words to the captain and told him to remain there until I came from the city, and he requested me to telegraph him immediately, and send him some orders. I stopped at my home, and put on my fatigue uniform, and came to the city, and went to the central armory and found there my adjutant, and that Lieutenant Colonel Glenn had taken what men had assembled there--there are three companies who have their armories there--and he had taken them to the Union Depot hotel. I immediately went there and reported for duty to General Brown. I inquired of my officers as to the number of men that had reported for duty, and then I had six companies in the city and four in the country. I inquired whether Captain Shof had been ordered out at East Liberty--he told me not. I went to the dispatcher's office, at the end of the hotel, and telegraphed to those companies to report to me immediately, at the Union Depot hotel. However, at that time they could not very well get in, and I changed the order to report to me on the first morning train coming into the city. About 7 o'clock Captain Nesbitt came up and Captain Glenn, of Mansfield, reported with their companies. That was Friday evening. It was six o'clock when I came to the Union depot, and they arrived at seven. I went out to the dispatcher's office the second time, to order Captain Perchman in. I then met, for the first time, General Pearson and told him what I proposed doing, and he said that he preferred that Captain Perchman should remain in his armory there for the present, and Colonel Moore, as chief of staff, told me he had communicated with Captain Perchman to this effect, that he should go and get his men rations and remain there, so that I then turned my attention to having my men fed. I asked the gentleman in charge of the depot if he had any cars in the ... he should run them down, so that I could put my men into them for the night, until further orders. He immediately had cars run down. I did that because I wanted to get my men--there was a great deal of talking on the platform around the depot about the future operations. General Latta had just come in, and there was a good deal of excitement, and I did not want my men to know anything about it. I put them in the cars and kept them there until three o'clock, in the morning. Then I received an order, about twelve or one o'clock, to take my command, at three o'clock, sharp, to Twenty-eighth street, by way of Webster avenue. I marched out of the Union depot precisely at three o'clock, and General Brown and Colonel Smith and another gentleman. We went to Twenty-eighth street by a circuitous route, and took a position on the hill side center, opposite Twenty-eighth street, in line. There we remained during the day. I should say about nine o'clock, perhaps between eight and nine o'clock, General Brown sent his adjutant to me, asking the detail of one or two companies--I think he said fifty men.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. That was on Saturday?
A. That was on Saturday morning. I sent two companies to the foot of the hill, and they were on duty there for an hour, perhaps an hour and a half, and they were relieved by two other companies.
Q. From your regiment?
A. Yes, sir; during the forenoon I sent a request to General Brown that my two companies should be relieved. They had all been down, and I asked that they be relieved by the Nineteenth regiment. I thought we were doing more than our share of duty, and for other reasons I asked to be relieved.
Q. You speak here of Colonel Glenn?
A. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn. He assembled my regiment in the city, and reported to the Union depot.
Q. You say you were accompanied by Colonel Smith?
A. Colonel Smith.
Q. What regiment?
A. He is connected with another regiment.
Q. During the day, what companies were on duty at the foot of the hill?
A. They were not under my command. I never knew what orders they had that were detailed. I do not know to-day what their orders were. I know what duty they were performing. I was never down on the railroad myself until I was ordered off the hill. We were there when the Philadelphia troops came there, and we were witnesses of the conflict. About two o'clock in the afternoon I received an order--I think it was about that time--the only order I received from the time I had got an order to go to Twenty-eighth street--I received an order to have my command in readiness to move, at a moment's notice, on board a train. I immediately sent my commissary, Captain Wallace, to provide rations. While there was no explanation of that order, I understood his meaning that we should take charge of a freight train. I had the provisions there. The captain got the provisions at Twenty-eighth street, three days' rations, and we remained, momentarily expecting an order to move down the hill and get on board a train. At the time that the Philadelphia troops came out----
Q. Before you come to that--did I understand you to say that you had no knowledge of what orders those companies had that were detailed, and sent down to the crossing of the railroad?
A. They were detailed away from my command, and I had no knowledge of what was to be done.
Q. Who did they report to?
A. They reported to General Brown. I know what duty they were performing there--could see it all. I might just say here that I had great apprehensions of the whole matter. They were not the impressions I had since. Those were what I had then. I want to say this: that I gave orders distinctly and positively that my men should not be allowed to talk with, or in any way have any conversation with, the strikers, and I say, also, that that order was positive. Of course, men sometimes were away; it was a pretty hot day, and they had to go for water, and occasionally, perhaps, they talked; but I do not think my orders were violated at all in any respect. I stayed with my men all day long watching their behavior, and at this time I received an order to get my men ready to go on a train. I felt pleased at this, for I thought those who were at the head of affairs understood the situation. I had my doubts before that whether they did. Though we did not go on the train, we were there, ready to go on after the firing was over.
Q. Give us the circumstances of the affair; how it occurred--you were present there at the time, were you not?--as briefly as you can?
A. I would say, first, that the Philadelphia troops came out in as grand style as ever men went to any duty, and their position was good. There can be no exceptions taken to the position. They moved up the tracks. My recollection of the matter is that there was one company in advance of the First regiment. I did not know it was the First regiment at that time. I know that from the report. They moved, and they were formed in line and marched to the left to the round-house, cleared the tracks, and then the rear rank was about faced, and cleared the track, leaving an open space. Two other companies were brought up, and a Gatling gun brought up to that space, and the company in advance marched right into the crowd. They were as determined men as ever stood before anybody. I looked very earnestly, and with a good deal of solicitation, when the stones were thrown and pistol shots fired. I could not see whether there was many or not. There was a great deal of confusion, and the firing began and was kept up--a continuous firing.
Q. You say that pistol shots were fired from the mob?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And stones thrown from the mob and other missiles?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there any firing from the troops before that?
A. There was not a shot fired until after they were attacked. The first thing I saw--I knew it was coming. I was not disappointed a particle in regard to the whole matter--the company charge bayonets on the crowd, and the first thing I saw was a man in the mob take hold of a gun, and one man wrenched the gun away from him, and struck him with the bayonet with a good deal of force.
Q. That is, one of the soldiers?
A. Yes; and then the pistol shots were fired. It was all done in a moment, and then the fire began by the soldiers.
Q. Was there any command given to fire?
A. It was too far away for hearing the command; but I may say it was effectually done, and if that was so, it was only a pity the command had not been given.
Q. Was it a volley or was it a scattering fire?
A. It was a scattering fire, but it extended all along the line. We were immediately in front of the rear rank that faced to the rear, and received a good share of the fire.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was there a rush made by the mob towards the troops before the firing began?
A. The thing had been gathering momentum from ten o'clock. It was not a mob--the mob in front--that I was afraid of at all. It was the feeling that existed there, apparently strong outside, and when the mills closed that afternoon, it seemed to me they just came up there in hundreds.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Rolling mills, iron mills, and so forth?
A. Yes, sir; the crowd accumulated rapidly. They were going and coming all the time, and they were there in force.
Q. The mill hands are generally at leisure on Saturday afternoon?
A. I think they came right out of the mills, when they closed down. A great many, perhaps, came there out of curiosity, but there was a great many added to the mob down on Twenty-eighth street. The crowd increased rapidly at that time.
Q. From what you saw, would you consider an order to fire justifiable?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What took place after that?
A. The crowd ran away. Those that were on the hill side came up and devoted themselves to the carrying away of the wounded for a time. The Philadelphia troops moved up and took their position by the crossing, at Twenty-eighth street, and placed their Gatling gun in position there, and I ordered my companies, Captain Glenn and Captain Nesbitt, up in line of battalion. The crowd down the road, that had been there, collected again. However, they did not make any attempt to force themselves on to the railroad. The Philadelphia troops would strike terror into the crowd and they would run away for a time, and then would find there was no danger, and then they would come back.
Q. When did you go after that?
A. Five or six o'clock, after quiet had been restored, and the wounded had all been carried away, I received an order from General Pearson, to assist Colonel Howard, in moving Breck's guns to the round-house, and then go to the transfer office, and hold it against any attack. I sent that order--it was a written order--with my adjutant, to General Brown, who was with Colonel Howard, on my right and front, and reported to him that I was ready to move, in obedience to the order. However, I want to say, that was very reluctantly done.
Q. What was reluctantly done?
A. That movement by me. That was done, because their officers and their commands were there. Captain Breck came to me at that time, and said he had such an order, and asked me if I would not see General Pearson, and protest against the matter. I said to him that there were my men immediately in my line, and he commenced to explain the situation that he could be in, and I said to him, "Captain, I won't allow any discussion of that kind here." I told him to step to one side, and this order reached me, just at that time, and after I read the order, I found Captain Breck was waiting and I went to him. He asked me if I had concluded to do anything in the matter, and I said to him, we will obey the order. I felt then it was a great mistake.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. For what reason?
A. I did not think we had any business down on Twenty-eighth street.
Q. You went down to obey the order?
A. We obeyed the order. However, just immediately at that time the Philadelphia troops began moving into the round-house, commencing on the left, and moving in all the way up, and Captain Breck took this battery, and then went away, and left me on the hill. When I moved up they were all in the round-house, and the mob was pressing down this track. I moved down the hill. Had to go down by a flank movement. I anticipated trouble then, because I knew by their actions--they hooted and jeered and taunted the soldiers--the Philadelphians--as they went away. I anticipated trouble. However, we marched down by the gate-way, and marched through the crowd, and to the transfer station. Upon my arrival at the transfer station, I took a view of the station myself. Colonel Howard came and asked me in regard to the matter. Colonel Howard asked me if I would take command of the station. I told him General Brown was here, and he was in authority. I told him that I would throw out pickets on my front. The transfer station was separated by tracks in between. Colonel Howard was on the side next to the hill, and I was on Liberty street, and I told him I would take care of my side; that he could dispose of his own troops. We remained there, and the most of them went and laid down to sleep. It was dark, and most of my men, except those on duty, went to sleep. During the night General Brown came to me, and said that the place was untenable, and he advised me to get out of it. We commenced to consult about the matter, and I told him there was no trouble there, that it was a good place to rest, and that if we got into any trouble we could get out of it. A short time afterwards he and Colonel Howard came back, and I had the situation in my own mind, and had sent my officers out on the hill side, and at that very time I had sent Doctor McCandless, surgeon on my staff. He was well acquainted with the hill side in that part of town. I sent him up there to look at the situation--it is a very ragged hill--to see in case there was a necessity to pick out the best way, of a return by the way of the hill side to my old position on the hill side. When General Brown and Colonel Howard came to me, I told them what I had done, that I expected that our position was such we could not do any fighting, but we could from the hill side, and I had sent officers out to select a way by which we could get out, if necessary. There was no immediate danger. About ten o'clock General Brown came to me again, and said we must get out. He had information that we must leave that place. Says I, "General Brown, you cannot persuade me to leave this, I will obey your orders, but I do not see any necessity for leaving this position at this time." He immediately ordered me to take my command, and go to the Union depot. I formed my command, and we started, but the road was full of cars, and we had to go out the best way we could. We got out into the open track below, and when I got out there, I halted the advance of the regiment, re-formed and marched into the Union depot in good order.
Q. Will you please tell me about how far it is from the transfer station to the round-house, where the Philadelphia troops were?
A. From the transfer station?
Q. From where you were stationed?
A. I have very little knowledge as to the location of that transfer depot. I never passed through there, except going east on the train at night, but I do not think it is very far, probably two hundred yards.
Q. That is where you were stationed, about two hundred yards from the round-house?
A. I should think so. That is my idea of the distance there. When I arrived at the Union depot, I was pretty disgusted with the thing--had been all day, for that matter. After I re-formed my men, I had expected to get some rations. I knew my commissary was there getting some, and I sent an officer to inquire and find out. General Brown, I went to him, and asked him for orders, and to my utter astonishment he told me I could dismiss my command.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you obey him?
A. Not then. I called around my officers--those that were nearest to me--surrounded the general, and protested in the strongest terms that I was allowed to, in regard to the matter, that it was a disgrace to the officers and men that I had there willing to do their duty; that it was a disgrace also to desert the Philadelphia troops. The general was a little startled at my talk, and he says, "You remain here a few minutes, and I will see you again." He left me, and I did not see him again.
By Mr. Means:
Q. I would like to know where and when your regiment was disbanded?
A. When and where it was disbanded. It was disbanded a few minutes before eleven o'clock at the Union Depot hotel, by myself, in obedience to General Brown's order. And I want to say this in regard to that matter: After I remained there awhile, I went up to the office of the Union Depot hotel, and inquired for General Pearson, and they told me that the general was not there. I inquired for General Latta, and they told me he was not there. I wondered where he could have gone to, and I saw Mr. Murdock, who is one of the officers, and he made the same reply; and I had great confidence in him.
Q. Your head-quarters is here at the market-house, isn't it?
A. I had my head-quarters at my office. That is, our armory.
Q. Your regiment was not brought there, then, as a regiment, and disbanded?
A. Not that night. No, sir; because I had four companies who had to go home by railroad.
Q. Were any of the companies brought down here and disbanded?
A. That night?
Q. Yes, sir?
A. No, sir. I directed my staff officers to notify the commanding officers of companies that their services were not needed, and to take their men to the armories and dismiss them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. What the captain wishes to get at is, did your men break ranks there at the Union depot?
A. I had a company in the next day at ten o'clock.
Q. They marched out by companies?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Means:
Q. What I want to get at is this: If your regiment was disbanded at the Union depot; and after that, did you not have command of them as a regiment?
A. Well, sir, I dismissed my regiment at the Union depot. I also sent word to the companies who had to leave the city--I had four companies--that they were perfectly safe, and they better not go away till morning.
Q. What did they do with their arms, when you dismissed them?
A. They took them home, except one company; they could not get away that night, and stayed there. At ten the next day, I had three companies that went out on the eleven o'clock train.
By Mr. Means:
Q. The companies that left lived in the rural districts; they took their arms with them to their homes?
A. I think they all did, so far as I know, except one company.
Q. And they remained in the city?
A. That company was a home company, and remained at the Union depot until ten o'clock next day, before it left.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. How many rounds of ammunition had you?
A. I think we had about eight or ten rounds to a man. It was not very equally divided, but we averaged that during the morning. We had received our ammunition, our share of the ammunition, by requisition, a few weeks before that time, and had sent out to the arsenal, and they had not received it, and it was left at Captain Fox's armory, in Lawrenceville, and on that morning, I think that we hadn't enough, and I sent out a wagon and had a box of a thousand rounds brought in, and it was carried up from the crossing to my regiment, and a great many of the strikers came up to see what kind it was, and that was the only time that any of them was up there in any considerable number. That is, if there were any up there, they were strikers away from the fold. They came up, and I allowed them to remain there until the ammunition was distributed and issued, so that they could see what it was. Then I ordered them down the hill and they went. A few minutes after that one of their number, I presume him to be one of their number, came up and commenced to me about our being there, and I asked him who he was, and he said he was a striker, and that they were armed and that they were going to fight for their rights.
Q. This was on Saturday?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before the Philadelphia troops came out there?
A. Yes, sir; he said they were armed and they were going to fight for their rights. I heard him, and told him if that was all the business they had up there he had better get down the hill, or I would arrest him. He left. That is the only man I talked to that day outside of my own regiment.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Did you know who that man was?
A. No; I did not know him.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. At the time your dismissed your troops at the Union Depot hotel, about eleven o'clock, was the whole number with you that you took out in the morning?
A. No, sir; there was not.
Q. What had become of those that were not there?
A. I dismissed some men early in the day of Saturday morning, men whom I think were not in a condition to do service there under the circumstances.
Q. For what reason?
A. There was two of them got something to drink and got drunk. I think they were drunk, and I relieved them from duty and sent them away. That was one thing I had great care about. I believe that a commander is responsible for the morality of his men, and I was looking after that particularly on that occasion.
Q. How many less men did you have at night?
A. I had between thirty and forty.
Q. That were missing--some of those went off on their own account?
A. No, sir. I dismissed one company entire. I had one company after the firing of the troops--a great many of the killed and wounded were killed immediately in front of my line, and I saw the men raising their guns to fire, and I ordered my men to lie down, and I think I saved the lives of some of them by so doing. Immediately after that there was a great deal of excitement, and the crowd down on the hill side came rushing back and got in the rear of my line. I ordered the captains to examine the men to see that they had not loaded their arms. I did not anticipate that that was the end of it, but I wanted to know whether any of my men had loaded their arms under the excitement, and I found it was reported that some of them had. I saw some myself, and this company--the lieutenant had an altercation and tussle, and took a gun--the man refused to obey, and the lieutenant took hold of the gun and took it from him. It created a panic in the company, and they ran back of the line for a few yards, and I sent Colonel Glenn to see what the trouble was, and the men were a good deal excited. Afterwards the captain came to me and I sent an order to have them remain there in that position, and the captain came to me afterwards and asked me to order them back into the line, which I refused to do. I determined to send them home. I dismissed twenty-eight men in one company. I want to say that I believe I did these men a great injustice. Some of these men tried to get back here at night. I did not know the circumstances, and I supposed that under the excitement of the firing that they had run back. And when the matter was explained to me afterwards, I believe I did them a great injustice. I know I did, because they did service after worthy of all praise.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Did any of your men straggle off and desert?
A. Some men went away--not many.
Q. How many men had you at night, or about how many, when you dismissed the regiment?
A. I had about one hundred and forty-six men and twenty-seven officers. I had my men counted before I dismissed them. I was not deceived in regard to them from first to last.
Q. What was the captain's name of that company you sent off?
A. Captain Graham.
Q. Were they veterans as a general thing--had seen service?
A. Which?
Q. These men in the company.
A. I could not answer that; some of them were, I know that. All my officers are old veterans, except one.
Q. You have seen service in the war?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what capacity did you serve in the army?
A. Orderly sergeant.
Q. For how long were you in the service?
A. From September, 1861, until the last day of May, 1861.
Q. When you were wounded?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What explanation did you have from General Brown for disbanding the regiment or dismissing the regiment at that time?
A. There was no explanation of it at that time.
Q. Did you think that that order of General Brown's to dismiss the regiment could be justified on any grounds?
A. No, sir.
Q. You dismissed your regiment upon that order, simply because you consider it your duty to do so. You obeyed orders?
A. Yes; I obeyed orders.
Q. Where was the Nineteenth regiment at that time?
A. I only saw one of the officers of the Nineteenth regiment at the Union depot, and that was Captain Bingham.
* * * * *
General A. L. Pearson, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I live in the city, sir.
Q. What is your profession?
A. I am a member of the bar of this city.
Q. Member of the National Guard?
A. Yes; I command the Sixth division National Guard.
Q. With what rank?
A. The rank of major general.
Q. Were you in the late war of the rebellion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long?
A. I entered the service in the beginning of 1862, as captain, and went through the intermediate ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and was afterwards brevetted brigadier and major general--commanded a brigade at the end of the war.
Q. Were you in the city on the 19th of July last?
A. Yes, sir; I was.
Q. State when you first heard of the disturbance among the railroad employés, and your connection with it thereafter?
A. On the evening of the 19th July--Thursday, I believe--I was going home-I live just at the Allegheny arsenal--I live on Thirty-ninth, just directly opposite the Allegheny arsenal--going out in the street car, and I observed numbers of men standing up along the railroad. At that time I knew there was no difficulty. Had not heard of any strike or any disturbance of any kind or character. I suppose I retired about half-past nine o'clock. In the neighborhood of ten, or probably half-past, a carriage drove up to my door, and the bell rang, and I went to the door and found a telegraph dispatch from General Latta, asking if I knew anything relative to the disturbance on the Pennsylvania railroad. The messenger who was in the carriage requested me to go with him. Who the gentleman was I do not know. I went with him.
Q. What time was the message received at the office?
A. That is what I cannot tell you.
Q. Did not notice that?
A. I did not notice it. I supposed it had just been received, and brought directly from the office to my residence. I received it probably a few minutes after ten--between ten and eleven. I got in the carriage and accompanied the gentleman down to Mr. Pitcairn's office, which is at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty avenue. When I got there I think Mr. Scott was present, who was the solicitor of the road, and several other gentlemen. They told me about the difficulties, and stated that they had sent to Sheriff Fife. At that time I knew of no difficulties. Did not know there were any troubles at all, and I waited a long time, and I presume it was in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock when Sheriff Fife arrived, and they talked over the situation of affairs, and at the request of the sheriff I accompanied him to Twenty-eighth street, walking up the track.
Q. Twelve o'clock at night?
A. I suppose in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock in the night. When we arrived in the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street, several shots were fired--not at us, however. They were fired, I presume, in the air, at least, nobody was hurt, and we went in among the crowd, and the sheriff mounted a little pile of lumber or so, and told this crowd who he was, and was answered with most outrageous language. He told them he was there as a law officer of the county, and insisted upon them dispersing. Told them the consequences of their illegal acts. After he had spoken sometime, some one, who evidently was leader of the party, cried out, "Why, you can go and bring your posse, we don't care a damn for you or your posse. Mayor McCarthy and his police are with us." Then they mentioned the name of some merchant who had promised them a thousand barrels of flour, and another gentleman who promised them one thousand dollars if they would continue. After they had made these remarks, two or three of the fellows took me one side, and told me about a man named McCall, who had been arrested for striking Mr. Watt, and wanted to know if I would defend him next morning at the mayor's office at ten o'clock. I told them if it was necessary; that I was an attorney, and I would go with them, and advised them to leave the railroad property at that time. Talked to them quietly, and promised to meet them the next morning to defend this fellow who had struck Mr. Watt. Sheriff Fife still talked with the crowd. The crowd was very large, and, while he was talking, one or two, maybe three, dispatches--whether they were telegraphic dispatches or not, I do not know--but they received one or two, and probably three dispatches.
Q. The mob?
A. The mob; and as some person would announce the fact that they received these dispatches they would run hurriedly with a lantern, and he would read it out. They said we don't care a damn for you, or your posse, to-morrow at eleven o'clock we will stop every road in the Commonwealth. There will not be a railroad train run to-morrow after eleven o'clock. Their language was simply outrageous. One or two women in the party were, if anything, worse than the men, and extended invitations to the sheriff which he did not accept at that time. Whether he has or not, I don't know. No such invitations were extended to me, however. At that time I was treated very civil, indeed. They treated me very nicely with the exception of the boisterous language which had been used more directly to the sheriff. Finding nothing could be done they insisted upon remaining where they were, and stopping the trains. We walked down to the telegraph office where we had left, and there in consultation with Mr. Scott and others who were present, the sheriff sent communications to the Governor, to the Lieutenant Governor, to the Adjutant General, and Mr. Quay, and whether he sent to any other State officers or not I can't say. He hesitated at first in regard to writing these communications, and said he would prefer to have his attorney. Says he: "I can't reach Mr. Carnochan, but I will submit and ask your advice in regard to this matter."
Q. That is, addressing himself to you?
A. Addressing himself to me. I told him I was very free to confess that after having heard what had been said by the mob at Twenty-eighth street, and the fact that there was not a single police officer to be seen in that neighborhood, although large crowds had congregated there, that it was more than likely that what they said in regard to the mayor was true, that everything looked very serious, that he had but one duty to perform, and that was to call out his posse comitatus, and in view of the fact that everything looked so badly just then, that I would not hesitate, were I the sheriff of the county, under the circumstances, to notify the Adjutant General of the true state of affairs. He then sent the telegraphic dispatches as I have stated.
Q. By whom were they written?
A. That is what I cannot tell you, sir. They were sent, I know, by the sheriff. They were not written by myself, and I do not think they were written by Sheriff Fife.
Q. Were they written by Mr. Scott, the solicitor?
A. I think it is more than probable that Mr. Scott wrote the dispatches. When I knew he was going to send the dispatches I had other things to think about. I knew my command was scattered, and I would have a good deal of work to get them out if I was so ordered.
Q. Who first suggested the calling out of the militia in that conversation?
A. That would be hard to tell. The conversation was a general one. Probably there were half a dozen gentlemen present at that meeting.
Q. Between yourself and the sheriff?
A. There was Mr. Scott was there, and I think Mr. Watt and the sheriff, and two or three other railroad officials, and myself. The dispatches were sent. I telegraphed General Latta that I was then at the telegraph office, and subject to any orders that he might send. At about three o'clock, probably half past three o'clock in the morning, I received a telegraphic communication--order from General Latta--ordering me to place one regiment--ordering out one regiment for duty. Upon that order I telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, who resided at the East End, telling him I had ordered out his regiment--the Eighteenth regiment. I came down to the city and stopped one or two of the newspaper presses, and got my order--I think it was in the Gazette and the Dispatch--calling upon the Eighteenth regiment to assemble at their armory at six o'clock in the morning, and report at the Union depot at seven. My adjutant was out of town, and I had no means of reaching any members of my staff; but having telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, I fortunately met him early on the following morning, and he had been at work from the time he had received my dispatch in getting his men together. From the fact that his regiment was scattered all over town, it was almost impossible for him to have access to the members of his command, and they did not report at the hour named, to wit: seven o'clock in the morning, but at about twelve o'clock. Colonel Guthrie reported at the Union Depot hotel. I deemed it then--at that time, at Torrens station, where the stock-yards were--there was a large number of sheds, and a great many cattle congregated there, and a large crowd had been there, and I considered it was the principal point of attack--that there was more danger to be apprehended there than any place else. I consequently sent Guthrie and his command to Torrens station by rail. I had telegraphed General Latta of the situation of affairs, and suggested the propriety of calling out the remainder of my division, and received an answer thereto, with orders to that effect. General Brown lived at McKee's, some distance below the city, and I had no means of communicating. I consequently issued my orders directly to the regimental commanders, Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard; also, instructing Captain Breck to report with two pieces of artillery. Late in the afternoon of Friday, probably in the neighborhood of half past three o'clock, Captain Breck reported with his two pieces of artillery, and Colonel Howard reported with but a very few men--I suppose, all told, not fifty from his regiment. I then ordered Colonel Howard and Captain Breck, with his two pieces of artillery, to take their position on Liberty avenue, with the expectation of moving out to Twenty-eighth street. Mr. Thaw, Mr. Scott, and Mr. Cassatt, and one or two other gentlemen, met at the office of Mr. Butler, who was the depot master, and wanted to know whether I could clear Twenty-eighth street with the number of men I then had--that was about seventy-five. I told them there was no doubt about my----
Q. What time was that?
A. That was at four o'clock. I told them there was no doubt about my ability to clear the tracks, at that time, with the number of men. That I had already ordered them to start, to go out Liberty avenue to Twenty-eighth street, and up Twenty-eighth, and take possession of the tracks at that point. I had no doubt of my ability to clear the tracks, at that time, but I was compelled to say that it would be at a fearful loss of life, a thing that I preferred to avert, if possible. Mr. Thaw and Mr. Scott both expostulated, and asked if I would send an aid, and stop the troops from going at that time, which I did. They halted at the Catholic church, and we then talked the matter over. Mr. Cassatt thought it much better to go out and take possession of the property then, even if there should be a trouble. I told them, then, that I could go and take possession of the track, that I thought, from the feeling that was existing then, it would be impossible for me, with seventy-five men, to hold the position. I would clear the tracks, but I would not promise to hold the position at that locality. After considerable conversation, believing it better to avert bloodshed and loss of life, and, acting upon the suggestion of Mr. William Thaw and Mr. Scott, I re-called the troops, and brought them into the Union depot, but, in the meantime, I had visited Torrens station, in company with the sheriff, and he there had spoken to the crowd, and commanded and demanded that they should disperse. They treated him with a very great deal of disrespect, hurling all sorts of outrageous epithets at him, and, seeing quite a number in the crowd whom I knew, not by name, but whom I knew, I thought if I would talk to them I might have some influence, and I got up on a tender, and spoke to them. It just had the opposite effect. They said, we don't care a damn for you or your troops. One man in particular said, "I have been in the army for four years, and many of us have been, and we are going to have bread or blood, and we will wade up to our waists in blood before this thing is over." I told them that was the language generally used by fellows who ran away. There was a good many women and children, and I begged that they would go away. We then returned to Twenty-eighth street, and I again spoke to the crowd there, with a like result. After the troops had been re-called into the Union Depot hotel, it was suggested that, inasmuch as very many of the men of my division were workingmen, who, probably, had fathers or brothers who were directly interested in the railroads, being employés of the road, that their sympathies would be with those that were opposing law and order, that some other troops should be called, and Mr. Cassatt suggested that a Philadelphia regiment be sent for. I telegraphed to General Latta what had been suggested, and, in answer thereto, he asked what I thought of affairs. I told him, from the situation of affairs, that I thought it would be much better to bring additional troops here, and that we ought not to have less than two thousand. That there was but one way to avoid the shedding of blood and loss of life, and that was to overawe the strikers and rioters by an appearance of strength. Acting upon that suggestion, I think General Brinton's command was ordered here. In the evening, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Latta, stating that he had ordered General Brinton's division to report to me. I received a dispatch from General Brinton, stating that he would leave at one o'clock with eighteen hundred men, fully armed and equipped. At that time, Colonel Gray had reported with the Fourteenth regiment at the Union depot, and a considerable number of the Nineteenth regiment--Colonel Howard's regiment--had also reported, swelling the entire strength of the division to the neighborhood, probably, of six hundred men. Of that number Colonel Guthrie, probably, had two hundred, and over, men at Torrens station. Anticipating the arrival of General Brinton early on Saturday morning before daylight, I ordered Colonel Gray, and Colonel Howard, and Captain Breck to have their men under arms, and ready for any movement I might suggest.
Q. On Saturday morning?
A. Yes, sir; and I think about two-thirty o'clock that morning, I sent Colonel Gray out, taking a circuitous route--taking Bedford avenue, so as to strike the top of the hill directly opposite Twenty-eighth street, with orders to deploy on the summit of the hill, and move down, and giving him time to get to that locality. I had taken out Breck's two guns upon gondola cars and what troops of the Nineteenth had reported under Colonel Howard, and just as we reached Twenty-eighth street, Colonel Gray's regiment could be seen coming down from the summit of the hill, and moving down towards the pieces. At that time there were not many men there--not many of the mob. We disembarked Captain Breck's guns, and placed them in position, facing Twenty-eighth street, and commanding that position. Colonel Gray moved his command down, probably half way down the hill and halted. Colonel Howard took possession of the railroad tracks, and I walked up to meet Colonel Gray's command, and found half a dozen men who had evidently been posted there, and we drove them off the hill. We pushed the crowd back clear to the westerly track, and I told them then and there, that the Philadelphia troops had been ordered here, and that we had no blank ammunition, that these men were all sworn into the service, that they had but one duty to perform, and that was to obey orders, and that they were there in opposition to the law, and that they must leave.
Q. The mob was there in opposition?
A. The mob was there in opposition to the law, and they must leave the tracks, that they had no right there, and that the orders that I would give to my troops would be to keep the hill side clear, and the tracks open for the passage of any trains the railroad officials might see fit to send. There was considerable howling at that time, and some of them spoke about wanting bread, and says I, "If you want bread, if you will go away from there, I will send you a car load of bread. I will furnish you with all the bread you want, if you go away and let these tracks alone." The tracks then were comparatively clear. There was no person on the hill side with the exception of the troops. I then gave directions to General Brown, who had command of the infantry portion of the division, to keep the hill side clear, and allow no person upon the track, and to hold it in the position until he received further orders from me. He spoke of the fact that Twenty-eighth street was a public street, and that the public had a right to use it. I told him that was a matter he had no concern about whatever. I had the responsibility of closing up that street, and I gave him an order to keep the hill side clear, and the people off the track, and anything he might do to carry out that order I would be responsible for, and he would be doing what would place him in no false position. I then jumped on the locomotive, and returned to the Union Depot hotel. During this time numbers of people had come to me to expostulate with me for calling out the troops. I told them that was a matter in which I had no concern whatever; I was merely obeying orders. I was a sworn officer of the Commonwealth, and that every officer and every man in my command had filed their oaths to obey orders. I was there to obey orders, and anything that might happen would not be upon my shoulders, but upon those who were breaking the laws. I received telegrams from General Brinton from various points on his route to Pittsburgh from Philadelphia. When he reached Pittsburgh, it was then in the neighborhood of two o'clock. He had about five hundred and fifty men and two Gatling guns, and I think twenty thousand rounds of extra ammunition. Upon his arrival, we furnished his command--they came in two sections--when the first section arrived, we furnished the troops of that section with such rations as we could procure, which was nothing more or less than a sandwich and cup of coffee, and probably thirty minutes after the second section arrived, and we furnished the troops in that section with sandwiches and coffee. We took the ammunition and placed it in the small building near the track, and I then took General Brinton out and had a consultation with General Latta, who was then in the Union Depot hotel. He wanted to know what my plans were, and I told him, and he asked me the question, "Do you still think that it is better to overawe the mob with the large number of troops?" And I told him, certainly I did, and General Latta agreed with me. Says he, "I think you are pursuing a wise policy. We will try to avert the shedding of blood and loss of life if possible." He then wanted me to show General Brinton the situation of affairs, and I drew a small plot of Twenty-eighth street and the hill, and the track, the round-house, &c. And General Latta asked me, "Who will you send out with General Brinton to show him the situation?" I told him I had better go out myself. We started out the tracks, taking the two Gatling guns by hand. At that time a large crowd was congregated in the neighborhood of the Union Depot hotel, many of them looking over the fences, and others had got inside, and were mingling with the troops, but we pushed out the tracks, and in the neighborhood of Twenty-fourth street there was quite a crowd lining the tracks, standing on the cars, occupying the side of the hill. Probably at that time there was in the neighborhood of one thousand five hundred or two thousand cars laden with all kinds of goods there, and I suggested to General Brinton the propriety of leaving a portion of his troops to guard his flank and rear, as well as to protect the cars, which he did. I think that was probably General Loud's brigade, consisting probably of three hundred men. They were deployed over that locality clear up to the lower round-house. We pushed on with the balance of the troops, headed by the sheriff and his posse. When we got to Twenty-eighth street, instead of finding the tracks clear, and the hill side clear of people, there was one dense mass of humanity, men, women, and children--the hill side was crowded with people. I could not see Colonel Gray's regiment, the Fourteenth. I found a small portion of the Nineteenth occupying the right hand track of the railroad, and the entire tracks in possession of the mob. As we went up the track the sheriff was received with all manner of derisive shouts, calling him all sorts of names. I was received in a like manner, but the crowd seemed to know me very well by name. They pointed me out, and everything that a dirty, low man could say was said. At that time one of the mob pushed through the line of soldiers and struck at one of the officers--whether it was General Brinton, or General Mathews, who commanded one of his brigades, I don't know.
Q. What did he strike with?
A. Struck him with his fist. I got the fellow by the shoulder and quickly pushed him towards the sheriff. Says I, "Here is a fellow that will make trouble; take charge of this man." The sheriff pushed him into the midst of his posse. At that time there was a fellow standing upon my right, just off the railroad tracks, and he was doing a good deal of loud talking and making all sorts of threats. I pointed him out to the sheriff, and says I, "Here is another fellow you had better arrest; he will make trouble." I pushed through the mob and started up the hillside to find where General Brown was--to find where the Fourteenth regiment was, and the remainder of the Nineteenth was. I found Colonel Howard, who commanded the Nineteenth regiment, occupying a position on a private road leading to the West Pennsylvania hospital, and asked him the question what he was doing there. He said he had been ordered to report there, and, says he, "I am sorry to say you can place but little dependence upon the troops of your division, and some of the men have thrown down their arms and others have left, and I fear the situation very much;" and spoke in like terms--says he, "I think the Fourteenth regiment is in the same position." I then gave orders to Colonel Howard to move his command in such a position that they would be of some use in case of attack, which he immediately proceeded to do. I then came down, pushed through the mob, and having heard this information from Colonel Howard of the situation of affairs, and finding General Brown was not to be found, I did not see him, and did not know where he was--had not seen him that day at all--and finding the hill side occupied with people, the tracks in complete possession of the mob, the troops outnumbered in a very large degree, I concluded it was my duty then to notify General Latta of the state of affairs, and to ask that additional troops be sent for. I knew that four divisions had been ordered under arms prior to that--General White's, General Huidekoper's, General Gallagher's, and probably General Bolton's, had been ordered under arms prior to that. As I pushed through the mob I found that General Brinton had deployed, by what command I cannot state. But one single line of his troops occupied a portion of the westerly track. There was a single rank facing the hill side, and as I passed down the company was moving up from his rear and moving directly up the tracks towards Twenty-eighth street. I left my station there with Major Evans, walked down the tracks, entered the telegraph office at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty avenue, and telegraphed General Latta of the situation of affairs, asking if he would immediately telegraph to the Fourth division commanders and order them at once. Probably that had hardly taken place, and in looking out of the window I found a man carrying a boy across his arms with his legs dangling down. I remarked to Major Evans that I feared there had been a conflict. He went out and came back with the report that a boy had been sun-struck. Just then I heard a cry on Liberty avenue, and looking out of the window I found the dead and wounded being carried past, and the crowd rushing down to the workshops of the railroad. At that instant Mr. Cassatt came in. He had been up in the cupola of one of the workshops, and had seen the firing and was the first to communicate the fact to me that the firing had taken place. I had not even heard the reports of the muskets. I presume the noise of the ticking of the telegraphic instruments and the steam which was up in half a dozen locomotives in the adjoining round-house was such that I did not hear the explosion of the pieces. Mr. Cassatt stated that as the mob was rushing round Twenty-eighth street and down Liberty, towards the round-houses, he feared destruction of property. The round-houses were filled with locomotives, the workshops filled full of valuable machinery, and the tracks lined with cars laden with all sorts of valuables of every kind and character, and stated that he feared that property would be destroyed. I had sent word to General Brinton asking him, if necessary, to send a staff officer to me or communicate in person. He came in in a moment or two, stating that he had cleared the tracks; that the mob had fired upon his troops; that many of the men had been knocked down by stones and pieces of iron, and without orders his troops had fired into the crowd; that the tracks were cleared, and that he was ready, and if they had any trains to send them out. It was then stated by some of the railroad officials that they had no crews to send out trains, and Brinton suggested that in as much as nothing could be done that night, and his men were almost in a famished condition, that they be brought into the round-houses or workshops. I then stated that it was the only thing to be done to save the property of the road. I issued orders to General Brinton to bring his troops in and to occupy the round-house, and I sent direct communications to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray ordering them to bring their regiments in and take possession of the transfer offices, which were long wooden sheds, extending from Twenty-third, I think, to Twenty-fourth street. My orders were obeyed. Captain Breck brought two pieces of his battery in and placed them in position, facing Twenty-sixth street. Brinton's two Gatling guns were brought in and placed in a like position. The gates fronting Twenty-eighth street were closed, and everything at that time in as good a condition as could possibly be. Mr. Pitcairn, superintendent of the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, who had been an observer of all the Twenty-eighth street troubles, came in, and I suggested the propriety that they should go down and send out rations from the depot hotel. They said they would, and they started off for that purpose. Towards evening an express wagon came up. General Brinton and his staff was occupying the second story, then, of the telegraph office, and I had my station there. We were congratulating ourselves upon the fact that we were going to have at least one decent meal. We could see the express wagon coming up with the supper, and just at that time the crowd made a rush upon the wagon and took entire possession, and instead of supper we got broken dishes through the windows, which did not add much to the good feeling existing in the building at that time. And after that an Irishman--I know he was an Irishman by the cut of his jib and his language--drove up on a bob-tailed, lantern-jawed horse and made a very inflammatory speech to the mob right in front of the gate. It was a very ludicrous speech, and the mob seemed to take it as such, because one of them pulled off a piece of board off a fence and struck the horse over the back, and the last we could see of this Irish orator he was going down Liberty avenue. Then a few shots were fired through the windows, and stones thrown, and General Brinton insisted upon firing into the crowd with his Gatling guns. I expostulated with him, telling him the situation was not serious enough to use his guns at that time, because then on Liberty avenue, directly in connection with where we were, there were very few of the rioters. Down Twenty-sixth and up there probably there were a thousand men, women, and children congregated, and particularly women and children, and as his officers would go up to his Gatling guns the active rioters who were on Liberty avenue would get behind the stone wall, leaving Twenty-sixth street exposed. I ran out and called attention to the fact. Says I, "If you fire now instead of killing these people that should be killed, you will kill a large number of women and children who are merely idle spectators," and gave direct orders to one of the officers not to fire that gun. They apparently cooled down and returned into the building, and the thing was repeated. I then gave orders again that until the affairs became more desperate that there was no occasion to use the Gatling gun, because the active rioters would not be injured--that merely women and children would be knocked down in the streets. At eight o'clock--in the neighborhood of eight and nine o'clock--General Brinton had been complaining during this time of the half-famished condition of his troops, and I knew the fact that they were in a half-famished condition, and I knew my own troops were no better off. My commissary--the officer who attended to the commissary of my division--was at Torrens station. General Brinton was at the Union depot, and he asked me the question, "Can you not go down and try to get some provisions of some kind to carry to my troops?" Says I, "I think I can." At that time everything was apparently quiet, and, accompanied by the members of my staff, we started down the railroad track, leaving General Brinton in command at that place, leaving him with orders to hold the position.
Q. Where was Cassatt?
A. Mr. Cassatt had, long before this, gone to the Union Depot hotel. I do not think any of the railroad employés were there at all.
Q. What time was it you started?
A. I think it was between eight and nine o'clock that night. We started down the tracks, and when we reached the depot----
Q. Were you dressed in uniform?
A. Yes; my entire staff was in uniform. All had our swords and everything. When we reached the depot, everything was silent as a graveyard in and about the depot, and we passed down and entered the Union Depot hotel. We went up to General Latta's room, and there found General Latta, Colonel Quay, and Mr. Farr, the Governor's private secretary, Colonel Norris, of the Governor's staff, and several other gentlemen. There seemed to be a very great deal of surprise manifested at the fact that we had got through the crowd and reached the Union depot. I had established my head-quarters there at the beginning of the entire affair, and it was then suggested that, inasmuch as the rioters had blamed me for ordering the firing and killing the citizens, that my remaining in further command of the troops would only aggravate affairs, and that was doing a very material injury to the troops, and it was stated by some one in the room that the rioters had gone through the hotel looking for me. That they had gone from the cellar to the roof, and if found, I and any with me, would be hanged. I thought the threat was an idle one, and wanted to know what they wanted me to do. At that time we could hear bodies of men marching up with drums and fifes, and hear them shouting.
Q. What room was that?
A. General Latta's room, at the Union Depot hotel. And then General Latta suggested me--he asked the question--and says he, "Is General Brinton in command out at the round-house." Says I, "He is." Says he, "Then I think the best thing we can do for the situation of affairs and the protection of your troops, and to try and quell this disturbance, is for you to go away from here. If you do not go, you will be hanged." I told him there was a sufficient number of us there to make a hanging very agreeable to all, and I did not think there was much danger; if any one was hanged, somebody would be hurt. He said it was no time to use any levity; the situation was very serious, and my life was not worth a penny, and that my remaining in command of the troops was doing an injury; that I had been blamed for the whole thing. I asked him what he wanted me to do.
Q. What time was that in the evening?
A. It was between nine and ten o'clock.
Q. Saturday night?
A. Saturday night. Says I, "What do you want me to do? Do you wish me to change my head-quarters? If so, will I go to the Monongahela house?" "No; you will just be as bad off there as here," and then Major Evans, of my staff, spoke up, and said, "General Latta, if you insist that this ought to be done, let General Pearson come to my house." General Latta said, "Yes; that is the very thing to do." I had never been at Major Evans' house, but knew it was in the neighborhood. The address was taken by General Latta, and I think by Mr. Farr, of the Governor's staff. At that time, Mr. Dalzell, one of the attorneys of the road, came into the room, and I spoke to him, and I spoke to Quay. Says I, "Mr. Quay, do you think I ought to leave this place?" Says he: "I certainly do. The situation of affairs is such in the manner in which you are blamed for this, that you are doing an injury to the troops;" and others of the Governor's staff spoke up in the same way. Says I, "Very well, I take this as an order, but before I go I will leave you three members of the staff." I left my brother, Mr. Murray, and Major Steen, stating that I would be prepared to perform any duty. That these officers knew where I could be found, and anything they wished done, I would do. Major Evans and myself left. There was no possible way of getting out front, and we crossed a small bridge, and went up over the hill-side, and reached Major Evans' house. At that time there had not been a car fired, and there had been no torch communicated to anything--buildings or cars.
Q. Where was Major Evans' house?
A. Major Evans' house is situated in what is known as Oakland. I do not know what street he does live on.
Q. What distance from the Union depot?
A. I suppose it is in the neighborhood of a mile and a half. We reached Mayor Evans' house, and I then sent him over to find out, if he could ascertain anything about my family. I had heard my house was ransacked, and I know that my daughter had been driven away. She drove down in an open buggy after the firing. Came down to Twenty-sixth street and the round-house, where the troops were, drove through the mob, and tried to get some communication from me. It had been reported that I was shot. It was impossible to get any communication with her, and the mob drove her off. I sent Major Evans over to see if he could find out anything about my family. While he was gone, Colonel Moore and my brother came out for me to give him an order for ammunition at the Allegheny arsenal. The ammunition had been stored there and could not be taken out, except by my order. I gave the necessary orders. At that time everything was quiet. They started away with the orders for ammunition. Subsequently Major Evans came in and reported that so far as he could learn everything was quiet. At about ten o'clock, Sunday morning, I was wakened up and told of the fact that the rioters and mob had set fire to the cars and burned out the round-house, and I immediately sent a written communication to General Latta, by Major Evans, stating that I had heard what had taken place, and desired to receive some instructions from him. That I was ready to perform any service, and to do any duty, and to go any place, and suggested the propriety of immediately telegraphing the Governor for his return. Probably about one or two--it might have been after that--Sunday afternoon I received a verbal reply by Major Evans stating that General Latta had stated for me to remain where I was until I got further orders. My appearance then would only aggravate matters and do more harm than good, and for Major Evans to report on the Monday following. I sent Major Evans in on the Monday morning, and at the same time General Latta had left. I believe he did not see him. I know nothing at all about the situation of affairs from that time up.
Q. How long did you remain at Major Evans'?
A. I remained several days there, and the family being a strange family to me--had never seen his family. I knew the major very well--and having received intelligence that there was a likelihood of the major's house being mobbed, and not desiring to put them in a situation of that kind, I left Major Evans' house. Subsequent to that--of course, when I left the Union Depot hotel, I looked upon that as being virtually a relief from my command, and found, by reading the daily papers, that General Brown had assumed command of the division. I think it was the 1st of August--a number of days subsequent, anyhow--I received an official communication from the Governor, instructing me to hold my command in readiness to move at an hour not later than eight o'clock, and to go up to Luzerne coal regions, where difficulties were apprehended.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you go?
A. At that time I found that the division had been ordered to disband--verbal orders had been given by General Brown to disband the troops, and by accident I was at Colonel Guthrie's head-quarters, and I suggested the propriety of him not disbanding just at that time, and he concluded that he would not. That he would have a street parade of his regiment that evening. I returned to my head-quarters, and when I returned, I got orders from the Governor, ordering me to have my division in readiness to start off at an hour not later than eight o'clock. I immediately communicated with various officers of the division, and at the hour indicated I was ready to move with the entire command. Transportation could not be procured at that time, and we did not leave until the neighborhood of twelve o'clock--started off with, I think, one thousand and thirty-five men, and went to Luzerne county. Do you desire me to give an account of how we proceeded there, and what took place?
Q. You might state whether the mob went to your house in search of you?
A. Of my own personal knowledge, of course, I do not know. From what I have heard, they did go.
Q. You ordered Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard to move their commands to the transfer station, I believe you said?
A. Yes, sir; I did that, because I considered it my duty to put these men in positions I considered the most dangerous--they were my own troops. The transfer sheds were long, low frame buildings, extending probably in the neighborhood of a square, open and unprotected, and I thought it was my duty at least to expose my own troops much more than strangers who were coming here from a long distance. I placed General Brinton's command in brick buildings.
Q. Was it General Brinton's suggestion, or because you deemed it the best position, that you placed him in the round-house?
A. I found that no trains were to be run at all, that it would be mere and utter foolishness to keep General Brinton's troops standing upon the railroad tracks, and to place them upon the hill side would be exposing that command to danger, as all the hill side and all the buildings on it were filled up by railroaders, I believe, and consequently, to place General Brinton's command on the hill side would subject them to any troubles that might occur from the railroaders living above them, and of the mob getting round on top. Then, the further fact that the mob would have taken possession of the round-house and used the cars as barricades, and he could do nothing. He suggested the propriety of bringing them into the round-house, and giving them some chance to rest, and getting them provisions; and I say now, that knowing all the facts of the case, if the thing was to be done over again to-morrow, I would do exactly what was done. To have placed them in any other position than that in which they were placed, would have been a piece of folly that I would not be guilty of. A man that would have taken troops and placed them upon the hill side, under the situation of affairs, I would characterize as an ass, and not worthy of commanding troops.
Q. Would it not have been better to have retired the troops to the Union depot, inasmuch as there were no trains to be moved that night?
A. It would have been a great deal pleasanter to the troops, but it would have given entire possession of the cars, round-houses, workshops, locomotives, and the entire moving machinery of the Pennsylvania railroad--placed it entirely in the hands of the mob.
Q. Could you not have sent out detachments to have driven away any mob that might have gathered for the purpose of burning buildings?
A. That might have been done in an open field, but the fact that the railroad tracks ran along Liberty avenue, are probably ten or twelve feet above the grade on Liberty avenue, and then on the right of the tracks is a hill side, and Brinton did not bring one thousand eight hundred men, Brinton brought about six hundred men, and Colonel Guthrie was at Torrens, and to have scattered the few men out along the railroad tracks--men who did not know the situation of affairs, and did not know the general locality of the ground, they would be subject to all sorts of annoyance, and could be shot down at pleasure by those people. There is one thing the committee must understand, that this mob did not only congregate at Twenty-eighth street. They formed in position on the south side; that they came over in a compact body by regiments. They formed in different localities in Allegheny City, and different places, and they were all marched to a given point, and to have sent a few troops along the line of the track they could have picked them up, one by one, and carried them off body and breeches. There was but one thing to do, and it was to take possession of the buildings, and the only mistake that was made was General Brinton's not calling out his pickets and shooting down the people, as they should have been shot down, and the property would have been saved, and if it had been saved, General Brinton and others would have been hanged for murder, because the feeling in this community at that time was such that if it had not been for the fact that the railroad property had been burned down, and private property had been taken and robbed, and private buildings burned down, there was no officer in command of troops safe, and his life was not worth a penny. The feeling in the community was such that I have no hesitancy in saying indictments would have been found and the officers convicted of manslaughter.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Is there no similarity between this riot, and the military force meeting the enemy in the field of battle?
A. Certainly not. Meeting an enemy on a field of battle, you go there to kill. The more you kill, and the quicker you do it, the better; but in this instance you had a division of six hundred men--my division was six hundred men. Colonel Guthrie was at Torrens, surrounded by a mob. The balance of my troops were at Twenty-eighth street, and here you had men who had fathers and brothers and relatives mingled in the crowd of rioters, and it was very natural for them to have a feeling that to fire then and kill these men, was like shooting their own relatives. The sympathy of the people, the sympathy of the troops, my own sympathy, was with the strikers proper. We all felt that those men were not receiving enough wages.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. You say you meet an enemy on a field of battle, and you go there to kill. What was the purpose of the troops in going out to Twenty-eighth street?
A. The purpose of the troops was to try to preserve order and preserve peace. There would be no difficulty of us going out there and commencing to shoot if that had been an enemy. The first thing we would have done, would be to throw out a skirmish line and commence to shoot.
Q. You were to preserve the peace at all hazards--if necessary to preserve the peace to call, you are justifiable in doing it?
A. Certainly.
Q. When an attack is made upon your troops with clubs and stones, and firing into your troops, are you not justified in killing?
A. My opinion may be different from a great many other military men. I look at it in this way: when troops are officered, it is the duty of the officers to do the thinking. If every man that carries a musket has a right to think and shoot just as he thinks, there is no occasion to have any officers at all, because, when we started out from the Union Depot hotel these Philadelphia men were insulted long before they arrived. Colonel Guthrie was insulted at Torrens, and if each man had carried out his own thoughts and commenced to shoot, it would have showed a great want of discipline.
Q. Would not the commanding officer be justifiable in giving the command to fire?
A. Most undoubtedly so. He would not only be justifiable, but it would be his duty so to do, and I have no hesitancy in saying, from what I have learned from the manner in which General Brinton's troops were received and treated, and the shots that were fired at them, the stones that were hurled at them, and the fact that these men were knocked down, it was his duty to have given the order to fire, and if I had been there I would have had no hesitancy in giving the order.
Q. What I understand you to say is, that there was not a public sentiment that would have justified the commanding officer in giving that command to kill?
A. The sentiment afterwards showed that the sentiment was directly against the firing.
Q. Do you mean to say that the civil authorities, the civil arm of the government, would not have protected the military officer in giving a command to fire under circumstances of the attack made there at Twenty-eighth street on the militia?
A. I have got to answer that in a twofold capacity. As a lawyer, I believe that the courts would most undoubtedly have sustained the officer. I believe that the mayor and his police were in direct opposition to the troops--after having heard the crowd state that the mayor and his police were in sympathy with them, and finding that no arrests had been made, and knowing the fact that upon every occasion that mayor's police were only too anxious to protect men up for disorderly conduct, that there was not a police officer to be found at Twenty-eighth street, and that no arrests had been made, although there was any number of chances to arrest for disorderly conduct and other offenses--finding that none of those officers were there, I had no other way to think that these men had said truly, that Mayor McCarthy and his police were in sympathy with the mob. I telegraphed Mayor McCarthy after the troops had been taken into the round-house--I telegraphed him, and I told him I thought his presence there might be the means of saving life. I believe then, and I believe now, that if Mayor McCarthy had come at that time and talked to the crowd, something might have been done. There was then a terrible feeling against the troops, and no feeling against the police. I believed then, and I believe now, that if he had responded to my telegraph, many valuable lives might have been saved. There was no sympathy extended to the troops by anybody outside of the sheriff and his posse. The sheriff and his posse were the only ones that gave any aid or assistance to the troops. He did all that he knew how and all that he could.
Q. Did you have any communication with the sheriff, after the firing at Twenty-eighth street?
A. No, sir; I did not see the sheriff after that.
Q. Do you know where he went?
A. I have no idea.
Q. You were in communication with him up to that time?
A. Certainly; he was at the head of the troops.
Q. And you, as commanding officer, were to protect him in making his arrests?
A. Yes; he was armed with warrants from Judge Young to arrest certain parties therein named, and we went out with him.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You speak of an order you received from General Latta. Did that order purport to be signed by order of the Governor, sent by him as Adjutant General?
A. No, sir; it was not by order of the Governor; it was a telegraphic communication, ordering me to order out one regiment.
Q. Was it official?
A. I think so. I have not got it, because they were destroyed at the Union depot. I think the Adjutant General's report shows all those telegrams. I think that gives all the telegrams that passed.
Q. Did you, at any time, give an order to the troops to fire?
A. I am sorry to say that I did not. I am sorry to say I was not there when the occasion required such an order. If I had been there, I would have given the order, and in such a manner that the active rioters would receive their reward of merit. They deserved it, and they ought to have had it. I am only sorry to say I was not there.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You said the people expostulated with you about calling out the troops. What people were they that came to you and expostulated?
A. Oh, very early in the morning. Of course, the Friday morning papers had the order, and people came to me, at the Union Depot hotel, and say, "You ought not to do this thing; these men are workingmen; they have their rights."
Q. Were there many of them--more than two or three?
A. I was stopped on the street by women--respectable women. I was stopped in the streets by business men of the place.
Q. Business men of the place expostulated with you?
A. Yes; and after the firing, men came to me and insisted upon my taking the troops out of the round-house. I want to say this in regard--there may be an impression in regard to the manner in which the Sixth division responded to my order--that it may not be known to the committee that we have no direct way of calling out the troops--that is, by any alarm--not by a fire alarm or anything of that kind. An officer has to hunt up his officers, and they, in turn, have got to hunt up their men, who are scattered all over through two cities, and when I notified Colonel Guthrie, I found him early in the morning and he was hard at work, and they responded as promptly as any regiment could possibly respond. There was no way to get his men together any sooner than they did. They went to Torrens station, as per order, and I believe remained intact until the 6th or 7th day of September. I do not know of them having disbanded for a single instant, from the time that they were first called out, until the end of the trouble in Luzerne county, and the Fourteenth regiment, as I have subsequently learned, performed their service as well as a regiment could. They had been ordered to disband, contrary to the wishes of Colonel Gray and his officers, and nearly obeyed an order made by a superior officer.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. You knew nothing of the command which General Brown gave?
A. No, sir; there are officers who heard the command and know all about that.
Q. He did it upon his own responsibility?
A. Certainly. Had General Brown carried out the instructions he received at Twenty-eighty street, and kept the hill side and the tracks clear, with the plans I had adopted of taking General Brinton out, and letting him occupy the position, and sending a portion of General Brown's command to Colonel Guthrie, and used a portion for the taking out of trains, I think there would have been no subsequent troubles. Instead of that we found the ground entirely occupied and in possession of the rioters and sympathizers, and the result was just as you know.
Q. Could the destruction of property have been prevented by any other distribution of the troops that night, do you think?
A. I presume, had we known the fact that the rioters had converted themselves from men to devils, and had concluded to roast everybody alive, and gone into it in the manner in which they did, that something might have been done. Of course, no one could anticipate the fact that those men would send burning flames of oil down upon the troops in the round-house. No man living could ever think of such a thing.
At this point the committee adjourned until ten o'clock, to-morrow morning.
MORNING SESSION.
PITTSBURGH, Friday, February 22, 1878.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at ten o'clock. Mr. Lindsey in the chair. All members present.
* * * * *
Mayor W. C. McCarthy, affirmed:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where is your residence?
A. My residence is 95, Robert street, Eleventh ward.
Q. What official position did you hold in this city last July?
A. I was mayor of the city.
Q. How long had you occupied that position?
A. Since the 1st day of February, 1875--the last time--I occupied it before.
Q. When did you first learn of any disturbance at the Pennsylvania railroad?
A. On Thursday, the 19th of July, in the forenoon.
Q. About what time?
A. That I am not able to say, but I suppose it was in the early forenoon.
Q. How did you learn of the fact?
A. Mr. Watt came to me in the mayor's office, asking me if I could furnish him with ten men. I told him no. By and by--before I come to that, I will give you the police force and the disposition of it. Every person connected with the police force consisted entirely of one hundred and twenty, having a supervision over twenty-seven square miles. Five of them were simply lamp watchmen, leaving one hundred and fifteen policemen. They were divided as follows: One captain, one chief, two turn-keys at the central station, eight station-house keepers, eight front office men. These eight men were all the men we had in daylight, all told, the rest were put on night duty. One night watchman at the city hall, two roundsmen. These roundsmen are men who perambulate the whole city, for the purpose of having an eye to the different police, that they were attending to their duty, and we had one corner man--a man stationed at the corner of Fifth avenue and Smithfield street--and nine lieutenants, and eighty-two patrolmen. These eighty-two patrolmen are men whose metes and bounds were set out to travel. We had one hundred and fifteen police of all kinds, classes, and individuals.
Q. How much ground was covered by each one of these patrolmen?
A. Some less and some more, if you knew the city I think you would know it. Well, take for instance, starting at the corner of Fourth avenue and Smithfield street, go following the cars down to the river; downwards, go down Fourth avenue in that direction and you cross Wood street, and you cross Market street, and you come to Ferry street, then you go along Ferry street, which may be called the lower end of town, to Second, then you reverse and come up this way, you come to Smithfield street, and you walk up to the corner of Fourth avenue and Smithfield street, the place of beginning, a route that really would be too much for two men, one man had to do it.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. How much ground would a man have to cover taking in all the side streets?
A. He would have to cover six squares, and extraordinarily large squares at that, and I think that it would take him over twenty minutes to rapidly walk it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. These police were night watchmen then all of them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had you before that had any day police?
A. Oh, yes. Previous to that, altogether the whole police force of policemen, including ten lamp-watchmen, consisted of two hundred and twenty-six men, and in consequence of the heavy taxation, and the absolute inability of the treasurer to pay for the policemen, they were compelled to cut it down one hundred and eleven men, or rather one hundred and sixteen men altogether--I am talking about policemen, I leave the lamp watchmen out--and then there was a deficiency of sixteen to eighteen thousand dollars for the year.
Q. When was that done?
A. That was done on the 1st of July, or thereabouts, maybe a little before that.
Q. You may state what occurred when Mr. Watt came to your office, on Thursday, the 19th?
A. Mr. Watt came and stated that he wanted ten men. I told him I couldn't furnish him ten men. I would furnish him with what we could, but if he would pay for them, we could pick up some of those discharged policemen who were not employed, and he very promptly answered that he would pay for them. So I told Detective McGovern and some others to take what they could, and all our own men, and fill up with the idle policemen, and that the policemen would be paid by Mr. Watt. Mr. Watt requested me to go up with them, which I declined to do. I couldn't see any reason why the mayor of the city of Pittsburgh should go to the Pennsylvania depot to take cognizance of a disturbance that only required ten men, in his own opinion, and I sent a very faithful and one of the best officers in charge of the men, Detective McGovern, a very clear-headed man.
Q. What did he say as to the extent of the disturbance up there?
A. He made no remarks about that.
Q. Did you ask him anything about it?
A. No, sir. Gave him what he asked for.
Q. Was any report made to you by Officer McGovern.
A. Oh, yes. We had reports all the time from that until this morning. Officer McGovern reported to me--I cannot say whether it was McGovern, or who it was--but the first intimation I had of any violence was a report come to me that a man by the name of McCall had struck Mr. Watt; that he was arrested and taken to the station-house by the police. Then I heard afterwards from this time out--what I have got to say about Thursday will be hearsay. You can produce evidence and substantiate whatever I may say--I heard there was a train somewhere about three o'clock to go out, and the police aboard the train told the engineer they would protect him. The track was clear, and the engineer refused to go on, and got down and left the engine in the possession of the police.
Q. What police was on the train?
A. That was in the afternoon.
Q. What police was on the train?
A. I cannot exactly tell you, but I think that Mr. Motts, Mr. Coulson, and some others were there.
Q. How did you obtain this information?
A. From the police.
Q. An official report from the police?
A. Oh, no. We didn't have that much red tape about these things. The only red tape we had was the morning report of the different lieutenants. I can produce the men; I suppose you will want them to verify it.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. They would report to the lieutenant would they?
A. No; they were in charge of Mr. Watt. The truth is, these men are under the control of the officers of the Pennsylvania railroad, and I felt it my duty to send as many men as I could there, who were paid by the city, and the others had to be paid by the railroad company, as I told you, but all the men we had in July was nine men.
Q. Did you send any of those nine men?
A. Oh, yes; McGovern and White and some more of them--I am a little mixed; and there was another order given for men as I understand. I started Mr. Davis to get them, but on that I am not so clear--I am a little mixed on that; Mr. Davis, however, can tell. He told me he met me on Fifth avenue and told me an order had come for more men, and I started then from Fifth avenue to get them.
Q. Did you receive any word from Mr. Watt after he left you with the ten police?
A. Directly from Mr. Watt?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No; not a word.
Q. Did you receive any telegram from him calling for fifteen more men or twenty-five more men?
A. I didn't receive anything of the kind; but I guess that must be the word Mr. Davis speaks about when he says he met me on Fifth avenue, and I told him to get the men.
Q. Didn't your clerks or any of your subordinates notify you that such a telegram had been received from Mr. Watt?
A. I don't know what Mr. Davis says he told me on Fifth avenue.
Q. For fifty men?
A. No, sir; I took supper at Castle Shannon. I left at a quarter to five, and came back at eight, and then there were some persons from the Pennsylvania had been there for policemen, and the Pennsylvania railroad got all the policemen they wanted. They got so many that they sent back word that they did not want any more.
Q. Did they send any such word to you personally?
A. No; I can prove it.
Q. I want just what they said about--the next that took place between you and the officers?
A. I got no communication directly from the officers of the Pennsylvania, from the time Mr. Watt had been there in the forenoon.
Q. Did you receive any telegram from Mr. Watt calling for fifty police?
A. I didn't.
Q. Were you notified by your clerks or subordinates that such a telegram had been received at your office?
A. Not in the shape you put it.
Q. Did you see Mr. Watt after he left with the ten men?
A. No, sir; I don't think that I did. I have no recollection of it whatever. I don't believe I did.
Q. Where were you from eight o'clock Thursday night, during the balance of the night?
A. I was at the office, and in the neighborhood.
Q. Were any reports made to you during the night, from the policemen?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In regard to the situation?
A. Yes; that everything was quiet.
Q. From what men?
A. I cannot name them, but I can bring the men here who were there to testify. Let me tell you what the police told me--the men that were out there.
Q. It is hearsay evidence. I think it is hardly proper?
A. Hear my statement, then, for your own guidance.
Q. I understand you to say that you didn't receive any dispatch from Mr. Watt, calling for fifty men, nor it was not communicated about in that form?
A. No, sir; it was not. Nothing of that kind occurred. He may have sent a dispatch, but I think I can very conscientiously affirm that I never saw it.
Q. Do you allow your clerks to act upon intelligence received at the office, without instructions from you?
A. Most undoubtedly. When I am away a riot or disturbance ought not to be going along until I come back. They know the general rules I act upon.
Q. Communications, in the shape of letters and dispatches, are they placed on file in your office, when received in your absence?
A. No, sir; not placed on file at any time. They are attended to and thrown away.
Q. Attended to by your clerks?
A. Yes; the chief of police and the clerks. If I am up in the Eleventh ward, they would have to wait an hour and a half until I got down.
Q. If a dispatch was received at your office, notifying you of a disturbance in one part of the city, and you are in another part of the city?
A. It would be attended to.
Q. It would be attended to without notifying you of the fact?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have telegraphic communications to all parts of the city, I suppose--stations?
A. With the station-house. We have got one station-house in the Thirty-sixth ward, Thirtieth ward, one in the Twenty-first, and one in the Second, or rather the telegraph is in the Third, one in the Eleventh, one in the Twelfth, and one in the Fourteenth, one in the Seventeenth, and one in the Nineteenth.
Q. Did you receive any reports during the night--Thursday night?
A. Yes; and everything was quiet.
Q. What officer had charge of that part of the city near Twenty-eighth street--what police officer?
A. Lieutenant Coates had.
Q. Did you receive any reports from him during the night?
A. I do not know that I did.
Q. Were there any affidavits made before you against parties--against any disorderly conduct?
A. There was on Friday forenoon.
Q. Did you issue warrants for that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how many?
A. Well, I guess there was eight or nine, maybe more--I have forgotten.
Q. In whose hands were those warrants placed to execute?
A. I cannot tell distinctly, but I think it was in the hands of Mr. McGovern.
Q. Did he execute the warrants? What instructions did you give him about that?
A. I told him that in consequence of the calling out of the soldiers that the public mind excited, and it would be very dangerous to act as we usually acted, and for him to be exceedingly cautious, and cause no disturbance.
Q. When you placed the warrants in his hands, what instructions did you give him?
A. That is what I gave him.
Q. Had the soldiers been called out?
A. Yes; I was perfectly astonished when I took up the newspapers. Here was a whole lot of telegraphic dispatches, that had been flying from one end of the State to the other.
Q. On Thursday morning or Friday morning?
A. On Friday morning.
Q. You did not tell him to make the arrests?
A. Absolutely?
Q. Yes?
A. No, sir; I knew too much for that. The policemen at any time create a riot in the street by going at it brashly, and after the soldiers were in it, I thought it very dangerous.
Q. Why?
A. Because they were under the control of men who were rather of the narrow gauge pattern, about 2×3.
They were men who knew no law but the law of force, and had no knowledge that truculent defiance always begets truculent defiance. Had the force been in the hands of men who thought with Coleridge, when he said:
"He prayeth well who loveth well, Both man, and bird, and beast."
Had it been in the hands of men, who had any idea like Coleridge, there would not have been a life lost, nor a dollar of property destroyed, in my deliberate opinion.
By Mr. Means:
Q. You speak of those two or three, do you allude to the military now?
A. I allude to the men assuming charge--that had control of the force after I was displaced by the military and counsel.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you not have charge of these in the beginning of the riot or disturbance?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
A. Because Mr. Watt came over and asked for ten men, and they were given to him.
Q. He asked you to go out, didn't he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You refused?
A. I did, for the reason that I could see no reason from anything he said that the mayor should start out to take charge of ten men, and control it--it must have been a very small affair.
Q. You received notice that another call had been made by Mr. Watt, didn't you?
A. No, sir; I have reason to believe, from what I heard--that Mr. Davis informs me--that I told him to go ahead and send them.
Q. Didn't Mr. Watt inform you that your presence could do a good deal towards quelling the disturbance there?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. Would not it have had that effect, in your opinion?
A. Indeed, I do not know. I think a disturbance that in Mr. Watt's opinion only required ten men, didn't require the city to go there in the person of the mayor, because it was a very slight affair, as he represented it--it made no impression upon me.
Q. A man, such as Mr. Coleridge described in that quotation you have made, would have had that effect?
A. No, sir; he would have been called upon, and if he had been asked to call for troops, it would have come in. Let me say about calling for troops, that if Mr. Mackey and Mr. Hartranft--but I should say Governor Hartranft and Mr. Mackey--had been in Harrisburg, there would not have been a troop brought here, and peace would have been preserved, but, unfortunately, neither of these two gentlemen were there. Let me tell you, sir, we had a puddler's strike here, and that I had some hand in, and the peace of the city was preserved; and notwithstanding the peace of the city was preserved all the time, some person, I don't know who, sent a request to the Governor for troops, that the peace of the city was disturbed and it could not be preserved. Mr. Hartranft did not know what to do, so he sent for Mr. Mackey. Mr. Mackey came to him and told him, says he, "Wait a few minutes, and I will let you know what to do." Mr. Mackey told him----
Q. Are you testifying to facts within your knowledge?
A. Within my knowledge. Mr. Mackey telegraphed to a gentlemen that I know very well, as to what the condition of affairs was. The gentleman telegraphed back that it was idle and futile to send soldiers here, and it would only create a disturbance. They could keep them away. They were kept away, and there was not a man killed, and not a dollar's worth of property destroyed.
Q. When was that?
A. It was two years ago.
Q. You say that you acted in attempting to keep and preserve the peace here and keep down violence until superseded by the military?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is not the military always in subjection to the civil authorities?
A. The Constitution says so, but the facts of the case are otherwise.
Q. Had you not entire authority and control, at all times, within the limits and jurisdiction of the city?
A. Not when the sheriff comes to the front. He is the chief peace officer of the county, and has the whole county at his beck and nod. The mayor is simply the city.
Q. Is not it the duty of other head officers to coöperate with the sheriff?
A. That depends upon circumstances. I could not coöperate with the sheriff, because the matter was under control of men who were acting entirely different from any way that I would have acted in the case, and I could not assume responsibility in a state of facts that I believe would lead to what was the ultimate result.
Q. Is not your power as magistrate, within the city limits, identical with those of the sheriff?
A. They are.
Q. What hindered you from acting then?
A. Because the sheriff took possession of the case, and called upon the troops. Had the sheriff come to consult me, instead of going to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company's office, and assumed control in calling for troops, the result would have been different. But I was thrown aside. I didn't suit.
Q. You were asked to go up to the scene of the disturbance, were you not?
A. No, sir.
Q. Didn't Mr. Watt ask you?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did he at ten o'clock, on Thursday, ask you to go to the scene of the disturbance?
A. He did.
Q. And you refused to go?
A. Yes, for the reason that I told you, that he asked for ten men, and I knew no reason--when he got all the men he asked for, and it was only ten men--I didn't see any reason why the mayor should go up there.
Q. Did you go up to the scene of the disturbance at any time during Friday?
A. No, sir.
Q. Friday night?
A. No, sir.
Q. Saturday?
A. No, sir.
Q. Saturday night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At what time?
A. Well, I think when I got out there, it must have been ten o'clock.
Q. What did you find there?
A. I found a howling mob, many of them armed.
Q. Did you know that this firing was going on all this time between ten o'clock Thursday and ten o'clock Saturday night, when you went to the scene of the disturbance?
A. I knew nothing of the disturbance at all. I heard that the soldiers had fired upon the crowd.
Q. You knew that there were crowds there, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You knew they prevented freights from running?
A. I did not.
Q. You know that they prevented freight trains from going out?
A. No, sir; I believe the fact is otherwise. I believe the fact is that after the police got possession of a train, on Thursday afternoon, that the engineer deserted, and that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company didn't attempt to put another freight out--that is what I heard.
Q. That is hearsay, isn't it?
A. That is, and I guess it is very true, too.
Q. You had come out then to see?
A. No, sir; I didn't.
Q. On Friday, did you increase your police force any?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you increase them any on Friday night?
A. No, sir.
Q. On Saturday?
A. No, sir.
Q. Saturday night?
A. Saturday night, when we heard of the shooting I directed the officers to go round and inform the proprietors of the gun shops of what had taken place, and to put themselves in a state of defense, and to get their arms out of the road; for they might be assailed, and directed the chief of police to insert an advertisement in the Sunday papers, calling upon the discharged policemen to appear at the mayor's office for duty. My idea of that was that there might be a necessity for these men performing police duty in the streets. I had no idea, until at that time, that where the city and county authorities had a thousand men under their command, in the Twelfth ward, that any policemen would be required or needed on the property of the Pennsylvania railroad, but I did think there would be very great excitement, and it would be necessary to have a force on the streets, not knowing what would happen, and I directed a call to be made for an immediate meeting of the police committee, on Sunday morning.
Q. Were the day force placed back on duty on Sunday morning?
A. Let me go on, as nigh as I can, in a chronological order of events. My mind, as to hours, after I got in the Twelfth ward and saw the state of affairs there, is a blank. I could not give you an hour from that time up to Monday morning, but I was on deck all that time. I went up to the Twelfth ward, saw a crowd there, and mixed in among them. Had a talk with quite a number of them, and tried to dissuade them from acts of violence and disorder, but I was talking to a lot of crazy men. Words were nowhere. Somewhere, as nigh as I can guess, I was in front of the Twelfth ward station-house, immediately above Twenty-sixth street or Penn avenue, and I was too late. It struck me then that there must be some cars set on fire. I left there and went up to the corner of Liberty and Twenty-fifth street, and saw a car on fire immediately above Twenty-fifth street. I looked at the situation, and turned back to the corner of Twenty-eighth and Penn streets, and I there met a policeman, who I think was Mr. Scribner. Says I, "Has the box been pulled?" Says he, "No; the crowd won't let us, but the alarm has been sent down to the police telegraph." I then waited there a very, very long time, expecting the fire department to come. When I stayed there long enough, and hearing nothing of the fire department, I came to the conclusion that the message sent by the police telegraph had failed. By this time Alderman Barclay was along side of a police officer, and a large man, whom I knew by sight, but not by name, and I said to the alderman, says I, "Can't we send an alarm in on this box." The alderman said, "We can try it." He went, I think, into the drug store and got a key, and four of us went to the box, and nobody interfered with us--there were very few up at that corner, and the alderman opened the box, and this man, I believe, he pulled it. We waited another long time--a very long time--and heard nothing of the fire department. Then I began to make inquiries, and I ascertained that a portion of the fire department had come up Penn avenue, and for reasons satisfactory to themselves, had stopped immediately below the Independence engine house, on Penn avenue, somewhere about Twenty-first or Twentieth street--I cannot give you the number--and that they had been stopped there, and were afraid to go on. I do not know what reason they had--they had some reason. I then went to the station-house; but, by the by, I may say here, when I left the lower end of the city the mob was still going through the streets, and I should have stated before, chronologically--what I forgot--that I issued orders by telegraph, and the men met at eight o'clock in the evening, at the station-house, after having lit the lamps.
Q. Saturday evening?
A. Saturday evening. I ordered all the policemen from the first, second, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth districts, to leave their station-houses, and to come at once to the central station, as soon as the men would come to the station-house. These men came between eight and nine o'clock, most of them nine o'clock, may be later. Some of them had to walk a distance of two miles, and they were put on duty immediately through the streets, and when I thought that I could leave things safely to the direction of the police, I went to the Twelfth ward to see how things were standing. That was the position of matters. When I found that the fire department had not or could not come, I went to the station-house--the Twelfth ward station-house--and telegraphed down to the central station to send up all the police that could be spared. That was done, and as these policemen came up, two or three or four or five or six, &c.--there was a great quantity of stealing going on.
Q. How many policemen came up?
A. I will get at that in a few minutes. As they came there was a great deal of stealing going on, and as fast as they came to the station-house, I started them out on to Penn street, to arrest the people that were carrying off goods. They continued at that work until such times as I thought I had enough policemen to assist the firemen, at which time possibly I may have had fifty or sixty, may be forty. I do not suppose I had over forty or fifty. When I thought I had enough to protect the firemen, I told officer Coulston to go to the fire department and tell them that we now had police sufficient, I thought, to protect them, and to come on, and we would do the best we could. Coulston started off with that message. After a lapse of sufficient time he came back and told me he had informed the parties in charge, of my message, that they replied to them that they would not move until they were ordered by the chief of the fire department and the fire commissioners, and I supposed, that at that time I may have had, all told, fifty or sixty--about fifty policemen--the fifth district and the sixth district had not been called in. The fifth district and the Lawrenceville district immediately adjoining the point where the Allegheny Valley railroad runs through, they were not called in because I supposed they would have as much to do in their own districts. The sixth district was not called in because Torrens station and the stock-yards were in that district, and I thought it altogether likely that the police of these two districts would be wanted to take care of things there for the reason I have given you.
Q. How long did you keep those policemen there in the Twelfth ward?
A. They were kept there until their regular time of going on duty.
Q. What time was that?
A. Well, the regular time was six o'clock, but they were there long after that.
Q. Sunday morning?
A. Yes, sir. I will tell you about that. I stayed up there until somewhere in the neighborhood of daylight. The soldiers, I had supposed, that had taken refuge in the houses there, that their strategy was to stay until daylight would come, and then they would come out upon the railroad track and take possession. That is what I supposed--nobody communicated to me what they would do.
Q. Did you make any effort to communicate with General Brinton or General Pearson?
A. No, sir; I did not. I thought those gentlemen had the matter in their own hands, and didn't want any advice from me; and about daylight, or thereabouts, I came down town, and somewhere in the neighborhood of seven o'clock, or thereabouts, it might have been a little after seven--might have been half an hour, but I just name that at random, approximate it--I received a telegraphic dispatch from the Twelfth ward station that the soldiers were on Penn avenue, marching past the Twelfth ward station-house. That struck me that it was an admirable strategic movement. I thought they had come off the railroad property with their full strength, five hundred or six hundred strong, to march through the streets, to intimidate the crowd, and I was highly delighted at that idea, and I requested Mr. Davis to go and get a buggy that we might go up and witness the effect of it. He came with the buggy, and we both started out, and after we got a considerable distance up town, in the neighborhood of the Twelfth ward, I received information that these men were retreating from the city--six hundred armed men. It sent my heart down about my thighs. I could not understand it. I could not believe it. Then the idea struck me that these men were not retreating from the city, but they were following a line of march by which they had two roads to go to East Liberty. I thought they were going either one of those two roads to join the forces out there, and possibly to come in together. When I got as far as the car stables, in Lawrenceville, just about Forty-second street, I think, I bethought myself it was hardly worth while to make that horse pull two hundred and ten pounds unnecessarily, and I stopped the buggy and got out. I told Mr. Davis to go on after the troops, and not to return until he knew where they had gone to. They might have gone by Stanton avenue to East Liberty, from the upper side of the cemetery, or they might have gone by the Morning side road up to the Sharpsburg bridge. I told him to go on, and not give it up until he could locate them, and then to come back to the Twelfth ward station-house, and report to me, and I then got in a street car at the car stables and came down to the Twelfth ward station-house. Then I telegraphed down to the central station to detain all the police that were there, and send them to the Twelfth ward, and I got tired waiting on Mr. Davis, and knowing that the police committee was to meet, I went over to where the firemen were at work, for the purpose of seeing the chief engineer, and concert with him some plan of action by which I could assist them. I could not find the chief engineer, high nor low. I asked the firemen where he was, and they didn't know, and I took that the work upon the fire--this was not on the railroad property, but on the opposite side of Liberty street where they were at work. I thought the work was ineffective, and I spoke to the firemen about it, and they told me the reason of it was that the water in the basin was low. I thought that a little strange, because it was a rule with the water department, with which I had been connected a great many years, to always have it full on Sunday, but I determined to see about that. Failing to see the chief engineer, I could not waste my time in hunting him, and I came down town. On my way down, I met the superintendent of the water-works, and I says to him, "Jim, the firemen complain they cannot work effectively up in the Twelfth ward, because there is no water in the basin," I think that is the way I put it to him. Says he "I think they are mistaken; the basin is full of water." I think it was at Eleventh street I met him. I came down to the central station, and, on the pavement, I met the secretary of the fire commission, Mr. Case. I says to him, "Frank, the firemen tell me that there is no water in the basin"--I meant a small quantity of water in the basin--"I saw Jim Atkinson on my way down, and he tells me the basin is full. You take my buggy at once, and go up and tell them that the basin is full, that they need not be afraid of the supply of water, and you leave the buggy at Rosewell's stables." He departed, and I suppose gave my message.
Q. What time did the fire commence on Saturday night?
A. It is a guess with me, but I think it must have been about eleven o'clock. I don't think I am far wrong.
Q. You stayed there during the night?
A. Yes; I was going through the crowd during the whole night.
Q. When you got fifty policemen, did you make any effort with those policemen to drive the crowd from the cars that were burning?
A. No, sir; I did not.
Q. Your efforts were simply confined to arresting men that were carrying off plunder?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your policemen armed?
A. Some are and some are not.
Q. They are all armed with maces, I suppose?
A. Yes; they all have maces.
Q. Why didn't you make some effort to stop the burning?
A. Because, in my judgment, it could not be done.
Q. How many men would it have taken to have stopped that that night?
A. Lord knows! I can't tell. I think it would have taken a good many. Near a thousand men cooped themselves up in some houses, and cooped all those men up in those houses after having done the firing. It was yielding to the mob. It was just saying plainly, that the mob was stronger than the soldiers, and that forty or fifty policemen, who had never been in a disturbance of this nature or kind, would simply have been suicidal?
Q. After coming to the central station, Sunday morning, did you return again?
A. Yes, sir; I did.
Q. What hour?
A. That I could not tell you. As I told you before, I took no note of time. It was after I had seen the police committee, and had talked with some of the citizens, with regard to a citizens' meeting, I went up on.
Q. During the day, on Sunday, how many policemen had you in the vicinity of the riot?
A. That I can't tell. I did not suppose, that all told, so far as I could guess or know, there were not more than thirty or forty.
Q. Did you make any demand to recruit your police--demand upon men to serve on the police?
A. That had been done by advertisement in the Sunday morning papers, by the chief of police?
Q. Did you issue an order calling on men, demanding them to join your police force?
A. Which, on Sunday?
Q. At any time?
A. Nothing, except that on Saturday morning for the police.
Q. It was in the shape of a request, was it not?
A. Yes; it was an order.
Q. It was not a command such as would be a command under the laws of the Commonwealth?
A. I don't think it was. I didn't see it. I didn't look for it.
Q. It was placed in the papers by your clerk?
A. By the chief of police.
Q. When you went to the scene of the riot on Saturday night, did you use efforts yourself to suppress the riot or stop it?
A. I went into the crowd and talked with them, but I might as well have talked to the moon.
Q. Who did you talk with?
A. There were several that I talked to that I did not know. I only met one man that I did know, and he had been a lieutenant of police.
Q. He was engaged in rioting?
A. He was there with the crowd and very muddled.
Q. How long before that had he been lieutenant of police?
A. He had been lieutenant of police, I suppose, as near as I can judge, some three weeks before.
Q. And discharged under the order discharging the day force?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you meet any other persons that had been members of the police force?
A. No; not in that position?
Q. What replies did you get from the men when admonishing them to desist?
A. Everybody was filled with the idea that the troops the citizens causelessly, and that had excited the indignation and made men wild. It was a fearful sentiment on Saturday night.
Q. I understood you to state that the reason why you did not go to the Twelfth ward during the Friday and Saturday before, was that you had been superseded by the military?
A. Yes; and because I was perfectly satisfied that the influence that controlled would be disastrous, and that I could not prevent it, and I was not going to permit myself to be compromised by it.
Q. You did go to the scene on Saturday night?
A. I did.
Q. Or rather on Sunday?
A. I did.
Q. Had you gone there on Thursday, or Friday, or Saturday morning, and made use of the police that you had under your command, could you not have prevented the disturbance?
A. Permit me to say again that it was impossible for me to have any connection with the men who had charge of that, because I could not control them. They are men that would not listen to me, and that I could have no influence with.
Q. Whom do you refer to?
A. I refer to the leading officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Q. You had control of your police force, hadn't you?
A. I had.
Q. You have control of the affairs of the city.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the organization of the police?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You could have control of the force--you are the peace officer of the city?
A. Yes, sir; and there is the sheriff.
Q. Why did not you then assert your rights as peace officer?
A. Because I recognized the fact that I have no right to come in conflict with the sheriff and the military. I was utterly hostile to their movements and to their plan of operations, and I felt satisfied that it could have no other end than the end that was reached. I, surely, under those circumstances, would have been of no more use than a painted ship upon a painted sea. They would not listen to me.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Did you go to them and talk with them, or did you try and see whether you could cooperate with them in any manner?
A. No, sir; I knew the men. That was enough for me.
Q. Do I understand you to say that there was an antagonism between you and the sheriff of the county?
A. It could not be otherwise in this matter, because they had adopted a plan of action that I could have nothing at all to do with.
Q. Were you called on first by the railroad officials?
A. Yes; and gave them all they wanted, and gave them so many men--I will prove to you that they said they didn't want them.
Q. You were asked to go to the scene of the disturbance?
A. Yes; we have talked that matter over several times.
Q. Did you receive any communication from Mr. Scott, the solicitor of the road, on Thursday?
A. I did not.
Q. On Friday?
A. I did not.
Q. Did he make a request to you that you would order the saloons of the city closed?
A. I got a document on Saturday afternoon--I don't know, some time on Saturday it was, according to my recollection--it was by Mr. Thaw, I think by Mr. McCullough, and I think by Mr. Quay, and I think by Mr. Latta, requesting me to request the saloons to be closed, which request, on my part, was complied with.
Q. At what time?
A. That I could not say. I had no right to compel the closing of them--none whatever. I could only request.
Q. You had a riot and disorder in the city then. Do I understand that you had no right to order the saloons closed?
A. No, sir; I have no right to order them closed, under any circumstances, except upon Sunday or upon election days. Then the laws forbid them to be open.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you have any knowledge of the disturbance, and the extent of the disturbance during Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, out in the vicinity of the Union depot, on the railroad?
A. I did not know of any disturbance occurring.
Q. During any of those days?
A. None of those days, except what I told you as having occurred on Thursday. I had reason to believe that there was no disturbance from Thursday afternoon until Saturday afternoon.
Q. Didn't you know of a large collection of people in that vicinity?
A. Oh, yes, sir. I knew they were coming there--went there to see the soldiers--what was going on. People went there as they would to a county fair or a boat race, to see what was to be seen. Men with their families, women with their children, even children in their arms, went there from curiosity.
Q. Don't you know that there was a large crowd there before the military arrived?
A. No, sir.
Q. No knowledge of that?
A. No knowledge of what we would call a large crowd. I know there was quite a crowd there on Thursday. I know from what I am told, there was a crowd there at the time of the alleged disturbance with Mr. Watt and Mr. McCall.
Q. Hadn't you been told by citizens and others, that there was a large crowd there--likely to be trouble?
A. No, sir.
Q. Hadn't any idea?
A. I had an idea that there was to be trouble, because when the military came out they were subject to the thousand contingencies that would produce disturbance.
Q. Had you any intimation of trouble before the military were ordered out?
A. As much as I told you occurred on Friday, after the arrest by the police of this man who was alleged to have struck Mr. Watt. Think there was no disturbance after that during the whole of Thursday night, and to Friday morning, when the police were dismissed.
Q. Did you go to any trouble to ascertain the extent of that disturbance, on the first disturbance on Thursday?
A. Of course, I knew the extent of it from what the police told me.
Q. You were shortly informed of what was going on--made all efforts necessary to ascertain?
A. It came to me without an effort.
Q. Didn't require any effort to ascertain?
A. No, sir; I inquired what going on, and ascertained what was going on.
Q. Didn't your police inform you that the mob had overpowered the police, and also the railroad authorities, on Thursday?
A. Why, no! they didn't overpower them. I proved that here. They were not overpowered.
Q. They had every control of their railroad and their rolling stock without interference?
A. I will prove it to you by the police.
Q. I want to know what you were informed of the situation of affairs--what you know of your own knowledge?
A. I was not there. I don't know anything of my own knowledge. I can tell you what can be proved by the police.
Q. I ask you the question, what reports you got from your officers?
A. That everything was quiet and peaceable after the arrest of McCall.
Q. Did you receive any reports from your officers on Friday, that everything was quiet?
A. On Friday morning I received word that the police had been dismissed by the Pennsylvania railroad men.
Q. Who informed you of that fact?
A. I can't tell you.
Q. An officer of your force?
A. I presume so; in fact it must have been; that state of facts I can prove here and demonstrate.
Q. Did you at any time deem it necessary to increase your force of police?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But did you do so?
A. Done what I could to increase.
Q. To what extent did you increase your force?
A. It was increased upwards of one hundred men, by the order of the committee of public safety, and after I got about one hundred, their orders were that I should increase the force to three hundred, but I came to the conclusion that that number of men were not needed, and I didn't employ any more. I suppose we had altogether about two hundred and forty or two hundred and fifty men.
Q. Did you increase your police force before you were ordered to do so by the public committee?
A. Yes; to the extent of ordering the police who were unemployed to report to the city hall for duty on Sunday forenoon. A portion of them came, not many. They considered they had been very badly treated, and they did not care about risking their lives under those circumstances.
Q. Could you have demanded citizens to serve as police on your force?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you do so?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have all you needed?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why did not you make this demand?
A. Because I had no time to do it. My time was fully occupied. I had met several gentlemen in the morning, and they called a citizens' meeting for the forenoon, and I expected them to make arrangements to go out, in what we might call, in a non-legal way, in a posse, but instead of doing that they thought it more advisable to send a number of gentlemen up to address the crowd.
Q. Who thought so?
A. The meeting.
Q. Citizens' meeting?
A. Yes, sir; they were there and addressed the crowd from the upper end of the platform of the Union depot, but it was of no avail, talking was of no use. Then they were to have a meeting in the afternoon. I came down to that meeting and met the committee at the city hall, talked a little there, and then they adjourned to meet on Market street, and there was considerable talk. Doctor Donnelly was there, he was one of the spokesmen, and he talked there about having offered, with the permission of the mayor, a company. He is slightly mistaken as to having formed a company; it was I who formed it.
Q. A military company with arms?
A. No, sir; a company of citizens.
Q. Armed citizens?
A. They were not armed. They had nothing.
Q. You subsequently armed them, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir. To properly understand the spirit with which I was actuated, with permission of the committee, I will read two extracts, one from the Post of Monday, and one from the Gazette of Monday morning, these extracts are not literally reported, but to show the spirit that was there, and with permission of the committee, I will read them.
Q. Are they long?
A. No, sir; they are not long. This is from the Post of Monday, July 23, 1877.
Q. An editorial?
A. A local report. This is the extract: "An enterprising individual here endeavored to throw cold water on the spirit of the meeting, by saying they needed a thousand men; but he was suppressed. Mayor McCarthy rushed to the stand, and said there was no use of any more fooling. 'Let all who wanted to save their city fall into line, and go at once to the mayor's office, and be sworn in as extra policemen. The fire was spreading, and the incendiaries were still at work, and we must act now.'" Then the reporter puts in this: "This suited the meeting, and a portion of the meeting formed in line, and, under head of the mayor, marched off." That is from the Post.
Q. Before you go any further, did you command that force?
A. I led them; went at their head. I will give you a history of that.
Q. As commander of them?
A. Yes; they were not going into action. There is a history about this, which I will give you after reading this. This is from the Gazette of Monday, July 23, an extract: "There was now a loud call for the mayor, who was in the crowd. He stepped to the front, and said, 'The city is on fire. There is no time to be lost. I want every man, who is ready to help me, to go up here to join this band to go and put down incendiaries.' Mr. Henry Pilipps, junior, said, 'Let us go to the city hall at once, and be perfectly organized as a vigilance committee, and let the mayor swear his policemen in.' The mayor then said, 'I can swear them in now,' and suiting the action to the word, the mayor made his way to one end of the crowd, and countermarched through them. The ranks were quickly filled up, as soon as the movement was understood. The meeting adjourned to call of the chair, and the company proceeded up Fifth avenue." Now this company that I formed there. Doctor Donnelly was present, and he had been spoken of as a fit person to command. I intended to have taken them down Diamond alley to Gregg's store, and arm them with axe-handles or pick-handles, or whatever could be got; but the large majority of them were indisposed to do that, and we started off to the university building, across the way here, and two or three portions of the building were broken in in search of some drilling arms that the cadets in the university use. After a considerable waste of time there, they couldn't get the arms. We succeeded in getting them into line again, and we marched off to Gregg's. Mr. Gregg opened the door, and the line formed outside in the street, and some men went into the store, and they carried enough of those ax-handles to arm the crowd. When that was done, I turned them over to Doctor Donnelly. In anticipation of the formation of this company, I had given orders for a number of police to collect at the city hall, to the end that they would lead this company and precede them, and in that position go and attack the rioters. When I had put Doctor Donnelly in charge, I told him to bring his men to the city hall, and I would give him a police force to precede them and march at their head to go to the scene of the riot. I don't know whether the Doctor understood me or not; but his police force did go. His company didn't go to the city hall, and right here, permit me to say that you have heard a great deal about fifty men squelching this mob, and a hundred determined men. I suppose Doctor Donnelly thought he had determined men, and he didn't go for police assistance. Possibly he expected he could accomplish it all without the aid of police. He went; he was repulsed horse, foot, and dragoon. The next thing I saw of them they came to the city hall in a demoralized condition. I said to the doctor when he came there, says I, "Doctor, keep your men here. I understand that there is a company of soldiers on a steamboat at the lock. You and I will go up and see if we can get them." He got into the buggy, and we went up there. We saw the lady of the house at the lock, and she told me that these men had had orders to go into camp at the poor farm. We came back to the city hall, and was informed that Doctor Donnelly's troops had gone to their supper, and would be back after supper. After supper there came some eight or ten of them--they were there ready for action. That was all that came back, and so you see what fifty determined men could do.
Q. Did this company of Doctor Donnelly's go up there armed with anything else but pick handles?
A. I don't know. I think that after I left them ready to come to the city hall, that they went some place and got some arms, because they came back to the mayor's office with some instruments----
Q. Muskets?
A. I guess there were some muskets the university had used. I know the university authorities created quite a disturbance about their not being returned to them.
Q. You spoke about different parties coming there to suppress this riot. Who were those parties, besides your officers--I mean outside of the city authorities?
A. This meeting of the citizens.
Q. Who else?
A. I don't know any others.
Q. The sheriff and the county authorities?
A. I saw nothing of them on Sunday.
Q. You were speaking of those parties attempting command or change of affairs in trying to suppress the riots. Did you have reference to the citizens' committee?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was it the sheriff's posse?
A. I have reference to the county authorities, the Pennsylvania railroad, and the military.
Q. Then what was it you had reference to--the citizens?
A. No, sir.
Q. Nor Doctor Donnelly's command?
A. I think Doctor Donnelly's command went in good faith, to do what they could--they were not able.
Q. You said you were utterly hostile to all those parties in their efforts?
A. I said I was hostile to their plan of operations, because I didn't think it was called for at the time it was done, because I believed it would end in disaster, which it did.
Q. Did you make any effort to have any conference with these parties to agree on some plan that would be effected?
A. No, sir; they went to work independent of me, and had called out the troops without consulting me at all. I was at my office all night waiting if anything would occur, and I knew nothing of this movement to call troops out until I saw the dispatches on Friday morning.
Q. Do I understand you that because they did not consult you, you put yourself in hostility to all these parties?
A. If you understand me that way, you understand me entirely wrong.
Q. I want to know that?
A. I have time and again here to-day stated that I was utterly hostile to their plan of operations, and that I had nothing to do with them, because I knew I would be powerless with these men.
Q. You made no effort to see them or converse with them, and had no conference with them?
A. No, sir.
Q. Made no attempt to have any conference with them?
A. No, sir; I did not. I am satisfied they did not want me.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Was it not your duty as mayor of the city, to take charge, notwithstanding these men, and if they put themselves in your way, to take them and make them behave themselves?
A. No; I could not do that. The sheriff is the leading officer.
Q. Here among the powers, I find set forth is, "To prevent riots, noises, disturbances, or disorderly assemblages--" that is a part of your powers.
A. I will show you something stronger than that there. That is very weak--wishy-washy. Do not understand me as being offensive--you have got a pretty good-natured face, and I like to talk to you. There it is, "The mayor of the city, shall be its executive officer, and the conservator of its peace. He shall have and exercise within the city limits, the powers conferred on sheriffs of counties, to suppress disorder, and keep the peace.
Q. That is what I meant. Was it not part of your duty to take charge yourself, as mayor?
A. Not under the circumstances. I had been superseded by the power that had the whole county at its beck, who had without my knowledge, and, as I thought, entirely unnecessary, laid out a plan of action I could have nothing at all to do with.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. I would like at this point, for the mayor to explain why he considered himself superseded, having acted without his knowledge.
A. Why I considered I had been superseded?
Q. You say that they acted without your knowledge. I want to know why you considered yourself superseded?
A. I did not consider myself superseded because they acted without my knowledge. If I said anything of that kind I have been misunderstood. I have time and again tried to express myself upon that point, and that is this, that the sheriff of the county, together with the military, had taken possession of this matter, and superseded the mayor.
Q. Had you been so informed?
A. I was superseded by the dismissal of the police on Friday morning, and the taking possession by soldiers who had been called out by the State authorities.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Do you know the fact of your own knowledge that the police had been dismissed?
A. I know that fact from the statement of the police--made to me and to the office.
Q. That is the only way you know that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You received no intelligence of that fact from the railroad officials?
A. No, sir; I did not.
Q. Is it their prerogative to dismiss the police, or have you got control of them?
A. They were under control of the railroad authorities. They directed them where to go, and according to their orders they went.
Q. Have they got control, equal to yourself, with any police in this city?
A. Under the circumstances they had.
Q. You delegated that power to them?
A. They were sent there for that purpose, to do just as they said for them to do.
Q. You delegated the power to the railroad officials to have charge of these men?
A. I cannot say that I delegated them, because there were not over four or five that were under my control.
Q. Did you consider, under all the circumstances, that the railroad officials or anybody else had the right to dismiss police without consulting you, or had any control over them?
A. Under those circumstances, I did.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Was that dismissal anything more than a mere taking of those warrants from the hands of the police, and putting them in the hands of the sheriff?
A. There was nothing of the kind took place, and now understand me: policemen, at the suggestion of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, were sent there during the afternoon and the night. They were there under the control of the railroad authorities, and when the railroad authorities did not want them any more, they dismissed them, which was on Friday morning.
Q. You understand they gave them a formal dismissal, and told them their services were not needed to keep the peace any longer?
A. I do not know in what form it was done.
Q. Was it not merely taking warrants from their hands, and telling these policemen they would put the warrants that were in their hands for execution into the hands of the sheriff to execute--was not that all the dismissal there was?
A. At that time no warrants had been issued.
Q. On Friday?
A. On Friday morning, when the police were dismissed by the railroad authorities, no warrants had been issued--no information had been made.
Q. After their dismissal, did you think then you had no further occasion to keep the police force there?
A. Not because they were dismissed, but because I had been superseded by the military and the county.
Q. I want to know why you thought you were superseded--were you so informed by either of those parties, either the sheriff or the mayor, or anybody acting for them?
A. No, sir; I was not informed by them.
Q. Why did you consider yourself superseded? Simply because they took action to suppress the riot?
A. They took possession of the whole business. There was no room for me.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Would not your police force which you could have gathered together have been some assistance to them in keeping the peace?
A. If the sheriff had asked me for the police as a posse to help him I could have given a hundred men.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. I want to ask you this question, if you think that you can be superseded by the military?
A. If I am not?
Q. Yes; can you be superseded by the military in your powers and duties?
A. If I had charge they would not supersede me.
Q. Is it not your duty to take charge?
A. That duty had been performed by the sheriff.
Q. Is it not your duty to take charge of your police and put down any riots or disturbance within the city limits, regardless of any power on earth?
A. No, sir; in the event that the sheriff does not interfere, it would be. If I got possession first I would hold.
Q. Were you not called upon first by the railroad officials?
A. I was called upon first by the railroad officials to furnish them with ten men.
Q. And you acted?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you not keep control?
A. Because they had taken it out of my hands by dismissing the police, calling upon the sheriff, and the sheriff called upon the State for troops.
Q. Then I understand you to say that the sheriff superseded you, in your judgment?
A. That is what I said a dozen times.
Q. Did the military supersede you?
A. Certainly they did.
Q. I want to know if you think the military can supersede you?
A. Mr. Chairman, you are getting too hair-splitting here. If I had charge the military could not supersede me--it would not be in their power.
Q. Did you not have charge at the commencement?
A. At the commencement I had, but on Friday morning I was thrown to the dogs. In the night they had sent for the sheriff. They did not come down to the mayor's office, where I was ready and waiting to hear what was going on there the whole night, but they went for the sheriff and they took him out.
Q. Did they not telegraph you for fifty more additional police?
A. Did I not tell you half a dozen times that I knew nothing about that--I received no dispatch--how often must I repeat that?
Q. Was it not received at your office?
A. I was told that they sent there for more men, and that they got them.
Q. Did they get fifty more policemen that they called for?
A. No, sir. Wait a moment, and I will prove to you that at supper time--after supper--they sent word from the outer depot to the inner depot that they would not furnish transportation to the policemen that went there--they had enough, and they did not want any more.
Q. You did not send them the fifty policemen?
A. I do not know anything at all about it. They got all they wanted.
Q. Now, in not getting them, they called upon the sheriff?
A. No, sir. I will prove to you they got all they wanted. They said they wanted no more, and they would not furnish transportation to the men at the Union depot; but if these men wanted to go they would have to walk.
Q. They did not get the fifty policemen. You have stated they sent for fifty policemen, and they did not get them?
A. I do not know that they sent for fifty policemen, but I have a moral conviction they sent for more men. How many I do not know. It may have been fifty. I have a moral conviction that more men were sent to them than they wanted, for they said so. Whether it was fifty men, I do not know. I do not think it was fifty.
Q. You were not at your office, and did not receive that dispatch calling for fifty men?
A. I was not at the office from quarter to five in the afternoon until eight in the evening. From eight in the evening I was there all night.
Q. I understand your position, Mr. McCarthy, to be this: that you may be superseded by the sheriff of the county, but not by the military?
A. No, sir; that is not my position, by a long slap. My position is that the military were sent here at the request of the sheriff--that the sheriff took possession of the business, and that the police were dismissed, and then I had nothing more to do with them. That is my position.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. That is, when the sheriff takes possession that then there is no further call on you or any further duty for you to perform--is that the position?
A. Under the circumstances as they existed at that time.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Why, then, did you assume command on Saturday evening?
A. Because I had reason to believe from what I saw that outside of the railroad property there was work to be done.
Q. It was not then for the purpose of protecting the railroad property that you acted on Saturday?
A. My good conscience, didn't the railroad company and the sheriff have one thousand men right on that ground, or thereabouts.
Q. It was not for that purpose, then, but it was for the purpose of protecting the city you acted on Saturday?
A. Yes; outside of that.
Q. What time was the information made by Mr. Watt before you on which the warrants were issued for these nine or ten men?
A. Sometime during Friday forenoon.
Q. Made by Mr. Watt?
A. I do not know. May be it was.
Q. Warrants were immediately issued, were they?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Placed in the hands of your policemen?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long were they kept by the policemen?
A. Until Saturday morning.
Q. And no arrests were made?
A. No arrests were made.
Q. And then what was done with them?
A. They came there and wanted to take the information away--the law authorities--I think Mr. Housey was one of them. We would not give them the information--would not let go of that. Then they wanted the names of the men who were implicated in it for the purpose of getting out bench warrants, and they got the names. We gave them to them.
Q. Why were these men not arrested on Friday?
A. Because a troubled state of feeling had been existing in the community by calling out the troops, and I instructed the policemen to be very cautious, and if they made any arrests, an arrest any time before the meeting of the grand jury would be sufficient, simply for the purposes of this information.
Q. Did you not understand these persons were the leaders in the disturbances on Twenty-eighth street?
A. I would understand they were engaged in it.
Q. That was the charge contained in the affidavit, was it not?
A. No, no; it was not a charge. I think that the information was made under an act of Assembly, passed within the last two or three years, about people interfering with the running of trains. I think that was it, though I am not quite sure.
Q. Would it not have been better to have made these arrests as soon as possible, before the arrival of the military?
A. No, sir; I think, under the circumstances, it would have been a very bad move to have made these arrests. I was conscious, at the time I gave the warrants to the officer, that it was a dangerous thing, on account of the public excitement that had been created by calling out the troops, and I told him to be very cautious about what he would do, and I was satisfied he would be cautious, as to rush pell-mell, right up there, and snatch these men right out, would have created a disturbance at once. At least, I thought so.
Q. On Saturday night, when you went out and ordered all the police you could get, consistently, to the Twelfth ward, I understand you to say that it was not for the purpose of protecting the railroad property, but to protect the city particularly?
A. I conceived that the railroad property had eight hundred or nine hundred--at least eight hundred men there, for that purpose.
Q. You took these policemen, you say, to arrest men that were carrying off railroad property?
A. Presumed to be railroad property.
Q. Or carrying off plunder?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many did they arrest?
A. I could not tell you. I suppose there may have been about a hundred.
Q. What was done with these men?
A. They were taken to the station-house, and Alderman Butler, I believe, who was in charge--I was not in charge for a week; I had something else to do--I believe they came to the conclusion that they could not be convicted of larceny, from not being able to identify what goods they had. All things were thrown together in the hurry of the moment, and they could not identify them nor the goods, and I believe they came to the conclusion that an action of larceny would not lie, and it would be troublesome to prove it, and he fined them.
Q. How many of them did he fine?
A. Indeed, I cannot tell. I never looked to see.
Q. Did he discharge any of them?
A. That I do not know. I had too much to do, to look after them.
Q. Was any record made of it?
A. Oh! yes; they have their names down in the watch-house docket.
Q. You never examined the record?
A. No, sir; I never examined it because it was a trifling matter compared with other things that had to be done, and I paid no attention to it.
Q. Had you any intimation from any source prior to the appearance of Mr. Watt on Thursday at your office of an outbreak among the railroad employés?
A. No, sir; but on the contrary, I happened to know from the president of the Trainmen's Union that when he was told that, eleven o'clock that day, he disputed the accuracy of the statement. He knew nothing of it, but when he was assured in such a way that he thought there must be something in it, he left the corner of Eleventh and Liberty streets for Twenty-eighth street, to know what the facts were. He himself did not believe it.
Q. You had no reason at all to anticipate anything of the kind?
A. No; I never dreamed that there would be an outbreak such as there was.
Q. That there would be a strike at all on the railroad?
A. Oh, no; had no idea of it at all. I very seldom come in contact with railroad men.
Q. In the conversations that you had with the men who went out in the Twelfth ward, did they give you any reasons for the outbreak and the strike?
A. No, sir; never entered into a critical examination of the question there at that time.
Q. Your conversation with them was simply in relation to----
A. What was occurring at the moment. I think from all I could gather from the railroad men, that they were averse to what took place.
Q. Had you noticed any influx of people in the city, prior to this time--within a few days?
A. No, sir; I had not, but there was one thing struck me with surprise, that I did not know the faces of vast numbers of people. I was born and raised in Pittsburgh, and I know an immense number of faces. I almost think I can tell a Pittsburgher when I see him, but on that day there were vast numbers of people I could not recognize. I got into close quarters with them twice. By the by, I have not told you that I came in contact with them at the head of the platform of the Union depot, but, like Doctor Donnelly's men, in about ten seconds I was placed hors du combat. They invited me to take a little walk--one fellow struck me. A good man in the crowd interfered, and told me they did not want to hurt me, but if I stayed there I would have to take the consequence. I looked around at Officer Jones, who went into the crowd with me, and I saw him looking pretty black, and he made up his mind to the situation, and he left. He came over to me, and says, "Mayor, you had better get out of this." I was disposed to kick. I did not feel very afraid of them. I am not a man of courage. He gave me a nudge, says he, "Get out quick." And I thought I had better go. With that the mob picked me up and carried me from the head of the platform and landed me out in front of the depot, and Alderman O'Donnell and Dan Hall, and four or five policemen then came up, and I was led into the Union depot.
Q. What time was that?
A. I cannot tell the time--it was when the mob was coming down the Pennsylvania railroad yard, smashing up cars and things.
Q. Some time Sunday?
A. I got a little angry, and lost my head. I did not care what I did, and Jones and I, and two or three others, I do not know who they were, went in.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. I would like to ask a few more questions in regard to the sheriff and military superseding the mayor?
A. Never ending and always beginning. Do you expect to put me in the hole, Mr. Yutzy?
Q. Not at all. I would like to know why you considered yourself superseded by any other authorities here in the city, the disturbance having commenced?
A. I have tried to impress that upon you half a dozen times.
Q. Were you informed, by either of those parties, that you were not needed?
A. I have told you two or three times no, and I shall have to continue answering it no every time you ask me.
Q. Did you not consider it your duty to make an effort to suppress the riot and disturbance after they had made an effort to do so?
A. After they had made an effort and abandoned it, I did make an effort.
Q. During the time you were making that effort, did you not consider it your duty also, as chief officer of the city, to suppress any riot or disturbance?
A. I think I told you several times.
Q. Answer that question?
A. I say I have already told you several times, that they pursued a course so diametrically opposed to anything I would have done or could have approved of, and having a firm conviction that no persuasion of mine could alter the determination of the authorities who had it in charge, that I could not interfere.
Q. You made no effort, then, to disperse or suppress the riot?
A. No, sir.
Q. After they had made an effort?
A. After they had made an effort, I did.
Q. During the time they were making an effort?
A. No, sir.
Q. Made no effort?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. And not until after they had failed, in your judgment?
A. Yes, sir. What more evidence would you want than that everybody had run away--they had left. I do not charge the soldiers with running away--do not understand that. I meant among the men who said the Philadelphia troops murdered the people there. I am not among those men. I believe they were murdered, but the Philadelphia troops are not responsible for it.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. During the time that the sheriff or the State authorities were making an effort to suppress this riot and disperse the mob, was it not your duty, just as much as if they had not been here, to preserve the peace, and make every effort in your power to the same end?
A. I have already answered that question half a dozen times. I answered it a moment ago.
Q. Will you please answer that, yes or no.
A. Under the circumstances, I do not think that I had anything to do with it.
Q. I would like you to answer that question. It may not be so very material, but I would like to have that question answered, yes or no?
A. I have answered it?
Q. Can you answer it, yes or no.
A. I have already answered it. Under the circumstances, I do not think so.
Q. The sheriff and the military, or even the United States Government, attempting to suppress a riot unless there was military law declared, did you not consider it your duty to make every effort in your power to preserve the peace and prevent any disturbance in your city?
A. I would consider it my duty to do so if there was nothing to interfere with me.
Q. Was there anybody interfering with your duties by any manner of means?
A. I have already said that I considered I was relieved by the sheriff and the State authorities.
Q. Did they interfere with you?
A. It just comes down to this; that is my platform, and that is what I believe, and you happen to think differently.
Q. I wish to ask you the question whether they interfered with you by any manner of means in the performance of your duties?
A. They did not.
Q. And still you suspended your operations or your efforts to suppress this riot and keep the peace?
A. Because these gentlemen superseded me and took possession.
Q. In what way did they supersede you?
A. By dismissing the police that they had in charge, the railroad men, and by the sheriff going there and performing his duties as sheriff, and by calling out the State troops.
Q. Who dismissed these police?
A. The railroad men.
Q. Are you subordinate to the railroad authorities?
A. No, sir; I am not subordinate to them, not by a long slap. There cannot be two kings where I am one.
Q. Still you regarded the railroad company as superseding you when they dismissed your police?
A. No, sir; I did not.
Q. Did they supersede you at any time--the railroad authorities?
A. Why, certainly they did.
Q. By calling upon the sheriff?
A. By the sheriff undertaking to order the crowd to disperse at Twenty-eighth street, and then immediately coming to the conclusion that the civil power had become exhausted, and then sending a dispatch by Senator Scott calling for the troops, and the troops being ordered out--that superseded me, suspended me. I went over that a dozen times. I am on this stand doing the swearing, and I am swearing for myself.
Q. I would not ask you any question that I did not think was a proper one?
A. I don't think that, but we differ.
Q. There appears to be a conflict of authority in this matter between the city and the county and the State authorities?
A. Not a particle of conflict of authority. I took pretty good care that there should be no conflict. When the county and the military and the railroad authority undertook to follow a course which I would have nothing to do with, that I could not approve of, that I believed would end in disaster, as it did, I stepped aside and let them have their way, because I could not control these men.
Q. We want to know where the responsibility should rest--which of those authorities should have taken command?
A. You have a right to form your opinion from the evidence before you. I have given my evidence, what I thought about the matter.
Q. For that reason I ask you the question whether you considered yourself superseded by other authorities, and should refrain from making any effort?
A. I have told you I thought so, and gave you my reasons for it.
Q. During the pillage and the carrying away of goods at the Union depot and in that vicinity, from the railroad, did you see any of the citizens carrying away any of those goods?
A. Oh, yes; there must have been citizens--they must have been citizens--it was not the fellows who were stealing that there was any danger from. It was the fellows standing around with their hands in their pockets.
Q. Did you know anyone in particular who was carrying away goods there?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you see any of the policemen carrying away any goods?
A. I did not; and don't believe they did.
Q. Did you see any of them taking cigars or anything of that kind?
A. Yes; I know what you are coming at now; I had forgotten all about it. We have not been going on chronology, we have been switching off. I saw a number of police throwing what I supposed to be segars, in fact I might say I know, to the mob. The circumstances were these.
Q. Thrown by the police to the mob?
A. O, yes; precisely that and nothing else. You will remember that I said that I telegraphed to detain the policemen, and send them up there on Sunday morning. I got up there pretty late, and the policemen were waiting on me. I hadn't much confidence in any person we had, because I knew that the retreat and dispersal of the soldiers had emboldened the disorderly, and they thought when the soldiers would leave the mob, that the citizens had no chance, and the community were demoralized. I got about twenty policemen, I think, and I thought it would be a good thing to put them to light work and put a little spirit in them. I took them around and told them to go up the wall and drive those thieves away. I didn't get on the wall, I walked down alongside the wall to witness their operations. As soon as the police mounted the wall and the thieves saw them--I kept down with the police the great body of them; I followed on the street and they upon the wall, and the wall was clear for a very few minutes, and I happened to turn my eye up, and I saw a policeman with a bundle of those soft felt hats that are piled on top of one another, and he was throwing them down to the crowd in the street, and I rushed up for him, and shook my fist at him, and used some choice Italian, and then he stopped, and after talking a little string to him I turned, and down the line I saw a couple of policemen jump into a car and throw things out--they were cigars--and they threw things down to the crowd. I rushed down there and bellowed like a mad bull at them, and they stopped finally, but the moral effect of their previous conduct was gone, and the crowd mounted the hill like so many rats, and that was the end of that business. The men engaged in that were two lieutenants, and I am free to say there were not two better men in the force, but they lost their heads; they were completely surrounded by fire, and they thought those things would burn up, and as they would be burned up they just thought they might mollify the crowd--a very mistaken idea--by throwing these things to the crowd. It was from no desire to help the mob, but they had ignored the moral principle involved that they had no right to touch anything, except for the sole and only purpose of preserving it for its owner, and no other purpose. They had forgotten that part of their catechism.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. In other words, the police were demoralized as well as the citizens?
A. At that moment they were. I don't think these men would ever do a thing of that kind again.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What was done with those policemen for that act?
A. I dropped them. I could not do anything else.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Discharged them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are they on the force now?
A. That I can't say. I do not know anything about the present force?
Q. Did you discharge them permanently?
A. They left, certainly, and were never on again. They were on again for some days afterwards, for I had too many things to attend to, to attend to them just at once. I pitied the men, because I knew them to be good men, and I am very confident they will never do so again. It took the starch out of me. I was demoralized by it. There are some things you haven't asked me questions about. There was some talk here the other day about protection to the fire department.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. There has been some testimony that citizens, about the time they were breaking into these gun stores, came and offered to be sworn--state what you know about that?
A. That was by Follensbee. Mr. Follensbee came there and offered. He came to the office very much demoralized.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Just state the fact whether he offered his services, and then whether you accepted or not, and then give the reason why you didn't accept him?
A. I don't know whether he offered his services or not. There were more men, during these two or three hours that I was assigning these men to duty--there were more men who came in there, in the capacity of military strategists, than would be enough to run the United States and Confederate army during the rebellion, and I was annoyed to death with every man coming in there who had some plan. I could not get my wits together. This Mr. Follensbee came there. I have no recollection personally of what he said, but I do know that he was very sadly demoralized with something stronger than I am going to take now. He is a good gentleman, as honest a man as ever lived.
Q. You did not swear him in?
A. No.
Q. Was that the reason why you did not?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Did any other gentlemen with him offer their services?
A. Not that I know of. There was so many people came in and talked about so many things, and how this, that, and the other thing could be done, that I thought of getting a stuffed club to beat them out with.
Q. Did you send any policemen to Mr. Bown's store?
A. Undoubtedly. I suppose there was a dozen there. They were over-powered by the momentum of the mob, and Lieutenant Chalfant was knocked down, as I was told by the policemen a few days afterwards, when we began to gather up our wits. I was told that some of the policemen that were there tried to keep the pavement clear, and took out their pistols, and citizens who were there requested them to put them up, and not use them--that they would be murdered.
Q. Just state what you know--what came under your own observation?
A. Nothing came under my observation there. You won't know how to probe this thing, unless I told you what can be shown.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. I am inclined to think that anything in the police officers' reports--the police officers reporting to you, in an official capacity--would be testimony?
A. Now, about Follensbee. The city clerk was down in front of Mr. Bown's, and there was not a very great many people. They had been trying to keep the people moving. Mr. Follensbee was standing there, and the city clerk appeared to go that way----
Q. We have had the city clerk's report of that, from himself, which is much better evidence than coming from a second party. All we want to know, is just what came under your observation, and what was officially reported to you by your policemen?
A. I sent men there, and I know they went there.
Q. You say you sent about a dozen policemen there?
A. I suppose there must have been a dozen, and I know, from the report of the police to me, that they endeavored to keep the crowd back, and did keep the crowd back, and that one man in the crowd counted one, two, three, four, and up to ten--they are no count, and the whole crowd made a rush at them, and Lieutenant Chalfant was knocked down, and the momentum of the crowd carried the crowd out of sight. They had thrown stones at the heads of them, and broken the windows.
Q. You didn't make any effort to get any greater number of policemen to send there?
A. We had to ... half a dozen places at the same time. We just done the best we could, and possibly might have done better, if there had not been so many strategists coming there to bother us.
Q. Did you send any policemen to protect the fire companies?
A. Why, yes, sir.
Q. Whom did you send?
A. I was there myself, with fifteen policemen.
Q. Whom did you offer assistance to?
A. Let me tell you.
Q. Just answer the question?
A. We can get to that better.
Q. Whom did you offer assistance to?
A. To the man in charge.
Q. Who was he?
A. I don't know what his name was.
Q. What street was it?
A. It was, as I think, at the corner of Twentieth and Liberty. You can't understand this, unless you let me tell the story.
Q. At what time?
A. I can't give you any hour. I know nothing of time.
Q. You offered assistance to the man in charge. What was he doing?
A. He was throwing water on French's spring works. You better let me tell the story. You are cutting it up.
Q. What did he say?
A. He says to me, says he, "I won't do it--I am not going to risk my life--if you want to take charge of this thing you can do it."
Q. He was throwing water at that time without any molestation from the mob?
A. Certainly; and the police was stationed across the street to protect them. Whether they would have stood fire or not, I can't tell.
Q. What assistance did you offer him?
A. The police that were there within thirty feet of me.
Q. If he was not molested by the mob at that time, he wanted no further assistance?
A. You won't let me tell this story straight. If you let me commence at the beginning you will understand it.
Q. Did you offer assistance at any other time than the one you speak of now?
A. I told you that I offered assistance on Saturday night, and it was refused.
Q. To whom did you offer the assistance on Saturday night?
A. I sent Officer Coulson to the fire department to tell them to come and aid the police.
Q. We have had Officer Coulson and his story?
A. On Sunday morning, when the fire had crossed Liberty street, I went to hunt the chief of the fire department, and could not find him, to concert measures with him. That is the time I talked about the water arrangement. Then a man connected with the Pennsylvania railroad came to me, and says he, "If I get an engine at the corner of Twentieth street to throw water on the railroad cars will you have the police force there to protect me?" Says I, "I will." I immediately went and I gathered about fifteen policemen, as nigh as I can guess, and had them at the corner of Twentieth street. I think it is at the lower end of French's spring works. I had them there a very long time, and no engine appeared. John Coyle, a member of the bar here, came along and spoke to me, and I said to him, says I, "John"--I told him the facts--"come along with me, I want to hunt this thing up," and we went up to find the chief, and we didn't find him. We found Commissioner Coates, the man that had a pistol at his head and lived to tell the tale. He said he had an engine. I left Mr. Coyle and came down. Coyle went about his business; and I saw an engine coming down one of the cross-streets--Penn street--and I went over to see where it was going, and it went away down town. I went back to where I had the police stationed waiting for the engine to come. After a very great delay, the engine came and attached to a fire plug; but instead of throwing water upon the burning cars, opposite to this street where we were, he commenced throwing upon French's spring works. Then Mr. Houseman I think it is--the gentleman who had made the request of me--I went to him and said something to him, and he came back to me and said, "These men won't do anything. You come and see what you can do." I went over to him, and the answer he made was he was not going to risk his life, but if I wanted to take charge of it I could do so. But I didn't do so. Then the police--they were few in number, and not able to do anything--I just told them to go and do what they could. Then I went down town, and knew the result of the citizens' meeting.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You said you did not agree, nor could not agree with the plan adopted by the sheriff and the troops, or the officers of the troops, in charge of matters, and at the same time the directions you gave your police was to be careful, and not excite the crowd, and not make these arrests. Are we to infer from that, that your plan was that you must not oppose force to them, you must handle them gingerly and tenderly. Is that what we must infer?
A. No, sir; every occasion presents its own line of action.
Q. The troops and the sheriff were trying to oppose the crowd by force and stop the riot, and you say you did not agree with their plan of action?
A. I don't. I think that the military force is only to be used in case of the very last resort.
Q. In ordering your policemen not to make these arrests, are we to infer----
A. Infer and understand this, that in ordering these policemen to be careful how they made arrests, it was after I had considered I had been superseded, and I wanted them to make the arrests when they made them in such a way as not to create any disturbance.
Q. Are we to infer from your evidence upon that point that your manner of managing such a mob would be to give way to them, and not oppose force to the crowd?
A. I have said nothing, I think, to indicate that.
Q. What would be your plan in such a case?
A. I would have policemen to do it. I don't think the policemen would create such a truculent feeling as an arrest by the use of military.
Q. You think then that the police are the proper force to use on such occasions?
A. Until you ascertain you can do nothing with them, until all other means have failed, and then, and not till then, are the military to be used.
Q. Did you attempt at any time on Sunday to gather your police force in a body so as to have an organized force large enough to accomplish something?
A. I could not get any force on Sunday large enough.
Q. You got fifteen--you say there was fifty or sixty policemen--did you undertake to gather that body?
A. I did not say there was fifty or sixty policemen. I am talking now about the night before.
Q. I think the question was asked you how many there was about there on Sunday?
A. I could not tell how many were there. I know only a small body of them could be got together, and then they began to collect the men who had went home in the morning before we knew that the soldiers had been withdrawn--they began to gather in before dark--then we had a pretty good force, and then with such assistance as citizens gave, we broke the back of the riot--we knocked them right and left.
Q. Hadn't whisky helped a good deal at that time to place them hors du combat?
A. I don't know about it myself, I do not drink it.
Q. I did not ask you as a connoisseur.
A. I think it had the effect to make the crowd vicious. I thought so when I was in their hands.
Q. This Sunday night and Monday morning was when you first began to regain some control there?
A. We got control--from dark on Sunday evening we had control.
Q. The mob had kind of petered out then?
A. Yes, and they had been licked out by the police and citizens.
Q. Where had there been any set-to where the mob had been licked--at what place?
A. At the Fort Wayne depot, at the intersection of Tenth and Liberty street.
Q. What police had had the set-to with the crowd at the Fort Wayne depot?
A. There was eight or ten policemen went there when the car was afire, and they put that out, and they were assisted by citizens also.
Q. How large a crowd did they find to contend with?
A. I don't know, it was an accomplished fact. The mob began to break in stores, and commenced at the corner opposite to Tenth on Liberty street, and the police and the mob had the battle there.
Q. How many police were there engaged in that battle?
A. There was a considerable number.
Q. Do you know how large a crowd there was there?
A. I am told the streets are full.
Q. What kind of a crowd was it?
A. Breaking into stores.
Q. The same crowd that had been burning cars?
A. I don't know.
Q. What was it composed of--this crowd running about the streets?
A. They were composed of men and boys. We had another battle with them at Seventeenth.
Q. This crowd that was plundering was easily dispersed at any time?
A. Easy. They were not people to be afraid of.
Q. Who were the people to be afraid of?
A. Those standing around doing nothing.
Q. Was there an apparent organization among them?
A. I don't know.
Q. Could you judge?
A. I don't know whether there was an organization; there appeared to be a common feeling. I was astonished from the fact that I didn't know them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. They appeared to be strangers?
A. They were strangers to me, I did not recognize them.
Q. In your intimate acquaintance with the people, you would take them to be people from elsewhere?
A. I thought I knew the people about Pittsburgh, but I didn't know these. I don't want to swear that they were strangers. I don't know that I know. I was recognized, and I thought I ought to recognize a great many of them.
Q. Those that were engaged in the act of rioting and police?
A. I am speaking more especially of those who captured me in the railroad yard, and carried me out in front of the depot.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. They did that systematically, did they?
A. Oh, yes; carried me right out.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you, at any time during the riots, employ your night force in the day time?
A. Such of them as we could get. Understand this, my idea of this matter was that the soldiers, having possession of the railroad property, were cooped up for the night, and that when daylight would appear they would go out into the open ground, and take possession of things. My idea was, they went into this place to prevent being pushed back during the night. The great body of the police force went off at six o'clock in the morning. I, supposing that the police would have nothing to do, except to do street duty under this excitement, and had instructed the chief of police to call upon the discharged policemen, supposing that he could get plenty of them, but that expectation was not realized, and not expecting that the soldiers would leave the city at the time they did, had given no orders to keep the night policemen on duty that morning; but when I found that the soldiers had all dispersed, I telegraphed down to the central station to detain such policemen as were there--and there were some there--and they were detained, and they were on duty all day.
Q. Did you make any effort to re-assemble the night police after you ascertained they had left?
A. Could not do it.
Q. Did you make any effort?
A. Could not do it.
Q. Could not you find them?
A. You couldn't get a man to go after them--the great body of them--until night would come. You would get them just as soon by waiting until they came on duty.
Q. Didn't you have the address in your mind?
A. Yes; and knew where they lived. We had plenty to do without doing that.
Q. Any more important duty to perform than to get these men to assemble?
A. That would depend altogether upon what the man in charge thought. I thought the most important duty was to have the police up there--all we could get--and let them do what they could.
Q. Without calling on the night police?
A. If we had means of calling on the night force to gather them in, it would have been done, but, to do so, we would have had to abandon everything else for the time being. Possibly, that might have been as well, though. When I went to the corner of Seventh and Grant streets, I found the firemen playing there, and the police having charge of the ropes--keeping the crowd away from them.
Q. Did you employ all your powers during these riots, regardless of any other efforts adopted to subdue the riots, in preserving the peace?
A. What do you call during the riots?
Q. The time from Thursday until Sunday?
A. Because I didn't think there was any riot before five o'clock on Saturday.
Mr. Lindsey: That question requires a direct answer--yes or no.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you exhaust all your powers during the riots, irrespective of these other parties?
A. I say there was no riot until four or five o'clock in the morning, when the soldiers charged bayonets on the crowd.
Q. Including all within the time from Thursday until Monday, did you exhaust----
A. I knew of no riots until the soldiers charged bayonets on the people. I have answered that question a dozen of times.
Q. Answer it yes or no?
A. I will not answer it yes or no. All my powers were exhausted in preserving the peace so far as I thought I could exercise them. That is the answer to that question.
Q. Have you any call--is there any call to assemble the police, by telegraph or otherwise?
A. We have a police telegraph from each station-house. We send messages on it every day.
Q. There is no particular call by which you assemble your police?
A. There is no alarm.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. I want to ask the mayor a question in connection with his answer to this. He says he used all his powers in preserving the peace, so far as he could exercise them. Was there anything to prevent you from exercising your powers as mayor?
A. Yes; the ground had been occupied by the State military and the sheriff, and occupied in a way that it was utterly impossible for me to act with them.
Q. And it was the only thing that prevented you from exercising your powers?
A. I will say that there was a party went down to the depot--the Duquesne depot--Sunday afternoon, stating he was going to set it afire. That man was arrested by the police, assisted by some citizens, and taken to the lock-up.
Q. You know that there was an assemblage of men at or near Twenty-eighth street during the day, on Friday, don't you?
A. I presume there was, or Mr. Watt would not have come down there and asked for police?
Q. For the purpose of protecting trains going out?
A. No, sir; I didn't know that. I don't think I knew that.
Q. For what purpose were they assembled there, so far as you know?
A. I only knew about them from Mr. Watt, and what he told me, I have forgotten now.
Q. You have forgotten what he told you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you take any measures to ascertain what the purpose of the assemblage was?
A. I think Mr. Watt must have told me what it was, and I judge so. The first thing I heard after the police went there, was that a man had struck Mr. Watt.
Q. I want to know if you don't know that during the day on Friday, and during the day Saturday, there was a large assemblage of men at or near Twenty-eighth street?
A. I knew that by common report, and hearing the police talk.
Q. Was not that an unlawful assemblage of men?
A. It may have been an unlawful assemblage of men.
Q. Didn't you know it was an unlawful assemblage of men?
A. I don't know, I presume it would have been an unlawful assemblage. I presume that they were there for an unlawful purpose.
Q. You did not take any pains to disperse that assemblage?
A. Have I not answered that question a dozen times?
Q. What is your answer? Did you take any measures to disperse that assemblage?
A. I didn't for the reason that I have given you--for the reason I repeated a dozen times to different other questions, in different forms. There is a good deal more I would like to tell you.
Q. You say on Thursday you sent police officers there, and they got on a train, and they attempted to run that train out?
A. And couldn't run it out.
Q. Why didn't they run it out?
A. Because the engineer stepped down and out.
Q. Why did he step down and out?
A. Because he wanted to.
Q. Was there any men taken by force?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Was there a crowd there at that time?
A. I suppose there were a great many people there. I have no doubt there was.
Q. Don't you think it was an unlawful assemblage, and that it was your duty, as mayor, to have gone there, and have dispersed that crowd?
A. The police were there preserving the peace. They were there and preserved the peace to such an extent, that the police say that they were on that train, and that train could go out. There was nothing to hinder it, if the engineer had stuck to his post; but, instead of that, he stepped off his engine, and left the police in charge. That is the report of the police to me?
Q. Wasn't it your duty to disperse that crowd there, as mayor of the city?
A. No; because I knew nothing of the details of that, at this time; because Mr. Watt got all the police that he needed, and they got more than they wanted--said they had more than they wanted, and they had the direction of them there, and the presumption is that the police did just what they wanted them to, and the only breach of the peace that occurred there was that of which Mr. McCall was arrested for--striking Mr. Watt--and taken to the station.
Q. Was not the train uncoupled? When they attempted to start that train, didn't they rush on and uncouple the cars?
A. I guess you are talking about the trains they attempted to run early in the morning, before the police came there. That is what I think. It was on that occasion that Mr. Watt came down after the ten policemen.
Q. Didn't Mr. Watt tell you of the circumstances?
A. I suppose he did.
Q. Didn't you have knowledge then that there had been a riot, or, at least, a disorderly crowd there, and wasn't it your duty then to protect those people?
A. And for the purpose of doing that, Mr. Watt came and asked for a certain number of policemen--for what he thought was sufficient--and they were soon there?
Q. And still you allowed that crowd to remain there?
A. That is not a fair way to put it.
Q. I want to get at the reasons that actuated you?
A. I didn't know anything of the nature of that crowd. I knew nothing more at the time than that Mr. Watt wanted ten men, and ten men was sufficient to control it. That was sufficient. They were there, and there was only one breach of the peace, and that man was arrested, and when this train, between three and four o'clock, undertook to be run out, it could have been run out.
Q. Did the crowd intimidate the engineer in any way, do you know?
A. I understood the police that he was not intimidated--that he could have gone out with the train, if he thought proper. They were there to protect him in so doing. They told me he could have gone out, if he had chosen. I don't know who he is, anything about him. I guess it was the last effort made to run a train out.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you consider at any time until the military arrived that the crowd that assembled there was an illegal crowd?
A. Oh, no; I didn't think it amounted to shucks.
Q. You consider there was no riot or mob nor illegal assemblage at any time before the military arrived?
A. I knew that there were men in a crowd.
Q. Answer that question now. You consider there was no illegal assemblage, mob, or riot previous to the arrival of the military?
A. I think that in the ordinary acceptation of the word mob and riot, there was no mob and riot previous to the military coming there.
Q. Or illegal assemblage of people?
A. I think any persons that go on the Pennsylvania Railroad Company's ground, don't obey their lawful orders and proper orders, that it is an unlawful assemblage.
Q. Was there any illegal assemblage?
A. I have no doubt there was.
Q. Were you aware of that?
A. I must have been aware. It could not have been otherwise.
Q. Did you make any efforts to disperse them?
A. Yes; I gave the Pennsylvania Railroad Company all the police they asked for.
Q. Did you drive them off?
A. I don't think they were driven off, but the Pennsylvania railroad got all the police they asked for.
Q. You didn't give them the officer they asked for?
A. In asking for me?
Q. Yes; you?
A. No; I was not going up to head ten policemen.
Q. You required them to pay the police also?
A. No, sir; you put your statement too broad. These policemen--we took what policemen we could belonging to the city and filled up with the others who were not in the pay of the city.
Q. And those others were paid?
A. I think there must have been about twenty-nine policemen outside of such of the city folks as were considered.
Q. The extras were paid off by the Pennsylvania railroad?
A. Yes; they were paid by them.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. You didn't call on any of the night force to go at that time?
A. No, sir; we couldn't do that. Nothing but the most imperative necessity would require that. We only had patrolmen to cover twenty-seven square miles. At the riot on Saturday night every man was called in from the first, second, fourth, seventh, eighth, and ninth districts; they were left entirely unprotected.
At this point the committee adjourned until this afternoon, at two o'clock.
AFTERNOON SESSION.
PITTSBURGH, Friday, February 22, 1878.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in the orphans' court room at three o'clock, P.M., Mr. Lindsey in the chair.
All members present.
* * * * *
R. L. Hamilton, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. 810 Penn avenue.
Q. What is your business?
A. I am a clerk for the water-works of the city of Pittsburgh--clerk of the water-works. I believe it is called, sometimes, clerk of the water extension committee.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. I have held the position of clerk of the water-works since February, 1876--February 4, I believe.
Q. Where is your office?
A. City hall. Third floor of the city hall. Municipal hall as it is called.
Q. State whether you were at or in the vicinity of Twenty-eighth street, on Saturday the 21st day of July?
A. I was.
Q. When the firing occurred?
A. I was in the vicinity at the time of the firing.
Q. Where were you--what was your position?
A. I can hardly understand the question.
Q. Where were you in relation to where the troops stood--explain the situation you occupied?
A. At the time of the firing I was running.
Q. Which direction?
A. Well, towards Liberty street and Twenty-ninth street, to get a brick house between me and the troops.
Q. Go on, and relate what you saw, commencing at the time you arrived at, or in the vicinity of Twenty-eighth street?
A. To explain the question, there was a meeting of the water committee called for Monday evening, and some two or three members of the water committee lived out in that direction. I started at that notice, and at two o'clock I arrived at Twenty-eighth street. I went up Twenty-eighth street to the Pennsylvania railroad tracks, and when there, I was informed that the Philadelphia troops were about to come out, and I waited to see them until sometime after four o'clock. These troops came out headed by the sheriff and several citizens of Pittsburgh, and after they had formed themselves in position, the sheriff commenced speaking to the crowd, and I couldn't hear what he was saying from where I was standing, and I got on a coal truck where I thought I could hear what he was saying. When I was on this truck, one company of the Philadelphia troops--the troops, at that time, were formed in two lines facing the hill, that is, the line next me was facing the hill. I wouldn't say positively about the line nearest the hill. I was near the round-house. There was one company of the Philadelphia troops brought up in single rank, they marched up very quietly until they got to the switch below Twenty-eighth street. They were met by the crowd, that is, a crowd of men that refused to go any further. There were orders given very quietly, and another company, with black plumes on their hats, came up, and this first company was put in double rank. They tried to force the crowd back, and the order was given to charge bayonets. The officers of the Philadelphia troops were in the rear of those two companies, they were charged up on the track, and after sometime, there was an order given to fire by the different officers of the Philadelphia troops.
Q. I wish you would now repeat what you said, beginning with the order which was given to charge bayonets, commencing about there, and repeat what you said?
A. After the second company had been brought up--the company with dark plumes on their hats, I cannot tell what the uniform was--after that, there was an order given to charge bayonets, and it was a very short time after this order to charge bayonets--that was only given to the two companies, the other files were standing, the rest of the Philadelphia troops were standing in two lines on each side of the railroad track--after that order given to charge bayonets, almost immediately, I heard the command given by several officers of Philadelphia companies, that is, I suppose they were from Philadelphia. I don't know them personally, but from their uniform, and from the position in which they were. The order to fire was given by several men in the uniform of officers of that regiment.
Q. Where did you stand during this time?
A. I stood on a truck loaded with coal. The left of the railroad tracks going out almost immediately in front of the sand-house of the Pennsylvania railroad, this side of Twenty-eighth street.
Q. How far from the tracks?
A. I could have stooped down and touched three of the militia with my hands, by stooping.
Q. How far were you from them at the time the order to charge bayonets was given?
A. I was in the same position. I had not left that position from the time I got up there to see what was said by the sheriff until I heard the order given.
Q. What officers gave the order to charge bayonets?
A. I couldn't say. I heard, but I couldn't say how it was given. The orders at that time were given very low. It was not to the whole regiment.
Q. From what direction did the order come?
A. Right from the rear of the two companies that were marched up the track, and they were not charging when the order was given.
Q. How did they have their arms when the order to charge bayonets was given?
A. The two companies, I think the whole of them, were at carry arms, from what I know of the present tactics.
Q. Were any of them at arms port?
A. Some of them in the charging parties had their guns at arms port--some of the charging party.
Q. Did you hear that command given?
A. No, sir; I didn't hear that command given, but I know now that some of them had their guns at arms port, because I remember the guns being in the position of arms port--some of them. A party directly in front of me were at carry arms.
Q. They were standing still?
A. Yes. They were in line. I think they were at a carry, so far as I can remember. I cannot swear positively as to that.
Q. When you heard the command given to charge bayonets, how close were those two companies to the mob?
A. Just as close as they could get.
Q. And the mob resisted them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the order was given to charge bayonets, did the two companies obey the order.
A. Part of them did. I could see them lunge with their bayonets--try to force them back.
Q. Did the crowd resist that charge?
A. Some of them did; yes, sir.
Q. And attempted to pull----
A. I heard parties say that if they would let them out in any way, they would be glad to do so. It was the crowd back of them that was holding them in. Others resisted.
Q. Did they try to pull the bayonets off the guns?
A. I saw them wrenching with the guns. Saw them wrenching the guns, and heard remarks made by different parties in front of the party charging bayonets that if they would give them room to get back they didn't want to interfere. I heard these remarks made from where I was.
Q. And the command to fire, you say, was given by captains?
A. I don't know about captains. I say officers of the Philadelphia companies that the word "fire" was given by.
Q. By officers of companies?
A. Company officers is what I say the word was given by.
Q. And not by field officers?
A. I wouldn't know that the field officers were with that regiment, but I knew from the position----
By Mr. Reyburn:
Q. You mean from the position they occupied, they were company officers?
A. I suppose they were company officers. They were in the rear of the two ranks facing me.
Q. Had any stones and missiles been thrown at the soldiers before the command to charge bayonets was given?
A. I cannot say positively as to before the command to charge bayonets was given.
Q. Were any thrown at the troops before the command to fire was given? Were there any shots fired by the crowd before the command to fire was given?
A. Not that I either saw or heard--not before the command to fire.
Q. Missiles had been thrown?
A. They had been thrown--I saw them thrown.
Q. Were any of the soldiers hurt?
A. Not that I saw. I saw one of the officers--I supposed to be a field officer--saw him hit, and it staggered him, but he didn't seem to be hurt--kind of shoved him to one side--it seemed to be a piece of a board or piece of wood--something like a block of wood--it was thrown from the hill side, and hit one of the officers. I saw that myself--not thrown from the hill side, but from what they call the watch-box--it is a watch-box. It was thrown from the back of that by a boy.
Q. You saw the boy?
A. It was a young fellow about sixteen or seventeen years of age, from what I could judge from his appearance.
Q. When the firing commenced, you ran?
A. I ran before the firing commenced. I was back of what they call the Hill house.
Q. Did you run before the command was given?
A. No, sir; I didn't. Whenever I heard the command given, I thought I had no business there, and I got out of the road, that is one thing that made me so positive the command was given. My idea of getting out of the road was on account of that command to fire.
Q. In what words--was there more than one command?
A. There was no more than one command. The word fire was given by different men in uniform. They were standing not in the rear, but in front of the line of militia that was right in front of me. I heard that from more than one voice.
Q. In what words was the command given?
A. The command I speak of as given by those parties, was the word "fire."
Q. Addressed to any particular person?
A. Not by those parties--just "fire."
Q. How do you know who gave that command?
A. I could hear them; I don't suppose I was six feet from some of them.
Q. Could you pick out the men who gave the command?
A. That gave the word fire?
Q. Yes?
A. No, sir; I couldn't.
Q. Then you don't know who it was that gave the command?
A. That gave these commands? No, sir.
Q. You say it came from officers in command of a company?
A. It came from what I supposed by the position they held--they were strangers to me.
By Mr. Reyburn:
Q. Couldn't you distinguish the officers from the private?
A. I thought I could. It was what I consider officers. I didn't pay that much attention. I had no idea there was going to be such a command given, and paid no attention to officers nor privates. These parties had no guns. Whether they were captains or lieutenants, or what, I couldn't say.
Q. You wouldn't pretend to say what man it was gave the command, or pick out the man?
A. That gave this command I speak of? No, sir.
Q. You could only tell the direction in which the words came?
A. If they had been Pittsburgh troops had been there, I suppose I could have told every man of them. I could not point out the men if they were brought before me now.
Q. Could you see the man who uttered the words?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So as to pick him out?
A. I could, provided I had seen enough of the man. I couldn't remember him now. I believe if I could see the man that I first heard these words "fire" from; if I would have seen him the next morning, I could point him out. I don't remember of having seen him since, and I don't know that I could point him out if he was here.
Q. How was he dressed?
A. Dressed in a gray uniform? He was in full uniform, with gold lace on it.
Q. What rank did his uniform indicate?
A. I didn't pay that much attention to him to find out what his rank was. The militia uniform is so badly mixed, I could hardly tell what the man's rank would be. The uniform seemed to be about the same in all the officers. I didn't pay any attention to these troops as regards that.
By Mr. Reyburn:
Q. Had he a plume, the same as the privates?
A. I couldn't say.
Q. Didn't notice?
A. No, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. How many officers did you hear give this command to fire?
A. I couldn't say exactly. I suppose seven or eight.
Q. All gave the command to fire?
A. Yes, sir; that is, I heard it in that many different voices; I couldn't say how many officers, but in that many different voices.
Q. Not at one and the same time?
A. Not at one and the same time.
Q. Did any other words precede the word "fire?"
A. Not by the officers I speak of.
Q. Nothing but simply "fire?"
A. Simply "fire."
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You are sure they didn't say not to fire, and you only heard the word "fire?"
A. I am sure of the parties I speak of.
Q. That they were not cautioning their men not to fire on the crowd?
A. No, sir; I am sure of that.
Q. Couldn't you have made a mistake, and only heard the last word?
A. Not from the position I was. The parties may have been mistaken in regard to where they got their order.
Q. When they were ordered to charge bayonets, what was the command given to charge bayonets?
A. As I spoke before, the command was given, that I could hear the command but couldn't hear what was said to the troops. It was given to two companies in a low tone of voice, but what I understood to be "charge bayonets," and a charge bayonets was immediately made after this order. It was in a low tone of voice.
Q. Not as a military officer ought to give a command?
A. Not as I would suppose a military officer should give a command. I am not posted in regard to how they should give it.
Q. He didn't say it as though he meant business?
A. It looked very much like it.
Q. He gave it in a low tone of voice?
A. Just gave it in a low tone of voice to those two companies--it was a command to those two companies.
Q. When he gave the command fire, did he speak it distinctly as though he meant exactly what he said?
A. Who are you speaking of?
Q. The officers that gave the command?
A. Yes; they spoke it distinctly.
Q. As though they meant exactly what they said?
A. I supposed from that they meant it, that is the reason I got out of the road. I thought they meant what they said.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. What position did those officers occupy when this command to fire was given. The officers I speak of giving the word "fire?"
A. They were in front of the command.
Q. In front of the rank?
A. In front of the rank. There was no room for them in place else.
Q. You are sure they were in front of the rank?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Seven or eight of them, you say?
A. If you will allow me to explain about the officers. Six, seven, or eight. There was two ranks of troops, stretching from the switch at Twenty-eighth street down the track in two ranks, and those two companies were at the upper end. What I supposed to be the general officers were in the rear of those two officers, and the other officers were scattered down along. There was two lines. There was seven or eight not scattered along, because they were over near to what I considered to be the generals.
Q. They were in front of the rank?
A. The line was facing this way. [Illustrating.] There was no officers outside of this rank [indicating] that I could see, and there was no room in this rank, because here is a truck--a coal truck. I stood from where I could stoop down and touch the soldiers.
Q. Wouldn't you suppose this was a pretty bad place for an officer to stand?
A. I should think it was.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. These officers stood between the mob and their men?
A. No, sir.
Q. They were behind the men?
A. What I consider the mob was at the switch at Twenty-eighth street. That was the switch here. [Illustrating.] The Philadelphia troops were formed in two ranks. There was the two companies coming up here, [indicating,] one in single file, and when they got to the switch the men stopped them. They were in single line. This company was brought up between the two lines, forcing every person out, keeping that part of the track clear. They succeeded until they got to this switch. When they got to the switch one company was not successful in driving them back.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You said the officers were in front of the men, did you mean those men that were standing in line? The officers were in front of them, was the ones you speak of?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It was these officers gave the command to fire?
A. These officers I was speaking of.
Q. It was not the men that were marching up to clear the crowd--I mean marching towards the crowd?
A. It was not those officers I heard.
Q. It was the bystanders? Those officers had nothing to do with those companies?
A. No, sir; not with those two companies up the track--no, sir.
Q. Did the companies commanded by the officers who gave the command, fire?
A. I didn't wait to see.
Q. You don't know that they did fire?
A. Not from my own knowledge, but from the parties wounded and killed, I would suppose so.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. How long after the command was given did you hear the firing?
A. I got back of this house before I heard any firing.
Q. What distance was you from the crowd, where you stood, when the command was given, when the firing began?
A. I suppose I would be a distance about forty yards, before I heard any firing.
Q. After the command to fire was given, you retreated to the oil-house?
A. I got the oil-house between me and the Philadelphia troops.
Q. How far was that from where you stood when the command was given?
A. I think it was forty yards from where I stood on the track.
Q. How long after you got to the oil-house, did you hear the firing?
A. I could hardly tell--it was a very short time. I don't think you could count a minute.
Q. You think you were not behind the oil-house one minute before the firing began?
A. Until I heard the firing.
Q. You started as soon as ever you heard the command to fire?
A. Just as soon as I could get off the track. As soon as I heard the command "fire," I commenced my way back in this crowd on the track, just as quick as I could get off and run.
Q. About how long did it take you to get through that crowd and behind the oil-house?
A. Didn't take me very long. I was not very long getting there, I know that.
Q. A minute?
A. I do not think I was a minute getting off the track. I was over a minute getting behind the oil-house.
Q. You were there not over a minute before you heard the firing?
A. I am sure of that.
Q. Do you think it was two minutes after the order to fire was given, before the firing began?
A. I think so; yes, sir.
By Mr. Reyburn:
Q. Where did these stones and missiles come from?
A. The things I saw thrown were right from back of what we call a switch-tender's shanty. There is a little shanty we call the switch-tender's shanty. It was parties standing back of that--I could see it from where I was standing--most of them that were thrown.
Q. How much of a shower of stones was it?
A. There was no shower. There was not even a slight storm. It was not what I would call a shower of stones.
Q. Only two or three stones thrown?
A. There might have been--I guess I saw six or seven. There were lumps of mud and pieces of wood. I do not think I saw a stone. I did see mud--that is, hard mud seemed to be taken from the side of the hill.
Q. Did you see one of those soldiers fall, in the ranks that marched down there?
A. Yes, sir; there was one of them fell, and they picked him up, and took him into the hospital grounds. He was sun-struck, or something of that kind.
Q. How do you know he was sun-struck?
A. That is what some of his comrades claimed. Before they got to Twenty-eighth street this man dropped. He seemed to be a Jew, from his looks. The boys used the expression: "Let the damned Jew lay there." The railroaders got water for him, and bathed him.
Q. Have you ever told anybody that you heard the firing there, and heard the command given to fire?
A. I was a witness in the criminal court, in the murder case against General Pearson.
Q. Have you told anybody outside that you heard the command to fire given?
A. I believe I did.
Q. Have you told persons you heard General Pearson give the command to fire?
A. Not in direct words.
Q. Have you not stated several times, on the street corners, to different parties, that you heard General Pearson give the command to fire?
A. No, sir; I do not think I ever did--not in those words.
Q. Did you ever state to anybody that you had heard the commanders of companies give the command to fire, before stating it here?
A. I do not know. I forget exactly just what words my testimony was in the court.
Q. I am not asking you what testimony you gave in the court. Have you ever stated to any person before to-day, outside of the court, or anywhere, that you heard officers of companies give the command to fire?
A. I believe I have. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have stated that you heard General Pearson give the command to fire?
A. Not in those words.
Q. What do you mean by "Not in those words?"
A. I think the order to fire emanated from General Pearson, but I never said, in direct words, that General Pearson gave the order to fire.
Q. It was only a supposition of yours?
A. No; it was from the remark that I have sworn--I heard General Pearson give this--my remark was that General Pearson had turned around to other officers, with whom I am not acquainted, and used the expression, "Your men to fire;" but I did not say he had coupled those words with "Order your men to fire."
Q. Did you hear him say those words?
A. I have sworn. Yes, sir.
Q. To whom?
A. As I told you, I was not acquainted with the officers to whom he addressed himself. He was speaking to parties in gray uniform. He was standing almost immediately in his rear.
Q. He said, "Your men to fire?"
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were you from him?
A. I suppose I would be--I could hardly judge the distance--I would take it to be about ten feet or so.
Q. Did he speak it in a low tone?
A. It was not very loud. It was not a low tone.
Q. Was there a good deal of noise and confusion about at that time?
A. Oh, considerable, just in certain localities.
Q. The crowd was boisterous, were they not?
A. To a certain extent.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You did not hear any command given to fire, positively, by General Pearson?
A. No, sir; I never said so.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. How do you account for the long interval of time intervening between the command to fire and the firing.
A. I could not say.
Q. Did they load after the command to fire was given?
A. I could not say.
Q. Did you see them load?
A. No, sir; I did not see them fire.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. There was nothing preparatory at all, to this word fire.
A. No, sir; I thought it very strange myself, at the time the command to fire was given. They were not even ready.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You say you heard General Pearson speak to those officers, and said something about firing. You do not know whether he said not allow the men to fire, or to fire?
A. No, sir.
Q. How long after he made this remark to those officers did the command to fire come from those officers, and did it come from those same officers he was talking to?
A. I could not say whether it came from the same officers he was talking to. There were about fifteen or twenty of them in the crowd. I cannot say who he was addressing. It was started from that crowd, and carried by others still further down the line.
Q. How long after that was that order given to fire?
A. I do not think it was a minute. I cannot recollect the time.
Q. How far was General Pearson from the place when he had this conversation with those officers--how far was he from the position where those officers did give the command to fire?
A. I can hardly know.
Q. The word passed along the line?
A. It was passed by parties in front.
Q. How far did it pass until it got to those officers that did give the command?
A. It did not pass any further than, I suppose, seven or eight feet.
Q. The officers were pretty thick, were they not?
A. Yes, sir; very thick.
By Mr. Means:
Q. General Pearson appeared to stand at the head of the column?
A. He stood in the rear of the two companies that were charging up the track between the two lines and the side of the track.
Q. It appears from your testimony that the firing was sometime after the command to fire was given.
A. Yes; it was sometime. I had time enough to get away.
Q. Do you think that this firing was in consequence of the order to fire?
A. I did not wait to see anything about that. As soon as I heard the word "fire," I thought that was enough for me.
Q. Have you ever had any military experience in the army?
A. No, sir; never in the army. I served two or three years in the militia.
Q. Ever practiced firing any in the militia?
A. Some little.
Q. How long after the command to fire was given do you discharge your piece?
A. If in position to fire, we generally pulled as quick as we could get it off.
Q. When this firing began, was it a volley, or was it a scattering fire?
A. It was kind of mixed, I thought. I did not think it was what I considered a volley from a number of men that were present.
Q. Was it a scattering fire that lasted some little time?
A. The firing was kept up. Scattering fire was kept up for three or four minutes.
Q. The first fire?
A. The first volley, though not what I consider a volley from the number of men that were present. It sounded more like a volley than a scattering fire--the first fire. After that it was a scattering fire.
Q. There appeared to be a number of simultaneous discharges of muskets?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there any one else present there where you stood that heard and saw what you said, or was likely to see and hear?
A. There were plenty there that could have seen.
Q. Any one that you know?
A. No, sir: no person that I know. I was not paying much attention to who was standing around me. No person that I knew of was in that locality at that time.
Q. Did you see the arms loaded at any time?
A. No, sir.
* * * * *
J. G. McConnell, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I reside in the Nineteenth ward, city of Pittsburgh.
Q. What is your profession?
A. Practicing law.
Q. State whether you were at or in the vicinity of the elevator on the 22d of July last, about the time it was burned?
A. I was, sir.
Q. What time did you arrive at that place?
A. I arrived there just about the time that the fire was taking hold of the elevator.
Q. Just about the time the fire was taking hold of the elevator?
A. Just about the time the inside of the elevator----
Q. Were there any policemen there at the time?
A. No, sir; I did not see any.
Q. Did any come there?
A. Not that I saw.
Q. Did you send for any?
A. Not at that time, sir.
Q. Afterwards did you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see who set the elevator on fire?
A. I did not.
Q. And how it caught?
A. No, sir; but after the elevator was on fire. The person who gave you that information has not given you the correct information. After the elevator was on fire some little time, I was standing on Eleventh street, probably halfway between Penn and Liberty. While standing there, a man came up alongside of me and stood there. I did not say anything, and directly there was another man joined him. The first one was a short thick-set man, with a light colored moustache and imperial and light hair; a man I should say weighing about one hundred and sixty-five pounds, probably about five feet eight inches in height. The person who joined him was somewhat taller, nearly six feet in height, and they got into a conversation. They were evidently well acquainted with each other; and then the short thick man made a remark. Says he, "The elevator makes a very handsome fire." I spoke up and said I thought it was a very great shame and outrage that property should be destroyed, and this man turned around and said, "What is it your business?" I told him it was my business to a certain extent, as I was solicitor for the elevator company. I said to him that I thought the firemen ought to turn their hose on it. I then went to see Mr. Evans, and asked him if he could turn the hose on, and he informed me that it was impossible to do so. He had been deterred by the mob, and they had cut his hose, or threatened to cut his hose, and some man had put a revolver to his head; that he had two streams on, but had to take them off. I walked down pretty close to Penn avenue and these two men were still standing there. I stopped opposite them and they were still in conversation. The short thick-set man turned around to the other one and in a whisper made this remark to him, "Has the Pan Handle bridge been set fire to yet?" The other one says, "No, I think not." He said, "Somebody ought to send a party to do that;" and I then, left and went down towards Wayne street, went down to the river, went down the river, came up towards Fifth avenue, and on Thursday or Friday subsequent to the destruction of the elevator, on my way out home, in the evening, about half past four o'clock, passing the ruins of the Union Depot hotel, I saw this man standing there--this short thick-set man. There was a policeman standing on the corner. I went up to the policeman and pointed this man out and said, "That man, I think, was a ring leader in the riot. If you will arrest him, I will make information against him." The policeman did not reply, but walked up towards the avenue.
Q. Do you know the policeman?
A. No, sir; I did not take notice of his number.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you see the grain elevator set on fire?
A. No, sir; I was standing out in front, and from where I stood the burning apparently began at the back side, towards the Pan Handle side of the road, towards the Washington street bridge.
Q. How many policemen did you see around the vicinity at that time?
A. Did not see any.
Q. The only one you saw was on this bridge?
A. I did not see any at all that day--that evening.
Q. When was it you saw this policeman?
A. Thursday or Friday, subsequent to the destruction.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you make any report of the policeman who refused?
A. No, sir; only to the officers of the elevator company.
Q. Did they make any effort to find out who the policeman was, afterwards?
A. I do not know, sir--that is, I made no official report to the company. I just reported it to one or two of the officers, and their instructions were, if I recognized the party, to report it, and if I recognized the party I saw on Monday evening to report it.
Q. You made no report of that policeman to the mayor of his refusal to act?
A. No, sir; if I had known his number I certainly should; but I did not know his number.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You did not hear enough of the conversation between those men, to find out whether there was an organization?
A. None, whatever. I did not hear sufficient of that. I believe that is all the conversation I heard in regard to the matter. There was a remark made that rather implied I had better get out of the way, and I stood over by the engine.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. These men were both strangers to you, the short man and the large one?
A. They were men who were working. I evidently took them to be mill men about the city here. I do not think they were strangers in the city at all, sir.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Were they railroad men?
A. I do not think so. I could not judge from their appearance. Just from their appearance, I took them to be men working about some of the mills or about some heavy employment in the city. I judged that more from their general appearance and from their hands. I noticed one man put up his fist. He had a very large heavy fist, and it looked like a work-man's fist.
Q. That was Thursday or Friday subsequent to the burning, that you met this other man?
A. Yes; Thursday or Friday?
Q. What time of day was it you met him?
A. I think it was about half past four in the afternoon. I left my office to go home, and it took me, I suppose, eight or nine minutes to walk up to where the Union Depot hotel stood at that time. Probably I stood around there ten minutes looking at the ruins, and it was just as I was moving off--probably it was about five o'clock.
* * * * *
Doctor James B. Murdock, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Please state where you reside?
A. I reside on Centre avenue, No. 99. Up over the hill from the railroad--over that side of the hill--back from it.
Q. A practicing physician in the city of Pittsburgh?
A. Practicing physician and surgeon.
Q. State what knowledge you have of the late riots?
A. When I heard I was to be subpoenaed here, I wrote down what I know about it, and perhaps that would be the quickest way of telling. My first knowledge of the riot was on the evening of the day of the riot, the 21st of July, about half past five o'clock in the afternoon, when I was returning to my office from my calls, and one of my neighbors came running to me in a hurried manner, and stated that a little boy had been shot and needed my services. I accompanied the messenger to a drug store in the vicinity of my house, and on my way there this messenger informed me how it happened, and told me the boy had been sitting on the hill side above the Twenty-eighth street crossing, and that he also was there, and that there was a volley of musketry fired from the soldiers, who were down on the railroad track, and that the little boy had screamed out----
Q. I hardly think this comes within the scope of our investigation, unless you can give us the number of persons killed and wounded. That might be within the scope of our investigation; but testimony as to the persons that were wounded is hardly within the scope of our investigation?
A. I do not know what I was subpoenaed here for. I was one of the surgeons in charge of the wounded at the West Pennsylvania hospital.
Q. State the number that were brought there wounded?
A. There were seven wounded men brought there that evening.
Q. How many soldiers?
A. Two soldiers. One of them wounded with a stone and the other sun-struck.
Q. Who were the other parties?
A. I do not know who they were. They were citizens--I do not know whether they were citizens or not. They were strangers to me.
Q. Do you know the number that were killed in that fire?
A. No, sir; I do not.
Q. You know nothing, I suppose, as to the wounded, except those that were brought to the West Penn Hospital?
A. Only just this little boy. I saw from there the attack on the round-house during the night.
By Mr. Reyburn:
Q. Did you see the firing of the cars when it commenced?
A. I saw the whole of that attack.
Q. You might give us a description of that?
A. The grade is down from Thirty-third to Twenty-eighth, and the cars ran from their own gravity. When they were let go they would run. The first car came down between ten and eleven, and it was run down the grade, and when it got opposite the round-house it seemed to run off the track. You could observe it from the hospital grounds. Soon after that a whole train of cars, loaded with coke, came down the track, and struck this first one. We could hear the collision. It stopped near the round-house. They continued the passing down of fired cars from the vicinity of Lawrenceville, until I left the hospital, about two o'clock in the morning, and the cars were burning there, and the sand-house was then on fire, when I left.
Q. From your position you could not see who done the firing?
A. No, sir; but I could see in front of the hospital grounds when a car would stop, as it sometimes would in its descent, there would be people take hold of it, and push it on down towards the round-house. I observe that those who did that pushing were nearly all boys, fourteen to sixteen or seventeen years of age.
Q. Twenty-five engaged in it?
A. I do not think I saw over twenty-five at this place. I could not see where the cars were started from, I could see them just as they were passing the hospital grounds.
Q. How large a crowd was gathered there?
A. On my way to the hospital there was an immense crowd. I had to go through Liberty street, but just at the Twenty-eighth street crossing and down on the track, as you may say, Twenty-eighth to Twenty-ninth street, there was not a hundred people visible. There were a great many on the side hill looking down.
Q. Were you present on Sunday?
A. Yes, sir. I saw the burning of the Union depot and the elevator. There is one circumstance that I, perhaps, might state to the committee if it is of interest. I do not know that it is, though. On my way around through the city, I saw a great deal of the plunder being carried off, and on Gazzam's hill Sunday morning, at eleven o'clock, I saw a boy some twelve years of age who seemed to be gazing over in the direction of the railroad. I asked him what he was looking at. He said that the round-house had been burned last night and that the depot and the elevator was going to be burned to-night. I asked him how he knew that. He said his father had told him he had been out all last night was going out to-night.
Q. Did you ascertain who he was?
A. No, sir; I did not. I did not think anything of it at the time. I did not think anything of it. When it occurred I remembered then of that statement.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you notice any firing by the mob, musketry or pistols, at the troops in the round-house?
A. No, sir; I did not see any.
By Mr. Means:
Q. You do not know whether this boy's father was an employé of the Pennsylvania railroad or not, that told you that the elevator and the other buildings were to be burned?
A. No, sir; the boy was in a part of the city where it would not be likely that an employé of the company would live.
Q. You do not know who the boy was?
A. No, sir; did not pay enough attention to it at that time.
* * * * *
J. R. McCune, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. In the Fourteenth ward, this city.
Q. What is your business?
A. I am president of the Union National Bank.
Q. Were you at the scene of the riots at any time during their progress?
A. I saw the burning--partly saw it on Sunday for the first. I was not at the scene of the riots prior to Sunday, and know very little or most nothing of my own knowledge--prior to Sunday.
Q. You may state what efforts you made in connection with others to suppress the riot on Sunday, and stop the pillaging and plundering?
A. I came down town on Sunday morning in conference with some other citizens, and thought it desirable to call a meeting of citizens. I then learned for the first time that the troops had left the city, and there were placards posted on the bulletin boards calling a meeting of citizens, I think, at twelve o'clock. I participated in that meeting, and was appointed on a committee to take such action as was deemed advisable. The committee was a large one, and adjourned to the council chamber, and it was there determined to appoint a sub-committee to visit the scene of destruction, and take whatever action seemed judicious. I think our duties were not restricted. I went with that committee, but cannot say that we effected much of anything. I believe that has been detailed to you before how the committee went up there, and got on a platform of a car, and Bishop Tuigg undertook to address the audience.
Q. Doctor Scovill's testimony in regard to that was correct?
A. So far as I saw. The doctor was immediately along side of me on the platform of the car. After leaving, there the committee was divided, and went to different points, one of which being to ascertain, if possible, if the railroad strikers were actively engaged in this burning, and we endeavored to hunt up the railroad men. We went up as far as Twentieth street, and interviewed railroad men wherever we could find them. They, I believe, universally disclaimed all participation in the riot. That is in the burning.
Q. In the destruction of property?
A. In the destruction of property. That was a point we inquired into particularly.
Q. Did they state who was engaged in the destruction of property?
A. My recollection is that they generally professed not to know. They promised to coöperate with us in efforts to stop the burning.
Q. Did they do that--did they coöperate?
A. I don't know how much they did in that direction. There was some of them came down to attend the meeting, and this committee reported to an adjourned meeting that was to be held, I think, at four o'clock in the afternoon. The committee returned, and stated briefly what had been done and the condition of affairs, and I think we suggested that there would be a large increase of the police force. The mayor was present, and the committee authorized him to employ as many policemen as they could get--five hundred if he could obtain them--and a number of gentlemen present pledged themselves for the payment of this police force.
Q. At four o'clock Sunday afternoon?
A. Yes; four o'clock Sunday afternoon, and there was also a sort of militia force organized, of which Mayor McCarthy told you this morning.
Q. This suggestion of employing five hundred police was made to the mayor, was it?
A. I don't remember from where the suggestion emanated. It seemed to be the unanimous wish of those present.
Q. Did you so inform the mayor of that week?
A. Yes; and the question was raised as to how they were to be paid, and quite a number of citizens there pledged themselves for the payment, and the mayor was asked if that would be satisfactory, and he said it was entirely so.
Q. Did the mayor issue any call, or any command, or summon any posse of citizens as a police force?
A. Immediately a call was made for citizens to unite with the mayor, and I think there was quite a force congregated together, and started to procure such arms as were available.
Q. That was the request made, was it?
A. I am not able to recall whether the request was made by the mayor. It was suggested from some source, and matters were done under a good deal of excitement. There was not much formality about that.
Q. Doctor Donnelly's command was organized at that time?
A. Donnelly had charge of it. An hour afterwards or so there were some others that repaired to the Duquesne depot. There are others can tell you more about that than I. The next morning I was at the mayor's office, when a sort of militia force was organized.
Q. How large a force was organized?
A. It is difficult to tell; I could only guess at it. There were, perhaps, two hundred.
Q. Composed of citizens?
A. Of citizens; yes, sir.
Q. Under whose command.
A. I think General Negley was made commander of them, temporarily. There was a telegram there from the burgess of Elizabeth, stating that a party of roughs or rioters were en route to the city by steamer, and this force went down there to meet them when they would arrive. Also during that morning there was a meeting of citizens convened, for the purpose of organizing a committee of safety. This meeting, held on Sunday, did not organize any permanent committee. On Monday there was a permanent committee organized, of which I was a member.
Q. How large a crowd was there during the day Monday, or was there any?
A. On Monday?
Q. Yes?
A. The streets were full of people. I think, possibly, I never have seen so many people in the streets, unless it was during the time of an immense convention.
Q. What class of people?
A. I could not undertake to say, sir. Seemed to me that everybody was there. There were comparatively few of them that I was acquainted with.
Q. This body of rioters, were they in force on Monday?
A. Thought there were a great many very rough looking characters on the street--that I had never seen so many.
Q. Were there any attacks made upon any property or persons, on Monday?
A. No, sir; not that I remember. I cannot re-call any.
Q. Were the business places open on Monday, throughout the city?
A. I think a good many were opened--some were closed. There was a great deal of fear expressed.
Q. Among the citizens?
A. Yes; the committee of public safety began immediately to organize a military force. They organized a force of infantry, and they organized a company of horsemen, and got them under way as rapidly as possible.
Q. To patrol the streets?
A. Yes; to go outside of the city limits, and endeavor to guard against any turbulence anywhere, or any organizations that might show themselves.
Q. Were you up about the railroad works any, during Monday?
A. I think I was not. No, sir; I was not at the scene of the burning on Monday.
Q. This crowd in the streets on Monday, did it seem to be just a promiscuous crowd everywhere on the streets, or was there an organization of men--roughs about?
A. There was nothing to enable me to determine that there was an organization.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Was the crowd attracted by curiosity to see what was going on?
A. It was largely so, I think--attracted by curiosity, although it seemed to me there were an immense number of strange faces amongst them.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. You had no trouble in preserving the peace after Monday morning?
A. The peace was preserved on Monday without trouble, because I think these organizations had a very wholesome effect. The committee of public safety then formally instructed the mayor to increase his police force. He had instructions to employ twenty additional men, and under that authority he did employ, I think, one hundred and thirty men, whom the committee on public safety paid.
Q. For how long a time did he keep these men employed?
A. A portion of them were discharged about ten days thereafter--perhaps in all the half of them--and the remainder were continued for forty or fifty days. I would state that the committee of public safety and other citizens united in a paper, whereby they pledged themselves to pay all expenses that might be incurred by this committee, without any limit whatever, and that we subsequently obtained specific subscriptions to the amount of about fifty thousand dollars.
Q. How much of that was expended in the operation?
A. I can't say positively, but a small portion of it, probably fifteen thousand dollars.
Q. And after the organization of that committee of public safety, the peace was preserved from that time forward?
A. Yes, sir; how much the committee had to do with it is a question I could not determine.
Q. Did the people unite heartily in carrying out the suggestions made by that committee?
A. Yes; I think the committee had no cause of complaint. They had the sympathy and coöperation of the community generally.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You know nothing of the causes leading to the riot?
A. Nothing; no, sir; nothing but what is patent to everybody. I had no special facilities for learning anything. Everybody had their own opinion. I was not on the ground prior to Sunday.
Q. Do you know whether this mounted citizens' police force went out of the city, and patrolled the streets leading to the city?
A. That is my impression. I was not with them, but I think they did.
Q. Along the lines of the Pan Handle railroad.
A. Yes; we were a good deal concerned about the Pan Handle road. There were rumors come to the committee that there was very imminent danger of them burning the cars in the tunnel and other points out the Pan Handle road. I think, however, you can glean the facts pertaining to the committee better from Mr. Johnson, who is chairman of that committee. He has examined the minutes, I think, and has charged his memory with the details.
Q. Do you know whether any men were arrested or not that attempted to come in on that road by this citizens' police force?
A. No, sir; my opinion is very vague on that point.
Q. Was not there some disturbance on Monday on some of your streets here in the city?
A. There was a good deal of turbulence all over the city. I remember one instance now. The committee was sent after some guns, and while they were being brought down Market street there was a halt made. They stopped the gun carriages, and somebody went up and boldly spiked the guns, which created a good deal of excitement for the moment.
Q. The crowd spiked the guns?
A. Spiked the guns.
Q. How many guns?
A. There were three of them, I think.
Q. What battery did they belong to?
A. I can't answer. I am not up on military affairs.
Q. Was not there some disturbance on Fifth avenue there that day?
A. There were disturbances, more or less, in many parts of the city. The city was disordered that day--decidedly disorderly.
Q. There was an effort made by the citizens generally, to suppress everything of that kind on Monday?
A. Yes; there was a decided effort made by the citizens.
Q. An organized effort?
A. Yes; the committee of public safety, organized for this special purpose. They acted promptly and vigorously.
Q. Do you know of any disturbance at Limerick, south side, on that day?
A. I cannot recollect it.
Q. Do you know of any disturbance on Second Avenue park?
A. No, sir; I cannot of my own personal knowledge--I cannot recollect.
* * * * *
Robert Atchison, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. 873 Penn avenue.
Q. What is your occupation?
A. Engineer.
Q. On what railroad?
A. P.R.R.
Q. Pennsylvania?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you in the employ of the Pennsylvania Company now?
A. I am.
Q. Were you in July last, the 19th of July?
A. I have been employed on the road for seventeen years, in the capacity of engineer. If it is necessary, I will just state what I know about it, if it is in evidence. On the morning of Thursday, 19th July, I think it was, the trains were all to be run double. I took out the first train. I was called at three o'clock in the morning, to take out the first train, and there was no trouble then, nor knew of any trouble. We went out--went to Derry.
Q. What hour did you leave?
A. I left at three o'clock in the morning, and got to Derry about seven, and returned. Coming back, before I got to the city, the other side of Walls station, I remarked to my fireman, that I thought there must be a wreck on the road. We had met no freights. We should have met some east of that, several miles. But paid no attention much to it, until I came in sight of Walls station. The accommodation is due there, then, twelve-forty, and I just remarked that if there was a wreck, I suppose they could run the accommodation round, as they often did, in such cases. When I came down--the conductor lives just a little way below--he got on my engine and rode down with me, and I asked him what was the matter, there was nothing out. He just made the remark, that the boys would not let anything go out this morning. That is the first intimation I had of anything, or I believe even the crews. They did not seem to know anything about it.
Q. What time was that?
A. It was about twelve-forty. We came on to the city unmolested by any person, until we came to Torrens station, that is a little way from East Liberty. There was a crowd there, but didn't seem to be doing anything--nobody was doing anything. We had some work to do, to put some cars in or something, and I just remarked to the crowd that was on the other side, says I, "What's going on here?" Says one, "Lots of fun." Mr. Garrett, the train master, gave the signal to me, and we went on, and came down to Twenty-eighth street, and what astonished me more than anything else was the crowd that was there, and the few people that I knew. They were strangers to me. At Twenty-eighth street I could not recognize but a few of our own men. They were all strangers to me. I passed on down with the train, took it to the west end of the yard, and put it away, and backed up my engine to the round-house, and put it in the round-house, and went home. Then I hadn't had any dinner--it was nearly three o'clock. I went home to dinner, and I didn't come up that afternoon, I don't think, again. I was up the next day around, but there was nothing going out, and the way we were running--some one remarked to me, I could not tell who it was--says he, "Go ahead, you can go in, but you can't go out." Says I, "Never mind, it is not my turn to go out."
Q. Were you put on Friday?
A. Yes; I was about.
Q. Was you ready to take out your train?
A. I was ready, and came up there on Friday. One of the officers remarked to me, there was nothing going out. It seemed to be this way: that if they got a train ready and the engine, there was no crew, and if you got a crew, there was no engine or anything else there. Some of the officers remarked to me that the Philadelphia soldiers were coming in, and everything would go on then as usual. I think I went home, and I didn't come back again that night. In the morning--Saturday morning, six o'clock--I was sent for to come up and go out. I believe before I had my breakfast. As soon as I got breakfast I went out, but I didn't see nothing for me to go out on, and I stood around there until eleven o'clock on Saturday, I think eleven or twelve, and I then just remarked to the foreman--I think it was the foreman, in the round-house--that I was going down home, and that if they wanted me, to send a watchman down to me, I would be at home--I would not be away from home. I said to my family, I believed I would go to bed and take some sleep, for I might have to come out to-night. I suppose it was fortunate for me I was not up in the crowd at the time of the shooting. I might have been there.
Q. Were you ready at all times to take out your train?
A. Provided everything had been all right I would. I would not like the idea of starting out there on Sunday morning. I didn't think I would like to take out a train then.
Q. Thought there was too big a crowd to get through?
A. I didn't feel like it.
Q. You were ready to go if the track was clear?
A. Yes; oh, yes.
Q. Had you heard, prior to your information at Walls, anything about the strike?
A. Never had the least intimation, because I do not think it was a pre-arranged matter at all. It did not seem to me that anybody seemed to know. No; I knew nothing about it, and nobody else seemed to know anything about it. The order was given on Wednesday, I think, that all trains would be run double from Thursday. That seemed to be a kind of sticker on some of them. They didn't care much whether they started or not, and some of them that morning, on the eight-forty train, refused to go out. They didn't care whether they went out or not, and just quit.
Q. There had been no pre-arranged plan for a strike to take place at that time?
A. Not that I had ever heard of.
Q. Had there been any arrangement made for a strike at or near that time?
A. Not to my knowledge. Not among the engineers, or so far as I know.
Q. Did you know of the existence of what was called the Trainmen's Union?
A. I did not at that time.
Q. Had no knowledge of that?
A. Had no knowledge nor no idea of anything of the kind going on.
Q. Had you talked with the conductors or brakesmen--had intercourse with them?
A. Oh, yes; there was never one of them mentioned anything of the kind to me, nothing of the kind at all. In fact, I don't have as much intercourse with the trainmen on the road as we did formerly when they had no caboose. Of late years they have been running cabooses, and they generally congregate there themselves.
Q. Engineers congregate more on their engine?
A. Yes; all the time train men go back in the caboose.
Q. You have an organization among the engineers?
A. There is an organization existing.
Q. Is that for engineers especially?
A. Especially, yes.
Q. Was there any talk of that kind in that organization that you know of--of striking?
A. Not a particle, not at the time.
Q. During the progress of the depredations or burning on Sunday were you present?
A. I was; I live close by.
Q. What class of men were engaged in active arson and destruction of property--burning?
A. It appears to me the roughest class of people I ever saw. They appeared to be all strangers to me. I was present when the alarm of fire was struck. I was at the corner of Twenty-sixth street, right opposite the round-house, where the soldiers were. I was coming down, I guess it was ten o'clock or near eleven, and the firemen responded to the alarm, and came up Penn avenue a little above my house, and they was stopped by the crowd. They told them they could not go any further. I was across the street. I heard one man say, "I will shoot the horse, and if you undertake to go, I will shoot you." They ran across the street, and came right beside me, and I heard them say they would have them out of there if they would have to burn them out. I just said, said I, "my God, men, don't set anything on fire here, you will burn it all up," and the answer he made was, "Go to hell, you son of a bitch." That was the very words he made use of. I thought the least I could say was the best, as I was by myself.
Q. Were there any railroad men engaged during the day Sunday?
A. I didn't see one railroad man to my knowledge, not an employé of the Pennsylvania railroad.
Q. Men that had been discharged, did you see any of that kind?
A. I did not see any of the kind.
Q. What did you, in connection with other railroad men, do to try and stop this?
A. We did not do very much, for we could not. It seemed as though everybody was intimidated, and felt himself afraid to undertake to do anything. I did, I know, as one by myself. I do not think, in a crowd of men, it would have been useless to try to stop the burning at nine o'clock in the morning.
Q. Sunday morning?
A. Sunday morning. The whole yard was in flames.
Q. Did you have any communication with the committee that was sent up from Harrisburg?
A. I did; I believe I did.
Q. State what that was?
A. General Brown came to me in the morning--about five o'clock.
Q. Sunday morning?
A. Sunday morning; and said to me--he wanted to know where this committee of railroad men was. I told him that I did not know where it was, but, says I, maybe I could find some of them. If we could get past Twenty-sixth street we might get some of them; but you can't pass through, they are shooting us there. Says he, tell them to come down to the Union depot, that I am authorized to give the men what they ask. There was a party went down there, and they could not find General Brown or any one else.
Q. Who was it went down?
A. I went down for one, and I didn't mind who else went down, it was impossible to get one of that committee, because they were scattered all through the city.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Were you on this committee of safety or any sub-committee, appointed by them, to go and confer with the strikers at any time.
A. No, I do not think--I think we went down. There was a committee of safety come up there, and I think Captain McMunn and myself and some of our ward boys, several of us, went down.
Q. As railroad men?
A. As railroad men, we went down. I got into the crowd down here, right below the elevator there, tried to find the leading man of the citizens' committee, and they got to shooting, and the crowd ran down there. There was a tremendous crowd there, and carried us along with them. I do not think there was any use to try to do anything at all.
Q. You said you would not like to have attempted to get out with that train on Saturday?
A. No; I would not.
Q. Did you apprehend any danger from any one?
A. None. I would not have apprehended any danger, I think, from anybody but from outsiders.
Q. Not from the railroad men?
A. Not from the railroad men. I did not think that they would interfere with me.
Q. Did you hear any threats of violence from the railroad men or engineers or any railroad strikers?
A. No; not to me at all.
Q. From any one else?
A. I did from outsiders--remarks--but I didn't know who they were--that the first man that would attempt to go out had better hunt his coffin.
Q. You saw the handling of cars and engines by the rioters during the destruction of property there in the vicinity of Twenty-eighth street and at the depot--did these men handle the cars and engines as if they had been accustomed to handling cars and engines?
A. I didn't see anybody handling an engine. After the soldiers went into the round-house, I never went up near the place, that is, further than going up some of the side streets to look over the burning. All the engines were further up, at Twenty-eighth street. I was not up there.
Q. You saw none of the mob taking engines and running them on the track?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see them handling the cars and switches?
A. I did not.
Q. You were speaking of an association of engineers. Is that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there any coöperation or action between that association and the Trainmen's Union at any time that you know of?
A. I do not think there was any of any account?
Q. If there was, you would know it?
A. I believe I should know it. There was a disposition on the part of all the men, when the strike had occurred, to stand out for their ten per cent. That was their object.
Q. That is, you mean all the trainmen, and engineers as well?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?
A. I was. I believe the order in this vicinity has disappeared.
Q. That association was got up for protection--a charitable institution for those that were connected with it?
A. Nothing to interfere with the railroad.
Q. If there had been any coöperation between the Trainmen's Union, or any connection between them and your association, you would likely know something about it.
A. Yes; there was this, so far as the ten per cent. went. That I believe was all after the burning. I do not think there was any connection with it before.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was there any coöperation or pre-arranged plan to strike for the purpose of securing this ten per cent.?
A. No, sir; not at all. The trouble had originated not until after there had been a committee to see Mr. Scott; but the thing had dropped, and I had heard nothing of it from the time that committee reported, and I do not remember the report they made, either.
Q. Was there a general dissatisfaction and complaint on the part of the railroad employés on account of this reduction of pay?
A. There was. That seemed to be a great deal of the trouble. They were dissatisfied with the pay they were getting.
Q. In your opinion, did that lead to the strike and trouble here?
A. I do not think it did. No, sir; I do not think so.
Q. What was it that led to the disturbance?
A. I do not think that would lead to it, because if the committee of engineers went to see the general officers, and they didn't get satisfaction, or claimed that the business that they were doing could not pay it, the men would have waited until such time as they would. They claimed that they were in pretty close quarters financially, but as soon as business would warrant, why they would restore it.
Q. What led to immediate troubles here? What was the immediate cause?
A. Running these double trains.
Q. Double-headers, as they were called?
A. Double-headers, as we called them.
Q. Why was there less objection to running double-headers?
A. In the first place it is very disagreeable for the men, and they consider it dangerous for one thing, and in running these trains it cuts a good many of them out of employment.
Q. Reduce the force of train men, not engineers?
A. Not of engineers, of trainmen.
Q. Wherein consisted the danger of running double-headers?
A. In the first place you hold just twice as many cars, and you don't have any more men on the train to hold them. Brakemen would hold thirty-four cars with two engines, and seventeen cars with one. If these trains get started they are pretty hard to manage.
Q. Did you have these engines at the head of the trains at all times, or did you have one in the front and one in the rear?
A. At the head all the time, they consider it safer that way to run them than to run one behind. Going through these up and down grades and turning is liable to break.
Q. The only danger there was in not having the same number of brakesmen to the same number of cars as you do when you run the single train?
A. That would have helped the matter considerably, I believe.
Q. There was no other danger?
A. There was no other danger.
Q. Could not that danger have been counteracted by having less trains?
A. They would not think that was safer.
Q. Would not there have been less danger by taking two trains and making one, and running them on the track--less danger of collisions than if you had to have two trains instead of one?
A. There is more danger running this double train than the single trains, because they are harder to manage.
Q. You can handle a train more readily?
A. Yes; check it up quicker. You can check a train much quicker--a light train than a heavy one--and they are less liable to break in the dark and in the fog. In the fog you can't tell whether they are broken or not. They might stop, and the hind part run into the front part, which has been frequently done.
* * * * *
J. F. Cluley, sworn.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Where do you live?
A. Centre avenue, city.
Q. What is your business?
A. Painter.
Q. Go on and state what you know in relation to the riots of last July?
A. On the Saturday, probably about half-past two, I went up to the depot and went in, and the Philadelphia soldiers were about starting out. I got up to Twenty-eighth street probably half an hour before they did. Everything was quiet there--at Twenty-eighth street. There was a company keeping the street clear--a company of troops.
Q. Who was that company commanded by?
A. I do not know. It looked like a cavalry company on foot from the trimmings on their clothes. As soon as the Philadelphia troops came up the mob closed round, and commenced hooting and hollering.
Q. Go on and state what took place there?
A. I suppose I had been up there probably twenty minutes, when they formed a double line and cleared the track. I was throwed over toward the round-house. I went round the cars at Twenty-eighth street, probably two hundred feet up the hill. There was a ravine coming down there, and I got outside of it. I don't mind how long I had been in there before the troops formed. At that time they had swept the tracks, and there was two or three lines formed outside the tracks. The troops had done some manoeuvering, they had marched up right against the track. At that time Twentieth street was blocked, and they marched, and the crowd did not get away, and they stepped back and made a bayonet charge. It seems to me after they had marched up against them I saw some men stagger, but I was too far off. About the time they made the bayonet charge there was a stone or three or four stones came from the direction of the hospital, and a pistol shot fired.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. From the direction of the hospital?
A. There is a watch-box there--it was not more than three stones, I think, they throwed. It was done just about the time the bayonet charge was made, and then there was a pistol shot about the same time.
Q. From the crowd?
A. It was generally in that direction; I suppose it was in the crowd. Then the firing was done just after.
Q. Did you hear any command to fire?
A. No; I was two hundred feet back. I was in a position that I could see the whole thing take place.
Q. Did the men fire as if they had received a command?
A. It appeared to be a scattered fire. As soon as they commenced firing, I started up on the hill. Some one called out they were firing blank cartridges, and I seen the dust flying around, and I threw myself down like everybody else. There was a man shot within the length of this room from me, and killed--a man named Ray, I think. I then started down hill, and when I was coming down I saw a man on the far side of Twenty-eighth street swing round a freight car, and throw into the company--he threw three or four stones or some missiles in among them, the last, when I was down almost to the track, and I thought every stone I seen throwed, I thought they would fire.
Q. Was it before they had fired?
A. After the firing, he swung around, and seemed to be inviting them, I thought, to do something.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Inviting the soldiers?
A. It looked as though he was. He was holding on to the iron rod on the car, and was swinging on in front of them. He was a large man, about six feet, very genteelly dressed--more so than the common run of them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. This man you saw swinging on round there, trying to make an effort to exasperate them?
A. It looked as though he was inviting them.
Q. It looked as though he was trying to exasperate them?
A. It looked as though he was inviting them to fire. I crossed the track ten minutes after the firing was over. The soldiers seemed to be laying huddled together. This stone throwing was right in among them.
Q. Did you see any of the soldiers struck down by missiles before the firing took place?
A. When the first advance was made, I thought I saw one of them stagger. I cannot tell whether they were hit. After they made the bayonet charge the parties took their hands and threw the guns up.
Q. What was the appearance of the class of men that threw the stones?
A. This I think was a half grown boy that threw the missiles from the back of the house.
Q. A boy?
A. It looked to me. Three or four have grown boys there.
Q. Did you see any men there throwing stones?
A. I don't recollect of seeing any stones throwed, except at this watch-box, until I saw this man, after the firing was all over. The track was perfectly clear when I crossed.
Q. What was the character of the crowd immediately in front of the military, or near the military?
A. Rough looking. I had seen the same crowd around for two or three days. I had been out and in on the railroad. I had seen them at ... street and Twenty-eighth street, for two or three days.
Q. Would you take them to be citizens of Harrisburg?
A. Yes, sir; not as a general thing. I know some of the conductors of the trains remarked to me that everybody was going in and nobody was coming out--all the tramps come in town and none going out.
Q. These men--would you take them to be what is generally denominated tramps?
A. Not all of them. Generally a pretty rough looking set. On the hill side there was plenty of women and children.
Q. I mean in the immediate vicinity of where the troubles were?
A. These were a rough looking set of men. I won't say they were all tramps. They were a rough looking set of men. I noticed them before the military came up. There was no disturbance at all until after the military came up. They were all quiet.
Q. They resisted the military, when they came up?
A. After they formed a line and made a charge.
Q. They resisted the military before the firing?
A. Yes; they stood right like a wall. The military marched up, and they didn't give the least bit. Then they stepped back a piece or two, and made a bayonet charge. I was not close enough to hear any orders given.
* * * * *
C. H. Armstrong, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. Thirty-second street.
Q. What is your occupation?
A. Coal business.
Q. Where is your office?
A. Liberty street, between Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth.
Q. Were you at your office on the 19th--Thursday, 19th of July last?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How large a crowd of men was there gathered about there during Thursday?
A. There was quite a large crowd there during Thursday morning. Towards the afternoon a great number had come up to see the strikers. There was very few railroad men among the crowd.
Q. What class of men were there?
A. Parties that lived around the railroad there, just come up to see the excitement.
Q. Where they demonstrative?
A. No, sir; they were not. They were all talking about double-headers, I do not know what they meant, and I asked them, and they told me about putting two engines on a long train.
Q. How large a crowd was there at any one time during the day, Thursday?
A. I guess three or four hundred--in the afternoon about four o'clock.
Q. Did they remain there during the night, Thursday?
A. Yes; I was up there about twelve o'clock, and there was a few men there--about thirty remained there during the night waiting for trains to go out.
Q. How many on Friday?
A. There was seven or eight hundred. They were expecting the soldiers in that evening. Were also expecting the Harrisburg men up that evening. They did not come up. I went down Saturday morning and went down the railroad from our house. I saw the Harrisburg soldiers there on the side of the hill and also down by the railroad.
Q. How large was it Saturday?
A. I don't know how large it was; the streets were just jammed and the side of the hill on Twenty-eighth street.
Q. Was you present when the firing took place?
A. Yes; I was up on the side of the hill about seventy yards from where the troops were.
Q. Did you see troops as they marched up?
A. Yes; I saw them before they left the Union depot. Saw them get their cartridges before they left there.
Q. Did you go up ahead of them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have any talk with the mob?
A. Yes, sir; I talked with some of the railroad men.
Q. Tell them that the troops were coming?
A. Told them that the Philadelphia troops were coming.
Q. What did they say?
A. They said that they were not afraid of that; as long as they didn't hurt them, they would not hurt them.
Q. Was the sheriff's posse ahead of the line?
A. Yes; I recognized a few of them, I believe the sheriff was ahead, and, I think, Deputy Sheriff Steward, and, I think, Mr. Pitcairn was also ahead of them. He was walking beside Sheriff Fife.
Q. Did you see any stones or missiles thrown by the crowd at the soldiers?
A. Yes; about the time they were charging bayonets.
Q. Was there any pistols fired by the crowd?
A. There was one or two fired. A pistol about the center of Twenty-eighth street; held it over, and shot down the road. By that time there were stone throwing. There were two cannons, and there was some boys started to throw stones, and one of them hit a soldier against a car, and the moment he fell they started firing. He threw up his arm about the time they charged bayonets--the crowd was throwing the bayonets up. The crowd catched hold of the bayonets, and threw the guns up to save themselves.
Q. Did you hear any command given by any of the officers to fire?
A. No, sir; I did not. I heard them charge bayonets. I heard that command, and I heard them give their military manoeuvres, but I heard no command to fire at all.
Q. Did you remain there during the night--Saturday night?
A. Yes; I was there until Sunday, at dinner time.
Q. What time did the mob begin to fire the cars?
A. At half past ten o'clock.
Q. Do you know who set the first on fire?
A. No, sir; I could not say, I heard them say it was small boys done it. It was right back of our office it first started. The time I saw it there was first one car on fire, and they started to run oil cars down against it.
Q. Were you there during the time, Thursday or Friday, when the police force came out?
A. They were there. I did not see them come up, they were up there when I was there.
Q. How many policemen?
A. I do not know how many there was, only about ten or twelve, I think. I think there was only three or four on Thursday.
Q. Did they make any efforts to disperse the mob?
A. Not as I saw.
Q. Did they assist in trying to start the train?
A. I did not see them trying to do that at all.
Q. Do you know who was in charge of the police?
A. No, sir; I could not say.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You heard the command given by the officers to charge bayonets?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you remain in the same position after you heard that command until after the firing commenced?
A. No, sir; I did not, after the first volley was fired.
Q. But from the time you heard the command given to charge bayonets up to the time of the firing, were you still in the same position?
A. Yes; I was in the same position.
Q. If there had been a command given by the officers to fire, you think you would have heard it?
A. I think so. I heard most of the other commands and the manoeuvres they went through before they charged bayonets.
Q. You heard that distinctly?
A. I heard the order to carry arms, shoulder arms----
Q. Arms port?
A. I do not know whether I heard arms port or not.
Q. How long after the command was given to charge bayonets before the firing commenced?
A. About two minutes. It was a different body of men that came up through the hollow-square.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. How did they fire. Did they fire altogether, as if they were ordered to fire?
A. The parties next to the cars. The men in their company did the first shooting, and they shot very low. At the same time those in front shot higher.
Q. They commenced?
A. Commenced right where these men fell.
Q. On the road?
A. No; that was, I run back against the car--a lot of flat cars filled with coal.
Q. Was this the line that was formed parallel with the railroad tracks, on the right towards the hill side?
A. No; towards the round-house.
Q. There is where the first shot was fired?
A. Yes, sir. A man standing near the end of the cars fell, and just as he fell, they just put their guns up and shot.
Q. Did you notice in what direction they fired?
A. Towards the hill.
Q. Over the heads of the other line?
A. Yes, over the heads; I could see the dirt fly; the party in front of them shot.
Q. Did they appear to fire in the direction of where the missiles and stones came from?
A. The missiles came right in front of this other body of men that shot towards the side of the hill. The stones were right at the foot of the hill, and they shot up on the side of the hill. The boys that threw the stones, were down at the foot of the hill, right back of the tracks. There was two cannons there, and those boys were right among them throwing.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Did you say the troops came out of the round-house, Sunday?
A. I didn't say they came out of the round-house; I say they passed Twenty-eighth street. I was on the corner of Twenty-eighth and Penn when they passed.
Q. Was anybody shooting at them?
A. I saw one man following them up as they came down Twenty-eighth street.
Q. He followed them up?
A. Followed them so far as I could see, about the middle of Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth. I was afraid they would shoot at me.
Q. What did he do while he was following up?
A. Threatened to shoot several times--threatened to shoot on an alley in Twenty-eighth street. We put up our hands at him. He got up again and followed them at Penn street. I got back of a sign and I believe he shot after he got a piece further up.
Q. You didn't see him fire?
A. No.
Q. He had a gun?
A. A breech-loader.
Q. Musket?
A. It was one of those breech-loaders. I saw him throw it up and examine the cartridges.
Q. Did you know the man?
A. No; I knew he wore a linen coat and a white straw hat.
Q. Was it a rifle or a shot gun?
A. Yes; regular musket, called breech-loaders, something similar to what the militia have.
At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the arsenal, at half-past eight o'clock, this evening.
ALLEGHENY ARSENAL, FRIDAY EVENING, February 22, 1878.
The committee met pursuant to adjournment, at the United States Arsenal, at half-past eight o'clock. All members present.
* * * * *
Major A. R. Buffington, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. First state your rank and official position here under the United States Government?
A. Major ordnance United States Army, commanding Allegheny arsenal--commandant Allegheny arsenal--which ever way you choose to put it.
Q. If you will go on and get at the facts, probably it will be as easy as any other way to come at a statement of the facts that came within your knowledge?
A. I presume what you want from me are simple facts. You want no opinions, nor anything else--my knowledge of the riot. I have here three or four little notes addressed to me:
July 21, 5, P.M.
Major BUFFINGTON, Commanding U.S. Arsenal:
The troops of the first division, after having been fired at by the rioters, returned the fire, killing and wounding a number. It is said the rioters will take the arsenal, and take the arms and ammunition. It may be a rumor; I will give it to you for what it is worth. It would be well for you to be on your guard.
(Signed)
A. L. PEARSON, Major General.
Q. What time did you receive that note?
A. I received that note somewhere about six o'clock. It is dated five-thirty, P.M., July 21, about half an hour afterwards--about six o'clock, I should judge. Previous to this, I would state that three gentlemen came here from the city--came to my quarters--and informed me in substance the same thing, before this was received--perhaps an hour. Was received somewhere about that time. That was the first notice I had of it.
Q. Who were those gentlemen?
A. Their names I don't know. They were strangers to me, and they introduced themselves. I have forgotten their names.
Q. Were they citizens of Pittsburgh?
A. Yes, sir; and when they came they were very much afraid that the mob would see their vehicle out in front of the gate, and they immediately left and went away on that account, saying they were afraid their vehicle would be recognized, and they were afraid of the mob. This word I mention was brought to me by Doctor Speers, of Pittsburgh, in a buggy, and he also was very much afraid of the mob. Cautioned me saying anything about it; that they would spot me, or something to that purpose. I also received this one. Here is a copy of that one written in the handwriting of General Latta. This was handed through the picket fence, which is by my quarters, to a young lady visiting my house at that time, with a request to give it to me, which she did. She refused to take it, and told him to take it to the guard-house, and he expressed a fear about taking it to the guard-house, and insisted on her taking it. In addition, I received this one. It is headed,
"O.D. 7, 21--7th month 21st day.
"COMMANDANT ARSENAL: Mob has started to the arsenal for the purpose of taking arms. Serious trouble at Twenty-eighth street between them and military.
(Signed)
"J. M. or T. M. KING, Superintendent."
I believe he is superintendent of the Allegheny Valley railroad. Having received information from those gentlemen previous to those notes, I immediately took steps to receive the mob if they should come out there. Lieutenant Lyon was staying over there. He came to the office, and I told him to tell my sergeant to go out quietly and couple the six pounder guns, have one of them brought down to the inside of the gate, as you come in. I had but one box of ammunition. All my men had Springfield rifles, and I had a part of a box of ammunition for them--I had plenty of ammunition, but none of that kind. My sergeant got some for my men, and I gave him some general instructions to guard and close the gates, and lock them, and let no one in without my knowledge. These preparations were carried on, and we got in readiness, and matters remained so until night came on, and there was no signs of anybody coming, and at night I thought I would go out in the street and see what was going on. Lieutenant Lyon, I believe, went with me. We struck down street and consulted with various people. Very few people know me here. I went out in the street and talked with a few of them. In a field below here--about two squares--is a new livery stable, and over that building there was some sort of a meeting going on, and we went to the door. They had sentries at the door. There was quite a concourse of citizens around. We could not get in, and we waited there until they came out. They were cheering inside, and somebody making speeches. Presently they came out, about twenty armed with some muskets they had gotten out of an armory below here somewhere--half-grown boys they were, and a few men--and filed off down street cheered by the populace surrounding them, and one man along side of me fired a musket in the air, and that is all that I saw. I didn't see any disposition of any of them to come here at all, and I returned, telling Lieutenant Lyon I had no doubt they would come out here, but I did not anticipate any trouble with them at all, and instructed the men to keep in their quarters with their clothing on--to lie down with their clothing on, ready at a moment's call. Between ten and eleven o'clock I heard drums beating down street, and I concluded the rioters were coming. I went out, and the men were turned out and placed up here behind that building, where they could not be seen, and by that time the mob had got at the gate. There was nobody there except a sentry and that six pounder gun there. I went out in citizen's dress. They were yelling and screaming about the gate. As I approached, one of them said, "Here comes the commanding officer, we will talk to him." I walked up to the gate, too--the gate is armed with open pickets--they stopped their noise, and I said, "Boys, what is the matter?" They said, "A party of Philadelphia troops have fired into a crowd down here and killed a lot of women and children, and we come to get arms; we want to fight them." I says, "I cannot give you any arms." I said, "I cannot help you, it is impossible for me to help you." He said women and children had been shot down, and I said, "It was a sad thing, but it is impossible for me to help you." "We don't want you, we want that gun." I ignored that request, and kept talking quiet to them. They seemed to be peaceable enough, except one man, and I imagined he was slightly intoxicated. "I know there are only twenty men in the place, and if twenty-five will join me we scale the walls." He abused them for not following. Presently one of them said, "He talks well, come on." Finally the better disposed of them called the others off, and they went up the street a short distance and returned again. This belligerent fellow staid near the gate and called for volunteers. There was nobody there except myself and the sentry. I kept the men out of sight, for I didn't wish to flourish a red handkerchief in the face of the bull. I was determined to exhaust all peaceable means. They came back again, and about the time they got opposite the gate, a cry of fire was raised, and an alarm struck on the bell, and they all raised the cry of fire, and they went off down the street. This man who was calling for volunteers, says he, "The guns are spiked, we will all go;" and they all went off again. That is my knowledge of the mob.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What stores of ammunition were here at that time that the mob could have got if they had entered?
A. We have here many buildings full of ordinance stores. We had for years, and have yet, something like thirty-six or forty thousand stand of arms. Don't put these down as the exact figures. We had a great many thousand stand of arms, and two magazines full of powder and ammunition, prepared and partially prepared for service; that is, the powder in the shells, the powder in the cartridges, two large magazines full. We have there, in fact, two of them full, and another partially so in the upper park. Besides these arms I speak of, we have many thousand stands of arms, revolvers, carbines, muskets, and all sorts of things. We have many large warehouses here. There is one there, [indicating,] and here is one, [indicating,] and one on the other side of the street; above that are the magazines. We have got a great deal of property here, valuable property, too, but we had no small arm ammunition except some of the old style ammunition--a lot of the old style paper cartridges which I had broken up. The arms we had are mostly loaders, except fifty breech-loading muskets, and my men here are armed with caliber fifty. A year before the riot began I was impressed with the dangerous position of this place, and I drew the attention of the authorities in Washington to it. There is a map showing the arsenal, [indicating.] That is Butler street. There, you see, are four buildings called temporary magazines. Those are wooden buildings. There are a great mass of breech-loading ammunition in there, partially prepared for service. There is one magazine, and there is the other one. There is Penn avenue--it is called a pike there. A man might have thrown a lighted cigar over and set fire to this place. I drew the attention of my chief to it, and called particular attention to this dangerous place. He saw the importance of it, and ordered me to break up the ammunition and otherwise get rid of it. Fortunately, all that was cleared out before the riot began. These magazines were all full, and the small arm ammunition I had broken up. Here the shops are below the work-shops, on a plateau just below this, and here is the road over which you came. Here is a sort of open space, and nothing but a low wall here with a picket. Right opposite, there is another gate leading into the upper park. My men were here, and this part is utterly defenseless, and in that place were a number of cannon. The mob would have cleaned me out here. There is not a man there, but a man in charge of the magazine, and twenty men, you see, would be a small force to defend it. It is not a fortified place, it is the same as houses surrounded by a wall with a wooden picket fence. The mob could push it over and come in, and there would be no trouble about it.
Q. Not a very strong fortification?
A. It is utterly defenseless; but, at the same time, I was not afraid the mob would do me any injury.
Q. How many cannon had you that they could have taken and moved off?
A. I don't know how many are in that shed. I have five or six pieces which I call in current service. Those pieces are mounted. Those are six-pounder guns, and there is plenty of ammunition which could be used for that purpose in those magazines. I had one of them on this side, [indicating,] and one on the other side. As mobs generally do, they always come where the danger is. Here was those six-pounder guns, with canister. The only hostile demonstration they made was to rush for the gate, but I merely raised my hands, and says, that won't do, and they stopped instantly. To show what the state of affairs was here, and my information of what was going on, sometime on Saturday night I received this communication from General Latta, addressed to the commanding officer, United States arsenal, Pittsburgh, without date, or anything else. He says:
"Have you communicated with General Government about prospects of attack on your arsenal.
(Signed)
"GEN. LATTA."
That was sometime late in the night. I don't know whether it was before the mob came or not. Here is the reply I sent to him:
"UNITED STATES ARSENAL, July 21.
"JAMES W. LATTA: In reply to your pencil note, without date, I have to say I have not communicated with General Government about prospects of attack on me, and shall not until such a course is necessary."
I had no communication with Washington, and none with the State authorities, except just what I showed you. They didn't advise me about what was going on. I knew nothing but just what you see here, except to give them all the assistance I could, and, by a strange mistake, I gave them all the defense I had. Here is a communication:
"HEAD-QUARTERS SIXTH DIVISION, PITTSBURGH, July 21, 1877, 11.30, P.M.
"Major E. R. BUFFINGTON: It is of the utmost importance that I should have two hundred rounds metallic ball cartridges. Please deliver them to Colonel Moore. In case I have none in store, I will deliver you the order of the Secretary of War to-morrow.
(Signed)
"A. L. PEARSON, Major General."
To explain, the State had here some ammunition which I had been giving to them as they wanted all along, and we had given it all out. General Pearson had been informed that there was no more here belonging to the State, but he said if he had none to give him some, and he would get authority from Washington. Down here is the note of the man in charge of the magazines. This is dated eleven-thirty, P.M. It did not come to me till long afterwards. I sent them with a guard to the upper park with instructions to tell the magazine man to give them if they had any of the State stores, and to tell this gentleman that I had none except a part of a box for my own men. It was just nine hundred rounds, and the guard carried the written order, and down to the bottom, pasted to it, is:
"July 22, '77.--4.20 A.M."
You see how late it was in the morning.
"Deliver to General Pearson's messengers eight hundred and sixty center prime metallic ball cartridges United States property, there being no ball cartridges belonging to the State at this arsenal.
(Signed)
"JAMES FITZSIMMONS."
By mistake, the State troops got all the cartridges I had. My men got forty out of the nine hundred. Each man had two rounds simply.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do I understand you to say that you had no ammunition for any of your arms?
A. I had not a round of ammunition suitable for any arm I had in here, for the simple reason that we are in profound peace, surrounded by friends. Since the Frankford arsenal got making metallic cartridges, we had a few rounds here for the use of my men, in case we wanted to shoot. We had a few blank cartridges. We had cannon ammunition, but all the small arm ammunition was broken up and powder taken out of it and balls thrown into the lead pile. We did not have any for arms we had here except, perhaps, a few cartridges for revolvers, which I issued afterwards to the citizens in the town to defend the city--two or three days afterwards.
Q. You have some muzzle loaders?
A. All the muskets are muzzle loaders except----
Q. And no ammunition for them?
A. No; we had powder and ball. I had paper cartridges made for the committee since that, as the controller will tell you. They came to get muskets, and I had cartridges made.
Q. You may state to what extent you supplied the citizens with ammunition?
A. Well, to quite a large extent. This is a statement which I have made up for General Negley. He represents the committee of safety. Here are fifty Cosmopolitan carbines; three hundred and ninety-nine Springfield rifled muskets; fifty Remington revolvers; fifty cavalry sabers; forty-nine belt holsters; forty-seven pistol pouches; forty-seven cavalry saber belts; fifty carbine slings; forty-eight carbine slings swivels; two hundred bayonet scabbards; one hundred and ninety cap pouches; two hundred cartridge boxes; two hundred cartridge-box belts; two hundred and fifteen waist belts; two hundred waist-belt plaits; fifty bridles--curb bridles; forty-nine holsters and straps; fifty saddles; fifty saddle bags; fifty saddle blankets; thirty-eight pounds of buckshot; four hundred and eighty-three musket percussion caps. These were to make buck and ball cartridges. Those were returned back to me since then.
These are to be added: One hundred and twenty-six Springfield rifled muskets, caliber fifty-eight; twenty-six Remington revolvers, caliber forty-four; thirteen Whitney revolvers, caliber thirty-six; six cavalry sabers, thirty-nine pistol holsters, sixty cap pouches, eighteen waist belts, thirty-three waist belt plaits. That was to the committee of safety; besides that, to the mayor of Allegheny City I issued--I am not sure--I think it was three hundred muskets, and powder, and balls, and buckshot, and cartridge paper for making cartridges.
Q. These cartridges were not paper, buck, and ball?
A. Oh, no; just the material I had, which was the balls and the powder. In order to get the powder, I broke up cannon ammunition--one pound cartridges--broke it up.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you witness any of the scenes of Sunday, the 22d.
A. Yes; for a very short time.
Q. Tell us what you saw on Sunday?
A. By these papers I was nearly all night. I went to bed to get some rest, and was in bed when I heard firing down this street. That is what first wakened me was the sound of firing down the street. Otherwise, before that it was perfectly peaceable and quiet. That officer had his twenty men out on this side of that building, for Sunday morning inspection, and he had just dismissed them, and hearing this firing down street, I jumped out of bed, and got into my pantaloons, and put my night shirt in my breeches, and got my coat on, and rushed out of the room, and before I got out I saw that, from the exclamations of those in the house, there were a number of men running through the grounds. Whoever they were, they were unauthorizedly coming in without any permission, and when I appeared on the grounds, there were a number of soldiers inside, how many, I do not know, and as I opened the door, the firing had ceased. I started towards the gate, and upon looking around in this direction, I saw Lieutenant Lyons coming towards my quarters, and an officer coming towards my house, and I turned to meet him. As he came up, I said to him, "You must take your men right out, sir; there is no protection here for you." He answered, "You have walls." "Yes," I said, "we have walls," raising my hand that way. He says, "Have you any suggestion to make." I said, "None, sir; except to organize your men and assault them." I supposed there was some fight going on, from what I saw and heard. That is all the words passed between me and the officer--who he was I do not know. He had a blouse coat, and looked like a second lieutenant. It does not matter who he was; under the circumstances there was no time, at that time, for wasting words, in my estimation. My orders were orders that were peremptory. I ordered him and his men out. As I told him these last words he started towards the gate, and I immediately turned and went towards the building, where a wounded man was brought in. Says I, "I will take care of the wounded." I called my men, and ordered him taken to the hospital. There was a man lying inside of the gate, one of my men bathing his temples. I asked what was the matter. He did not know. I called my man and instructed him to take him to the hospital. I went to the gate, and I saw nothing there, except a few citizens--workingmen in their Sunday clothes--going to church. I did not see an armed man anywhere. Brinton and his command had gone up the street in the meantime, and left the arsenal. In a few moments I was joined by Lieutenant Lyon, and I authorized him to go immediately for a surgeon for these wounded men, and he went down to Doctor Robinson's office, which is one square below, and brought Doctor Robinson in immediately, by a private entrance, to save time. I went to the hospital--there was no signs of any riot in the street, or anything of the kind--I went to the hospital, and there saw Doctor Robinson, who referred to Lieutenant Ash, and said his leg must come off, but I prefer to have some surgeon to consult with. I suggested to him Doctor Lemoyne, and he agreed to that, and I went to my quarters and wrote Doctor Lemoyne a note, telling him, in the letter, Doctor Robinson had been called in, and that he wished to consult with him, and I sent one of my own horses and a messenger into the city, for Doctor Lemoyne, and he came out. He lives, maybe, three miles from here. In the meantime, the wounded had the attention of Doctor Robinson and his partner, Doctor Evans. Doctor Lemoyne soon came, accompanied by Doctor Reed, and then the wounded had the attention of all four of them. That is all I saw. As to the condition of the Philadelphia men, Lieutenant Lyon can tell more than I can, because he saw the whole thing. The stragglers were inside here; were kept here, and fed, and taken care of until Tuesday evening, and they were clothed like my men. They were so demoralized that one of them, it was reported, could not eat, and in order to divert their minds, Lieutenant Lyon put them to work--they were so afraid they would be shot by somebody. Lieutenant Ash died here, and his brother and his wife were here at the time he died.
Q. When did he die?
A. Died on Tuesday about two o'clock.
Q. What become of the other wounded man that was brought in?
A. The other wounded man was playing possum. There was not anything the matter with him. When he went to the hospital he was lying on a bed, and I said, "what is the matter with you?" He did not answer. Says I, "get up, we do not want anybody in the hospital except sick men." The other men wounded themselves getting over the pickets. They came over the pickets, and I am satisfied they wounded themselves in getting over the pickets. One man had a wound in the center of the hand, which he said was caused by a piece of shell. I think he put his hand on a picket of the fence, and one man had his pantaloons torn. They had some little scratches on them. In a few minutes they got out, and went to the works with the other men. There was only one wounded man, that was Lieutenant Ash. One man was wounded down street here, and ran into the Catholic church--Corporal Ash--and a few days ago he came in here to see me. He was shot in the abdomen, and strange to say he got well. Those were the only wounded men down street here.
Q. You did not know, at the time that this soldier approached you, that it was General Brinton?
A. No; I do not know who it was. It did not make any difference who he was. As I wrote afterwards to Washington, they virtually forced my guard. It is a very different thing for a man outside and a man inside. I know what the place is, and it is presumed that I ought to know how to take care of it; and, in addition to that, I am responsible to the civil authority for every act of mine which comes in conflict with it. I am amenable, in other words, to the civil authorities, and it seems to me I ought to know beforehand what I am doing before I enter into a fight--to know what is going on. I shall certainly take care to do so. Suppose I had opened on some of those men; they would have had me up here for murder, sure, the next day. If it had once begun, it would have been a serious business. I questioned my guard. I said to him, when did you hear that firing--when that firing began, did you see anything in the streets? "No," he said, "there was a small boy in front, a newspaper boy, and I asked him to look down the street, and he said he saw no one. That is the fire that got me out." I said, "were there any shots fired after you heard that?" He said, "there was not a shot fired while the men were here at all." I did not hear a shot fired after I left my quarters, until along sometimes afterwards, way down below here somewhere. Some man--so it was reported, and I believe it was so--some man shot two of them with the same shot, from behind the cemetery wall, or somewhere near there.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. If that mob on Saturday night had made an attempt to enter your grounds here, would you have considered you were justifiable in resisting it with any amount of force?
A. Unmistakably. I had it there ready to use, and the beck of my hand would have brought my men there.
Q. Did you know this officer that approached you and asked permission to bring his men inside?
A. He did not ask any permission--just as I have reported to you. The words were no more or less than just what I have said. The mere fact of his being there revealed to me that he had come there for that purpose. I did not wait for any request at all. The mere presence of himself and his men was sufficient for me. I took my action from what I saw.
Q. How many men were inside of the grounds?
A. That I do not know. Lieutenant Lyon can answer that better than I can.
Q. The number of men that stayed here?
A. The number of men that stayed here were eight besides Lieutenant Ash. These men I kept--afterwards, when I saw the command was gone, these men, I allowed them to stay in because I would not send them out in the streets. I told the men to join the command, but the command moved off, and these men were allowed to remain in, and were fed and kept.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Was there any formal demand made by any officer of the militia to be admitted, or request to be admitted here?
A. None, sir; except just what I told you.
* * * * *
Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Just state your rank?
A. First lieutenant of ordinance.
Q. Stationed at----
A. Allegheny arsenal.
Q. State what came under your observation here on the morning of the 22d--Sunday morning?
A. We have Sunday morning inspection about eight o'clock. I finished the inspection, and returned to my quarters and had hold of the door, when I heard the firing down street. I turned to look out to see what it was, when I heard a yell and a lot of men running over the wall--jumping over the wall. I ran up to the gate in that direction. I thought they were the mob. Soldiers were running. I thought it was our own guard. When I got as far as that large warehouse, I met this officer, and I took him to Major Buffington's quarters.
Q. Did you know who the officer was?
A. No, sir; there were several officers, and the only way I now know it was General Brinton, is the fact, that some of them say that he wore a blouse, and he was the only one that had a blouse. The others were in full dress uniform.
Q. Did he state to you what he wanted?
A. No; he seemed to be commanding officer, and I took him to the major's quarters. He was in a great hurry. There were several officers with him.
Q. What was the result of his interview with Major Buffington?
A. As the major says, he made the remark to him, as he stated in his statement, and after that this officer, with the other officers, walked toward the entrance and went out, and I followed more leisurely. When we arrived there, they were bringing in the wounded, and the major told them all the wounded they had they might leave, and he ordered those that were bringing them in, to re-join the company--these eight men came in under the pretense that they were wounded, excepting one man, who had brought--I think he helped carry Lieutenant Ash in, and the major told him he would have to join his command, and he went to the gate and found the command had moved on, and he came to me and said he would willingly hide anywhere. He would hide in the coal-shed. He had never fired a gun off in his life, and only belonged to the militia three weeks.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Did the general commanding leave his command, in your opinion--the man that wore the blouse--had he left his command, and come in here for protection?
A. I do not think he came in here for protection.
Q. What brought him here?
A. He came in to see if he could get admittance for his troops.
Q. Did General Brinton then move on with his command?
A. As far as I know. I went down with some of these men that were carrying the wounded, to show them the direction to the hospital; then I returned to the gate to go for Doctor Robinson, and I do not think they stopped there more than a minute.
Q. Did you see any mob following in the rear?
A. There was none, I am quite positive. When I went to the gate, there was a man who keeps a beer saloon standing at the gate, and he said there was only one man following, and he gave the name of this one man. I went up to him and asked him, and he immediately stopped talking, and he said he did not know the man's name.
Q. When you went for Doctor Robinson, did you see any of the mob?
A. I saw no mob. I saw quite a number of people in the street that had come out of curiosity, hearing the firing, but they had no arms with them at all.
Q. Did you have any conversation with these wounded men to ascertain how they were wounded?
A. Oh! yes; I asked them all how they were wounded. One man said that they kept firing away from the middle of the street. They had two cannons, and loaded them up with glass and nails--little toy cannons. He said he got struck that way two or three times.
Q. How long after Lieutenant Ash was brought into the hospital was it before Doctor Robinson arrived?
A. I should think it was not more than five minutes, because I did not go down all the way to the hospital--the hospital is halfway between here and the guard-house, and I went immediately back to the gate, and went down to Thirty-seventh street, where Doctor Robinson lives, and he was sitting in his chair, reading the morning paper, and he came with me immediately, and I did not think it was more than five minutes, certainly not more than ten.
Q. How long was it before Doctor Lemoyne arrived?
A. I do not think he came until about two hours afterwards.
Q. Was there any amputation performed?
A. No, sir; they tried to perform an amputation, but Lieutenant Ash was not strong enough.
Q. Did you learn where he was wounded--where he was when he was shot?
A. I never could learn. I did not ask him, because the doctors did not want him to have any conversation.
Q. You do not know how far he had been carried?
A. No, sir; it was my impression he was shot near Thirty-seventh street. Some of the men said he was shot near the round-house. Lieutenant Dermott, who was stationed at the university here as assistant professor in engineering, he was up here while these wounded men were in the arsenal, and together we went over to the commissary where their cartridge boxes were, and I found the cartridges they had in their boxes, and they all averaged twenty rounds a piece, and one man he had forty. Some had less than twenty.
Q. Of the soldiers?
A. Of those eight that were here. I asked him--he was an old man. In fact, he had been wounded in the hand at the battle of Gettysburg, he said. When they were passing them around, there were several extra cartridge boxes, and he took one.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Were you in the vicinity of the crossing of Twenty-eighth street and the railroad, the scene of the riot, on Saturday?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the time the military arrived there?
A. I was not there the time the military arrived there. I was there about an hour before they arrived. I was talking with Captain Breck. He had two six-pounder guns, and I told him they were not of much use. He ought to have Gatling guns. He said the Philadelphia troops did have a pair of them. I waited until my patience was exhausted, and I came home.
Q. Did you see any of the movements of the military in that vicinity, or while you were there?
A. They made no movement while I was there. They simply remained stationary where they were. There were some on the hill side with their arms all stacked.
Q. None at the crossing of the railroad, were there?
A. I am not positive about that. At any rate, I did not keep account of them. They could get across the track very readily, for I went across. I do not think there were any there. I think they were mostly on the hill, and those had their guns stacked, but they were down at the crossing and on Twenty-eighth street, talking with the people, about the same as though they were going to have a party.
Q. That is, the soldiers were away from their command?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mingling with the crowd?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In conversation with them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there any considerable number of them with their arms where they were stacked?
A. They were stacked there, and there were several sentinels along the line where the arms were stacked, but the men, as a rule, had their guns stacked.
Q. They had broken ranks?
A. They had broken ranks.
Q. Did you see them make any effort to keep any portion of the track clear?
A. Not while I was there; no, sir.
Q. How long were you there.
A. I was there three quarters of an hour, perhaps an hour.
Q. Did you see any portion of the military in ranks?
A. I saw no portion of them drawn up in line of battle, or anything like it; no, sir; or company front either. I think the only men I saw, were those that were without arms, walking up and down with the crowd, talking to them, and the sentinels on post over the stacked arms.
Q. They appeared to be the only ones on duty?
A. They appeared to be the only ones on duty at that time.
Q. As the militia were passing here, did they throw away their arms or ammunition?
A. Well, not that I saw, except that Major Buffington found a case filled with cartridges belonging to the Gatling guns.
At this point the committee adjourned until to-morrow morning, at ten o'clock.
PITTSBURGH, Saturday, February 23, 1878.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at half-past ten, in the orphans' court room, Mr. Lindsey in the chair.
All the members present.
* * * * *
O. Phillips, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. State your residence and your official position in July last, and then go on and give us the facts?
A. My residence is 344 Ridge avenue, Allegheny. I was mayor of the city for the last three years, up to January, 1878.
Q. Of the city of Allegheny?
A. Yes; of the city of Allegheny.
Q. Just commence and give us a statement in your own way, chronologically--give us the facts?
A. On Thursday or Friday, the 19th or 20th of July last, I had been over in Pittsburgh during the day, and went back to my office in the afternoon, and there I found that the railroad officials of the Pennsylvania company had sent up the office for police assistance, stating that a crowd of men were interfering with the running of trains near the outer depot, and that Chief of Police Ross and ten or twelve policemen had gone down there.
Q. The outer depot of the Fort Wayne road?
A. Yes; I jumped in a horse car and went down there myself, deeming it my duty to go and see what was the trouble, and when I got to the outer depot I saw a number of men walking up and down the track, and quite a large number of men at Strawberry lane. I noticed a locomotive pass me and go down. It was interrupted or stopped by some men climbing up on the engine, and gesticulating in a threatening way, but what they said I do not know, but the engine stopped, and returned to the round-house. I went down then to where this crowd of men was, and saw it was a very large assemblage--several hundreds--and the police force were an atom, a mere drop in the bucket. Some of the men wanted to talk to me about their troubles. I told them, as mayor of the city, I had nothing to do with that. I was simply there as a representative of peace and good order, and spoke to the men, cautioning prudence, asking them if they realized the seriousness of what they were doing. I noticed that a man by the name of Robert Ammon was recognized as their ring-leader. He came up to me and introduced himself as having known me at my factory, on the South Side, and said he would like to talk to me. I stepped aside to converse with him, and while we were talking, men would come up and say: "What shall we do now, Bob?" He would say: "Stand aside, I do not want to be interrupted." He told me he had been an employé of the railroad company six weeks or two months before that, but had been discharged, and since that he had been around the country organizing Trainmen's Unions. He told me he had influence to stop these troubles; that if he had sent a telegram to Martinsburg the troubles would have been stopped. He said it was not worth while to go to the railroad men; he asked me to make a speech to the men; I told him that was not my style. The men gave me their assurance they would protect the railroad property, both day and night, and when they could not do anything further they would send to me for police. I then left my officers quietly mingling with these men, and then I went back to the mayor's office, which was on Thursday or Friday, I am not sure which, or Saturday. Word came to me that some of the supposed strikers had gone to one of the military organizations in Allegheny, and had taken thirty or forty arms, and had taken them down towards where the men were on a strike, and they expected to come up in a short time and remove the guns from Captain Bigham's armory, a company of the Nineteenth regiment. I went over there, and, assisted by the postmaster of Allegheny, and two or three of my police, we carried over thirty or forty arms and ammunition and placed them in our watch-house. A messenger came up hurriedly and said that the crowd were coming up to take these guns from me. My force were all out in the districts, and I then had the locks and bayonets taken off these muskets, so that if they got the guns they would be of no service to them. On Sunday, the day of the serious trouble, I had Knapp's battery taken out of the armory, by some of the battery men, under the command of Captain Walker, and these guns, four field pieces, were loaded with small square iron nuts. We had not any ammunition. We had blank cartridges but no balls, and I had these things loaded, and then, assisted by citizens, armed with axe handles and wagon spokes, I had gotten from one of the wagon-yards, and their old fowling pieces, and everything of the sort. They posted these guns at the Allegheny end of the bridges. I had been notified that the mob were coming over Sunday afternoon and Sunday night to burn the Allegheny shops, and release the inmates from the penitentiary. I notified the warden of that fact, and he kept his force on day and night, heavily armed, for a number of days. I selected two or three gentlemen of cool judgment and discretion, and those on horseback, and went to Pittsburgh and rode around among the rioters on this Sunday night to try and find out which bridge they proposed to come over, and then hurry back and notify me, and my intention was to concentrate all these field pieces at that bridge and stop them. I had taken the police pretty much away from the city of Allegheny and put them at the bridges, and sent squads of private citizens to patrol the streets. My force consisted of about fifty-five men. I kept the police on both day and night, until their strength was exhausted, and they could not stand it any more. On Monday I telegraphed the Secretary of War, and asked permission to draw five hundred muskets from the arsenal. That permission was granted, and I sent out two wagons, guarded by twenty-five or thirty veteran soldiers, and they went and brought me the guns. I called a special meeting of councils on that same day, and asked permission to increase the police force, which permission was granted me. I swore in a hundred special policemen, and armed them with maces. A hundred of those veteran soldiers were armed with Springfield muskets, and we made our own ammunition and cartridges, with either five or six buckshot. A hundred veterans were in reserve in the armory, to come out along with the citizens at ten taps of the big bell. The employés sent me word there were so many tramps coming over that they could not protect railroad property, and asked for police assistance, and I detailed a squad of policemen, and guarded all the crossings from Irwin avenue to Strawberry lane, and kept the crowd back. There was a meeting of these railroad employés in Allegheny, to which they asked me to attend. I was very kindly treated by them, and quite a number of them would come to my office and confer with me. I received a communication from the railroad officials, Mr. Thaw, General McCollough, indorsed by Mr. Quay and Mr. Latta, and asked me to close the liquor saloons. I requested the chief and one or two officers to go around and close them, and they did. I do not know whether I had the power, but I thought the emergency required it should be done, and I ordered them closed, and I sent officers to see that they were kept closed. When the Governor came through, he sent for me, and I went to see him at his car, and he asked me what protection I had, and I told him just as I have related to you, and told him I did not want any military until I was completely overpowered, and that I thought I could protect the city, and if I could not, I would call on him, and he said he would send me a thousand effective men. I had submitted to the railroad employés in Allegheny that if they would go down and bring these ten miles of stuff they had run down the road--all this stuff--to Allegheny, and take the eastern bound over to Pittsburgh, &c., I would see that their wages were paid, and then I would take the road off their hands. The railroad company had declined to receive the road until the stuff was brought back. On the day proposed to raise the blockade, I went down to the depot with thirty picked policemen, and when I got there in the dispatcher's office, there were seven or eight hundred people, or more. I stepped upon a pile of railroad ties, and ordered all the men that did not belong to the railroad to step on the other side of the railroad track. Said that they would settle their difficulties without outside assistance, and at least four of the men went on that side of the track. There were private detectives going through them, and they would ask, "Who is that man?" and they told him it was Mayor Phillips, of Allegheny. I then proposed to the men, employés of the company, to go down and bring up the first draft of cars, knowing that if we would get the first draft up, the back-bone of the trouble would be broken; and they all got up in a hurrah and got the first draft up, and then all the stuff was brought up.
Q. Then you turned it over to the railroad company?
A. Yes; the railroad company took it after the stuff had been brought up. I know little or nothing of the trouble that took place in Pittsburgh.
Q. What day was that that you brought up this stuff?
A. Several days afterwards. I cannot tell you the date. I do not exactly remember the date. On Sunday, the day of the burning, there was a committee of railroad strikers met Mr. Layng at my house, that Sunday morning, and had a conference with him, and agreed to take care of the property of the company, and they did it well and manfully.
Q. The first day you went out and met the crowd of several hundred, were they composed entirely of railroad employés?
A. No, sir; they were not. Very few appeared to be railroad men.
Q. What class of men were in the crowd?
A. Workingmen--rough-looking men--men that I did not know.
Q. After the railroad employés agreed with you that they would protect the railroad property, did they permit the crowd of roughs to remain with them?
A. No, sir; because they sent me word that the roughs were coming there, and they were apprehensive there would be trouble, and wanted policemen, and they guarded all this property, until at last they said they were tired and worn out, and asked me to protect this ten miles of property down below. I had not any authority to go outside of the city with police, but the railroad company agreed to pay, and I sent a police force ten or twelve miles down the road, and protected the property until the troubles were over.
Q. Do you know anything of the crowd trying to prevent, or making preparations to prevent, trains from coming in with soldiers on the Pittsburgh and Erie road?
A. We were notified there that none of the soldiers would be allowed to come in that way. Some of the men intimated to the effect that they would be stopped. It was in the early part of the troubles.
Q. Notified by railroad employés?
A. Some of the men notified the police, and the police told me. I do not remember exactly how. I told the men we would not have any military over there as long as we could do without them. A squad of men came up and said United States soldiers had come there, and it was contrary to the contract. I told them that that was answered simply, and that the United States Government would send their troops when, and how, and where they pleased, but I had seen the military authorities of Pittsburgh, and asked them not to send any troops to Allegheny until I called for them. I thought I could protect the city. I was assisted by the people of Allegheny all I could ask for.
Q. Under what circumstances or condition of this order would you consider yourself justifiable in calling on the Governor to send you troops?
A. Well, sir, when I went down that day, and I felt I could not control the multitude, and they attempted any threatening, I proposed to fight them. I would not give up without. I had armed the police with revolvers and maces. I had something myself, and when we could not fight, I proposed to call on the military, and not till then.
By Mr. Means:
Q. You determined to make a fight before you called on the military?
A. That is the English of it.
Q. And to head the police yourself?
A. I did, sir. I head them all the time. I thought that was my place.
Q. In case of a ... occurring in any part of the city, did you regard it as your duty to visit the point and ascertain?
A. Yes. I was up day and night for a week, and I was nearly worn out. I kept the battery in camp in the city hall yard. Kept them there day and night, and had these veteran soldiers sleep on the floor of city hall, so that we could call on them at any moment.
Q. Would you consider it your duty to have called out a posse of citizens, and to exhaust your power in that direction, before calling on the State for military aid.
A. Most decidedly. I had arranged and published hand-bills all over the city, that at ten taps of the bell the citizens of Allegheny were to come forward to protect their firesides and homes. I swore in a goodly number of them to go on duty.
Q. You did swear them in?
A. Quite a large number of them.
Q. Do you regard your authority and powers subordinate to those of the sheriff of the county--within the limits of your city, I mean?
A. No, sir. I thought I was the chief executive, and the man the people looked to.
Q. You regard yourself as superior within the limits of the city?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you have allowed yourself to have been superseded by the sheriff in authority or power?
A. That is pretty hard to answer. I do not think I would. I thought I was placed there to protect the city by the people, and I would try to do that.
Q. You would do your duty as long as anybody else would?
A. That is my idea.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. As far as the military is concerned: if you had called for the military, you would have considered it was your duty to give general supervision and direction, within the limits of the city, in putting down the disturbance?
A. I would have done all I could. I would have assisted the military all in my power.
Q. You regard the military subordinate to the civil authorities?
A. I think so; yes, sir.
Q. Did Robert Ammon tell you how many lodges of Trainmen's Unions he had established?
A. I do not remember the number, sir, but he said a goodly number?
Q. Did he tell you on what roads he had established them?
A. He told me he had been on different roads. Eastern and western roads, if I remember rightly.
Q. Did he tell you the object of that Union?
A. As I gathered, it was to see about regulating the wages--to control--to compel--that is the substance of it. A very hurried conversation we had, and a good deal of excitement at the time.
Q. Did he say that there was a pre-arranged plan for a strike at this time.
A. Yes, and if I remember rightly, it came a little premature--a little too soon.
Q. Did he say that he had direction of the different strikes?
A. He said that if he sent a telegram to Martinsburg the strike would stop, and if he would turn over his hand here, the thing would be stopped.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Does anything more of importance occur to you?
A. I only visited Pittsburgh once during the riot, and that was that Sunday afternoon, and made a statement to the citizens that the railroad men had agreed to protect the property. I stayed in my own place.
Q. Did you have any talk with any of the other strikers besides Ammon about their places?
A. No, sir. I talked with a great many of the employés. I attended their meetings.
Q. What reason did they give for going on a strike at that time?
A. I did not hear any reason. I did not understand the strike was coming from them at that time.
Q. They were on a strike?
A. That, on account of the wages, they could not live on what they were getting.
Q. That was the reason they struck, because the wages were not high enough?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear any other cause of complaint from the men that struck?
A. No, sir; that was the substance of it.
Q. Did you learn what reductions had been made in the wages of these men?
A. No; I did not. They told me their troubles. I listened to them quietly and politely, but did not think it was what I was for. I told them I was simply a representative of peace and good order, and protect their property as well as my own.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. There appears in a statement made by Boss Ammon, a report made public in the Leader of January 28. He says: "Meanwhile prominent citizens came forward and supplied me with arms and ammunition for my men." Do you know anything about that?
A. I deny it, sir, in toto--emphatically--that any prominent citizens gave arms to any of the men there. They helped themselves to arms--somebody did--at this armory. I just related how I was afraid they were going to help themselves to some more, and I got them myself, and carried them to the watch-house.
Q. Do you know whether there was any coöperation between Bob Ammon and the railroad officials during these troubles, working together?
A. I do not know of my own knowledge. I would say I do not know a thing about it, and I did not believe there was anything of the sort--work together in harmony?
Q. Yes?
A. Not a bit of it.
Q. Here is a statement he makes in regard to you: "I pledged my honor that they would be guilty of no violence, and they heartily and unanimously seconded my pledge. The mayor expressed his satisfaction at the aspect of affairs, and ordered the police off the ground. The train dispatcher wished to retain ten policemen as a guard for the property, and the question was referred to me whether they should remain or not. I put it to the men, and they responded 'Do as you please about that, Bob; you're boss now, and we'll follow where you lead.'" Mayor Phillips said to them: "If you are determined to strike, I beg to state that I have known Mr. Ammon from his childhood, and have full confidence in his honor and judgment, and I don't think he would give you any wrong advice?"
A. That is stuff. I did not know Bob Ammon more than five minutes before that. He introduced himself to me, and he was a young man. I could not express satisfaction with men who were doing wrong and breaking the laws of the city. That would not do. I emphatically deny the whole thing.
* * * * *
Thomas Furlong, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Furlong?
A. I reside in Oil City, Venango county.
Q. Were you in the city of Pittsburgh in July last?
A. I was.
Q. Were you present at the scene of the riots during any of the days?
A. I was. I arrived in the city of Pittsburgh on Friday morning, about nine o'clock, and remained here after that during the riot.
Q. I wish you would state, Mr. Furlong, what knowledge you have of any of the police of the city of Philadelphia having fired upon any of the troops, the soldiers?
A. Well, while working in my capacity of detective officer, I was called to Philadelphia--the city of Philadelphia--to get evidence in regard to certain things that occurred during the riot. While there, I received information that some of the mayor's police had fired on the Philadelphia soldiers during their retreat on Sunday morning, on Butler street, on the morning of the 22.
Q. What did you learn in relation to it?
A. I saw one gentleman in Philadelphia that said he would swear he saw a uniformed police officer fire at the Philadelphia from the curbstone or from the pavement.
Q. Who was this gentleman?
A. I disremember his name now. I have his name and all the facts.
Q. Do you know where he lives?
A. I do know where he can be found. He lives in Philadelphia.
Mr. Lindsey: I think we hardly ought to take his testimony--what this gentleman said. We ought to have the gentleman himself. You can go on and state what you found out yourself about the truth, either in admissions that the police may have made in your presence, or from facts that you have dug up, that is, in relation to the matter you may state, and not what the gent said.
A. All the evidence that I obtained in that line in reference to the matter came in that way. It is hearsay evidence. There has never been information made against this party.
Q. Against the policeman?
A. Against the policeman charged with having done this shooting. For that reason I didn't bring these records along. I should have brought those records if there had been information made against him, and I saw no police officers fire at the Philadelphia soldiers myself.
Q. Have you any other evidence to show that a policeman fired upon the Philadelphia soldiers except what was told to you by the gentleman that you spoke of in Philadelphia?
A. I have interviewed the other gentleman upon the same subject, and the statement of this first gentleman--Philadelphia gentleman--has been corroborated by other parties. There is a police officer in the city at the present time, a member of the force now, that saw a police officer, who was a police officer at that time, on the 22d of July, saw him engaged in supplying ammunition to be fired at the Philadelphia soldiers.
Q. Can you give us the name of that police officer?
A. I could give you the name of that police officer and the name of the man that supplied the ammunition. I would rather not do it, though. I have been working in connection with our council.
* * * * *
F. S. Bissell, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I reside in the Eighteenth ward.
Q. What is you business?
A. Foundry business.
Q. Please state what you saw and heard of the riot, in a brief way?
A. I will state briefly, that about, I think, after twelve o'clock, on Sunday, I had learned what had transpired in the city.--I live quite a distance out--and I came to the city and walked down Liberty street, and saw the wrecking, and went down past the Union depot, and waited, I suppose, ten or fifteen minutes there, went around towards Adam's Express depot, saw what transpired there, although I was on the outskirts of the crowd, and although I didn't mingle in the crowd, and learned from some parties that a meeting was to be held at the city hall, for the purpose of rallying a number of citizens to quell the riot or insurrection. After a number of ineffectual efforts to get a body of citizens together, I went with a few parties down to the Duquesne depot. I made up my mind that that would be the next place burned.
Q. Please state where the Duquesne depot is?
A. Duquesne depot is at the foot of Liberty street, on the river, at lower end, fronting on the Monongahela.
Q. What road is the depot on?
A. The Pennsylvania depot--it is the old Pennsylvania depot.
Q. Go on Mr. Bissell?
A. During the afternoon we arrested two parties there in the act of firing--one in the act of firing a car, and the other inquiring how to get into the depot--how to set it on fire. I state this briefly--these parties have been tried. I remained around there all the afternoon, until ten o'clock that night, and about six or half-past six, along about there, after the elevator had burned or was about falling, a wagon came very rapidly down street--it was one of the express wagons--and informed some one there that the next attempt would be that depot, that the mob were surging that way. I then started with a few citizens, Mr. Little and McCandless and others, to get a cable to stretch around that building, our object being to keep back the crowd, and allow nobody inside that line if possible, so as to distinguish who the parties might be who would come to burn it. We got a few of the young men who belonged to the military--belonged to some of the militia companies--to stand guard inside of the rope during the night, and some other persons living at that place. There was nothing particularly transpired after that that I know of. We stayed there until half-past ten, or about that, and then went home.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. How many men went with you to the Duquesne depot?
A. We started from the city hall. That was the organization that we called Doctor Donnelly's brigade. They had marched up street, and I think there was about a dozen of us remained at the depot, and we made up our minds to stay there. This was on Sunday afternoon. We expended our breath in trying to impress upon the citizens around about there, that if they burned that depot, it would burn their property.
Q. Was there a large crowd of people then in that vicinity?
A. Quite a large crowd. I suppose somewhere in the neighborhood of a thousand or more scattered around. There is a pretty large extent of ground.
Q. Did many participate in riotous conduct there?
A. No, sir; it seemed to be a few parties. They were pretty much all under the influence of liquor.
Q. Many of this crowd were there from curiosity?
A. A good many, I have no doubt. The report was, that they were coming down towards the Duquesne depot, and the next place would likely be the Duquesne depot and the bridges. That was only, doubtless, the opinions of the people.
Q. These men you arrested there in the act of applying the torch to the depot and the cars you speak of, were they accompanied by any considerable number of men appearing to be participating in it?
A. A few sympathizers, and men who were standing out there appeared to be sympathizers. That was the party who was arrested by Doctor Dixon. He was tried.
Q. Was he a citizen of the place?
A. I think he lived down on the south side, somewhere.
Q. The other man, was he a citizen of the city?
A. I couldn't say. I don't know anything about him.
Q. Have both of those men been tried?
A. They have, sir. I think they have been tried.
Q. Were there any police in the vicinity at the time you were stationed there?
A. No, sir; I didn't see any. We clubbed together, a number of us then, and made up a little purse and hired a few police.
Q. Private police?
A. No; only to look after the building at night, and help us arrest anybody that should attempt to burn.
Q. Were those men sworn in by you men as special police?
A. I think they had belonged to the police force--the men who had been discharged, owing to the inadequacy of the funds to meet bills.
Q. Did you have any conversation with the mayor in regard to these policemen?
A. No, sir; I had no conversation myself. We put down what we could pay, and paid it when we were called upon.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Did you go down to the scene of the riot and burning on Sunday?
A. Sunday afternoon a good deal of the firing had been done before I got to the city, and walked on down Liberty street past the wrecking--just made a pretty quick trip.
Q. What kind of people were engaged?
A. Some of them appeared to be about as rough a crowd as I ever saw.
Q. Was there much of a crowd actively engaged?
A. I thought so. Down about the Union depot there was an immense crowd of people carrying off all sorts of baggage--seemed to be more engaged at that than anything else, outside of the firemen.
Q. Would it have been impossible for a force of men to have stopped that?
A. I don't think it would have been possible. I didn't see how. I think women would have been shot--a great many innocent people. People were panic stricken, and every thing seemed to be upside down.
Q. Wild?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Thomas Furlong, re-called:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Mr. Furlong, were you at the Twenty-eighth street crossing at the time the firing occurred?
A. I was.
Q. I wish you would go on and state what you saw there?
A. I was at Twenty-eighth street nearly all day on Saturday, the 21st. I was there at the time the train came in from the east, bearing the Philadelphia soldiers. I followed the train from Twenty-eighth street down to the Union depot, and when I got down there, I found the Philadelphia soldiers had gotten out of the cars and were at lunch on the platform, drinking coffee and eating sandwiches. I had some conversation with them, and finally they fell into line and were marched up the railroad track back towards Twenty-eighth street. I started to go up with them, walking near the head of the column. The sheriff was first in front of the troops with a squad of men, and I was ordered to keep away from the head of the column by some of the sheriffs men. I walked faster than they did--they made rather slow progress. I got up to Twenty-eighth street perhaps ten minutes or thereabouts, before the head of the column reached there. There was a great crowd of people congregated at Twenty-eighth street, and below, and on the hill all around there--a terrible crowd of people. As soon as the soldiers got in sight of this crowd, they commenced shouting, jeering, swearing, using abusive and profane language, and the closer the soldiers got to them the more boisterous the crowd grew. The soldiers came advancing slowly until the head of the column got almost to where Twenty-eighth street crosses the railroad track. The crowd didn't give way, they just stood there blockading the crossing. It was a solid mass of people. The soldiers walked right up against them, and I was standing, at that time, in the neighborhood of forty feet below the lower side of Twenty-eighth street, on the east side of the track, on the right hand side of the track going out of the depot, standing close by the track, but about forty feet below the watch box that is situated there. There was a young man--I don't know his name, I never saw him--nor have seen him since, although I looked for him a good deal, too--standing within about three feet of where I was, at the time the soldiers marched up against this crowd. He picked up some stones--he had some stones gathered up--a little pile of stones. He picked up these stones, and commenced to throw down into the soldiers. I remonstrated with him, told him he ought not to do it, the soldiers would be likely to fire up there. He replied, they daresn't shoot. He then pulled a revolver out of his hip pocket and fired down towards the soldiers. When I saw him point his revolver, and I followed the direction at that time, there was just a shower of missiles and stones of one kind or another. Every person appeared to be throwing something; and from the other side of the track they were throwing coal. The coal just appeared to be raising off the cars and dropping on the soldiers. This man fired two shots out of his pistol.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Did he shoot as if he was taking aim?
A. Yes he aimed toward the soldiers. I couldn't see that he took deliberate aim at any particular person, but he fired down into the troops.
Q. He didn't fire up into the air?
A. No, sir. We were standing on an elevated position. We were above the soldiers, standing, perhaps, three feet higher than the soldiers were standing. I don't see how he could have fired down there, without hurting some of the soldiers or citizens, or some of the mob. The people were so thick down there. There was another man standing behind this watch-box, and he also fired into the crowd, with a revolver.
Q. How many shots were fired by the mob, before there was any firing from the soldiers?
A. I saw smoke come from behind this watch-box. I thought at the time it was some person. I saw a man there, this man wore a cap, and from where I was standing, I could see him very plainly in looking that way, and I thought he was shooting. I could see the smoke, but there was so much noise, that I could not hear the report of the pistol. I saw two shots fired by this man, immediately in front of me, and before the report of his last shot quit ringing in my ears, the soldiers commenced firing.
Q. Did you hear any command given to the soldiers to fire?
A. I didn't; I stood there for, I suppose, a minute and a half after the mob threw coal, and stones, clubs, and missiles of that kind, at the soldiers, and I was very much afraid that the soldiers wouldn't fire. I was afraid that they were going to lay down their guns, and not fire. I wanted to see them fire. I was afraid they would lay their guns down, and not fire. In fact, I was very glad to hear them commence firing.
Q. What effect did the firing by the soldiers have upon the mob?
A. It scattered that mob quicker than any mob I ever saw scattered before in my life. The first shot that was fired, I thought the ball came pretty close to where I was. I could hear it whistle, and I laid down. The crowd was so that I did not consider it safe to run, and I dropped down on my face right where I was standing, and I laid there until the firing ceased, and when I got up, there was no rioter to be seen anyplace; that is, in that immediate vicinity.
Q. Where did they go to?
A. There was a ditch or a washout; there was a ridge running diagonally down the hill off Twenty-eighth street then, and there was an old water course alongside of this ridge, in some places that was several feet deep, and they piled in there and laid down on the side of the hill, and behind coal cars and behind houses, and they got just wherever they could.
Q. How long was the crowd in re-assembling.
A. Well. I remained there. This firing occurred shortly after five o'clock in the afternoon--it couldn't have been quarter after five--I think it was hardly that late--five or ten minutes after five o'clock, perhaps--along there--and I remained there on the ground until after six o'clock, and the crowd hadn't re-assembled on the crossing, while I was there. A very large crowd gathered down on Liberty and Twenty-eighth street, down on Penn and Twenty-eighth, and in that neighborhood, there was large crowds of people, but they didn't come to where the soldiers were--kept away from the soldiers. The soldiers, after the firing was over, they threw out a guard line, and took possession of the track, and didn't allow parties to walk up or down the track.
By Mr. Means:
Q. The soldiers had entire control of the track?
A. They had entire control of the track at that time; yes, sir. I came down town and got my supper, and after that I went to Twenty-eighth street. At that time the soldiers were in the round-house, so I was informed.
Q. Was this picket line still out?
A. No; I didn't find any picket. I did not go up the railroad track. I went up Penn street at that time. I was not up on the railroad track, and I could not say whether there was a picket line on the railroad track or not, at that time.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. If you were present at any of the efforts made by the railroad company to start their trains, you might state what occurred on Friday and Saturday?
A. On Friday I was up there all day, in the vicinity of Twenty-eighth street--in the neighborhood, back and forward--and I saw a number of engines making steam, and heard, from time to time, that they were going to start trains out, and also heard the railroad strikers say that they couldn't take any trains out. They were not going to permit any trains to go out--any double-headers. I saw no trains go out, that is, no freight trains. Saturday morning I saw a few cars of stock. They came over, I believe, from Allegheny, and were taken out to the stock-yards. There must have been, at least, a couple of hundred men on top of the cars.
Q. What class of men?
A. They appeared to be strikers. I didn't know the men. They appeared to me like railroad men, and a good many of them were strangers to me. The cars were just covered with them--as many as could possibly get on. I recollect that Monkey John Richardson, as they called him, was on the train. I think it was his crowd. He seemed to have control of the party.
Q. It was run by the strikers themselves?
A. I believe that the train was run by the strikers; yes, sir.
* * * * *
J. P. Moore, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. In the city.
Q. Are you a member of the National Guard?
A. Yes, sir; adjutant general, Sixth division, for the last three years.
Q. Adjutant, Sixth division?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It is not necessary to go over the whole history; General Pearson has given us a full history. I would like you to state what occurred on Saturday, beginning with the arrival of the Philadelphia troops, and state what came to your knowledge. Give us a full history of what occurred after that time?
A. I accompanied General Pearson with the Philadelphia troops as far as the outer round-house. Upon our arrival there, General Pearson had notice of the displacement of the troops he had posted at three o'clock in the morning.
Q. What troops were those?
A. The Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments, and Breck's battery. He immediately went to the crossing, and taking Major Evans with us, we went up to Colonel Howard--not seeing General Brown--and inquired the reason of the displacement of the Nineteenth regiment from the position he placed it in in the morning. The general was not satisfied with the answer of Colonel Howard, and returned, and found as we were coming down, that the sheriff was addressing the people, or notifying them to leave the scene. The Nineteenth was in the hospital grounds. On our arrival at Twenty-eighth street, the general directed me to remain with General Brinton, and he went to the telegraph office--Mr. Pitcairn's office--and telegraph communication with the Adjutant General was established. General Brinton then formed the First regiment, one line facing towards the hill and one towards Liberty street, and directed the company in grey uniform, one of which I think was the Weccacoe Legion, and a portion of the Washington Greys, to clear the people from between the ranks. They started on that movement, followed by the two Gatling guns, and went up with the two guns as far as Twenty-eighth street, when they came as far as crossing of Twenty-eighth street. In order to move the crowd back, the Legion endeavored to make a wheel to the left. In making that wheel, the order was given to charge bayonets, and the front rank came to an arms port; the rear rank stepped back about a pace, the crowd being so dense in front of them, that the men in the front rank could not get to the position of charge bayonets. The rear rank kept back about a pace, and they came to the charge.
Q. Who gave the order to charge bayonets?
A. I am not certain whether it was General Matthews or not. I heard General Matthews give the order to load, but I could not say whether it was General Matthews or a company officer that gave the command to charge. At the same instant, a man by the name of Horn, who was about three files from the left of the company, stooped down and passed through the front rank, raised up and struck at General Brinton, and at the same instant a pistol shot was fired either by the man Horn or a man immediately in his rear. Stones were hurled, and one of the men of the--I cannot say whether he belonged to the Greys or the Weccacoe Legion, but it was one of the party that was charging--was struck on the shoulder and knocked against one of the Gatling guns. There had been no firing done by the troops at that time, but the crowd outside were hurling epithets at the soldiers, and asking, "Why don't you shoot, you sons of bitches. Why don't you shoot?"
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Did they shoot or fire?
A. Some of them said: "Why don't you fire? Why don't you shoot;" and some of them said: "Shoot, you sons of bitches! Why don't you shoot," General Brinton gave the order to cease firing a very few moments afterwards. There was one point I wished to call your attention to--this man of the Weccacoe Legion--and I believe he is the same man Doctor Murdock spoke of yesterday--that man firing his piece three times after instructions; wiping the blood out of his eyes, loaded and fired his piece.
Q. Where was he struck?
A. He was struck about the head, and blood was running down over his face.
Q. Then he wiped the blood out of his eyes and fired his piece afterwards?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was the command to fire given by any of the officers?
A. I think it was.
Q. What ones?
A. I could not designate the officer. I heard the word fire so frequently between the parties outside casting their anathemas at the soldiers. As I understood, the order came from an officer; but I could not distinguish which one it was. I heard the order to load very distinctly.
Q. Did you hear the order from an officer to fire?
A. I did so.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Which men fired? These men endeavoring to press back the crowd, did they fire? You say they wheeled to clear the crowd off Twenty-eighth street; did they fire into this crowd?
A. I think not, sir.
Q. Where did the firing come from?
A. From the First regiment.
Q. They were standing back by the cars, were they?
A. One line here--it was standing towards Liberty street, and the other facing towards the hill.
Q. The two ranks--the one in front facing to the right, and the rear facing to the left?
A. I think the front rank was facing towards Liberty street. I think they were moved out by the left flank from Union depot.
Q. The front rank would be facing towards the hillside and the rear rank facing towards Liberty street?
A. I think not, sir. They marched left and front. Their proper front would be by left face. They were marched out that way; consequently the front rank would face towards Liberty street.
Q. The other rank would face towards the hill?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did this firing come from--the front rank, facing the hill?
A. The rank facing the hill fired. The first shots that were fired from the front rank were fired towards Liberty street, and they turned round then and commenced firing in another direction, over their heads and through the files of officers, and General Brinton gave the order to cease firing, with Colonel Benson and Major Lazarus. Colonel Stewart, of the Governor's staff, who was then in citizen's clothes at that time, came down and volunteered to assist in anything which was to be done. Major Fife and myself went down the line and assisted in stopping the firing.
Q. Did they fire as if they had been commanded or ordered to fire?
A. The first round or so evidenced that fact to me. Immediately after the firing, I received an order from General Pearson to take one half a regiment of General Loud's brigade. I reported to General Brinton the order on General Loud, and he informed me he had seen General Pearson, and the matter was arranged. I asked him where General Pearson was, and he said he was in Pitcairn's office.
Q. You say General Pearson ordered you to take a portion of the regiment?
A. To the Union depot. I reported to Brinton for an order on General Loud.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Where was General Pearson at the time the firing took place?
A. He was in Pitcairn's office.
Q. He was not present?
A. No, sir; there was no officer of the division at Twenty-eighth street, except myself at the crossing. The cars were taken out for the removal of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments--an order had been issued to that effect. The train was taken out and left about, maybe, one hundred and fifty feet below Twenty-eighth street. Immediately at the end of the train, I left Major Dickson, Captain Denney, of Colonel Guthrie's staff, Major Fife, and Major Stroff. Major Evans went over to the Nineteenth regiment.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You say General Pearson was in Pitcairn's office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was not there at all--how far is that from where the firing was?
A. About eleven hundred feet, according to my estimate of it. There was not an officer of the sixth division there except myself.
Q. Then it was impossible for him to have given the order?
A. He did not give any order to fire. General Brinton left immediately after the firing to see General Pearson in answer to an inquiry which was brought by Major Evans to him in regard to the firing. When I received this order I started to report to General Brinton to get the order spoken of a few moments ago, and I met General Brinton at the--going into the office of Mr. Pitcairn, and received from him the information that General Pearson was in Pitcairn's office. The first authentic information that General Pearson had of the firing was what I communicated to him in Pitcairn's office.
Q. What was the reason given for you sending this portion of the regiment--it was not sent anywhere, was it--to the Union depot?
A. There was no reason assigned. It had been arranged not to send that half regiment to the Union depot. I asked for General Pearson, and went to ascertain the cause of it, and the general said it was not necessary and directed me to remain there. At the request of General Brinton, he was going to bring the Philadelphia troops into the building, and a little after six o'clock they commenced to come in.
* * * * *
James Park, junior, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Will you please give us your residence and business?
A. My residence is Allegheny city. My business is manufacturer of steel and copper.
Q. I wish you to state now, in your own way, what knowledge you have of the riots that occurred in July last, and the efforts made to suppress them?
A. Some days previous to the Saturday when the riot was started, I was aware of the strike on the part of the employés of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. On Saturday, the 21st of July, I believe it was, I was at the Pennsylvania railroad depot at the time of the arrival of the Pennsylvania regiments----
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Philadelphia regiments?
A. Philadelphia, I mean, sir. I was there when they disembarked, and during the time they were engaged in taking their lunch. I felt very greatly exercised in reference to the whole matter, fearing that, with the small force of military, in the event of anything that would precipitate firing upon the people, very disastrous consequences might follow. Seeing Mr. Cassatt on the back porch of the hotel building, I went up to him, and cautioned him with some earnestness. I told him that Saturday was an idle day with our workingmen, and I thought I knew the temper of our men pretty well. Sunday would be an idle day, and it would be great wisdom on his part not to attempt to do anything until the following Monday.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What hour was that?
A. It was about four o'clock, as near as I can recollect.
Q. Before the troops went out?
A. Before they marched out. I told him it was very natural for our home military to feel some sympathy, if it were ever so little, in behalf of those who were termed strikers, and that they ought not to expect to place full dependence upon their efficiency in case of anything like a riot. He referred to the Philadelphia regiment as being composed of men who would not fire over the heads of the mob in case of any mob being started, but I told him that in case of necessity for firing that he ought not to have less than ten thousand men, and that I doubted with that force whether he would be able, in case of firing upon the people, to quell the mob that might be precipitated upon us from the firing of the militia, but at all events not to do anything with less than five thousand men. He said in reply that they must have their property. That if the State authorities will not give them possession of it they will call upon the general Government. He took out his watch and said they had now lost an hour and a half's time, meaning that the military should have been marched from the hotel to the place where the great crowd was congregated an hour and a half before the time which I am speaking of. I left for Allegheny just after talking to Mr. Cassatt, and went to my home on a matter of business--to see my son--and came back, taking the car up Penn avenue, and leaving the car at Thirtieth street. Just as I left the car the volley of firing took place. There was an immense crowd of people on the side of the hill. From the number that fell, I supposed there were a very great many killed, but it turned out afterwards that two thirds who fell had fallen to roll into a ditch that was cut on the other side of the road running up the hill, to save themselves. I thought it strange that the firing took place upon the people on the hillside. I could not see, from where I stood, what was going on close to the military, but it struck me, I recollect, at that time, as being very strange that the firing should be made about the line of the angle of the slope of the hill. I don't know that I can say anything more on that point. I went to my works, and I found great excitement all over that region of the city. I went to crowds of men, women, and children, warning them to go into their houses, for the reason that a little while before there was a good deal of commotion on Penn avenue, near Twenty-eighth street, and I thought giving evidence that some fighting was going on that might reach up into the neighborhood of these crowds of people, but I found that, with all my efforts, I did not accomplish anything, people still remained, and a great many run in that direction, just as people will. I cannot account for it, but no doubt gentlemen are well aware of the fact, just as I am, that people will do that thoughtlessly. My own son, who was just by my side the moment the firing took place, ran and got probably a hundred feet from me before I checked him. I told him he must not go in that direction at all. He came to his mind in a minute, and said he did not think what he was doing. I state this just to show how easy it is for a crowd of people to congregate where there is any excitement, particularly when the military are about. I went to my residence in Allegheny and heard nothing at all what was going on, supposing everything was quiet, and that there was no disturbance. Nor did I know that there was anything in the way of burning of property until Sunday morning. My partner, Mr. Charles L. Caldwell, came to my house and said he thought I better come to the city; that something ought to be done; that the Pennsylvania railroad property was being destroyed, and there ought to be some effort in the way of getting up organizations to arrest the work of the mob. He told me to go to the Chamber of Commerce; that James I. Bennett and others would meet me there. We repaired to the Chamber of Commerce and found the door closed, and we went to the printing office, and finally stopped at the office of the Pittsburgh Post, meeting Mr. Barr and Mr. Wakes, I think it was, and prepared for a meeting that we had bulletined to take place at twelve o'clock at the city hall, on Market street. That meeting was very well attended. A great many people on the way from church noticed the announcement on the bulletin boards, and repaired to the place of meeting. I felt very proud, on that occasion, of the people of Pittsburgh, and ever since that day, when away from home, I have registered from Pittsburgh, a thing I never did before. I always registered in Europe, and in this country, from Allegheny. Ever since that I have registered from Pittsburgh, and always will do so. I found wealthy men at that meeting, who pledged all that they were worth--not five thousand or ten thousand dollars--but all that they were worth, to put down the mob. John Moorhead, John Harper, John Slagle, and John R. McCuen signed a pledge that they would pay their proportion of all the necessary expenses to check that mob. A committee of twenty-five, I think, was appointed to meet at two or three o'clock at the mayor's office, city hall. This meeting I speak of was at the old city hall. That committee of twenty-five convened and appointed a committee to go to the mob and try to bring it to reason. There were no preparations to do it then, on the part of the citizens, but it was thought that the committee might appeal to them and stay the conflagration and destruction of property. That committee did go there, and went into the midst of the mob, and did appeal to them. I thought that they had about checked the matter, and that the Union depot would be saved, but the committee went from there to meet with some of the men who were on a strike. The committee met a number of them--I was present during all this time, and I know what the committee did, and do not state from hearsay--the committee met quite a number of the railroad men, who were there at that time--the strikers--and found them to express very great regret at the destruction of property. We proposed to them that they would attend an adjourned meeting, at the old city hall, to take place at three o'clock, or half past three o'clock, and proposed that they would organize and assist the citizens in saving the property. They talked very nicely about it, and one of their number--I think two of their number--attended that meeting. He was authorized to get up an organization of those men who were then termed strikers. I was a little too busy for some days to notice, but I believe they did make an effort in that direction. Then this committee of public safety went to work on Monday. I am speaking now of what took place on Sabbath afternoon. On Monday, Pittsburgh was certainly in a very deplorable condition. I noticed that the streets--some of them--particularly Fourth avenue and Third street, were crowded almost from curb to curb with strangers--not railroad men, because I think I should have recognized, from their appearance, the class of men that work in our work-shops from this crowd. They seemed to be composed of strangers, miners, and others from the neighboring parts here, up and down the river. Of course, the most of that crowd were idlers, men who would be ready to join in almost any destruction of property. They were not, I think, citizens--probably very few of them. Efforts were made by the committee of public safety to get organized. The mayor sent to Washington and got permission to take some of the Government arms. They were brought into the city, and General Negley and others were called in to assist, and, I think, the preparations that were made were done in a very short time, because on Tuesday the city seemed to be entirely quiet, and these crowds started for home. One very large crowd, that came down from the upper Monongahela river, were met by the mayor and General Negley, and many citizens that we organized, some with weapons and arms, and they agreed to go home, and said they had understood that men, women, and children were being shot down by the soldiers from a distance, and they came down to protect them, but they agreed to go home quietly. I believe I have told the story about as near as I can recollect--about all I know of it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Anything in relation to the Duquesne depot that you know of?
A. At the meeting on Sunday, we started organizations, and were very much pleased to find our young men, particularly, falling into line. I think it could not have been five minutes after the announcement was made, that we wanted all to organize a company to go to the Duquesne depot--fearing that it might be set on fire--I think it was not five minutes after that, that I noticed, I think a hundred, probably, marching right past where I stood. I was presiding at the meeting, and I believe they were led in the wrong direction--they were taken up Third street, I believe--some person took them up to the elevator. Another company that formed--I do not know how many--went down to the Duquesne depot to protect that.
Q. Was any attempt made to destroy the Duquesne depot?
A. I understand there was some arrests there. I was present at the mayor's office when a man was brought in there, and Doctor Dickson and some others testified that he was caught in the act.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Do you know anything about the events before the strike, the dispute between the railroad employés and the railroad company--the causes leading to these disturbances?
A. Nothing more than from general information, that it was because of reduction of wages, and that the men thought the reduction was more than they were willing to accept, and that it had eventuated in a strike. I understand from quite a number that they were not committing any violence. Mr. Shinn, vice president of the Allegheny Valley railroad, and Mr. McCargo, superintendent of the Allegheny Valley railroad, said to me just before the arrival of the Philadelphia regiment, that there was no effort made at all by the railroad strikers to prevent the running out of trains. I think I can recollect very nearly Mr. McCargo's words. Says he, "Mr. Park, you or I can get on a locomotive and run out any train, and nobody will disturb a hair of our heads." He then followed that up by saying the difficulty was to get anybody to go on to a locomotive.
Q. To man the train?
A. That understood the moving of a locomotive, and running a train out. After seeing Mr. Cassatt, after this interview with Mr. McCargo, I mentioned that to Mr. Cassatt, and he said their presence intimidated them, and he said they made no act of resistance; but their presence intimidated persons--that the strikers were on the ground or on the road, intimidating persons that would take out trains.
Q. Was any threats made by yourself and other citizens to prevent a collision between the military and the people? You related an interview with Mr. Cassatt. Was there any other threats made by citizens like yourself to prevent a collision?
A. I don't know of anything done in that way. I suppose persons would have felt that they were interfering. I felt a little in that way. When I was advising Mr. Cassatt, I felt that the State, or the railroad company, or one power, was directing that sheriff--somebody was directing the whole movement, and believed for me to give advice on that, probably it was a little premature, or at least Mr. Cassatt might have thought it was uncalled for, and I was greatly in fear that some stone might be thrown or pistol shot, and that the military might fire, and I felt sure the strength was not there if the mob was started--if a mob was precipitated upon the citizens of Pittsburgh, there was not military enough to put it down.
Q. Did you know that the trains had been stopped during Thursday and Friday?
A. Yes; I knew by general rumor, and was told by a great many that the Pennsylvania railroad were not able to operate.
Q. Why didn't you make a suggestion to the railroad officials sooner?
A. I never thought of doing it; but if I had thought of doing it, I would have thought that they might have told me to attend to my business, just as I would have done, if I had any difficulty at my works, and railroad men came to advise me--"you mind your own business, and I will attend to my strikers."
Q. In the suggestions that you made to Mr. Cassatt, did you suggest any plan to preserve the property and prevent its destruction from Saturday until Monday?
A. I said the better way would be to wait. I am not very clear in my recollection. I tried to fix it upon my memory, but it is a little misty just how I put that to Mr. Cassatt; but as near as I can recollect, it was like this--of course, in substance it would be the same--that Saturday was an idle day, and Sunday would be an idle day, and to-night these people would be in their beds and with the force he had--he said, I think, eight hundred men would be expected in momentarily--I said, as near as I can recollect, that to-night these people will be in their beds, and with the force you will have, take possession of your grounds, but don't attempt to move any train until Monday. I recollect very clearly impressing that upon him, not to move a train until Monday. I knew on Monday all the mills would be running and the men would be at their places, and if there was any little disturbance in the moving of trains, the civil authorities could manage it, even if the military didn't take any part in it.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. From your knowledge of the kind of people, did you regard it as necessary to call the military to suppress them?
A. No, sir; I didn't. I think it was a mistake, a very serious mistake. I knew that the day police of Pittsburgh had been discharged--that is, most of them, and that the mayor was left with a very small force, but I knew at the same time, that the class of men that was engaged by the railroad companies--they are a pretty intelligent set of men--they can be reasoned with, and if arrangements had been made to have had their ground protected by police, not allowing any one to come up Twenty-sixth or Twenty-eighth streets--done that at night, I don't think there would have been any trouble. I don't think any of those men that were termed strikers--I think they would have hardly violated the law in knocking down police, if the police had said the orders were that nobody was to come. I forgot to say that very soon after the firing, after I had warned these little crowds on Penn street to go into their houses, I went over to my mill--the mills generally stopped about half past three o'clock, sometimes as late as four o'clock, and I found that some of our men had been a good deal excited--one man had rushed into the office, and wanted to know from our time-keeper if his gun was at home. He told him he must not have his gun, must not attempt to go for it, because if he did he would alarm his wife, who was then sick, but he went for, and brought his gun back, and handed it to our time-keeper, and went out in the mill for something, and the time-keeper gave it to our manager, and he took it back in our office, and broke the stock of it, then our time-keeper bet five dollars with this man that he had not a gun, and the gun was brought in, and it was broke up, and this man rejoiced over it, and said he had been making a fool of himself, he was very glad he had come to his senses, and he didn't take time to reason, nor did, I think, any of these men. Their general life and their education and training has been more or less different from yours or mine. If your son had been in that crowd or your brother, and you had heard he was shot, you would have just done as I would have done, sat down and reasoned whether he had any business to be there, and you would not have run in and shot down Philadelphia soldiers, or any other soldiers. They just heard somebody was killed, and they rushed for arms, all being done on the impulse of the moment, and done in a way that you or I would not have done, because if my son had been there and shot, I would have lamented it terribly, but I would not have gone there with a pistol or gun. I would have reasoned, undoubtedly, as you would have done, that he had no business to be there, or ought to have been home. These men didn't reason in that way.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Have you not had quite a number of strikes among the employés in the mills or factories in this vicinity, during the last five or six years?
A. I can call to mind quite a number of them.
Q. You are a manufacturer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Employ a large number of men, do you not, sir?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you ever had any strikes in your works?
A. Yes, a number.
Q. Did the strikers attempt to prevent other men from working, that you employed?
A. Not by force. I never knew of any attempt by force. They did it by persuasion. I have twenty odd men out now. My rule is never to take any man into my employ that has ever struck on me. I will keep them from starving, with money, but not with work. I don't think there is any occasion for a strike. We require notice, and we give notice, and let every man know that if he ever strikes, he never can work for us as long as God spares me on this earth. I will lend him money, or do anything for him, but he will never work for me.
Q. In the different strikes, in your works, was there ever any violence used by the strikers, to prevent men from working, you put in there?
A. I don't recollect of any cases.
Q. Did you ever have any difficulty in getting strikers quiet--dispersed from your works?
A. No, sir; they were always very quiet, and when told to leave--sometimes they were not inclined to go out, and they called to me and I requested them to go, spoke to them mildly about it, and told them that my rules were to be carried out. I did once have to bring in a policeman, but the man was very drunk and did not know what he was doing. I am satisfied that if he had been sober, he would have left the building without calling in a policeman.
Q. You have had strikes in the city where there have been a larger number engaged than in this?
A. Oh, yes; we have had strikes where the aggregate number would have amounted to many more than those engaged at the Pennsylvania Railroad Company's works. We have had ten strikes here.
Q. Was there any violence resulting from them at all?
A. No; I don't recollect only in the case of a strike on the part of the puddlers, probably about twenty-five years or so ago. There was some little trouble at Bailey's mill. They brought on some eastern puddlers, and when they attempted to start the furnaces--it was principally women, the wives of some of the men--they struck them with stones a little, and had some few knock-downs, but they soon quieted.
Q. Have you had any difficulties lately--any violence, that is the last few years?
A. No, sir; none at all.
Q. Have you not had a strike among your puddlers, within the last few years?
A. Yes; about two years and a half or three years ago, and I couldn't employ them again just for the reason that my rules were, that any man that strikes can never work for me again, and I thought, of course, as there were so many idle puddlers at that time, that I would have no trouble in starting up my puddling forge. A puddler came around and says, "I can get men and can start you puddling." Says I, "I would like very much to start." Says he, "I can get up a gang by Monday." Says he, "Did you have any trouble?" Says I, "Yes; they struck." Well, they wouldn't work. That lasted for three or four months, and I concluded that some determination had been agreed upon, that these men that struck, must work for me, and I determined they never would--I determined before we started up. I would lend them money at any time, but they might starve, or their families starve, for want of work. I dedicated that forge to negro labor. My men was a little disposed to interfere by violence with the men who engaged themselves to carry on that work, but I have never known any serious interference with my negro workmen at all. We have had peace and quiet, so far as I can learn, and white puddlers have never molested them at all, and we have had them two or three years.
Q. Still working?
A. Yes; we pay them the same price as white men, because I told them when they came that we would pay them just the same price as white puddlers got in other mills, and we have had to do so.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. Have you an idea how many employés are employed in the different mills in the cities of Allegheny and Pittsburgh?
A. I guess twenty or twenty-five thousand, probably; that is merely a guess. I would have to think over the number of mills. I suppose something like twenty thousand, and probably more.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You are speaking about a strike about twenty or twenty-five years ago. Have you any recollection of the military being called out at that time?
A. I don't recollect of them being called out--they might have been.
Q. At any other time within the last twenty-five years, were the military called out to preserve the peace?
A. I think one time I recollect of them being called out--I think it was at the time of starting the negro puddlers at the bolt company's works. I think then the military was called on; that is about two or three years ago.
Q. Was there any serious opposition to those new men working there?
A. There was some quarreling and knocking down. I think there was nothing very serious.
Q. As a general thing, in strikes among your men here in the mills or manufactories, you think it is bad policy to call out the military to suppress any trouble that might arise from them?
A. Yes; I do so. I think so for the reason that the military would do very well, if they could overawe, but the fear is that somebody would throw a stone, or somebody would fire a pistol, and then they would fire into the citizens. You understand as well as I do, that you put up proclamations and warn people to disperse, and you can go in and talk and plead with them, and still the crowd will be there, and it is almost certain that innocent people will be shot down, if there is any firing.
Q. In your testimony, you state you saw Mr. Cassatt in the rear porch of the Union depot, and advised him not to attempt to move trains on Saturday, as the men in your mills and manufactories were idle on that day--not to attempt to move trains until Monday--what reply did you get from him to that advice?
A. He said they must have possession of their property. If the State authorities did not give it to them, they would call on the general Government, taking his watch out, and said that they had now lost an hour and a half. That is about as near as I can recollect. The idea was they had lost an hour and a half in moving the Philadelphia regiment up to Twenty-eighth street--up to where the crowd was congregated over their property; that is, the railroad men as a general thing, on their property. I think the citizens were, as a general thing, on the hillside, as near as I can understand it--the most of the citizens, spectators, &c., were up on the hillside--some of them were up as high as the pest-house, on the hill. One young lad was shot there through the wrist--he was in a line with the pest-house.
Q. Were you a member of the citizens' committee waiting on Mr. Cassatt at that time?
A. No, sir. We had no citizens' committee at that time.
Q. Were you a member of the committee that waited on the Governor and the officials of the railroad company, at any time after that, to give him some advice?
A. Yes.
Q. State that?
A. I have forgotten the day. I don't recollect the day he arrived, but I think it was--I don't recollect the day he did arrive--it was some time in the week after the riot.
Q. The latter part of the week?
A. Probably it was; by the way, it was Saturday. I recollect very distinctly, because I spoke of Sunday just about as I did to Mr. Cassatt. Joseph F. Dilworth, Mr. Johnson, and myself were appointed a committee to visit the Governor. We got word to meet him Saturday morning at Thirty-third street, in a car, and we went up there and met him. I believe I did the first talking, and advised that nothing should be done until Monday to take possession of the ground. He said he was going to do nothing in a hurry--was going to take his time, and move with caution.
Q. Was this the conference with the Governor?
A. With the Governor himself. He said he was not out here in the interest of any railroad, but in the interest of peace, or something to that effect. He left me to understand that he didn't come to look after the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but to look after the safety of this community. He had an impression that our water-works were stopped, and he did just as he said he would do. He waited quietly and did not do anything at all until Saturday night, until everybody was in bed. He put out pickets along Penn avenue, and up and down the streets, to keep everybody from going on the railroad property, and then commenced to work, and tore up the track and relay. That could have been done before the Governor came.
Q. Could the trains have been run.
A. I think so. I don't think there would have been any disturbance at all. If they had the trains there, they could have taken them out without any disturbance.
Q. In your opinion, from what you know, would there have been any disturbance, if they had attempted to move trains on Saturday or Sunday, when the Governor was here, at the time you had this conference with the Governor?
A. I think there would have been no disturbance--I am satisfied that the men who were designated as railroad strikers, regretted, probably as much as any other set of men, the destruction of the railroad property, and probably they would have been about as ready as any other men to have interfered with any outside people annoying the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in its moving trains. They might not have gone on to the locomotives and moved them themselves, but if any persons could have been procured to take out the trains, I don't think that the railroad strikers would have interfered.
Q. Would the crowd of people have interfered on that Saturday?
A. I don't think they would have interfered on that Saturday--that was about a week after the riot.
Q. Did I understand you to say you appealed to the Governor not to attempt to move trains on that Saturday?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you think at that time there might be trouble?
A. I think so. I thought it was wise to take time, and do nothing until Monday.
* * * * *
J. Guy McCandles, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. State whether you were present at the firing of the militia, on Saturday afternoon?
A. I was.
Q. Go on and state what you saw, and what occurred.
A. I was there the whole of Saturday. Went up Saturday morning, and was there during the day, and was there at the time of the firing, and when the Philadelphia troops came up, and whenever the troops came up, the crowd increased in front of them on Twenty-eighth street, until it was very dense, and there was a company deployed across the street to push them back. They marched up in front, with arms port, and marched up against the crowd, in order to push them back, but it was too dense, they could not do it. They retreated back a step or two, and charged bayonet. I was up on the hill, about two or three rods up on the hill, so that I could not hear any orders given of anything of that kind--I could only see their movements. I could see all their movements well. They attempted to charge bayonets, walked up slowly, got nearer and closer every moment, until the bayonets began to infringe on the crowd. Then one of the crowd got hold of a bayonet, and tried to pull the musket from the soldier. He jerked it from him, and he then gave him a sort of a push, and knocked him, I do not know which. Right immediately back of them, I saw a man draw out a pistol, and shoot right into the crowd. At the same time, there was two or three other pistol shots heard at different points. Almost simultaneously, we had a scattering fire from the soldiery, directed mostly right up on the hill towards where our troops were lying.
Q. Hid you hear any order to fire given?
A. I did not.
Q. How close were you?
A. About three rods off, at least. I could not have heard an order to fire. There was a good deal of noise and confusion.
Q. How many were wounded in the conflict?
A. I really don't know. I saw about fifteen or sixteen that were wounded, around on the hill where we were standing. I saw about that many there. There was one of the soldiers that was killed, shot through the head, twenty or thirty feet off, and when I went to him he was dead--a soldier of the Nineteenth regiment. I thought it was one of our own men. He was dead when we reached him. It was not one of our men, but the Nineteenth regiment, that was lying on our right and front. There was a very heavy volley of stones thrown into the soldiers previous to the fire.
Q. You were surgeon of the Fourteenth?
A. I was surgeon of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. It was commanded by ----
A. Colonel Gray.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you know whether this soldier was killed by a shot fired from the mob or not?
A. It was not a pistol shot, I know that from the character of the wound.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. He was not one of the soldiers who put the mob back?
A. No, sir; he was one of the soldiers on the hill. They were facing towards the hill, and there was a great many of the mob that were there on the side of the hill, between the other soldiers, before us and Twenty-eighth street--a dense mass of them there.
Q. Was he standing in his command?
A. He was away from his command. He was not exactly in the crowd--the crowd was below him.
Q. He was not with his command?
A. Was not standing in rank at the time.
Q. How far away from his command?
A. About a rod from where the command was at the time. There was one or two companies on the hill in the same line with the others, and then two or more--three rods down, in front, near the hospital grounds. Had he been down with his command he would not have been shot--the shooting was higher.
Q. Was he back of his command?
A. As I say, his command was, at the time--some of the companies were--down near the railroad tracks, and there was a couple of companies up to the right of our regiment, three rods back of them on the hill, and it was between two--he was just between the two.
Q. Was he immediately behind any particular company, close----
A. He was some little distance to the right.
Q. Was he a non-commissioned officer, do you know?
A. No, sir; he was a private.
* * * * *
Doctor John S. Dixon, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. 273 Penn avenue.
Q. Practicing physician?
A. Yes, sir; for ten years, in the city of Pittsburgh.
Q. State what knowledge you have of the riot, and what was done to suppress it?