Europe in the XIX century (1815-1878)

Contents

CHAP.

I. Europe after Waterloo

II. The Independence of Greece

Chapter I Europe After Waterloo

After Napoleon's first collapse in 1814 the Powers of Europe sent their representatives to a Congress at Vienna to rearrange the map. The Waterloo campaign did not materially influence the final settlement. The Congress expressed the right of the Great Powers to exercise a general control and inaugurated the Concert of Europe.

It will be useful first to see what the Republic and the Empire had done, so as to understand what the AlHes considered should be undone. In 1792 Louis XVI, still king in name, was forced to declare war against Austria; then in the same year when Austrians and Prussians poured into France, when the Duke of Brunswick issued a manifesto denouncing the French who had made their king a slave and driven the nobles into exile, the country roused itself, back to the wall, and the invaders recoiled from the position at Valmy. The RepubHc was established, and the war-cry was for the defence of lyiberty. Fraternity, and EquaHty. Almost at once a new cry was raised ; the Republic would retaliate by invading countries under monarchical rule so as to give them the blessings of republicanism and the rights of man. It was a propagandist Republic in arms to force its gospel upon Europe. And a third cry was heard very soon ; the Republic wanted the

M. I

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natural boundaries of France to be hers, namely the Rhine and the Alps. Prussia, deserting the AUies, recognised the Rhine frontier in 1795, for the French armies had actually won it.

Bonaparte's campaigns of 1796 and 1797 in north Italy took the French arms far beyond the natural boundaries. His tremendous victories in 1805-07 laid all central Europe at his feet. He, as Emperor, was heir to the Republic in so far as he broke down all out-of-date medieval survivals and feudal inequaUties. Where he annexed lands to France, the north-west coast of Germany, north Itaty, and the Dalmatian coast, an element of personal freedom was introduced for the first time on a wide scale such as would satisfy republican ideals. Saxony and Poland may be quoted as ardently attached to him. But whether the Belgians and Dutch, the Bavarians and Westphalians, or the Italians, were so ardent, it would be hard to say. The burden of Conscription was laid upon them. They were unable, under his Continental System, to obtain British manufactured goods. In fact they were treated in the Napoleonic scheme as victims to the honour and glory of French mihtary might, compelled to fight the battles of France and to abstain from trade, rather than as peoples liberated from monarchies by a generous and chivalrous race of crusaders. The glitter of Napoleon's imperial court, and of the minor kingly and ducal courts which mimicked it, did not bhnd them to the truth.

Two countries in particular, Prussia and Spain, saw that even in theory they were not invaded for their own good. The Spaniards were the first to show that peoples as well as kings were the enemies of France. The Tyrolese were not far behind them in patriotism, but were few in numbers and, being far from the coast, had no assistance from

I] EUROPE AND NAPOI.EON 3

Britain. Then, after the retreat from Moscow, the Prussians as a people led the uprising of Germany, forcing their king in the early days of 18 13 to league himself with the Russians ; and indeed the Moscow disaster was brought about by the Russian peasants co-operating with their Tsar, destro3dng their property, and retreating before the French so as to starve them out.

Thus various problems were placed before the Congress at Vienna in 1814, while Napoleon was at Elba. Was he alone to be punished, or France as well? Were the old dynasties to be restored to the old positions, or were popular rights to be acknowledged? How were the countries most Uable to be invaded by the French to be saved from future invasion ? In answer to the first question the AlHes treated France generously; she was not to suffer. But after the Waterloo campaign a certain amount of humihation was inflicted, for, if she had not unanimously welcomed Napoleon back from Elba, at least a great many of her sons had welcomed him. As to the others, the chief and immediate need was to strengthen Europe against any possibihty of renewed war. The various monarchs wanted compensation after the hardships they had suffered from Napoleon. The Congress could not formulate schemes of self-government for each nation saved from France; it could only restore dynasties, or award to them new lands left kingless. Monarch and people in each case had to settle popular questions at home. The result was disappointment and -brooding over wrongs up to the year 1848. In fact 1792-94 were too near to 1814-15. All that the Spaniards and Tyrolese had done, all that the Prussians had suffered, could not make rulers forget that the crisis through which Europe had passed had its origin in the repubhcan fury twenty-two years back. lyiberty seemed to be synonymous

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with Jacobinical excess. And, even had such a thought not been natural, one can hardly picture any statesman at Vienna solemnly proposing the creation of a ParHament and popular franchise for each country. It is a hard truth that a nation must win its own salvation.

The crown of France was restored to Louis XVIII, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI; "Louis XVII" was reserved for the young dauphin who had perished during the early days of the Republic. At one time there was a possibility that the French ex-Marshal Bernadotte, adopted heir of the King of Sweden and Regent for him, and declared enemy of Napoleon after the Moscow disaster, might be chosen. There was some feeling that the Bourbons should not be restored, and it may be that Tsar Alexander, who for a time supported Bernadotte, wanted to show thai the Powers in crushing Napoleon had no wish to humiliate France and therefore ought not to force upon her the old dynasty. But, as at the time of our own Restoration, it must have been clear that the king de jure should have his chance; should the Bourbons, like the Stuarts, misuse it, then the French nation would take matters into its own hands and none would pity them. In the meanwhile la legitimite would stand for peace, whereas Bernadotte might prove to be ambitious and restless. France needed peace such as the true king, restored by the Allies, would find it to his interest to maintain. Moreover it was a new France over which Louis XVIII was to preside; a France of peasant proprietors and small estates, where the law of succession was as laid down in the Code Napoleon ; a France to which the Revolution had given liberty and to which, though curtaiUng the liberty which had become licence and brought anarchy and bankruptc3^ in its train. Napoleon had given stabiHty ;

I] RESTORATION OF LOUIS XVIII 5

a France which, in spite of conscription and absence of self-government, enjoyed personal freedom. The emigres, those nobles and royalists who had fled in 1789 and subsequent years, some of whom were irreconcileables and had hounded on the Austrians and Prussians in 1792, and some of whom were less bitter and returned to France on Napoleon's invitation, did not regain their old privileges; they might hope to secure remission from taxation, as in the good old days before 1789, and to occupy all the highest positions in Church and State, but they had against them the solid weight of a peasantry that had become free and prosperous. The Bourbon dynasty without a privileged nobility was not really dangerous.

Whether the men of 1814 consciously argued in this manner, or whether we with a century's experience attribute to them our thoughts, is immaterial. Something of this kind, a confidence in the legitimist dynasty as the best shield against civil war and a new revolution which would bring in again a military despot, and as the best guarantee of peace for a France drained of men by long wars, must have been in the mind of the wily Talleyrand who represented la legitimiti to the Powers.

In 1814 the Allies looked upon Napoleon rather than upon France as the enemy. But, after "the hundred days " of 1815, it was necessary to punish the country that had welcomed Napoleon back from Elba. A fine of forty millions of our money was imposed. An allied army of 150,000 men, under Wellington's chief command, was to occupy certain positions. Works of art carried off from conquered countries to adorn the Louvre were to be restored^. Blucher and the Prussians, who indeed had

^ For instance the bronze horses of St Mark, the restoration of which to Venice caused much excitement; yet the Venetians had suffered more than any other nation from Napoleon's severity, wanted to plunder in revenge, and in particular to blow up the "Jena" bridge in Paris; their bitterness was shown also in much destruction and wanton defilement of private property on their march after Waterloo into France. But WelHngton set his face steadily against the reprisals of mere revenge, and our own soldiers, behaving decently in France, certainly set a good example.

It was Wellington also who protested strongly against the re-annexation of Alsace and lyorraine to Germany, lyouis, he argued, would not be safe on the French throne if the provinces won by his ancestors were given up. They had been recognised as belonging to France by international treaties^. The inhabitants, from whose ranks had come many famous Frenchmen, wished to be French, for they had learnt under France the meaning of freedom and the Revolution had created a large class of peasant proprietors, who might lose their advantages if handed back to Germany. The Tsar supported WelHngton, and Austria did not care to make this a vital question. The Prussian desire for annexation was not pressed, although the argument that carried them off as loot from Constantinople at the time of the Fourth Crusade. The French bitterly resented the loss, and probably the modern Huns justify their thieving instinct because the French of Napoleon were fond of loot.

1 The French first obtained Alsace, less a few patches of land, in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia; Louis XIV seized Strasburg, hitherto a free German city, in 1681 by a mixture of fraud and force, but the Treaty of Rastadt in 17 14 recognised it as his. Three bishoprics of Lorraine, Metz, Verdun, Toul, became French by the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis in 1559; the last Duke of Lorraine, Francis, gave up the rest of the duchy in 1737 when he married Maria Theresa, and received Tuscany in exchange; it then fell to a dethroned King of Poland, and on his death to France,

I] AIvSACB AND LORRAINK 7

German lands ought to form part of German^^ appealed to Prussian minds most of all; for Prussia was directlyaiming at obtaining the lead in Germany, and it was a sentimental ambition, as well as a military need in view of any future war against France, that demanded restoration, and how could the British and Russians who lived far away from Strasburg and Metz understand German sentiment? However France retained her old boundaries as in 1789. Indeed she had one actual gain, for the little papal state of Avignon, joined to her early in the Revolution, remained French. Just a scrap of Lorraine and a scrap of Savoy, recognised as French in 18 14, were taken away in 1815.

Napoleon's Europe was as follows. Belgium, Holland — except for a short time when Louis Bonaparte was king, — all Germany west of the Rhine, a piece of north Germany touching the North Sea and extending to a point on the Baltic at Lubeck, Savoy, north-west Italy extending down the coast to Rome, and the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, were parts of France. North-east Italy was the Kingdom of Italy with Napoleon himself as king, wearing the old iron crown of Lombardy, and his stepson Eugene as viceroy. Murat, his brother-in-law, was King of Naples. Central Germany, composed of four kingdoms, Westphalia under his brother Jerome, Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg under German kings created by him and allied to him, and several duchies, formed the Confederation of the Rhine. Poland, reconstituted as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was under the King of Saxony. Austria, stripped of the Tyrol and neighbouring territory which he gave to Bavaria, and of the land behind Trieste incorporated with France, was nominally independent. Prussia was reduced to little more than East and West Prussia, Brandenburg,

and Silesia, but a French garrison held Dantzig. Denmark was his ally. One point is clear ; by abolishing the medieval survivals in Germany, the Holy Roman Empire, the electorates, the secular power of archbishops and bishops, the lay bishoprics in those parts of Germany where the Protestant Reformation had given church lands to prince-bishops, and by creating the Confederation of the Rhine, he gave a great impetus to the German ideal of union; similarly in Italy, by creating three main divisions and abolishing all foreign rule except his own, he first suggested a possible unity.

Of the immediate neighbours of France the question of Belgium was the most important and touched the EngUsh most nearly. The Austrians had been in occupation from 1714 to 1793, the French from 1793 to 1814. To our statesmen it was a fixed idea that no strong Power should hold Antwerp so as to create there during peace a naval base from which it could menace our shores ;— Napoleon had wished to do so, and our ill-fated expedition of 1809 which occupied the island of Walcheren was aimed against the shipping of Antwerp, but throughout the long war our naval blockade of the mouth of the Scheldt made Antwerp useless to him. Now the Austrians had no ambition to regain a country so far from them; they coveted rather access to the sea by way of Venice and Trieste. No one thought of a free and independent Belgium as coming within practical politics ; the mixed races, the Flemings of the western part, the French-speaking Walloons of the east, the lyiegeois who used to be governed by prince-bishops, the Brabanters and Hainaulters lying between, had no bond of union, except an affection for France. Now this affection, which speaks volumes for her decency and ability to secure the loyalty of even those whom she i] HOI,I.AND AND BBIvGlUM 9

had conquered, was quite sufficient in itself to make the AlHes callous towards Belgian feeling. At Vienna the statesmen of the moment cared only to promote the interests of their own countries, not those of the people concerned, least of all those of small states. So the Roman Catholic Belgians were handed over to and incorporated with the Calvinistic Dutch under the House of Orange to form the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Such a strange union seemed to be the only solution then possible.

Holland had been practically part of France between 1794 and 1814. Napoleon had indeed made his brother I/Ouis king for a short time, but he had enrolled both Belgians and Dutchmen in his armies as if they had been Frenchmen. The House of Orange was restored in 1814. But after a French regime old and now meaningless titles were dropped. "Stadholder" disappears, and a "king" of the Netherlands appears for the first time in history. In 18 15 Belgian and Dutch regiments fought against France under the Prince of Orange, the new king's son and heir, and at Quatre Bras they held their ground in a way which materially helped WeUington's plans. Yet the union was unnatural. Not only was there a reHgious difficulty, but also, ever since the days of Philip II and Parma, the Dutch had been free, the Belgians in turn under the yoke of Spain and of Austria ; the Dutch were sailors and merchants, the Belgians in pre-Spanish days had been manufacturers and bankers ; the Dutch had held both banks at the mouth of the Scheldt, and had killed the commerce of Antwerp. Of course the twenty years of connection with France would do something to bring the two races together. Also, when under the same crown, the Belgians would be able to navigate the Scheldt freely, which meant that Antwerp would enjoy a commercial prosperity that she had never known since 1585^. But all the traditions of Belgium were opposed to Dutch traditions.

At the other end of the French frontier the House of Savoy was restored to its old dominions as in 1792, namely the Duchy of Savoy, which lay south of the Lake of Geneva and west of the Alps; Piedmont, lying around the upper Po and enclosed on two sides by Alps and on the third by Apennines; the territory of Nice; and the island of Sardinia, from which the Duke took the title of King of Sardinia. To these were added the old rich republic of Genoa, and the strip of coast known as the Italian Riviera which had been conquered by Genoa^. It was a compact little kingdom, strong out of proportion to its size because it contained the Alpine passes between France and Italy, and now stronger than of old because of the addition of Genoa. The object of the Allies was to erect a strong barrier against any future attempt of France to reconquer Italy, either by the inland passes or the coast road. As a matter of fact the Riviera is a very difficult country for an army on the march ; the mountains in places fall sheer to the sea, and landsHdes are frequent, so that even to-day both the road and the single-track railway have to be often repaired. But Napoleon had invaded Italy in 1796 along this coast. Genoa had repubhcan sympathy with France. Therefore the land had to be annexed to Savoy and Sardinia.

The restored dynasty had no leaning towards constitutional government. But the Savoyards and northwestern ItaHans had enjoyed personal freedom, as had the

^ The year when Alexander of Parma besieged and took Antwerp.

2 Many a Riviera town has to-day an old fort erected by the Genoese to overawe, not to protect it; the old "freedom" of Genoa carried with it freedom to enslave.

I] SARDINIA; AND AUSTRIAN ITAI,Y ii

Belgians, during the score of years of French regime; probably also, like the Belgians, they felt that the burden of conscription imposed by Napoleon had been balanced by their share of military glory. Thus a yearning for popular government was openly shown. Genoa lamented her lost repubUc, and from her came Mazzini the ardent conspirator and dreamer. Nice was the birthplace of Garibaldi. And ultimately the dynasty, by no means liberal in 1814, caught the ideas of democracy from their subjects and became the champions of a Hberal monarchy. The Emperor of Austria, Francis II, looked to Italy and the Adriatic for his reward after years of war against France and Napoleon. It has been the fate of Austria to expand towards non-German lands, for France was her hereditary enemy in the west, Bavaria supported by France tried constantly to undermine her ascendancy in south Germany, and Prussia was her youngest and strongest rival in north Germany. For centuries she was the bulwark of Europe against the Turks, gaining Hungary and much Slavonic land in consequence. In 1814 she recovered the Tyrol, which Napoleon had given to Bavaria, and thereby held the Brenner Pass and the Adige route into Italy. She recovered lyombardy, which the Spaniards had ceded to her in 1714 and Napoleon had conquered in 1796. She obtained Venetia, both the late repubhc of Venice^ and all

^ It is interesting to compare modern Venice with, modern Genoa. The one has a magnificent hinterland for trade, the Po valley, and access to the transalpine routes to Germany; but the shallow water of the lagoon prevents the approach of the large ships of commerce which the conditions of modern trade demand. The other is shut in by a triple amphitheatre of m.ountains ; but the deep-sea harbour can admit large ships. The art of the engineer has been unable to deepen the lagoon, but has been able to drive roads and railways over the Apennines. Hence the trade of Genoa

12 EUROPE AFTER WATERIyOO [ch.

the hinterland that Venice had conquered, and the Dalmatian coast downwards from Trieste to Ragusa and Cattaro. Thus Austria, by way of compensation for the loss of Belgium which, indeed, she never cared to hold, secured the string of harbours and inlets on the flank of Turkey where she was able to create a navy ; the effect of this we feel to-day. lyower down, the protectorate over the Ionian Islands was entrusted to us, and Malta was definitely acknowledged as ours.

South of the Po the Duchy of Parma was allotted to Marie I^ouise, Napoleon's Austrian wife, for her Hfe; a new Duchy of lyucca was created for the Bourbon Duke of Parma, who, when Marie died, was to have Parma back again, and then lyucca was to go to Tuscany. The Duchy of Modena was restored to a junior Hapsburg line. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, which since the extinction of the famous Medici family in 1737 had been held by a Hapsburg, was restored to the Emperor's brother. The Pope regained not only full authority over Rome and the Patrimony of St Peter, but also the Marches which stretched from the Apennines to the Adriatic, and the I^egations of Bologna and Ferrara which touched the lower Po. The Bourbon king of Naples recovered Naples, and Sicily, owing to British aid, he had never lost. Thus the overthrow of Napoleon simply meant the re-establishment, and in the cases of Genoa and Venice the establishment, of foreign rulers whose one idea was to be despots and who had no

is great, and that of Venice, whether under Austrian rule or as a city of free Italy, cannot be compared with what it was in her glorious medieval days. Genoa before 1914 was being rebuilt and laid out as a modern city with wide and prosaic streets, only a few of her quaint narrow ways remaining and still flanked by her old palaces, and her citizens had largely forgotten the past in their more recent prosperity. Venice is substantially unaltered.

I] OTHER PARTS OF ITAI.Y 13

consideration for national feeling. Austrian white-coated soldiers garrisoned the territories actually governed by Austria, and were ready at a moment's notice to march over the borders into the Roman or Neapohtan territories to maintain pope or king. This was done to prevent any possibihty of a new French occupation. LiberaHsm was to be suppressed because it meant sympathy with French ideals. Of course there was no bond of union between Milanese, Tuscans, Romans, Sicihans, and the others. Italy was "a geographical expression." But all Itahans must have had a feeHng of community as long as the French regime lasted. Napoleon had broken up the artificial kingdoms and duchies of old days, the Alhes had restored them, and educated Itahans could not but grieve that they were handed over to the tender mercies of those who cared nothing for them.

Napoleon had destroyed the medieval Germany of 1792, a bundle of two or three hundred states, great and small, lay and clerical. Francis II was no longer Holy Roman Emperor but Emperor of Austria. There was no thought of reviving the electorates in 18 14. Napoleon's example was followed, and the Germany of 18 14 as constituted by the Congress of Vienna was in less than forty pieces.

The general position of the Emperor of Austria has already been indicated. He was King of Hungary and of Bohemia, he ruled over a considerable stretch of Slavonic country, he recovered the Tyrol which Napoleon had cut off from him, and he had no regret in giving up any claim to the Belgian Netherlands. He held comparatively httle German land, and his ambition was to dominate Italy.

In strong contrast the ambitious dynasty of the HohenzoUerns aspired to dominate Germany. It was in 1701 that the ** Markgraf " and Elector of Brandenburg first took the title of King of Prussia, as ruler of the non-German Prussians^. Many small pieces of central and western Germany were absorbed by the dynasty. The reigning HohenzoUern in 1795 made peace with the French RepubHc and deserted the AlHes ; in 1805 he made no effort to help the Austrians against Napoleon; and in 1806 he reaped the reward of his base selfishness, and was goaded into war by Napoleon and overwhelmed in the double defeat of Jena — Auerstadt. Napoleon crushed Prussia ruthlessly. Her resurrection dates from the early part of 1813, when she forced her king to make alhance with the victorious Russians and took the chief lead in the uprising of Germany. Prussian statesmen demanded a large reward for her devotion and services, the entire annexation of Saxony which had been Napoleon's warmest ally; but to this Great Britain and Austria could not agree, and indeed there was even some danger that the Allies might split into two parties and fight each other on the Saxon question. Finally Prussia obtained about half of Saxony and a good part of central Germany, including the great cities of Magdeburg and Halberstadt; likewise Westphaha, and a large stretch of land on the left bank of the Rhine, including Koln and Trier 2. This was more than a mere gain of many square miles and much population. It was a recognition that Prussia, not Austria, was the leading German power, worthy to hold and defend against any new French aggression that Rhineland which was so dear to the German

^ We are apt to forget that the genuine Prussians, not the Brandenburgers, are Slavs. Hence modern talk of German Kultur as a bulwark of civilisation against Russian Slavism is more than a little illogical.

2 That is the archbishopric-electorates of Koln (Cologne) and Trier (Treves). The third archbishopric-electorate of Mainz (Mayence) was added to Hesse Darmstadt.

I] PRUSSIA AND POLAND 15

heart, which France coveted and had held so long, and over which a watch had to be kept^. Westphalia and Rhineland were Roman CathoHc, and Lutheran Prussia was deputed to guard them. Thus the future of the Hohenzollerns was assured; they would be the champions of all Germany, Catholic or Protestant, west or east, if in course of time they kept up their military strength.

Prussian ambition also aimed at securing a good portion of Poland. In the old pre-Napoleonic partitions of Poland they had gained most of the Vistula and Warsaw with it; Napoleon had restored Poland, not as a kingdom, but as a Grand Duchy, and the Poles fought very well under him, especially as cavalry. But as Prussia received so much new land in Germany, the largest portion of Poland was now awarded to Russia, Warsaw included; Prussia's gain was the strip of West Prussia, filling the gap between Brandenburg and East Prussia, with the old free German city of Dantzig, and the fortresses Thorn and Posen; Austria obtained Galicia, including Lemberg, but Cracow was made an independent repubhc.

Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, had been Napoleon's allies; but whereas Saxony remained true to him to the end, the Bavarians turned against him, and he even had to fight against them as he retired from the great battle of Leipzig. Therefore it was thought that v^hilst the Allies should punish Saxony they should leave the other two intact. The Allies finally accepted the King of Saxony as king, but only in command of half of his old dominions, that is, the present Saxony Ijdng around Dresden and Leipzig. The Kings of Bavaria — minus the Tyrol — and of Wurtemberg retained their lands and titles. Hanover was entirely restored to George III of England, no longer as 1 See p. 74.

i6 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch.

Elector but as King of Hanover. The Grand Duchies of Baden, Hesse Darmstadt, Hesse Cassel^, and the two Mecklenburgs, were constituted; and several Duchies, such as vSaxe Weimar and Saxe Coburg^, still remained to represent the Httle states which had formerly been a chief feature of Germany. Four only of the old free cities of Germany remained, Frankfort on the Main, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. Bavaria held a piece of the old Palatinate on the west bank of the Rhine. The old archbishopric-electorate of Mainz was added to Hesse Darmstadt.

A spirit of unity was abroad in Germany, yet the time had not come for a settlement of a definite union. The old jealousy between Austria and Prussia was quite sufficient in itself to prevent the scheme, and the question of ascendancy had first to be fought out between them. But a Bund or Confederation was formed : it embraced thirtynine states, German Austria, Prussia, the four lesser kingdoms, five grand duchies, many duchies, four free cities, together with the King of the Netherlands by virtue of his position as Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and the King of Denmark who held the Duchy of Holstein. It was by no means an ideal confederation. In general terms one can say that the kings and dukes and others

1 But, curiously enough, the Grand Duke was popularly styled "Elector."

2 A former Elector of Saxony had two sons, Ernest and Albert. Luther's protector was of the Ernestine branch, but his nephew lost the electorate in 1547; the lands of their part of Saxony were split into fragments and shared by members of the family, such as Coburg, Gotha, Altenburg, Weimar, Meiningen. The Albertine branch got the electorate and the "march" of Meissen, which Napoleon formed into the Kingdom of Saxony, and of which the Congress awarded a large share to Prussia.