A new natural theology : based upon the doctrine of evolution

Front matter

PRINCETON, N. J.

Morris, J.

A new natural theology

Introduction

§ 1. Religion and Science . . . ... 1-5

Religion sees God everywhere, and projects its activity into Nature.

But this projection does not take place without provoking, at times, conflicts with science.

For these conflicts the religious mind is ultimately responsible.

The proper attitude of the religious mind is to hold its religious conceptions of the universe open to modification from increase of knowledge.

History teaches that it need not fear to adopt this attitude.

Nor ought it to be difficult for it to do so, as belief in God is not to be confused with belief in particular modes of manifestation of God.

§ 2. Herbert Spencer's Claim to have reconcilnl Religion and Science . . 5-8

The basis of Spencer's reconciliation is " that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable."

But he takes account only of those sides of religion which conn.' into contact with scientific theory and philosophical speculation.

And while he grants the possibility of religious belief, he makes all truly religious beliefs impossible.

Moreover, he requires the truths of religion to be stated as truths of science ; and instead of allaying the conflict between religion and science, he intensifies it.

§ 3. The Position of the Christian Church . . . . 8, 9

The Christian religion, in opposition to Spencer's views, relies on its

basis in historical fact.

But if the Christian elect to rely exclusively on the evidences of his

religion, he must be content to resign all claim to the possession of a

natural theology.

This his idea of God will not permit him to do.

§4. The Impossibility of a pure Agnosticism . . . 9-12

The doctrine of final causes is inadmissible in scientific hypotheses. But as each person must in one way or another interpret the universe

t<» himself', conclusions are arrived at by all which involve the validity

of the doctrine of final causes.

Suspicion of error does not affect the formation of these conclusions.

VI 11 A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

$ 4. The impossibility of a purr Agnosticism — continued. pages

The possession of a reflective mind makes belief in final causes a

necessity.

And even those who adopt an agnostic attitude with regard to the

universe are constrained to give some interpretation of it. The agnostic cannot be creedless.

$ 5. The Place of Natural Theology . . . .12-14

Natural theology deals with a question of practical moment to tin- conduct of life.

Its aim is to interpret to man the spiritual significance of the universe.

And, as the interpretative science of the universe, it has a sphere of its own distinct from philosophy on the one side, and from the inductive sciences on the other.

Its truths are relative to the state of our knowledge.

§6. Is a Natural Theology possible? . . . 14-17

Repeated failures to construct a true natural theology are, from the nature of the case, to be expected.

No natural theology can be for all time.

It is sufficient for a tenable natural theology if the position be established that such and such a view of God is the only conclusion permissible.

And the suspicion that, after all, we cannot attain to fixity of conception need not trouble us.

Chapter II

$ 1. Preliminary Considerations . . . . 18, 19

The natural theology of any age must be in accordance with the scientific conceptions of the age.

The argument of design is inappropriate to the order of evolution. Natural theologians, however, still cling to Paley's method.

§ 2. The Argument of Paley ..... 19-22

The analogy of the watch, as stated by Paley, is not apposite to the facts of the case.

If adaptations be evidences of design, the conditions of evolution must be shown to imply design.

It is not sufficient to point out the fitness of the means to the end ; the design must be evidenced not by the adaptation of means to an end, but by the manifestation of intelligence in the co-ordination of the conditions.

Nor is it sufficient to say that evolution only tells how the design is executed.

The true nictli.nl of procedure is to clear the mind from all ideas of design, and follow the teaching of evolution whithersoever it leads.

$3. The Attempts to re-state Paley's Argument . . . 22-29

Those who attempt to re-state Paley's argument begin with erroneous notions, and attempt to assimilate to them the true view of facts. This seen in

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS IX a. The Bampton Lectures of 1884 . . . 23-27

The lecturer takes the argument of design to be entitled to all the nine points said to be allowed by law to those in possession.

And evolution is called upon to answer at the bar of Paleyism, and not Paleyism at the bar of evolution.

In another place, however, by calling attention to the original properties of things, and the beneficent consequences which have flowed from them, a distinct advance is made on Paley's argument.

But even here it is assumed that whatever is beneficial or subservient to life partakes of the general nature of beneficence or plan.

b. Archdeacon Wilsons Address on Water . . . 27-29

The Archdeacon also makes use in his argument of the original

properties of things, and discovers in them a primary cause which is

moral and not physical.

He sees design not in the purposes which these original properties

fulfil, but in their co-ordination to effect these purposes.

He only succeeds, however, in denying the original properties of

things to be products of evolution, by reading the circumstances of

the evolution of plant and animal life into the evolution of an

entirely independent order of phenomena.

$ 4. The Argument from Order to Design . . . 29-41

If evolution forbids us to see in adaptations evidences of design, it

does not follow that it also forbids us to infer, from the inherent order

and adjustment of things, an Ordering Intelligence. This is an argument not from design, but towards it. But even this argument natural theologians have failed to set in its

proper relation to the evolution order.

a. M. Janet's Final Causes ..... 31-34

The human mind, says M. Janet, requires a cause not only to explain phenomena, but also the order of the phenomena ; and when a combination of phenomena to be intelligible must be referred not only to its causes, but also to its effects, it becomes a relation of means to ends, involving the principle of finality.

This he illustrates in the case of the stomach and its protecting epithelium.

M. Janet, however, argues entirely from the pre-evolution point of view ; and as opposed to the inference of order, permits only of the alternative view of chance.

And in general his views admit of the weighty objection that if adaptations be in themselves evidence of a final cause, it is impossible to reconcile with the Wisdom and Power of God the waste of life and the existence of parasites.

b. Professor Momerie's Personality . . . . 34-36

Here design is seen in Nature as a whole, and all objections from the

want of beneficence in the accompanying circumstances of the design

lose their relevancy.

The order and progress in nature, Professor Momerie maintains,

leads to the inference of an Infinite Ego.

This requires, however, that the order and progress in Nature be

inherent in the conditions of evolution, and we have no conclusive

evidence that this is the case either in nature as a whole, or in the

particular case of man.

A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

Professor Flint's Theism ..... 36-41

The manifestations of God, says Professor Flint, are to be recognised by acts of creative intelligence and will ; and lie states that will, intelligence, conscience, reason, and the ideas of cause, design, goodness, infinity, which they supply, all coalesce in the apprehension of God.

The argument, however, so far as it is inferential, depends on the inference of intelligence. In inferring intelligence, he passes in review the facts of Nature, and asserts that mind alone can account for the order and adjustment in the universe.

But he never enters into the spirit of the evolution teaching ; and only after he has thrown down the gauntlet does he condescend to notice it. This vitiates his whole procedure.

The same false view of the facts of the case also runs through and colours his consideration of the objections to the Divine Wisdom, Goodness, and Ik'nevolence.

He sees beneficent uses in pain, suffering, the struggle for existence, and even death ; but it is questionable if these can be carried far enough to justify the general scheme of things.

§5. A General View of the Argument from Beneficence . . 41-46

That the actual may be taken to be the designed without regard to the ultimate tendency of things is a common error in teleological speculations.

Instances of this error.

The view that previsions exist in the instincts of animals.

Examples of more apposite previsions in the evolution of the organs of speech, the geographical evolution, the domestic animals, and the odours of flowers.

But the same order which produces these produces also orders of phenomena prejudicial to life.

And though beneficent uses may be seen in death, they are not to be seen in the ruthless destruction of life.

§6. General Conclusion on the Argument of Design . . 46,47

Relatively to life there is a want of absolute beneficence in the dispositions of the universe, which inclines the mind to atheism.

But the atheistic position is at once turned if the Purpose of God be not fulfilled in the present order of things.

And this brings us into view of the cardinal error of the argument of design, in that it presumes to declare the end and purpose of God in creation, while manifestly the course of evolution is as yet unfulfilled.

Nature must be regarded not as a, product of bare creative Energy, but as a, process of God working out the Purpose of God.

Chapter III. A Preliminary Consideration Of The Order Of Evolution

§ 1. The Significance of the Process of Nature . . . 48-51

There are no scientific truths which do not ultimately rest upon the conviction of the related nature of human ex] eriences.

Into this conviction there are built up definite conceptions of the

relations of things as they obtain in experience; and these become in turn the basis of a religious interpretation of the universe.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xi

§ 1. The Significance of the Process of Nature— continued. pages

The growth of our scientific conceptions has been attended by corresponding stages of religious interpretation. And if we would carry over from science into religion a true view of the universe, nature must be viewed not as a product, but as a process.

The doctrine of evolution is an extension of the principle of the continuity of Nature.

But over and above the fact of continuity there is a progressive movement in evolution which gives a character to the universe.

This character makes manifest a Purpose.

§ 2. The Adequacy of our Knowledge to interpret the Universe . 51-54

The determination of the character of things in general is a matter beset by great difficulties ; but in the case of the universe these are greatly minimised by the fact of the uniformity of natural changes.

The general order of the universe is fairly discernible ; and though much of our knowledge is hypothetical, it is not necessary for the discernment of general principles to be altogether free from hypotheses.

Provided that we can come into view of the conditions of evolution, precision in the view of facts is not material.

It is sufficient if we be attentive to the distinction between philosophical speculations with regard to principles and scientific hypotheses with regard to facts.

The former must be rejected ; the latter are under certain circumstances admissible.

§ 3. The Darwinian and Spcncerian Schools of Evolution . , 54, 55

^ The distinction made between the value of philosophical speculations and scientific hypotheses is of great value in determining our attitude towards the conflicting schools of evolution.

With Darwin the doctrine of evolution is a scientific induction ; with Spencer it is on one side a philosophy, and on another a speculative history of the universe.

Our attitude towards Spencer's system cannot be other than one of reserve.

Corresponding to each of the four great orders of phenomena —

matter, life, mind, and spirit — presented to us as coexisting, an

order of evolution is presented in time.

These four orders of evolution include all that we can know of the

universe.

§ 5. The Question of the Origin of each Order of Evolution . . 56-59

A popular argument is that which insists on the origins of matter, life, and mind as demonstrative of a break in the continuity of nature, and so evidential of the direct operation of a Creative Will.

But this argument proceeds entirely on negative premisses, and is only possible to a mind prepossessed in favour of certain notions respecting the Deity.

The question of origins is strictly a philosophical question, and not an interpretative one.

And rejecting on this ground the theistic speculations with regard to the origin of things, we must also equally reject the crude monism which interprets the principle of continuity to mean the universality of a single mode of operation, that of force.

Xll A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

§ 6. The Question of a Creative Intelligence . . . 59-65

The plan and process of evolution have a marked similarity throughout all the four orders of evolution.

A few rout properties in each remain unchanged ; and the process of evolution is throughout the same, and consists essentially in the formation of relations.

This analogous to the formation of relations by man.

Illustrated by the evolution of the steam-engine.

Intelligence is the co-ordinating power of the relations formed ' by man, and may not the formation of the relations in the universe require the exercise of a like co-ordinating power ?

F. E. Abbot's view that it is the office of intelligence to discover or create relational systems.

But unless there be coupled with this teaching, the inference that the relational system of the universe is directed to an end, and reveals a purpose, it cannot withstand criticism.

This shown by an examination of the interdependence of the relations in nature, and of the evolution of new relations.

§ 7. The Laws of the Orders of Evolution . . 65-69

Our argument requires that we shall discern an end, and for evidences of an end we must look towards the laws of the evolution orders.

The law of the evolution in any order may reside in (1) the root properties of the order, (2) the circumstances under which the evolution arises and continues, or (3) the connection between these two.

This law is to be carefully distinguished from the secondary laws of the evolution processes.

The law of the evolution determines the scope and tendency of the evolution.

The possible interpretations of the universe limit themselves to two ; and the problem of natural theology is to ascertain if a law of evolution prevail which is independent of the physical order.

Chapter IV

$ 1. The Unchangeable Order of the Physical Universe . . 70-72

To ascertain the law of the evolution of matter we must arrive at those elements which, remaining constant throughout its history, embody the conditions of its evolution.

The testimony of discoveries and of the various sciences to an unchangeable order of the physical universe. This testimony confirmed by the geological record. Atomic matter possesses the same constitution wherever it occurs. § 2. The Evolution of the States of Matter . . . 72-76

The nebular hypothesis.

M. Faye's meteoric hypothesis.

Mr. Norman Lockyer's hypothesis.

The systems of worlds must have been evolved from an originally extended matter in some way analogous to the order which these

hypotheses set forth.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS Xlll

§ 3. The Constitution of Matter . ... 76-81

The root properties of matter are manifested in the relations and structure of its molecules.

The molecular constitution of matter illustrated by the solid, liquid, and gaseous states, the constitution of molecules, the indestructibility of the atom, the properties of the atoms, the chemical changes in molecules, electrical phenomena, and the phenomena of light.

§ 4. The Evolution of the Constitutional Properties of Matter . . 82-85

The main problem is to account for the manner in which the various elementary substances have acquired their distinctive features. Mr. W. Crookes' hypothesis.

Dr. Carnelley's views.

§ 5. The Conditions of the Physical Evolution . . . 85-91

Criticism of Herbert Spencer's view of an " undifferentiated homogeneity in unstable equilibrium."

The root properties of matter are definitely related to the forces and energies of the universe.

The conditions of the physical evolution are the conditions of the manifestation of energy and force.

The relation of force to energy.

Energy of motion and energy of position.

Conversions of the modes of energy.

The conservation of energy.

The energy of the universe a constant quantity.

The changes in the physical universe take place under the condition that the energy of the universe is neither added to nor diminished.

Energy not a product of evolution.

The law of the physical evolution is, that there is an original organization which is persistent in all the secondary and derivative organizations of the evolution order.

§ 7. The Question of the Origin of the Physical Universe . . 92-96

The opposed views of Creationism, Atheism, and Agnosticism.

The argument of Creationists against the operation of chance in the origin of the universe.

From the point of view of evolution we can take no account of the possible operation of chance in the origin of the universe.

The origin of the universe as a naked problem must ever remain a mystery.

Taken, however, as it ought to be, in connection with other ultimate facts of the evolution order, it possibly admits of a philosophical solution.

And it is our object to show that interpretatively it admits of solution as a system manifesting Purpose.

Even the agnostic is forced to a solution in which a non-materialistic philosophy is wedded to a materialistic creed.

Xiv A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

§ 8. The Interpretation of the Physical Order of Evolution . . 96-98

The bare fact of an evolution in which interdependent organizations are established in accordance with a primary and persistent form of organization, makes a teleology of some kind imperative. ■ The order of evolution is progressive, and points forward to some ultimate stage of organization.

The hypothesis of unending cycles of evolution merely constrains us to look for the interpretation of the universe in the culminating characteristics of the present cycle.

Chapter V. The Law Of The Protoplasmic Evolution

§ 1. The Root Properties of Protoplasm . . . 99-107

The protoplasmic structure, and the protoplasmic cell.

Cells in plant and animal life.

A physical explanation of the structure of protoplasm would not account for the activities of life.

A life-form compared with a crystal.

The assimilative property of protoplasm and the system of energy.

The distinction between the activities of life and the physical forces.

The power of movement in plant and animal life as distinguishing life from force.

Life is probably, however, a material organization.

§2. The Processes of Evolution in Life-forms . . . 107-121

We recognise in protoplasm a new endowment of root properties, which lie at the base of a distinctive protoplasmic order of evolution.

The functions of the protoplasmic cell become distinctive acts of separate organs.

This due to the rise of a division of labour under the processes of variability and heredity.

The process of heredity.

Reproduction connected with the nuclei of the cells.

Heredity dependent on the chromatin elements of the nucleus.

Professor Weismann's hypothesis of the germ-plasm.

The reproductive property of protoplasm preserves its original characteristics intact throughout the evolution of the forms of life.

The same is true of the assimilative property, the food being only taken from different sources, and elaborated by different methods.

The power of movement in plant and animal life is, in relation to the protoplasmic evolution, in strict subordination to the requirements of the assimilative and reproductive properties.

The development of life.

Life probably originated in the waters of the sea-shore, and gave off colonists to the land, the fresh waters, and indirectly to the deep sea.

§ 3. Analogy of the Evolution of Life to the Evolution of Matter . 121, 122

Both have a base of unchanging units, and corresponding evolution processes.

And we proceed to show that they have analogous laws.

ANALYSTS OF CONTENTS XV

§4. The Law of Natural Selection . . 123-133

The variability of life-forms.

Variations afford the material for the law of natural selection.

Natural selection and the struggle for existence.

Improvement of type takes place by structures becoming adapted to fulfil their functions under more complex conditions, or assuming the office of another function.

Degeneration of parts, illustrated by the aborted structures of the whale.

Degeneration of type when the life is not kept up to the struggling point.

Difficulties in the way of regarding natural selection as the exclusive law of the protoplasmic order.

Criticism of the views of the philosophical school of evolutionists, with special reference to Spencer's system.

The law of natural selection, to be viewed as the law of the protoplasmic evolution, must be seen to depend on some fixed principle outside the protoplasmic order.

This principle not resident in the root properties of protoplasm.

But found to reside in the fact of the physical order.

Each life-form, in its adaptations, is illustrative of the relations of the physical order, and reflects its own peculiar part of the harmonies of the universe.

§6. The Interpretation of the Protoplasmic Order . . . 136-133

We advance a step, and interpret the continuity and progression of

the physical order to be in accordance with an order prevailing in the

universe, and assuming relatively to life the character of a power

controlling the form of adaptative features.

The adaptations of life-forms are expressive of the harmonies of

the universe.

The power which rules over the adaptations of the protoplasmic

order is, however, so far as we have yet viewed the matter, purely

materialistic.

§ 7. The Natural Religion of the Author of Ecce Homo . . 138-140

This professes to measure the ground common to aggressive science and religion.

The view taken of the power in Nature as related to man.

The conception given of God.

The ideal life of the community under this natural religion.

But no law is recognised by it, save what is in accordance with the physical order, and no hopes but what are limited by the protoplasmic law.

Chapter VI

THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MIND IN RELATION TO PHYSICAL AND PROTOPLASMIC PROCESSES

§ 1. The Distinction betiveen the Manifestations of Mind and Physical

The changes in the physical universe are changes of relation between the atoms and molecules of matter.

XVI A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. The Distinction between the Manifestations of Mind and Physical pages Phenom ena — continued.

Protoplasmic changes are also changes of relation in matter ; and all protoplasmic changes depend, equally with physical changes, on determinate physical conditions.

Mind, however, is neither force nor life ; and mental manifestations are not mechanically conditioned.

Mental manifestations pertain not to the order of changes of relation, hut to the order of consciousness of relations.

Illustration of this.

Criticism of the view that mental manifestations are merely accompaniments of nervous changes.

§ 2. The Philosophical Views of Mind . . . 149-155

These cannot here be discussed except in so far as an attempt is made to show that they are a posteriori in agreement with the evolution order.

To substantiate the view of the philosophical evolutionists, that mental manifestations and nervous reactions are opposite faces of the same thing, it is necessary that a mental element be shewn to come directly into touch with the changes of relation by which the mind is affected.

This can only be if the adaptations of nerve tissue are determined solely by the physical circumstances of stimulation.

Herbert Spencer's account of the origin of nerve tissue and of nerve cells.

The teaching of embryology and the evidence of primitive nervous organizations, is decidedly opposed to Spencer's views.

The analogies between the mental and the physical order of facts.

Criticism of the view that the lower animals possess sensibility, but not mind.

Mental manifestations pertain to a new and third order of evolution.

$ 3. The Nervous System as the Organ of Mind . . . 155-158

The development of the nervous system.

The nervous system of man and the functions of its parts. The extension of the duties, performed by the ganglia, in the course of evolution.

§ 4. The Physical Side of the Mental Life . . . 159-162

That there is a physical side to the mental life is apparent not only from the growth in complexity of the brain, but also from the general structure of nerve tissue.

This illustrated by Weber's law, the states of the brain, the delay accompanying consciousness, the physical accompaniments of mental acts, and the connection of memory and of abstract ideas with sensorial elements.

The manifestations of mind are strictly correlated to the stimuli with which the brain has been supplied during the course of the psychological evolution.

\ 5. The Inner Side of the Mental Life . . . 162-164

Something is involved in feeling, knowing, and willing, which is distinguishable from anything physical.

Criticism of G. H. Lewes's view of discrimination.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS XV11

§ 5. The Inner Side of the Mental Life— continued. pages

Mental manifestations pertain to the order of consciousness of relations ; and are separated from changes of relation by a gulf which no metaphor can bridge.

§ 6. The Evolution of the Manifestations of Mind in Relation to the Inheritance of the Nervous System . . . 164-172

The question is how far the protoplasmic processes of variability and inheritance affect the manifestations of mind.

Experience, with all that is implied in the term, cannot be regarded as a product of evolution.

Somewhere in the line of the evolution of nerve processes automatic action must have given place to the pure operation of mind.

Criticism of Dr. Romanes's view of the evolution of memory.

The nervous organization inherited from our ancestors goes far to determine the character of our manifestations of mind.

Criticism of the view that mental evolution depends on cerebral evolution.

The influence of mind on the protoplasmic evolution.

As mind became of service to animal life, natural selection became directed to the inheritance of such protoplasmic variations of the nervous system as were favourable to higher manifestations of mind.

Mind is realized in each individual only by its own pleasurable activity.

§ 7. The Farther Evolution of the Manifestations of Mind by means of the

The mind as exercised through the senses.

The influence of language on the mental evolution, seen in the evolution of the power of abstract thought and the power of self-adaptation.

The general influence of the social bond.

§ 8. Mind in Relation to Evolution . . . . 175, 176

The physical order of evolution presents the sphere, and the protoplasmic perfects the organization necessary for the manifestation of mind.

And though mind brings with it into the universe an element distinct from what obtains in the previous orders of evolution, it is in the earlier stages of the evolution of its manifestations connected with the protoplasmic law.

And this connection must first be investigated in seeking for the law of the evolution of mind.

Chapter VII. The Manifestations Of Mind In Relation To The Protoplasmic Law

Pleasures and Pains . . . . .177-179

Pleasures and pains are in the lower animals indications of the

wholesomeness or harm of an activity or state.

They are neither prophetic nor guiding factors in evolution.

But they nevertheless possess significance as factors conservative of

an animal's position in life.

b

Xviii A NEW NATURAL THEOLOGY

§ 2. The Pleasurable Feeling of Existence . . • 179-181

An animal, in making for pleasure and avoiding pain, tends to bring

about harmonic relations between its subjective feelings and its

external conditions ; and there eventually arises, associated with life,

a pleasurable feeling of existence.

Thus mind comes to occupy a definite position in the order of

evolution ; and natural selection is directed to the evolution of mental

qualities.

The struggle for existence is the schoolmaster of mind.

§ 3. The Adjusting Power of Mind in Animal Life . . 181-184

It is not inconceivable that at a certain stage of evolution the further

progress of life may depend more on the judgments of the mind than

on the influence of natural selection.

The consideration, on this view, of animal instincts.

Instincts are modifiable features, and do not rise above the plane of

factors conservative of life.

§ 4. The Power of Mind in Man . . • .184-186

Pleasures and pains, instincts and intelligences, do not in the lower

animals transcend the horizon of present experiences.

Yet the survival of the fittest has been so far associated with mental

qualities that there has been a continuous rise in the order of mental

manifestations.

And man, through his mental endowments, reigns, to some extent,

in the place of natural selection.

§ 5. Pain in Relation to the Development of Mind . . . 186-190

Mind in man becomes in a measure free from servitude to the protoplasmic law ; but before proceeding to inquire into the new law of mind, we stop to consider the teleological bearings of the position at which we have arrived.