Essays on the pursuit of truth and on the progress on knowledge

Preface

THE SECOND EDITION.

The Volume in which the two following Essays first appeared, in the year 1829, was on the whole favourably received ; so much so, at least, as to be out of print in two or three years. The Author has since been repeatedly urged, in various quarters, by strangers as well as friends, to publish another edition; a step which he has hitherto declined, partly on account of the tardy and limited encouragement extended to such works, but chiefly because he was dissatisfied with the principal Essay, as a less adequate view of the subject than he was capable of presenting, and he did not wish it to re-appear without such a complete revision as other studies prevented him for a season from bestowing upon it.

Within the last year, however, he has had an opportunity of performing this task. He has en-

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IV PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

larged the Essay by additional considerations and arguments, and thrown the whole into a more systematic form, so as to be less unworthy, he trusts, of the great questions which it ventures to discuss.

In the second Essay, which is of inferior importance, he has not found it requisite to make any other alteration or addition worth notice than appending to it a few Notes.

Besides these two Essays, the original volume contained another, " On the Fundamental Principle of all Evidence and Expectation," not here reprinted. The reasons for the omission are, that it is a Treatise calculated for a different class of readers ; and, more especially, that the Author has not at present either the leisure or the inclination to give it that deliberate revisal which he conceives it to require. He may probably publish it hereafter, in an improved and expanded form, either alone or in company with other treatises more congruous with it in character than the two Essays which this brief explanation is intended to introduce.

PREFACE

THE FIRST EDITION.

Few words will be necessary in introducing the present Volume to the Public.

Some of those who did the Author the honour of pronouncing a favourable judgment upon a former Essay of his on the Formation of Opinions, expressed at the same time a regret that he had passed too lightly over one very important part of the subject ; namely, the conduct of men in the application of their means and faculties to the investigation of truth. While he had explained more or less to their satisfaction in what manner the mind is affected by the circumstances in which it is placed, and the inevitable determination of its views by the evidence presented to it, they thought that he had indicated in too cursory a way the duties of mankind in the collection and examination of that evidence, the effect of which, when once brought

VI PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

before the understanding, is so completely uncontrollable by the will. •

In consequence of these suggestions, he applied himself to the subject, and produced the treatise on the Pursuit of Truth, which stands first in the Volume, and which he presents to those who took an interest in his former Essay, in the hope that it may prove a not unacceptable companion to it.

In respect to the second Essay, he has only to offer a remark on its external appearance. It is, as the reader will observe, in Dialogue, a form not very frequently used by modern writers in the exposition of philosophical views, and adopted on the present occasion rather by way of experiment than from any opinion of its preferableness. After considering what has been said by Hurd and others on the employment of real or fictitious, ancient or modern names, he has preferred designating his speakers by simple letters, as being less repulsive to the taste than any other expedient, except that of using the names of eminent characters of past days, which he was precluded from adopting, because the opinions expressed in these conversations have reference to the actual times in which we live. This is a point after all of little importance in philosophical discussions, since the parts of the dialogue assigned to the different speakers are intended to exhibit opinions rather than character, and may be considered as only embodying in language the various views which successively present

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. Vll

themselves to the same mind in reflecting on the subject selected.

The Third Essay * embraces topics which the Author can scarcely hope will attract attention, except from that small number of intellectual men who have turned their thoughts to the consideration of the foundations of human knowledge, a subject included along with many others of vital, although unappreciated importance to Society, under the repulsive appellation of metaphysics. By these few, however, he ventures to hope that the treatise will be found of some interest, if not from the absolute originality of its views (on which it is not for him to pronounce), yet from the novelty and regularity of the order in which they are exhibited.

With regard to the whole of the Essays, he may venture to offer them to the Public, and particularly to the friends who have expressed so indulgent an opinion of his former volumes, as the result of long continued, if not always successful reflection. The greater part of the Volume indeed was written out for the press four or five years ago, since which it has had the benefit of repeated scrutiny and revision. He mentions these circumstances, not to disarm criticism or to preclude ani-

* This Essay is omitted in the present edition as alreadystated in the new Preface, but the author did not conceive it needful to suppress this short notice of it.

Vlll PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

madversion, but as establishing a title to a careful and candid examination from his readers, especially from those who may see reason to differ from the conclusions at which he has arrived.

Contents

ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH.

Page.

Chapter I. The Importance of Truth and of our Moral Sentiments in relation to the Pursuit of it 1

Chapter H. The Duty of Entering upon Inquiry - 17

Section 1. In what circumstances Inquiry is a Duty 18

2. Objections and Prejudices inimical to the

Duty of Inquiry - - - 37

3. Continuation of the Subject - - 45 Chapter m. Duties in the Process of Inquiry - - 59

Section 1. Duties of the Inquirer in relation to the

State of his own Mind - - ib.

2. Duties, in relation to the Evidence - 76

Chapter IV. The Issue of Inquiry - - - 87

Section 1. The Issue of Inquiry, not a matter of

2. The Issue of Inquiry attended by its

natural Consequences - - 100

Chapter V. Duties towards others in relation to the

Pursuit of Truth - - - 104

Section 1. Moral Influence - - - 105

2. Intellectual Assistance - - - 117

3. Treatment of the Young - - 124

4. Public Communications - - 130

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X CONTENTS.

Page.

5. Reception of Public Communications - 136

6. Duties of Non-Inquirers - - 148

Chapter VI. Duties of G-overnments in relation to the

Pursuit of Truth - - - 156

Section 1. Duties of Governments considered as

Inquirers themselves - - 157

2. Duties of Governments towards their

Subjects considered as Inquirers. Encouragement of Inquiry - - 159

3. Continuation of the Subject. Methods

of promoting the Attainment of Truth 163

Subsection 1. Employing Public Instructors - 164

2. Employing Force - - 180

Chapter VII. Conclusion - - - - 190

ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE.

APPENDIX OF NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

ESSAY

THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH,

IN REFERENCE CHIEFLY TO

THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH IT.

ESSAY

ON

THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH,

IN REFERENCE CHIEFLY TO

THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH IT.

CHAPTER I.

IMPORTANCE OF TRUTH, AND OF OUR MORAL SENTI- MENTS IN RELATION TO THE PURSUIT OF IT.

Truth, by which term is implied accuracy of knowledge and of inference, is necessarily conducive to the happiness of the human race. This is an assertion scarcely requiring in the present day to be either enforced or illustrated. That mankind are deeply concerned, not only in clearly understanding the properties of the material world, and of their own physical constitution, but in an accurate acquaintance with the operations of the human mind, the consequences of human actions, the results of social regulations, the effects of political institutions, the relations in which they themselves stand

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2 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OP TRUTH.

to other beings, and their real position in the universe, is a proposition so undeniable, when clearly expressed, as barely to escape the character of a truism.

The transcendant importance of this fulness and accuracy of knowledge is attested by the sad tale of error and suffering presented to the eye in every page of history. What possible problem can mankind have to solve in their mutual intercourse but one? What is it, but to make themselves conjointly as happy, and, for that purpose, as noble-minded and virtuous as they can, during the short term of their mortal existence ? And how have they hitherto solved this problem? In what numerous ways have they not proved themselves totally blind to their real interests, perverted their capabilities, wasted their resources, exasperated the unavoidable evils of their condition, and inflicted gratuitous wretchedness on each other and on themselves ? It is clear that men can have no interest in suffering, no taste for misery, no preference for unhappiness in itself; and wherever they are found in a regular and systematic career after it, they must be labouring under an impression that they are in pursuit of a different object. It is error, therefore, it is ignorance, it is illusion, it is an incapacity on their part to see the real consequences of actions, the real issues of events, that gives rise to all those evils which desolate the world, except such as can be traced to irresistible impulse or to the physical circumstances of man's nature and condition.* " Error is the universal cause of the misery of mankind/' are the first words of a distinguished philosopher f , in his treatise on the Search after Truth ; and they are scarcely too unmeasured.

The various modes in which this consummation is effected meet us everywhere. In the rapid glance we are now taking we can hardly pause for particular illustrations ; but perhaps a few instances may indicate the nature of the evil in less compass, and with far greater suggestive power, than any general description. We are told by a high authority that amongst the superstitions of the Shetlanders, one is, or was, that he who saves a drowning man will receive at his hands some deep wrong or injury J, — a prejudice manifestly fatal to one of the noblest and most universal impulses of the human heart, and inevitably leading to acts of cowardly selfishness and cruelty.

A still more deadly prepossession exists among the Bechuanas in South Africa and all the Caffer tribes. They have no idea of the possibility of death except from hunger, or violence, or witch-

* For a more extended discussion of the utility of truth and the mischievousness of error, the author would beg to refer to a former work of his, viz. " Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions."

■f Malebranche.

J Memoirs of Sir Walter Scott, vol. iii. p. 155.

B 2 craft. If a man die, even at the extreme age of ninety, without any appearance of perishing from hunger or violence, his death is imputed to sorcery ; and blood is required to expiate or avenge it. " This circumstance," says the narrator, " gives rise to indescribable scenes of slaughter and misery."* It is reported by travellers that the superstition of the evil-eye prevails to a great extent in the present day, even amongst the highest classes, in Naples, where it occasions perpetual discord, insults, revenge, and even murder, f

These instances are undoubtedly extreme cases, and, being alien from our own prejudices and habits, strike us all as palpable proofs of the connection between error and suffering ; but if we look around us in our own community we shall find the connection as strongly illustrated by circumstances in which familiarity alone has prevented us from observing it.

The prevalence of misery, as the consequence of error and ignorance, proclaims the paramount importance of accurate knowledge. To discover truth is in reality to do good on a grand scale. The detection of an error, the dissipation of a doubt, the extirpation of a prejudice, the establishment of a fact, the deduction of a new inference, the cleve-

* Researches in South Africa, by Rev. John Philip, D.D., vol.ii. p. 120.

"f See, among other testimonies, that of Sir David Wilkie, in the Memoirs of his Life by A. Cunningham, vol. ii. p. 260.

lopment of a latent principle, may diffuse its beneficial consequences over every region of the world, and may be the means of lessening the misery or increasing the happiness of myriads of unborn generations.* The great interests of the human race, then, demand that the way of discovery should be open, that there should be no obstructions to inquiry, that every possible facility and encouragement should be afforded to efforts addressed to the detection of error and to the attainment of truth, — nay, that every human being, as far as he is capable, should actively assist in the pursuit ; and yet one of the greatest discouragements to such efforts at present existing amongst mankind is the state of their own moral sentiments. Although he who has achieved the discovery of a truth in a matter of importance, or rescued an admitted truth from insignificance and neglect f, may justly indulge the reflection that he has conferred a benefit on his fellow men, to which even time itself can prescribe no limits, he will do well to prepare for the odium and persecution with which the benefit will be resisted,

* " Kevolutions of ages," says Milton, " do not oft recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse." — Areopagitica.

■f " In philosophy, equally as in poetry, genius produces the strongest impressions of novelty, while it rescues the stalest and most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission." — Coleridge 's Friend, vol.i. p. 184.

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6 ESS&Y ON THE PUKSUIT OF TRUTH.

and console himself with a prospective reliance on the gratitude and sympathy of a future age.

It is impossible to deny the fact, that in some of the most important departments of knowledge the bulk of mankind regard novelties of doctrine — a description under which all detections of error and acquisitions of truth must come — as acts of moral turpitude or reprehensible arrogance, which they are ready to resent on the head of the promulgator.

A state of things in which the real interests and the moral sentiments of the human race are thus placed in strong opposition cannot fail to be fruitful of evil; and whoever should be fortunate enough to hasten its termination would perform no slight service to his species. On this point the past history of the world, although it affords little ground for vehement exultation, teaches no lesson of despair. In the progress of society men's moral sentiments inevitably change, both from those alterations in circumstances which enhance or depress the value of certain qualities of conduct, and from that acuter insight or correcter appreciation of the tendencies of action which accompanies an advance of civilisation. From one or other of these causes, modes of conduct formerly regarded as of trivial moment grow into importance, qualities at one time extolled sink into dubious virtues, or even positive vices, acts once shunned are zealously performed and warmly approved, new duties are evolved from the novel situations in which men are placed, and the code of morality is amplified with rules which would have been unintelligible or undervalued at a previous period, because the circumstances to which they are applicable either had not then arisen or were wholly unregarded. Such changes may be seen by comparing either past times with present or savage with civilised communities. The dexterous horse-stealer, an ignominious felon in England, is the consummate hero of the Crow Indians.* How large the stride in moral sentiment from the blind and selfish superstition of the Shetlander, who runs away from the drowning seaman, to the enlightened benevolence which plants the life-boat on the sea-beach to succour the stranded ship, and stimulates such men as the noble-minded Pellew to plunge into the very midst of peril in order to rescue their fellow-creatures from destruction ! f

In reference to that class of actions which are connected with the pursuit of truth, both these causes of change in moral sentiment have been in operation.

* Astoria, by Washington Irving, vol. ii. p. 79. — " Horsestealing is their glory and delight."

f This is an allusion to the magnanimous conduct of the late Lord Exmouth, on repeated occasions, and more especially in the case of the Dutton. There is something so ennobling in even the mere reading of such instances, which cannot be too widely known, that I have quoted the account in the Appendix, Note A.

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In the first place, circumstances have occurred which have greatly raised in importance the consequences of inquiry, and of course the consequences of the conduct exhibited in prosecuting it. So long as science and civilisation had no existence, as mankind were solely occupied with providing for their physical wants, or were continually engaged in the rougher work of mutual depredation and hostility, the cultivation of knowledge as a separate sphere of exertion, and indeed any semblance of regular investigation even in practical concerns, would be almost unknown, and consequently the virtues and vices connected with the pursuit of truth would not be called forth. Gradually, however, as civilisation advanced, as the interests of society growing more complicated required more careful discrimination, as wealth and the exemption from occupation accompanying wealth became diffused, and curiosity was at leisure to speculate on the nature and destiny of man and other beings, to investigate surrounding objects, and to scrutinise passing events, it became manifest that the results of this mental activity would have important bearings on the fortunes of mankind. "What we term inquiry must always have place and possess importance in a certain degree, inasmuch as it is mixed up with ordinary conduct ; but it is not so immediately apparent that, when pushed beyond the point of direct applicability, it has an extensive influence on human affairs.

The speculations of thoughtful men might na-

ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. d

turally be regarded for a while as vain dreams or visionary theories, having little connection with the hard and pressing realities of life ; but they were found in process of time to penetrate everywhere, to permeate morals, manners, education, government, religion : and when investigation was successfully turned into the paths of physical science, the relation of systematic knowledge to human welfare was brought home to mankind in its most irresistible form.

The happiness of the world has thus proved itself to be in various ways deeply implicated in the establishment of truth and the rectification of error even in subjects apparently remote from ordinary life ; and in consequence the conduct both of communities and individuals in every thing relating to inquiry has risen to an importance of which earlier ages never dreamed, and has become more extensively the object of our moral sentiments.

In the second place, concurrently with this change produced by the growing importance of the pursuit of truth, and of all conduct connected with it, the moral sentiments of mankind on the subject have also undergone progressive alteration from a more and more accurate appreciation of the tendencies of human actions, and a nicer discrimination of complicated moral phenomena. On this point, nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that we have greater reason to look forward with hope than around us with complacency, or backward with exultation.

In a matter so greatly enhanced in importance it was hardly to be expected that the good and evil qualities of conduct should be all at once appreciated with distinctness and precision ; and, accordingly, a very cursory examination is sufficient to show that mankind have hitherto lamentably erred, and still continue to err, in apportioning their approbation and disapprobation to the qualities displayed in reference to the prosecution of inquiry. Their moral sentiments have been roused indeed, but have at the same time been grossly misdirected. They have too frequently bestowed their smiles on conduct destitute of merit or even fundamentally vicious, and poured their indignation on acts most truly deserving their admiration and applause. Nor as to this misdirection of their feelings can the major part of the human race, even in what are termed by courtesy civilised communities, be truly said to have radically improved. Such mistakes as these are by no means easily rectified. The morality of the subject, besides having been hitherto neglected and still remaining beset with prejudices, involves some nice distinctions, which cannot fail to be generally overlooked or confounded till they have been clearly exhibited and rendered plain and familiar by repeated expositions.

We must expect that here, as well as in other matters, the moral sentiments of mankind will prove tenacious of their accustomed course — reluctant to take a new direction. When men have once been habituated to look upon any quality or any system of action with approbation or the reverse they can scarcely divest themselves of the feeling, even though they discover the object no longer to deserve it ; and they are slow in bestowing the same sentiment on conduct by which it has not been familiarly excited. Thus (to take an obvious illustration) the barbarian glare anciently flung over warlike qualities and military achievements still continues to dazzle the world into an admiration of actions manifestly destructive to human happiness. On this subject mankind have yet attained to no sound feeling ; their moral sentiments lag behind existing knowledge and established conclusions : and it will require the reiterated efforts of moralists and philosophers to work into their minds the only sentiments to be entertained by rational beings towards the vulgar heroes and pageants of history.

The same process of distinctly pointing out and repeatedly exhibiting the clear tendencies of action, is required to rectify the moral feelings of the world in all that regards the pursuit of truth; and we may venture to hope it will be applied with eventual, although not immediate success. Tardy as mankind evince themselves in all changes of moral sentiment, they cannot permanently continue to bestow their approbation on qualities clearly proved to be pernicious, nor withhold it from actions shown to be undeniably calculated for their welfare.

A retrospect of the three last centuries alone leads us to anticipate that any improvement in the discrimination of good and evil in the various paths of human life must eventually find its way from the meditative few to the less reflecting many. Amongst these few, in the present day, the fundamental principles, without which a code of morality in reference to the pursuit of truth cannot exist, are universally held. Philosophers unite in regarding truth as inseparably allied with human happiness, and error as essentially hostile to it. It was otherwise with the sages of antiquity, amongst whom there was a prevalent dissociation of the utility from the truth of a doctrine. It was supposed that a dogma might be advantageous and even necessary to society, to morality, and to political institutions, although it were false, and that it ought in this case to be strenuously supported and shielded from scrutiny even by those who were aware of its character. With such a notion there could not co- exist any conscious obligation, or any inducement but sheer curiosity, to enter upon the search after truth, and faithfully pursue it. On the contrary, it unavoidably led to the employment of fallacious arguments, hollow pretexts, disingenuous connivance, and violent oppression, in order to maintain the authority of established doctrines. It could not fail to be fruitful in falsehood, hypocrisy, fraud, and despotic intolerance.* The same policy of a double doctrine was inculcated by Machiavel, and was, indeed, long acted upon in Europe prior to the reformation ; it has been well characterised by Mr. Stewart as the policy of " enlightening the few and hoodwinking the many."

If similar views are yet occasionally entertained amongst the ignorant or half informed, they are seldom avowed. Even the hardly less revolting, but certainly less consistent, principle of more recent times, and maintained even by many of the early teachers of the Christian Church f, that a true doctrine may be rightly supported by false representations, and by what are called pious frauds, is discarded professedly, if not always really, by every party, every sect, and every individual with the slightest pretensions to a name in philosophy or literature, or even to a reputable standing in society. " Nothing," it has been well remarked, " can be more irrational in the pretended children of light than to enlist themselves under the banners

* " It seems," says Dr.Whately, in an instructive dissertation on this subject, " to have been the settled conviction of most of those who had the sincerest desire of attaining truth themselves, that to the mass of mankind truth was in many points inexpedient, and unfit to be communicated ; that, however desirable it might be for the leading personages in the world to be instructed in the true nature of things, there were many popular delusions which were essential to the well-being of society." — Essays on the Writings of St. Paul, p. 3.

j - Ibid. Also Middleton's Free Inquiry, passim.

of Truth, and yet rest their hopes on an alliance with Delusion."*

There is, happily, a growing disposition in the world, amongst the intelligent part of it at least, to prize truth of doctrine and veracity of statement; to look with disdain on all artifice, disingenuity, and disguise, both in speculation and practice ; to regard the business of fife no longer as an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and perpetual deceit ; to consider the great interests of humanity as not requiring to be supported by ignorance, hypocrisy, and superstition ; to believe that the suppression and concealment of facts and arguments can be of no service except to the few at the expense of the many; and that it is for the benefit of mankind, as well as essential to their progress in all which is virtuous and high-minded, that every important question should be freely and boldly examined, f This state of feeling, on the part of men of cultivated minds, seems highly favourable to an impartial discussion of the conduct which we ought to observe, or, in other words, the moral sentiments

* Coleridge's Friend, vol. i. p. 53.

f " From the whole deduction which has now been made," says an able writer, " it appears that superstition is useless ; that truth and reason are alone to be depended on in giving a regular and safe determination to human actions ; and that the idea of managing mankind by means of prejudices and by arts of deception is false philosophy, as unwise as it is immoral." — Dr. Haedy on the Progress of the Christian Religion, quoted in Mill's translation of Villers on the Reformation, p. 58.

ESSAY ON TPIE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 15

we ought to cherish, in relation to the pursuit of truth ; and even if the present endeavour to trace the duties connected with it shall fail of yielding that entire satisfaction which it is seldom the destiny of any thing human to give, it may animate the conscientious inquirer, and serve as a groundwork for more successful efforts.

Little has yet been effected in this part of ethical philosophy; at all events, the subject has never, as far as the author knows, been systematically treated in the point of view here described : it is a department of moral exposition yet to be created. Locke, indeed, in his Conduct of the Understanding, and in his Letters on Toleration, has thrown out excellent remarks on some of the topics which it embraces ; and these treatises, which cannot be too warmly recommended, breathe an admirable spirit of right feeling and sound judgment in relation to the pursuit of truth.*

Malebranche, too, in his celebrated work, "De la Kecherche de la Verite," abounds with instructive observations, encumbered nevertheless with anti-

* Since the first edition of the present Essay was published many works have appeared in which correct and ennobling sentiments concerning the morality of investigation are incidentally expressed, some of which the author has had the satisfaction of tracing, or fancying he traced, to the influence of his own inadequate exposition of the subject. The Essays and Discourses of the late Dr. Channing may be particularly cited, as abounding in fervent and forcible lessons on this great theme. Occasional use of them is made in the following pages.

quated matter and exploded doctrines, through which few in the present day will venture to toil.

Neither of these distinguished writers, however, looked at the subject in the particular light in which it is the object of the following pages to place it ; and even if they had, the lapse of a century and a half may be presumed to have brought us into a more favourable position for viewing it in its most important relations.