Essays on the formation and publication of opinions

Preface To The First Edition

It has been frequently objected to metaphysical speculations, that they subserve no useful purpose ; and it must be allowed, that there are many inquiries in this department of intellectual exertion, which '. sad, in appearance, and even in reality, to no practical result. This is however a defect inherent in every pursuit, and can be brought as no :pecific objection against the philosophy of mind. How many substances are analysed by the chemist, which can never be rendered useful ; how many plants are minutely described by the naturalist, which might have remained in obscurity without the leas^t possible detriment to the world ; and how many events are narrated by the historian, from which no beneficial inference can be drawn ! It seems to be a necessary condition of human science, that we should learn many useless things, in order

IV PREFACE.

to become acquainted with those which are of service ; and as it is impossible, antecedently to experience, to know the value of our acquisitions, the only way in which mankind can secure all the advantages of knowledge is to prosecute their inquiries in every possible direction. There can be no greater impediment to the progress of science than a perpetual and anxious reference at every step to palpable utility. Assured that the general result will be beneficial, it is not wise to be too solicitous as to the immediate value of every individual effort. Besides, there is a certain completeness to be attained in every science, for which we are obliged to acquire many particulars not otherwise of any worth. Nor is it to be forgotten, that trivial and apparently useless acquisitions are often the necessary preparatives to important discoveries. The labours of the antiquary, the verbal critic, the collater of mouldering manuscripts, the describer of microscopic objects, (labours which may appear to many out of all proportion to the value of the result,) may be preparing the way for the achievements of some splendid genius, who may combine their minute details into a magnificent system, or evolve from a multitude of particulars, collected with painful toil, some general principle destined to illuminate the career of future ages. To no one perhaps are the labours of his predecessors, even when they are apparently trifling or unsuccessful, of more service than to the metaphysician : and he who is well acquainted with the science can scarcely fail to perceive, that many of its inquiries are gradually converging to important results. Unallied as they may appear to present utility, it is not hazarding much to assert, that the world must hereafter be indebted to them for the extirpation of many mischievous errors, and the correction of a great part of those loose and illogical opinions by which society is now pervaded.

The principal Essays in the following work are attempts to throw the light of metaphysical investigation on subjects intimately connected with the affairs and the happiness of mankind. The importance of the topics discussed in the two Essays to which the volume owes its title will be acknowledged by all, and will be perceived by the attentive inquirer, that the principles which the author has there attempted to establish, lead to the most momentous conclusions, many of which he has contented himself with leaving to the sagacity of his readers. If any one will take the trouble of rigidly pursuing the main principle of the first Essay to all its consequences, he will find them of a magnitude and importance of which he was originally perhaps little aware.

In venturing upon these remarks, the author would not be conceived as making any undue claims to originality. Most of the principles, which he has advanced, have been repeatedly asserted, and have had an influence on mankind of which they themselves were probably unconscious. Itoften happens, that an important principle is vaguely apprehended, and incidentally expressed, long before it is reduced to a definite form, or fixed by regular proof: but while it floats in this state on the surface of men's understandings, it is only of casual and limited utility ; it is sometimes forgotten and sometimes abandoned, seldom pursued to its consequences, and frequently denied in its modifications. It is only after it has been clearly established by an indisputable process of reasoning, explored in its bearings, and exhibited in all its force, that it be-

PREFACE. Vll

comes of uniform and essential service ; it is only then that it can be decisively appealed to both in controversy and in practice, and that it exerts the whole extent of its influence on private manners and public institutions.

February, 1821.

Preface To The Second Edition

A new Edition of the following work being called for, the author has only to state, for the satisfaction of his readers, that the text of the present impression differs from that of the last in nothing but a few verbal alterations. The additions, which he has deemed it expedient to make, he has thrown into the form of an appendix of Notes and Illustrations, in which he has attempted to extend, support, and elucidate some of the doctrines contained in the Essays.

Contents

ESSAY I.

ON THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS.

Section I. On the Terms Belief, Assent, and Opinion, II. On the Independence of Belief on the Will, III. On the Opinions of Locke and some other

Section I. Introduction

II. On the Mischiefs of Error and the Advantages of Truth, - III. Continuation of the same Subject,

Xll CONTENTS.

Page.

Section IV. On Freedom of Discussion as the Means of

attaining Truth, - - - - 101 V. On the Assumptions involved in all Restraints

on the Publication of Opinions, - 107 VI. On the Free Publication of Opinions as affecting the People at large, - - 114 VII. On the ultimate Ineflicacy of Restraints on the Publication of Opinions, and their bad Effects in disturbing the natural Course of Improvement, - - 122

MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.

Essay III. On Facts and Inferences, ... 131 IV. On the Influence of Reason on the Feelings, 140 V. On inattention to the Dependence of Causes and Effects in moral conduct.

Part II. 162

VI. On some of the Causes and Consequences

of Individual Character, - - 168

VII. On the Vicissitudes of Life, - - - 176

VIII. On the Variety of Intellectual Pursuits, 186

IX. On Practical and Speculative Ability, 194

X. On the Mutability of Human Feelings, - 210 Notes and Illustrations, - 217

ESSAY

FORMATION OF OPINIONS.

ESSAY I.

ON

THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS.

SECTION I.

ON THE TERMS BELIEF, ASSENT, AND OPINION*

Every proposition presented to the mind, the terms of which are understood, necessarily occasions either belief, doubt, or disbelief. These are states or affections of the mind on which definition can throw no light, but which no one can be at a loss to understand ; resembling, in this respect, all the other simple operations and emotions of which we are conscious. Although we cannot define or illustrate them, we may, nevertheless, enlarge or limit the application of the terms by which they are distinguished.

By some writers the term belief has been restricted to the state of the understanding in relation to propositions of a probable nature. Locke, for instance, makes a distinction between the perception of truth in propositions which are certain, and

16 - ON THE TERMS BELIEF,

the entertainment, as he expresses it, given by the mind to those which are only probable ; styling the former knowledge, the latter belief, assent, or opinion.* This distinction, however, is not sanctioned by the practice of the generality of metaphysicians, who constantly employ the term belief in reference to facts and propositions of all kinds. They speak of the belief, not only of our own identity, of the existence of an external world, and of the being of a God, but of the axioms and theorems of geometry. Nor does there appear to be any ground for the distinction when we appeal to our own consciousness. The nature of the affection is the same, whatever be the nature of the subject which has occasioned it. It is a state, indeed, which admits of various modifications ; or, in other words, the belief of some things may be more firm and lively than of others. This strength and liveliness, however, do not at all depend on the logical nature of the propositions entertained. We believe as firmly, that there was a sanguinary contest between the English and French on the field of Waterloo, as that the

* " Probability is likeness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments, or proofs, that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so." — Essay on the Understanding* book iv. chapter 15.

ASSENT, AND OPINION. 17

three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, although the one would be ranked by logicians amongst probable, and the other amongst certain propositions.

There are two other terms sometimes employed as synonymous with belief, viz. assent and opinion, but all the three have their respective shades of meaning. Assent appears to denote the state of the understanding in relation only to propositions ; while belief has a more comprehensive acceptation, expressing the state of the mind in relation to any fact or circumstance, although that fact or circumstance may never have occured to it in the form of a proposition, or, what is the same thing, may never have been reduced by it into words. Every body believes in his own identity, and in the existence of an external world, although comparatively few have thought of these truths in express terms. It would, therefore, be more proper to speak of a man's belief in his identity than of his assent to his identity; of his belief in the existence of matter than of his assent to it; but we might with perfect propriety speak of his assent to the proposition that matter exists.

The term opinion is used by Locke, in some passages of his Essay, as synonymous with belief and assent, but there is a wide difference in its general acceptation. It is seldom, if ever, used in reference to subjects which are certain or demonstrable. We talk of a person's opinions in religion 2*

18 ON BELIEF, ASSENT, AND OPINION.

or politics, but not in algebra or geometry, and so far the last named philosopher and common usage are in accordance ; but he appears to have sometimes forgotten that the term, in its ordinary sense, denotes not the state of the mind, but the subject of belief, the thing or the proposition believed. Thus we say to receive, to hold, and to renounce an opinion.

The distinctions here pointed out are not, however, very closely observed. On the contrary, it is surprising that words of so much importance should be employed with so little precision. Belief is often indiscriminately used to express a state or affection of the understanding, a proposition believed, a doctrine, and a collection of doctrines. In the following pages it will simply denote the state or affection of the mind, while the term opinion will be employed (in reference to propositions of a probable nature) to designate that which is believed.

It may be remarked, that whatever we believe may be thrown into the form of a proposition ; and when we say of such a proposition that we believe it, it is equivalent to saying that it appears to us to be true. The expressions are exactly synonymous, or convertible ; for it would be a manifest contradiction to assert that we believed a proposition which did not appear true to us, or that a proposition appeared true which we did not believe.

Section II. On The Independence Of Belief On The Will

It has been frequently asserted, and still more frequently assumed, that belief is, in many cases, a voluntary act of the mind. In what cases, how" ever, it is dependent on the will, few writers have ventured to state in direct terms; nor do I know that the subject has ever been examined with that closeness of attention which its importance deserves. If it were a point of mere speculative curiosity, it would scarcely be worth while to rescue it from the vagueness in which it has hitherto remained ; but the fact is, that many of the actions, as well as many of the moral judgments of mankind, proceed on an assumption of the voluntary nature of belief, and it therefore becomes of practical moment to ascertain how far that assumption is founded in truth. Of the justness of this remark we shall have occasion in the sequel to adduce ample proof.

It may be observed, in the first place, that there are a great number of facts and propositions, in regard to our belief of which it is universally allowed that the will can have no power, and motives no efficacy. A mathematical axiom, for instance, can-

20 ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF

not be doubted by any man who comprehends the terms in which it is expressed, however ardent may be his desire to disbelieve it. Threats and torments would be in vain employed to compel a geometrician to dissent from a proposition in Euclid. He might be compelled to assert the falsity of the proposition, but all the powers in the universe could not make him believe what he thus asserted. In the same way, no hopes nor fears, no menaces nor allurements, could at all affect a man's belief in a matter of fact which happened under his own observation. The remark is also true of innumerable facts which we have received on the testimony of others. That there have been such men as Csesar and Cicero, Pope and Newton, and that there are at present such cities as Paris and Vienna, it is impossible to disbelieve by any effort of the will.

In those cases, therefore, where the evidence is of such a nature as to produce universal assent, it is acknowledged by all that the will can have no power over our convictions. If it exercises any control at all, we must look for it in those subjects which admit of diversity of opinion. But the belief, doubt, or disbelief, which a man entertains of any proposition, which others regard with different sentiments, may be the same in strength and every other respect as the belief, doubt, or disbelief which he entertains of a proposition in regard to which there is entire unanimity ; and if in the latter case his opinion is involuntary, there can be no reason

BELIEF ON THE WILL. 21

to suppose it otherwise in the former. The mere circumstance of others taking a different view of the subject (of which he may be altogether unaware) can have no tendency to render his belief more liable to be affected by motives, or, in other words, to bring it under the control of the will.

It will, perhaps, be generally granted, that decided belief, or decided disbelief, when once engendered in the mind, cannot be affected by volition. This influence is usually placed in the middle region of suspense and doubt, and it is supposed, that when the understanding is in a state of fluctuation between two opinions, it is in the power of the will to determine the decision. The state of doubt, however, will be found to be no more subject to the will than any other state of the intellect. All the various degrees of belief and disbelief, from the fullest conviction to doubt, and from doubt to absolute incredulity, correspond to the degree of evidence, or to the nature of the considerations present to the mind. To be in doubt is to want that degree or kind of evidence which produces belief; and while the evidence remains the same without addition or diminution, the mind must continue in doubt.* The understanding, it is clear, cannot

* Belief appears to be the firmest when there are no hostile or contrary considerations for the mind to rest upon. In proportion to the number and importance of contrary considerations belief is impaired, and if they are increased to a certain extent, it fades into doubt. The latter is often a state of osciU

22 ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF

believe a proposition on precisely the same evidence as that on which it previously doubted it ; and yet to ascribe to mere volition a change from doubt to conviction, is asserting that this may take place ; it is affirming that a man, without the slightest reason, may, if he please, believe to-day what he doubted yesterday.

It may be alleged, perhaps, that it is not necessary to suppose the understanding to believe a proposition on the same evidence as that on which it previously doubted it, since the will may have the power of changing the character of the evidence. This implies that it may be capable either of raising additional ideas in the mind, or of detaching some of the ideas already there from the rest with which they are associated, and dismissing them from view. But it is acknowledged by our best metaphysical writers,* that by mere volition we cannot call up any idea, nor, therefore, any number of ideas forming an argument ; such an operation necessarily implying the actual presence of the ideas before the will is exerted : it is also

lation, in which the mind passes from one class of arguments to another, the predominant affection of the moment according with the arguments on which the contemplation happens to be fixed. The mind may also be said to be in doubt when it is acquainted with neither side of a question, and has therefore no grounds for a determinate opinion. The one may be called active or positive, the other passive or negative doubt.

* See Lord Karnes's Elements of Criticism, and Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind.

BELIEF ON THE WILL. 23

impossible for us to choose what ideas shall be introduced into the mind by any topic on which we bestow our attention ; and it is manifest, that when ideas have been once joined together, we cannot prevent them from suggesting each other according to the regular laws of association. In the examination of any subject, therefore, certain ideas will arise in our minds independently of the will, and as long as we fix our attention on that subject, we cannot avoid the consequent suggestions, nor single out any part and forget the rest. We may, it is true, by the help of external means, or even by an internal effort, dismiss a subject entirely from our thoughts ; we may get rid of it by turning our attention to something else ; but while we continue to reflect upon it, we cannot prevent it from suggesting those ideas, which, from the habits, character, and constitution of our minds, it is calculated to excite.

We come then to the conclusion, that since the same considerations present to the mind must invariably produce the same belief, doubt, or disbelief; and since volition can neither introduce any additional considerations, nor dismiss what are already present, the will can have no influence on belief; or, in other words, belief, doubt, and disbelief, are involuntary states of the intellect.

But the proof of the involuntary nature of belief depends not on the. justness of any metaphysical argument. Every one may bring the question to

24 OP THE INDEPENDENCE OF

the test of experiment ; he may appeal to his own consciousness, and try whether, in any conceivable case, he can at pleasure change his opinion, and he will soon become sensible of the inefficacy of the attempt.* Take any controverted fact in history ; let a man make himself perfectly acquainted with the statements and authorities on both sides, and, at the end of his investigation, he will either believe, doubt, or disbelieve the fact in question. Now apply any possible motive to his mind. Blame him, praise him, intimidate him by threats, or allure him by promises, and after all your efforts, how far will you have succeeded in changing the state of his intellect in relation to the fact ? How far will you have altered the connection which he discerns between certain premises and certain conclusions ? To affect his belief you must affect the subject of it, by producing new arguments or considerations. The understanding being passive as to the impressions made upon it, if you wish to change those impressions you must change the cause which produces them. You can alter perceptions only by altering the thing perceived. Every man's consciousness will tell him, that the will can no more modify the effect of an argument on the understanding, than it- can change the taste of sugar to the palate, or the fragrance of a rose to the smell ; and that nothing can weaken its force, as apprehended by the intellect, but another argument opposed to it.

* See Note A.

Section III. On The Oi>inions Of Locke And Some Other Writers On This Subject

The view which we have just taken, of the involuntary nature of belief, coincides with that which Locke has presented to us in the following passage, as well as in other parts of his Essay.

" As knowledge," says he, " is no more arbitrary than perception ; so I think assent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects which 1 turn my eyes to, and look on in daylight: and what upon full examination I find the most probable, 1 cannot deny my assent to. But though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived, nor our assent, where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it; yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth. 1 '*

It is not to be concealed, however, that this

* Essay on the Understanding, book iv. chapter 20. 3

26 ON THE OPINION OF LOCKE AND

powerful reasoner frequently makes use of language implying belief to be an affair of the will, although there is only one case which he specifically points out as an exception to the general remark in the preceding extract.

" I think," says he, " we may conclude, that in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side ; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions.'"*

Here he has evidently mistaken the effect of an argument on the understanding for an act of the will. To have " sufficient grounds to suspect either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side," is to be already in doubt, or in the state called suspense ; and consequently our suspense cannot be occasioned by subsequent volition, much less can it be converted by the will into assent or dissent.

Locke has in fact asserted, first, that the mind may be in doubt from a consideration presented to the understanding, and then, that in consequence of this doubt it may voluntarily suspend its opinion ; or in other words, voluntarily doubt what it before doubted involuntarily.

The case adduced is analogous to that of a sur-

* Essay on the Understanding, book iv. chapter 20.

SOME OTHERS ON THIS SUBJECT. 27

veyor, who in taking the dimensions of a piece of timber, should be led to suspect the correctness of the instrument which he employed. The suspicion would be manifestly involuntary, and could be removed only by a proof of its being unfounded. That in the instance alleged by Locke, or in any instance, assent, suspense, and dissent, are voluntary actions, is moreover inconsistent with his former admission, that assent must follow or be determined by the greater manifest probability. For, if a greater apparent probability unavoidably produces assent, a smaller apparent probability opposed to it must produce dissent ; and two equal probabilities poised against each other (which is the only remaining case that can possibly occur) must either produce uncertainty, or one of them must produce the same effect as a greater probability, and the other the same effect as a smaller probability. Thus two opposite and unequal effects would be made to result from two equal causes. And if to believe a proposition is the same thing as for that proposition to appear to the mind more probable than its opposite, then to say, that a man may believe if he choose one of two equally probable propositions, and disbelieve the other, is to say, that by an act of the will two propositions may appear equally and unequally probable at the same time.

In the writings of another celebrated philosopher, Dr. Reid, we find the doctrine, that belief is

28 ON THE OPINION OF LOCKE AND

independent of the will, stated without any such exception as that which has been the subject of the preceding animadversions.

" It is not in our power," says this acute writer, "to judge as we will. The judgment is carried along necessarily by the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to us at the time. But in propositions that are submitted to our judgment there is this great difference ; some are of such a nature that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and perfectly understand their meaning without finding himself under any necessity of believing them to be true or false, probable or improbable. The judgment remains in suspense, until it is inclined on one side or another by reasons or arguments."*

That Dr. Reid did not ascribe this suspense of the judgment to any exertion of the will is sufficiently evident from the manner in which he expresses himself. It is scarcely necessary to adduce the following passage by way of corroboration, but it is too explicit and too much in point not to be presented to the reader.

" Every degree of evidence, perceived by the mind, produces a proportioned degree of assent or belief. The judgment may be in perfect suspense between two contradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, or equal evidence for both.

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, page 555, 4to. edition.

SOME OTHERS ON THIS SUBJECT. 29

The least preponderancy on one side inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed with doubt, more or less, until we come to the highest degree of evidence, when all doubt vanishes, and the belief is firm and immoveable. This degree of evidence, the highest the human faculties can attain, we call certainty.' 1 *

Lord Bacon, in several parts of his writings, appears to have entertained similar views on this subject, although, as he never made it a matter of separate consideration, and only incidentally mentions it, his language cannot be expected to be uniformly consistent. In one remarkable passage he directly asserts the independence of belief on the will, and distinctly points out the only way in which it can be controlled.

" The commandment of knowledge," says he, " is yet higher than the commandment over the will ; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself: for there is no power on earth, which setteth up a throne, or chair of state, in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.' 1 !

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, page 691, 4to. edition. t Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, book i.

Section IV. On The Circumstances Which Have Led Men To Regard Belief As Voluntary

It is natural to inquire, why the affection or state of mind, which we term belief, should be considered as depending on the will any more than other affections or states of mind ; why the discernment of truth and error should be considered as voluntary, and the discernment of other qualities as involuntary. We cannot alter at pleasure the appearances of objects, nor the sentiments which they occasion. If we open our eyes we must see things as they are, and receive the impressions which they are fitted to produce. Fields will appear barren or fertile, hills low or lofty, rivers wide or narrow, men and women handsome or ugly, pleasant or disagreeable. If we take up a book its language will appear to us refined or vulgar, its figures apt or inappropriate, its images beautiful or inelegant, its matter well or ill arranged, its narrative pathetic, or lively, or uninteresting; and we think not of ascribing these impressions to the will ; why, then, when we go a step farther, and find its arguments convincing, or doubtful, or inconclusive, should that be considered as a voluntary act ?

The common error, of regarding belief as depen-

BELIEF REGARDED AS VOLUNTARY. 31

dant on volition, may perhaps be mainly ascribed to the intimate connection subsisting between belief and the expression or declaration of it, the latter of which is at all times an act of the will. So close is this connection, and so frequently do they coincide, that the same language is often applicable to both. It is not, therefore, surprising, that they have been confounded together, and even received one common appellation, for the term assent is used to express the intimation of our concurrence with an opinion as well as the concurrence itself, our ostensible as well as our real belief. By this intimate connection and frequent coincidence, men have been inadvertently led to attribute the properties belonging to an external sign to the state or affection of the mind, and have drawn their inferences as if the two things were exactly identical. As we can refuse to express our agreement with a proposition, so, it has been assumed, we can refuse to believe it ; and as motives have power to induce a man to declare his assent, so it has been taken for granted they have the power of inducing him to yield his credence.