Elements of mental science; being a comprehensive exposition of the phenomena of the human mind considered in its general characteristics, in its particular functional activities, and as an organic whole

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Preface

THIS text-book in Mental Science is designed to be a compact but comprehensive presentation of the facts of the human mind in scientific method and form. The science is treated as one of observation, not of speculation. Little space accordingly is given to metaphysical discussions. The design is rather to prepare the beginner in mental studies for an appreciative understanding of the history of philosophic thought in the past and of the speculations and discussions in this field of investigation at the present, as he may prosecute these studies in the lecture-room or in private reading.

The science is carefully defined in its proper province and comprehension, and is mapped out into departments that are determined by lines of demarkation appearing in the nature of the mind, so that the treatment may be recognized as exact, orderly, and exhaustive.

The outer boundaries of mental science, it is believed, are now determined beyond reasonable question ; and the leading divisions with their respective organic relationships are also as clearly iv PREFACE.

ascertained. The progress of the science, henceforth, will be in the line of the investigation of the more specific phenomena of mind in their respective natures, and their relations to one another and to the universe of object with which the human mind is in interaction.

Two leading peculiarities in this present treatment of the subject may be specified here. They are, first, the separate formal presentations of the three comprehensive functional forms of mental activity — the functions of form, of knowledge, and of choice on the one hand, and of their several objects — the beautiful, the true, and the good on the other. The active subject and its object are exhibited each in its own proper character and laws, so that light from each side is thrown upon the other.

Secondly, the facts of the mind viewed as an organic whole, and accordingly as more than a mere aggregation of specific functions, are presented under the two like complementary views of rational activity — subjective and objective.

In addition to those peculiarities of method may be mentioned many peculiarities in special doctrines, as touching the place and office of the imagination and of memory in mental phenomena, the nature of knowledge, the genesis of our ideas of time and space and of so-called a priori truths, and others.

Free use has been made of the author's pre-

PREFACE. v

vious works in this field of knowledge, his " Psychology," "^Esthetics," "Logic," "Ontology, or Philosophy of Thought and of Being. " MuLTUM MAGNORUM VIRORUM JUDICIO CREDO : ALIQUID ET MEO VINDICO.

New Haven, 1886.

Chapter I. § 6. The Essential Activity of Mind

Chapter II. The Tri -functional Unity of Mind. — § 7. The human mind one in a plurality. § 8. Not identical with the object of its activity. § 9. Simple. § 10. Its three functions — sensibility, intelligence, will.

Chapter III. The Continuousness of Mind. — § 11. The human mind continues in its activity. § 12. This continuousness the ground of personal identity. § 13. The ground of memory. § 14. The ground of habit. § 15. The condition of mental growth.

Chapter IV. The Organic Nature of the Human Mind. — § 16. The human mind a part of a larger whole therefore finite and dependent. § 17. A sympathetic part in interacting ministry. § 18. Organic in its own interior nature.

Chapter V. The Self-consciousness of Mind.— § 19. The mind conscious of its own acts and feelings. § 20. Exposition of consciousness as a knowing function viii CONTENTS.

employed with the modifications of the mind itself. §21. Consciousness variously modified in degree and in range.

Chapter VI. The Spontaneity and Self-deter- MINATENESS OF THE MlND. — § 22. The activity of the mind as spontaneous. § 23. As self-determined. § 24. As aiming or telic.

Chapter VII. The Relativity of the Mind. — § 25. Diversity of relationship in the human mind. § 26. The real. § 27. Of the tri-functional relativity in subject to object. § 28. The true, the beautiful, and the good as respective objects to the three mental functions. § 29. Correspondence of these classifications with the fourfold division of causes.

Book II

THE SENSIBILITY.— I. SUBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter I. Its Nature and Modifications. — § 30. The sensibility defined. § 31. Form. § 32. Sympathy. § 33. The imagination. § 34. Feelings and forms respective states of the sensibility and the imagination. § 35. Classification of the feelings. § 36. Method.

Chapter II. Pleasure and Pain.— § 37. Pleasure and pain defined. § $&. Their immediate source in mental acts and affections. § 39. Relation to external objects. § 40. Finalities. § 41. Simple and integral. § 42. Tests of action and condition. § 43. Modifications.

Chapter III. The Sensations.— § 44. Sensations defined. § 45. Medium of sensation. § 46. The nervous organism in man. § 47. Its functional nature. § 48. 11) In the nervous organism itself. § 49. (2) In the body generally. § 50. (3) In respect to the mind. § 51. Sensations classified. § 52. Simple bodily pleasure and pain. § 53. General vital sense. § 54. The general organic sense. § 55. Special senses— touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight.

CONTENTS* ix

Chapter IV. The Emotions. — § 56. Emotion defined. § 57. Three general classes of emotions. § 58. Intellectual emotions. § 59. ^Esthetic emotions, — the Sublime, the Beautiful, the Comic. § 60. Moral emotions.

Chapter V. The Affections. — § 61. Affections defined. § 62. Love and hate. §§ 63, 64. Varieties. § 65 Resentments.

Chapter VI. The Desires. — § 66. Desires defined. §§ 6y, 68. Classified. § 69. Self-love and selfishness. § 70. Appetites. § 71. Rational desires. §§ 72, 73. Personal desires. § 74. Social desires. § 75. Hopes and fears.

Chapter VII. The Sentiments. — § 76. Sentiments defined. § jj. Classified in reference to their essential nature. § j8. Contemplative sentiments. § 79. Practical or moral sentiments. § 80. Rational sentiments. § 81. The sentiments classified in reference to their objects.

Chapter VIII. The Passions.— § 82. The passions described.

Chapter IX. The Imagination.— § 83. The imagination defined. § 84. Different names. § 85. Its nature unfolded. §§ 86-88. Ideals.

Chapter X. The Imagination : — Sense-Ideals.

§ 89. Sense-ideals defined. § 90. Modifications. §§ 91,92. Relations of mind and body. § 93. Phantoms. § 94. Exalted sensibility. § 95. Suspended sensibility. § 96. Dreaming. § 97- Catalepsy. § 98. Somnambulism.

Chapter XI. The Imagination :— Spiritual Ideals.— § 99. Spiritual ideals defined. § 100. Source. § 101. Embodiment.

Chapter XII. Memory.— § 102. Memory defined. § 103. Its law. §§ 104-107. Conditions of a good memory. § 108. Special rules.

Chapter XIII. Mental Reproduction. § 109.

x CONTENTS.

Mental reproduction defined. § no. Spontaneous or voluntary — Reverie. §§ 111-117. Laws of mental association. §118. Reflex action. §§ 119 — 123. Recollection.

Chapter XIV. Artistic, Philosophical, and Practical Imagination. — § 124. The three functions of the imagination. § 125. The artistic imagination. § 126. The philosophical imagination. § 127. The practical imagination.

THE SENSIBILITY.— II. OBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter XV. Form in its Nature and Modifications. — § 128. Form defined. § 129. Form addresses the emotions. § 130. Its three constituents. § 131. Kinds of beauty.

Chapter XVI. Form Received. — § 132. Subjective conditions of the experience of beauty. § 133. Objective conditions.

Chapter XVII. Form Produced. — § 134. Form produced explained as idea expressed. § 135. Conditions or principles of form-production.

Book III

THE INTELLIGENCE.— I. SUBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter I. Nature and Modifications. — § 136. Intelligence defined. §§ 137-140. Its modifications.

Chapter II. Perception. — § 141. Perception defined. § 142. Relations to sensation. § 143. Sphere of perception. §§ 144, 145. Kinds of knowledge given in perception. § 146. Perception gives immediate knowledge of external reality.

Chapter III. Intuition. — § 147. Intuition defined. § 148. Its sphere. §§ 149, 150. Kinds of knowledge given by intuition.

CONTENTS. xi

Chapter IV. Thought. — §§ 151, 152. Thought defined. § 153. The three essential constituents. § 154. The comprehensive principle of thought. § 155. The fundamental laws : — Disjunction, Exclusion, Identity, Contradiction. § 156. Ground of their validity. § 157. The forms of thought. § 158. The judgment. § 159. The concept. § 160. The reasoning.

Chapter V. The Categories of Pure Thought. — §§ 161, 162. Category defined and explained. § 163. The category of identity and difference. § 164. The category of quantity. § 165. The category of modality.

Chapter VI. Intellectual Apprehension and Representation. — § 166. Intelligence as capacity and as faculty. § 167. Intellectual apprehension. § 168. Intellectual representation.

Chapter VII. Curiosity and Attention. — § 169. Intelligence instinctive or voluntary. § 170. Curiosity. § 171. Attention.

THE INTELLIGENCE.— II. OBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter VIII. The True, — its Nature and Modifications. — § 172. The true explained. § 173. Its fundamental category. § 174. Attributes classified. § 175. Intrinsic attributes — Properties. § 176. Extrinsic attributes — Relations. §177. Category of Substance and Cause. §178. Category of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. § 179. Our knowledge a true knowledge. § 180. The true as received and the true as produced.

Chapter IX. The True Received. — § 181. Faith. § 182. Faith and knowledge. § 183. The true divisible into (1) internal or supersensible and (2) external or sensible. § 184. Internal, supersensible, or intuitive truth. § 185. The mind and its phenomena inseparable except in thought. § 186. Reality of our intuitions. § 187. Reality distinguishable from simple judgment. § 188. No knowledge before presxii CONTENTS.

entation of the truth. § 189. The category of reality and its subordinate categories. § 190. Theories of time and space. § 191. Time as real. § 192. Space. § 193. Synopsis of fundamental categories. § 194. Matter. § 195. The truthfulness of sensible impressions.

Chapter X. The True Produced.— § 196. The true produced — how possible. § 197. How validated. § 198. By what particular processes. § 199. By reasonings. (1) Immediate. § 200. (2) Mediate. § 201. By concepts. § 202. (1) By amplification. § 203. (2) By reduction. § 204. Relations of subject-concepts and attribute-concepts. § 205. Conformity of nature to thought. § 206. (1) Intuitive thought. § 207. (2) Perceptive thought.

Book IV

THE WILL.— I. SUBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter I. Its Nature and Modifications. — § 208. The Will defined. § 209. Its modifications.

Chapter II. Volition. — § 210. Exemplified. § 211. An act — selective and directive. § 212. Free. § 213. Personal. § 214. Personality involving mental sovereignty. § 215. Originative. § 216. Moral. § 217. Responsible.

Chapter III. Growth and Subordinations of Will. § 218. The will capable of growth. § 219. Dependent. § 220. Governing and subordinate volitions.

Chapter IV. Conscience. — §221. Its elements. — §222. Discernment of right and wrong. § 223. Sentiment of obligation. § 224. Sense of approval or disapproval. § 225. Subjection to will.

Chapter V. Hope, Faith, and Love. — § 226. As virtues. §227. Hope defined. § 228. Faith defined. §229. Love defined.

CONTENTS. xiii

THE WILL.— II. OBJECTIVE VIEW.

Chapter VI. The Good — Its Nature and Modifications. — § 230. The good defined. § 231. Its field. (1) The self ; (2) the not-self. § 232. The good as object to the will, moral. § 233. Moral good direct object to the will in character, indirect object in condition. § 234. Right moral action beneficent.

Chapter VII. The Good Presented — Motives. — § 235. Motive defined. § 236. In what sense motive determines the will. § 237. Motive as good. § 238. Motives classified — external and internal.

Chapter VIII. The Good Produced — Duties. — § 239. Duty explained. § 240. Its fundamental conditions. § 241. Duties classified.

Book V. The Reason.— The Mind As Organic Whole

Chapter I. The Nature and Modifications of the Reason. — § 242. The reason as the organic whole of mind. § 243. Method.

Chapter II. The Reason. — I. Subjective View. — § 244. The reason not a special faculty ; its threefold activity. § 245. I. The activity of the reason upon itself. § 246. II. Upon the several functional activities. § 247. III. Upon exterior objects.

Chapter III. The Reason. — II. Objective View. — § 248. The proper object of rational activity, the perfecting of character and condition. § 249. In respect to itself and its environment.

INTRODUCTION.

§ i. Mental Science in the larger sense comprehends the four subordinate sciences of Psychology, ^Esthetics, Logic, and Ethics. It is the proper province of Psychology to set forth the facts generally of the human mind as learned from observation ; of Aesthetics to exhibit the laws and generic forms of the particular function of mental activity known as the Sensibility and the Imagination ; of Logic to present the laws and forms of the Intellect ; and of Ethics those of the Will.

Mental Science will properly embrace these four subordinate sciences, but will view them from its own single point of observation and with a single method also peculiar to itself, while each of the others will have its own separate starting point and develop itself by its own method. It will thus be more comprehensive than psychology, as now generally understood, while it will avoid entering into the technical details and peculiar methods of the other three. Its aim will be to present in a general view the entire field of mental states and operations in their organic relations and interdependencies, preparing the student in this way to enter more intelligently into the investigation of the manifold questions that present themselves concerning the phenomena of the human soul and the nature and regulative principles of truth, of beauty, and of morality, as well as also the deeper and broader speculations of metaphysical philosophy.

§ 2. In dignity and importance no science can outrank the science of mind. The mind is " the self," the conscious, proper self; and sound wisdom indorses the familiar maxim that " the proper study of mankind is man." The most important thing for one to know is himself — his own rational nature, its powers, its conditions, its final destiny as determined by a wise use of this self-knowledge. All other sciences found their claims to interest in this and from it derive their shaping and validating principles. " To know and understand itself," says Sir William Hamilton, speaking of the human mind, " and thus to establish its dominion over the universe of existence — it is this alone which constitutes man's grand and distinctive pre-eminence." No study affords a better means of discipline, as no science — at least no science of observation — can put forth a better claim to certitude and exactness of method, and none certainly is better fitted to train to those habits of reflective contemplation on the phenomena of human existence which characterize the man of truest and highest practical wisdom, and thus to effect the fullest and fastest growth of the essential excellencies of personal character.

§ 3. The science of mind and the science of matter — -Mental Science and Physical Science — constitute the two great branches of science divided in reference to its subject-matter. If, however, Space and Time be assumed to be true realities, since we observe that the logical attribute of quantity has in them its most fundamental applications, Mathematical Science may not improperly be ranked as a third co-ordinate science with those of mind and matter. The three comprehensive divisions of human science would accordingly be : (1) Mental or Spiritual ; (2) Physical ; and (3) Mathematical.

Mental Science is properly ranked among the so-called Inductive Sciences. It begins with observation of particular facts, not with general truths. From one or more of such observed facts it induces to others of a like nature, so that a single observation may suffice to give a trustworthy knowledge of an indefinite number of facts of the same class. One observation, or at least a few observations, thus, will afford a knowledge of the essential nature of all exertions of thought, or of imagination, or of will. So the observation of the character of one man's feelings, or thoughts, or purposes will acquaint us with the character of those of other men generally in like

4 IXTRODUCTION.

relations. Still farther than this : as guided by induetive thought, Mental Science conducts us from observations of one department of mind to other co-ordinate and complementary departments, just as the comparative zoologist is enabled to determine from the bony structure of an animal what its cellular, its muscular, its nervous systems, what its size, its food, its habits of life must have been, and even the character of other animal and vegetable life around it, as well as its general climatic environment. Mental. Science, thus, is built up chiefly and characteristically by the application of the methods of inductive thought. The co-ordinate movement of thought — the deductive — which proceeds from the whole class or the composite attribute to a subordinate grade, and so on to the individual or to the simple, as also the secondary logical processes of classification and of analysis, are much and freely employed in aid and furtherance of induction, but rather in subordination than predominance.

§4. The facts of mind, which first through observation and then by means of induction, with its auxiliary processes of thought, are developed into the full form of a science, are discovered first and mainly by direct introspection. The mind is enabled to look inwardly upon itself, upon its exercises and affections, to distinguish one from another, to mark the respective qualities of each, to note their relations to one another and their interdependence, and thus to gather up into its comprehensive observation the facts which enter into and constitute the science.

But in addition to this, the thoughts, the feelings, the determinations of other men are also revealed to our view in the various ways in which the mind of man is accustomed to reveal itself.

Still a third important field in which are to be observed the facts of mental science, is that of language, in the formation and the use of which men unite, -dropping aside for the time what is peculiar and abnormal and expressing thought and feeling in so far as they are common to men as a class. Language is the grand social revelation of the facts of mind in which there is agreement and consent of many minds, and so is peculiarly trustworthy and authoritative.

While in manifold other ways the mind of man reveals itself to our observation, as in the arts, in government, in social customs, and science will not overlook any of those revelations, still it remains that the great commanding sources of fact for mental science are these three • — 1. Introspection; 2. Observation of others; 3. Language.

§ 5. From a careful survey of these several fields in which the facts of mind are presented to our observation, and in these facts, we learn that there are certain appearances or phenomena which are traceable to one common source or ground, and which in one particular selection and grouping we call the peculiar characteristics of mind. These characteristics or attributes of mind, which are thus observed to be common to mind, constitute the subject of mental science. The science or knowledge of these attributes is the science or knowledge of mind, since the science or knowledge of an object is nothing but the science or knowledge of the attributes of that object considered in themselves and their relations. The object itself, indeed, is none other than the complement or concrete whole of its attributes ; and it is known solely in and through its attributes.

Attributes are divided into two great classes, the essential and the relative. The essential attributes are intrinsic to the object and make it to be what it is in itself ; the relative attributes are extrinsic to the object and make it to be what it is by reason of its relations to other objects. The roundness, and the brightness, and the gravity of the sun are among its essential attributes ; its being the center of motion to the other bodies of the system is a relative attribute. It becomes thus the one object of mental science to gather up these attributes of mind, distinguishing the essential from the relative, to arrange them in their due order of importance and dependence, and then unfold each in its proper fullness and bearing.

We shall find that the mind possesses one essential attribute which so far outranks and transcends all others that it has often not improperly been regarded in its divers modifications as constituting the one comprehensive fact of mind, and thus the one topic to be considered in mental science : it is the attribute of activity. This attribute, because of this pre-eminent, if we do not more truly say exclusive, importance, it will be convenient to exhibit, first, in its divers subordinate forms and modifications, and, secondly, as one organic whole. Our method will accordingly be to consider, in the First Book, the General Attributes of Mind ;

In the Second Book, the first subordinate department of the essential attribute of mind, just named, its activity, viz. : — Its FUNCTION OF Form, otherwise known as the Function of the Sensibility and the Imagination ;

In the Third Book, the second special department of mental activity, The INTELLIGENCE ;

In the Fourth Book, the third special department, The Will ; and —

In the Fifth, the attributes of mental activity as an organic whole, under the appellation of The Reason.

Book I. General Attributes Of Mind

CHAPTER I.

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND.

§ 6. The first glance turned inward on our mental nature discovers to us the prominent fact that it is an essentially active nature. We discern the mind, in truth, only in its operations. Even what we call the states of mind are active states. Our thoughts are active ; our imaginings are active ; our determinations are active. They all bear the character of change, of motion from one form or condition to another. Our feelings are the feelings of active natures ; they are not like impressions on stones, or inactive substances ; they are the affections of active beings. So striking is this fact that by some philosophers the feelings have been denominated the active powers of the mind.

Observation of other minds corroborates this testimony given by the inspection of our own inward being. They make themselves known to

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND. 9

us indeed only as they act or move and as by such action or motion they impress our minds. The universal language of men confirms the f ac t : — the human mind is essentially active. This is its first, great, comprehensive attribute. There is no actual or possible revelation made of mind that does not reveal this as its ever present and its predominant attribute.

It is by this characteristic that mind is distinguished from all other real or supposed natures. It is primarily and sharply distinguished from matter by this. Matter is recognized as inert, inactive ; as motionless and formless, except as moved and shaped by something extrinsic to itself. Whatever hypothesis may be entertained in regard to the nature of matter, whether as a real, peculiar entity in itself, or whether as a mere " center of force," or, in the better form of this class of hypotheses, as a potentialized force, that is, as force changed from an active or living force to a mere potency — a mere capability of moving when meet occasion shall come to it for moving — whatever hypothesis may be entertained in regard to the nature of matter, it is ever and always recognized as the direct opposite of mind in this respect — that it is inert, inactive, moving only as it is moved.

In like manner, the prevalent theories of space and time, even when recognizing them as real entities, refrain from attributing to either of them any such attribute as that of activity, at io GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OF MIND.

least in the narrower and more generally accepted sense of that term. They may be recognized as active positively in determining our cognitions, and negatively in certain limitations of real objects and actions. It is after all only the niceness of metaphysical speculation that recognizes activity as a mark of space or of time.

This grand attribute — activity — ,then, we recognize as entering into the essential constitution of mind. In exact statement, indeed, activity constitutes the very essence of mind. We are not to think of the mind as a something existing back of this activity, and from itself putting forth the activity. The activity is its very self, in the sense that the whole constituting attribute of an object is the object itself. As will appear hereafter when the nature of thought or of knowledge is unfolded, there is no substj-atum to be supposed as a necessary support for the attribute, in which the attribute may be said to inhere while yet distinct from it. The substance, so far as an actual being, is the same as its constituting attribute ; the mind is the same as its attribute of activity ; — mind and active substance arc the same. This will more fully appear in the sequel.

Activity being thus the very essence of the mind, the beginning studies of mind should be led to recognize it as having this character. Our more familiar view regards the mind as a substance with certain attributes, a view which in itself shuts out the notion of mind as a cause;

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND. n

whereas, subject to the restrictions of the meaning of that term to be given hereafter, the mind should far more properly be viewed under this latter relation of thought — as a cause, and so as active. The exposition of the nature of mind suffers much from this inconsiderate treatment of it, as a mere inactive substance. A chief difficulty in the study of mind springs from the difficulty of conceiving it as essentially active. From the start, therefore, the study should aim to regard the mind as an essentially active nature ; and every conception of it in any of its particular modifications, should keep steadfastly in view this essential attribute of its nature: The mind is essentially active.

Chapter II. The Unity Of Mind, With A Threefold Diversity Of Function

§ 7. The human mind is, in the proper sense of the statement, a unit — it is single or individual, one by itself. The phrase — the human mind — may be used abstractly to denote the aggregate of the attributes of mind ; but when we speak concretely of the mind of a man, we speak of it as a unit, existing distinctly and separately from all other beings, as one among many.

The decisive proof of this singleness or individuality of the human mind is derived from experience and observation. So positively does every one know as from his own personal knowledge of himself that he is truly himself a distinct and separate being, that the statement of the truth seems a truism. He unintentionally and unavoidably makes this interpretation of his conscious experiences, that he is himself and not a part or a mode of the existence of any other being ; and that his mind, his soul, the being within him that thinks and feels, is as distinct from other minds as his body from other animal bodies. He feels himself, accordingly, to be responsible for

THE UNITY OF MIND. 13

much at least of what he thinks and purposes. All the records of human experience present uniform testimony in confirmation of this utterance of individual consciousness. There is a plurality of minds ; each human mind is one of this plurality. .

§ 8. Much less is the human mind to be regarded as identical with its object. As an activity it implies an object upon which or toward which it is exerted ; and to account for the interaction of mind with its object, to account, for example, for the mind's apprehension or thought of an object, it has been supposed by some that thought and object must be one and the same. But the common sense of men rejects this supposition as in contradiction of all its strongest and deepest convictions — of convictions that could have only grown out of uniform experiences.

That mind and its object are distinct is a truth of simple observation. This dualism in existence, implied in the fact of mental activity exerted upon some object distinct from itself, is thus a truth fundamental to all true philosophy, — to all philosophy that builds not on groundless assumption, but on solid fact as presented to human observation. Mental action and object imply each other and are real correlatives in thought ; and the speculation would seem to be idle that should seek to reduce the one to the other, or indeed to subordinate the one to the other. The remotest conclusion which any such speculation could legiti-

14 GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OE MIND.

mately reach would be that mind ever acts upon mind as object — upon some other mind, or upon itself in some one of its own departments of being.

§ 9. The human mind is also simple. It is not made up of a number of constituents of diverse nature put together so as to form a mere aggregate or accumulation of elements. It has divers functions, performs divers acts, but it remains in all the same simple nature. The sun both warms and illuminates ; but it is the same sun that acts in both heat and light. So the human mind with its diversity of functions is one and simple, and cannot be decomposed into different things, one of which discharges the function of thinking, another that of feeling, and a third that of purposing.