Mental science; a text-book for schools and colleges

Preface

This volume is a response to advice and encouragement given the author b}' several eminent professors, and also the execution of a purpose partially entertained at the time of the pubHcation of his former book, "The Human Mind." The discussions in that treatise, in order to justify peculiarities of doctrine, are frequently extended and minute. It was proposed, in case the work met with favor, to reproduce its chapters in a simpler form. The author need hardly say that the reception accorded "The Human Mind" has surpassed his highest expectations.

"Mental Science," therefore, is now offered as an educational manual, and as a compend for the reading of those who would inform themselves respecting the doctrines of an earnest philosophy without entering upon non-essential details. The majority of the discussions have been not merely abridged, but simplified ; a considerable number have been entirely rewritten. Some chapters, too, which are devoted to logical questions, and which may prove serviceable in connection with some future effort, have been omitted. It has, however, been the aim to present a true theory of every normal activity of the intellect.

In order to assist the eye in that work of review which is a condition of all thorough scholarship, teachers will perceive that italics have been employed more freely than would otherwise be desirable. They w^ill also notice that ten out of the fifty chapters into which the treatise is divided have been printed iv PREFACE.

in small type. The dissertations thus marked are not deemed absolutely indispensable to a course in psychology. They are, however, as interesting as any others in the book, and they have no peculiar difficult}^

The general system of doctrine in the service of which both " The Human Mind " and "Mental Science" have been composed, might be styled Perception alism. For some such term ma}^ properly designate a form of philosophy which maintains, from an anah^tical and theoretical point of view, that TYianhind are not deluded in claiming that they perceive fact and truths and that what they call their perceptions are true perceptions of those very things which they say that they perceive.

Some old writers have described this radical doctrine which Perception alism supports as that of "the reliability of those faculties which God has given us." This is a fair definition ; but it should be understood that the reference to our Maker in it is not presented in proof of the doctrine, but simply to indicate that trustworthiness is claimed only for well-known and actually existing faculties, and not for any faculties the conception of which is peculiar to some philosophic school.

The word ' ' perception " is sometimes limited in its application : we now use it in its most unrestricted meaning. For we have perceptions of simple fact and perceptions of necessary relations ; presentational perceptions and inferential perceptions ; the perceptions of sense and of consciousness, and perceptions concomitant of these ; the perceptions of the intuitive, and those of the discursive, reason ; we perceive what is true actualistically and what is true hypotheticallj- ; we perceive the possible and the necessary, and the contingent and the probable.

Our doctrine is that all these perceptions, when made by a sound mind and under proper conditions, are trustworthy ; and our philosophy finds justification for this doctrine in the critical investigation of every mode of human cognition or conviction.

PREFACE. V

Perceptionalism does not assert that the mind of man is infallible. On the contrary, recognizing the frequent recurrence of error, it seeks to understand the sources and laws of mistaken belief as well as those of correct belief. But it emphasizes the truth that man is capable of knowledge, or well-grounded certainty, about many things ; and that where this is not attainable, he may often wisely form a judgment of probability.

We allow that the dogmatic statement of this truth, even though accompanied by arguments showing its excellence and reasonableness?, could scarcely be entitled a system of philosophy. If, however, the reliability of our faculties became evident as the last result of an exhaustive analysis of the phenomena of the intellect, then, in the S3'stem thus evolved, we say that there would be a philosophy worthy of the name.

We trust that the discussions now again, in simpler form, presented to the public, may once more be welcomed as an attempt in the right direction.

For some time past our country has been invaded by two systems of speculation, which, like an army with two wings extended in martial arra}', have threatened to subdue America either to a materialistic or to an idealistic agnosticism. But the educated thought of this land cannot be permanently affected by theories which resolve our commonest and most assured convictions into doubt and unbelief. It is our confident expectation that some such system as that which we have named Perceptionalism will be the philosophy of the future in these United States.

E. J. H.

Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y., May 23, 1885.

Contents

Chapter Page

I. Mental Philosophy and its Methods .... 1

II. The Sources op Psychological Information . 7

Chapter I. Mental Philosophy And Its Methods

Mental phi- 1- Mental pMlosophy is the science — that is, the losopby de- accuratc and S3^stematized knowledge — of the intelpartmentof Icct. When Scientific knowledge is thorough and psychology, satisfactory, we know not only what a thing is, but also what it has to do with other things, and especiall}^ how it comes to be what it is. In other words, we know not only the nature of the object, but also its relations to other objects, and especiall}^ to the conditions of its existence. Mental philosophy, therefore, considers not only thought in its various forms and developments, but also the conditions on which these depend, and all the various relations of thought.

In speaking of scientific knowledge as thorough and accurate, we do not claim for it absolute perfection, but onlj^ such excellence as care and diligence are able to attain. Great alterations have been made of late 3'ears in the natural sciences, — for example, in geograph}^, geology, chemistr\^, and physics ; nor does any one claim that no further progress is possible in the knowledge of the material creation. In like manner important changes have taken place in those sciences which relate to the life of spiritual beings ; errors have been eliminated, doubtful questions settled, -and new doctrines established. The metaphysical, logical, ethical, and political teachings of the present centurj^ differ greatly from those of ancient times, though not, perhaps, so much as the ph3'sical science of to-day differs from the theories of three centuries ago. In ascribing to mental philosoph}^ a scientific character, we claim only that this philosophy contains a well-ascertained and reliable S3'stem of doctrines, and that it is progressing — though, it ma3' be, somewhat slowlj" — in the settlement of disputed questions.

2 MENTAL SCIENCE. [Chap. I.

This philoso2:)hy is a department of psychology, which embraces also the philosophy of sensation, and that of the emotional and motive powers of the soul, and that of the will. The mind, or intellect, is not an existence separate from the will or from the heart ; but, like each of these, it is simply the soul, or the spirit, viewed with exclusive reference to one set of its powers. The same object may be denominated in different ways, as it may be viewed in different lights. Thus the same person ma}" be spoken of as the judge, the law-giver, and the king of a people. The word ' ' intellect " was originally applied to that higher power of thought to which we commonly give the term " understanding," and which is an abilit}' to perceive not merely objects and facts, but also the reasons and relations of things. Now, however, it is often used so as to cover every form of the power of thought from the highest to the lowest, and is applied to the soul as having this general power ; in this sense it corresponds exactly with the word " mind."

Mind or Some define mind, or intellect, as the power of knowinteiiect, ing / we prefer to say that it is the power of think- ^ "® ' ing. This difference primarily regards terms, yet even in this respect has some importance. A wrong use of terms is alwaj'S perplexing, and frequently results in error. The words '' knowing" and " knowledge " should not be generically applied to the phenomena of intellect, because we are conscious of various states and acts of mind which we naturally distinguish from knowledge, and deny to be knowledge ; for example, suppositions and imaginings. But there is no mental state or operation which might not be characterized as thought or thinking, or at least as involving thought or thinking.

It is true that the word " thought " is sometimes used in specific senses ; for example, one might say that he thinks, but that he does not know, that a certain piece of coin is counterfeit. Thinking, when thus contrasted with knowledge, signifies an imperfect and less confident kind of conviction. But at the same time it is true that when we know, we have a thought — a conception — of that concerning which we know ; and thinking, in this sense, is alvmys a part of knowing. Again, the word "thought," used emphatically, may signify an attentive and rational exercise of the intellect. We speak of persons as thoughtful and as thoughtless, just as we speak of a man of mind and of a man without mind. We say, " Sits, fixed in thought, the mighty Stagirite." Here is another special sense, with which, however, the more general meaning co-exists ; for even the most thoughtless person is not without some form and degree of thinking.

Chap. I.] MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHODS. 3

We do not sa}^ that thought, even in the wide sense, is the only form of mental action, but that, in all cases of mental action which are not thinking, thinking is involved or presupposed as a condition ; and that for this reason the intellect may properly be designated the power of thought. Mental phi- ^' Somc intelligent persons entertain a prejudice losopby rec- against mental science ; they regard it as obscure, unommen e . satisfactory, and without uscful application. It must be allowed that various metaph3^sical systems have been composed which are profound only in the sense of being hard to understand, and whose doctrines, when ascertained, are simply pernicious delusions. We cannot expect people to spend much time in endeavoring to comprehend the absurdities of false philosophy. But it is evident that the rejection of all study of supersensible things could he justified only on the supposition that the phenomena of mind or spirit are beyond the reach of careful and accurate investigation. Otherwise we wilfully turn our thought away from that nobler part of being to which we ourselves belong, and in whose life of thought, enjo3'ment, choice, dut}', and affection the ends of all existence are to be realized. Now the facts of psychical experience, so far from being removed from our inspection, are subjected to our immediate cognition, and are perfectly within the range of our attention and inquiry. They have been found difficult of observation and analysis, yet not so difficult as to prevent the formation of an excellent body of philosophy. Every earnest student can now find in mental science an ennobling and satisfying pursuit.

Psychological studies, moreover, are as useful as they are noble. If their only utility were to satisfy a thirst for knowledge, and to occupy the mind with pure and elevating thoughts, this of itself would be a great benefit ; but the}' have value in other respects. The mental strength to be obtained from metaph3'sical pursuits is one of their chief recommendations. Perhaps no other employment contributes so effectuall}' to develop those powers of penetration and discrimination which are the chief elements of intellectual manliness and maturity. Then, too, psychology is the necessary foundation for those arts and sciences which pertain to the proper use of the various faculties of man. It is a stud}" indispensable to those who would improve and perfect such sciences, and of great assistance to all who would obtain a satisfactory understanding of them. Logic, which treats of the correct use of the rational faculty, is a direct outgrowth of mental philosoph}', and is constantly- receiving important modifications from the latter science. Ethics also, especially in its more fundamental discussions, is based

4 MENTAL SCIENCE. [Chap. I.

on a searching analj'sis of certain mental workings. Similar remarks appl}^ to aesthetics, or the philosophy of taste, and to rhetoric, which is the science of the pleasing and the persuasive in human thought and speech.

A loise system of education must he regulated by a true psychology. Whether we would establish efficient schools for the young, or in a more general way subject ourselves and others to wholesome formative influences, we should seek the advice of mental philosophy.

This science, too, throws great light on theology. It is the indispensable servant of theology. To understand Deity, we must understand man. In short, every science which in any way involves a consideration of the laws of spiritual existence finds a powerful assistant in the general philosophy of mind. TheBaco- . 3. An instructor in an}^ abstruse study should be nian method. ^^^^ ^q f^p^-jj g^^^ ^q cxprcss positive convictions. At the same time he should avoid even the appearance of dogmatism, and should endeavor to show that his views are reasonable. Especially he should make known the method by which his system of doctrine has been constructed, so that others may judge whether the method be a correct one ; and, if so, whether in any case he has departed from it.

Without method no satisfactory progress can be made in philosophical investigations. The importance of it cannot be over-estimated, and has alwaj-s been acknowledged by thinking men, but more especially since the true method was illustrated and advocated by Lord Bacon. The S3"stem inaugurated by this distinguished man is founded on the evident truth, that, as philosoph}^ aims to explain facts, so it should seek that explanation in a questioning of the facts themselves.

From this principle two modes of work originate, the first and more rudimentary of which is preparatory to the other. The primary philosophy merely observes facts and classifies those which are similar, and in this way obtains general facts, which are also the expression of certain laws or modes of Nature ; the more advanced philosophy carries on the investigation by analyzing the general facts already secured and co-ordinating their essential elements. By means of it we reach more profound and satisfying laws.

Thus Newton, analj'zing those laws — of falling bodies, of planetary motions, and of projectiles — with which he was already familiar, discovered the more fundamental law of gravitation, which enters into these, and which continuall}' operates on matter everywhere. In like manner Sir William Hamilton, following the suggestions of earlier writers, has resolved those various

Chap. I.] MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHODS. 5

laws of the association of ideas, which careful observation had established, into the comprehensive law of redintegration ; that is, that the mind tends to repeat fully any complex operation which it may formerly have experienced, and which it has now in any degree begun. In short, the laws of psychical no less than those of pli3'sical Nature are to be learned through the ascertainment and co-ordination, the analysis and generalization, of facts. Such being the case, the student of philosophy may boldly question any doctrine, though upheld b}^ the highest ability and learning, which can claim no record of experience or observation in its support, and as confidently hold any opinion sustained by accurately recorded and carefully analyzed phenomena.

4. The statement that facts are the necessary founance o?Siese dation for philosophy may seem to some too evident p7atoiiis1ii* *^ require emphasis. But the neglect of it in times past, and even in our own day, has been the source of many and great errors. The metaphysical worthlessness of almost all the ancient and of much of modern philosophy originates in the admission of high-sounding notions, the truth of which never was proved, and never could be proved, from any examination of things reall}^ existing. Onl}'^ fanciful and unsatisfactory S3'Stems could be constructed after such beginnings. Plato and his followers, in ancient days, carried out the separation of philosophy from actuality more fully than any other class of thinkers ; and, in modern times, this has been done most signally by the German idealists. Plato adopted the principle that general or universal ideas are the onl}^ proper sources of knowledge and objects of study. The individual or specific he rejected as transitory and, in a sense, unreal. Such a commencement destro3'ed the possibilit}^ of progress. A revival of these Platonic views in an exaggerated form gave rise to the systems of Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, by which the thought of continental Europe was powerful}}^ debauched. These philosophers, being too wise to appeal to experience, sought truth by the "immediate beholding of reason," and evolved it out of "the depths of their consciousness." The spirit of Hegelianism, even at the present time, may be inferred from the condemnation, by Dr. Schwegler, of Lord Bacon, as "the author of scientific empiricism," and b}^ his contemptuous assertion regarding Locke's philosophy, that its " empiricism is clear as day." It is a strange perversion of judgment when learned men condemn a philosophy on account of its chief excellence, and simply because it has been carefully deduced from facts !

6 MENTAL SCIENCE. [Chap. I.

Aristotle ^^ those investigators, ancient and modern, who

a«d the have rejected Platonic methods as dreamj^ and m^'ssciiooimen. ^j^^j^ ^j^^y ^^^^ Until Comparatively recent times, have systematically based their doctrines on the analysis of observed phenomena. Aristotle, the illustrious rival of Plato, did not do so. The acuteness of this great man cannot be over-estimated, but the intrinsic value of his metaphysical writings has been grossly over-estimated. He did, indeed, recognize the truth that all our general knowledge is an induction from the observation of particulars ; 3'et he did not sufficiently perceive the practical importance of this principle, — that it is the only true starting-point of all philosophy. The patient reader of his works can see that he has accepted from previous teachers many absurd doctrines which admit of no proof, and that he forms his own theories depending, first on his own penetration, then on the opinions of preceding philosophers, then on the logical support which other doctrines may give the one under discussion, and then, last and least of all, on facts. Remarks similar to these might be made respecting the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, and regarding the authors of some famous S3'stems of speculation. We might also trace the progress of the last few generations, in psychology, to a more faithful observation and a more patient analysis of mental phenomena than were formerly attempted.

Induction ^* '^^^ Baconian method of philosophizing is termed and "The Inductive S^-stem," because the induction of

analysis. principles from facts is its distinguishing characteristic. This work largely consists in the observation and classification of facts as similar. But it includes more than this : it reaches from the past to the future, from that which has been seen to that which has not as 3^et been seen ; and, indeed, the most essential part of it is the exercise of a power of judgment natural to us. Eveiy fact, that is, ever}^ causal fact — for of such only we speak at present — consists of certain antecedents and consequents ; and it is an intuition of the intellect that similar antecedents must be accompanied or followed by similar consequents. Whenever a fact seems to contradict this principle, it is because some element which should exist in the antecedent to make the case similar to one previously observed, has escaped observation, and is not seen to be wanting. Thus, by means of an inductive judgment, the observation of facts results in the ascertainment of laws.

But, in the conjunction of circumstances which make up the antecedent in any particular fact, some circumstances only are essential elements of the antecedent ; others are merely

Chap. II.] SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION. 7

accidental and no jDart of the true cause. Hence the necessit}^ of analysis^ — of discrimination, — without which induction alone could not obtain the exact statement of any law. Moreover, as the laws of existence do not operate singly but in combination, there is 3'et more need of analysis to resolve these combinations, and in this wa}^ to ascertain laws which are simple and ultimate. In the ruder attainments of philosophy induction is more prominent than analysis, — the latter takes place spontaneously, — but in the more abstruse inquiries this state of things is reversed. It is difficult to say whether of the two is more necessary to philosophical progress. They are equally the indispensable instruments of science. All the rules of philosophizing simply assist and direct us to the successful employment of these two modes of thought.

CHAPTER 11.

THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION.

1. As science arises from the investigation of facts, an important question with respect to any department of knowledge is, whether there be abundant and reliable sources of information. In this respect the mental philosopher is peculiarly fortunate. The study of ps3'chical phenomena demands attention and thoughtfulness ; and it is a work of some difficult}^ to those unaccustomed to it, just as reading or mental application of an}^ kind is commonly irksome and laborious to uneducated persons. Yet the student of mind has this great advantage, that the operations and states of this wonderful agent are continually subject to his observation, and even, in a considerable measure, to his control. Besides, the facts thus submitted to him are those respecting the truth of which it is impossible to entertain a doubt. The most extravagant sceptic cannot question the existence of those thoughts, feelings, wishes, and actions which constitute his restless life of unbelief.

,. , The radical source of all information regarding

The radical .,. . .,^. -.. i^tt*

source of iu- mmd IS consciousness, or that immediate knowledge formation, -^jjict^ ^jj^ mjnd has of its own states and operations. All other means of knowledge are of use onl}^ as they co-operate with this. Our knowledge, through consciousness, of the nature and workings of our own spirits is our only means of understanding the life of other spiritual beings and of comprehending

8 MENTAL SCIENCE. [Chap. H.

the indications of their psychical activity. Each of us, knowing ■what passes within his own bosom, learns to understand the experience of others. A child not more than two or three 3'ears of age can speak of its thoughts and affections, wishes and pleasures, pains, hopes, and disappointments ; and knows, also, that others are similarly exercised. This statement can be easil}^ verified : question the little prattler, and you will find that he uses terms expressive of mental, just as intelligently as those indicative of bodity, operations. And these cognitions of spirit, thus early begun, are continued throughout life, pertain to ever}' form of experience, and are free from all uncertainty.

Two important diflQculties are to be encountered in using the testimony of consciousness.

In the first place, the changeful rapidity of our ps3xhical operations interferes with the steadiness of our gaze. What the poet saj's of pleasures is true of mental phenomena in general ; they are

"Like that Borealis race Which flit ere you can point their place."

And even when the current of inward life is partially arrested, that special phase of experience which is made the object of scrutiny often changes its nature while we are endeavoring to look upon it. The feeling grows cold ; the mental image becomes dim ; the concrete practical notion resolves itself into its elements. Psychological facts call for a keen and quick observation. They resemble those sea-birds which are ever on the wing, — which move even while at rest, and must be shot while flying.

The second hindrance experienced in using the testimony of consciousness arises from the impossibility of proving the correctness of one's observation by exhibiting to others those phenomena which are visible directly onlj- to one's self. This difficulty is more formidable in appearance than in realit}'. The earnest and patient student can generally S3^mpathize sufficiently with his teacher to understand and appreciate an appeal to consciousness. Nevertheless, there is here some opportunity for difference ; the disputatious opponent and even the honest inquirer may some- That may be 3'our experience, but it is not mine." 2. Because, therefore, of the subtile and evanescent J character of mental phenomena, and because of the Languagl*""' i«ipossibiUty of presenting the facts of consciousness to the immediate observation of others, great value attaches to certain indirect revelations of mind, which are subject to public and general scrutin}-.

The most important of these is language, — that man^ellous instrument, the expression and embodiment of human thought.

Secondar; sources oi

Chap.il] sources of psychological information. 9

Not only every word, but also every change, construction, and combination of words, in language, represents some form or mood of man's intelligence. And so well suited is this instrument for its office, that no idea, however delicate, which may have secured the interest of men, fails of expression in their speech. He who has mastered the vocabularj^ and linguistic forms of any people has obtained a perfect measure of their mental development. Moreover, every word in any language has a certain fixed meaning, which can be ascertained ; and this circumstance is of great assistance when we would study the thoughts of men. For the transitory idea is made fixed and permanent b}^ its sign, and is shown also to be an existing reality. No matter how much we may question the truthfulness of any conceptions, we cannot deny the existence of the notions themselves if they onl^^ have become established in the speech of any people. The relations of words, also, illustrate the relations of ideas ; so that many points concerning the contents and combinations, changes and successions, agreements and diff'erences, of thoughts can be understood better through a critical study of language than in any other waj^.

Another source of information is found in those volpiishmenS' uutary actious, labors, and accomplishments which men^^^^^^^^ result from mental activity. Every human being has the power of perceiving both his own actions and those of his companions ; and as he refers his own conduct to his own inward life as its cause, he intuitivel}' adopts a similar rule with regard to the conduct of others. Moreover, as different thoughts and aims result in different actions corresponding to them, we learn to use specific deeds as the indicators of specific thoughts. Sometimes the thoughts of men are even better understood from their actions than from their language. We not onl}^ trace actions to thoughts ; we also ascribe accomplished results to actions. This is a j'et greater exercise of mental penetration ; and b}'" means of it we can perceive most plainl}" the former presence and activitj^ of departed laborers. Beholding a field fenced and tilled, we are as sure that husbandmen have wrought in it as if we had seen them with onr eyes. Nor is it necessary to such a judgment that we should have previously witnessed the performance of a work in ever}^ respect the same as that submitted to our consideration. There is need only of an essential sameness or similarity. One who might be acquainted with the manufacture of locomotives, but who had never seen a steamship, could affirm, on an inspection of the latter, that it was the product of a similar exercise of intelligence, and intended for a similar purpose. In like manner we think that there is as much

10 MENTAL SCIENCE. [Chap. IL

evidence of design in the sting of a wasp as in the barbed and poisoned arrow of a savage, and that there is more proof of skill and wisdom in the formation of the eye than in the construction of the telescope. All investigators of mind, from the earliest ages, have learned much respecting the existence and the activity- of intellect from its manifestations in human life and histor}', and in the mightier works and ways of the Supreme Being.

Works of lit- Man}^ data of mental science may be obtained from erature. works of literature. These themselves are the productions of intellect, so that ever}^ volume ma}^ be studied as well with reference to the mind of the author as with reference to the subjects treated. What wonderful powers, what interesting operations, are revealed in the orations of Cicero and Demosthenes, in the poems of Homer and Virgil, in the discussions of Plato and Aristotle ! Besides, by the labors of men of genius, the varying phases of human thought and life, the history of man's past experience and achievements, and the peculiarities of the different races inhabiting the earth, have been carefully represented, recorded, and discussed. The writings of such men — poets, dramatists, historians, philosophers — yield us great direct assistance.

Physioiocricai ^' '^^^ study of Certain bodil}^ phenomena, as being piienomejia morc or Icss closcly connected with psychical states with'pyschi- ^nd operations, is another source of philosophic infornoio ^Qp' "^^^^^1^5 1^ which, however, some have ascribed undue ' ' importance. The influence of health and of disease upon mental vigor, the effect of severe stud}^ or of strong passion on the physical frame, the connection of sensation and of sense-perception with the nervous system, and the general dependence of psychical activity upon the condition of the brain, are topics deserving of earnest consideration. It is onl}' through an investigation of these topics that we can determine those laws by which soul and body are united in one life. At the same time we have the following remarks to make.