The science of ethics: an elementary system of theoretical and practical morality

Front matter

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Preface

It has been the controlling design in the preparation of this work simply to introduce to ethical studies. After a careful analysis of an act of duty by which the essential constituents of duty are ascertained, the science is unfolded in the light of this analysis, with logical exactness, into a full presentation of its principles and truths in their due relations to one another — into a well-grounded, comprehensive, and organic system of theoretical and practical morality. The elementary character of the work has precluded the introduction of the historical and critical discussion, by which ethical literature is so generally characterized. The peculiarities of the treatise are to be found mainly in the analysis of the concrete act of duty which furnishes the fundamental principles of ethical science ; in the systematic development and arrangement of these principles ; in their application to the particulars of ethical practice ; and the more full and detailed presentation of the practical part of ethics. The results attained in the introductory analysis of duty are supposed to be

IV PREFACE.

accepted generally without question. The recognition throughout of the essential constituents of duty attained in the analysis as co-ordinate and complementary, and, therefore, characterizing all duty, has seemed to the writer to give to the treatise a solid and unquestionable basis, together with thoroughly logical harmony and completeness — the characters, in other words, of a truly scientific treatment. As was requisite, however, in an elementary work, the presentation has been didactic rather than argumentative ; — the principles and truths being left for the most part to appear in their own light.

New-Haven, April, 1876.

Contents

INTRODUCTION.— § i. Ethics Defined. § 2. Founded on Psychology. § 3. One of the Three Great Departments of Mental Science. § 4. Method.

CHAPTER I. — Analysis of an Act of Duty. — § 5. The Duty of Regulus to return to Carthage

CHAPTER II.— Subject of Duty— A Moral Person.— § 6. Moral Person Denned. §§ 7, 8. An Essentially Active Being. § 9. Endowed with Sensibility. § 10. With Intelligence. § II. With Free Will. § 12. The Moral Faculty — Practical Reason, Moral Sense, Conscience. § 13. Threefold Function of Conscience — Discriminative of Right and Wrong, Obliging to Action, Approving or Disapproving. § 14. Conscience as Source of Pleasure or Pain.

CHAPTER III. — Object of Duty.— § 15. Object of Duty Defined. § 16. A Person. § 17. Rights Correlative to Duties. § iS. Good Essential Attribute in a Duty and a Right. § 19. Duties Classified — (1) to Self; (2) to Fellow-men ; (3) to God.

VI CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.— Moral Action.— § 20. Moral Action Defined ; implies Love in Subject of Duty, Good in Object of Duty, and Rectitude in its Essence. § 21. Systems of Morality on Each of these Elements.

CHAPTER V. — Love as Principle of Duty. — § 22. Love Necessary in all Duty. § 23. Fulfils the Whole Law of Duty. § 24. More Exactly Defined. § 25. Its Three Stages. § 26. The Opposite of Love, or Hate. § 27. Unsympathetic Spirit Opposed to Duty.

CHAPTER VI. — Goodness or Beneficence.— § 28. Good the One Result of all Perfect Moral Action. § 29. Different Senses of the Term Good ; Good in itself as Happiness, the Primary and Ultimate Good ; Good as means, the Secondary and Mediate Good. § 30. Good in itself the Gift of God alone ; Secondary Good the only Possible Immediate Effect of Human Effort ; Secondary Good either Good of Character or of Condition. § 31. The Highest and Largest Good Required by Duty. § 32. Summary of Doctrines Respecting Good. § ^. Relation of Moral Action to its End § 34. Evil, the Opposite of Good, either Physical or Moral

CHAPTER VII.— Rectitude.— § 35. All Perfect Moral Action must be Right. § 36. Rectitude Respects an Action. § yj- Particularly the Relation in an Action between its Source and its End. § 38. Implies a Natural Fitness or Conformity in this Relation. § 39. An Unswerving Directnesss in its Movement. § 40. And a Parallelism with all Specific Right Acts. § 41. Wrong the opposite of Right.

CHAPTER VIIL— Motives.— § 42. Motive Defined as Object of the Will. § 43. Two Classes of Motives— Those of Character and those of Condition. § 44. The Three Subordinate Species of the First Class. § 45. Three Species of the Second Class. § 46 Motives as Ultimate or Proximate. § 47. Motives not Morally Right or Wrong. § 48. Selection Among Motives — In What Way Wrong.

CHAPTER IX.— Moral Obligation.— § 49. Moral Obligation Defined. § 50. Its Ground.

CHAPTER X. — Moral Law.— § 51. Moral Law Defined. §52. Divided into Physical and Moral. §53. Harmonious in its

CONTENTS. I'll

Requirements. § 54. Commanding. § 55. Excites Sense of Personal Responsibility. §56. Its Sanctions. §57- Merit. Demerit, PVaise, Blame.

CHAPTER XI.— AUTHORITY.— § 58. Authority Defined. § 59. Its Seat. §60. How Expressed. §61. Natural Law. §62. Positive Law. § 63. The Bible.

CHAPTER XII.— Casuistry.— § 64. Casuistry Defined. §65. Its Leading Principles.

Book II. Practical Morality Duties And Rights

INTRODUCTION.— § 66. Division of Duties. § 67. General Recapitulation.

DIVISION FIRST — DUTIES TO SELF.

CHAPTER I.— Nature and Division.— § 68. Personal Duties Explained. § 69. The Ground of Obligation in Them. § 70. Self-Love . § 71. Defined. § 72. Two Classes of Personal Duties — in Respect to Condition and to Character.

CHAPTER II. — Personal Duties in Respect to the Body. — § 73- Ground of Obligation in Personal Duties. § 74. Duties Enumerated: — I. Of Guarding the Body. §75. II. Of Nourishing it— (1) By Food. § 76. (2) By Exercise. § 77. (3) By Rest. § 78. III. Of Ruling It. § 79. (1) By Overcoming Sloth. § 80. (2) By Regulating Appetite. §81. (3) By Training to Habits of Ministry. § 82. (4) By Subordinating Bodily Wants.

CHAPTER III. — Personal Duties in Respectto External Condition. — § 83. Nature and Divisions of Personal Duties in Respect to Condition. § 84. I. In Respect to External Nature. § 85. II. In Respect to Property. § 86. Institution of Property Beneficent. § 87. Right to Property Relative. § 88. Relations of

Vlll CONTENTS.

Duty to Property. §89. Modes of Acquisition. §90. Personal Duties in Respect to Property. § 91. III. In Respect to Station. § 92. IV. In Respect to Friendship.

CHAPTER IV. — Personal Duties in Respect to Character.-^} 93. Character Defined. § 94. Formation of Character Involves an Ideal, Persistent Endeavor, Principle of Habit, and Use of Outward Occasions. § 95. Maxims. § 96. Culture of the Sensibility. § 97. Of the Imagination. § 98. Of the Intelligence— As Activity. § 99. In Observing. § 100. In Reflecting. §101. Of the Regulative Faculty. § 102. Of the Free Will— As a Power. § 103. As Dominant. § 104. As Free. § 105. As Finite.

DIVISION SECOND DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN.*

Part I. Duties To Persons

INTRODUCTION.— § 106. General Division of Social Duties.

CHAPTER I. — Definition.— § 107. Classification Grounded on Constituents of Duty — Love, Good, Right.

CHAPTER II. — Duties to Persons Determined from the subject of Duty or from Love. § 108. Division. § 109. Sympathy. § no. Kindness. § in. Loving Endeavor. § 112. Resentment. § 113. Fortitude. § 114. Anger. § 115. Forgiveness.

CHAPTER III. — Duties of Persons Determined from the Object of Duty or from Good. — §116. Divisions. § 117. Courtesy. § 118. Truthfulness. § 119. Its Two Forms. § 120. Truth of the Heart. § 121. Veracity — Its Objects. § 122. Its Sphere. § 123. Trustfulness. § 124. Justice and Beneficence — How Related and How Distinguished. §125. Beneficence, as Related to Benevolence. § 126. The Crowning Virtue. § 127. Its Specific Forms. § 128. Modes. § 129. Measure. § 130. Its One Object or End. § 131. Justice Defined. § 132. Its Sphere.

CHAPTER IV. — Duties to Persons Determined from the Act of Duty. — § 133. Two Species of Duties thus Determined.

CONTENTS. IX

§ 134. Aim in Duty. § 135. To be Governing. § 136. And True to Its P^nd. § 137. Straightforwardness in' Performance. § 138. Harmony with Things and Events.

part 11. — Duties in the Family.

CHAPTER I. — The Family Institution. — § 139. Family Defined. § 140. Rise of Obligation. § 141. A Moral Community. § 142. Seat of Authority. § 143. Classes of Duties.

CHAPTER II. — Marital Rights and Duties. — § 144. Origin in the Marriage Covenant. § 145. Polygamy. § 146. The Parties to this Covenant Intelligent and Free. § 147. Sanctity of the Marriage Union. § 148. How Solemnized. § 149. Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife Equal and Reciprocal. § 150. Authority Joint and Indivisible. §151. Rights and Duties Complementary.

CHAPTER III. — Parental and Filial Rights and Duties. — § 152. Origin and Limitation of these Duties in the Family Relation. § 153. Rights and Duties Correlative. § 154. Duties of Parents. §155. Duties of Children. §156. Finiteness of the Obligation.

CHAPTER IV. — Fraternal Rights and Duties,- Origin and Limit in the Family. § 158. Equal, Reciprocal, and Complementary. § 159. Special Duties.

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Part III. Duttes In The State

CHAPTER T. — End and Moral Nature of the State. — § 160. State Denned. § 161. Its Origin. § 162. Organized. § 163. Sphere. § 164. A Power. § 165. Seated in the Free- Will. § 166. Working Through Organs. § 167. The End of the State Life. § 1 6b. Its Moral Attributes. § 169. Not a Mere Jural Society § 170. Comprehensive Duties of the State as Moral.

CHAPTER II. — The Rights and Duties of a State in X CONTENTS

Relation to Itself. — i. Existence. — §171. Enumeration. §172. Right of Existence. § 173. Origin of States. §§ 174, 175. Threefold Duty in Self-Preservation. § 176. Support. § 177. Right to Property and Service of Citizens. § 178. Taxes. § 179. Direct Taxes. § 180. Capitation Taxes. § 181. Excise Duties. § 182. Imposts. § 183. Stamps. § 184. Income Taxes. § 185. National Self-Defense. § 186. Maintenance of Authority. § 187. Sanctions of Law. § 188. Rewards. § 189. Penalties and their Primary End, Prevention of Disobedience. § 190. A Second End of Penalty, — Moral Teaching of the Community. § 191. A Third End — Reformation of the Offender. § 192. Modes of Punishment. § 193. Degrees of Penalty Vary with the Nature of the Offence. § 194. With Facility of Detection. § 195. With Number and Strength of Offenders. § 196. With the Moral Sentiment of the Community.

CHAPTER III.— Political Autonomy. — § 197. Autonomy Defined. § 198. Ground of Right. § 199. Duty. § 200. Spheres. § 201. Organic Laws. § 202. The Legislature. § 203. The Judiciary. § 204. Legal Rights and Equities. § 205. The Executive.

CHAPTER IV.— Political Growth.— § 206. Right and Duty of Growth. § 207. Spheres. § 208. Maxims. § 209. Rights and Modes of Territorial Extension. § 210. Increase of Population. § 211. Internal Strength. § 212. Public Improvements. § 213. Weights and Measures. § 214. Money Defined. § 215. Standard and Unit of Value ; Material. § 216. Elements of a Sound Monetary System. § 217. Postal Facilities. $ 218. Development of Resources. § 219. Classes of Industries. § 220. Relation of the State to its Productive Industries ; — Limitation of its Duty. § 221. Modes of Fostering Private Productive Industry. § 222. Free Trade and its Limitations. § 223. Public Health. § 224. Public Education. § 225. Degree of Public Education. § 226. Modes. § 227. Public Morals — The Duty of the State to Promote Morality. § 228. Modes.

CHAPTER V.— The State and the Citizen.— § 229. Citizen Defined. § 23c. Rights of Individuals in the State — to Pursue the End of their Being. § 231. Freedom of Thought and Action. § 232. Protection. § 233. Special Help. § 234. Duties of Individuals to the State — Loyalty. §235. Obedience. §236. Support. § 237. Self-Expatriation.

CONTENTS. xi

CHAPTER VI.^-International Morality. — § 238. International Law — its Divisions. § 239. Sources. § 240. Peculiarities of Internationa] Obligations. §241. Specific Duties — Sympathetic Good Will. § 242. Lex Talionis. § 243. Political Retaliation Vindictive or Amicable. § 244. Comity of Nations. § 245. Rules ot" Comity. § 246. Truthfulness. § 247. Justice. § 248. Beneficence. § 249. International Integrity. § 250. Rights of War. § 251. Recognizable War Must be Public. § 252. Prosecuted by Armed Force. § 253. Have Ostensible Ground of Justice. § 254. Parties Affected by War — Non-Combatants. § 255. Neutrals.

DIVISION THIRD DUTIES TO GOD.

CHAPTER I.— § 256. Nature and Ground. § 257. Will of God — How Revealed. § 258. Classification of Religious Duties.

CHAPTER II.— Personal Religion — Piety Towards God. — § 259. Piety Defined. § 260. Religious Gratitude.

CHAPTER III.— Personal ReliCxIon — Reverence, Prayer. — § 261. Reverence. § 262. Prayer — its Constituents. § 263. Its Characteristics. § 264. Obligations to Prayer. § 265. Objections to Prayer. § 266. Irreverence.

CHAPTER IV. — Personal Religion — Godly Sincerity. — § 267. Defined. § 268. True Thought of God. § 269. True Expression to Him. § 270. Idolatry- § 27 c Superstition. § 272. Hypocrisy. § 273. Formality.

CHAPTER V. — Personal Religion — Religious Trust — Obedience and Service.— § 274. Religious Trust. §275. Qualities. § 276. Obedience. § 277. Qualities. § 278. Service. § 279. Qualities. § 280. Vows.

CHAPTER VI. — Personal Religion — Religious Integrity. — § 281. Singleheartedness. § 282. Unswerving Directness. § 283 In Parallelism with all Lines of Duty. § 284. In Moderation.

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Xll CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VII.— Social Religion— Family Religion.—' § 285. Spheres of Social Religion. § 286. Obligations to Family Religion. § 287. Religious Solemnization of Marriage. §288. Religious Ordering of the Household. § 289. Special Duties. § 290. Worship.

CHAPTER VIII.— Social Religion— State Religion.—

§ 291. Relations of Religion to the Political Community. § 29 2 Special Religious Duties in the State — (1.) Must not Act Irreligi ously. § 293. (2.) Must Protect Citizens in their Religion. § 294 (3.) May Enlist Religion in Marriage. § 295. (4.) Recognize. Religious Seasons. § 296. (5.) Appoint Special Religious Obser vances. § 297. (6.) Enlist Religious Sanctions — Oaths. § 298. Four Kinds of Oaths. § 299. Interpretation of Oaths.

CHAPTER IX. — Social Religion— The Church.— § 300. Religious Association Natural. § 301. Divers Forms and Relations to the State. § 302. Religious Officials. § 303. Sacred Seasons. § 304. The Sabbath. § 305. Obligations to Observe the, Sabbath. § 306. Sacred Places. § 307. Worship.

Introduction

§ i. Ethics is well defined to be the Ethics defined. Science of Human Duty.

The science has otherwise been named Moral Science, Moral PJiilosophy ; also, Deontology, from the Greek, signifying science of duty.

In analogy with other sciences which Methods. relate to life and conduct, a system of

ethical science may look more to the principles of duty ; or to the application of these principles to practice ; or, still further, to the result of this application of principles to practice in forming character. The definitions have varied accordingly ; and the respective systems founded on these definitions become, characteristically, either sciences of the Laws of Duty, or sciences of the Duties of Man, or sciences of Human Character.

While the method of unfolding the science varies somewhat with these various modes of regarding the science, the substance of the exposition is not, or certainly need not be, materially varied. Ethics never becomes, like Arithmetic or Rhetoric, a proper art ; it does not, by apposite examples and exercises, put the learner at the time of the study upon the practice of one after another of the particular duties which it enjoins, nor upon the specific applications of its principles to the conduct. It remains a proper science, whether its more immediate aim be to unfold the principles of duty, or the application of these principles to conduct, or the character which the principles if applied would form.

Moreover, the exposition of the science must cover substantially the same ground whether it founds its method more in the principles of duty, or in their application in specific duties, or in the results in character.

§ 2. Ethical science is founded directpSTdjJff°" ly on psychology, or the science of mind. It accepts thus the enumeration and the classification of mental phenomena, together with their origin and relations, which psychology teaches. It goes beyond that science, inasmuch as taking up one of the three great departments of mental phenomena, or, in other words, one of these departments of mental activity as defined and explained in psychology, it presents that in respect to its laws and its general forms.

Ethics, accordingly, accepts from psychology its doctrine in regard to the human will as one of the three great functions of the mind ; its exposition of what its precise function is ; how it is modified in its action ; how it is related to the other functions of the mind — the sensibility and the intelligence. With this doctrine of the nature and relations of the will furnished to it by psychology, Ethics proceeds to unfold the laws which must govern in a pure and perfect act of will, and the forms in which the will exerts itself under these laws.

In the same way, Logical Science takes from psychology the doctrine of the intelligence — what it is in its essential nature and relations — and then proceeds to derive its necessary laws and its valid forms. As thought is the proper product of the intelligence, Logic is defined as the science of thought ; or inasmuch as the perfect in thought is truth, logic is the science of truth.

^Esthetical science, also, accepts the psychological doctrine of the sensibility — its nature and modifications— and then proceeds from this doctrine to unfold its laws and its general modes or states under these laws. As it is form which is the sole object of the sensibility, aesthetics is defined as the science of form. Or inasmuch as the perfect in form is known as the beautiful, aesthetics is the science of beauty.

Inasmuch as a perfect act of will in man is duty, Ethics is the science of duty.

., § 3- Ethics, accordingly, with Logic

Co-ordinate with 3 ° . ' b J ' &

Logic and JE&- and ^Esthetics, makes up the group of sciences founded on the three great departments of mental phenomena which are presented in psychology. The three sciences have a common parentage and are related to one another as strictly co-ordinate sciences.

Sir William Hamilton calls them the three nomological sciences, which respectively present the laws of the three great forms of mental activity, all in like manner derived from psychology which presents simply the facts of mental activity.

§ 4. The proper method in ethical Method. science will be, first, by a careful anal-

ysis of an act of duty to ascertain precisely what elements necessarily enter into duty and make it what it is, and thus ascertain the essential principles of duty ; and then to enumerate and classify the general forms in which acts of duty appear, under the manifold modifications of human experience.

When we have ascertained precisely what it is that makes an act one of duty — a moral act — then we know what must characterize all duty ; what characters it must have in order to be duty ; in other words, we know the laws of duty or the principles of right action. And when we have ascertained the general forms in which the free-will exerts itself in acts of duty, by a careful exploration of the field of human experience so far as it is characterized as moral, we are enabled to apply to all these forms the laws of duty which we have ascertained. We are enabled, in other words, to determine in regard to all human action what is truly moral in it, and also, on the other hand, to determine what must enter into every form of human ac« tion in order to make it truly moral.

This treatise will therefore present in the first book — Theoretical Morality — a full analysis of an act of duty, in order to determine its essential nature ; and in the second — Practical Morality — the specific duties pertaining to human life.

ANALYSIS 01- AN ACT OF DUTY.

BOOK I.

THEORETICAL MORALITY THE NATURE OF DUTY.

CHAPTER I.

ANALYSIS OF AN ACT OF DUTY.

§ 5. It was a received tradition among instance of duty, the Romans that some two centuries

and a half before our era, a certain general of theirs, of the name of Regulus, having been made a prisoner by the Carthaginians, was sent back to Rome to effect an exchange of prisoners under an oath that he would return to Carthage in case of failure ; that Regulus failed in this errand, but resolutely and against the protestations of friends, kept his oath, and returned to Carthage to certain torture and death. Cicero tells us that such was the sentiment of the age in regard to the inviolable sanctity of an oath, that Regulus would not have been allowed to do otherwise.

The tradition may have been authentic or not. However this may be, the story exemplifies what will be recognized by all as an act of duty. It was the duty of Regulus to return to Carthage in fulfilment of his oath ; he at least recognized it as such ; his return was an act of duty. He did that which was due to the Carthaginians — that which was owed to them ; for the term duty, derived to our language from the Latin through the French, means simply that which is owed. Or, at least, he owed it to himself— to his self-respect, to his conscience — to keep his oath. By returning, he simply discharged a debt.

It is immaterial how the debt was contracted ; how the obligation was created. It is enough that, in a proper sense of the word, Regulus owed his return to Carthage, and his act of returning was, consequently, an act of duty.

If now we scrutinize this act of Regulus,

ekmente. we discover three elements in it which are very prominent, and which imply one another, so that the supposed removal of either one would essentially change the character of the act and would also involve the removal of the other elements. They are (i) a person owing — Regulus ; (2) a person or persons — the Carthaginians — or at least himself — to whom there is something due ; and (3) the act discharging what is owed — the return to Carthage. It is plain, moreover, that these three elements are the exhaustive elements of this order or class in the act. There is no other. They are complementary elements.

We have thus given us on the bare inspection of this act of Regulus, the three essential elements

ANALYSIS OF AN ACT OF DUTY. Q

— a personal agent owing duty, a person or persons to whom this duty is owed, and an act discharging this duty. We use language correctly in denominating these elements respectively a moral person or agent ; a moral end or object ; and a moral action.

We shall proceed to unfold in order, in separate chapters, these several elements and the several constituents of each.

IO THEORETICAL MORALITY.

CHAPTER II.

SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON.

§ 6. A moral person may be defined Moral person to De a being capable of duty.

It is the same thing to say that a moral person is a being capable of obligation, — that is, a being capable of owing and of fulfilling obligation— as to say that he is a being capable of duty — that is, a being capable of owing and fulfilling duty.

In the present treatise we confine our view to human duty ; and thus we speak of moral persons so far as subjects of duty only as men. In this restricted view, the term duty is synonymous with virtue, which is a term from the Latin signifying manhood ; an act of duty being in the case of men simply an act of true or perfect manhood, or an act which a true and perfect man would do.

§ 7. Indispensable to a moral person Mental requisites. thus defined as a being capable of duty,

is the essential attribute of a human mind or soul, viz. : — An active nature endowed with the threefold function of sensibility, intelligence, and free-will.

SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I I

§ 8. A moral person is an essentially i. Active nature, active being.

In this statement are involved these two particulars : —

i. That a person is moral only in so far as he is active ; and

2. That his very nature impels him to act.

The proof of the first of these two particular propositions is found in the very notion of duty, as already indicated. A duty is an act. So far as it is owed it is an act to be done : and when it is fulfilled, it is fulfilled only by an act.

All morality, hence, respects an active nature. Every moral person must be one capable of acting or one who is acting or who has acted. If we speak of a moral state, or a moral condition, of a moral habit or a moral disposition, of moral character, or moral responsibility, there is necessarily implied in the expression, a nature capable of action, or acting, or that has acted. Simple and clear as this is, ethical theories and ethical discussions have run into pernicious error by dropping out of view this essential element of activity which must exist in everything that is moral.

Secondly, every moral person is by his very nature impelled to act. It is as natural for him to act, and of course, to act morally, as it is for a stone, when unsupported, to fall to the ground, or for a plant to put forth stalk and leaf, or for an animal to take food. He may within certain limits act in this way or in that, but he cannot refrain from acting in some way. He may act feebly or he may act with energy ; — he may, to some extent, control the de* gree of activity which he will put forth ; but he must act in some degree. Indolence is never absolute inaction.

§ 9. One of the three general and essen- 2. sensibility. ^m\ functions of a moral nature is Sensibility.

Regulus felt himself bound by his oath to return to Carthage. Without this feeling, his return could not possibly have been a moral act : so far as any personal morality on his part is concerned, he might as well have been returned a corpse or in a state of utter unconsciousness. Duty to be fulfilled must be felt to be owed.

The analysis of this feeling of duty, as psychology teaches us, gives as its constituent elements, (1) the impression made upon the sensibility of Regulus by the memory of his oath ; and (2) the impulse or instinctive tendency occasioned by this impression to fulfil the oath, by returning to Carthage. His memory kept pressing on his sensibility the idea of his oath and this kept alive the impulse to fulfil it. The complex feeling, consisting of the impression and this kind of impulse, is known as desire.

In the case of Regulus, as in common instances of duty, desire to fulfil duty is mingled with desires or tendencies in an opposite direction. Regulus, doubtless, felt a strong desire to avoid the ignominy, the torture, and the cruel death which threatened his return to his enemies who would be infuriated by his failure to bring the prisoners ; a strong desire also to gratify the earnest wishes of his coun-

SUBJECT OF DUTY A MORAL PERSON. I 3

trymen, of his friends, of his family, to remain in Rome. But with these desires, there was also the desire of fulfilling duty. It was this desire that prevailed over the others ; at least, it was this desire which was the occasion of his determining- to return. Without that, such a determination is inconceivable as a moral action.

§ 10. The second general function es- 3. intelligence, sential in a moral nature, is Intelligence. Regulus knew his duty as well as felt it. Nor could there be duty or fulfilment of it without such intelligence. He must have known his oath. As his memory recalled it, he recognized it as real, as binding, as involving certain acts which he understood very well. Had he been without any knowledge of any such oath ever having been made, or of its having any binding force upon him, or of the acts which it required of him, there could have been no fulfilment of duty, no morality, even if he had in some way been taken back to Carthage.

Intelligence or knowledge of duty, thus, is essential in all morality. This knowledge respects the three general attributes of duty : —

First, That it is real — that it exists ;

Secondly, That it is in its essential character binding or obligatory ; and

Thirdly, That it involves action, which action, also, is intelligible as to its particular attributes.

Among these attributes of the particular action which must be recognized in all duty or morality are : —

First, The end or object of the action ;

Secondly, The particular activity to be exerted in accomplishing this end ; and

Thirdly, The mode of exerting this activity.