Elements of psychology

Preface

THE governing aim in the preparation of this work has been to furnish a suitable text-book for beginners in metaphysical studies. It has been written predominantly for use in the class-room ; and is designed to serve as introductory both to the higher and more critical discussions of the phenom ena of mind usually given in the lectures at colleges and universities and also to the study of the derived sciences of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. With these three sciences, which form what has been denomi nated by Sir William Hamilton Nomological Psy chology, its subject matter makes up the entire cir cle of the mental sciences.

In preparing the work, the general field of psy chological literature, as it has been cultivated up to the present time in this country, in Great Britain, and in continental Europe, has been studiously ex plored, so that all the established results of the most recent investigations might be incorporated into it. This accumulated mass of knowledge, the endeavor has been to reduce into a strictly systematic and scientific form, a form that is indeed the simplest for apprehension by others when attained, but the latest and most difficult of attainment in the progress of science. Something more than accurate presenta-

195032

IV PREFACE.

tions of the observed facts of mental action, some thing more than generalizations of these facts under their appropriate heads, has been aimed at. The endeavor has been to reduce these generalized facts to the exactness of scientific system, in which all the parts are exhibited in their organic interdepen dence and relation both to the common whole and to one another. The phenomena of mind are thus presented as the manifestations, the affections and the operations, of a single active nature in the diver sity of its functions and of its relations to the beings and objects to which it is related. The general at tributes of the human mind having been enumerated and explained, the particular phenomena of mental activity, the facts of sensibility, intelligence, and will, are exhibited as the states of a single active nature which, while revealing more prominently and characteristically sometimes this and sometimes that side of its composite life, never wholly drops out of its phenomenal action any constituent element of its being.

The particular phenomena of mind as classified subjectively by psychologists generally at the present time under the departments of intelligence, sensi bility, and will, are in this work treated in the light of their respective relation and correspondence to the old and still unquestioned classes of phenomena handed down to us from antiquity under the object ive enumeration of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Psychological science, in the light of this correspondence, it is believed, is enabled to exhibit its phenomena in a new clearness and impressiveness.

PREFACE. V

The order of treatment, hitherto adopted, has been in this work varied by giving priority to the department of the sensibility before that of the intelligence. This is unquestionably the order of natural manifestation, as we must have sense of an object — must be impressed by it — before we can think of it. This natural order, as might be antici pated, prevents much obscurity and confusion and consequent error in the explanation of certain men tal states, particularly those of the imagination and memory. These two states have been generally, and of course very erroneously, presented under the in telligence or cognitive function.

Further, the department of the sensibility has been treated with more fullness and more scientific method than has been usual heretofore. This de partment has been far less cultivated than the departments of the intelligence and the will. Yet even these functions are so closely and vitally related to that of the sensibility that they cannot be fully and accurately shown except in their relation of interdependence to the sensibility.

This elementary work in mental science is con tributed to our text-book literature, in the earnest hope that it may be found to be serviceable in some degree to the elevation of the study of mind to its true and proper rank in the circle of educationaJ studies.

NEW HAVEN, February, 1876.

Contents

INTRODUCTION. — § i. DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY. — § 2. SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE. — § 3. PROVINCE OF PSY CHOLOGY.

Book I. General Attributes Of Mind

CHAPTER I. — THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND. — § 4. The Mind essentially Active. § 5. Definition of Mind. § 6. Three forms of Mental Activity.

CHAPTER II. — THE SINGLENESS AND SIMPLICITY OF MIND. — § 7. The Mind Single and Simple. § 8. Each Mind a Distinct Unit § 9. Mind not the same as its Object. § 10. Mind Homo geneous.

CHAPTER III. — THE FINITENESS AND DEPENDENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. — § n. The Human Mind Limited and Dependent; —in its Range. § 12. In its Intensity. § 13. In its Dependence on Objects. §§ 14-16. The Dependence of Mind on its Objects, Three fold.

CHAPTER IV.— THE PASSIVITY OF THE HUMAN MIND.— § 17 The Human Mind Passive. § 18. The Mind Passive in Respect •- Objects Without. § 19. In Respect to its Own States. § 20. Impressions on the Mind Vary. § 21. Mind Active and Pas sive in Every Experience. § 22. Pleasures from its Activity and Susceptibility.

vii

Vlll CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V. — THE CONTINUOUSNESS OF MIND. — § 23. The Mind Continuous in its Activity and its Passivity. § 24. Habit. § 25. Mental Growth.

CHAPTER VI. — THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OF MIND. — § 26. The Mind Conscious of its own Acts and Beliefs. § 27. Self-Con sciousness Respects not the Mind Itself but its Modifications. § 28. In Self-Consciousness, the Mind both Knows and Feels. § 29. Self-Consciousness Varies in Degree.

CHAPTER VII. — THE RELATIVENESS OF MIND TO ITS OB JECTS. — IDEAS. — § 30. The Mind Knows Only in Relation to its Objects. § 31. Ideas, What. § 32. Nothing but Idea Object to the Mind. § 33. Nothing but Mind Subject for Idea. § 34. Twofold Relation between Mind and Idea. § 35. Idea More Exactly Defined § 36. Any Expressed Idea Apprehensible either as True, or as Beautiful, or as Good. § 37. The True. § 38. The Beautiful, § 39. The Good. § 40. The True, the Beautiful, the Good, Respectively Objects for the Intelligence, the Sensibility, and the Will-

CHAPTER VIII.— § 41. Symbols of Mind.

Book II. The Sensibility

CHAPTER I. — ITS NATURE AND ITS MODIFICATIONS — §§ 42- 44. The Sensibility Defined and Explained. §§ 45,46. Form. § 47- The Imagination. § 48. The Two Departments of the Phenomena of the Sensibility. §§ 49-54. The Feelings Distinguished into Classes.

CHAPTER II.— PLEASURE AND PAIN.— § 55. Pleasure and Pain Defined. § 56. Distinguishable in Thought from both act and feeling. §57. Degrees. § 58. Attendant on Every Mental Ex perience. §§ 59-63. Modifications.

CHAPTER III.— THE SENSATIONS.— § 63. Sensation Defined. § 64. Referable Solely to Mind. § 65. Medium of Sensation. § 66. The Nerves, — Two Classes. § 67. Sensation the Same, whatever Part of the Nerve is Affected. § 68. Sensations Classified § 69. Simple Bodily Pleasure and Pain. § 70. General Vital Sense. § 71. General Organic Sense. § 72. Special Sense. § 73. Touch. § 74. Taste. § 75. Smell. § 76. Hearing. § 77. Sight.

CONTENTS. IX

CHAPTER IV.— THE EMOTIONS.— § 78. Emotion Defined. §§ 79.8o. Three General Classes of Emotions. § 81. Intellectual Sense. §82, Aesthetic Sense, — Beautiful, Sublime, Comic. §83. Moral Sense.

CHAPTER V.— THE AFFECTIONS.— § 84. Affections Defined. § 85. Love and Hate. § 86. Habitual Dispositions. § 87. Affec tions in Relation to Their Objects. § 88. Resentments.

CHAPTER VI.— THE DESIRES.— §§89,90. Desires Defined and Characterized. § 91. Aversions. § 92. Desires Classified in Reference to Capability of the Soul. § 93. Appetites. § 94. Ra tional Desires. § 95. Social Desires. § 96. Hopes and Fears.

CHAPTER VII.— THE SENTIMENTS.— § 97. Sentiments De fined. § 98. Sentiments Classified. § 99. Contemplative Senti ments. § 100,101. Practical or Moral Sentiments.

CHAPTER VIII.— THE PASSIONS.— § 102. The Passions De fined and Classified.

CHAPTER IX. — THE IMAGINATION. — § 103. The Imagination Defined. § 104. Diverse Denominations of the Faculty. § 105. The Nature Illustrated. §§ 106-108. Ideals Defined and Classified

CHAPTER X.— THE IMAGINATION.— SENSE-IDEALS.— § 109. Sense-Ideals Defined. §§ 110,111. Sense-Ideals, as Related to the Sensuous Organism and to the Mind. § 112. Phantoms. § 113. Exalted Sensibility. § 114. Suspended Sensibility. § 115. Dream ing. § 116. Catalepsy. § 117. Somnambulism.

CHAPTER XI.— THE IMAGINATION— SPIRITUAL IDEALS;— § 118. Spiritual Ideals Defined. § 119. Spiritual Ideals Analyzed and Exemplified.

CHAPTER Xll.— MEMORY.— § 120. Memory Defined. § 121. Its Law. § 122-126. Conditions and Special Rules of a good Memory.

CHAPTER XIII.— MENTAL REPRODUCTION.— ! 127. Mental Reproduction Defined. § 128. Mental Reproduction, Spontaneous or Voluntary. — Revery. §§ 129-135. Laws of Mental Association. § 136 Voluntary Reproduction. §§ 137-140. Rules of Recollection

CHAPTER XIV.— THE THREEFOLD FUNCTION OF THE IMAGINATION. — § 141. The Three Functions of the Imagination

A*

X CONTENTS.

Enumerated. § 142. The Artistic Imagination — ^Esthetics. § 143 The Philosophical Imagination. — Logic. § 144. The Practical Imagination. — Ethics.

Book III. The Intelligence

CHAPTER I. — NATURE AND MODIFICATIONS. — § 147 Intel ligence Defined. §§ 148-151. Its Modifications.

CHAPTER II.— PERCEPTION.— § 152. Perception Defined § 153. Relations to Sensation. § 154. Sphere of Perception. §§ I5S-IS7- Kmc* of Knowledge given by Perception.

CHAPTER III.— INTUITION.— §§ 158-159. Intuition Defined. § 160. Sphere of Intuition. §§ 161,162. Kind of Knowledge given by Intuition.

CHAPTER IV.— THOUGHT.— §§ 163,164. Thought Defined. § 165. The Three Essential Elements. § 166. Thought or Act of the Discursive Intelligence. § 167. Its Three Forms. § 168. The Judgment. § 169. The Concept. § 170. The Reasoning. § 171. Classes of Attributes. § 172. Intrinsic Attributes — Qualities and Actions. § 173. Essential and Accidental Properties. § 174. At tributes of Relation and of Condition.

CHAPTER V.— THE CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT.— §§ 175, 176. Category Defined. § 177. The Category of Identity and Dif ference. § 178. The Category of Quantity. § 179. The Category of Modality. § 180. The Category of Properties and Relations. § 181. Categories of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good.

CHAPTER VI.— EXISTENCE.— § 182. The Reality of Objects. § 183. Mind. § 184. Matter. § 185. Universe. § 186. Substan ces and Causes. § 187. Space and Time.

CHAPTER VII.— INTELLECTUAL APPREHENSION AND REP- RESENTATION.— § 188. Intelligence as Capacity and as Faculty § 189. Intellectual Apprehension. § 190. Intellectual Representa tion.

CHAPTER VIII. — CURIOSITY AND ATTENTION. — § 191. In. telligence Instinctive or Voluntary. § 192. Curiosity. § 193. At tention.

CONTENTS. XI

CHAPTER I. — NATURE AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE WILL, -§ 194. Will Defined

CHAPTER II.— CHOICE.— §§ 195-199. Choice Exemplified and Explained. §§ 200-203. Free Personality Analyzed.

CHAPTER III.— MOTIVE.— § 204. Motive Defined. §§ 205. 206. Motive ever a Good to the Whole Soul and in the Mind. §§ 208,209. Motives Classified as External and Internal.

CHAPTER IV.— GROWTH AND SUBORDINATIONS OF WILL. — §§ 210,211. The Will a Power Capable of Growth. § 212. De pendence of Will. § 213. Governing and Subordinate Volitions.

CHAPTER V. — CONSCIENCE. — §§ 214, 215. Conscience — Its Motive and Elements. § 216. Discernment of Right and Wrong. § 217. Sentiment of Obligation. § 218. Sense of Approval. § 219. Conscience Influenced by Will.

CHAPTER VI.— HOPE, FAITH, AND LOVE.— § 220. Hope, Faith, Love, as Virtues. § 221. Hope Defined. § 222. Faith De fined. § 223. Lo ;e Defined.

OF THE

UNIVERSITY

OF

INTRODUCTION,

§ 1. PSYCHOLOGY is the science of the Psychology human mind.

The term psychology is from the Greek language, and properly signifies a discourse upon the soul or mind.

As a science, psychology professes to set forth the facts pertaining to the human mind or soul in logical order and completeness.

The terms mind, soul, and spirit are all used to denote that in man which thinks, feels, and wills. They are used, however, often with different shades of meaning. The word mind points rather to the thinking faculty, the intelligence ; soul indicates more immediately the feeling capacity, the sense ; while spirit rather regards the rational nature that wills and directs its own acts. Other synonymous terms are conscious subject, the self, ego, the human consciousness.

§ 2. The one source from which we obtain our knowledge of the facts of mind is experience. This experience is either our own or that of others as shown in their expressed acts.

As we shall see, the more essential facts of mind

2 INTRODUCTION.

are its operations, because it is essentially of an ac tive nature. We are able to take notice of the opera tions of our own minds. Men of reflection in all ages have sought to know themselves, their feelings, their thoughts, their endeavors ; the various kinds of their mental operations ; and the relations of those acts or states to one another and to their respective objects. These observations and studies have been recorded ; have been compared ; and thus the world has ever been increasing its knowledge of the mind. Moreover, men have framed language, have intro duced words and shaped sentences, so as to set forth more exactly their thoughts. Thus it has come to pass that the language of men is a rich treasurehouse of information in regard to the facts of mind. The literature of the world which contains the record of what man has done, what he has experienced, what he has observed in himself and the world around him, what he has thought and suffered and achieved, is the grand repository of knowledge in regard to the nature and the attributes of the human mind.

In fact, it is in language, in the varying significa tions of words, which must vary to mark the progress of knowledge, that we find not only the best light in the study of mind, but also the occasion of the most serious mistake and error and dispute, just as a changing, intermitting light may mislead, even although it be the only guide we can obtain.

§ 3. From these facts — these phenom- PrycVhob vf ena — °* mm<3, gathered from the univer sal experience of men through personal

INTRODUCTION. 3

observation and study of the experience of others recorded in language and literature, we are enabled to discern the general characters or attributes of mind and thus far to know its nature. It is accord ingly the particular province of psychology to set forth in order and completeness the general charac teristics or attributes of mind.

All true knowledge is in fact but knowledge of attributes. All our knowledge of the sun consists in our knowing certain attributes belonging to it, as that it is round, is bright, is in the heavens, is centre of the planetary system, and the like. Of the sun as a substance, apart from its attributes, we know nothing ; at least we know nothing more than this, that it is not the moon, is not the earth, is not any thing else that we can name. All positive know ledge terminates in attributes. When we know all the attributes of an object, we know everything that can be known in relation to it ; while we gain no knowledge of it whatever, until we recognize some attribute belonging to it. All science, accord ingly, searches for attributes ; deals with attributes ; and deals with nothing else. Psychology, as a sci ence, consequently, seeks only to recognize the at tributes of mind, enumerate them all in their proper order, and exhibit them in their respective relations to one another, and to their several objects.

We have thus the proper method of studying the mind prescribed to us. We are to gather up the facts of mind, for the purpose of finding all the general attributes of mind. We are then to exhibit these attributes one by one in such way as to show

4 INTRODUCTION.

that our survey of these attributes is complete, ano that no one is omitted, since this assurance of com pleteness it is the very object of a science to give. We are to exhibit them, moreover, in their true re lations to one another ; and, also, inasmuch as the mind will be found to be but part of the vast whole of creation, in their true relations to other things so far as they may become objects to it.

Our method, accordingly, will lead us, in Method. the first part of our study, to exhibit the

general attributes of mind, and in the three subsequent parts respectively, to exhibit in or der the special attributes of the mind as essentially of an active nature, as affecting other minds and objects, and as equally affected by them.

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND.

Book I. Chapter I

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND.

§ 4. The mind is essentially active. Mind essentially AS we survev the facts of mind — its

active. J

phenomena — we discover everywhere an active nature. There is not a fact which does not reveal this activity. Our thoughts are active ; our purposes are active ; our feelings even are the modi fications of an active nature. The feelings of the human soul are not like impressions on an inactive substance as on a stone. So essential is activity in them that they are in a certain truth sometimes reckoned as the active powers of the mind.

It is by this property of activity that mind is distinguished from matter, which is the only other kind of being of which we have any knowledge. Matter is inactive, inert ; it moves only as it is moved, and just as it is moved ; it is moved only by mind as the only moving force of which we know anything. Matter is not only motionless but also formless, ex cept as it is moved and shaped by mind.

The best definitions that can be given of mind are accordingly those which define it through this

attribute.

§ 5. If we define mind by distinguishing

Mind defined, it from all other being, we have the defi nition : MIND IS THAT KIND OF BEING

WHICH ACTS ; while matter, the only other kind of being, is that which is inert or incapable in itself of action. Or, if we define it by its characteristic properties, we have the definition : MIND is THAT

WHICH THINKS, AND FEELS, AND WILLS.

This then is the fundamental and essential at tribute of mind — activity. As we shall see, all other attributes are really but modifications or character istics of mind as active. So that wherever there is mind there is activity, as the essential element.

Not only is activity the essential attri- Actiyity peculiar bute of mind, but it is peculiar to mind.

There is no activity that we know of which is not the activity of mind, or the proper and sole result of its activity. On the other hand, wher ever there is activity, there we discover mind im mediately or remotely revealed. All causes are but modes of mental activity. And as we, instinctively as it were, demand for all things a cause, and if we recognize second causes, still demand a first great cause, and can conceive of such cause only as a determination of some mind ; so we are forced to regard mind as the only activity of which we can conceive. At least, psychology, which is a science of observation, recognizing the fact that mind does originate action, — that its purposes act upon thoughts and feelings, on other minds, on matter even, mov-

THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MIND. 7

ing the limbs and other organs of the body and through them even material objects without, — recog nizing this fact and observing no motion or effect which it cannot account for on the ground that it is the immediate or remote effect of the action of mind, does not regard itself as called upon to suppose any other activity. Until proof is brought to it, this sci ence cannot in its teachings recognize that there is any activity other than that of mind.

§ 6. There are to be recognized three very Three forms of different f orms or kinds of mental activ-

mental activity.

ity; in other words, we observe three dif ferent functions of the human mind. If an orange be put into the hand, the mind at once feels certain im pressions made upon it ; there is a feeling of softness, of roundness, of agreeable perfume. The mind feels from some object out of itself. One function of the mind then is feeling. This, its function of feeling, is called the sensibility. The mind also through these senses of touch and smell and still more through that of sight, perceives this exterior object ; it knows it to be there in the hand, it knows it to have these attributes of form and smell and color ; the mind thus perceives and knows ; and this, its function of know ing, is called the intelligence. Moreover the mind de termines to hold fast the orange, to move it before its eye, to smell or taste it ; this is another form of its activity ; and this, its function of determining, is called the will.

We can discover no other form of mental activity ; we can conceive of no other. These three forms are equally necessary each to the others. We cannot know or choose the orange, until the orange has been introduced to our intelligence and our will through some impression upon us, through some feeling : and all feeling in man is more than mere impression on a blindly passive, immovable rock ; it is impression on that which knows it feels and which determines and acts ; as for instance, by throw ing off the impression, or by allowing it and then per mitting its thought to rest upon it and then perhaps determining upon some act in relation to it.

These three great functions of the mind pre senting three different departments of mental activity or three distinct classes of mental phenomena, mark out the three grand divisions of psychology which treat respectively of the three specific forms of mental activity or the three special functions of the human mind.

THE SINGLENESS AND SIMPLICITY OF MIND. 9

Chapter II. The Singleness And Simplicity Of Mind

§ 7. The human mind is single and sim-

Mind single and r)\Q. simple,

It is single in the sense that it is one by itself, separate from all other beings. It is sim ple in the sense that it is homogeneous in its whole nature and cannot be decomposed into separate ele ments.

§ 8. Each mind is a unit, by itself, exist- Unityof mind. ing separately from all other minds and

from all other beings. This implies that there is a plurality of minds and that each individ ual mind is one of a number. Psychology, as a science, assumes this as a fundamental fact.

It belongs to another science to discuss the gen eral question in all its bearings, whether there is more than a single mind in the universe of being. That there is but one mind, and that consequently each human mind is an inseparable part of this one universal mind, is one form of pantheism — that of idealism — which denies the existence of matter as distinct from mind ; the other form of pantheism being that of materialism, which denies the existence of mind as distinct from matter.

IO GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OF MIND.

Psychology, which does not properly Proved from inquire into the true significance and

experience. *

proof of these pantheistic doctrines, sat isfies itself with the test of observation and expe rience. Every one knows from himself, that he is not a mere mode of existence of some one universal being. He knows of himself that the life of his mind is as distinct from that of other minds as the life of his body is distinct from that of other bodies ; that he thinks, and feels, and wills, not as a part of a universal thinking and feeling and willing, just as much as he breathes and has a sense of pain or pleasure and moves his limbs by himself and not as a part of a universal animal life. He feels a re sponsibility for many of his actions, because he knows they are his own and not those of a being called in the language of theory and speculation the absolute and the infinite. All the records of human experience unite their testimony in confirma tion of what each individual knows in his own con sciousness. Only in figurative language, used to help out the notion of the close relation between the hu man mind and the divine mind, can it be said, that there is one sole mind in the universe, one function of thinking, one of feeling, one of willing. There is a multitude of minds ; each human mind is one of this multitude, existing by itself.

§ 9. The human mind is not the same as the obJect witn which it has to do. This is another form of specula tion which has arisen in the endeavor to account for the communication between the mind and

THE SINGLENESS AND SIMPLICITY OF MIND. II

the object of which it thinks, which it feels, which it chooses. That thought and its object are one, is the unwarranted assumption of some theorists. It is enough here to reply, that this supposition is contra dicted by the testimony of each man's consciousness as well as by the records of the experiences of men gen erally. When I think of the sun, I know that the sun is different, is not one with myself, in any but a figura tive sense. I may, in a warrantable use of language, say, when I think of the sun, that the sun is in my thought, is in my mind ; but this language is strained beyond its true meaning when it is construed to imply that the sun is not external to me, and truly without my mind and as an existence separate from it.

§ 10. The human mind is homogesimpiicity of neous and cannot be decomposed into

mental action.

simpler elements.

It has in a certain sense, divers functions ; but it is the same mind that acts in each. If we distinguish the several functions of thinking, of feeling, and of willing, it is still the same one mind that is engaged in each. It is the same one river that yields to the ship that is launched into it and that bears it down its current ; that hardens its sur face under the frost and scatters spray when it dash es upon a rock. It is the same wind that chills us and drives us. We cannot separate a river into some thing that shall simply yield to a ship and some thing else that shall float it down its current ; or a wind into something that shall chill us and something else which shall beat upon us and drive us, which two things may be combined and make a wind. So we cannot separate the mind into three several things, one of which can think, another feel, and the third will. On the contrary, it is incon ceivable how the mind can think without feeling or without willing.

DEPENDENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. 13

Chapter III. The Finiteness And Dependence Of The Hu Man Mind

§ ii. The human mind is limited and Human mind lim- dependent.

ited in lange.

It is limited in its range. It can reach but a part of the universe of objects.

The range of its activity may enlarge with the expansion and growth of which its nature is capable through interminable ages, and yet a boundless uni verse will ever infinitely outstretch its largest capa city. More than this, the range of its activity varies during this progress and growth. There are times in which the mind is conscious that it has not the power which it has at other times. It feels itself at such times shut up within narrow limits, as if by a power without, so that it cannot exert itself with the grasp and energy that it knows truly belongs to it.

§ 12. The human mind is limited also in intensity. 'm its intensity.

The force with which it acts may in crease indefinitely, but it never can become compa rable to the force of the infinite mind. In infancy and childhood it is very imbecility and weakness ; in adult life, it is relatively strong and vigorous; yet while we anticipate from the very instincts of our nature an ever advancing increase of power, this instinctive anticipation never looks forward even to a near approach to the power of the infinite mind. So, too, it is variable in respect to the strength already in a sense acquired. At one time it is listless, dull, heavy, even as compared with what it had been a few hours before. At another time it is compara tively quick, bright, and vigorous ; it observes, and judges, and feels, and acts with far greater prompt ness and keenness and force.

§ 13. The human mind, moreover, is Dependent on limited in being dependent on its object for the exercise of whatever range and intensity of capacity actually belong to it. It can not act at all without an object.

After some experience, indeed, its own thoughts and feelings and endeavors may be objects to it. Upon these it may exercise its various functions with out looking out of itself. But at first absolutely, and ever to a great extent, it depends on objects out of itself. For the most part these objects are out of its reach. They must be brought to it.