The human mind, a treatise in mental philosophy

Preface

The treatise now offered to the public, though the outgrowth of studies which the author has long pursued with pleasure, immediately originated from aims which have been entertained during the last ten oi twelve years. First of all it has been his effort to compose a metaphysical system satisfactory to himself. Discontent with the various published theories of belief and conviction forced him to form new views on these fundamental topics; and, from this beginning, he was led on to attempt a general reconstruction of the philosophy of mind. While deeply conscious of imperfection both in the design and in the execution of this undertaking, he yet is confident that the leading doctrines advocated have been framed correctly, and cannot be set aside by future investigations.

Along with the desire of producing a satisfactory philosophy, the ambition arose to write a scientific book, such as every American gentleman should have for reading and for reference. During the composition of this treatise, the author has had in view those thousands of our people, whose education has interested them, more or less, in metaphysical studies. He felt assured that this considerable body of his fellow-citizens would welcome a volume in which the principal names and terms, questions and controversies, of mental philosophy might be compendiously presented and discussed. He sincerely

IV PREFACE.

hopes that the system expounded in the following pages may secure the attention and approbation of learned professors, but the treatise has not been specially prepared for them.

Finally, the adaptation of the work for use in our higher educational institutions, has been a constant aim with the author. In furtherance of this end, he has distinguished separate dissertations by the numbering of sections, has indicated speclgc topics by side-headings, and has employed many logical divisions and definitions. The advocacy of new opinions renders the book larger than would be needful, if it were merely the digest of a finished science; yet the study of the whole volume is recommended in all cases in which this may be found practicable. At the same time, certain discussions, concerning matters which are not essential to a fair knowledge of psychology, and which are not commonly considered in text-books, may properly be passed over by those who do not wish to make a speciality of metaphysics.*

Owing to circumstances which the writer would have gladly altered, had he been able, the chapters of the Human Mind were composed without any assistance from friendly consultation or criticism. Had such advantages been available, probably some defects would have been avoided, which cannot now be rectified. It has, however, been a matter for felicitation that one's lot has been cast in an age which has inherited from preceding ages the works of many men of genius, and which has been distinguished by the talent of its own philosophers. So far as possible, the author has indicated his obligations to previous thinkers, in the course of his discussions. But he here acknowledges a special indebtedness to two writers, whose influence upon his speculations has been very pervasive. The undertaking

• See note, page 721.

PREFACE. V

now completed could not have been begun with any great confidence of success, had not the mind of the author been indoctrinated and stimulated by the productions of those great philosophers — the most eminent of living metaphysicians — the presidents of Yale and of Princeton.

In conclusion, it would be ungrateful not to mention the fidelity, judgment, and skill with which Mr. John F. McCabe has superintended the manufacturing of the book. He has spared no pains in the effort to secure accurate typographical expression.

New York, July 6, 1882.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Mental Philosophy Defined and Recomiviended . . 1

II. The true Method of Philosophical Investigation . 4

Chapter I. Mental Philosophy Defined And Recommended

§ 1. Mental philosophy is the science — ^that is, the scjntifio knowi- accurate and systematized knowledge — of the intellect. When scientific knowledge is thorough and satisfactory, we know not only what a thing is, but also what it has to do with other things, and especially how it comes to be what it is. In other words, we know not only the nature of the object, but also its relations to other objects, and especially to the conditions of its existence. Mental philosophy, therefore, considers, not only thought in its various forms and developments, but also the conditions on which these depend, and all the various relations of thought.

This science is a department of psychology, which d^efine^ ^*^^'''* cmbraccs, not only mental philosophy, but also the philosophy of sensation, and that of the emotional and motive powers of the soul, and that of the will. The mind or intellect is not an existence separate from the will, or from the heart, but, like each of these, it is simply the soul or the spirit viewed with exclusive reference to one set of its powers. It is natural to us to denominate the same object in different ways as it may be viewed in different lights. Thus the same person may be spoken of as the judge, the law-giver, and the king of a people. The word intellect was originally applied to that higher power of thought to which we commonly give the term understanding; and which is an ability to perceive, not merely objects and facts, but also the reasons and relations of things. Now, however, it is very frequently used so as to include every form and development of thought, from the highest to the lowest; and thus it corresponds exactly with the word mind.

In saying that mind or intellect is the power of ^w^^to tiiink.^ thinking, we differ from an eminent authority who defines it as the power of knowing. This diflerence, perhaps, primarily regards terms, yet, even in this respect, has some importance. A wrong use of terms in philosophy is always perplexing, and frequently results in error. The words knowing^ and knoidedge^ are not generically applicable to the phenomena of intellect, because men generally are conscious of various states and acts of mind to which they never apply the term hioidedge^ and which they would deny to be knowledge; as, for example, suppositions and imaginings. But there is no mental state or operation which might not be characterized as thought, or thinking. It is true that the word thought is used in more specific senses, as well as with this general meaning. But it has the general meaning. We sometimes say that we think, but that we do not know, that so and so is the case. Thinking, when thus contrasted with knowledge, signifies a less confident and perfect conviction concerning truth. But we would also allow that, when we know, we have a thought — a conception — of that concerning which we know; and thinking, in this sense, is always a part of knowing. Again, the word thought, used emphatically, may signify an attentive and rational exercise of the intellect. We speak of persons as thoughtful and as thoughtless; just as we speak of a man of mind, and of a man without mind. We say, "Sits, fixed in thought, the mighty Stagirite." Here is another special sense which co-exists with the more general meaning of the word thought. For even the most thoughtless person is not without some form and degree of thinking.

Psychology and mental philosophy are concerned ^ntai^^clence?^ propcrly ouly with the human soul and the human

intellect. Yet there are laws common to man and to other beings both of a lower and of a higher grade of existence, and the philosopher should illustrate the stud}^ of the human mind by whatever information may be obtained from analogical instances. Important questions, too, respecting other than human beings may be incidentally treated in the course of psychological discussions.

§ 2. With some persons of intelligence, mental J^coSmenS^^^ philosophy, or at least that important portion of

it, which concerns the fundamental elements of thought and of existence, and Avhich has been named metaphysics, forms a subject of ridicule. These, mostly, are practical men who care little for abstract speculations and sometimes despise them as useless; or persons whose temperament renders them averse to the more rigorous exercises of the intellect; or those students of material nature to whom no knowledge is satisfactory save such as can be derived from physical observation and experiment. It must be allowed that the past history of philosophy has afi'orded proper subjects for the exercise of wit. Not only, in every age, have certain stupid students and teachers sought a reputation for wisdom by addicting themselves to mental science, and by uttering profound nonsense respecting abstruse questions, but even able and subtle thinkers, also, have been led, by the inherent difiiculty and intricacy of metaphysical discussions, into paradoxical and absurd opinions. Nevertheless, notwithstanding egregious mistakes, in some of which the

§2. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY DEFINED AND RECOMMENDED. 3 whole thinking world has participated, the philosophy of the human spirit has always interested many able minds; and to-day, uiore than ever, it is worthy of their pursuit. For the progress in metaphysical knowledge, which began ages ago, has been particularly rapid during the last hundred years. We have now a well-ascertained body of mental science. And, what is of greater consequence, the true methods and tests of this branch of philosophy are now so well known, that a safe and steady advancement seems to be assured for the future.

It would be idle to expect metaphysical inquiry to ilte^thriSfd?^^" afford pleasure to such as are radically unfitted or

indisposed for mental application. But we can commend this study to those who have delight in convincing and satisfactory thought on hard subjects, and who would exercise, to the fullest extent, the high faculty of reason. And, beside the exhilaration arising from the vigorous employment of one's powers, the successful student of philosophy enjoys the acquisition of clear views respecting the workings of his own nature : he comprehends what, to other men, are mysteries. He feels, also, that the subject of his investigations is of the very highest dignity. An ancient author, quoted by Hamilton, has said, "On earth there is nothing great but man; in man, there is nothing great but mind " ; and a modern poet, animated by this sentiment, teaches that "the proper study of mankind is man." These statements are true, whether we consider man's history and relations or contemplate that nature which, making him what he is, gives to him his exalted position and fits him for an immortal destiny. Man's physical structure, although this is that which allies him to the brutes and even to the inanimate creation, is the subject of a noble science. How much more elevated is the study of that psychical nature by which man is allied to spiritual intelligences, and to God Himself! For with reference, especially, to the endowments of the soul we read, " God created man in His own image."

Psychological studies, moreover, are as useful as utiHtyf "^"^^"^ they are noble. If, indeed, their only utility were

to satisfy a thirst for knowledge and to occupy the mind with pure and elevating thoughts, this, of itself, would be a great benefit ; but they have value in other respects. The mental strength to be obtained from metaphysical pursuits is one of their chief recommendations. Perhaps no other employment contributes so eifectually to develop those powers of penetration and discrimination which are the chief elements of intellectual manliness and maturity. Then, too, psychology is the necessary foundation for those arts and sciences which pertain to the proper use of the various faculties of man. It is a study indispensable to those who would improve and perfect such sciences; and of great assistance to all who would obtain a satisfactory understanding of them. Logic, which treats of the correct use of the rational faculty, is a direct outgrowth of mental philosophy; and is constantly receiving important modifications from the latter science. Ethics, also, especially in its more fundamental discussions, is based on a searching analysis of certain intellectual workings. Similar remarks apply to aesthetics, or the philosophy of taste, and to rhetoric, which is the science of the pleasing and the persuasive in human thought and speech. A wise system of education must be regulated by a true psychology. Whether we would establish efficient schools for the young, or, in a more general way, subject ourselves and others to wholesome . formative influences, we should seek the advice of mental science. Psychology, too, throws great light on theology. The former science is the necessary servant of the latter. To understand Deity we must understand man. In short, every science which, in any way, involves a consideration of the laws of spiritual existence, finds a powerful assistant in the general philosophy of mind.

Chapter II. The Teue Method Op Philosophical Investigation

§ 3. Not every one is capable of clear opinions in Btouctors.^ °^ ^" philosophy. Some find it difficult to form any opinions at all; and many, even of the intelligent, find it necessary to adopt views at second hand, without any thorough investigation, accepting what may seem most probable. Nevertheless, so far as may be, we should seek for clear convictions, founded on good reasons. This duty is particularly incumbent on teachers of philosophy. He who has no opinions of his own, had better be a learner till he may become confident as to the truth. Moreover, an instructor should express his positive opinions in a positive way. Well-established beliefs should not be uttered as if they were unsettled questions of controversy. Otherwise truth is put on a par with falsehood, or, at least, the student is bewildered in dubious debate.

At the same time the true teacher avoids even the appearance of dogmatism; he would have nothing accepted simply on his own authority. So far as possible he gives reasons for his views ; and he especially desires that others should know the method by which his convictions have been formed. For then they can judge whether the method be a correct one ; and, if so, whether, in any case, he has departed from it.

Without method no satisfactory progress can be jnwBaconian me- jnade in philosophical investigations. The importance of it cannot be over-estimated; and has always been acknowledged by thinking men ; but more especially since the true method was illustrated and advocated by Lord

§ 4. TRUE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION. 5

Bacon. The system inaugurated by this distinguished man is founded on the evident truth, that, as philosophy aims to explain facts, so it should seek that explanation in a questioning of the facts themselves. From this principle two modes of work originate, the first and more rudimentary of which is preparatory and ministerial to the other. The primary philosophy merely observes facts and classifies those which are similar, and, in this way, obtains general facts which are also the expression of certain laws or modes of nature; the more advanced philosophy carries on the investigation by analyzing the general facts already secured and co-ordinating their essential elements. By means of it we reach more profound and satisfying laws. Thus Newton, analyzing those laws, of falling bodies, of planetary motions and of projectiles, with which he was already familiar, discovered the more fundamental law of gravitation, which enters into these, and which continually operates on matter everywhere. In like manner Sir Wm. Hamilton, following the suggestions of earlier writers, has resolved those various laws of the association of ideas, which careful observation had established, into the comprehensive law of redintegration, i. e., that the mind tends to repeat fully any complex operation which it may formerly have experienced, and which it has now, in any degree, begun. In short, the laws of psychical, no less than those of physical nature, are to be learned through the ascertainment and co-ordination, the analysis and generalization, of facts. Such being the case, the student of philosophy may boldly question any doctrine, though upheld by the highest ability and learning, which can claim no record of experience or observation in its support; and as confidently hold any opinion sustained by accurately recorded and carefully analyzed phenomena. ^„ . i. ^ § 4. The statement that facts are the necessary

The importance ?. t , • p t . , , , , "^

of these princi- loundation lor philosophy may seem to some too pies, piatomsm. gyj^j^j^^ ^^ require emphasis. But the neglect of it in times past, and even in our own day, has been the source of many and great errors. The metaphysical worthlessness of almost all the ancient and of much of modern philosophy originates in the admission of high-sounding notions, the truth of which never was proved, and never could be proved, from any examination of things really existing. Only fanciful and unsatisfactory systems could be constructed after such beginnings. Plato and his followers, in ancient days, carried out the separation of philosophy from actuality more fully than any other class of thinkers; and, in modern times, this has been done most signally by the German Idealists. Plato adopted the principle that general or universal ideas are the only proper sources of knowledge and objects of study. The individual or specific he rejected as transitory and, in a sense, unreal. Such a commencement destroyed the possibility of progress. A revival of these Platonic views in an exaggerated form gave rise to the systems of Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, by which the thought of continental Europe was powerfully debauched. These philosophers, being too wise to appeal to experience, sought truth by the " immediate beholding of reason ;" and evolved it out of "the depths of their consciousness." The spirit of Hegelianism even at the present time may be inferred from the condemnation, by Dr. Schwegler, of Lord Bacon, as " the author of scientific empiricism," and by his contemptuous assertion regarding Locke's philosophy, that its " empiricism is clear as day." It seems a strange perversion of judgment when learned men condemn a philosophy on account of its chief excellence, and simply because it has been carefully deduced from facts! (See Schwegler's "History of Philosophy.")

Of those investigators, ancient and modern, who sSooSe^^ *^^ tiave rejected Platonic methods as dreamy and mystical, very few, until comparatively recent times, have systematically based their doctrines on the analysis of observed phenomena. Aristotle, the illustrious rival of Plato, did not do so. The acuteness of this great man cannot be over-estimated, but the intrinsic value of his metaphysical writings has been grossly over-estimated. He did, indeed, recognize the truth that all our general knowledge is an induction from the observation of particulars; yet he did not sufficiently perceive the practical importance of this principle — that it is the only true starting-point* of all philosophy. The patient reader of his works can see that he has accepted from previous teachers many absurd doctrines which admit of no proof, and that he forms his own theories depending, first on his own penetration, then on the opinions of preceding philosophers, then on the logical support which other doctrines may give the one under discussion, and then, last and least of all, on facts. Remarks similar to these might be made respecting the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, and regarding the authors of some famous systems of speculation. We might also trace the progress of the last few generations, in psychology, to a more faithful observation and a more patient analysis of mental phenomena, than were formerly attempted.

§ 5. The Baconian method of philosophizing is ^^^IT "^^ frequently termed "The Inductive System," because the induction of principles from facts is its distinguishing characteristic. This work largely consists in the observation and classification of facts as similar. But it includes more than this: it reaches from the past to the future, from that which has been seen to that which has not as yet been seen ; and, indeed, the most essential part of it is the exercise of a power of judgment natural to us. Every fact, that is, every causal fact — for of such only we speak at present — consists of certain antecedents and consequents; and it is an intuition of the intellect that similar antecedents must be accompanied or followed by similar consequents. Whenever a fact seems to contradict this principle, it is because some element,

§ 6. THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION'. 7

which should exist in the antecedent to make the case similar to one previously observed, has escaped observation, and is not seen to be wanting. Thus, by means of an intuition, the observation of" facts results in the ascertainment of laws.

But, in the conjunction of circumstances which make up the antecedent in any particular fact, some circumstances only are essential elements of the antecedent: others are merely accidental and no part of the true cause. Hence the necessity of analysis — of discrimination — without which induction alone could not obtain the exact statement of any law. Moreover, as the laws of existence do not operate singly but in combination, there is yet more need of analysis to resolve these combinations, and, in this way, to ascertain laws which are simple and ultimate. In the ruder attainments of philosophy, induction is jnore prominent than analysis : the latter takes place spontaneously. But, in the more abstruse inquiries, this state of things is reversed. It is difficult to say whether of the two is more necessary to philosophical progress. They are equally the indispensable instruments of science; and all the rules of philosophizing simply assist and direct us to the successful employment of these tw. modes of thought.

Chapter III. The Soueces Of Psychological Information

§ 6. As science arises from the investigation of facts, an important question with respect to any department of knowledge is, whether there be abundant and reliable sources of information. In this respect the mental philosopher is peculiarly fortunate. The study of psychical phenomena demands attention and thoughtfulness; and it is found to be a work of special difficulty to those unaccustomed to it; just as reading or mental application of any kind is commonly irksome and laborious to uneducated persons. Yet the student of mind has this great advantage, that the operations and states of this wonderful agent are continually subject to his observation, and even, in a considerable measure, to his control. Besides, the facts thus submitted to him are those respecting the truth of which it is impossible to entertain a doubt. The most extravagant skeptic cannot question the existence of those thoughts, feelings, wishes and actions, which constitute his restless life of unbelief.

The radical source of all information regarding onnformSion^^^ mind is consciousness; or that immediate knowledge which the mind has of its own states and operations. All other means of knowledge are of use only as they co-operate with this. Our knowledge, through consciousness, of the nature and workings of our own spirits is our only means of understanding the life of other spiritual beings and of comprehending the indications of their psychical activity. Each of us, knowing what passes within his own bosom, learns to understand the experience of others. A child not more than two or three years of age can speak of its thoughts and affections, wishes and pleasures, pains, hopes and disappointments; and knows, also, that others are similarly exercised. This statement can be easily verified: question the little prattler, and you will find that he uses terms expressive of mental, just as intelligently as those indicative of bodily, operations. ' And these cognitions of spirit, thus early begun, are continued throughout life, pertain to every form of experience, and are free from all uncertainty.

Two important difficulties are to be encountered in using the testimony of consciousness. In the first place, the changeful rapidity of our psychical operations interferes with the steadiness of our gaze. What the poet says of pleasures is true of mental phenomena in general ; they are

•• Like that Borealis race Which flit e'er you can point their place."

And even when the current of inward life is partially arrested, that special phase of experience which is made the object of scrutiny, often changes its nature while we are endeavoring to look upon it. The feeling grows cold ; the mental image becomes dim ; the concrete practical notion resolves itself into its elements. Psychological facts call for a keen and quick observation. They resemble those sea-birds which are ever on the wing; which move even Avhile at rest, and must be shot while flying. The second hindrance experienced in using the testimony of consciousness, arises from the impossibility of proving the correctness of one's observation by exhibiting to others those phenomena which are visible directly only to one's self. This difficulty is more formidable in appearance than in reality. The earnest and patient student can generally sympathize sufficiently with his teacher to understand and appreciate an appeal to consciousness. Nevertheless there is here some opportunity for difference: the disputatious opponent, and even the honest inquirer, may sometimes say, "That may be your experience; but it is not mine." o^ ^,_„ „ § 7. Because, therefore, of the subtle and evanescent

Secondary Bources ^ , n i i i i r ,^

of information. Character ol mental phenomena, and because oi the Language. impossibility of presenting the facts of conscious-

ness to the immediate observation of others, great value attaches to certain indirect revelations of mind, which are subject to public and general scrutiny.

The most important of these is language — that marvelous instrument, the expression and embodiment of human thought. Not only every word, but also every change, construction and combination of words, in language, represents some form or mood of man's intelligence. And so well suited is this instrui

§ 7. THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INEOHMATIOIf: 9

ment for its office, that no idea, howeTer delicate, which maj haYC secured the interest of men, £ii]s of expression in their speech. He who has mastered the Tocabnlary and linguistic forms of an J people^ has obtained a perfect measure of their mental dcTelopment MoreoTcr, CTeiy word in any langnage has a certain fuced meaning, which can be ascertained; and this circumstance is of ^reat assistance when we would study the thoughts of men. For the transitoiy idea is made fixed and permanent by its sign; and is shown also to be an existing reality. No matter how much we may question the truthfulness of any conceptions, we cannot deny the existence of the notions themselves if they only have bea>me estaUished in the Gpeech of any people. The relations of words, also, illustrate the relations of ideas; so that many points, concerning the con> tents and combinations, changes and successions, agreements and differences, of thoughts, can be understood better through a critical study of language than in any other way. 13m «,>,»^yKA. Another source of information is found in those volnoBiB HaddaSi uutary actious, labors and accomplishments, which ** ""*^ result £rom mental activity. Eveiy human being

has the power of perceiving both his own actions and those of his comj>anions; and, as he refers his own conduct to his own inward life as its cause, he intuitively adopts a similar rule with regard to the conduct of others. Moreover, as different thoughts and aims result in different actions corresponding to them, we learn to use specific deeds as the indicators of specific thoughts. Sometimes, the thoughts of men are even better understood firom their actions than from their language. We not only trace actions to thoughts; we also ascribe accomplished results to actions. This is a yet greater exercise of mental penetration; and by means of it, we can perceive most plainly the former presence and activity of departed laborers. Beholding a field fenced and tilled, we are as sure that husbandmen have wrought in it, as if we had seen them witb our eyes. Nor is it necessary to such a judgment that we should have previously witnessed the performance of a work in every respect the same as that submitted to our consideration. There is need only of an e^eii- Uci sameness or similarity. One who might be acquainted with the manufiicture of locomotives, but who had never seen a steam> ship, could affirm, on an inspection of the latter, that it was the product of a similar exercise of inteUigence, and intended for a similar purpose. In Hke manner we think that there is as much evidence of design in the sting of a wasp as in the barbed and poisoned arrow of a savage; and that there is more proof of skill and wisdom in the formation of the eye than in the construction of the telescope. All investigators of mind, from the earliest ages, have learned much respecting the existence and the activity of intellect firom its manifestations in human life and history, and in the mightier works and ways of the Sapreme Being.

Many data of mental science may be obtained from ^rks of litera- ^orks of literature. These themselves are the productions of intellect, so that every volume may be studied as well with reference to the mind of the author, as with reference to the subjects treated. What wonderful powers, what interesting operations, are revealed in the orations of Cicero and Demosthenes, in the poems of Homer and Virgil, in the discussions of Plato and Aristotle ! Besides, by the labors of men of genius, the varying phases of human thought and life, the history of man's past experience and achievements, and the peculiarities of the different races inhabiting the earth, have been carefully represented, recorded, and discussed. The writings of such men — poets, dramatists, historians, philosophers — yield to us great dived assistance.

The study of certain bodily phenomena, as being nomen?^^as*^ SnI ^norc or Icss closcly councctcd with, psychical states »^?ted witii psy- and operations, is another source of philosophic ingy. etc. lormation; to which, however, some have ascribed