The perceptionalist

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Preface

This volume is a response to advice and encouragement given the author by several eminent professors, and also the execution of a purpose partially entertained at the time of the publication of his former book, "The Human Mind." The discussions in that treatise, in order to justify peculiarities of doctrine, are frequently extended and minute. It was proposed, in case the work met with favor, to reproduce its chapters in a simpler form. The author need hardly say that the reception accorded "The Human Mind" has surpassed his highest expectations.

"Mental Science," therefore, is now offered as an educational manual, and as a compend for the reading of those who would inform themselves respecting the doctrines of an earnest philosophy without entering upon non-essential details. The majority of the discussions have been not merely abridged, but simplified ; a considerable number have been entirely rewritten. Some chapters, too, which are devoted to logical questions, and which may prove serviceable in connection with some future effort, have been omitted. It has, however, been the aim to present a true theory of every normal activity of the intellect.

In order to assist the eye in that work of review which is a condition of all thorough scholarship, teachers will perceive that italics have been employed more freely than would otherwise be desirable. They will also notice that ten out of the fifty chapters into which the treatise is divided have been printed iv PREFACE.

in small type. The dissertations thus marked are not deemed absolutely indispensable to a course in psychologj 7 . They are, however, as interesting as any others in the book, and they have no peculiar difficulty.

The general sj'stem of doctrine in the service of which both " The Human Mind" and "Mental Science" have been composed, might be styled Perception alism. For some such term may properly designate a form of philosophy which maintains, from an analytical and theoretical point of view, that mankind are not deluded in claiming that they perceive fact and truth, and that what they call their perceptions are true perceptions of those very things which they say that they perceive.

Some old writers have described this radical doctrine which Perceptionalism supports as that of "the reliability' of those faculties which God has given us." This is , a fair definition ; but it should be understood that the reference to our Maker in it is not presented in proof of the doctrine, but simply to indicate that trustworthiness is claimed only for well-known and actually existing faculties, and not for any faculties the conception of which is peculiar to some philosophic school.

The word " perception" is sometimes limited in its application : we now use it in its most unrestricted meaning. For we have perceptions of simple fact and perceptions of necessary relations ; presentational perceptions and inferential perceptions ; the perceptions of sense and of consciousness, and perceptions concomitant of these ; the perceptions of the intuitive, and those of the discursive, reason : we perceive what is true actualistically and what is true hypothetical^ ; we perceive the possible and the necessa^, and the contingent and the probable.

Our doctrine is that all these perceptions, when made by a sound mind and under proper conditions, are trustworthy ; and our philosophy finds justification for this doctrine in the critical investigation of every mode of human cognition or conviction.

PREFACE. V

Perceptionalism does not assert that the mind of man is infallible. On the contrary, recognizing the frequent recurrence of error, it seeks to understand the sources and laws of mistaken belief as well as those of correct belief. But it emphasizes the truth that man is capable of knowledge, or well-grounded certainty, about man}' things ; and that where this is not attainable, he may often wisely form a judgment of probability.

We allow that the dogmatic statement of this truth, even though accompanied by arguments showing its excellence and reasonableness, could scarcely be entitled a system of philosophy. If, however, the reliability of our faculties became evident as the last result of an exhaustive analysis of the phenomena of the intellect, then, in the system thus evolved, we say that there would be a philosophy worthy of the name.

We trust that the discussions now again, in simpler form, presented to the public, ma}' once more be welcomed as an attempt in the right direction.

For some time past our country has been invaded by two systems of speculation, which, like an army with two wings extended in martial array, have threatened to subdue America either to a materialistic or to an idealistic agnosticism. But the educated thought of this land cannot be permanently affected by theories which resolve our commonest and most assured convictions into doubt and unbelief. It is our confident expectation that some such system as that which we have named Perceptionalism will be the philosophy of the future in these United States.

E. J. H.

Hamilton College, Clinton, N". Y., May 23, 1885.

PREFACE.

Thirteen years ago, a treatise entitled "The Perceptionalist " was placed in the hands of Robert Carter, then the oldest living publisher in New York City, and then, as always, one of the best and noblest of men. He objected to the designation 44 Perceptionalist," because of its novelty, and because it could not be found in any dictionary. In deference to his judgment, the name was changed ; after which one, and then another, edition of the book, under the title 44 Mental Science," was issued by Robert Carter and Brothers.

Meanwhile the term " Perceptionalism " has been used for a dozen years to distinguish a system of philosophy, and has found its way into some of the dictionaries. Under these circumstances, and in view of the present opportunity, it is only proper that the book should appear under its original name. This seems the more expedient because, in the present edition, the treatise is preceded by a dissertation in which Perceptionalism is denned, and in which the leading doctrines of Perceptionalism are briefly stated.

After the necessity for the present issue became apparent, the author reviewed "Mental Science" carefully, to determine what changes were needed in the text, or if any additions were desirable. He found that only a few unimportant alterations were called for. These have been made; and he now offers 44 The Perceptionalist" to the public as the best text-book within his power to produce.

viii PREFACE.

As this work is specially designed for use in colleges and universities, it may not be out of place to state the way in which it has been found most serviceable in an Eastern college and in a Western university. The writer has been influenced by consideration for a class of students whose instruction in Mental Science must be limited to about fifty exercises in the lecture room. To meet their needs, he has sometimes omitted those portions of the book which are printed in smaller type.

But another method, suggested by the peculiar plan of the book, has been tried for several years, and has proved very satisfactory. For, after the first seven or eight chapters (which are introductory), the treatise may be said to consist of two parts or volumes, each of which relates to one broad view, or aspect, of the phenomena and faculties of the mind. The first of these volumes begins definitely with Chapter X., and is based on the division of our mental powers into the Primary and the Secondary. Thought (or Conception) and Belief (or Conviction) are called the primary powers, because the exercise of them is the essential and ultimate work of the intellect; while Attention and Acquisition, Reproduction and Association, Analysis and Synthesis, Abstraction and Generalization, are secondary powers, because their function is to modify the workings of Thought and Conviction and to render them efficient.

Of course, "Thought" here, as opposed to "Conviction," signifies mere thought, — the mere power of having ideas.

The peculiar doctrines of Perceptionalism are presented chiefly in the first part, or volume, of the treatise. The second volume, beginning with Chapter XXX., regards mental life as divisible into three Grand Phases, — the Perceptive, or Presentational; the Reproductive, or Representational; and the Discursive, or Rational, — each of which is a resultant of the activity, under determining conditions, of both the Primary and the Secondary powers of mind. The course of discussion thus introduced, no less than that of the first volume, brings under survey all the phenomena of the intellect. But it considers the concrete forms of mental life, and seeks to under-

PREFACE. ix

stand these while keeping in remembrance the principles and laws elucidated in the first volume. It will be noticed that the order of thought in this second series of chapters agrees with that commonly followed by text-books in mental philosophy.

Finally, the treatise closes with two chapters based on yet another logical division, whereby 'the fundamental Elements of both Thought and Belief are distinguished as the Experiential and the Intuitional.

Such being the construction of the book, the author has been led to make it the foundation of two somewhat independent courses of instruction. He has emploj^ed the first twenty-nine chapters, together with some lectures, for a twelve weeks' course ; and he has given another twelve weeks' course in connection with the first seven chapters and with the concluding portion of the book beginning with Chapter XXX.

These courses are so independent that a student can take either of them without taking the other, while, at the same time, they are so supplementary to each other that every student who has the time should take both. As a matter of fact, most students of the University of Washington who have taken one of these courses have elected the other also.

The above method is especially commended to any professor who can devote himself to philosophical instruction with more than ordinary thoroughness, and who may wish to supplement the chapters of the book with lectures of his own.

E. J. H.

Seattle, Washington, October 15, 1898.

PERCEPTIONALISM.

A PREFATORY DISSERTATION.

1. The word "perception," in its ordinary meaning and widest application, signifies the correct apprehension of fact or truth. On this basis, that philosophy ichich examines and explains perceptions as such, may be styled Perceptionalism. Let us discuss this name and give some reasons for the use of it ; and let us consider the nature of the philosophy which it designates.

The Latin preposition "per," like its English equivalent " through," often indicates instrumentality, or agency, as in the maxim "Qui facit per alium, facit per se" ; but "per" never has this meaning when used as a prefix in the composition of words. It then signifies either movement through or over some place, as in the verbs peraqro, perambulo, permitto, perrumpo, or else thoroughness in the performance of some action, as in the verbs pereo, perfero,perjicio, pernego, pernosco. This last thought — thoroughness — is the ordinary signification of ' 4 per " as a prefix, and is that belonging to it in the words " perceive " and " perception."

The verb " percipere " and the noun "perceptio" originally meant any thorough taking of a thing, so as to bring it within one's possession. In the seventeenth chapter of Cato Major, Cicero speaks of the " perceptio fructuum," or harvesting of fruits; and, in the same chapter, he says " Themistocles omnium civium perceperat nomina " ; that is, Themistocles had learnt, or mastered, the names of all the citizens. These quoxii PER CEPTIONALISM.

tations illustrate the transfer of the word from a physical to a psychical application. But "percipere," as indicating intellectual apprehension, does not always, nor even generally, include memorizing ; as it does when Themistocles is said to have learnt the names of his fellow-citizens. Ordinarily with the Romans this word signified simply the cognition of fact or truth; and especially, when they spoke of perceiving a thing by the senses or by the mind, they used language just as we do; they meant that psychical operation by which one comes to know that a thing is, or what it is, or that it would be, or what it would be. And this is a very natural use of language ; for when we have gained the knowledge of any fact or truth, we may then be said to have taken something into our possession, whether we retain it afterwards in our memory or not.

In short, perception and cognition are two names for the same process. They differ in that perception emphasizes the thought of the process more than that of the result, while cognition emphasizes the thought of the result more than that of the process. But perception always terminates in knowledge, and is therefore cognition ; no act or process is called perceptive except on the assumption that it produces absolute and well-founded conviction.

2. These statements will be confirmed if we consider the different modes of perception which occur in our daily experience. There are three simple modes of immediate cognition. Men perceive their own bodies and bodily affections and the immediate causes of these affections ; such cognition is the beginning of all sense-perception. They perceive their own souls as in activity, as thinking, feeling, or willing ; this we call consciousness, or internal perception. Then, in connection with bodily and mental phenomena, they perceive spacial, temporal, causal, and other relations ; and, along with these relations, certain fundamenta on which they rest, such as spaces, times and changes. All such cognitions may be distinguished as concomitant perceptions, because they accompany those of sense-perception and consciousness. Thus, there are three simple modes of immediate perception.

A PREFATORY DISSERTATION. xiii

We also form compound immediate perceptions, especially of external objects ; and these prepare the way for inferential, or " acquired" perception. The boy born blind, who obtained sight through a surgical operation, could not at first distinguish the cat from the dog visually, though he could tactually. Catching the cat one day, he passed his hands over her, and identified what he felt with what he saw. Then he set her down and said, " So, puss, I shall know you another time." Here a concomitant perception compounded the cognitions of sight and touch ; and evidently a basis for subsequent inference was secured by means of that compositional cognition. Hereafter, whether puss be seen in the daytime or handled in the dark, the same knowledge will be obtained through one sense which originally resulted from the use of two. All our ordinary sense-perceptions are more or less "acquired"; and some of them, such as determinations by the eye of the distance, size, and shape of remote objects, are quite complex judgments.

More evidently, though not more really, inferential than the ordinary discriminations of sense are those ration al perceptions by which things are seen as necessarily or probably or possibly consequent upon given antecedents. Here, perhaps, it would be more literal to say that a thing is inferentially perceived when it is necessary, and that, in other cases, we only perceive that it may probably or possibly exist ; yet, even in these cases, we speak of perception if the judgment be made correctly. Because we may Icnow that a thing is probable or possible.

All rational perceptions are related to our presentational cognitions, and seem consequent upon them. For in the immediate cognitions of fact we perceive, not merely simple fact, but also, by a concomitant cognition, various necessary relations according to which one fact is conditioned upon, or connected with, another. This prepares us for logical inference ; so that afterwards, when a necessitant, or a necessary condition, appears, we can infer a necessary or a possible consequent, such as the case calls for.

Then, too, we must mention that important mode of rational perception which takes place even in the absence of any antexiv PERCE PTIONALISM.

cedent. For the mind, using that power of conception which deals with things that are not as if they were, makes inferences from supposed or imaginary premises. Therefore we recognize hypothetical as well as actualistic perception, and hypothetical as well as actualistic knowledge.

3. Now, as every mode of perception — whether it be presentational or inferential, whether it be actualistic or hypothetical — claims to be a mode of cognition and to result in knowledge, it is plain that the doctrine which explains perceptions as such must assert and maintain the reliability of our perceptions. In other words, Perceptionalism must teach that what men call their perceptions are true perceptions, and that what men know they truly know, and that these positions are justified by the thorough examination of both thought and fact.

It may cause astonishment to some that any system should set forth such teaching as distinctively its own. It may be asked, " Do not all philosophers accept the perceptions of mankind as veritable cognitions ? Is it not presumptuous in one school to assert that this doctrine is specially and pre-eminently the result of its own investigations ? " We reply that the past history of philosophy, and the condition of philosophy at the present time, warrant the statement that all the more celebrated systems, both of ancient and of modern days, conflict more or less with the ordinary convictions of mankind ; and by far the greater part of the speculative talent of the existing generation not only rejects the radical idea of Perceptionalism, but considers that idea a mark of intellectual shallowness. The popular philosophies of to-day, while differing from each other, are wonderfully agreed in explaining away various fundamental beliefs. Who are more antagonistic than the Associationalists of England and the Idealists of Germany ? Yet both teach that we have no proper knowledge of an external and material world ; both declare that space and time are mental products, and not things which have independent natures of their own ; and, according to both, substances, powers, the relation of cause and effect, and necessitudinal connections generally, are merely forms of conception.

A PREFATORY DISSERTATION. XV

Then, too, particular schools of philosophy, in their very points of variance from each other, are at variance also with the judgments of mankind. Materialism, in saying that the soul is composed of a multiplicity of molecules, and that its life is the action of these molecules, denies that unity of the human spirit in which all meu believe ; on the other hand, Pantheism denies the well-known multiplicity of agents and objects in the universe, asserting that there is one only substance.

4. In view of the history of speculation, the student of theories might even question whether there is any thorough-going system which maintains the reliability of human cognitions. At the same time, if he were convinced that there is such a system, he could not refuse it the name Perceptionalism. In every scheme of metaphysical philosophy, the theory of knowledge is the fundamental part, and that from which it is most expressively designated. We advocate the name "Perceptionalism," not only on the ground that there is a philosophy which should be known under this title, but also because we believe that the system thus distinguished is likely hereafter to receive more consideration than has been accorded to it heretofore.

In ancient times there was no such system. Aristotle asserts that the beginning of all knowledge is that i ' natural power of judgment which is called perception " (Svva/xtv o-v^vrov Kpvtlktjv rjv kolXovctlv ata-Orja-tv) ; but he did not investigate our first cognitions so as to determine their content and establish their correctness. The Stoics held that alo-Orjo-Ls, or the immediate perception of fact, is the origin of knowledge and the criterion of truth; and this same doctrine was taught by the Epicureans. Moreover, both these schools, agreeing with the Aristotelians, declared that man's rational perceptions are reliable ; though they allowed that reason may err, and taught that mistakes in perception are to be attributed, not to the senses, but to judgment, or inference. Both also went farther than the Aristotelians in exalting aiorOrjo-t^ — in this connection signifying specifically presentational perception — as the source of knowledge; with this doctrine, they opposed Platonism on xvi PERCEPTIONALISM.

the one hand, and Scepticism on the other. Yet neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean system attained a permanent success ; neither proved sufficient to resist the Neoplatonism and Mysticism of the first centuries of the Christian era.

In subsequent times, Scholasticism, applying Aristotelian ideas to the doctrines of the Church, showed great dialectic power, but added little to scientific knowledge. Finally, after the theological awakening of the sixteenth century, came the speculative activity of the seventeenth ; and towards the close of the seventeenth century, in the year 1689, John Locke gave to the world the beginning of a great philosophy.

5. Locke founds all knowledge on " experience," and has, therefore, been styled the founder of an "empirical," or associationalist, philosophy; but erroneously. By "experience" Locke means simply presentational perception, — the aio-Orja-Ls * of Aristotle, and of the Stoics; " sensation and reflection" are the names which he gives to the outward and to the inward modes t>f this perception. Moreover, he teaches that the perception of necessary relations occurs in connection with the cognition of simple fact, and is absolutely and objectively intuitive. These initial principles of Perceptionalism were obtained by Locke from the critical observation of the phenomena of mind. Yet his "Treatise on Human Understanding," defective in the development and yet more in the expression of its thought, did not save the eighteenth century from the Associationalism of Hartley, the Idealism of Berkeley, and the Scepticism of Hume.

In opposition to these destructive theories, the "Essays " of Thomas Reid, the Glasgow professor, were written towards the close of the eighteenth century. In these the natural force of the ordinary convictions of mankind was powerfully directed

* Atodrjois with the Greeks referred pre-eminently, but not exclusively, to sense-perception. Aristotle speaks of reason as a higher kind of atoOyo-is ; and also of the moral faculty in the same way. Thus, in his Ethics we read : "Touto irpbs T&Wa £a>a rods 6.vQponrois tdiov, to p.6vov dya8ov teal kclkov Kal BiKatov /cat dSiKov /col raV &A\oov atadrjcriv <ix €lV ^' , The verbs alo-9d.vofj.ai, sentto and perceive, all have about the same significance and the same breadth of application.

A PREFATORY DISSERTATION. xvii

against the subtle errors of that day. But the thought of Reid is lacking in theoretic discrimination and construction. He often assumes first principles, sometimes leaves difficulties unexplained, and can scarcely be said to have produced a philosophic system. His excellence and his deficiency are both expressed when he is characterized as "the apostle of common sense." Mightily defending the truth, he left it as he found it, without analysis and without systematization.

6. During this nineteenth century some advance has been made by eminent philosophers, who have called themselves Intuitional ists. Their writings thoroughly discuss both original (or presentational) and acquired (or inferential) perception ; and also throw much light on those immediate cognitions of necessary truth which, because they take place hypothetic ally as well as actualistically, and in the absence as well as in the presence of objects, have been called " the intuitions of the mind." Nevertheless, so far as we can learn, no teacher of Intuitionalism has succeeded in founding a school in which, like the patriarch, " he will command his children after him." Ambitious pupils, however carefully instructed, do not become permanent disciples. They read and study further — as they ought to do — and then are more or less influenced by some imposing and skilfully constructed system of error.

We ascribe this to the narrowness and incompleteness of Intuitionalism. Correct, so far as it goes, it is but the commencement of a philosophy. Its teachings regarding the immediate perception of fact and the necessary relations of fact should be united with others, equally important, concerning the rational and discursive intellect, and concerning thought and conviction in general. In short, with sincere respect and consideration both for ancient tradition and for modern theory, we assert the need of a new and comprehensive elaboration of mental science.

The name ' ' Intuitionalism " of late years has been very properly abandoned as the designation of a system of philosophy / it is not only confined in its suggestions, but is also affected with an obscurity arising from the ambiguities of the word "intuition." And the name " Realism," which some propose, is yet

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more unsatisfactory. This title belongs historically to the doctrine of the reality of " universals " — a doctrine rejected by those who would now call themselves Realists. It also furnishes ground for quibbliug controvers} 7 . For those philosophers who reject the ordinary beliefs of men do not admit that they deny reality. They say, ' ' The question is not, ' Is there reality? ' but i What is it? ' and ' How shall we think about it? '" And they protest against the settlement of such questions dogmatically, or in any other way than by a process of critical investigation.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that a most important class of human perceptions — including general judgments, and among these axioms, or the priucipiated intuitions of necessary sequences — do not, properly speaking, assert reality, but only hypothetical truth.

7. On the whole, Perceptionalism appears to be the best designation for a philosophy which teaches that man's immediate or intuitive convictions are never mistaken, and that, under certain conditions and limitations, even his inferential conclusions may be relied upon. For us, this name defines a system of doctrines to which scientific method leads, and which, we believe, is destined to be generally accepted by thinking men. At the same time we are far from saying that the doctrines of Perceptionalism have reached perfection or completion; that would be too great a claim. We assert only that many leading positions have been established, and that the future of this system is assured beyond a peradventure.

Some learned professors condemn this confidence of ours as that of " a rustic philosopher who has never adequately studied the deeper phases of the cognitive problem " ; and many others regard a system which prefers the views of the vulgar to those of illustrious theorizers to be of very dubious value. It must even be acknowledged that a certain presumption against our philosophy is natural and reasonable. We trust, however, that we shall not be excluded from a candid and attentive hearing while stating some doctrines in the connected assertion of which Perceptionalism may — as we think — not only claim to be a

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system, but also challenge comparison with other systems. We shall simply state these doctrines, without discussing them at any length.

8. First of all, we need scarcely say that Perceptionalism agrees with assertive, and differs from sceptical, systems in holding that there is such a thing as knowledge, and that some things are self-evident, or immediately cognizable. For, as Aristotle says, it is folly to seek proof for everything. If there be knowledge at all — if we have absolute and well-founded conviction about anything — some knowledge must be immediate, or ' ' intuitive " ; and other knowledge must be consequent upon that. Therefore earnest thinkers seldom ask, " Is there knowledge?" but "What is knowledge?" and also, "How do we know?" and, " What do we know?"

9. Again, Perceptionalism teaches that cognition — and, in particular, cognition by the senses — is an extremely different thing from sensation. Cognition is an intellectual operation; sensation is a feeling — a psychical commotion — produced by the action of the nerves upon the spirit. Sense-perception is conditioned on sensation because it involves a cognition of the sensation, but it does not include the sensation. The cognition of the sensation, but not the sensation itself, is an element in sense-perception. In order to perceive the acidity of a lemon, this juicy fruit must be applied to the tongue so as to produce a specific feeling. Thereupon — and in one and the same act — we perceive the sensation and its causal correlative.

The thought, or conception, of a sensation should not be identified with the sensation. The thought of the feeling of sourness, or of the feeling of hunger or thirst, or heat or cold, or hardness or softness, is a different thing from that feeling ; so, likewise, the cognition of a sensation is not the sensation. Therefore, the act of sense-perception does not include the sensation, but only the cognition of it, together ivith that of its cause.

Some corporeal sensibilities — especially the visual — are so delicate and so intellectual in their use that their character as feelings is eclipsed by their service as the instruments of perception ; yet, even in such cases, we distinguish the feeling

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from our cognition of it. For example, the pleasure derived from certain sensations of color arises from feeling rather than from perception.

But if thought and sensation are things radically different, then the teachings of Sensationalism must be rejected ; for this doctrine affirms that cognition, memory, conception, imagination, and intellectual activity of every kind, are either bodily feelings or the reproduction and refinement of such feelings. Not only so, we must reject also that more specious theory which speaks of " the sensational elements of knowledge," and according to which sense-perception is the combined action of the reason and the sensibility. The error involved in this theory is double, and is the beginning of further error. For no one can rightly explain sense-perception if he do not see both that sensation is not, and that the cognition of the sensation is, a constituent part of the perception ; and no one can correctly understand the nature of thought in general who fails to see that sense-perception, though conditioned on sensation, is wholly intellectual, and contains no sensational element whatever.