Organized democracy

Front matter

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COFYRKiHT DEPOSIT.

Contents

I. Machine Politics 1

II. Organized Democbact 23

III. The Cost of Machine Politics . . • 116

Chapter II

Evert people, every body politic, under government of any form, must be organized. That means that in every political community, under any form of government, public work must be specialized. Each kind of public work must be done by men specially selected for that kind of work. The degree and form of the specialization will vary in different communities. But in every community, whatever be the form of its government, public work must be specialized. In other words, there must be organization.

Democracy is no exception to this law. Even under a "government by the people," even in the smallest communities, there must be the division of labor, specialization. In other words, even a democracy must be organized.

What, then, is organized democracy?

Let us begin our attempt to answer this question by stating what it is not.

It most certainly is not government by everybody. It is not government by rotation; government by the entire mass of citizens, turn and turn about; one man taking a hand at some kind of pubHc work for a few years, and then some other man, equally ignorant and inexperienced, taking his place for a few later years. The attempt at government of that kind, as our experience has now demonstrated, gives "macliine politics," and not democracy. We cannot get democracy by perpetual periodic changes in the persons of our public officials ; by any process of perpetual periodic revolution.

Moreover, political organization, to some extent, must be had in the very smallest communities. Even in the government of a small country town, the actual daily work of administration must be done by men specially selected. Even in the smallest rural communities, if we give to the individual citizen the fullest possible share in the practical operation of the government, we shall still find that the regular daily work of government must be done by a few men specially selected ; in the time-honored phrase of New England, by "selectmen." Even in the little country town, the outside practicable field for the action of the ordinary citizen is, that he shall have his one voice in the selection of those few "selectmen."

When, however, we consider the government of large communities, of large cities, states, or of a nation, then the necessity of organization becomes simply overwhelming. In all large communities, government by the entire body of citizens in mass, or government by perpetual rotation, becomes a glaring and grotesque impossibility. In small communities, public work, being on a smaller scale, and less intricate, requires a less degree of special training. Country roads do not require the same solidity and finish with the public highways in the cities ; for they do not carry as heavy traffic. Country schools deal with pupils in smaller numbers ; and do not require, in general, such complex educational apphances. In short, all the public work is on a smaller scale, and has less intricacy. The result is, in the small rural communities, that public work need not be specialized so highly. Nevertheless, it must be specialized. In other words, there must be organization.

These considerations clear the way for an affirmative statement of the form of organized democracy.

Its form must be decided by the application to public affairs of the methods, and the system, which human experience has shown to be best fitted for the handling of large private affairs, in the hands of large private corporations. A city, a state, or a nation is a "body politic," a large public corporation. In handling the affairs of any large private corporation, human experience has demonstrated it to be an absolute necessity, that administration must be single headed; but that the single administrative head must be supervised — and controlled — by a deliberative body; by some kind of executive committee; by a comparatively small body of men, specially selected by the individual members of the corporation, for the work of supreme supervision and control.

The work of administration, of execution, requires that men work under single heads. Even at the head of each little "gang" of day laborers there must be a single foreman. At the head of each administrative office and department there must be some one man, who will be the head of that office or department, responsible for its operation. Over all the different departments, combined, there must be a single responsible administrative head, a "superintendent," a "president," a chief executive, under one or another name. Finally, over this single administrative head, this chief executive, there must be an executive committee, a board of directors, a deUberative body of some kind, specially charged with the work of supervision and control.

This form of organization has been found to be absolutely necessary in order to secure administrative eflBciency, in all large private affairs. It has been universally adopted in the administration of the affairs of all large private corporations. It will be quite as serviceable, and it is quite as necessary, in the administration of the public affairs, — of every large municipal corporation.

There is, however, one essential difference between the two situations.

In the private business corporation the business is of a single kind, of a comparatively simple character, involving the interests of a comparatively small number of persons. Moreover, the directors, or members of the executive committee, are usually large owners in the property or business to be managed. For that reason it does no great harm, if those directors are — as matter of form — selected at an annual election by the shareholders. Moreover, the shareholders are generally able to tell with comparative ease, by an examination of the annual accounts, and by the size of the dividends, whether or not their property has been well managed. They are, therefore, in general, well able to form an intelligent judgment as to whether or not they need a change of directors.

In a large modern political community, however, the number of persons interested, and the interests involved, are extremely large and complex. Their magnitude, and diversity, far transcend those concerned in any private business. The wise and efficient handling of those largb public interests requires our ablest men; and those men must have the training that comes from large experience; an experience far beyond any that can be acquired in any short term of years.

These facts make it an impossibility, in large communities, that the individual citizens, who correspond to the shareholders in the private corporation, should be able to pass an intelligent judgment on the conduct of their public affairs. The citizens have neither the time, nor the opportunity, to get the necessary knowledge. Under a proper form of election machinery, the citizens constitute, in my belief, the best available agency for the work of original selection — of the directors, who are to supervise each people's public affairs. But private citizens cannot have the time, or the knowledge, to enable them to form an intelligent judgment on the quality of the work of those directors, after those directors have once been selected. Consequently, the system of annual elections, or elections for short terms of years, which serves well enough in private business corporations, is quite out of place, and will certainly fail to give good results, in the government of large communities. ]\Iorcover, we have already seen, that the inevitable result of any system of annual elections, when applied to the selection of the public officials of our large communities, is the election machine- But here we face the most difficult feature in our problem. Under a democratic government, we must in some way secure due responsibility to " tlie people." In some way, too, we must secure the selection of able and upright men for the work of our different governmental organizations, local, state, and national. Above all things, it is essential that we should have the right men at the head. The selection of the men below, of the rank and file, is comparatively unimportant. It is the men at the head, on whom we must depend for results, in all our governmental organizations. It is at the government's head, that we must have men of exceptional capacity, with the thorough training for their official work which can come only from experience. Any government, which is to do its Vvork rightly, in any large community, must be a thing very different from government by ordinary average untrained citizens, under any conceivable system of rotation in office. This large and intricate work, of managing large public affairs, demands the ablest men that the community can furnish; and those men, when once chosen, must not be continually changing, but must keep their places so long as they are able to do their work efficiently. Only when they become inefficient, should new men be put in their places. Nothing can be devised, which is so certain to destroy the efficiency of any large working organization, as frequent changes in its members. Especially, any high degree of efficiency is an impossibility, under any system of frequent periodic changes in the men at the head. Such a system is one of periodic decapitation.

But how is it to be accomphshed, as an actual practical fact, that we shall have public work done by a body of men selected by reason of their fitness for their work, men of special training, and large experience? In short, how are we to get a sound system of democratic organization ?

In seeking the answer to this question, we shall find that our own experience in the development of democratic institutions has now established certain political laws; and if we wish to make democratic institutions a practical success, we must follow those laws.

Moreover, if anything has been made clear by our study up to this point, it is that any substantial improvement in our existing political institutions must provide for a large reduction of the volume, and intricacy, of our election work; that it must put an end to the periodic permanence of that work; and that it must at the same time provide some simple, inexpensive, workable process of popular election, whereby each separate political community can make its own free choice, of the men who are to have the supreme control of its public affairs.

Bearing these things in mind, let us now consider some of the political laws, as to the development of democratic institutions, which have been ascertained by our experience of the last hundred years.

The first of these laws is this: —

I. ADMINISTRATION MUST BE SINGLE HEADED.

It need hardly be said, that every chief executive, every head of the administrative forces of a community, must himself be under constant supervision, and complete control. Moreover, under any form of government that can be termed democratic, the entire administrative force of the community, through its single head, must be, directly or indirectly, under the control of " the people." As has already been seen, the chief practical defect of our present political system is, that the supreme control of public officials and public affairs is not now in the hands of the people, but is in the hands of the machine politicians. Indeed, the prime essential of organized democracy is, the securing, in a simple practical effective form, the control of public affairs by the people — by the whole people — acting as a unit, as a single political organism.

Subject to such control by the people, however, the first law of organized democracy is, that administration must be single headed.

That means, that every administrative office, or department, must have a single head; that it must be under the full control of some single man, who shall individually be held responsible for the efficiency of that office, or department.

In order to accomplish that result, he must have the selection, and the control, of his subordinates. Control — of his subordinates — can be secured only by vesting in him the power of removal — of those subordinates. Then, too, in order to secure his own efficiency, he must, in his turn, be subject to removal, at any time, by his immediate official superior, for any cause which prevents his effective discharge of his official duty.

It also means, that the chief executive, in every government, in the government of every city, state, and the nation, shall be held individually responsible for the efficiency of all the administrative departments and offices under him; that, in order to secure such efficiency, he must have the appointment — and removal — of all his heads of departments; that, in order to secure his own efficiency, to enforce his responsibility, he shall himself be subject to removal, at any time, by the best available superior power; not merely for a crime, or a distinct violation of law; but for any cause, which makes him at the time unable to properly discharge his official duty; for physical or mental disability; for fatal defects in administrative temperament; for obstinacy; in short — for any reason which makes his removal at any time necessary for the complete protection of pubUc interests.

It is easily seen, that single-headed administration, in this form, giving to each head of an office or department the selection of his subordinates, and to the chief executive the selection of all his heads of departments, will at once remove one of the chief causes of the existence of the election machine. It will at once sweep away a large part of its work. It will remove the greater part of the prizes, which are now to be won by success in carrying our annual elections. The chief fact, to-day, which makes the volume of our election work so vast, is, that we use the process of popular election for so large a number of subordinate administrative offices, in our state and local governments; and, in addition, we use tlie process at short fixed periods. In the national government, indeed, we use the process of election only for the President and the members of our national legislature. That is reasonable. The use of the process to that extent rests on a basis of sound sense. But in our state and local governments, besides using tlie process for tlie selection of our chief executives, and the members of our different legislative bodies, we also use it for the selection of a large number of administrative subordinates. That is one of the chief causes of the present large volume of our election work. That, too, is the cause of the large number of periodic vacancies, which constitute the prizes, to be won at each of these annual election campaigns.

It is evident, then, that the adoption of single-headed administration, if it had no other effect, would at once eradicate one of the chief evils in our present pohtical system. It would have the immediate effect, of cutting down the number of elective offices; consequently of cutting down the volume of election work. To that extent, it would take away the inducements, and the occupation, of the professional politicians.

But single-headed administration will be found to justify itself on every reasonable ground.

Every man, who has had any considerable experience in active practical affairs, is well aware, that the only administrative responsibility, which has any practical value, is the responsibility of single men. The responsibility of more men than one, even with small numbers, is worth little. The responsibility of men in large numbers is worth nothing.

When, then, we talk of the administrative responsibility of one of our large political "parties," with its large numbers, and shifting personalities, we talk of responsibility which has no practical value; which has, indeed, no practical existence. We might almost as well talk of the responsibility of a swarm of bees.

We may lay it down as a universal political law, that the division of power means the division of responsibility; and the division of responsibility means its destruction.

Conversely, we may lay it down as the same political law, in another form, that the conservation of responsibility requires its concentration; and the concentration of responsibility means the concentration of power.

Furthermore, there is only one way possible, by which to enforce administrative responsibility; and that is, by giving to every administrative head the selection, and the removal, of his subordinates.

The theory of our present form of "government by the people" is, that administrative responsibihty is to be enforced by "the people," through the use of the process of popular election, at short fixed terms, by the entire body of citizens in mass, as to large numbers of officials in mass. It is an attempt to enforce responsibility — of public officials in mass, to the citizens in mass. It is the very quintessence of the attempt at mass rule.

Such an attempt inevitably results in the utter destruction — of administrative responsibility, and administrative efficiency. It is fundamentally and fatally vicious. Every system of government, that has ever been framed on that principle, has had the same result. No other is possible.

In ancient times, the old Romans carried the system of divided responsibility to an absurd extreme, when they gave the command of their armies to one consul on one day, to the other consul on the next.

In modern times, "parliamentary government," as it is termed, has developed official responsibility in a still more remarkable, and grotesque form; that of responsibility of the heads of administrative departments, termed a "ministry," for legislation. Under what is termed "parliamentary government," the practice is, that the heads of administrative departments, collectively, lose their administrative positions, not for failures in administration, but for a failure on the part of themselves and their followers to carry some measure of legislation. At times, the resignation of some single minister, or even of the whole of a ministry, may be enforced for reasons which concern administration. But the regular practice is, that an entire ministry resigns from their offices of administration, by reason of a failure to carry some measure of legislation. We need go no further, to find the cause of the universally conceded administrative inefficiency of the British government. Administrative responsibility, in any correct sense of the term, has no existence. The heads of administrative departments are compelled — to give their time and best efforts to work in the House of Commons; to keeping a majority in the House, not to the affairs of the Army, the Navy, or the administrative oflBces of which they purport to be the heads. Either work alone, the work of legislation or administration, will tax to the utmost the powers of any one man. The result is, that neither work is done well. No single minister is responsible for any one thing.

No single minister gives his time, and energies, to one thing. No single minister is judged separately, for liis indi^ddual performance, of any one class of work. The result is, that the absence of individual responsibihty works the destruction of administrative efficiency.

Administrative efficiency can be secured in only one way; that is, through a system of individual responsibility, for indi^ddual performance, in the work of administration alone; by having all administrative officials selected and removed separately, by reason of their success or failure in giving good administrative results.

Thereupon it follows, that the selection, and the removal, of all administrative officials must be made by some man, or body of men, who will have full and accurate knowledge of the quality of their official work.

That being so, the selection and removal of all administrative officials must be made by their immediate official superior. He is the only person, who can have the needed knowledge. Moreover, he will be led by his own personal interests to use his power of selection and removal, with a view to serving the interests of the public. For it is on the fitness and efficiency of his own subordinates, that he must depend for his own administrative success.

No doubt, there will always be the possibility, that the power in his hands may be used unwisely. But a wise use of that power in any other hands will be an impossibility.

Nor is there the possibility, that any man should get the most earnest and efficient work from his subordinates, unless they know that he has the power to discharge them at any time, for misconduct or inefficiency. What would become of the business of any one of our large private corporations, if employees were independent of their employers; if they could keep their situations for four years, or for one year, whether they did their work well or ill ? Human nature is the same, in both public and private affairs. The term system, which practically allows our public servants to keep their official positions for a fixed term of years, with practically no regard to the quaUty of their work, or their fitness for their places, is flatly in defiance of all the principles of sound administration, and the dictates of common sense. Such a system — to an absolute certainty — destroys all possibility of high administrative efficiency. It would very quickly ruin any private business. Its effects on our public business are quite as bad, as they would be on the business of any private individual. The reason why the system does not work the ruin of our public business is, that the resources of the entire people are so vast. The mere fact, however, that, with our vast wealth, and our peculiar conditions, we have been able thus far to endure the system, does not alter its nature. Nor does it throw doubt on the soundness of the conclusion, that the only way to secure administrative efficiency, in either public or private affairs, is to put every administrative official under the control of some single superior; and give to that superior the power of selecting men whom he judges fit for the work they are to do, and discharging those men when they show themselves to be unfit for that work.

These points are so elementary, and any other doctrine so flatly contradicts the teachings of simple common sense, that it would seem almost impossible that a system of fixed official terms for administrative officials should ever have been adopted.

The reason for its adoption is to be found in the fact, that democratic governments have thus far been regarded, rather as protections against tyranny, than as organizations for the efficient transaction of public work. The fundamental fact has been ignored, that every kind of work, public as well as private, requires special qualities and special training; especially the training that comes only from experience. All these considerations have been practically ignored, in the framing of our present system of government; and, for that matter, in the framing of nearly every government that has ever yet existed, democratic or hereditary.

But another fact, even more importa,nt, has been disregarded in framing our present political system. It is tliis. In order to ensure eflScient work, work of the highest order, the workman must have before him the possibility of a career for life, in which he can make for himself a reputation; with the possibility of rising to the top of his profession, if he shows himself sufficiently deserving. He must be sure of permanent employment, subject, of course, to the condition of honesty and efficiency. He must be paid reasonably in money, but largely and liberally in the possibility of an honorable reputation. Work of the highest order is paid for, in general, not excessively in money, but largely in reputation. In this respect, our public service, rightly organized, can have an immeasurable advantage over any private employment. We can, if we will, make it pay sufficiently well in money; but in reputation — far better than any private calling. In other words, we have it in our power, to a degree impossible for any private employer, so to deal with our public servants, as to make it for their own selfish individual interest to give us the highest kind of work. But that can be done only in one way, only by one metliod; and tliat is, by abolishing the term system; by gi\'iug our public service pei-manence; by making the rewai-ds of the ser\ace depend on fidelity and efficiency; by judgmg each man separately: by making his continuance in the service, and liis advancement in the service, depend on the quality of his indi^'idual work; by removing from the se^^^ce the faithless and mefficicnt; by weeding them out singly, whenever their inefficiency is discovered; by then putting new men in their places, and testing tliose new men at their work; in short, by selectuig men, remo\'ing tJiem, and promoting them, separately, according to the quality of their indi\ndual performance.

Above all, their tenure of their offices must not depend on success in carrjning popular elections.

In other words, we must abolish the system of tenure by election, and substitute in its place the system of tenure during good behavior.

There is, moreover, another consideration, which beai-s on this same point.

If any chief executive is to be held responsible for the efficiency of the entire body of the administrative force under him. justice to liim. and a due regard for tlie possibility of liis giving the people efficient service, absolutely i-equu"e, that the selection.

and control, of his heads of departments should be in his individual hands. Tliosc department heads must not only be able and competent men; but they must be men who can work with, and under, him. We have no right to hold a man responsible for results, unless we give him a free hand in the selection of his tools, his subordinates. Moreover, he must have the control of those subordinates after they are selected; and they must know that he has it. It is not intended, that, in the use of that control, he must be absolutely free from all regulation and restriction. But his control of his subordinates must be full and complete. If he is held to a strict accountability, his own personal interests will compel him to use that control as wisely as he can. For, if he selects and removes his subordinates for reasons other than their eflSciency or inefficiency, he will thereby prevent his own official success. Thereby, in time, he will compel his own removal.

In short, from whatever point of view we consider the question, we shall jBnd, that concentration of power is the essential condition, of both administrative efficiency, and administrative responsibility.

The framers of democratic governments hav^e generally been distrustful of the concentration of power in single hands. Their fear has been, that the concentration of power would increase the danger of its abuse.

Directly the reverse is the fact. Our main dependence for enforcing efficiency and responsibility, with every administrative official, must always be the supervision and control of his immediate superior.

But with the few administrative chiefs, the few men at the head, there will be the operation of another force, that of pubUc opinion. That force it is important to utilize — within its proper limits — though we can depend on it only as an occasional auxiliary, not as the power of permanent control.

Public opinion, in order to have substantial effect, must have concentration. It must be concentrated on single men. If any public official wishes to make a wrong use of his power, he is much less likely to do so, if he knows that he must face public opinion alone; if he knows that the disapproval or wrath of the public is to be poured, the whole of it, on his single soUtary head. Here, again, we touch the essential weakness of any attempt to enforce the responsibility of a "party," or of any group of professional politicians. In any such attempt, the force of public opinion scatters. It wastes itself by diffusion. It strikes so many, that it hurts none. More than that, the men who are really the efficient causes of corrupt official action, keep in the background. They are the " power behind the throne," the uncrowned kings; the political leaders, behind the scenes, who pull the wires and move the puppets. If, however, there is some single department head, or some single chief executive, who has ample power — to prevent, or remedy, abuses, who can at once discipline, or remove, corrupt or inefficient subordinates, on whom the community can at once put its finger, on whom responsibiUty rests with reason, who, in his turn, can be immediately removed by his own single superior, then public opinion becomes a force that can have some practical effect; that can have some real power in producing practical results. But in order to give to the lightning of pubUc opinion any real power, it must be able to strike some single head.

Here, again, we encounter the fundamental law, that the conservation of responsibility requires its concentration; and the concentration of responsibiUty requires the concentration of power.

At every turn, whenever we carefully study the practical operation of administrative forces and administrative bodies, we shall find ourselves confronted with the absolute necessity, that every administrative body must be single-headed.

But when we come to the case of the cliief executive.

what are we to do then ? What security are we to have for oflBcial efficiency and integrity, on his part ?

Here, too, we shall find, that the only practical way of enforcing responsibihty on the part of a chief executive, a mayor, a governor, or a president, is to abolish the term tenure; to limit his official duty to the work of administration; to hold him individually responsible for the efficiency of the entire administrative force under him; to that end, to give him full control of all the administrative departments, through their official heads; and then, to have him removable, by a representative popular assembly; not at the end of a term of years, but at any time; not merely for crimes and misdemeanors, but for failure to give good administrative results; whether by reason of a direct violation of law, for physical or mental incapacity, or for mere inefficiency; in short, for any reason, which causes his removal to be at any time demanded by public interests.