The Transvaal outlook — n/a

Contents

0 o 0 T

PART I. Page

The Mtlttary Situation 1

Some General Considebationb 5

The Impossibility of Solving the Problem of TRANSportation and supply, foe any large army in South Afeioa, Except by Lines of Railway 8

The Extreme Ease of Destruction of Railway Communications in the Present South African Field of Operations 21

The Absence of Preparation on the Part of the British Army for the Handling of the Present Problem of Transportation and Supply 28

The Reason for this Absence of Preparation on

the Part of the British Army 38

The Possibility of a Solution of the Problem of Transportation by the British Army, Under Existing Conditions 49

Part II

The Political Situation Between Boers and British. 58 The Boers, and Their Rights 62

part in.

The Present Outlook 86

The Cause of the Boers 105

PART IV. Postscript 109>

1201923

LIST OF MAPS.

Face Page.

South Africa 1

Field of Operations Around Ladysmith 8

Diagram of Mileage and Altitudes on Railway Line

from Durban to Charlestown 22

Field of Operations on the Line of Lord Methuen's

Advance 52

THE TKANSYAAL OUTLOOK.

i.

THE MILITAEY SITUATION.

The thing of most absorbing public interest now before the civilized world is the war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics.

Its especial importance to the American people is to be found in the value to the British nation of American sympathy. That sympathy, down to the present time, has been largely on the Side of our kinsmen beyond the sea. It has been assumed, with or without reason, that we had, during what has been termed the Spanish War, a manifestation of sympathy on their part, which went virtually to the extent of active intervention and support It has also been generally assumed, that, although in the present contest the purely technical right of the situation <fn legal grounds is with the Boers, yet nevertheless, upon the whole situation, the British nation is entitled to the sympathies of the civilized world; that the present contest is really one between progress and stagnation; is a question of the spread of the realm of liberty and order; is, in fact, a struggle between democracy and oligarchic class rule. It has been assumed, in effect, that the Boers are resisting the march of civilization.

Public opinion seems, however, on these questions, to be gradually verging towards a condition of, at least, doubt. It is not now so generally assumed, as it was a short time ago, that the Boers are an obstacle to progress. It is evident, that we are beginning to examine the facts. The indications are, that the tide of sympathy is turning away from our nearest kinsmen.

However this may be, large numbers of persons are of the belief that, whichever of the contending parties may hold the meritorious side of the contest, yet there can be no question as to its outcome. It is generally assumed, that victory is sure finally to rest with the British, and after no very long period of time. Consequently, it is also assumed, that it is more in the interests of mankind that the result should be reached quickly ; and that the war should come to a speedy termination, by a great British triumph, which is generally believed to be a practical certainty.

It is, therefore, of prime importance to give careful attention to the military situation. If the facts of that situation should warrant the conclusion, either that the British will not succeed at all in the conquest of the South African Republics, or that success will be attained only at the end of a long and costly war, the situation would be essentially changed. If the war must in any event entail upon the British people an enormous expenditure of money and life, it will behoove them seriously to consider, whether they can, with safety to themselves, and with safety to their empire, afford to prolong the existing contest ; whether it is not imperatively demanded, by their own interests, and the interests of the whole civilized world, that the war with the South African Republics should be brought to an immediate termination, even if that termination should result in the abandonment of the contest by the British Government.

The military situation, from this point of view, becomes one of principal interest. At all times the operations of war have an absorbing interest. At this particular time, however, the interest which they excite is exceptional; and arises from the fact, that the prospect either of a British failure, or of a British success which would come only at the end of a very long period of hostilities, will have the deepest significance.

In the Army and Navy Gazette, in the issue of October 14, 1899, there appeared an editorial entitled " War at Last." That paper is edited by the Honorable William Howard Russell, correspondent of the London Times during the Crimean War, and during the earlier portion of our own Civil War. The editorial in question amounted to a warm and hearty congratulation, to Mr. Chamberlain, on the fact, that his foreign policy had at last attained the object for which he had so strenuously labored, a war with the Transvaal Republic. It would seem natural, and even probable, that any person who had had, even to a slight extent, a personal observation of actual military operations would never have had the hardihood to emit a publication of the nature of the one just mentioned. However, Dr. Kuesell was guilty of that indiscretion. Its nature and extent will appear more fully upon the reading of his language.

" War at Last.

" Mr. Reitz, as Secretary of State of the Transvaal Government, has signed the declaration of war, which is to be effective if the Queen's forces are not withdrawn from the frontier and if the reinforcements now on their way are allowed to land, but he is only the instrument of Mr. Kruger's will. It is not in our line to interfere in the process, but it seems to us that the severance of the knot ought not to have been effected at this moment, yet it cannot be regarded by us with dissatisfaction as an untoward event from the political point of view. In fact, if we could read the 'inwards' of Mr. Chamberlain we think there would be found in characters of flame inscribed under his orchid, ' Heaven be praised I Kruger has declared War V From the Pretoria point of view the declaration may have been necessary. From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician, or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late. If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in — an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders — a great blow to the loyal colonists — and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops destined in case of war to invade the Republics. We were not ready and we were not strong. If there was no threatening movement or concentration of ours on the frontiers to justify the demands of the Republics there was ample evidence that the British Government was preparing a great army to operate if necessary against them. * * * It is not too much to say, that the declaration of war by the Republics must have caused the utmost satisfaction to the millions of people who have supported the Colonial Secretary in* the energetic policy he has pursued in dealing with the Transvaal Government, and we hope sincerely that the results of the success of our arms in the field will be productive of the benefits which are expected from the overthrow of the Boer Republics, confer honor on our leaders in the council and the field and give peace and prosperity to South Africa.''

To us, with our later acquired knowledge from actual events, it seems almost impossible to realize anything more humorous than the preceding utterances, of one who presumably has kept in touch for the last forty years with military operations and current military literature. It is well, however, that we bear in mind the existence of the frank avowal contained in the foregoing paper, which may be deemed almost official, to the effect that the British troops at the time of the publication of that editorial were near the boundaries of the Transvaal, "destined in case of war to invade the Kepublics." It is also interesting to observe the implied affirmation, that, although the British people six weeks or a month prior to the time of the Transvaal declaration "were not ready, and were not strong," nevertheless at the time of the publication, to wit, on the 14th day of October, 1899, the British people were " ready," and were " strong." It is equally interesting to note the point made in the next succeeding sentence : " From the standpoint of the soldier, the politician or the statesman, it must be regarded as a grievous blunder. It was too late." Dr. Russell's meaning is that it was the action of the Transvaal which was " too late." The implication is, that, for the purposes of the British Government, the declaration of war by the Transvaal Republic came in the very nick of time. Let us note also the further implication, when Dr. Russell says : " If the forces of the two Republics could have been set in motion six weeks or a month ago, there could have been an infinity of mischief to Natal and to the Cape Colony for them to inflict and revel in — an immense encouragement to the Boer Afrikanders — a great blow to the loyal colonists, and much possible obstruction to the concentration of the troops destined in case of war to invade the Republics.

In view of the fact, now apparent, that the South African Republic was in the highest state of preparation for the breaking out of hostilities, that this preparation had extended over a period of more than four years, and so far as now appears, had provided for almost every possible contingency, it becomes really ludicrous, to consider the state of absolute absence of counter preparation, at every material point, on the part of the British Government, which, as we now know, was forcing a war, virtually at the point of the bayonet, upon a people whom they thought to be much weaker than themselves, whom they thought to coerce by a mere demonstration of superior force, and who, as Mr. Chamberlain fondly imagined, would submit to any extortionate demands that might be conceived, rather than enter upon the prosecution of actual hostilities.

Even under the conditions existing to-day, as to the contest between the British Empire on the one hand, and that apparently feeble power, the South African Republic, on the other, it is a fact that the sympathies of the civilized world will be largely influenced by their opinion of the probable outcome. It is a sad condition of affairs, but it is nevertheless the truth, that a large portion of mankind is inclined in almost any contest to take the side of the strongest, or of the party which they deem to be the strongest, without very much reference to the justice or injustice of the position of either side. In view, however, of this fact of human nature, it becomes desirable to consider, with as much accuracy as conditions permit, the prominent features of the present military situation in the war between the Transvaal and Great Britain, and to figure, as far as is now possible, the probabilities as to the result of this present most unfortunate contest

Especially will this inquiry be found interesting, if the result should be a conclusion that Great Britain is in this present contest somewhat overmatched, and that it behooves her, with a view simply to the preservation of the Empire within its present limits, to put an end to this most unnatural and unjustifiable struggle at the earliest possible moment.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

It has for a long time been agreed by competent military authorities, that, under ordinary circumstances, the stronger position, in case of invasion, is that of the defense. It need not be said, that, under ordinary circumstances, the strongest defense is some form of attack. Bearing that in mind, however, it is quite well conceded among military authorities, that in case of an invasion the stronger position, generally, is that of the defense.

In this respect there has been no essential change in the principles or rules of military science during the last one hundred years. Yet the advantages on the side of the defense have been steadily increasing. They were sufficiently strong at the time of the battle of Bunker Hill, when a handful of minute men, without drill or discipline, posted behind earthworks which had been hastily thrown up in a few hours, were able to defeat, for the time being, and so long as their ammunition lasted, the flower of the British Army. Even in the days of the old-fashioned smooth-bore musket, under ordinary conditions, the defense was much stronger than the attack. Starting only from that point of time, the chief improvement has been in the range and accuracy of weapons. The change has been one of degree, and not of kind. The principles applicable to problems of that nature have not been changed in their essence. No conditions have been introduced which are new in kind.

To come down a little later, to the days of our own Civil War, and comparing the conditions existing at that point of time with those existing at the present day, the changes between the relative positions of the attack and the defense are hardly worth mentioning. In the days of the Civil War the Springfield rifle was a weapon of fairly long range and accuracy. The increase in range and accuracy since that time is one which need have very slight consideration in any study of the principles of military science applicable to the questions of attack and defense. There has been, as said before, merely an increase in range and accuracy. The increase in rapidity of discharge is one to which military critics are inclined to attach great weight But even this is less important than is commonly supposed. The fire of the old Springfield rifle was fast enough — for practical purposes in most cases. Under very exceptional circumstances, it was, no doubt, desirable that the firing should have greater rapidity. But the fire was rapid enough, to serve fairly well the needs of the men who used it. With it they accomplished very satisfactory results, that is, from a professional standpoint From one point of view, the increased rapidity of fire is almost a disadvantage, in that it tends to cause an enormous waste of ammunition, with no adequate corresponding benefit Smokeless powder is, no doubt, a thing of the greatest importance. But many of the advantages resulting from smokeless powder can often be had from the mere withholding of fire, until an enemy gets within easy range, as the Boers always do, as is always done by steady and skillful troops. So that these points of

T rapidity of fire, and the use of smokeless powder, are of less importance than is some times supposed. They introduce no substantial change in the principles — of the military art

The fundamental features which enter into the consideration of any military problem are to-day what they always have been. They are as follows:

1. Supply and Teanspobtation.

Strictly speaking, these should come under one heading, that of supply. They concern ordnance, ammunition, clothing, medical and surgical appliances, commissary stores; together with what may be called the furniture of transportation, that is, wagons, animals and railways.

2. The Field of Operations.

Under this head come, of course, all questions relating to the actual area of the war, the mere surface distances, all matters of topography, such as streams and mountains ; and all features bearing on transportation, such as railways, wagon-roads, paths, and places where railways, wagon-roads, and paths are possible of construction.

3. The Contending Foboes,

Under this head are comprised, of course, all facts as to the quality of the individual units of an army; its organization; its discipline; its drill; but above all things, the quality of its commanders.

From this short statement, it is apparent that, for the solution of any military problem, the facts required are somewhat complex, and need very careful study. The omission of any one of them may cause a fatal defect in the conclusion to be deduced. The opinion of the most competent expert, therefore, on any existing military situation, may, in the event, be set at naught by the disclosure of essential features, which were at the time unknown to him, and which it was impossible for him to foresee.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THE PKOBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY, FOR ANY LARGE ARMY IN SOUTH AFRICA, EXCEPT BY LINES OF RAILWAY.

This Transvaal situation is one of the most interesting that has ever fallen under the observation of any military critic. Its controlling features are strongly marked ; and although it is, of course, an impossibility for any man to have a thorough knowledge of them all, yet many points in the situation are so clearly beyond dispute, and have such a large military value, that a careful conjecture, at least, can be made as to the probabilities of the situation, and as to the possible result. It need hardly be said, that the entire complexion of a battle, or a war, is liable at any moment to be changed by the events of the hour, or the minute. A thunder storm, or the untimely illness of a commanding general, witness Waterloo, may easily turn possible victory into a crushing defeat. Contingencies of that sort must always be implied, in any endeavor to discuss any military problem. Bearing carefully in mind, however, the existence at all times of such contingencies, it will be interesting to note some of the features of the military situation in the present war.

In the first place let us consider the question of supply and transportation.

Here it is evident, that on one side, that of the Burghers, the question of supply has received the most careful attention, and the provision made therefor has been remarkably complete. We now know, that for several years past the Transvaal authorities have been importing large quantities of the munitions of war, of all kinds, comprising everything that could be needed in the prosecution of an aggressive or defensive campaign.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that the absence of

-- preparation on the part of the British is quite as marked as its completeness on the part of the Burghers. Assuming, as is stated to be the fact, that the British authorities have massed at Ladysmith a considerable quantity of military supplies; assuming also, that they have large quantities of supplies at other points, for instance, Pietermaritzburg, Colenso, and Kimberley, yet it is very plain that Mr. Chamberlain did not anticipate real hostilities, but supposed that the mere demonstration of force on his part would be ample to prevent so much as a pretense of resistance on the part of the Transvaal Republic ; and consequently, he deemed it necessary to make no very elaborate preparation for military operations. It is, therefore, fair to assume, that such supplies as may have been accumulated at the points above mentioned have neither the order nor the completeness necessary to make them adequate to the prosecution of military operations on a large scale.

In considering this question of supply and transportation, it will be necessary to note, at no great length, some features of the situation which more particularly belong to other topics, of the field of operations, and the numbers, and quality, of the two contending forces.

Let us take first the position in and around Ladysmith. Ladysmith itself is on the railroad leading from Durban through Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Charlestown, Standerton, and Elandsfontein to Pretoria. The distance from Durban to Pietermaritzburg is seventy miles ; from Durban to Ladysmith is one hundred and eighty-nine miles ; from Durban to Charlestown is three hundred and four miles.

These distances, it is seen, are considerable. They are such as to make the supply of any considerable armed force under existing circumstances impossible except by line of railway.

The nature and difficulties of the problem of supply, for large bodies of men, is a matter which has apparently had no careful study at the hands of the English army officers. However that may be, the operations of the two contending armies during our Civil War give us the fullest information on the points here involved. The science of transportation was developed during that war to a degree never before approached, or conceived as a possibility. It received its development at the hand of masters. The matter of supply of large bodies of troops, as practiced by General Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign, just prior to the cross-country march to Savannah, is down to the present time the marvel in military history. To borrow a term from the sporting world, it holds the record. A few facts taken from the history of the military operations of that period will throw a strong light on the problems now to be solved by the British authorities in the South African campaign.

In fact, one of the chief reasons for the March to the Sea was this matter of transportation and supply. The real reasons and nature of that celebrated march have often been overlooked. One of the main moving considerations, which decided General Sherman to make that movement, was the practical impossibility of keeping open his existing line of railway communication to Nashville. Sherman's telegram to General Grant of October 9, 1864, says on this point:

" It will be a, physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest and Wheeler and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without home or habitation."

On November 6th he again telegraphs:

"That devil Forrest was down by Johnson ville making havoc among the gunboats and transports."

In another telegram of November 6, Sherman says, apropos of Forrest's ubiquity :

"Forrest seems to have scattered from Eastport to Johnson ville, Paris and the lower Tennessee. General Thomas reports a capture by him of a gun-boat and five transports."

As a consequence of what Sherman called the " physical impossibility" of keeping open his railway communications, he said in one of his despatches to General Grant, " I propose we break up the railroad from Chattanooga and strike out with wagons for Savannah."

The reason for this impossibility of keeping open railway communication of so great length as General Sherman's line then was, will be more apparent when we look at a few further facts. The length of that line was as follows : From Louisville to Nashville, 185 miles; from Nashville to Chattanooga, 151 miles; from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 137 miles; in all, 473 miles. The clearest evidence on this point is to be found in General Sherman's statement, which appears at page 398, Volume 2, of his Memoirs, as to the impossibility of supplying any considerable force of men with a line of such length by any other means than a railroad. His language is :

" Sherman's Memoirs," II, 398:

"The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much as if not more so, than in peace.

"The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads : from Louisville to Nashville, 185 miles; from Nashville to Chattanooga, 151 miles; from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 187 miles."

Every mile of this ' single track ' was so delicate that one man could in a minute have broken or moved a rail. But our trains usually carried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important bridge or trestle, the destruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuilding.

• 1 * » * * ******** #

" Our trains from Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Four such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of ten tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the absolute necessities of the army, and allowed for the accidents that were common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that single stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals, for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz. : from May 1 to November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons, would have required thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six mules each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles each day, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that region of country. Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlanta campaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and only then, because we had the men and the means to maintain and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy. Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their necessary baggage. Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer the purpose well enough, but they should always have rough board seats. For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with straw or bushes were usually employed. Personally, I saw but little of the practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer in charge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to me the whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all the way from Nashville to Atlanta. I am convinced that the risk to life to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled that on the skirmish line, called for as high an order of courage, and fully equaled it in importance."

It is also to be borne in mind that at that time General Sherman had, so long as his communications were open, not only a line of railway, but the two rivers, the Cumberland and the Tennessee; the Cumberland at parts of the year being available for water transportation as high as Nashville ; and the Tennessee as high as Chattanooga, So that, practically, General Sherman, at the time that he speaks of the impossibility of keeping open his communication at Louisville, had not only a line of railway, but two navigable rivers. No such aids are possible for the operations of the British force in South Africa.

Let us now see how this line of communication was handled.

General Forrest started from Verona, Mississippi, on the 16th of September, 1864, on his celebrated march into Alabama and Tennessee. He left Cherokee on the morning of the 2 1st of September. He reached that place on his return on the 6th day of October. During that expedition, according to his official report dated October 17, 1864, he accomplished the following results:

" I captured 86 commissioned officers, 67 Government employees, 1,374 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 933 negroes, besides killing and wounding in the various engagements 1,000 more, making an aggregate of 3,360, being an average of one to each man I had in the engagements. In addition to these I captured about 800 horses, 7 pieces of artillery, 2,000 stand small arms, several hundred saddles, 50 wagons and ambulances, with a large amount of machinery, commissary's and quartermaster's stores, all of which has been distributed to the different commands. The greatest damage, however, done to the enemy was in the complete destruction of the railroad from Decatur to Spring Hill, with the exception of the Duck River Bridge. It will require months to repair the injury done to the road, and may possibly be the means of forcing the evacuation of Pulaski and Columbia, and thus relieve the people from further oppression."

The destruction of the railroad was very complete ; it covered a long distance. General Forrest's anticipation was that its restoration would " require months."

We will now see how the problem was handled upon the side of the United States Army. The report of General Daniel S. McCallum, Director and Manager of Military Kailroads, dated October 13, 1864 (Official Record, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 1, page 507), reads as follows:

" Sir : — I have the honor to transmit the following statement in regard to the effect of the late raid by the Rebel General Forrest upon the military railway lines in the Division of the Mississippi : 1 engine and 12 cars, burned on a trestle near Decatur Junction, all destroyed, 3 cars, burned between Huntsville and Stevenson. All the bridges and trestles between Pulaski and Athens, a distance of SO miles, destroyed. This embraces Duck River Bridge and the most formidable trestle on the Decatur and Stevenson Line, 1100 feet long and 90 feet high ; and about two miles and a half of track partially destroyed. Between Spring Hill and Columbia three bridges destroyed and two to three miles of track. The Chattanooga line is uninjured, excepting the tearing up of one or two rails by small guerrilla parties. High water on the Chattanooga and Atlanta line has carried away the bridges over the Chattahooche and Oostenaule Rivers, and two or three between Chattanooga and Dalton. The Rebels have turned up several miles of the track."