Read here

Trade and currency in early Oregon, a study in the commercial and monetary history of the pacific Northwest

James Henry Gilbert · 1907 · Scanned text · Free in the US

36,282 words · about 2 h 32 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
About this edition

Scanned text — may contain errors · view original scans

Free in the US: this text is in the public domain in the United States; it may still be in copyright elsewhere.

Licence: PD · PD-US by publication date

Text from Internet Archive, read from page scans by OCR and set out for reading on screen; no words of the book are rewritten or summarized. How RedLectern is built

About this book

Author
James Henry Gilbert
Language
English
Published
1907
Length
36,282 words · about 2 h 32 min
Sections
10 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States · PD-US by publication date

 

Contents (10)

Continue:

Front matter

TRADE AND CURRlEI^C^y l^l EARLY OREGON

A Study in the Commercial and Monetary History of the Pacific Northwest

BY

Preface

The author's acquaintance with the subject matter of the following monograph began some two years ago with an inquiry into the fiscal history of Oregon. As a result of that inquiry he was impressed by the rapid evolution through which the currency of the Pacific Northwest had passed and the opportunity it afforded for the study of an unusual variety of monetary facts. He at once undertook the task of tracing the development from the commodity currencies of the hunting and early agricultural periods to the solution of the legal-tender problem at the close of the Civil War. Further examination of the subject, however, made it clear that an adequate discussion of the monetary history was impossible without a concurrent treatment of trade, since the connection between the media of exchange and the nature of the transactions settled by them was in this case unusually close and vital. The circumstances under which the settlement of Oregon began compelled a reversion to the cruder forms of production and exchange. During the earlier stages of industrial development in this region the existence of the colony was dependent on the introduction of supplies from without, which, in turn, was contingent on the outgo of some staple product. At first furs were exchanged directly for assorted goods, then the process was complicated somewhat by the barter of wheat for furs ; and finally agricultural products were exchanged for gold dust, which, through the operation of Si 5

PREFACE coinage, became the metallic money of the Pacific Coast. It was the activity of the trader that imparted a high degree of exchangeabihty to the articles which attained successively to the rank of currency. Even in the later period, when the isolation of the settlement was partly overcome, the commercial position of the Pacific Coast States enabled them to reach a solution of the legal-tender problem which, under different circumstances, would have been impracticable. The relation between trade and currency was so intimate at every step that the periods in the development of the one coincide naturally with the stages in the evolution of the other. Thus the scope of the present work has been broadened to embrace a treatment of those facts which, under the timeworn division of economic science, are included under the head of Exchange.

The author is indebted to Mr. George H. Himes, Assistant Secretary and Curator of the Oregon Historical Society, for favors shown him and for suggestions offered while prosecuting his research ; and to the Portland Oregonian for the use of rare newspaper files. He is also under obligations to Professor E. R. A. Seligman, Professor Henry R. Seager and Professor H. L. Moore of Columbia University who have assisted him in revising and preparing the work for publication.

J. H. G.

Columbia University , February, 1907 .

CHAPTER I The Fur Trade, British Monopoly, and Beaver Currency

PAGE

1 . Early Coast Traders . o . . . . . lo

2. Commercial Scheme of John Jacob Astor 13

3. Rise of the Hudson's Bay Company 16

4. Competition of the Northwest Company 18

5. Union of Rival Traders 20

6. Monopolistic Policy of Hudson's Bay Company ....... 22

7. Organization and Profits of the Trade 29

8. Beaver Currency, Barter and Evaluation ........... 32

CHAPTER n

Early Agriculture, Alaskan Market and Wheat Currency

1. From Fur Trader to Squatter 36

2. Dependence of Early Settlers 38

3. Farming, Milling and Exporting 39

4. Alaskan Market and Coast Trade 41

5. Lack of Specie and the Demand for Wheat 43

6. Customary Tender for Debts 45

7. Wheat Credit, Orders and Receipts 46

8. Gray Currency Bill and Security to Debtors . 47

9. Treasury Notes and Territorial Scrip • . 49

10. Defects of the Currency . 54

11. Insularity of the Settlement and Slackness of Trade ..... 57

12. Project of a Combined Exporting Company 68

13. Immigration and Improvement in Trade 70

CHAPTER III California Market, Gold Dust and Private Coinage

1. Discovery of Gold and the Demand for Provisions ...... 73

2. Price Levels and the Profits of Traders 74

7] 7

CONTENTS

PAGE

3. Influx of Gold Dust and the Demand for Coinage 76

4. Territorial Act for the Minting of Gold 80

5. Oregon Exchange Company and " Beaver Money " 84

6. Importation of Coin and Rise in the Price of Gold Dust ... 86

7. Passing of the Hudson's Bay Company 88

8. Revival and Diversification of Industry 91

9. Depression of 1854 .... 92

CHAPTER IV Civil War, Legal Tenders and the Adherence to Coin

1. The Coast; Its Commercial and Monetary Situation 95

2. Metallic Medium and the Exclusion of Bank Bills 97

3. Union Sentiment and Upholding Greenbacks 98

4. Fear of Paper Standard and Recourse to Protective Measures - 99

5. Merchants' Agreements and Market Price for Legal Tenders • loi

6. Blacklisting and the Penalty for " Greenbacking " 103

7. Legal Tenders for Taxes and Fiscal Confusion 105

8. Specific Contract Law, a Security for Lenders 112

9. Problem of Greenbacks; Factors in its Solution 114

10. Coin Price of Legal Tenders on the Coast 117

11. Depreciated Paper and the Position of Debtors 118

12. Unchanged Standard and the Stability of Prices 119

CHAPTER I The Fur Trade, British Monopoly and Beaver Currency

Every section of the new world has been, at some period in its history, an object of exploitative trade or industry. Fur traders, gold miners and treasure seekers have been the pioneers in the field of exploration and the precursors of civilization and a new economic order. With the failure of resources which invite to exploitation, men, who have traversed rich valleys in search of treasure or navigated majestic rivers in quest of fur-bearing animals, either settle there themselves or pilot others thither to till the soil, to build mills and factories and to freight the streams with the products of diversified industry. It was the trapper and hunter who first crossed the plains and penetrated the forests of the Pacific Northwest, for the earliest visitors had noticed an abundance of fur-bearing animals. The sea-otter found about the bays and inlets of the coast was clothed with a coat of extreme fineness unrivaled for its richness, softness and beauty. Farther inland were the mink and the marten, while forest, lake and stream were teeming with myriads of beavers. From the earliest times furs have been used for clothing and ornament, and, among civilized peoples, they constitute an article of comfort, fashion or luxury according to their quality and beauty. In Russia, China and Turkey during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries furs formed a part of the official 9] 9 lO

TRADE AND CURRENCY IN EARLY OREGON [iq garb of state, and were highly esteemed as marks of rank and distinction even among the male sex. Up to 1780 the supply of furs for these countries was largely drawn from northern Asia, but about this time the Siberian output failed very rapidly and became inadequate even for the oriental demand/

Attention was now directed to newer fields, and profitable communication was soon established between the native hunters of Alaska and the eastern market ; it was reported that the first sea-otter skins from the Northwest sold in Chinese markets at from sixteen to twenty pounds.''

During the first half of the nineteenth century fur-bearing animals were hunted with such avidity that the supply fell off very rapidly, although the price remained nearly stationary owing to the substitution of other fabrics of silk, wool or cotton. Notwithstanding the relaxation of the demand and the rapid failure of the supply, however, the amount received by collectors of undressed furs in 1844 reached $3,000,000, and for several years Oregon Territory supplied one million dollars' worth annually. 3

The natives of the Northwest coast had long practiced the arts of hunting and had clothed their bodies in the skins of wild animals, but were wholly unacquainted with the artificial value imparted to some species of furs by social custom, and were, therefore, eager to exchange any surplus for European trinkets and cheap commodities. An abundance of valuable furs might be had for beads, knives, tobacco and spirits, and a rich harvest

'Irving, Astoria, p. 512.

'Bulfinch, Oregon and Eldorado, p. 2.

' Greenhow, Oregon and California, p. 412.

II]

II awaited the trader who should first enter the Northwest region. The attention of the commercial world was first directed to Oregon Territory by the voyage which proved fatal to Captain Cook, the explorer. His successor, Captain James King, on his return made known the high prices which the furs of the sea-otter commanded in Chinese markets, and turned the attention of British merchants to the Pacific Northwest. A brisk trade was developed between the natives and the oriental market as early as 1786.'

Not long after the Revolution American traders began to engage actively in the traffic along the coast, the first expedition being made from Boston in the ship Columbia and the sloop Washington, under the command of Kendrick and Gray, in 1788. Both vessels entered Nootka Sound and spent the summer of 1788 collecting furs. Captain Gray, in charge of the Columbia, then carried the furs to Canton and exchanged them for a shipload of teas and other Chinese merchandise. On his return to Boston it was found that the cargo scarcely paid the cost of the expedition.^ In June, 1791, Gray again entered Fuca's Strait and traded with the Indians during the summer and following winter. Early in the spring he sailed southward along the coast and entered the mouth of the Columbia River where he spent three days trading with the natives. Strictly speaking, neither of these expeditions was worth while from the commercial standpoint, but merely served to open the way for a more profitable trade during the next twenty years. From a historical standpoint, however, the last-named expedition was of utmost importance, since Gray's dis-

'Twiss, Oregon Territory, p. 18. 'Bulfinch, Oregon and Eldorado, pp. 3-4.

covery of the Columbia River helped to establish our claim to Oregon Territory.

During the interval between 1792 and 181 2 the traffic with the natives was carried on mainly by a group of Boston merchants. Trading vessels entered the bays and inlets along the coast and summoned the natives to bring on their peltries in canoes. Early in the nineties there were as many as twenty-one vessels plying along the coast, nearly all of which were the property of Boston merchants. They gave in exchange for furs West India products, British manufactured goods, and Spanish and Italian wines. After spending two summers collecting furs they would sail for China, sell the peltries, and return to Boston with a cargo of teas, spices, nankeens and other oriental products.

Up to 1 81 2 British and American traders had merely crept along the coast and made no attempt to penetrate into the interior. No effort had been made to organize bands of trappers and hunters, but merchants had depended solely on traffic with the natives. It remained for the enterprise of John Jacob Astor, of New York, to lay the foundation of a great commercial scheme, which contemplated a vast increase in the possibilities of the trade by making all the interior tributary to the coast. Briefly, his plan was to found a chain of trading posts extending from the Mississippi Valley along the Missouri and Columbia rivers to the shores of the Pacific. From a central depot at the mouth of the Columbia all the interior posts could obtain their suppHes, and hither all furs might be sent for final shipment. Coasting crafts, fitted out at the mouth of the Columbia, could carry on a prosperous trade with the natives along the coast. Supplies would be forwarded by an annual ship from New York, which, after discharging its cargo, could take on a load of furs, market them in Canton and return to New York with a cargo of Chinese merchandise. The fullest possible development of the inland trade would contribute directly to Astor's cherished scheme of colonization and help to make his Pacific settlement the germ of a new civilization beyond the Rockies." '

In order to further the execution of his commercial project, Astor obtained a charter from the New York legislature for the American Fur Company with an initial capital of a million dollars and the privilege of increasing it to two million, if necessary. The whole capital was contributed by Astor himself, and, although the company took the form of a corporation, the New Yorker was the sole director.

The failure of such a promising scheme resulted from a series of mishaps involving the loss of ships and cargoes, the hazardous condition of trade during the war of 1812, and the persistent opposition of his Canadian rival, the Northwest Company, which steadily refused to enter into any agreement liable to defeat its purpose of securing a monopoly in the Northwest trade. Astor's party of one hundred and twenty arrived, in the Tonqum, at the mouth of the Columbia in March, 181 1, and erected a fort on the present site of Astoria. A friendly trade was at once established with the natives in the vicinity, and, after the arrival of an overland party from Saint Louis, bands were sent out to establish five interior posts. Astor's men began to fear the hostility of the Northwest Company, whose traders were already in the valley of the Columbia and had begun to traffic with the Indians. The sites chosen by the American Fur Company were at the mouth of the Lewis River, at Lantou, at a

^Irving, Astoria, p. 39.

point six hundred miles up the Columbia, at a station on the east fork of the Lewis River, and at a point on the Willamette not far from its mouth. An effort was made to cultivate the friendship of the Indians and to encourage hunting and trapping.

Up to this point all went well ; but before long a complete disaster was to overtake the To7iquin. After discharging her cargo at Astoria, the vessel sailed northward along the coast and engaged in traffic with the Indians. Too many savages were allowed to board the vessel at once and the crew were overpowered and slain, while the ship itself was wrecked by an explosion of the powder magazine. Having received no word from the Tonquin by the following spring, Astor despatched another supply ship, the BeaveVy with a cargo of valuable merchandise. The vessel was to discharge a portion of its cargo at Astoria, then proceed northward along the coast to New Archangel for the purpose of supplying the Russian posts in Alaska. On returning to Astoria, she should complete her cargo of furs and sail for Canton. It appears that Astor had already entered into an agreement to supply the Russian traders in the north with goods and necessaries in exchange for peltries at stipulated prices. It was a part of the agreement also that Alaskan furs should be carried to Canton and sold on commission and merchandise returned to the Russian posts. ^

The war was now in progress between the United States and Great Britain and the seas were swept by hostile fleets. Astor delayed sending the next annual supply ship lest it should be taken and plundered. Meanwhile the Beaver had reached Canton with the first cargo of furs, arriving in January, 1813. Here the captain was

^Irving, Astoria, p. 429.

offered $150,000 for furs that had cost the company but little over $25,000. Had the peltries been sold and the proceeds invested in nankeens the cargo would have yielded $300,000 in New York. The captain, however, refused the offer, borrowed money on Astor's credit at eighteen per cent., and lay in the harbor while furs were declining in price and the war was wearing on to a close. In March, 1813, Astor sent a third supply ship, the Lark, which was caught in a storm off the coast of the Sandwich Islands, driven ashore, and plundered by the natives.

The partners at Astoria were now growing dissatisfied, and, in July, 1813, signed a manifesto setting forth the gloomy prospect and announcing their intention to abandon the enterprise on the first of June following, unless a supply ship arrived in the meantime with orders from New York. The reasons assigned for taking this step were the failure of supplies from without, the discouraging condition of the inland trade, and, above all, their inability to compete with the powerful and enterprising Northwest Company. The truth was that M'Dougal, who represented Astor's interests on the coast, courted rather than feared the competition of his rival. He had but lately left the service of the Northwesters for partnership with Astor, and his sympathies were still on the side of his Scotch comrades. The agents of the Northwest Company, too, seemed determined to take advantage of Astor's temporary embarrassment to dislodge him from the field. In two memorials to the British government they had complained that the American settlement at the mouth of the Columbia River and the vast scope of its commercial possibilities seriously menaced the trade of the Canadian company. As soon as the partners had announced their l6 TRADE AND CURRENCY IN EARLY OREGON [i5

intention of abandoning the enterprise, clerks, voyageurs and servants began deserting for the service of the rival company. Negotiations were now begun for the sale of the post with goods and furs to the Northwest Company, and, on the i6th of October, terms were agreed upon whereby the whole property of the American Fur Company was transferred for a consideration of $58,000, or about one-fourth of its real worth. ^

The control of this vantage point at the mouth of the Columbia enabled the Canadian company to extend its posts and to take complete possession of the field opened up by Astor. Occupancy by the Northwest Company, however, was destined to be only temporary. Its plans were but half matured when it was forced to yield to a permanent tenant in the form of a great commercial monopoly created, like the East India Company, by royal charter, strengthened by sweeping grants of privilege, and destined soon to exercise, not only a commercial sway, but a quasi-political sovereignty over a dominion larger than many independent kingdoms.

In May, 1669, King Charles II of England incorporated by royal grant an association of traders with Prince Rupert at the head to be known as The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay." The grant comprised the "whole trade and commerce of all those seas, straits and bays, rivers, lakes, creeks and sounds, in whatsoever latitude they shall be, that lie within the entrance of the straits commonly called Hudson's Straits," together with all lands adjacent and tributary to them and not then actually possessed by any English subjects.^ The region covered by the grant

^ Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, pp. 303-304. 'See charter of the Hudson's Bay Company, reprinted in Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, pp. 465-466.

I?

embraced an area of 2,250,000 square miles, or one-third that of Europe. The company and its successors were made lord proprietors of this vast domain, holding in fee simple in ''free and common socage, and not in capite or by knight's services." For the privileges conferred no consideration was asked except an annual payment to King Charles or his heirs of two elks and two black beavers, and even this modest tribute should be rendered only when his majesty should visit Prince Rupert's Land.' In addition to commercial privileges, the charter conferred the right to make laws and impose penalties, provided they were not repugnant to the laws, statutes and customs of England. All other subjects of his majesty were forbidden under heavy penalties to "visit, haunt, frequent, trade, traffic or adventure" within the region drained by the streams emptying into Hudson's Bay. The original capital stock v/as, in 1676, £10,500, which was trebled in 1690 and again in 1720. At the latter date an additional subscription of £3150, likewise trebled, made the total capitalization £103,950.

The field for the Hudson's Bay Company's enterprise was both rich and extensive. Forest and stream abounded in what seemed to be an inexhaustible supply of fur-bearing animals, and the natives could be induced to take and sell the skins for a trifling compensation. At the outset traders found that a beaver skin might be had for a half-pound of glass beads, a half-pound of powder, a comb, a small looking-glass or a quart of brandy.^ A gallon of liquor, which cost but twenty shillings, after being diluted one-half, would exchange for eight beaver skins worth six pounds ; or, if the brandy were exchanged

^ Westminster Review, July, 1867, p. 86.

^ Bryce, Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Company, pp. 22-23, l8 TRADE AND CURRENCY IN EARLY OREGON [ig

for other skins, the return might be increased to eight pounds instead. A four-penny comb was known to exchange for a bear's skin worth two pounds.' The sheer lack of competition and the dependence of the natives on British traders for what soon assumed the importance of necessaries in their sight — fire-arms and ammunition, not to mention blankets, beads and spirits — enabled the company to establish and to maintain a favorable tariff. Within fourteen years from the date of the charter the company was paying fifty per cent, dividends, while from 1690 to 1800 the profits averaged from sixty to seventy per cent.^ From the conquest of Canada in 1762, French traders became almost extinct, and the trade of that country fell into the grasp of the Hudson's Bay Company as well.

But the harvest was so rich as to excite the cupidity of the unprivileged and to invite competition even within a territory covered by a chartered monopoly. In 1787 the Northwest Company was organized as a partnership in Montreal, and, about 1805, entered the domain of Prince Rupert's Land as a formidable and aggressive rival of the Hudson's Bay Company, and for a time menaced the security it had so long enjoyed. In the impending conflict the capital and chartered privileges were on the side of the English company, while the dash, daring and enterprise were on the side of its rival. The charter of the former conferred exclusive privileges of trade, while the Northwest Company was in the nature of an intruder with few rights save those it usurped. The Hudson's Bay Company had established certain posts at the mouth of streams and other accessible places and induced the natives to resort to these "factories" for purposes of

^ Nicolay, Oregon Territory, p. 163.

'Bryce, op. cit., p. 24.

trade ; but the enterprising Northwesters carried the traffic into the lodges and hunting-grounds of the Indians. The officials and agents of the British company received fixed salaries, while the pay of the Northwesters was proportioned to their success. They received certain stipulated prices for furs, and the principals seldom questioned how they came by them. In many cases, too, Canadian traders were bound to the Northwest Company by debts they z mid not discharge, and so doomed to perpetual service. Goods were furnished in advance at exorbitant prices, and the partnership was charged witlx putting into circulation a depreciated " Northwest currency," worth only half as much as the regular Canadian currency. Earnings were reckoned in the latter, while goods were charged for at prices estimated in the former.'

The traders of the Montreal company soon entered forbidden fields in every direction, reached out to Hudson's Bay, swarmed across prairies and mountains, and crept down the Columbia to its mouth. Competition between the rival companies, at first merely sharp and aggressive, developed into warfare characterized by barbarous battles fruitful in bloodshed and in pillage. At first the rivalry took the form of an attempt to induce the Indians by threat or promise to deal only with agents of one company. As the conflict deepened, however, servants of the Northwest Company forced entrance into the lodges of the British traders, seized their furs and then compelled the victims to sign statements to the effect that the property relinquished was not their own.

In 181 1 Lord Selkirk obtained from the Hudson's

^ Dunn, Oregon Territory and the British North American Fur Trade, p. 28.

Bay Company an extensive grant of land for the purpose of establishing agricultural settlements in the Red River district. A colony of Scotch farmers at this point threatened to be a grave hindrance to the Montreal company, since it lay directly on their route to the northwest, and from this region they were in the habit of drawing supplies for their posts. Despite the opposition of the Northwest Company, however, a colony of Scotch Highlanders was peaceably located there in 1812. In June, 1814, the governor of the new province issued a decree forbidding all persons, under pain of seizure and prosecution, from carrying out of the colony " any provision either of flesh, dried meat, grain or vegetables." A strict enforcement of the order would doubtless have dealt a fatal blow to the enterprise of the Canadian company by cutting off its supply of provisions; but the daring Northwesters resisted with such a show of violence that the Scotch farmers were frightened away and their homes were destroyed. During the following spring, when Selkirk again sent a colony of settlers to the Red River district, hostilities were resumed. Posts were seized and destroyed on both sides and on June 19, 1816, a pitched battle was fought in which the Highlanders were again routed and a score of their number, including Governor Semple, were slain.

Competition so ruinous to life and property could not fail to enlist the interest of Parliament, particularly when one of the rivals was a monopoly under royal charter. So severe had been the conflict that both companies were well-nigh impoverished, and the Hudson's Bay Company's dividends had dwindled from sixty or seventy

^Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, p. 324; Simpson, Narrative of a Journey round the World, p. 43.

per cent, to nothing. The affair was taken up by Parliament in June, 1819, and the conduct of the rival companies was minutely investigated. By an act of July 2, 1821, the preamble of which lamented the ''evils which have arisen from competition," the two companies were united under the title of the Hudson's Bay Company. It appears that an agreement ''for putting an end to competition " had been signed by the partners of the Northwest Company and the governor of the Hudson's Bay Company in the preceding March, and the King was petitioned for an exclusive grant of trade to the consolidated companies. The new charter was for a period of twenty-one years and covered all that region northward and westward of the territories of the United States not incorporated in any British province or belonging to the dominion of any other country.^ This designation covered Oregon Territory, which was already occupied by the Northwest Company, the ownership of which remained in dispute between the two governments until 1846. It was stipulated in the grant, however, that in that portion of America lying west of the Rocky Mountains, which, according to the convention of 1818 with the United States, was to remain free and open to the subjects and citizens of both nations, privileges of trade were not to be claimed or exercised to the exclusion of American citizens.

During the interval between 1813 and 1821 the Northwest Company had held peaceful possession of the territory surrendered by the American Fur Company, but had done little to develop the trade. At the consoHdation of the rival companies in 182 1, all the stations were

^ See Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, p. 474. ^Ibid., p. 475.

occupied by the Hudson's Bay Company. Astoria, or Fort George as it was now called, was abandoned and Fort Vancouver, on the north side of the Columbia river about 120 miles from its mouth, became the commercial depot and the emporium of the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest. The treaty for joint occupancy of Oregon Territory by Great Britain and the United States proved, in reality, to be a concession in favor of single occupancy by the former. The union of the rival fur companies under a royal charter was a combination of dauntless energy with an abundance of capital, and the exposures incident to the Parliamentary investigation had led to a refinement of methods, John McLoughlin, an employee of the Montreal company, now became ''chief factor" at Vancouver and took up the task of developing the trade in Oregon Territory. The Hudson's Bay Company soon dotted all the wild interior with its posts, locating six permanent stations on the coast and sixteen east of the Cascade Mountains. The streams were freighted with cargoes of outgoing merchandise and supplies and with incoming peltries, and soon the returns from the Vancouver station exceeded those of any other ''factory" in the Northwest. Soon, too, the giant monopoly exercised an undisputed commercial sway over what is now Oregon, Washington and Idaho. As early as 1830 it was said, " The will of the Hudson's Bay Company is the supreme law of the land. The natives are subservient to it and the American traders dare not resist it."'

There is nothing extraordinary about the supremacy of the Hudson's Bay Company within the territory ilesignated by its charter, for British subjects were forbidden under heavy penalties to traffic within its borders ; but

^ Kelley, Oregon Territory, p. 76.

the Oregon country was theoretically open to the traders of both nations, and, within its boundaries, ascendency in the trade must be in the nature of an acquisition and the consequence of larger capital or superior skill in excluding or suppressing competition. The rise of the British supremacy in the fur trade of Oregon Territory furnishes an interesting study of competition and of monopolistic behavior under the most elementary conditions. Up to 1848, or the close of the early agricultural period, when more extensive dealings were estabHshed with the outside world and the current of trade was turned southward on account of the gold discoveries in California, the economic history of the Pacific Northwest was conditioned by the enterprise of the Hudson's Bay Company, and, until that time, the account of American settlement and progress centers about a few fitful, and, for the most part, futile attempts to dispute its monopolistic sway. Early agriculture, as we shall see, had an inseparable connection with the fur trade, the surplus products of the soil being used to swell the annual shipment of furs. Let us then see, as an introduction to subsequent periods, how the Hudson's Bay Company's power in Oregon was established and maintained. We shall examine, first, the nature of its dealings with the Indians ; secondly, its treatment of American competitors ; and, thirdly, its attitude toward early immigration.

The opening of the book is shown; the full text loads in the reader.

Loading the full text…