Elements of intellectual philosophy : designed as a textbook

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DESIGNED A3 A TEXT-BOOK-

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Contents

Chap, i.— UWlv nf Intellectual Philosophy.

Sect

I

CHAPTER FIRST. UTILITY OP XJSTEIiX.'SCTUAIi PHILOSOPHY

$. 1. Of the prejudice existing against this science.

A prejudice prevails against the science of Intellectual Philosophy. It is generally entered upon in our academies and colleges with reluctance, and relinquished without regret. This aversion is not limited to the idle, but includes those, who know the value of time and the importance of mental improvement.

The objections against the Philosophy of the Mind, which have in a great measure given rise to this prejudice, may be principally summed up in two particulars.

§.2. Of the metaphy sicks of the schools.

Of these, one is the frivolous character of the metaphysical writings of the schools.

The origin of those institutions, to which the name of schools is given, was this.* By order of a general Council of the Roman Catholick Church, held at Rome in the year 1170, certain persons were appointed to give instructions either in the cathedrals and monasteries, or in some suitable buildings erected near them. The places of instruction were called by the Latin name scholae ; the teachers were termed scholastici. These minor institutions, seme bf which had an existence previous to the enactment of 2

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the canons of the Council, which has been mentioned, at length grew up into the more imposing shape of seminaries, answering to the publick literary institutions of modern times. But while there was an alteration in the institutions themselves, and universities and colleges in the endarose from these small beginnings, the same appellations continued.

By the schools, then, are to be understood the European literary and theological institutions, as they were constituted and regulated from about the middle of the twelfth century to the period of the Protestant reformation. By the scholastics: philosophy, using the terms in a general sense, \ve mean those topicks, which were most examined and insisted on during that period.

The learning- of the schools may in general be referred to three great divisions, viz.

Ontology or the science of Being in general ; — ■•

Natural theology, which seems to have been the application of the principles of ontology to the particular existences, called God and angels ; and pneumatology or doctrines having relation to the human mind.

The following are some of the inquiries, which were warmly agitated during the period now under examination.

Whether the Deity can exist in imaginary space no less than in the space, which is real ? Whether the Deity loves a possible unexisting angel better, than an insect in actual existence ?

Whether the essence of mind be distinct from its existence f And whether its essence might, therefore, subsist, when it had no actual existence ?

Whether angels can visually discern objects in the dark ? Or whether they can pass from one point of space to another without passing through the intermediate points ?

Such inquiries, it will readily be admitted, were worse than fruitless. But Intellectual Philosophy, as it exists at the present day, evidently ought not to be estimated by what it was in the scholustick ages. If, therefore, the pre-

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. II

judice, which has been mentioned as prevailing against this science, be in any measure founded on the frivolous discussions of the schools, it is so far unjust ; since it is now prosecuted on different principles and with different results.

§. 3. Supposed practical inutility of this science.

A second ground of the prejudice, existing against this science, is the prevalence of a false opinion of its practical inutility. In studying Intellectual Philosophy, we are supposed in the erroneous opinion, which has been mentioned, to learn in a scientifick form only what we have previously learnt from nature ; we acquire nothing new, and the time, therefore, which is occupied in this pursuit, is mispent.

All persons, however ignorant, know what it is, to think, to imagine, to feel, to perceive, to exercise belief. All persons know the fact in Intellectual Philosophy, that memory depends on attention ; and when asked, why they have forgotten things, which occurred yesterday in their presence, think it a sufficient answer to say, that they did not attend to them. Every body is practically acquainted with the principles of association, even the groom ; who, with all his ignorance of philosophical books, has the sagacity to feed his horses to the sound of the drum and bugle, as a training preparatory to their being employed in military service.

From some facts of this kind, which may safely be admitted to exist, the opinion has arisen of the practical inutility of studying Intellectual Philosophy as a science.

§. 4. Its supposed practical inutility answered.

If, however, these facts be admited to be a valid objection in application to this study, the same objection evidently exists to -the study of other sciences, for instance, Natural Philosophy. It is remarked of savages, that they gain an eminence before they throw their missile weapons, in order by the aid of such a position to increase the momentum of what is thrown. They do this without anysci-

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entiflck knowledge of the accelerating force of gravity. The sailor, who has perhaps never seen a mathematical diagram, practically understands, as is evident from the mode in which he handles the ropes of the vessel, the composition and resolution of forces. In a multitude of instances, we act on principles, which are explained and demonstrated in some of the branches of Natural Philosophy, We act on them, while we are altogether ignorant of the science. But no one, it is presumed, will consider this a good excuse for making no philosophical and systematick inquiries into that department of knowledge.

But without contenting ourselves with this answer to the objection, that the study, upon which we are entering, is of no practical profit, some further remarks will be made, more directly and positively showing its beneficial results.

§. 5. Intellectual philosophy teaches us how to direct our inquiries.

It is one of the good results of a knowledge of Intellectual Philosophy, that we are taught by it to limit our inquiries to those subjects, to the investigation of which our capacities are equal and are adapted. The Supreme Being is an all pervading mind, a principle of life, that has an existence in all places and in all space, and whose intelligence is like his omnipresence, acquainted with all things. But man, his creature, is made with an inferiour capacity ; he knows only in part, and it is but reasonable to suppose, that there are many things, which he will never He able to Jcnow. But, although it be justly admitted, that man is subordinate to the supreme Being and is infinitely inferiour to Fiim, his Maker has kindly given him aspirations after knowledge, with the power of satisfying in some measure and under certain limitations these natural breathings forth of the soul. If, therefore, man be a being, formed to know, and there be, moreover, certain restrictions, placed upon the capacity of knowledge, it is highly important to ascertain the limitations, whatever they may be, which are imposed. Nor is this always an easy thing to be determin.-

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ed. There is oftentimes a difficulty in ascertaining precisely the boundary, which runs between the possibility and the impossibility of knowledge, but whenever it is ascertained, there is an indirect increase of mental ability by means of the withdrawment of the mind from unprofitable pursuits, in which there is an expence of effort without any remuneration.

When, for example, a piece of wood, or any other of those material bodies, by which we are surrounded, is presented to any one for his examination, there are some things in this material substance, which may be known, and others, which cannot. Its colour, its hardness or softness, its extension are points, upon which he can inform himself, can reason, can arrive at knowledge. He opens his eye ; an impression is made on the organ of vision, and he has the idea of colour. By means of the application of his hand to the wood, he learns the penetrability or impenetrability, the softness or hardness of the mass, which he holds. By moving his hand from one point to another in the mass, he is informed of the continuity or extension of its parts. But when he pushes his inquisition beneath the surface of this body, when he attempts to become acquainted not only with its qualities, but with that supposed something, in which those qualities are often imagined to inhere, and, in a word, expends his efforts, in obedience to this unprofitable determination, in learning what matter is, independently of its properties, he then stumbles on a boundary, which it is not given men to pass, and seeks for knowledge where they are not permitted to know.

The necessity of understanding what things come within the reach of our powers and what do not, was a thought, which laid the foundation of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.

§. 6. Remarks of Mr. Locke on this point

"Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay (he remarks in the Epistle to the reader) I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber and discours-

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mg on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts, which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who ail readily assented, and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first inquiry."

Such were the sentiments on this subject of a man, who has probably contributed more largely than any other individual to help us to the correct understanding of the mind ; and whose writings, such is their singular originality and acuteness, can hardly be too strongly recommended for perusal.

4- ?• Helps as in the correction of mental errours.

A second advantage resulting from the study of the Philosophy of the Mind, is, that it teaches us in many cases to correct whatever deficiences or errours may exist in our mental constitution.

In our present state of imperfection, while we are found to experience various kinds of bodily evils, we are not exempt from those of the mind ; and we know not, that it can any more excite surprise, that some people exhibit mental distortions, than it can, that we daily see not only the healthy and the well-formed, but the " maimed, the halt, and the blind."

If then it be asked, how are these mental defects, which we observe, -to be remedied, the answer is obvious, that we should act in regard to the mind, as we do in promoting the restoration of the body ; wo should commit the business of ascertaining a remedy to those, who are in some good degree acquainted with the subject and with the nature of the disease. A physician, altogether ignorant of the anatomy and physiology of the human system, would

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY 15

be poorly qualified to relieve a fellow being in sickness, or who had met with a fracture in his limbs. But if knowledge be necessary, in order to heal the weakness of the body and restore it to its proper soundness and beauty, it is not less important in the restoration of analogous evils in the mental constitution.

In looking round to see, whose minds, are disordered and whose are in a sound and healthy condition, we notice, for example, some persons to be troubled with a very weak memory. We have a very candid confession on this point in the writings of Montaigne. He informs us, that he did not trust to his memory. When he had any commands to execute he always punctually committed them to his memorandum book. "I am forced (says he) to call my servants by the names of their employments, or of the countries, where they were born, for I can hardly remember their proper names ; and if I should live long, I question, whether I should remember my own name." It appears, however, from his acqaintance with the principles of the ancient philosophers, that he had not much reason to complain, except of his own inattention to this extremely valuable mental operation. He remembered principles ; he could keep in recollection the outlines of the sciences, but could not so well remember insulated facts, especially if they related to the occurrences of common life. This peculiarity in the operations of the memory is not unfrequently found among men of letters, especially if they possess a vivid imagination. But it must be considered a mental defect ; one, which it is not only important to understand, but to try to remedy.

Since then it must be admitted, that there are diseases and distortions of the mind no less than of the body, and that we cannot expect a restoration from those evils without an intimate acquaintance with the state and tendencies of our intellectual powers, such an acquaintance become* exceedingly desirable.

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$• 8* Is the gratification of a reasonable curiosity.

There is a third recommendation of this study, which will apply to it in common with many others, viz. That it is the gratification of a very reasonable curiosity. The botanist examines the seed of a plant, and its mode of germination, the root and the qualities by which it is fitted to act as an organ of nutrition and support, the structure of the stem, the position of the branches, the form of the leaves, &c. — And it is considered in him a commendable pursuit, and suitable to the inquisitive turn of an intellectual being. Although the declaration of scripture be readily admitted, that the flowers of the field are clothed in brighter raiment than the robes of Solomon, it can never be doubted, that they are a subject of inquiry far inferiour to the mind of man, for the same scriptures teach us, that it is for man, considered as an intellectual and immortal being, that all nature lives and blooms. If, therefore, he be worthily employed, who marks the progress of the acorn as it shoots up and spreads itself forth into the strength and fullness of the mountain oak ; how much more so is he, who observes the first thoughts of an infant and marks their subsequent history, till he sees them in the proud and overshadowing maturity of the demonstrations of Newton.

§. 9. Is a help to those ivho have the charge of early education.

This study, in the fourth place, furnishes many very valuable hints to those, who have the charge of early education. General experience evinces the truth of an intimation of Mr. Pope, that education gives a direction to the mental character in subsequent life much the same as the inclination of the tree follows the bent of the twig. Children and youth adopt almost implicitly the manners and opinions of those, under whom they happen in Providence to be placed or with whom they much associate, whether they be parents, instructers, or others.

Let it, therefore, be remembered, that passions both good and evil may then rise up and gain strength, which it

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. it

will afterwards be found difficult to subdue. Intellectual operations may at that period be guided and invigorated, which, if then neglected, can never be called forth to any effective purpose in after life. Habits and associations of various kinds may then be formed which will follow the subject of them down to the grave, being, as long as life lasts, beyond the power of all attempts at a removal of them.

What We learn from every day's observation agrees with what we are taught in the saying cf Solomon ; " Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it."

It is, then, reasonably expected of parents and instructed, that they attempt to eradicate in the minds of the young bad passions and foster and sustain those, which are good ; that they pursue suitable methods for the invigoration of the mental powers, and that they strive to strengthen those habits and associations, which shall render them good members of a family, useful citizens in the commonwealth ; and above all should those under their care be trained up in the understanding and practice of that religion, which brings peace and hope.

No one certainly can be considered properly qualified for this great undertaking, who has not formed a systematick and philosophick acquaintance with the principles of the mind.

$. 10. Instructs us not only as to our thoughts but language.

It may not be out of place to remark here, that this science concerns not only the various forms of thought, but the nature of language also, which is the medium of communication, by which our thoughts are made known to others. Here then is another and fifth benefit, which may properly be set up against those objections, which have been made to this interesting department of science, since it is in a great measure by means of language, that dirTcrent and distant minds hold intercourse, the forms of society are preserved, and

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the great family of man are enabled to go forth in the path of social and civil melioration.

As words are in themselves mere arbitrary signs, and have no natural or inherent fitness for the expression of the signification, which is attached to them, more than various other signs, which might have been employed, they afford a fruitful subject of remark to the intellectual philosopher, who states the object for which they are used, explains their necessary imperfection, and teaches us in their skilful and appropriate application.

&. 11. Has a connection with moral philosophy, ${C.

It is to be considered further, that this study has an intimate connection with others, which are of great importance ; and this connection may be regarded as increasing the urgency of attending to it. It will perhaps be a more satisfactory illustration of this remark than any thing we can say ourselves, if we make a quotation here from Mr. Stewart's review of the philosophical works of Locke and Leibnitz.

" Although my design is to treat separately of metaphysicks, ethicks, and politicks, it will be impossible to keep these sciences wholly unmixed in the course of my reflections. They all run into each other by insensible gradations ; and they have all been happily united in the comprehensive speculations of some of the most distinguished writers of the eighteenth century. The connection between mctaphysicks and ethicks is more peculiar)' close ; the theory of morals having furnished, ever since the time of Cud worth, several of the most abstruse questions, which have been agitated concerning the general principles, both intellectual and active, of the human frame. "

Especially, is the knowledge of the principles of Intellectual Philosophy connected with the various departments of criticism. We see not how a person can give any rational account of the effects of a work of imagination without such knowledge, or point out the excellencies and do-

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fects of a painting, or sit in judgment upon any other work of art. For, whatever we perceive to be beautiful or sublime in such works, could never possess the qualities of beauty or sublimity independently of our mental frame, and we never apply those epithets to them, except it be with reference to certain principles within us.

But we leave these and all other considerations, tending to show the utility of this science, with a single reflecr tion more, trusting, that it will be enough to justify us in our pursuits.

§. 12. Teaches us to revere the wisdom of our Creator,

W« are taught by this science to revere the wisdom of our Creator.

We are frequently referred in theological writings to the works of creation, as a proof of his greatness and wisdom; and the remark has been made, not without reason, that the "stars teach as well as shine." The discoveries of modern astronomy not only assure us, that there is a God, but impart this additional assurance, that he is above all others, to whom the attributes of divinity may have been at any time ascribed.

But it must be added, that of all things created, whetber in the heavens above or in the earth beneath, the human mind is that principle, which evinces the most wonderful construction, which discloses the most astonishing movements. There is much to excite our admiration in the harmonious movements of the planetary orbs, in the rapidity of light, in the process of vegetation ; but still greater cause for it in the principle of thought, in the inexpressible quickness of its operations, in the harmony of its laws, and in the greatness of its researches. How striking are the powers of that intellect, which, although it have a local habitation, is able to look out from the place of its immediate residence, to pursue its researches among those remote worlds, which journey in the vault of heaven, and to converse both with the ages past and to come.

It ought not to be expected that we should be intimate-

]y acquainted with a principle possessing such striking powers, without some reverential feelings towards him, who is the author of it.

§. 13. Of the mental effort necessary in this study.

This science demands great mental effort on the part of the student. This effort is of a peculiar kind. It consists essentially in a continued and unbroken fixedness of attention. Such an effort is painful to many, and perhaps this is one cause of the unfavourable reception, which this department of knowledge has often met with. But the advantages attending it are so numerous, it is to be hoped, they will overcome any disinclination to mental exertion. The fruits of the earth are purchased by the sweat of the brow, and it has never been ordered^ that the reverse of this shall take place in the matters of knowledge, and that the fruits of science shall be reaped by the hands of idleness. No man has ever become learned without toil ; and let it be remembered, if there be many obstacles in the acquisition of any particular science, that he, who overcomes a multiplication of difficulties, deserves greater honour than he, who contends only with a few.

Chapter Second

§. 14. Introductory remarks on this subject.

It is often highly important, in the investigations of a science, to state, at the commencement of such investigations, what things are to be considered as preliminary and taken for granted, and what are not. If this precaution had always been observed, which, where there is any room for mistake or misapprehension, seems so rcasonable, how many useless disputes would have been avoided 5 — the paths to knowledge would have been rendered more direct and easy, instead of being prolonged and perplexed. It is impossible to proceed with inquiries in the science of intellectual philosophy, as it will be found to be in al^ most every other, without a proper understanding of those fundamental principles, which are necessarily involved in what follows.

Those preliminary principles, which are necessary to be admitted, and without which we are unable to proceed with any satisfaction and profit in our inquiries, will be called, for the sake of distinction and convenience, primary truths.

There would seem to be no impropriety in calling them truths, since they are forced upon us, as it were, by our very constitution ; all mankind admit them in practice, however they may affect to deny them with their hps ; and they are as plain and incontrovertible at their very first enunciation, as any discoveries in physicks or any demonstrations in geometry. We call them primary, because they are the ultimate propositions, into which all reasoning resolves itself, and are necessarily involved and implied in all the investigations, which we shall make on the pres-* ent subject.

The first of this class of truths, which will come under consideration, is this ;

§. 15. A belief in our personal existence.

Des Cartes formed the singular resolution, not to believe his own existence, until he could prove it.

He reasoned thus ; Cogito, ergo sum, I think, therefore, I exist. This argument, which he considered conclusive and incontrovertible, evidently involves what is termed a petitio principii or begging of the question.

It is easy to perceive, that the very thing to be proved is assumed. Cogito is equivalent to the proposition, / am a thinking being ; and ergo sum may be literally interpreted, tkerefore, I &m in being. His premises had already implied, that he existed as a thinking being, and it is these very premises, which he employs in proof of his existence. The acuteness, which has generally been attributed to him, evidently failed him in this instance. The argument of Des Cartes was unsuccessful, and no one, who has attempted to prove the same point, has succeeded any better.

It is necessary to take different ground from that taken by this philosopher and his followers. We consider the belief of our existence a primary truth. A few remarks may tend to show the propriety of thus doing.

There was a time when man did not exist. He had no form, no knowledge. Light, and motion, and matter were things, in which he had no concern. He was created from nothing with such powers and such laws to his powers, as his Creator saw fit to give.

We are called upon to mark the history of this new created being.

At one year of age, or, if it be preferred, before one half or quarter of that period is passed, we will suppose, that some object, external to himself, is, for the first time, presented to his senses; The consequence is, that there is an impression made on the senses, and a perception of the object, presented to them. But it is impossible for him, as I think every one will allow, to perceive the object without a simultaneous conviction of the existence of the percipient. Nothing can be heard, or seen, or touched without an attendant belief, that there is a being, who hears, and handles, and beholds. This is a conclusion, which is necessarily involved in our mental constitution and which, as it has such an origin, neither requires any .argument nor fears any refutation.

Malebranche in his search after truth speaks much, if the expressions be admissible, in commendation of the i] .it of doubting. But then he bestows this commendation with such limitations as will prevent those evils, which result from too freely giving up to a sceptical spirit.

"To doubt (says he) with judgment and reason, is not. go small a thing as people imagine, for here it may be said,

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that there's a great difference between doubting and doubting. We doubt through passion and brutality, through blindness and malice, and, lastly, through fancy, and cnly because we would doubt. But we doubt also with prudence and caution, with wisdom and penetration of mind. Academicks and atheists doubt upon the first grounds, true philosophers on the second. The first is a doubt of darkness, which does not conduct us into the light, but always removes us from it." (B. I. ch. 20.)

We may remark in view of these observations of-Malebranche, that such is the doubting of those over-scrupulous inquirers, who demand proof of their own existence. Such scepticism as that is truly a doubt of darknes, which does not conduct us into the light, but always removes us from it.

A second of those truths, which we term primary, w this ;

<§. 16. A belief of our personal identity.

The proof of our personal identity is sometimes refer* ffed to what is termed consciousness. We are said to be conscious of our identity. When these expressions are used, it is meant by them, that we have a conviction of the understanding, or we know ourselves to have enjoyed a continuance of being. If any thing more than this be intended, it will be found to be an use of terms without meaning.

We have employed the phrase, personal identity.

The words, person and personal, convey a complex idea. They have indeed particular reference to that indestructible principle, which we denominate the mind; but they' have reference to it, considered in its connection with the body.

By mental identity we have reference to the continuance and oneness of the thinking principle merely.

By bodily identity we mean the sameness of the bodily shape and general organization. We cannot attach any other meaning to the latter phrase in consequence of the constant changes in the material particles, which compose ©ur systems.

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In those apprehensions, however, which we attach to the phrase, personal identity, we have reference to both the one and the other, the mind and the body ; and combine together the two ideas, which are conveyed in both the phrases before mentioned, viz. mental identity and bodily ident ty.

A belief in personal identity, or conviction that there has been a continuance of our being, is to be regarded, and with abundant reason, as a primary truth.

The mere fact, that it is implied in our reasonings from the past to the future, and universally in our daily actions, is of itself a sufficient ground for considering it as such, for reckoning it among the original and essential elements of the understanding.