The colonial policy of Lord John Russell's administration

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Appendix

A.—List of Officers appointed to the Government of Colonies, by Lord Grey

B.—Correspondence relative to the reduction of Military

Force

C.—Recapitulation of Measures relating to the Sugar

Colonies D.—Tables of Import and Consumption of Sugar .

E.—Mauritius—Address to Governor Higginson, and His Excellency’s Reply

F.—British Guiana—Tables of Produce

G.—Extracts from Reports of Select Committees, etc., relating to the West Indies

H.—Jamaica—Despatches to Sir C. Grey

I.—Report of Privy Council—Constitution for the Australian Colonies .

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THE COLONIAL POLICY

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL’S ADMINISTRATION.

Letter I

COLONIAL POLICY.—PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—EFFECT OF FREE TRADE ON THE COLONIES.

My pear Lorp Joun,

The affairs of the Colonies have of late years been very largely discussed. The books, the pamphlets, and the speeches of which they have been the subject, have been almost innumerable ; but of these even the few to which I should be the last to deny the praise of ability and fairness, advocate views which seem to me either incorrect or incomplete ; while, as the rest have for the most part been designed to serve party or personal objects, they have been little calculated to assist the Public in forming a sound opinion on the questions to which they relate. No small proportion of what has been spoken or written about the Colonies for the last few years, has had for its aim to decry and to misrepresent the policy pursued towards them by the

VOL. 1. B

- we, ae ‘ "COLONIAL POLICY.

' ‘Auiintattation which you were at the head; and as so large a share of the responsibility for the measures of that Government devolves upon myself, it is natural that 1 should wish the Public to have the means of knowing the real character and scope of those measures, and the grounds upon which they were adopted. Nor is this unimportant on grounds far higher than what concerns any individual: the national interest is deeply involved in having the course of Colonial administration correctly understood. In Parliament, or at least in the House of Lords, the debates which have taken place on Colonial affairs have been entirely confined to particular questions, affecting individual Colonies, and have never afforded me an opportunity of statmg my views as to our general system of Colonial Policy, which, to be properly understood, requires to be considered as a whole; perhaps, also, the subject is too extensive for Parliamentary discussion. I propose therefore to endeavour in these pages to supply a deficiency which I conceive to exist, by laying before the Public a connected view of the Colonial policy which was pursued while I was entrusted with the task of conducting it, as a member of your Administration.

It has appeared to me that I shall be able to do this most conveniently in the form of a series of Letters, which I address to you, because you were acquainted, while they were in progress, with the transactions to which I shall have to advert, and will therefore be able to judge of the accuracy of my statements.

You cannot but take an interest in the subject, since all the most important of the measures of which | shall have to speak were, of course, adopted with your knowledge and assent ; and I am happy to think that there has never been the slightest difference of opinion between us, as to the principles which ought to form the guide of our policy.

It is my intention to avoid, as far as possible, any notice of the various attacks made upon our measures, and of the misrepresentations to which we have been exposed. I shall do so, because it is my wish to give to these Letters a tone as little controversial as is consistent with the object I have in view, and also because the objections which have been made to our policy have been so multifarious and so contradictory, that an attempt to answer them all would be intolerably tedious. Hence, without adverting to the various speeches and pamphlets by which our Colonial administration has been assailed, I shall endeavour to give a general sketch of our policy, of the views on which it was founded, and of its results; leavmg it to those who take an interest in the subject to draw their own conclusions, and noticing objections which have been made to our policy only when necessary for its elucidation. I fear that, even adopting this plan, it will be difficult to compress within a moderate compass a statement, however succinct, of what has been done in the numerous Colonies of the British Empire, with an explanation of the grounds on which we have acted ; and that much which is not unimportant will

BQ wW have to be omitted. The ample mformation laid before Parliament, to which I shall take care to refer, will however enable those who desire it, to obtain a more perfect knowledge of the transactions to which I shall advert.

_ Before I proceed to give an account of what has been done in particular Colonies, it will be convenient that I should state, somewhat fully, the general principles which have in all cases been the guide of our policy, and that I should call your attention to the manner in which the peculiar circumstances of the times have affected the administration of Colonial affairs. To begin with the last, I have to remark that in these affairs much of the opposition we have met with, and the principal difficulties we have encountered, have arisen, directly or indirectly, from our having thought it our duty to maintain the policy of free trade, and to extend its application to the produce of the Colonies. That these difficulties must be expected from this policy I was quite aware when your Government was formed ; but the greatest service that I believed we were called upon as a Government to render to the country was that of completing the work, which had been happily begun, of removing restrictions from industry, and securely establishing a system of free trade throughout the empire. So far back as when I first entered upon public life——now more than twenty-five years ago,——it was my conviction that, next to the removal of the religious disabilities which then threatened the disruption of the Empire, and to the accomplishment of such a reform of the House of Commons as was requisite to make it a fitting instrument for effecting every other public improvement, the political object of the greatest importance to the public good was to relieve industry and commerce from the shackles with which they had been encumbered by measures adopted for their advancement under the erroneous theory of “ Protection.” Hence, beginning with the year 1827, when I voted with a very small minority against the principle of the sliding scale, in the Bill for the amendment of the Corn Laws brought forward by Mr. Canning, I had, both by votes and speeches, supported every proposal submitted to the House of Parliament of which I was a Member, which I considered to be calculated to advance the object of giving greater freedom to industry. I believed that the Colonial trade ought to form no exception to the general rule, but should be placed on the same footing as other branches of our commerce. I considered it to be no less for the real and permanent interest of the Colonies themselves, than for that of the Mother-country, that industry should cease to be diverted from its natural channels, and a useless burden to be imposed on the consumer by differential duties, levied for the purpose of favouring Colonial produce in our markets, and our produce in the markets of the Colonies.

Entertaining these opinions, I should not have accepted your proposal to form part of your Administration, if I had not felt satisfied that its measures would

6 COLUNIAL POLICY.

be directed to the completion of the work of commercial reform, and had I not expected that, notwithstanding the difficulties I anticipated, we should be supported in this policy by Parliament.

In that expectation I have not been disappointed. By the measures which we have succeeded in carrying, for the alteration of the duties on sugar, coffee, and timber, for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and for giving power to the local Legislatures to abolish differential duties in the Colonies, provision has been made for placing the Colonial trade on a footing free from serious objection; while the accomplishment, at no very distant period, of the further improvements it still requires has obviously been ensured.

These measures, necessary and beneficial as I am convinced they will ultimately be admitted to have been, amounted however to nothing less than a revolution in an established system of policy, which could not fail to shock many long received opinions, and to bring about a great change in the relations hitherto subsisting between this country and the Colonies. For more than two centuries, the great object of all European nations, in seeking to obtain possession of Colonies, was the gain supposed to accrue from the monopoly of their commerce, which it was the practice for the parent State to maintain, while, on the other hand, it gave to their produce a preference’ in its own markets. This policy began to be relaxed by Parliament immediately after the American Revo-

PRELIMINARY REMARKS. ¢ lution (of which calamity it was, in truth, the chief cause); but, although the views on which it is founded had been considerably modified, the principle of placing the trade with the Colonies on a different footing from that with other countries had been maintained up to the year 1846, and was generally regarded as one of unquestionable propriety and wisdom. So much was this the case, that in the begining of Sir Robert Peel’s commercial reforms, the tariff of 1842, as originally submitted to the House of Commons, contained provisions by which various new protected interests would have been created in the Colonies, and a large revenue would have been sacrificed by the Mother-country, without any real benefit accruing to them. Amongst other articles proposed to be dealt with were tea and tobacco, on ‘which it was intended to reduce one half the amount of duty to which they would otherwise be hable when they were the produce of British possessions. It so happens that I was myself the person by whom the attention of the House of Commons (of which I was then a Member) was called to the inexpediency of this mode of dealing with the customs-duties ; and I moved a resolution against the establishment of any new protecting duties in favour of Colonial produce’, arguing that, in order to derive a revenue from duties on imports without imposing an undue burden on the consumer, and without diverting industry from its natural and therefore most productive channels, duties

* See Hansard, 3rd series, vol. Ixxiii. p. 512.

ought not to be levied on the importation of any articles which would meet in our market articles of the same kind produced in the Colonies, and not subject to an equal amount of taxation.

This principle, which is equally applicable to articles produced at home and to those obtained from the Colonies,* is now recognized as sound by the

* It is obvious that, if any article of consumption is subject to a duty when imported from a foreign country, and is either free from duty or pays a lower duty when produced at home or imported from a Colony, the result, whether intended or not, is to give that artificial encouragement to a particular branch of industry which is known by the name of Protection. For this reason, by our present law, beet-root sugar produced at home is subject to an exciseduty equal to that on sugar imported from the Colonies, and which in two years more will also be charged on foreign sugar. Hence, it was a fallacy to contend, as was done in 1842 and in 1843, (if I remember right, the argument, which had much effect at the time, was first used by Mr. Gladstone,) that imports from the Colonies ought to be relieved from duty because they should be considered as ‘an integral part of the Empire.” Though an integral part of the Kmpire, it is, from the nature of things, impossible that they should be under the same fiscal system as ourselves ; and unless they could be so—that is, unless they paid all the same taxes that we do, and these taxes included excise-duties on all articles on which we raise a revenue, and which they produce—no special exemption from duty could be given to Colonial produce in our ports without incurring all the objectionable consequences’ of a system of protection. In the United States, free commercial intercourse between the several States of the Union would have led to the utmost confusion, if the power of levying customs-duties had not been given exclusively to Congress, excise-duties not being made use of as a mode of raising revenue. It does not appear to me at all inconsistent with the idea of the unity of the Britizh Empire, that no attempt has been made to unite its several members, divided as they are from each other by the diameter of the globe, in one fiscal system.

majority of intelligent and educated men; but this was far from being the case until very recently, and it was so much otherwise at the time of which ] am speaking, that, although in the resolution I moved I abstained from proposing to abolish existing protecting duties in favour of the Colonies, and only sought to lay down the rule that no new ones should be created, the motion was rejected, obtaining the support of a minority far below the usual strength of the Opposition; and in the tariff of 1842 the erroneous principle I had endeavoured to condemn was adhered to, the Government only abandoning its application in those cases in which it would have seriously affected the revenue. I refer to this circumstance, because it shows how strong was the hold on men’s minds of the old opinions respecting the Colonial trade, and how great was the shock given to these opinions, when the policy of placing our trade with the Colonies on the same footing as that with foreign countries was first systematically adopted in Sir Robert Peel’s Act for the repeal of the former Corn Law, and in the measures which followed it. This accounts for the great bitterness of the political discontent and opposition to your Government.excited by these measures. It is notorious that distress is usually the parent of political discontent, even when that distress cannot be referred by the sufferers themselves to the conduct of the Government; much more so, when they believe their difficulties to have been occasioned by its measures. But the abandonment of long established commercial and fiscal regulations, however vicious in policy, generally occasions temporary loss and inconvenience to those engaged in the branches of trade and industry affected by such changes; and if they do not occasion actual loss, these changes invariably excite the apprehension of it, which 1s nearly as bad. Hence reforms of this description are always found to create many enemies to the Government by which they are accomplished; and in the application of the principles of free trade to Colonial produce, the hostility thus excited was aggravated by its being thought, however unreasonably, that these measures involved an act of injustice, as invading what had long been regarded as a right on the part of the Colonists.

Nor is this all; the abandonment of the ancient commercial system of this country towards the Colonies brought a still larger question under discussion. Not only those who still adhered to the opinion that the former policy with respect to colonial commerce was the right one, but many of the most eager advocates of the principles of free trade, concurred in arguing that, if the Colonies were no longer to be regarded as valuable on account of the commercial advantages to be derived from their possession, the country had no interest in keeping these dependencies, and that it would be better to abandon them; thus getting rid of the heavy charge on the country, especially in providing the requisite amount of naval and military force for their protection. In lke manner, the Colonists

PRELIMINARY REMARKS. ll began to inquire whether, if they were no longer to enjoy their former commercial privileges in the markets of the Mother-country, they derived any real benefit from a continuance of the connection. It is obvious that questions of this kind could not be raised without creating great difficulties in the administration of Colonial affairs, and the more so, because it is impossible to deny that the view of the subject to which I have adverted is at least plausible ; and when the old doctrine, that the great value of Colonies arises from the commercial monopoly which the Mother-country can claim with respect to their trade is abandoned, some other explanation may fairly be asked of the grounds on which we should nevertheless continue to support the charges inseparable from the maintenance of our Colonial empire.

Although it would be impossible, within the limits to which I must confine myself, fully to discuss in this Letter so large a subject, it is requisite, for the clearness of what is to follow, that I should state generally why, and on what terms, I think that the connection between this country and the Colonies ought to be preserved, and also that I should explain how these views have been applied in practice. I consider, then, that the British Colonial Empire ought to be maintained, principally because J do not consider that the Nation would be justified in throwing off the responsibility it has mcurred by the acquisition of this dominion, and because I believe that much of the power and influence of this Country depends upon its having large Colonial possessions in different parts of the world.

The possession of a number of steady and faithful allies, in various quarters of the globe, will surely be admitted to add greatly to the strength of any nation ; while no alliance between independent states can be so close and intimate as the connection which unites the Colonies to the United Kingdom as parts of the Great British Empire. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that the power of a nation does not depend merely on the amount of physical force it can command, but rests, in no small degree, upon opinion and moral influence : in this respect British power would be diminished by the loss of our Colonies, to a degree which it would be difficult to estimate. Hence, if it is an advantage, not for the sake of domineering over other countries but with a view to our own security, to form part of a powerful nation rather than of a weak one (and, considering the many examples we have seen of the injustice to which weak ones are compelled to submit, this can hardly admit of a question), it seems to follow, that the tie which binds together all the different and distant portions of the British Empire, so that their united strength may be wielded for their common protection, must be regarded as an object of extreme importance to the interests of the Mother-country and her dependencies. ‘To the latter it is no doubt of far greater importance than to the former, because, while still forming comparatively small and weak communities, they enjoy, im return for their allegiance to the British Crown, all the security and consideration which belong to them as members of one of the most powerful States in the world. No foreign Power ventures to attack or interfere with the smallest of them, while every Colonist carries with him, to the remotest quarters of the globe which he may visit in trading or other pursuits, that protection which the character of a British subject everywhere confers, and can depend, in any difficulties, or under any oppression to which he may be exposed, on the assistance of Her Majesty’s diplomatic and consular servants, supported, if necessary, by the whole power of the Empire.

But I should regard it as a very unworthy mode of considering this subject, if it were to be looked at with a view only to the interests of this Country, as that word is usually understood. I conceive that, by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not. at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. Supposing it were clear (which I am far from admitting) that a reduction of our national expenditure (otherwise impracticable), to the extent of a few hundred thousands a year, could be effected by withdrawing our authority and protection from our numerous Colonies, should we be justified, for the sake of such a saving, in taking this step, and thus abandoning the duty which seems to have been cast upon us?

It is to be remembered, that if we adopted this policy we must be prepared for very serious consequences, which would undoubtedly result from it. Some few only of these I will mention. Noone acquainted with the actual state of society in the West India islands, and the feelings prevalent among the different classes of their inhabitants, can doubt that, if they were left, unaided by us, to settle amongst themselves in whose hands power should be placed, a fearful war of colour would probably soon break out, by which the germs of improvement now existing there would be destroyed, and civilization would be thrown back for centuries. In Ceylon a similar result would follow; its native races are utterly incapable of governing themselves, and yet they certainly would not submit to be ruled by the mere handful of Europeans who have settled among them, if this small body were unsupported by British power. The great wealth which within the last few years has been created in this island would be destroyed, and the most hopeless anarchy would take place of that security which now exists, and under the shelter of which such promising signs of improvement are beginning to appear. Even in New Zealand, although I have little doubt that the Colonists of European descent would be found capable of establishing a government, under which they might eventually rise to prosperity, yet we could scarcely hope to see this effected without a series of contests with the native inhabitants, in which the latter would in the end be destroyed, but not until they had inflicted and suffered an almost equal amount of misery. On the West Coast of Africa there is at this moment a far more encouraging prospect than at any previous time ; the efforts which have been so long made to improve the negro race seem to be at length beginning to produce important results, and a great change for the better may be looked for. But if we take up a new policy, and abandon our positions on the African coast, the Slave Trade will again revive in the extensive territory within reach of our settlements, where it has now been extirpated, and has given place to a legitimate commerce, which is daily becoming more important.

To say nothing of higher motives, and of the duty which I conceive to be no less obligatory upon nations than upon individuals, of using the power and the advantages entrusted to them by Providence to advance the welfare of mankind, I would ask whether, even in mere money, there would not be something to set off against the saving of expense from the abandonment of our Colonies? On the other side of the account we have to put the destruction of British property which would thus be occasioned, and the annihilation of lucrative branches of our commerce, by allowing anarchy and bloodshed to arrest the peaceful industry which now creates the means of paying for the British goods consumed daily in larger quantities, by the numerous and various populations now emerging from barbarism under our protection.

It is true there are several of our Colonies to which the last observations do not directly apply; but the policy of abandoning a part of our Colonial Empire could scarcely be adopted, without giving so great a shock to the feeling of confidence and security in the remainder, as greatly to increase the difficulty of maintaining it; and I must add, that:it appears to me very doubtful whether even the Colonies most capable of governing themselves, and which have no uncivilized tnbes to deal with, from whom any danger could beapprehended, would not for some time have much diffi- - culty i maintaining their present state of tranquillity and security, both externally and internally, if their connection with the Mother-country were suddenly dissolved.

In New South Wales, for instance, the interference of the Home Government in the internal administration of the Colony 1s exceedingly slight ; but, shght as it 1s, it may be questioned whether, without it, the conflict of interests and opinions between different classes of the inhabitants and between different districts would not be likely to lead to very dangerous struggles; while in their relations with each other it would be still more hkely that the different Australian - Colonies would be involved in difficulties, if they ceased to be all placed under the supreme authority of the Imperial Government.

I have thought it necessary to state thus strongly my dissent from the views of those who wish to dismember the British Empire by abandoning the Colonies, because it is impossible not to observe that this policy— unworthy of a great Nation, and unwise as I consider it to be—is not only openly advocated by one active party in the country, but is also hardly less effectually supported by persons occupying an important position in Parliament, and who, while they hesitate to avow their adherence to it, hold language which obviously leads in the same direction, and advocate measures the adoption of which would inevitably bring about this result.

If the reasons which I have just stated for maintaining the connection between this Country and the British Colomies are admitted to be sound, it will follow as a necessary inference, that two very plain rules as to the terms on which that connection should be continued may be laid down. In the first place, I think it will clearly follow that this Country has no interest whatever in exercising any greater influence in the ternal affairs of the Colonies, than is indispensable either for the purpose of preventing any one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large; or else for the promotion of the internal good government of the Colonies, by assisting the inhabitants to govern themselves when . gufficiently civilized to do so with advantage, and by providing a just and impartial administration for those of which the population is too ignorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs. While

VOL. I. c it was our policy to maintain a monopoly of the trade of the Colonies, it was necessary for the Home Government to exercise a considerable control over their internal administration, because otherwise this monopoly would certainly have been evaded; and accordingly it will be found, on looking back at the earlier history of our Colonies, (especially those which now constitute the United States,) that the interference of the servants of the Crown in their internal affairs, and the differences which that interference occasioned, arose almost entirely from the endeavour to uphold the commercial system then in force. The abandonment of that system has removed the necessity for this interference. Secondly, I think it will follow, that when this Country no longer attempts either to levy a commercial tribute from the Colonies by a system of restriction, nor to interfere needlessly in their internal affairs, it has a right to expect that they should take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the expenses incurred for their advantage.

In subsequent Letters I shall endeavour to show, with reference to the transactions of the several Co- -lonies, that these rules were strictly adhered to while I held the office of Secretary of State; but before I do this, it will be convenient that I should offer some further general remarks upon the rules themselves, and the manner in which they have been acted upon. And first I would observe, with regard to the vague declamation on the absurdity of attempting to govern the Colonies from Downing-street, of which we have heard so much, that it would undoubtedly be in the highest degree absurd to attempt to govern from Downing-street, if this is to be understood in the sense of directing from thence all the measures of the local Authorities ; but I am not aware that such an attempt has at any period of our history been thought of. On the other hand, it is obvious that, if the Colonies are not to become independent States, some kind of authority must be exercised by the Government at home. It will conduce to a clearer understanding of the subject, to consider by what means any control over its dependencies is now practically maintamed by the Mother-country, and to what extent that control ought to be carried.