An essay on some subjects connected with Taste

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ESSAY C/N SOME SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH TASTE. AN ESSAY on- SOME SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH TASTE; BY SIR GEORGE STEUART MACKENZIE, Bart. f. r. s. ; r. f h. cl. r. s. e. ; f. s. s. a. ; &c. Opinion urn commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat. Cic. EDINBURGH : Printed at tlie Caledonian Mercury Press, FOR OLIPHANT, WAUGH, AND INNES, EDINBURGH J AND LONGMAN, HURST, RISES, ORME, AND DHOWS, LONDON. 181?.

ADVERTISEMENT.

. The following Essay was written for amusement and exercise. Some vacant hours having occurred during the session of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1816-1817 ; I offered to fill them up by reading some parts of it. The reception these dittached parts met with, and the discussion which they excited, led to my reading almost the whole of the Essay to the Society, and to my afterwards bestowing more pains upon it than I had intended, with the view of committing it to the press. I have only further to say, on ushering my Essay into the world, that I have VI stated my opinion, that no man, in such discussions, or on any occasion, should take it for granted that the perceptions and consciousness of all men are similar to his own ; and this, exclusive of the usual licence given to essays, is offered as an apology for what might appear to be a too frequent use of the first person. G, S. M. CONTENTS. Page INTRODUCTORY REMARKS , 1

Part II. Observations On The Theort Of Association

Sect. 1. Of the Basis of the Theory 42 Sect. 2. Of the Theory as applied to Form 60 Sect. 3. Of the Theory as applied to Colour 177 Sect. 4. Of the Theory as applied to Sound. 233

Part III. Of The Differences Of Taste Errata

P. 1 54— 1. 4. 5. for desert read dessert. 286 — I. 13. after that insert part. TO THE BINDER. The Plate to be at the end. ESSAY ON- SOME SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH TASTE. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. Of the different branches of metaphysical inquiry, none, perhaps, has occupied the attention of speculative philosophers more constantly than that known by the term Taste. On entering into a subject of this kind, with views of it considerably different from those entertained by the eminent men who have displayed so much ingenuity and talent in their at tempts to establish their doctrines, I can not divest myself of a degree of diffidence A which is even painful. I feel my own inferiority very sensibly, and the inferio rity of what I am about to offer ; and it is only in consequence of my believing, that views of any subject, different from those commonly entertained, especially when the latter appear variously modified, are likely to excite discussion, and thus bring us nearer to truth, that I venture to submit to the consideration of others, a detail of what has occurred to me on the subject I have announced.

It has been truly remarked by a writer in the Edinburgh Review, that " The " studies to Avhich Mr SteAvart has de " voted himself, have lately fallen out of " favour with the English public ; and " the nation which once placed the name " of Locke immediately under those of " Shakespeare and of Newton, and has " since repaid the metaphysical labours *' of Berkely and of Hume with such just " celebrity, seems now to be almost with " out zeal or curiosity as to the progress " of the philosophy of mind."* The same writer remarks, that it would be curious, and not uninstructive, to investigate the cause of this distaste, but that the in quiry would be laborious. The difficulty, however, does not appear to be very great in assigning a reason for the declin ing attractiveness of the philosophy of mind.

It is certainly not to be found in the age having become frivolous and im patient of labour ; for it is notorious that, in the present times, an infinitely greater body of talent is bestowed on scientific and other laborious pursuits, than the sciences and arts have had to boast at any former period. Nor do I think with the * Edinburgh Review, vol. xvn. p. 167. writer I have quoted, that the cause is to be found in the more general diffusion of knowledge, nor in the multiplication of its branches, which have given a character to the present age. I attribute the decline of metaphysical study, to the want of some goal towards which our exertions can tend. There is always in the investigation of matter, an apparent limit to inquiry in every branch. The natural philosopher knows the possibility of arriving at a de monstration of the correctness or fallacy of a theorem ; and he is tolerably certain that, of every problem, there may be a solution within the reach of human in vention.

The chemist knows that a body is compound ; that the means of analy sing it are attainable, and that the ma terials of the compound may, by the discovery and proper application of the means, be spread out before him. In zoology, botany, and in every branch of physical 1 nowledge, there is a prospect of reward for him who pursues them ; and the attainment of the honour of discovery, and the application of discovery to the increase of human happi ness and comfort, appear, in such pur suits, so nearly within our grasp, that the stimulus to active research is con tinually felt. This is not the case with the investigation of any thing belonging to the invi sible and immortal mind. There is no such stimulus ; there is no prospect of arriving at the end of the analysis ; there is nothing to be discovered which can di rectly be added to the stock of human happiness ; there is no honour of disco very ; no reward, but the admiration ex cited by a display of extensive reading, retentive memory, ingenious observation, profound thought, and elegant writing, — a reward, which, though great, is not of that substantial kind which is chiefly tempting to the exercise of talent.

The preference to the one kind of in vestigation over the other, is thus easily, and, perhaps, accurately accounted for. The conviction of the very small prospect of substantial reward likely to be derived from the investigation of mind, has been strengthened by the apparent facility Avith Avhich one system is made to sup plant another, and by the risk of every new one being in its turn OAerthrown. Each system, on whichever branch of in quiry it may be founded, seems, as it arises, to satisfy scarcely any one but its author. The cause of this dissatisfaction, which appears to have been overlooked, perhaps also has contributed to the relinquishment of metaphysical studies. It seems to exist in every investigator having considered, exclusively, his own individual perceptions and consciousness, as they happened to regard the objects of his inquiry ; and from his having set them up as a standard, to which the percep tions and consciousness of every other human being were to be referred.

Hence some philosophers have been accused of indulging in reveries, others in wild fan cies, and many have been said to have yielded to the whims of disordered ima ginations. It is no wonder, then, that men dislike venturing into regions where they are exposed to such unmerciful treatment, and prefer the examination of matter to the investigation of what is not tangible. No theorist, who believes his own con sciousness and perception to be the proper standard for all men, ought to expect any one to agree with him, who does not happen to have a similar standard per ception and consciousness. But such ill founded expectation, has probably been the cause of theories of taste having so rapidly succeeded each other, and of their having left so few traces of satisfac tion behind them. One may perceive that a building is before him, but may not be conscious of those emotions which, he is told, are excited by it in the minds of others.

One may be conscious of hearing sounds, but he may not perceive those relations of sound, which are em ployed in the composition of music ; while another is not only conscious of hearing sounds, but is quick in perceiving their relations, and takes delight in hearing them combined according to these relations. As it is a fact universally known, that some individuals are always to be found, to whom the scenes of nature impart no pleasure ; in whom the skill of the architect and the art of the sculptor excite no emotion ; and some to whom music is merely noise ; Ave may reasonably ask, why have philosophers neglected such facts ? Is it not equally interesting and important to inquire, Avhy some men have no enjoyment in Avhat gives pleasure to others, as to la bour incessantly to discover the nature of the enjoyment, in those who are capable of receiving it ?

Such questions have tempted me, after a very long in terval, during which I had submitted to the influence of those causes to which I have attributed the general neglect of metaphysical studies, to resume the con sideration of subjects which I had in a manner forgotten ; and to endeavour to discover, whether the investigation of the causes of variation in intellectual endow ment might not lead into some track by which we might at length arrive at the great road to truth, and reach the right explanation of the differences in taste. The progress of the discovery of truth may be compared to the effects of a spark of fire communicated to a combustible body. The rays emitted from the com bustion are, at first, feeble ; but they gradually and constantly acquire new power, till at length the light blazes in full resplendence, defying every effort to extinguish it.

In making this comparison, I do not mean to insinuate, that, in any thing proceeding from my pen, the inci pient combustion is to be observed ; but if I can contribute to prevent its being yet longer smothered (for I think it has at length appeared), I may believe that, in doing so, I act as every man ought to do who loves truth, and desires to see it established.

Part I. Of The Meaning Of The Words Beautiful And Sublime

Nothing, perhaps, has retarded philosophers in their progress of investigating subjects connected with Taste so much, as the want of definition for the terms employed ; and probably most people, who begin to reflect on the meaning of the words Beautiful and Sublime, are, at first, and it may be permanently, in doubt regarding what they are to understand by these signs. Mr Stewart has well observed, that " the function of " language is not so much to convey " knowledge (according to the common " phrase) from one mind to another, as " to bring two minds into the same train " of thinking ; and to confine them, as ** nearly as possible to the same track. " Many authors have spoken of the won- " derful mechanism of speech ; but none "** has hitherto attended to the far more " wonderful mechanism which it puts " into action behind the scene."* This, though it fully explains the cause of the endless variety of phrase Avhich may be used (and used with propriety and effect) to express the same thing, does not, perhaps, account for the extraordi- * Ph.

Essays, p. 158. nary prostitution of the word Beauty. It appears to me to have originated, not so much from too great an anxiety to make ourselves understood, as from the vain and silly conceit so often manifested, by people who wish others to believe that they know, and that they feel, a great deal more than they actually know or feel. It is sufficiently notorious, that the propensity to hyperbole has added many useless words to our language, marred the meaning of others ; and has even destroyed confidence between man and man, and set suspicion on the alert. While I am quite disposed, in many cases, to admit the propriety of using language which may be considered metaphorical, but which has been brought to signify what is definite ; I am not so well disposed to admit the propriety, or legiti macy, of many of the appeals to ordinary language, which have been made in support of some theories of taste.

In ordinary language custom reconciles us to many expressions, which we should not chuse to write. The playfulness of ordinary conversation, in which words are, unquestionably, very frequently abused, ought never to serve as an excuse for our not separating, in philosophical discussions, propriety from abuse. Mr Jeffrey (the lively, and very able author of the article Beauty in the Sup plement to the Encyclopædia Britan nica) has observed, that " the words " beauty and beautiful must mean some " thing ; and are universally admitted to " mean something much more definite " than agreeableness or gratification in " general ; and while it is by no means " easy to define what that something is, " the force and clearness of our percep- ** tions of it, is demonstrated by the rea " diness with which we determine, in " any particular instance, whether the " object of any pleasurable emotion is ** or is not properly described as beau " ty." * That every one has a clear per ception of what he may chuse to call Beauty, without being able to tell what it is, is not to be wondered at while men continue to believe Beauty to be some thing sui generis ; and while there is a great variety and incongruity of causes, which give rise to the perception in dif ferent individuals.

Mr Stewart has en deavoured to shew that Beauty does not mean one thing, but many things ; and he has ingeniously attempted to explain, that the term Beautiful may originally have been applied to colour as being * Sup. Enc. Brit. vol. n. p. 174. agreeable to the eye ; and that it may have been afterwards extended to the agreeable impressions made by other things on the other senses. As all the senses are coeval, and as their susceptibility of being impressed both agreeably and disagreeably must have been known, before the invention of a term to convey that impressions were felt, and why they were felt ; the conjecture that the term Beautiful was first applied to the agreeable impressions made upon the eye, is scarcely more plausible, than if it had been made with respect to the impressions which are agreeable to the ear, the nose, or the tongue.

But admitting the conjecture to be right, there does not appear any sufficient reason for fixing on the im pressions of colour in preference to those of form. Colour is by no means so general, nor so various, in its effects, as form ; and it is probable, that there is a far greater number of persons who are capable of judging of form, than of those who can judge of colour. We meet with persons whose eyes do not enable them to distinguish some colours ; but we seldom meet with any who cannot distinguish forms. Without, however, disputing that beautiful was originally used to denote the pleasure which colour gives to the eye ; I may observe, that leading us, as Mr Stewart has done, to the first occasion of the term being employed, proves that, originally, it meant one thing ; for, although it might have been very rapidly extended in its application, the very term extension implies previous li mitation.

Beautiful must have been applied, originally, either to some object possess- V ing a quality which conferred agreea ble sensation to the eye, or to the qua lity itself, or to the effects of the quality. The following sentence leads me to believe, that the quality is what is re garded by Mr Stewart as that to which the term Beautiful is applied. " Al " though I have endeavoured to show " that our first notions of beauty are de " rived from colours, it neither follows " that, in these complex ideas of the " beautiful which we are afterwards led " to form in the progress of our experi " ence, this quality must necessarily en s' ter as a component part ; nor, where '.* it does so enter, that its effect must " necessarily predominate over all the " others." * Now, though we may suc cessfully trace the laws of thought and of * Ph.

Essays, p. 306. speech, which have been the causes of the extended application of this trouble some word, we are not satisfied in re gard to what the quality called Beautiful consisted of, since the quality colour is not beauty. Hence, though it is quite evident that the search after Beauty, as something sui generis, is absurd, I do not think that the suggestion of Mr Stewart has led us much nearer to the solution of the enigma which has so long puzzled the philosophical world. There is yet another consideration, arising out of the suggestion made by the great and amiable mind of this author, which it is necessary to mention. I apprehend that there is an error in supposing, that any thing is either agreeable, or disagree able, to the eye itself, as an organ, ex cepting either too great a blaze of light, or too little for rendering objects distinct *.

The organ itself sees ; that is, it is so contrived that an image is formed on the retina. The formation of an image, or the contact of coloured light, enables the eye to perceive form and co lour ; but it is not the organ that makes an estimate either of the one or of the other. There is an internal faculty to which the perception is conveyed, and which judges and determines which per ceptions are those of Beauty, and which are those of ugliness. Were it the eye * " It is not necessary for any of the purposes " which I have at present in view, that I should at " tempt to investigate the principles on which colours, " forms, or motion, give pleasure to the eye. With " the greater part of Mr Alison's remarks, on these " qualities, I perfectly agree ; although, in the case of " the first, I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere " organic impression, independently of any association " or expression whatever, than he seems willing to al -• low."— Ph.

Essays, p. 235. See also p. 299, 300. alone that judged of its perceptions, the moment when its functions ceased, all our ideas of form and colour should va nish. But in the dark, or when our eyes are shut, the impressions of external objects remain with us. A man who be comes blind by accident, or by disease, still retains the impressions which were formerly made through the medium of the eye. In sleep we see objects and their qualities, as distinctly as when we are awake; and we can give a distinct account of persons, their actions, and of the co lours of their dresses, as they appeared to us in our dreams. Persons who are blind, but who have once seen, retain the im pressions of colour and form, and see in their sleep, as well as others whose or gans are perfect. I have, fortunately, had an opportunity of ascertaining this fact, in the case of a friend, whose talents are of no ordinary cast ; and whose upright character removes every sus picion of inaccuracy, which might be attached to the accounts of themselves, given by uneducated persons in the lower walks of life.

The gentleman to whom I allude, lost his sight about 27 years ago. He still dreams of persons and of objects he had formerly seen, and thinks he sees them ; and often the conscious ness of his being blind, and of its being necessary for a person to lead him, occurs to him in his dreams, at the same time that the objects of which he dreams are distinct before him. Of persons and things he has never seen, he has formed ideal images, and of these he dreams as if he saw them. It may be worth while to add the curious fact, that the same gentleman, for some time after he had become blind, frequently dreamed that he was in danger of losing his sight, and suffered much more misery in these dreams, than he ever experienced from the actual conviction of the severe pri vation he has suffered. * That the eye does not judge, is proved also by the fact, that two persons, whose eyes are perfect, do not pronounce the same judgment on the same thing, in regard to the impressions it makes upon them.

Each must see the object exactly as it is seen by the other ; that is, the impression must be the same on the eyes of both. Yet what is Beautiful to one may be ugly to another, and vice versa. * I have no doubt that other persons, in the same circumstances, dream as my friend does ; that persons born blind, dream of forms which they have ascertained by touch, and also of ideal forms. The examination of intelligent persons in such circumstances, will certainly lead to the establishment of some important truths connected with the philosophy of mind. If the eye itself both perceived and judged, there could be no such thing as difference of taste. I conclude, there fore, that the eye can neither be pleased nor displeased ; that it has nothing to do in the determination of what is Beau tiful, or of what is ugly.

The determi nation is the office of internal faculties. The same kind of illustration is applica ble to the other senses. Hence all argu ments derived from the supposition that the external senses not only perceive but judge, are useless. Their instruments are adapted to convey perceptions to higher powers, which receive or reject them. To follow the mind of Mr Stewart, so strong in itself, and which has become so gigantic in its power by regular and constant exercise, in an attempt to discover what has baffled the efforts of the greatest philosophers, may appear pre sumptuous. But I do not pretend to say that I have succeeded ; I only consi der that it is my duty to assist, as far as my abilities will go, in the search for truth. Hitherto it seems to have been expected that the metal was to be found, like gold, in a state of purity, and its ores have been thrown aside as useless dross.

I have found an ore in which I suspect the metal to be concealed ; but whether I have been deceived in my at tempt to reduce it, I do not know. The process and its result, however, is submitted to abler analysts. It will be readily granted that percep tion and consciousness existed before language. We are, therefore, not to 0 attempt to adapt these to the word beau tiful ; but to trace its meaning out of the consciousness of those effects of per ception, which the word was originally intended to convey. Every sense, and every faculty of the mind, desires to be gratified, and shuns whatever is likely to oppose gratification. The eye is gratified by certain quantities of light, and offended by others. Smell is more or less acute in different persons, but in all it is pleased by some impressions and annoyed by others.

The senses also of hearing and touch can be gratified or offended. In the same manner the faculties of the mind are affected. If we read a book on any subject, the subject, or the manner in which it is treated, is either agreeable to us, or dis agreeable. Imagination creates ideas which may please or offend ourselves, or enable us to please or offend others. Memory recals events which may excite laughter, or overwhelm us with sorrow. In short, every thing of which the mind is capable, whether we refer to the ef fects of perceptions conveyed by the in struments of sense, or to the activity of the higher powers, can be excited only by two effects of perception opposite in their nature, or the reverse of each other ; and each of which has various degrees of power or influence. The words Pleasure and Pain express the two effects under which every emo tion of the mind, excited by perception, may be arranged.

Each effect, considered as generic, has its species ; and each species has its degrees. We derive one species of pleasure from seeing a sine building, and another species of pleasure from beholding a rainbow. One building is capable of yielding to us a greater degree of pleasure than another ; and a rainbow that is indistinct affords us less pleasure than one that is full and clear. We experience one species of pain in seeing an animal put to death ; and another when we look at any thing which is deformed. If torture be em ployed in putting an animal to death, we experience a greater degree of pain, than we do when the process of killing is rapid. The human figure, with a hunch on the back is, in degree, less disagree able, than Avhen to the hunch is added deformity of the limbs. Now, I consider that the Avords Plea sure and Pain refer, neither to an object itself, nor to the qualities of an object, but to the effect of its qualities on the mind.

In the same manner beautiful appears to me to be an expression, not for an object, nor its qualities, but for some effect Avhich the perception of its qualities impresses on the mind. This effect can only be pleasing or painful ; and that it is a pleasing effect is evident. Hence I am inclined to conclude, that beautiful expresses simply a certain de gree of certain species of pleasurable effect impressed on the mind. This view of the subject seems to de rive confirmation, from the facility with which it explains the extensive applica tion of the word Beautiful, without trac ing the steps of what has been called * a very wide and capricious analogy ;' and which has been done so elegantly by Mr Stewart. Men, rather than take the trouble of inventing new terms, have transferred those which signified a particular sensation or emotion, to the ex pression of other sensations or emotions similar in relation to their genus, though differing in their species.

For instance, a colour is said to be Beautiful, also a sound, and likewise a form. Pleasure is here the genus of the effect produced ; but the pleasure derived from colour is of a species different from that conferred by sound ; and that arising from form differs from both. But they all produce the generic effect pleasure ; and hence the same ivords have come to be employed to denote the degrees of all the species. I am, therefore, disposed to class the term beautiful (without pretend ing to form a proper scale), with other words denoting degrees of pleasure, in this way ; agreeable, handsome, pretty, elegant, beautiful P lovely, enchanting, angelic, &c. It may add to the proba bility of my conjecture being right, that each of these words, if my conjecture should not be received, is just as much in want of definition as beautiful.

We call an object pretty. Let us substitute this or any other for beautiful, and repeat the observation of Mr Jeffrey, which I will do here to save the reader the trouble of going back. " The words " pretty and prettiness, elegant and ele- " gance, lovely and loveliness, must mean " something ; and are universally felt to '.' mean something much more definite " than agreeableness or gratification in " general ; and while it is by no means " easy to define what that something " is, the force and clearness of our per- " ception of it is demonstrated by the " readiness Avith which we determine, in " any particular instance, whether the " object of any pleasurable emotion is " or is not properly described as pretti- " ness, elegance, or loveliness." * * Goodness and badness, and their species, are terms as extensively applied as pleasure and pain, and their From the view of the subject I have thus taken, the extension of the word beautiful to denote many things, to which varieties ; and it would be as much in vain to seek for any species of goodness as something sui generis, as it is to search for beauty.

Goodness and badness are equally applied to religion, to morality, and to the im pressions made on our senses. We speak of a virtuous man as good, and also of the taste of an orange, and of the smell of a flower : of an immoral man as bad, and also of the taste of putrid meat, and of the smell of a dunghill. If we take goodness and badness, in the same manner as pleasure and pain, as generic, we shall be at no loss to find the degrees of every variety of both. Of moral character, we say that a man is of a character that is benevolent, or generous, or noble, or upright, or affectionate, &c, all of which goodness may be said to embrace. It appears evident that, among such terms, any one of them stands, in the same man ner as beautiful does among its congeners. If we speak of taste or of smell, we have agreeable, fine, pleasant, delightful, delicious, &c, as degrees of every species of smell and taste of the genus good.