Systematic Morality: or, a treatise on the theory and practice of human duty, on the grounds of natural religion

Front matter

SYSTEMATIC MORALITY, OR & Œreattse ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN DUTY, ON THE GROUNDS OF NATURAL RELIGION. BY WILLIAM JEVONS, JUN. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. " Cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia, accurate copoioseque a philo9ophla disputata, latissime patere videntur ea, quæ de officiis tradita ab illis et præcepta sunt. Nulla enim vltæ para, neque publicis, neque privatis ■, neque forensibus, neque domes ticis in rebus ; Deque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrabas, vacare officio potest : In eoque colendo sita vitæ eat honestas omnis, et in negligendo turpitudo. Atque bæc quidem quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum : quia est enim, qui, nullis officii præceptis tradendis, philosopbum se audeat dicere (" Cickro. LONDON : PRINTED FOR ROWLAMD HUNTER, ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD ; AND SOLD BY G. & J. ROBINSON, & W. GRAPEL, LIVERPOOL. 1827.

HELLING AND CO. PRINTERS, LIVERPOOL. TO THE REV. JAMES MYLNE, professor of JWoral iphilngopho, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, TO WHOSE ENLIGHTENED INSTRUCTIONS IN PUBLIC THE AUTHOR FEELS INDEBTED FOR HIS FIRST SATISFACTORY VIEWS IN MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE, AND WHOSE UNLOOKED-FOR KIND ATTENTIONS IN PRIVATE HE STILL REMEMBERS WITH LIVELY GRATITUDE, THIS WORK ON HUMAN DUTY IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.

Preface

. Books of morality abound so much, that any addition to their number may seem superfluous. The ground, however, was not so completely preoccupied, as to leave room for no improvement ; and something has hitherto been wanting in this department of literature, which it is hoped the present work may serve to supply. For though, in the numerous productions of our divines and essayists, we possess a rich store of moral instruction, conveyed, in many instances, with all the force of elo quence and all the graces of elegant diction ; yet this instruction is so widely scattered, so loosely arranged, and so much mixed with extraneous matter, that it can not easily be collected, nor presented to the mind with such distinctness as to make the desired impression ; and notwithstanding the great and undoubted utility of writings of this description, there is a manifest want of some work which may condense their materials, and combine philosophical views and systematic arrangement with their practical and persuasive strain. Works, indeed, VI

PREFACE.

. there are, which profess to exhibit a complete system of ethics; but the number of these is surprisingly small, considering the importance and universally-interesting nature of the subject, and few even of this small number are calculated to answer the purpose just mentioned. Some are too exclusively theoretical : others too exclusively practical. Some have too much of a political character, and treat not so much of Morality, properly so called, as of Natural Jurisprudence ; others are too deeply tinctured with theological opinions, which are acknowledged to confound, if they do not contradict, our reason. The most popular of the treatises on ethics, which are in possession of the British public, is that of Paley ; and so long as good sense, clear reasoning, and perspicuous style are relished, so long it will maintain a high reputation, notwithstanding its inconsistent and too accommodating morality.

To have entered into competition with that justly-admired work, would have seemed presumptuous ; but a slight inspection of the contents of the present work will suffice to show, that it takes entirely different ground, and considers the subject of morals in another point of view. Paley's is a work of Casuistry, which, though it exercises the judgment with many interesting discussions on difficult points of duty, is not much calculated to mend the heart, or to inspire the love of virtue. The present work is more strictly a system of Morality, since it treats of the Philosophy of Human Character, investigates the sources of the several passions and affections, points out the aberrations to which they are subject, and lays down rules for their correction and governance.

PREFACE.

. VII Avoiding for the most part those minute discussions re specting the exact boundaries of right, in contracts, promises, oaths, and wills, which occupy so large a space in Paley's work, and which belong more properly to the Science of Natural Law ; it aims to show wherein right feeling, as well as right acting, consists ; and to recommend the inward virtue of the heart, by describing not only the conduct which it produces, but the dispositions which constitute its very essence. It aims, in short, to present, in a more condensed and systematic form, such moral instruction as is usually found in sermons and moral essays ; and while the practical part, which constitutes by much the larger portion of the work, may prove acceptable to the general reader as a manual of duty for constant use, the author ventures to hope that the theoretical part may be found not uninteresting to the philosophical inquirer, as tending to disembarrass from their wonted confusion the several distinct questions which the theory of morals involves, and to illustrate the formation of human affections on those principles, in the application of which Locke and Hartley have already led the way.

Alfred-street, Liverpool, Jan. 17, 1827. ERRATA IN THE FIRST VOLUME. P. 136, 1. 23, after just insert as. P. 185, 1. 17, for pity read piety. P. 186, note, for U read X. P. 278, 1. 13, dele more. P. 321 , 1. 1 , for diplays read displays. P. 376, in the note, for ŒscAines, read Ætehiner. CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. Pa$e Introduction 1

Chapter I

Or the Origin of Moral Sentiments and of Human Affections in general 9 Introductory Remarks on the State of the Controversy, and on the Misapplication of the terms Self-Love and Selfish 8*& Section i. Of the Pleasures and Pains of Sense 20 ■ ii. Of the Love of Action and Excitement 24 iii. Of the Love of Novelty, and the Emotions of Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, and Admiration. ... 29 iv. Of the Pleasures of Memory 32 v. Of the Pleasures of Conception and Imagination 37 vi. Of the Pleasures of Intellect, t>r the Love of Knowledge . . . . 41 vii. Of the Principle of Imitation 44 viii. Of Wit and Ridicule SO ix. Of the Sense of Sublimity bH x. Of the Sense of Beauty 57 tol. i. b CONTENTS. X Page Section xi. Of the Desire of Property 66 xii. Of the Desire of Society 70 xiii. Of the Desire of Esteem 72 • xiv.

Of the Desire of Power 76 xv. Of Gratitude and Resentment 79 xvi. Of the Affections of Kindred 80 xvii. Of Friendship and Antipathy 84 ■ xviii. Of Patriotism 86 ■ — xix. Of Sympathy 89 xx. Of the Formation of Moral Sentiments 115

Preliminary Remarks 189

Chapter I

General Duties of Action 1 93 Section i. Of Industry 194 ii. Of Beneficence or Usefulness 207 iii. Qualities or Habits conducive to the successful Discharge of Active Duty in general 225 1. Method md 2. Perseverance 228 3. Enterprise 230 4. Despatch 232 5. Fixed Attention 233

Chapter II

General Duties of Restraint CONTENTS. ad. Page. Section i. Of Prudence 237 >■■ ii. Of Justice , , . 250 ■ iii. Of Veracity 256 iv. Of Moderation 265

Chapter III

Duties relating to the Desire and Pursuit of Pleasure , 270 Of Temperance and Chastity, or the proper regulation of the Appetites ibid Amusements, how far allowable 280 1. Sports 282 2. Games of Chance and Skill 283 3. Reading ,,.,,.. 284 4. Company , , . , , , 288 5. Theatrical Amusements , 289 6. The Pursuits of Taste 291 Observations respecting the Pursuit of Pleasure in general . 293

Chapter IV

Duties relating to the Desire and Pursuit of Wealth 296 Preliminary Remarks , ibid The Love of Wealth criminal, when it employs the following means : I. Violation of the Rights of others 298 1. By deeds of Violence or Outrage 300 2. By secret arts of Fraud and Dishonesty .... 301 3. By extortion or exorbitance in Commercial Dealings , 304 II. Servile Conduct, Mean Compliances, False Professions, &c , 305 III. Gaming, Lotteries, Hazardous Speculations, &c. . 307 The Love of Wealth chargeable with excess in the following cases : I. When it renders the character selfish and interested . 310 II. When it occasions the neglect of higher duties and more important objects , . CONTENTS. J*ag« III. When money is sought and loved for its own sake .313 Observations on the Contempt of Wealth 31 S

Chapter V

Duties relating to the Desire and Pursuit of Reputation 317 Preliminary Remarks ibid I. Review of the diversities of this passion, according to the different qualifications which are the subject of praise or esteem 321 II. Review of its diversities, according to the manner in which it is manifested in the behaviour 327 Fear of Censure and Ridicule , ibid Vanity 331 Pride 332 Conceit 338 Haughtiness 339 Arrogance 340 Assurance ibid Contempt 341 Modesty 343 Humility 345 Affectation 35 1 Hypocrisy 353 Ambition 356 Censoriousness 363 Charity 365 Envy 371 Emulation ; 374 Notes and Illustrations SYSTEMATIC MORALITY.

Introduction

. Morality, or Moral Philosophy, is that science which treats of the government of human con duct. It points out certain modes of feeling, thinking, and acting, collectively expressed by the term Virtue, which are to be approved of and practised ; and others, comprehended under the name of Vice, which are to be condemned and avoided. It aims to ascertain the true na ture and origin of this distinction, and to esta blish on just grounds the obligation which it involves. It fully describes and accurately distinguishes these opposite modes of conduct; exhibits at large their respective tendencies ; and urges every argument fitted to inspire a love of the one, and a hatred of the other. It inquires, moreover, into the sources of hu- VOL. I. B

INTRODUCTION.

. man error ; investigates the causes which operate in the formation of character; reveals the subtleties and delusions of the human heart; and hence deduces further precepts concern ing the means to be employed for cultivating and improving the moral principle. It is a science which may confidently be pro nounced the first in importance and utility of all the subjects of human knowledge ; since its direct aim is to ascertain the surest means of happiness, and its truths are such as "come home to the business and bosom" of every in dividual of our race. Most other branches of knowledge are useful only for particular pur poses and to particular classes : some can only be recommended as interesting objects of curiosity, as sources of rational amusement, or materials of agreeable and ornamental accomplishments.

But this study is of universal im portance. It relates to subjects in which all men, without exception, are deeply interested ; to subjects which the daily business and inter course of life is continually presenting to our attention, and respecting which we are every moment called upon both to judge and to act. To be ignorant, therefore, upon these subjects,

INTRODUCTION.

. 3 is to be wanting in the most indispensable of all acquirements. Entire ignorance, indeed, of this kind is scarcely possible in persons of mature age and sound understanding ; for the great leading truths of morality are unavoidably forced upon the attention of all by the common maxims and ordinary experience of life. And hence it is, that to many persons the knowledge of moral duty appears so simple and obvious, that all instruction relating to it, that is merely practical, can consist only in the repetition of insipid truisms. But the moral knowledge of the generality of men will be found, when justly estimated, to need both much enlargement and much correction. Obscure, superficial, defective, and often grossly erroneous, are those notions of duty which men pick up by chance, and ill are they prepared for encountering the temptations of life, who are furnished with no better store of this important knowledge.

There is a certain keen sensibility of conscience — a certain high-toned moral principle — a certain superiority to pre vailing prejudices, and popular, but mistaken maxims — an ardent, heartfelt love of virtue, and a deeply-rooted abhorrence of vice, which is rarely met with among mankind, and which

INTRODUCTION.

. cannot be expected but in those who have daily exercised their minds in the meditation of duty, and grown familiar with all the features and all the loveliness of virtue. Consi dered merely as a means of intellectual im provement, this study will be found of no small importance ; for the power, which it tends to cultivate, of forming correct ideas on subjects most frequently occurring in books and in con versation, and of justly estimating the various characters which the intercourse of society or the page of history presents to our notice, is obviously one of the most useful of all mental accomplishments. The study of morals, in deed, is peculiarly the study of man, and is in timately connected with every science and every branch of literature, which relates to the faculties, the feelings, or the actions of men.

It is founded upon, or rather it forms a part, and the most important part too, of the philosophy of the human mind ; for without a knowledge of the laws which determine the formation and operation of the passions, it is evidently impossible to ascertain the best means of correcting and regulating them. It has a bearing also upon political science; for the statesman has to deal with men, and

INTRODUCTION.

. unless he be well acquainted with the force of their prejudices and the prevailing motives of their actions, will be liable to fall into the grossest errors in his plans of government or legislation. It is allied more closely still to the studies of taste and criticism ; for the same principles which explain the formation and nature of our moral sentiments, and of the se veral affections to which the rules of duty relate, serve also to explain the feelings of taste ; and indeed virtue itself may be considered as taste exercised upon its highest objects. What is history, moreover, but a dry detail of facts and dates, unless we read it with minds prepared to mark the operation of human passions, and to regard with discriminating attention the various characters which pass in review before us ?

Whence arises all the charm of fiction and the drama, but from the faithful delineation of human character, which is equally the subject, though differently treated, of moral science ? The moralist de scribes in general terms, and enters into a systematic detail of the several elements which constitute, under various combinations, the human character ; while the novelist and dra matist select some particular passion, or some

INTRODUCTION.

. particular feature of manners or character, which they illustrate, not by a formal and general description, but by examples which far more forcibly seize the attention and impress the mind. The study of morals is, therefore, the best preparative for duly relishing, or justly criticising these interesting productions ; and let me add, that if they have hitherto been of doubtful tendency and questionable utility, it is only because they have usually been written, either with no view whatever to moral instruction, or without that light and guidance which moral science alone can furnish. Only let the inventive genius of fiction be subjected to the control and guidance of an enlightened morality, and it will prove an instrument of most powerful efficacy for the instruction and reformation of mankind.

Thus extensive is the range of moral science ; thus close its connexion with all the most inter esting of our studies and pursuits. Considered1, therefore, I repeat it, merely as a branch of liberal study, as a means of improving the un derstanding and refining the taste, this science is entitled to high regard. But when we more over consider how essential the knowledge of

INTRODUCTION.

. duty is to its fulfilment, and how close and im mediate the connexion between correct moral sentiments and a well-regulated conduct, it rises to a dignity and importance commensu rate only with " the vast concerns of an eternal scene." The whole subject of moral science may be divided into three great parts. The first, under the title of Theoretic Morality, will in clude those inquiries which relate to the origin of our moral sentiments, and the nature and obligations of virtue in general. The second, under the title of Practical Morality, will comprehend the detail and description of all the particular dispositions, feelings, and modes of conduct, which respectively constitute virtue and vice, together with such representations of their several tendencies, as may serve to recommend the one and dissuade from the other.

The last will treat of the means of cultivating and improving the moral principle, and will include that particular class of duties which are called instrumental duties. This part may be distinguished by the title of Disciplinary Morality.

BOOK I THEORETIC MORALITY.

Plain and simple as the subject of moral duty may at first appear, the theory of morals has nevertheless afforded an ample field for contro versy ; and no sooner have we entered upon the inquiries it involves, than we find ourselves perplexed amidst the variety of contending systems offered to our notice.* This diversity of opinion, however, will be found, on more attentive examination, to be generally more apparent than real ; and a discriminating judgment will perceive, that the subject of dispute has not been always kept distinctly in view ; that several questions of a very different nature have been confounded ; and that writers have, in some instances, appeared to differ, only be- * For a brief review of the leading theories of morals, see Bclsham's Elements of Moral Philosophy. — Section 12 — 15. cause they have regarded different subjects of inquiry, which they have not been sufficiently careful to distinguish.

In the theory of morals there are three distinct questions, which, though often confounded, require a separate discussion. They are as follows : — I. What is the origin of our moral sentiments ? II. What is the essential characteristic, or best criterion of virtue ? III. What is the nature and ground of moral obligation ? CHAP. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, AND OF HUMAN AFFEC- TIONS IN GENERAL. What is the origin of our moral sentiments ? or how, in other words, have we learned to make the distinction between right and wrong; to regard some actions and dispositions as wor thy of approbation, others as deserving of blame ? On this question there is a wide and real diversity of opinion among ethical writers ; some maintaining that our moral sentiments VOL. I. c are acquired by the natural exercise of our powers of perception, under the varying influ ence of circumstances and education ; while others contend that they are instinctive or in tuitive, being either the self-evident dictates of untaught reason,* by which, independently of, and antecedently to all experience of their ten dency, we are led to approve of virtue and to condemn vice ; or the perceptions of a certain internal faculty called a moral sense,t which informs us of the moral character of actions in the same manner as the eye informs us of co lours, the ear of sounds, or any other external sense of its appropriate objects.

There is ano ther class of writers who take a middle course, resolving our moral sentiments into some remoter principle, but expressly contending that that principle is such as cannot be itself re solved into self-love ; I allude particularly to Mr. Hume and Dr. Adam Smith. The former of these maintains that there is implanted by nature in the human breast a principle of humanity or disinterested benevolence, which causes us to take delight in whatever tends to the happiness of mankind ; that it is this prin- * According to Clarke, Price, Beattie, Stewart, &c. t According to Hntcheson | Reid, &c. ciple which renders virtue an object of regard on account of its utility, and vice an object of abhorrence on account of its pernicious ten dency ; but he expressly maintains that this principle of humanity is an original, instinctive principle, which cannot be deduced from a selfish origin.* The latter ascribes the formation of our moral sentiments to a somewhat differ ent process.

He urges in objection to the doc trine of Hume, that the consideration of utility or beneficial tendency is not what first prompts us to approve of virtue, but an after-thought derived from mature reflection, and only serving to confirm the sentiments to which we have been led by a different principles That principle, according to him, is Sympathy, which, leading us to transfer ourselves in imagination into the situation of others, compels us to approve or blame their conduct according as we find ourselves disposed or averse to par ticipate in the feelings from which it springs. But, in like manner with the writer first men tioned, he claims for this principle of sympathy the character of an original, instinctive • Hume's Inquiry concerning the principles of Morals. — Sec note A at the cud of the volume. t Sec Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.— Part iv. ch. 2. principle, and denies the possibility of tracing our moral sentiments to any remoter source.* The doctrine of a moral sense, or of instinctive or intuitive moral principles, is merely a modification of that doctrine of innate ideas, which has been so ably and successfully com bated by Locke.

The phrase, indeed, of innate ideas is now no longer used, and the manifest absurdity, which it seems to imply, of suppos ing that there are ideas of right and wrong in the mind of the new-born infant, is now distinctly disavowed, and was never, I imagine, the meaning or opinion even of those who did employ it. All that now appears to be con tended for by the advocates of a moral sense, or instinct, so far as they have distinctly ex plained their meaning, is, that we are endowed by nature with certain capacities of moral feel ing, by means of which, without the aid of in struction or previous experience, certain senti ments of approbation or disapprobation un avoidably arise, as soon as certain actions are presented to our attention. " It is not," says Dr. Brown, " contended, that we came into the * Sec Smith's Theory of Moral Sentimente.— Part vii.

Sec. 3. ch. 1. world with a knowledge of certain actions, which we are afterwards to approve or disap prove ; for we enter into the world ignorant of every thing which is to happen in it : but that we came into existence with certain susceptibi lities of emotion, in consequence of which it will be impossible for us, in after-life, but for the influence of counteracting circumstances, momentary or permanent, not to be pleased with the contemplation of certain actions, as soon as they have become fully known to us, and not to have feelings of disgust on the contem plation of certain other actions."* The existence of some original susceptibilities of emotion has never, I imagine, been denied. Without this, it is evident, education and association would be altogether insufficient to account for the formation of our moral sentiments ; for were there nothing originally and by nature pleasurable or painful, it is obvious that nothing could be so by association ; and it is only, as an eminent living writer justly observes, " it is only by co-operating with the natural principles of the mind, that education produces its * Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, by the late Thomas Brown, M. D.— Vol. iii. p. 606. effects."* In combating the doctrine of instinctive or intuitive moral principles, it has been customary with the advocates of the opposite doctrine to bring forward, with perhaps too little caution, the diversities and inconsistencies which may be found in the moral sentiments of different ages, countries, and classes, in order to shew the want of that uniformity which we should reasonably expect in an instinctive principle.

Hence they have been charged by their opponents with representing the distinction between right and wrong as altogether arbitrary and conventional, so that what is virtue in one age or country, may be vice in another. Such a doctrine, if indeed it has ever been maintained, is certainly as remote from truth, as it is dangerous in its tendency. With no appearance of reason can it be affirmed that our notions of right and wrong are to this extent factitious ; for however widely mankind may differ on some particular points, a general and total disagreement in their moral senti ments has never yet been witnessed, and can not even be imagined possible. Particular actions may be here and there allowed, which * Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, — rart ii. ch. 1 . Sec. vi. § 174. are at variance with our notions of justice or humanity ; but no circumstances of society can be supposed, no means of education can be con trived, which will have power to render all which these terms designate, hateful, and all which the contrary terms express, approved and honoured.

There is, and ever must be, a general uniformity in the moral sentiments of men, which utterly forbids the supposition that they are the mere result of arbitrary ordinance or casual prescription, and compels the belief that there must be some universally-operating principle, which, independently of the influ ence of education, leads us necessarily to approve of virtue and condemn vice. What, then, is this principle ? Is it any thing more than that simple capacity of corporeal pleasure and pain, which is essential to our nature as sentient beings? This is the disputed question, the discussion of which now claims our atten tion; and if it can be shewn that from this source alone, according to the acknowledged laws of the human mind, our moral sentiments may be deduced, no other argument will then be wanted to overthrow at once whatever systems are erected on the needless hypothesis of a moral sense or instinct.

For it is only by the appeal to ignorance that those systems can be defended ; and if that appeal can be answered in the way which I propose, they must fall, of course, by their own weight. In order, how ever, to prosecute with success this analysis of our moral sentiments, it will be expedient to extend the investigation to the whole train of human affections, including even those which belong to the province of Taste. They are all so closely allied together, they partake so much of a common nature, and mutually throw so much light on one another, that they cannot well be understood or treated of separately. This general analysis of human affections is required, indeed, not merely with a view to the controversy of which I have been speaking, but as a necessary preparative for the ensuing practical inquiries; for without a just know ledge of the nature and laws of human affections, it is impossible to lay down judicious practical rules for their government and direc tion.

It is, therefore, a subject which justly claims a place in this theoretic branch of moral science. Before, however, entering upon this analysis, I would endeavour to obviate a certain misapprehension, to which the doctrine I shall advance will be liable. If it be true that the pleasures and pains of sense are the source from which all our desires and affections flow, this necessarily implies that they are all de ducible from a selfish origin, or may be said, in a certain sense, to be founded in self-love. But these terms, be it carefully observed, when used in this connexion, have a different im port from that offensive signification which they sometimes bear. The term self-love be ing often used in contradistinction to benevolence, and selfish being the epithet by which we designate that cold, calculating, interested character, which always looks to its own advantage, and is insensible to all the generous feel ings of sympathy, gratitude, and kind affection, the same invidious sense has been unfortunately attached to these terms in their application to the present subject, and great indignation has accordingly been expressed against the attempt to deduce the affections of the hu man mind from self-love, as if this were to deny the reality of any disinterested feelings, and to represent mankind as being always actuated by a cold regard to individual happiness.

The VOL. I. D doctrine thus interpreted would certainly de serve that indignation which it has provoked, and would contradict the testimony of consciousness in every well-disposed and well-princi pled mind. We admire actions of exalted virtue, and condemn deeds of atrocity or baseness, from a certain instantaneous impulse, which evidently leaves no room for far-fetched calcu lations of their consequences to ourselves. We scorn the very thought of an act of meanness, even where it would most effectually serve our interest ; and we feel that we love our parents, our children, our friends, with an affection which has nothing in it of a cold and calculat ing character. Be it, however, observed, that it is one thing to assert that the thought of self is always uppermost in the minds of men, even when they appear to be actuated by the most disinterested and elevated affections; and quite another thing to say that such affections are remotely derived from a selfish origin.

The former revolting doctrine, though doubtless maintained by some ethical writers, among whom may be reckoned Hobbes, Mandeville, and Rochefoucauld, is by no means to be im puted to the system advanced in the following pages, as will plainly appear in the course of the inquiry.* In following out the analysis of human affections, I shall observe the following order : — First, I shall enumerate and describe the pri mary affections, from those lowest desires, called Appetites, which are common to man with the brutes, and which arise from the im mediate pleasures and pains of sense, to those more refined, but equally original feelings, which arise from the exercise of the higher faculties. The course of this investigation will gradually lead to the consideration of those feelings or affections which may be called de rived or secondary, because created by the remoter influence of good and evil, and consist ing chiefly in the permanent desire and conti nued pursuit of whatever things are instrumental to the gratification of our primary de sires.