Part III
Funk: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish stores be reopened?
Goebbels: If they will be reopened is another question. The question is will they be restored? I have set the deadline for Monday.
Goering: You don’t have to ask whether they’ll be reopened. That is up to us to decide.
Goebbels: Number 2. In almost all German cities synagogues are burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place, others want to put up new buildings.
Goering: How many synagogues were actually burned?
Heydrich: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire; 76 synagogues demolished; and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.
Goering: What do you mean “destroyed by fire?”
Heydrich: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.
Goebbels: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being leveled by the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new buildings. That ought to be the criterion for the whole country, the Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall have to provide us with ready free space.
Number 3: I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews to enter German theaters, moving houses, and circuses. I have already issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe we can afford that. Our theaters are overcrowded, we have hardly any room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting next to Germans in movies and theaters. One might consider, later on, to let the Jews have one or two movie houses here in Berlin, where they may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business anymore.
Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a sleeping car with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim a seat. They shall be given a separate compartment only after all Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.
Goering: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them separate compartments.
Goebbels: Not if the train is overcrowded!
Goering: Just a moment. There’ll be only one Jewish coach. If that is filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.
Goebbels: Suppose, though, there won’t be many Jews going on the express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would then have a compartment all to themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a seat only after all Germans have secured a seat.
Goering: I’d give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me, we won’t need a law. We’ll kick him out and he’ll have to sit all alone in the toilet all the way!
Goebbels: I don’t agree. I don’t believe in this. There ought to be a law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German beaches and resorts. Last summer * * *
Goering: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting things have happened lately.
Goebbels: Also at the Wannsee beach. A law which definitely forbids the Jews to visit German resorts!
Goering: We could give them their own.
Goebbels: It would have to be considered whether we’d give them their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them, but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for recreation.
It’ll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to forbid the Jews to enter the German forests. In the Grunewald, whole herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.
Goering: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much like Jews,--the Elk has such a crooked nose,--get there also and become acclimated.
Goebbels: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and their children and begin to gossip and incite.
Goebbels: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best ones--and tell them: “You may sit on these benches” these benches shall be marked “For Jews only.” Besides that they have no business in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in German schools. That’s impossible. It is out of the question that any boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German gymnasium and receive lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own communities.
Goering: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the insurance company be called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as he’ll be finished with his report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared. But I believe that at present we should not work it through raised taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose, better.
(Hilgard appears)
Mr. Hilgard, the following is our case. Because of the justified anger of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt, synagogues burned, etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also insured against damage committed by public disorder, etc.
(Hilgard: “Yes”)
If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is simple enough; I’d only have to issue a decree to that effect that damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one: In case of reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose these, and that is why I’d like to discuss with you ways and means by which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to the German economy, instead of the Jew. I’d like to hear from you, and that is the first question I want to ask: In your opinion, are the Jews insured against such damage to a large extent?
Hilgard: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire insurance, the ordinary glass insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft. The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim compensation are partly Jews, partly Aryans. As for the fire insurance, they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner and that applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places the fire may have spread. Although the damage done to the latter’s property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made late last night.
As for the glass insurance which plays a very important part in this, the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims, mostly the owners of the buildings are Aryans. The Jew has usually rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for example on Kurfuerstendamm.
Goering: That is what we’ve said.
Goebbels: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.
Goering: It doesn’t make sense, we have no raw materials. It is all glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign currency! One could go nuts.
Hilgard: May I draw your attention to the following facts: the glass for the shop windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian, but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate money-value to which these damages amount is $6,000,000--that includes the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to Aryans because they have the insurance policies. Of course I have to reserve final judgment in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the $6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might well have to import glass for approximately $3,000,000. Incidentally, the amount of the damage equals about half a whole year’s production of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.
Goering: The people will have to be enlightened on this.
Goebbels: We cannot do this right now.
Goering: This cannot continue! We won’t be able to last with all this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Aryan is the one who suffers the damage; is that right?
Hilgard: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass insurance goes.
Goering: Which would have to replace the glass.
Hilgard: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Aryan, the owner of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel, the owner is the Jew.
Goering: And now the third category.
Hilgard: Under this fall the victims of thievery.
Goering: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be thievery?
Hilgard: I don’t think so.
Goering: Could that be termed as “Riot”?
Hilgard: That is just the question which we are unable to decide at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?
Goering: That is a case of “Riot.”
Hilgard: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance against damage caused by riots--these were discarded by us long ago.
Goering: But this here is “Rioting.” That is the legal term. There was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes in and knocks everything to pieces, or “Public Disturbances.”
Hilgard: Public disturbance. It is no riot.
Goering: Are they insured against damages caused by public disturbances?
Hilgard: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Unter Den Linden. The Jewelry store of Margraf, is insured with us through a so-called combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur. This damage was reported to us as amounting to $1,700,000 because the store was completely stripped.
Goering: Daluege and Heydrich, you’ll have to get me this jewelry through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!
Daluege: The order has already been given. The people are being controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by yesterday afternoon.
Goering: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they’ll be confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in all right.
Heydrich: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we have already several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get the loot back.
Goering: And the jewels?
Heydrich: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with furriers, for example, in Friedrichstrasse, district C, there the crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks, etc. It’ll be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party’s consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.
Daluege: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the police will immediately receive a report in case the neighbor’s wife, (everybody knows his neighbor) has a fur coat altered or in case somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We’d like the Party to support us here.
Hilgard: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May I say a word in general about our liabilities and a “Petidum” of the Versicherungswirkschaft report. We’d like to make it our point, Mr. General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the obligations for which our contracts call.
Goering: But I have to. That is important for me.
Hilgard: If I may give reasons for this request, I’d like to say that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very good international basis for our business transactions, and in the interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have to make sure that the confidence in the German insurance shall not be ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of honor of the German insurance.
Goering: It wouldn’t the minute I issue a decree--a law sanctioned by the State.
Hilgard: I was leading up to that.
Heydrich: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be paid, it’ll be confiscated. That way we’ll have saved face.
Hilgard: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance company the chance to * * *
Goering: One moment! You’ll have to pay in any case because it is the Germans who suffered the damage. But there’ll be a lawful order forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall also have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to the Jews, but to the Minister of Finance.
(Hilgard: Aha!)
What he does with the money is his business.
Schmer: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A certain rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way, the insurance companies shall be refunded.
Goering: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance companies the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You’ll fulfill your obligations, you may count on that.
Kerl: It seems that in one respect, we’ll have to arrange this somewhat differently. As far as the glass insurance goes, the fact of the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies, with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very small reciprocity companies [Gegenseitsvereine]. They won’t be able to make up for the damage. We’ll have to find out how far they are covered by reinsurance which I cannot tell at the moment.
Hilgard: In this connection, the reinsurance plays a relatively small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by department stores. There is not reinsurance in the glass insurances, for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does not need reinsurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes out our chance for profit.
(Interrupted by Kerl)
No, sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass insurance amounts to $14,000,000, if I am not wrong. Under normal conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our greatest asset. So far, the greatest profits were made in it. But now, the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for one ordinary year. With the various special glass insurances, it is altogether different.
Goering: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million left.
Hilgard: We’ll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million mark. I wanted to be careful.
Heydrich: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes--sales taxes, taxes on property, and on income. I assume that the Minister for Finance too, has been informed of all this.
V. Krosigk: I have no idea about the extent.
Heydrich: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.
Daluege: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were delivered on the basis of commission.
Hilgard: We’ll have to pay for them, too.
Goering: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such values.
Heydrich: There were 35 killed.
Kerl: I think we could do the following: Jews we don’t pay anyhow. As for Aryans, payment shall have to be made. The insurance company may contact us through the “Reichsgruppe” and we shall investigate each case. I am thinking of the small reciprocity companies; it should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not. In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Aryan, and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases where it is absolutely necessary.
Funk: That is not necessary. I’d like to refer to what I’ve said before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.
Goering: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their ability to pay.
Funk: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don’t have to pay.
Goering: Right, well, gentlemen, this is all very clear. We’ll stick to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to pay too, and I understand this very well. They’ll have to want that, so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest profits so far. That means they’d have enough surplus money, and if they haven’t divided it all up in dividends, they’ll have savings enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do that, then we’ll have to wonder whether we should let small companies live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contract in every respect and shall have to pay.
[Part IV is missing]
Part V
Goering: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margraf’s the jewels disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won’t get them refunded. He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen, or burned. There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.
As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew shall have to make good for the damage.
Goebbels: That doesn’t have to be put in the decree, though. This decree is quite sufficient the way it is.
Hilgard: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign countries might be involved in this.
Goering: Well, they’ll have to pay. And we’ll confiscate that.
Hilgard: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or American insurance companies!
Goering: Then they’ll pay him for the damage. The question merely is the following: do you think there are reinsurances for all this damage in foreign countries?
Hilgard: Very few, amounting to very little.
Goering: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he hasn’t had any. The Jew will make good.
The Jew shall have to report the damage. He’ll get the refund from the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. After it’s all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance companies since they can’t have to make good for all the damage. Mr. Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.
Hilgard: I have no reason for that--the fact that we won’t have to pay for all the damage is called profit!
Goering: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay 5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million--why, cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with you, or whatever you’d call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your whole body grins. You made a big profit.
(Remark: Let’s initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)
Hilgard: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it, because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are the losers. That is so, and that’ll remain so, and nobody can tell me differently.
Goering: Then why don’t you take care of it that a few windows less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.
(Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting)
Gentlemen, let us continue.
Woermann: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if they are insured, and not if they are not insured.
Goering: Well, they’ll have to insure themselves--or what else do you mean?
Woermann: As for insurance, the foreign Jews are, to my understanding, mentioned only in Article 2 and 3, and not in Article 1. If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article
1: “Jews inside the country.” Well, we’ll have plenty of complaints then.
Goering: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they’ll receive their compensation.
(Woermann: If they are insured!)
The number of those who are not insured is negligible.
Heydrich: I’d like to say one more thing of primary importance. In the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that easily.
Goering: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr. Woermann means, he is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not insured. That may be the case here and there.
Woermann: We shall then have plenty of complaints.
Goering: I’d like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign Jews.
Woermann: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it all very nicely.
Guertner: Now, if I don’t misunderstand, Mr. Woermann, he is primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are mentioned regarding the insurance.
I’d like to know whether there are any objections against compelling also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he shall not be paid the money from the insurance.
Goering: He is quite able to do that.
Woermann: Even if he is not insured?
Guertner: Oh!
Goering: There should hardly be such instances. Let’s take a chance on it.
Stuckart: If he is not insured, he’ll have to have the damage restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?
Goering: He cannot.
Woermann: He can file claims against the State.
Stuckart: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won’t recognize riots.
Goering: Perfectly right.
Woermann: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.
Goering: Like the Fuehrer says, we’ll have to find a way to talk this over with the countries which also do something against their Jews. That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to stand him--that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a few chances and just tell the Poles: all right, we are not going to do that; let’s talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I’d like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.
Woermann: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general reservation.
Goering: I have always said and I’d like to repeat it that our steamship companies and German companies in general should finally catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc. That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why I don’t understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and I told him: “We don’t need any helium, I fly without helium but the prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such gangster-states.” He had a rather silly look on his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr. Woermann, it ought to be considered.
Woermann: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to be consulted.
Goering: Granted, but I’d like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews as long as we can help it. We’d rather have the foreign office take part in these cases where that question becomes acute, so that some compromise can be reached.
Woermann: Generally, and in particular cases.
Funk: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened or not?
Goering: That depends on how big a turn-over these Jewish stores have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a need exists. If we’d close all Jewish stores which are not open right now, altogether before Christmas, we’d be in a nice mess.
Fischboeck: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is, were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided following investigations in every single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.
Goering: I shall have this decree issued today.
Fischboeck: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had already been reached. We’ll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the actual execution of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses. We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These, in turn, shall resell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed price.
If this is carried out as planned, it’ll concern only the approximately 3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a deadline should be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year, definite buyers for the stores designated for Aryans, cannot be found, it’ll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan’s shop is of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish-owned businesses which so far have been obvious as such in the eyes of the public.
Goering: That would be excellent.
Fischboeck: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees which is operated by the State.
Goering: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.
Funk: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January 1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated. That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of this law.
Goering: I believe that we can agree with this law.
(Remark: Yes)
Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after 1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property. As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be prepared in an excellent manner.
Funk: In every single store everything is there.
Schmer: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore, over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion that we don’t need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.
Goering: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full amount.
Schmer: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.
Goering: The Jew will receive the amount which won’t be put into the account book.
Schmer: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money. The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to report every change in his financial status, so that it can easily be controlled. He won’t run away; we’ll keep it in the Reich. The only thing you’d have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.
Goering: Mr. Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the next-best jewelry store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.
Schmer: In that case, we’ll have to report this change in his property.
Goering: But if he wants to scram!
Fischboeck: The OK on the aryanizing is not being given the minute the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way. The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the price for the purchase is to be paid in installments lasting over a long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a frozen account.
Goering: We could do the same thing here.
Schmer: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a decree made by the authorities which OK the aryanizing.
Daluege: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday, 7,500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.
Fischboeck: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in Vienna, 5,000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether.
Schmer: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?
Goering: Nothing will be changed there.
Fischboeck: Everything can be shut down at any time.
Heydrich: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering, 3,000 I believe.
Fischboeck: More than 5,000.
Goering: Is that the same in the Reich?
Fischboeck: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I’d like to make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish national wealth in Austria is reported to amount to 320 million marks only; the value of the apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million. We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could also be an occasion to cash the contribution, which might be deducted this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment buildings wouldn’t be a problem at all. The only thing we’d need for it would be managers, and there’d be plenty of them. We’d like to requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in bonds of all kinds, in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over these bonds. We’ll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won’t be affected, the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall be expired.
Funk: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?
Goering: Because that way he would actually be given a share.
Funk: That is entirely new.
Goering: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.
Funk: Shares yes, but not internal loans.
Fischboeck: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%. We’d have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we’d let him have shares.
Goering: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he’d keep the shares. He’ll have to turn them in.
Fischboeck: In that case I’d like you to arrange this by calling the shares in so that the stock market won’t be ruined. That can very easily be done. They’ll be turned in. Administering the shares is also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you want to recall the shares or not.
Funk: This way, the Reich will become possessor of half a billion shares.
Goering: Yes, yes.
Goebbels: He’ll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.
Fischboeck: But it is a business based on profits.
V. Krosigk: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister, Mr. Fischboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as the owner of the shares.
Fischboeck: The reason why this is so very important is that our whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ for any other undertaking.
Goering: That’s it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly manipulating against us.
Fischboeck: For example, if we don’t want the Jews to possess jewelry we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry only by paying with bonds.
Goering: Nobody would pay them claims on the debit-ledger.
Fischboeck: They are not transferable.
Goering: Only if authorized.
Heydrich: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures?
Goering: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%.
Heydrich: But we’ll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation of valuable objects in Jewish possession.
Goering: What he has now in his possession, that’ll come.
Schmer: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.
Goering: I think Fischboeck’s proposal is very good. We should give it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares, etc.
Fischboeck: I should also like to have a decision made on the following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested money in a way we don’t like. That is money which they have loaned out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won’t simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.
Funk: If word of this debate should reach the public, we’d have a run on the capital market tomorrow.
Fischboeck: That’s why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of internal loans, shares and everything they had.
Goering: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do it any other way.
[Part VI is missing]
Part VII
Frick: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.
Goering: I have said so before.
(Shout by Goebbels)
* * * that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? Therefore, I shouldn’t like to have anybody else in the Committee, in order to keep it as small as possible.
Buerkel: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also?
Goering: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this week right and left.
Heydrich: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. May I make a few proposals to that effect?
Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable organizations.
Goering: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of the “Green Frontier.”
Heydrich: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. Illegal * * *
Goering: This story has gone through the whole world press. During the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever they tried to go ashore, they were barred.
Heydrich: That was the report. There weren’t even 100 Jews.
Goering: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every midnight. That was in the Burgenland.
Heydrich: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by legal measures.
Goering: How was that possible?
Heydrich: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.
Goering: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn’t help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign currency that in the end we won’t be able to hold out.
Heydrich: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.
(Goering: agreed)
This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so rightly pointed out to us.
(Goering: agreed)
As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8,000 to 10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of the aryanizing and other restrictions, Jewry will become unemployed. The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won’t enter into the German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined.
As for the isolation, I’d like to make a few proposals regarding police measures which are important also because of their psychological effect on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which shall facilitate many other things. I don’t see any danger of excuses, and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.
Goering: A uniform?
Heydrich: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that the foreign Jews who don’t look different from ours, are being molested.
Goering: But, my dear Heydrich, you won’t be able to avoid the creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They shall have to be created.
Heydrich: As for the question of ghettos, I’d like to make my position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I don’t think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics and the like. We don’t want to let the Jew live in the same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.
Goering: We’d only have to forbid long-distance calls.
Heydrich: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from communicating out of their districts.
Goering: And in towns all of their own?
Heydrich: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that they would be a terrific danger. I’d take different steps. I’d restrict the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental district and the district
* * *
Goering: Wait a minute! I don’t care so much for it that the Jews don’t appear in spots where I don’t want them. My point is this one: if one Jew won’t have any more work, he’ll have to live modestly. He won’t be able to go far on his 3½%--to restaurants, etc. He’ll have to work more. That’ll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from the Aryan.
Heydrich: No, I’d say that for the necessities in daily life, the German won’t serve the Jew anymore.
Goering: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there’ll be the following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have so and so many retail stores, then they’ll again be in business, and they’ll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.
Schmer: In a small town that wouldn’t work at all.
Goering: It could only be worked out if you’d reserve in advance whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you’ll have to have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food and stockings.
Heydrich: We’ll have to decide whether we want that or not.
Goering: I’d like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot make another subdivision here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. I’d say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there. One may go one step further and say that these and these stores will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But not stores.
Heydrich: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan district to buy?
Goering: No. I’d say that enough German storekeepers would love to dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn’t alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German economy.
Heydrich: I shouldn’t like to comment on that. Now a few things which are important also from a psychological angle.
Goering: Once we’d have a ghetto, we’d find out what stores ought to be in there, and we’d be able to say: you, the Jew so and so, together with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative store, a cooperative one for Jews.
Heydrich: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution of the ghetto. I’d say one shouldn’t want to build a ghetto. But these measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically drive the Jews into a ghetto.
Funk: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are 3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The individual alone will starve.
Goering: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.
Heydrich: As an additional measure, I’d propose to withdraw from the Jews all personal papers such as permits and driver’s licenses. No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted to drive because that way he’d endanger German life. By not being permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore restricted to move about so freely. I’d say the Royal Square in Munich, the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Dr. Goebbels has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I’d like to say this: cultural activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I don’t see why the Jew should go to these places at all.
Goering: To health spas, no.
Heydrich: Well, then I’d like to propose the same thing for hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan Volkgenossen.
Goering: We’ll have to manage that gradually.
Heydrich: The same applies to public conveyances.
Goering: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals?
(Remarks--Yes!)
We’ll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be straightened out one right after another.
Heydrich: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that we may start out on all this.
Goering: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry should have to contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?
Buerckel: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.
Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of this, and to put something on the side.
Brinkmann: They’d be subject to punishment.
V. Krosigk: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be ordered without their closing out their securities?
Funk: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register the money.
V. Krosigk: But for the time being they may dispose of it.
Goering: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t get rid of the money.
Funk: They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their stocks and bonds.
Fischboeck: There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be carried out during next week.
V. Krosigk: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.
Goering: I would make that a condition.
Fischboeck: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure this way.
Goering: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall, as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., etc., have to make a contribution of 1 billion. That’ll work. The pigs won’t commit another murder. Incidentally, I’d like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.
V. Krosigk: Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has said in the beginning; that we’ll have to try everything possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don’t want the society-proletariat here. They’ll always be a terrific liability for us.
(Frick: “and a danger!”)
I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!
Goering: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me on 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other countries. “What are you talking about the Jew for?--Take him!” Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their “coreligionists” in North America, Canada, or elsewhere.
I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary within the next few days.
Blerning: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this internal loan.
Goering: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?
(Remark: “Sell them”)
To whom?
(Remark: “on the stock market--he orders a bank to do it.”)
Well, I’ll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.
Blerning: That could be done only through a decree.
Goering: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t know himself how and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won’t move.
Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.
Goering: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won’t be new trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The Jew can only sell. He can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this moment, the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with whom, they’ll think they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and by then we’ll be ready.
Daluege: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?
Goering: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.
[Conference closed at 2.40 PM]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1817-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1936 EDITION
The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Page 211.
BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS [AMT WERKSCHAREN]
I. TASK:
The factory troops in the National Socialist Community “Strength through Joy” [NS--Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”] carry out the following tasks:
1. To help and come to the rescue, in their capacity as a young factory guard, whenever there is a question of bringing the German working man strength through joy.
2. Shaping of factory celebrations and festivals in order to permeate the factories with National Socialist ideology and philosophy, with special regard to the creation of a new ritual.
3. To be an ideological shock squad [Weltanschaulicher Stosstrupp] within the factory.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1818-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1940 EDITION
The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Pages 195-196b.
BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING
The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung] is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP--Main Training Bureau.
* * * * * * *
The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude [Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung].
It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist community of factory, accomplishment and people.
* * * * * * *
THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY
Regulations for its building:
The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is the nucleus of the factory community.
The Factory Troops Leader:
The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory. For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer].
Membership in the Factory Troops:
Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for a German worker’s community.
* * * * * * *
TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS
Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means, the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.
Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most extreme devotion.
It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest accomplishments for the people and the Reich. Commitment:
Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county [Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the factory.
The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS
[Item 1]
1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry.
2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of Fuehrer’s letter to Duce.
3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador.
4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second letter of Fuehrer.
5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin, dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin.
6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject.
7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico.
# # # # #
[Item 2]
Rome, August 25, 1939.
Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.)
Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.)
(Valid)
Foreign Affairs Berlin
Citissime
No. 370 of 25 August Top Secret To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subject: Today’s Telephonic Instructions. V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann. 2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm. 3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.) [Illegible notations]
I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520 o’clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today’s letter of the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time, he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself, completely, correctly, and true to the meanings.
Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the following:
He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow. He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an implacable anticommunist.
(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.)
The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous position against England.
The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania’s freedom of movement in favor of Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the Hungarians.
With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have to revise its attitude.
He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because the Polish mentality--supported by England’s attitude--is no longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further reasons for discord--he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia--by means of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order to solve the other big controversial questions--points of differences between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however, are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification. Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict 2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet. However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with everything.
At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army in a very short time.
Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of events. No longer the word “peace,” but “victory” would govern his action.
Mackensen
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS
Telegram in Cipher (Good) Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 00-32 hours Rec Rome same day 02-25 Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40
Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939
[illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v. Mackensen personally.
The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce immediately.
Duce!
I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion, this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you, Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to immobilize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you for all the efforts you have made in our common cause.
Adolf Hitler
End of Letter: Schmidt.
# # # # #
COPY
Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o’clock, 27 August 1939, for immediate delivery to Il Duce.
DUCE!
[Text of message the same as above].
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS
Extract from Memorandum Handed to German Foreign Office by Count Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome 7 August 1939.
2. * * * Above all it must be most clearly and unmistakably stated that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war has come, Italy is ready to agree a hundred percent. If Germany has to mobilize, Italy will also do so at the same time, since it intends to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already before, this should be clearly understood. * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS
BTSCH/KR
NOTE
On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls at 11:15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440 are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would elapse.
At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed immediately.
Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just transmitted to us the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce by telephone. Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived here over three routes.
At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would receive me at 1 o’clock.
After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.
ROME, 1 September 1939
(Signed) Mackensen
# # # # #
Coded Telegram (Copy)
From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours Arr. Rome: 3 September 1939, 3:00 hours. Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours
DECODING
No. 450 dated 2 September 1939. For High Officials or their representatives in person. Top Secret. To be decoded in person. Top Secret. For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential information.
The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.
Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its “moral satisfaction.” If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.
Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of the Fuehrer.
End of Copy
The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.
Woermann
# # # # #
Telegram Heading in Italian 773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat--459
For the Ambassador
I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce personally:
Duce
I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also--even if we march now over different roads--that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of message. Cable report is requested
Ribbentrop
# # # # #
Rome, 4 September 1939 Foreign Berlin No. 418 of 4 September 1939 Telegram, secret code procedure (good)
CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.
TOP SECRET
Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer’s message, which took place in Ciano’s presence at 0940, that he would forward his view point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had as prerequisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully. He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not consider the “symbolic withdrawal” suggested by Paris. In view of the strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible, he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know, that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet. The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely “diotic,” brought about by people who apparently have never even studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking, which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it.
If the Fuehrer’s message says that the Fuehrer and the Duce “would now go separate ways”, he is of an entirely different opinion. On the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to the last, what the Fuehrer desired of him, and he continues his preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical month for him is September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful defense. Already today, he ties down 400,000 men of the opponent by his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to the Fuehrer, via the military attaché (who is invited this evening to the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures with appropriate carbo-graphic material, which he also showed me and explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the military attaché. I only wish to emphasize the Duce’s remark, that the mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent.
At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of mine) by the press.
Duce was in a confidential mood.
/s/ MACKENSEN.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1832-PS
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone at 2200 hours from the Reich Chancellery and reported as follows:
According to authentic information, the rumors spreading in Rome, by way of the Italian embassy in Berlin, that a relaxation of the situation is to be noted and that conferences are being held. We wanted to state on the contrary, that just the opposite is true and that the situation is getting more serious from hour to hour. “The Armies are marching”. It would be good if I would see to it that the rumor mentioned above should not be believed by the Duce and Ciano.
Rome, 27 August 1939.
to the notice of: Mackensen
1. B. R. [initialed] 2. Military attaché [initialed] 3. Naval attaché [initialed] 4. Air attaché [initialed] 5. to be returned to me. Rome, 27 August 1939. [initialed]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
FOREIGN OFFICE RAM NO. 56/R
Berlin, 2 March 1941
STRICTLY SECRET
Personal
In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.
Signed: Ribbentrop
To: The German Embassy in Ankara Madrid Moscow Rome (Quir.) Rome (Vat.)
The German Legation in Athens Belgrade Bern Budapest Bukarest Helsinki Lisbon Pressburg (Bratislava) Sofia Stockholm one each
# # # # #
65215
Enclosure To RAM No. 56/R
STRICTLY SECRET
Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941
After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.
Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia--a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?
* * * * * * *
As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.
At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinking to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.
Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duel--Europe vs. England--Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.
The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:
1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.
The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.
Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.
Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning Japan’s attitude in case of America’s entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.
The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.
The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.
* * * * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835-PS
Urgent. To Ambassador:
Fuehrer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following letter by Fuehrer to Duce.
Report execution.
Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 -
Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.
1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.
2. For this reason, I’ve done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
3. I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic but nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.
4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force.
These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.
I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.
5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known.
6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria, operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be necessary under the circumstances.
If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more thoroughly about all this.
7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.
Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year ago. This is my unshaken conviction.
Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of letter, Bureau of Minister.
With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter tonight to Duce.
Howel 27.3.41 2400
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1842-PS
Notes on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940.
* * * * * * *
All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England, and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August. But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, that such an attack would mean the beginning of England’s destruction. Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected, and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled. Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made unusable.
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With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed, that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.
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The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves. But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the Spaniards were to be given assistance.
The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not clash with Italy’s in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to Rome.
On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain’s entry into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also state, that Spain’s entry into the war would be left to the judgment of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1850-PS
Filing reference 11 C-2 [in ink]
Subject: Negotiation between Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Oberst Karmann, Oberst Lorenz, in the Chambers of the Reich Board of Trustees on 8 July 1933.
Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an Ex-service men’s Association for which membership of the SA is laid down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20,000 men. In addition, approximately 8,000 non-commissioned officers and men are released yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his establishment. Oberst Karmann, however, wishes to send ex-service men compulsorily to the S.A., as soon as this is required by the Chief of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry and customs officials should, for example, do several years military service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good, regularly paid positions in the S.A. would, when they claimed their right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards their financial circumstances by reason of their S.A. service. He would see that there was official compensation for this.
Berlin, 8 July 1933.
131 Fl [ink] C002167
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Confidential 5 July 33 filing reference [in ink] [ink]
Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division, on Wednesday the 5th July 33.
1. Leadership of Reich Youth [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with pre-military training.
I state that, by a decision of the Fuehrer, the spheres of duty of the Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect.
2. Students. A discussion is taking place today between Oberst v. Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training.
I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military sports for students on the right lines.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor. He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose.
3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth’s duties; he was working out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff declared himself in agreement.
Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink]
4. Labor Service. Military sports in Labor service camps are suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is being organized on the wrong lines.
5. The Office for Defence Policy [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to Oberst v. Vietinghoff’s question was that of the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it advisable to dissolve it.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training.
6. The budget. I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff’s attention to the fact that the budget question must find its solution through the S.A., that it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau’s suggestion and how it would work out.
Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for Finance.
I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon. Furthermore, the Fuehrer’s demand in Reichenhall that I should train 250,000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which I shall act.
In accordance with this demand of Hitler’s I should have to examine the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry would not be allowed.
7. The Reich Trusteeship. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I was taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered that I had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and only calculated to cause further delay. I assured him that I was of the same opinion.
8. Branch Leaders [Zweigstellenleiter]. I referred to my order to the main groups; it is to be left to them to employ Branch Leaders as Training Inspectors as they are required. If they were not needed, the former Branch Leaders would have to leave their posts.
Berlin, 5 July 1933.
131 F4 C002170
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SECRET
Filing Reference 11 C-3 [Ink] Bauen
Discussion with Reich Defense Minister v. Blomberg on 15 July, 0930 hours.
1. My note of 13.7 to General v. Blomberg showed both parties that, in fact, there had been a misunderstanding in the way the budget question was viewed. General v. Blomberg had not been informed that Oberst v. Reichenau had tried to have the budget for the Chief of Training of the S.A. introduced by the Reich Ministry for Defense.
The Fuehrer’s statement of 12.7 regarding the basic regulations for pre-military fitness training for youth, which had been shown to him today, had cleared all doubts.
At the last discussion he had merely intended to grant to the Chief of Training from his own special Fund for Training purposes, money which might possibly be refused by the Reich Minister for Finance. He had only wished to offer his services for this purpose, and today agreed with me that the Reich Ministry of the Interior should decide upon the budget for the Chief of Training and put the case before the cabinet.
2. With a view to a practical solution of the budget problems he suggests that a discussion should take place between the Chiefs at the beginning of August, in which the Ministers Frick, Schwerin-Krosigk, and v. Blomberg should take part; he recommended also that I should first have a word with State Secretary Reinhard in the Reich Ministry for Finance to smooth the way.
3. General v. Blomberg had me explain to him the forms of training in the military camps and requested that the very necessary camouflage measures be taken.
4. Relationship of the higher S. A.--Fuehrerkorps to the Reich Ministry for Defense. Berlin, 15.7.33.
C002171.
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Ki/Eg Berlin, 1 Sept. 1933.
Filing Reference
Subject: Enrollment in the SA of members of the Reichswehr who are due for release.
for the archives [in ink]
Discussion (1.9. 1933/0936 hours) between Oberst Hinria and Hauptmann von Wolf (general section and Armed Forces Section of Reich Ministry of Defense) on the one hand and Stabsfuehrer Waehmann and Adjutant Kiefer on the other.
Oberst Hinria expressed the wishes of the members of the Reichswehr. The latter wish, on entering the SA after their demobilization to receive a rank corresponding to their last appointment. They consider it inadvisable that, for example a non-commissioned officer on entering the SA should have, as his superior in rank, a man who was formerly under him.
As opposed to this, Stabsfuehrer Waehmann holds that this idea is contrary to the spirit and the service instructions of the SA, for it is a demand which is particularly stressed in the SA that one should place oneself voluntarily under the orders of another.
With regard to the Unions [Treubuende] the commonly held opinion is voiced that their main purpose was to prevent the members of the Reichswehr due for release from going over to the left. After the assumption of power, since this danger was averted, this purpose will no longer be held good in future. Nevertheless, Oberst Hinria advocates their continued existence, for the reasons stated below.
Suggestions for a temporary solution: In future the Reichswehr will presumably only be recruited from members of the S.A. Thus the men being demobilized, will automatically return to the S.A. Therefore, the solution for this period is simple.
Filing reference [in ink] 131 Gi [in ink]
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SECRET
Filing reference
11 C-5 [in ink]
Discussion with State Secretary Reinhard, Reich Ministry for Finance on the morning of 18.7
1. I reported to State Secretary Reinhard on the whole question of the budget for the new sphere of duties assigned to Chief of Training; I also asked that the further payment of the budget funds granted by the Reich Ministry for Finance and belonging to the Reich Trusteeship, since dissolved, should be cleared up for the current financial year.
2. Preliminary examination of the supplementary budget drafted by me for the financial year 33/34 and an additional demand of approximately 25 millions.
State Secretary Reinhard considers it very difficult under the circumstances to carry through the supplementary budget for the current financial year. He was informed that the Reich Ministry for Finance wishes to dispose of the funds granted from the Reich Trusteeship, but on the other hand considers it necessary that the discussion of Chiefs mentioned by General v. Blomberg should take place between the Ministries. Taking the long view, State Secretary Reinhard believes that the estimated budget could still be approved if the unemployment problem were solved in the autumn. This is in his opinion a preliminary condition.
In addition, however, Finance Minister Krosigk had the matter of the budget in his own hands, for he [Reinhard] has to solve all the problems relating to unemployment.
Berlin, 18 July 1933.
[illegible initials] R. [ink]
131 E (1) [in ink]
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SECRET
11 C-4 [in ink] Bauen
Filing Reference
Discussion with Ministerial Director Gerullis, Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Instruction, on 17 and 18.7.33
1. Gerullis is fundamentally of the opinion that all military sports in the colleges and universities should be in the hands of the Chief of Training. He declared himself to be in agreement with my suggestion to take onto my staff as liaison officer a Student Leader who is still to be nominated, (Schwab or Krueger) and who, according to my suggestion, is to be responsible for all training in military sports.
In addition it is necessary for carrying this out further, that the S.A. Leaders etc., at present appointed as instructors in military sport in the Colleges and universities, should once again be summoned to a special course in order to do their training on the new lines. Gerullis suggests Councillor Ministerialrat Haupt, present at today’s discussion, as representative for Prussia. [3 illegible words in ink and illegible initials follow]
2. From 1 October, five officers of the General Staff are to be appointed for 3 years to the Universities of Koenigsberg, Breslau, Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt-on-Main to teach military tactics, leave of absence being granted for that period.
(Regulars, 5 senior Staff officers for this) [marginal note in pencil]
They will give lectures on military tactics in those universities. On 1 September these gentlemen will be brought to Berlin and will make contact with the Chief of Training. Questions regarding Military Training are to be cleared up with me by these gentlemen. This ruling is the joint decision as mentioned by Oberstleutnant Weissenberger, who also took part in the discussion of the Reich Ministry for Defense and the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education.
3. With regard to the former soldiers of the Reichswehr now united in the Unions it was said: The SA has no interest in incorporating the Unions, for all elements who do not believe firmly in the principles of the new idealogy, are unwanted. (There is also no power of authority over these unions). The troop commanders should, however, be guaranteed authoritative influence over the unions in their commands. They should then see to it that:
1. All those who have hitherto been members of the Unions, who are suitable by reason of their ideology, are incorporated into the S.A.
2. That the members of the Reichswehr due for release in the future continue to join the unions which are under the supervision of the Commanders, but are without exception incorporated into the SA. The necessary foundations for this enrollment are to be laid immediately upon entry into the Reichswehr and also constantly during military service.
Oberst Hinria has also set up for future use the following organization and order of service:
1. SA with preparation for the Reichswehr.
2. Period of service with the Reichswehr.
3. Re-entry into SA after release.
4. Transfer to the S.A. Reserve [SA--Handwehr] after the age of 45.
(Expansion of the Kyffhaeuser Union to form the SA Reserve.)
[illegible pencilled initials] 131 G 2 [in ink]
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Personal [in pencil]
Ch 25/4/33 [in ink] [Illegible initials]
11C- 7 [in ink] 5 September 1933.
To the Chief of Naval Command for the attention of Konteradmiral Dr. N. C. Gross.
Berlin W. 10 Koenigin Augustastrasse 38-42.
K/Kl.
Sir:
I am very much obliged for the dates of the Fleet Maneuvers sent to me at the request of the Chief of Naval Staff [Chf der Marineleitung].
On the 17th inst. I shall go on board in Pillan punctually at 1200 and will take the liberty of reporting in good time when and where, I shall be arriving in Pillan, for before that I shall probably be on a duty visit in East Prussia.
I take this opportunity of expressing a personal wish.
The Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Roehm, informed me that he will also be present at the Fleet Maneuvers. I should be very grateful if I could go on board the same cruiser, for I think that particularly with regard to the whole question of the training of Naval-SA units, my presence might be of value. Since the problems relating to this are my responsibility, it would be a great advantage to me, if the opportunity were offered me, to discuss the question and all its complications with the Chief of Staff. In Nurnberg I took the opportunity of discussing the matter with Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky, who is assigned to my staff. Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky believes, however, that it is unlikely that my request will be fulfilled on account of the distribution already on hand.
For this reason, Sir, I am again applying directly to you.
Perhaps Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky could inform me briefly whether my request can be granted.
Your very faithfully,
Heil Hitler K. [Krueger] Obergruppenfuehrer. C--2177 131 D2 (in ink)
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For filing 11C-8
received 31.10.33 Initials [ink]
SECRET
Filing reference
1. The speech delivered by the Fuehrer to the SA leaders on the evening of Tuesday the 17.10, has induced me to bring up for decision by the Chief of Staff, the question, as to whether it is right that the SA training in the Army of the Reich should be continued. In the clearly expressed declaration of the Fuehrer there might be lost a suggestion of apprehension, if we trained the SA in the Reichswehr; informers and spies might have the opportunity of passing information regarding that training to our foreign political opponents.
The Chief of Staff intends to decide this question before the Gruppenfuehrer at the Gruppenfuehrer discussion on 23.10, while I am commissioned to discuss the decision intended at the Reich Ministry for Defense. If the Reich Minister for Defense assumes complete responsibility for the resulting consequences, the Chief of Staff agrees to the training of the SA in the army.
I informed Hauptmann von Dernuth on 18.10 of this wish of the Chief of Staff, with the request that he would inform Oberst von Reichenau to that effect, and obtain the decision of the Reich Minister for Defense.
On 19.10, 1100 hours, Oberst von Reichenau asked me to attend a discussion during which this question was approached again. Oberst von Reichenau drew attention to the fact that, to reject the training of the SA in the Army of the Reich, by this decision of the Chief of Staff, would mean that the training by special courses would also be a thing of the past and also the entire training in frontier-guard duties would be rendered impossible. I replied that, with regard to the questions of frontier protection, no conversation had taken place between the Chief of Staff and myself. This point would therefore need special consideration.
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C002177/1 P.T.O.
Filing reference [in ink]
The Chief of Staff is placing the decision with the Reich Minister for Defense, who, for his part, bears the responsibility for the training of the SA in the Army of the Reich.
The clearly-expressed speech of the Fuehrer on 17.10 caused the Chief of Staff to clear up the question of responsibility in such a way as to leave no room for doubt; for this reason it was absolutely necessary that the Reich Minister for Defense should make inquiries of the Chancellor.
If the Reich Minister for Defense assumed full and complete responsibility for the training in the Army of the Reich, the Chief of Staff saw no reason to cease training the SA in the Army.
II. Oberst von Reichenau showed me the letter written by Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow to the Reich Minister for Defense by way of reply to the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
Since it was possible to misinterpret the wording of von Jagow’s letter, I repeated to Oberst von Reichenau the remarks I had made to Jagow, which the Reich Minister for Defense made in my presence. It appeared that Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow had had the opportunity on the occasion of his visit to Berlin on 17.10, to speak to Korvettenkapitaen von Langsdorff at the Reich Defense Ministry on the suspension of weapon training in the SA camps. A remark made by Jagow on this subject, which was quite unimportant and only reached Minister von Blomberg in the course of a report, was the reason for Minister von Blomberg’s complaint regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
Oberst von Reichenau remarked that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the Reich Minister for Defense and, after examining the facts, he was of the opinion that the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense about Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, which was reported by word of mouth to Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger had been unnecessary.
C002178/1
Reich Minister for Defense von Blomberg would now feel induced to write to Jagow.
III. Discussion regarding the appointment of personnel to the Reich Ministry for Defense.
IV. Discussion about the case of von Reichenau, von Obernity, and Gruppenfuehrer Franken. It so happened that, through Hauptmann Fenchtlinger, Nurnberg, a conversation between himself and Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity has come to the knowledge of the ministry.
Oberst von Reichenau is very anxious that this misunderstanding should be removed. He will therefore write a personal letter to Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity.
Berlin, 19 October 1933.
/s/ Ringen. C002179/1
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1851-PS
THE NEW GERMANY SPEAKS HERE