Part V…

Part V

Subject: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: March 28, 1941

The Chief of the operational staff of the Armed Forces of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Berlin, March 28, 1941

[in pencil] Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 P. M.

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only

KW/W F St [Stamp] [several pencil marks]

Tentative Plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.

1. In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.

2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:

a. One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.

b. One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in the Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.

c. Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:

a. Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.

b. Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c. Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d. Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.

For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.

5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:

a. Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd

b. Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th

c. Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

[illegible initial]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1751-PS

SECRET

SS Main Office Economy Administration [SS Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt]

Department Chief [Amtsgruppenchef]

Concentration Camps Dramenburg, 12 May 1944 DI/Az,:14 h 2/Na/s- Geheim Tgb-Nr. 605/44

Re: assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes

To the Camp Commanders of Concentration camps Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo, Neu, Au.I III, br-Ro, Natz, Stu, Rav, Herz, Aufenth, Camp Bergen, Belsen

Group leader D Riga, one copy each for KL Riga, Kauen, Vaivara

SS Wirtschafter Ost, Krakau with one copy each for KL Lublin, Warschau and Plaszow.

There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case permission for assignment has to be requested here before assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.

To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment in the concentration camp.

Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes without permission.

[signature illegible] (Waffen) SS Lt Gen and Lt Gen of the SS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1752-PS

SECRET

Preparations already made for the International Congress

Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Fuehrer to stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for 11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had been made.

The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken:

1. In Germany.

2. abroad.

1. Preparations in Germany.

a. The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Fuehrer had decided on Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General Government.

b. The site of the meeting.

All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any time.)

c. The program of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate offices,

1. Foreign Office

2. Propaganda Ministry

3. Head Office for internal security

and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the program.

d. German speakers and lecturers have been visualized, among others three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand.

The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor.)

Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have already been approached. Amongst others we already have the promise of Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European organisation for the “racial-biological questions of Jewry”.

e. The following have been entered as honorary members:

Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop

Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich Himmler

Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels

Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank

2. Preparations abroad

The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.

The German representatives abroad have received several official instructions, according to which they are

a. to propose delegates to be invited,

b. nominate lecturers,

c. approach the representatives of governments with a view to their participating at the congress.

In the course of these instructions being carried out, the following have promised their participation, or membership of the congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee:

Italy: Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma (honorary committee)

The former Minister of State Preziosi (congress-committee and congress lecturer)

France: Minister for Education Abel Bonnard (Honorary committee) Secretary of State Paul Marion (congress-committee)

Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh (honorary committee and congress lecturer)

Holland: The leader of the NSB, Mussert (Personally invited by Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter’s stay in Holland)

Arabia: The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (honorary committee and congress lecturer)

Iraq: Prime Minister Gailani (honorary committee)

Norway: At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the congress.

Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of General in the SS Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others, Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also willing to speak.

The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State Preziosi.

3. Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda try to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation plans to destroy the “Jewish People”.

The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov-congress in Moscow.

U.S.A.: We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress.

The last new beginning 6. 5. 1944.

England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own White Paper regarding Palestine problem.

At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all fronts, be refuted by this great anti-Jewish Congress.

The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!

What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?

To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress to an indefinite date, after half of Europe has already been won for this plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.

It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues invitations to it.

The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the greatest possibilities of disguise.

An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town in the East of the Reich.

Berlin, 15th June 1944. Hg/We

/s/ Hans Hagemeyer, Head of the Department.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1757-PS

REPORT OF GOERING’S COMMISSION

for the investigation of the Aryanisations carried out in the Gau of Franconia between 9.11.38 and 9.2.39 and the irregularities connected therewith which have been established

[P.9] k. By an order of the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer of the 2nd September 1938, No. 57/38, issued with the agreement of the Fuehrer’s deputy, all party offices, including organisations and attached formations, are forbidden to accept administrative dues, donations, gifts, bequests or material payments of any other kind for the participation of the party in economic tasks, including the transfer of Jewish firms to persons of German race, nor are they allowed to make the fulfillment of such tasks dependent on the payment of contributions, etc. The order was addressed to all Gau treasurers and reached the Gauleaders as well, among others.

[P.12] From the course of events one can only assume that the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer’s order of the 2nd September 1938 No. 57/38 about the ban on financial payments for the cooperation of the Party in Aryanisation and other economic tasks was considered in Franconia to be superseded, and that they thought themselves entitled to obtain considerable sums of money for the Gau of Franconia in connection with Aryanisation.

[P.13] l. Following upon the November demonstrations, the deputy Gauleader, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His * * * reasons can be given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the 25th March 1939:

“The 9th and 10th November 1938. In the night of the 9/10 November and on the 10th November 1938 events took place throughout Germany which I considered to be the signal for a completely different treatment of the Jewish question in Germany. Synagogues and Jewish schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed both in shops and in private houses. Besides this, a large number of particular Jews were taken to concentration camps by the police. Towards midday we discussed these events in the Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of the opinion that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on the Jewish question. By the great action against the Jews, carried out in the night and morning of the 10th November, all guiding principles and all laws on this subject had been made illusory. We were of the opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our own initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that, in view of the great existing lack of houses, the best thing would be to put the Jews into a kind of internment camp. Then the houses would become free in a twinkling and the housing shortage would be relieved, at least in part. Besides that, we would have the Jews under control and supervision. I added “The same thing happened to our prisoners of war and war internees.” The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was, for the time being, impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new proposal to him: I said to him that I considered it unthinkable that, after the Jews had had their property smashed they should continue to be able to own houses and land. I proposed that these houses and this land ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to carry through such an action. I declared that by the Aryanisation of Jewish land and houses a large sum could accrue to the Gau out of the proceeds. I named some millions of marks. I stated that in my opinion, this Aryanisation could be carried out as legally as the Aryanisation of shops. The Gauleiter’s answer was something to this effect: “If you think you can carry this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used to build a Gau school.” The very same afternoon I began to organize the Aryanization of land. I stated here as in my memorandum, too, that I considered this Aryanisation of Jewish land as a logical continuation of the events of the 9th and 10th November. I was of the opinion that I was doing a service to the Party by trying to bring it money. I was further of the opinion that the transfer of the land and houses from Jewish to German hands was a National-Socialist action.”

[P.16] Holz appointed commissioners for Nurnberg and Furth to carry out the Aryanisation of Jewish landed property * * *

[P.18] 2. The Aryanisation was accomplished by the alienation of properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, and reductions in buying price.

The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal value or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these low prices, Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of the 6th February 1939 that the Jews had mostly bought their property during the inflation period for a tenth of its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number of individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true.

[P.70] Favoritism shown to third parties and irregularities during the Aryanization of properties.

[P.72] Schoeller case. c. Gauamtsleiter Fritz Schoeller bought Grimmstrasse 3, Nurnberg by a contract of the 15th November 1938. The house has a nominal value of RM 43,300 and an exchange value of RM 50,000. The buying price was fixed at RM 5,000. Holz admitted (statement of the 27th March 1939) that he was in agreement with the buying of the property. He based his agreement on the fact that Schoeller was an old and deserving party member and deserved particular consideration owing to his family circumstances.

Report of German Commission to Goering on Streicher. [Extract from Part II]

[P. 139] On the other hand, the minority of the shares of the Mars-Werke, Nurnberg, with a face value of Reichsmark 112,500, were acquired through publishing house manager Fink for the Gauleiter according to the latter’s instructions at the instigation of the deceased SA Brigadier General Koenig. These shares were in the possession of the Jewish banking house Kohn, the proprietor of which was at that time in protective custody. Verlagsdirektor Fink, as agent for the Gauleiter, acquired the parcel of Mars-Werke shares from this Jew at 5 per cent of the face value, i.e., the sum of Reichsmark 5,600.

In the presence of Fink, Koenig informed the Gauleiter in detail of the completed transaction. The Gauleiter gave his complete assent and, in addition, gave the order to transfer the parcel of shares from the account of the banking firm Kohn to the account of Fink at the Dresdner Bank. He further ordered that his name should not be mentioned at all in connection with the transaction.

By order of the Gauleiter, Fink withdrew Reichsmark 5,600 from a Stuermer account, and later, also acting for the Gauleiter, he bought the remainder of the shares of the Mars-Dresdner Bank, at 60 per cent for the Gauleiter with Stuermer funds.

After Fink learned of the investigating commission he discussed the matter with Gauleiter Streicher. Streicher told Fink that he would keep the shares, because they had no connection with the Aryanization of estates, and if the purchase of the Mars shares should be contested he would simply pay over the required sum to the Reich.

After the investigating commission had started to work Gauleiter Streicher sent for Fink and told him the following: “The police have found out about the Mars shares. We will simply say that the shares were not bought for me but for the Fraenkische Tageszeitung!!” [P. 145] Thanks to the efforts of the district economic adviser and president of the chamber of commerce Strobl, it was possible to persuade the Hungarian consul Pfaller to buy the estate of the Gauleiter on Lake Constance without ever having seen it, for a price of Reichsmark 240,000. It is noteworthy that the Gauleiter and people close to him had a very bad opinion of Consul Pfaller, but after the purchase of the estate the Gauleiter sent him a picture. In order to avoid the Gauleiter’s appearing personally as the seller, a sham contract was made with publisher Willmy, so that the latter would appear to the outside world as the seller of the estate.

[P. 152] Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip, but only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him. Usually the beatings are carried out with sadistic brutality.

The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily in the prison cell, together with deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA Brigadier General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the “Deutscher Hof” he said: “Now I am relieved. I needed that again!” Later he also stated several times that he needed another Steinruck case in order to “relieve” [erloesen] himself.

In August 1938 he beat editor Burker at the district house, together with district office leader Schoeller and his adjutant Koenig.

On 2 December 1938 he asked to have three youthful criminals (15 to 17 years old) who had been arrested for robbery brought to the room of the director of the criminal police office in Nurnberg-Fuerth. Streicher, who was accompanied by his son Lothar, had the youths brought in singly and questioned them about their sex life and in particular, through clear and detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether and since when they masturbated. One of the youths did not know the word, whereupon Streicher gave him a vivid description. The last one of these three boys he beat with his riding whip, with blows on the head and the rest of the body.

[P. 151] From 1934 to 1938 Gauleiter Streicher employed the Jew Jonas Wolk as contributor to the Stuermer. Wolk wrote for the Stuermer under the pseudonym of “Fritz Brandt”. In addition, Wolk did spy work for the Gauleiter abroad. From February 1937 to August 1938 the Stuermer paid the Jew Wolk a fee of Reichsmark 8,262.39. Wolk was previously convicted six times, among other things with loss of civic rights. It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934 to 1937. The Fraenkische Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9,623.65.

[P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer [Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons, Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the investigating commission.

[P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance, at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, not even by an Adolf Hitler.

[P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve.

[P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig’s word carried the weight of that of the Gauleiter.

[P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG, Gau economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was quickly reached in many cases which could be verified.

As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men mentioned.

[P. 179] By the law of April 1938 it is decreed that all applications for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 1759-PS

United Mexican States } Mexico, Federal District } Embassy of the United } ss States of America } }

Mexico City, D. F. } } ss Mexico }

Raymond H. Geist, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In 1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances, both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being substantially duplicated all over Germany.

There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power, military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity. Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks, proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933; there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin. Most of these establishments were being openly prepared, nevertheless they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers. I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of Germany, in fact, all establishments which could serve a military purpose were converted to military uses.

I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the Arbeitsdienst, which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a labor service, it was essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935 through the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the future army of aggression.

Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises. They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a general plan to prepare Germany’s manpower for war.

I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth, which included boys from 14 to 17, who dressed in their uniforms, were likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields, woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale.

The Deutsche Jungvolk (boys from the ages of 6 to 14) was also the vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses, particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of adult uniformed officers.

I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were also incorporated in the so-called Arbeitsdienst, usually located somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which the parents might expose themselves.

So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone either in the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentence there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake on any possible opposition.

In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force, I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauerstrasse, just across the street from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. He had been an officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended, including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head of the artillery on the General Staff and a very close friend of Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein’s nephew was on the General Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the information which he had received from his friends, the armament program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany’s winning the war on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met at Graffenstein’s house.

By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in 1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar conversations along the same line at Graffenstein’s house during the following years.

Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: “You must take into account the National Socialist program in the East. If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall have to go to war with you.” During this conversation he made it clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with England and France but with the United States as well Halder replied: “That is a pity.”

The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where I knew him, he held no official position, deriving his income from his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified Germany’s strength and resources in those quarters. He made this statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis, but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was preparing to stop them.

I also had the same information from another reliable source. After Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them primus inter pares. He told me of the German program for aggressive war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner’s home. The army, he said, was at a highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything. He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the German war machine started moving.

Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A personal friend, Dr. Hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague.

I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources; the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German, told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received information from the Gestapo itself.

For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best.

My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933. In fact I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische Abteilung des Politizeipraesident, i.e., the political division of the Politizeipraesidium, which was charged with supervisory and preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at the Politizeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels, who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner Best. The organization at No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A. meeting places became the “arrest points.” There were at least fifty of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents and the S.S. [Schutzstaffe] were incorporated as administrative and executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which wore elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo.

Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only “political” prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was carried out without any legal procedure, neither indictment nor trial. Prisoners were, occasionally, released from the concentration camps and turned over to the prosecuting attorney for prosecution before the legal courts of justice. A prisoner accused of high treason, for example, whose offense might carry a death sentence, would be released to the prosecuting attorney for trial in the people’s court. All felonies were tried by the regular courts.

As I have stated, my frequent contacts with this entire Gestapo organization began with the first wave of terrorist acts in the week of March 6-13, 1933. That wave was accompanied by universal mob violence. Since 1925, one of the cries of the Nazi party had been “Jude Verrecke” (Death to the Jews) and when the Nazi party won the elections in March, 1933, on the morning of the sixth, the accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on the Communists, Jews, and those who were suspected of being either. Mobs of S.A. men roamed the streets, beating up, looting, and even killing persons.

No American citizen, so far as I am aware, was killed, but a number of them were assaulted and injured and appealed to the Consulate General for aid and protection. For example, Nathaniel Wolff, an American citizen, who resided in Rochester, New York, made an affidavit which stated:

This morning, March 6, at 5 o’clock, there came into my room five or six Nazis with drawn revolvers. They abused me, called me a dirty Russian Jew and started going through my belongings. They asked me what remarks I had made. I replied that I had made none that I knew of and that I am not interested in politics. One of them shouted “Do you call throwing bombs not being interested in politics?” Another asked at the same time, “Are you the Wolff who lived in the Pension Stephanie?” Having left the Stephanie on account of difficulties with the Portier regarding the price of the room and his behavior, I whistled very softly, intimating that I understood the source of the denunciation. Thereupon one of the Nazis remarked: “Du Scheiss Jude, warum pfeiffst du?” and hit me in the jaw. They said that they would take me to the police station, whereupon I answered, “The quicker, the better, because my conscience is absolutely clear.” One of them said, “Do you call throwing bombs having a clear conscience?” The intruders were not accompanied by an officer, nor did they carry “Hilfspolizei” armbands. They took me in an automobile to an address in the Knewbeck Strasse beyond the Kant Strasse (I believe No. 67 or 76, Gartenhaus left, I think three or four flights up the stairs). I was conducted to a bare room in which the shutters were closed and the windows boarded, evidently to prevent sounds from getting out, where, after my possessions were taken away including my keys, I was left with two guards who spent the time abusing the Jews. At five minutes before seven, the group who had arrested me returned with two or three members including one who was apparently a leader, when I was again abused, that is, they gave me to understand that they imagined I was implicated in communistic activities. I remarked that I should like to send a telegram to my cousin, Alan Steyne at the Hamburg American Consulate, and asked if I had the right to do so, whereupon the leader replied: “As a foreigner you have no right, and especially not as a Jew.” One of the men then proceeded to bind my hands and feet as closely and as painfully as possible. I still bear the marks of the bruises on my wrists. I was questioned about various English and French letters which had been found in my room and taken along with them and then I was left about half an hour alone because they evidently discussed my fate. After some time one of the group returned and advised me that every one had a right to his own political opinions as long as no attempt was made to mix into politics. He remarked that nothing was to be gained by brutality, undid the rope and freed my hands and feet and gave me a cup of coffee and said, “Probably the thing isn’t so bad because women chatter a great deal” and that I was denounced by a girl. After a few minutes he elaborated the statement that the girl, Paula, of the Pension, had denounced me as having the intention of throwing bombs at the Nazi parade. I expressed my astonishment and told him the facts of the case. He appeared to laugh it off and asked me if I would be willing to sign a paper on the condition that they would release me. I said “yes.” They then said I would have to go to the police to have my signature attested to and one of the men who had come in, in the meanwhile, went out to draft the paper I was to sign. He returned with the paper which read: (1) “I am a Jew,” (2) “I will leave tonight for Paris,” (3) “I promise never again to set my foot on German soil.” “I attest that no physical violence was done to me and that none of my property was stolen.” This paper I signed. They told me to put on my coat and come to the police. Instead of taking me to the police station they took me to Charlottenburg towards the Gruenwald. When I asked to which police station they were taking me, they replied “You’ll get there soon enough.” When we were near the Heer Strasse they pretended that the automobile was broken down and informed me that I would have to walk through the woods to get to the police station. We proceeded into the woods where three members drew their pistols and the other two brought straps out of their pockets and informed me that they were going to teach me a lesson and made as if they were about to tie me to a tree. They said that they intended to beat the life out of me and “You can walk back afterwards.” I replied that I hoped I would be able to walk. This was probably about eight o’clock and we were entirely alone as nobody had followed us. I took off my coat myself and remarked “If one can’t help oneself, one may as well make the best of it.” One of them threw my coat to the ground and said “Get ready” and after making a threatening gesture, said “You can go home now!” pointing to the wrong direction, whereupon they walked rapidly to the automobile and disappeared yelling after me, “Keep your mouth shut.” I was also threatened that if they ever caught me in Germany again, they would know how to get me out of the way. * * *

Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit which stated:

Yesterday, March 10, 1933, in the afternoon at about 4:30, I came out of “KDW” with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in Wilmersdorf, Kaiser-Allee 172, and proceeded to walk along Tauentzien Strasse. A man in S. A. uniform stepped on my toe purposely, obviously offended me and said “Pardon.” I said “bitte,” and walked ahead. He followed me and kicked me saying: “Na und?” A policeman saw this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me. Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being unwilling. The S.A. man continued to attack me, struck me in the face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm. During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said: “I am an American and am entitled to protection.” He shrugged his shoulder and said “What can I do?” By this time the S.A. man had obviously inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away.

Upon my appeal the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station house at 13 Bayreuther Strasse. My fiancee and I reported to the officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman said that he had had orders not to interfere in any affair in which an S.A. man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely powerless, and were under the direction of the S.A., and that there were S.A. [Sturm-Abteilung] in the police itself. Thereupon I departed * * *

Another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber, made an affidavit which stated:

That on the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street door and a demand for immediate entry, and a concurrent threat to break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor’s wife, and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to the apartment of the deponent where they again rang and pounded on the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there, and was answered--“The police.” He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be found, and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber went to the wardrobe to get his, and was stopped, being asked by the intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one of his four suits hanging there in where he thought the passport was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as “Look. Four suits, while for fourteen years we have been starving.” Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was answered--“Jews. We hate you. For fourteen years we have been waiting for this, and tonight we’ll hang many of you.”

When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious, and they demanded the passports again of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber found her American passport and her German passport (required by local authorities as the wife of a German citizen, and issued by the Police at Munich after her arrival here), and the intruders took both in spite of Mrs. Klauber’s protests that she was American. She then searched for her husband’s passport, laid hold of his pocket-book, and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found it and handed it over.

Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying “He hasn’t had enough yet,” and beat him further. Then they left, saying “We are not yet finished,” and just as they departed, one of them said to Mrs. Klauber “Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them” and struck her on the jaw with his police club * * *

I personally can verify that the police had been instructed not to interfere; that is that there was official sanction for these activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims attest this fact. I had become acquainted with the two police officers stationed at the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tiergartenstrasse near where the Consulate General was located; these officers told me that they and all the other police officers had received definite instructions not to interfere with the S.A., the S.S. or the Hitler Youth.

For the Germans who were taken into custody by the Gestapo, chiefly Communists at that time, there was, from my experience and from the information that I had from all sources, a regular pattern of brutality and terror. Upon arrest, the victims would be systematically subjected to indignities and brutalities such as beatings, kicking, pushing downstairs, deprivation of food and all comforts, and threats of much worse. After the victims had been imprisoned--usually in cellars, since both the headquarters at No. 8 Albrechtstrasse and the S.A. meeting places usually had them--they would be beaten with various degrees of severity. If the Gestapo believed that the victim--particularly Communist leaders--had information as to other alleged accomplices they would give systematic beatings, usually when stripped and tied on a table. This would go on often for many days until they had extracted the information they wanted or killed the victim.

Based on all of the reports which I had from many sources, my judgment is that the victims were numbered in the hundreds of thousands all over Germany. Many of them were ultimately released. I can state with certainty that the contemporaneous accounts in foreign newspapers, such as the London Times and the American newspapers which I have seen, are accurate.

The second wave of terror was not so systematic nor so concentrated as to point of time. It was directed chiefly against the Jews, and was chiefly the result of the ruthless and occasionally violent enforcement of numerous decrees and orders, such as the Nurnberg Decrees. After the initial outbreak in March, 1933, and all through that year and the next, the Jews still in Germany had, in many cases, come to believe that things might become a little better and that they could live in some sort of peaceable relationship with the Nazis, even though they were reduced to the status of second or third class citizens. In 1935, however, the pressure on them began to increase and they began to be excluded completely from certain civil activities. The terrorism was continued all the time to some degree; but the enforcement of the new decrees in 1935 was characterized by such brutality and ruthlessness that it warrants special attention. Inadvertent violators were dealt with, for example, with great severity.

The 1938 wave of terror was a very pronounced and definite one. Again the object was the Jews, particularly the wealthy ones. The ostensible occasion was the murder of the German diplomat, von Rieth, by a French Jew, but the violence was in no sense spontaneous. Dr. Best, the Administrative Officer of the Gestapo, told me that the terror had been decided upon and ordered by Hitler himself, and that he, Dr. Best, could, therefore, do nothing about it. Actually that statement corroborated what everyone knew. Innumerable persons with whom I talked and who witnessed the violence told me that at all of the synagogues, which had been set on fire by the Nazis, the fire departments were always present, but never acted except to prevent the fires from spreading to neighboring non-Jewish properties. Nor did the police interfere with any of these acts of vandalism and incendiarism.

I personally did not see any of the violence nor the burning of the synagogues while the acts were being perpetrated, as the mobs throughout Germany commenced to work at midnight on November 8, 1938, and carried through their activities during the early morning hours of November 9. At that time I was on my way to the Wartburg Castle, and on the day of November 9 I saw the burned synagogues and the looted and smashed shops in Eisennach, and later in Berlin. I also know that at this time many of the wealthy Jews, who had previously escaped attack, were arrested, among whom were relatives of American citizens. Pursuant to requests from the United States, some of which were transmitted through the Department of State, I personally intervened with the Gestapo through Dr. Best, and secured the return of nearly twenty victims from the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp. Among these victims were Fritz Warburg and Eugene Garbaty. I think that many, perhaps most of these people, were released in the space of ten days or two weeks with the warning that if they remained in Germany they would have cause to regret it. In all cases the victims were subjected to rough treatment. Those who returned from the concentration camp and whom I saw in my office had their hair closely clipped, a common outward sign that they had been at Saxonhausen.

The Gestapo authorities with whom I spoke on my frequent, and often daily visits to the Gestapo headquarters did not hesitate to state that they regarded Communists in particular as subversive and as an element dangerous to the State, and that it was necessary to wipe them out. Diehls, the first chief of the Gestapo, in particular, whom I saw nearly every day of the March wave of terror in 1933, made no attempt to conceal the systematic character of the roundups of what he called “subversive persons”; though he did attempt to justify it to me as necessary to the safety of the State. While denying that any violence against American citizens was contemplated, he admitted that it was being undertaken against Germans. Terroristic tactics, however, in all their various forms, were so completely and thoroughly the actuating policy, that it would have been wholly redundant to discuss it. They and I both understood that it was the mainspring of all Gestapo activity--indeed of all Nazi activity--and that it was beyond discussion.

On one occasion I received a clear and definite admission of the Nazi terroristic policy with respect to many of their victims. In 1938 I was making strenuous efforts to free a young man from a concentration camp. He had been arrested in March, 1933, for aiding certain of his comrades to escape Germany, and had been sentenced by regular courts to a sentence of 2½ years. When he was released from the Brandenburg Prison at the end of that time, he was taken into custody by the Gestapo and sent to Dachau, the notorious concentration camp, and from there to Buchenwald. I had tried over a long period of time to secure his release by appeals personally to Himmler, Heydrich and Best, and had failed. In 1938, however, I was told by Ministerialraet Krohne, in the Ministry of Justice, that if I could reach Gruppenfuehrer Eiche of the Todtenkopfverbaende (Death’s Head Regiments) I might be successful. Eiche was then the head of all German concentration camps. After having first been told officially by the Gestapo that no such person existed, I was finally able by a ruse to secure his telephone number whereupon, through the recommendation of Krohne, I was able to make an appointment with Eiche at the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp near Berlin. He told me that with respect to Communists and any other persons who were suspected of holding views contrary to the Nazi conception of the State, such persons were “Asociale”, that is, impossible of social assimilation and, therefore, they must be physically eliminated from society or destined to perpetual confinement. Thaelman, the leader of the Communists in the Reichstag, was, as is well known, kept during the Hitler regime in perpetual confinement. His ultimate fate has never been revealed.

On another occasion I was given considerable information by a high official of the Gestapo as to the policy of the Nazis with respect to the Jews. I had had a considerable contact with the head of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, known as the “Judische Abteilung der Gestapo”, one Dr. Hasselbacher, in connection with making arrangements for official representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee to visit certain Jewish centers throughout Germany, for which visits, of course, the permission of the Gestapo was necessary. These negotiations brought me frequently in touch with Dr. Hasselbacher, whom I came to know very well. He told me that Germany will be made “Judenrein”, that is, clean of Jews. He said that all the Jews who failed to leave Germany would be exterminated. That statement was made in 1938 before the extermination camps were established, but the statement of Hasselbacher clearly indicated the eventual emergence of extermination camps in accordance with the general Nazi plan; for certainly the Jews were unable to leave Germany, even if they had been permitted to do so by the Nazis, as no world-wide arrangement had been made to receive them in other countries.

I had a great deal of experience with the systematic measures which were taken to confiscate property of non-Nazis, particularly Jews. Force of circumstance and a settled governmental policy made this campaign a more gradual one. Drastic and sudden action would have led to the alienation of a great deal of ready assets owned by the Jews and would have tended to destroy the economic value of Jewish-owned property. It would also have resulted in the physical destruction or hiding by Jews of things of value, as indeed did happen to a great extent. Consequently, the Nazis permitted many Jews, particularly those of wealth and position, to remain unmolested for many years, giving the Jews the faithless and false assurance that they were exempted from the general repressive program for various reasons. For example, I knew well the leading German cigarette manufacturer, Eugene Garbaty. Until September, 1938, he was in complete control of his fortune. During that month, however, he was compelled to sell his factory, worth between seven million and ten million marks for the sum of one million marks. In October, 1938, his country estate near Dresden, valued probably over two million marks, was simply confiscated with no payment at all. It was to be used, as the authorities stated, for a welfare center for German Youth. After his experience in the Pogrom of November 8, 1938, Garbaty applied for a passport and received one only after paying a bribe of 500,000 marks to the corrupt Count Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, and enough other fines to equal the million marks that he had received for his factory. He left Germany with nothing, except that earlier, by bribing the customs officials with approximately 250,000 marks, he had been able to get valuable art treasures out of Germany. Garbaty is now a citizen of the United States and is living in Connecticut.

Another instance of the same nature occurred with respect to my landlord, Mr. Franz Rinkel, who told me the entire story of his persecution at the hands of the Nazis. He had a fine house at No. 2 Bruckenalle in Berlin, in which I lived. Rinkel was one of the victims sent to Saxonhausen and whom, after the space of a week, I was able to rescue. One Dr. Lilienthal, a fanatical Nazi lawyer practicing in Berlin, coveted Rinkel’s house. The general system of expropriating the property of the Jews was illustrated in this particular case. My landlord was approached by Dr. Lilienthal and told the price the latter desired to pay, a mere fraction of the value of the estate. He was given a few days to make up his mind to sell at that price. He sold because he knew that if he did not, he would be accused of some trumped-up crime and taken away to the concentration camp. Dr. Lilienthal took possession of Rinkel’s house. I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent would be accompanied by a uniformed S.A. or S.S. man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and know the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. Indeed, he was my next door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars. I know too that Alfred Rosenburg, who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion. There were, of course, innumerable instances in which Nazis used their positions in the Party to void debts and the like. An illustration of this were the cases of the persons who came to the Consulate in Berlin and informed us of the circumstances. For example, Max Schussler, an American citizen, made an affidavit which states:

* * * I own several apartment houses in Berlin, one situated at Ring Strasse 11, Berlin-Steglitz. On the property at Ring Strasse 11 resides a tenant by the name of Hans Zink, who owns and operates a restaurant in those premises. He has been in arrears in his rent for about a year. Since the first of February of this year, that is, since the new Government came into power, he has refused to pay his rent. I gave instructions to the Sheriff to have him put out. Yesterday two uniformed men came to my office and spoke to my secretary and said that if I do not recall the order to the Sheriff to have Zink evicted, something will happen to me. I did not see these men. My secretary received them. She stated they wore black trousers and brown shirts. She referred them to my attorney, Felix Szkolny, Charlottenstrasse 17, Berlin S.W. 68. They went to the attorney, but he refused to give the order. They came to my office again and said to my secretary that if I did not give the order in writing and hand it over to a certain address within an hour’s time, something would happen. I then called the police station at Alexandrinenstrasse 134, Revier No. 113, and a police officer came to my office and accompanied me to a taxi, when I went home.

About a week before, it may be noted, Zink had come to my office and insisted on my rescinding the order of eviction, and said, “I care nothing about law; we are now in power, remember that. Do anything you please, I am not going out of the office until you cancel the order”. I called the police, and an officer came. Zink said, “I do not care what you say”. After about ten minutes the officer put him out.

At two o’clock Tuesday morning, March 7, I was awakened and faced by two men with pistols, who had come into the house. They were allowed to enter by the janitress, as they claimed to be “Hilfspolizei”, and also by my maid. These two men were accompanied by two others in civilian clothes, the former wearing the brown National Socialist uniforms. They said, “Here, dress yourselves, quick too”. My wife asked them to turn about while she dressed, but they refused. She was compelled to remove her night gown at the point of a revolver and stand naked before the intruders. When she protested they said, “Don’t be theatrical”. My wife then wanted to telephone, but they said, “No, sit down. Do not touch the telephone”, while they kept their pistols pointed at us all the time. I sat down. One of them said, “Have you got a fountain pen? You sign that”. I had to sign the order to the Sheriff cancelling the order of eviction, and had to sign another letter to the tenant Zink, stating that the order of eviction was called off. I hesitated to sign and they drew their revolvers on me, and my wife in terror fell to her knees, and then I signed. I asked if they had credentials, and they pointed to the “Hakenkreuz” on their sleeves and said that was their credentials. They then said, “If you recall that order tomorrow, you will be dead”. After I signed, they left * * *

Actually, all Nazis used their positions in the Party as a means of enriching themselves. I have already spoken of the bribe to the customs officials and the Foreign Office officials, which Mr. Garbaty was compelled to pay. Another instance of the venality of the Nazi officials was illustrated in the case of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, who owned a house near me and whom I knew well. He was told by Count Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, through his stooge, one Herr Schmidt, that his passport would cost him 250,000 marks. Bartholdy told me the facts and asked me if he should pay. Knowing the Nazi practices and the danger which he ran as a Jew in Germany, I advised him to pay. He did, got his passport and visa, and left Germany. This happened in November, 1938.

I was informed by a personal friend, a Jewish banker in Berlin, Herr Kempner, whom I believed to be qualified to make an accurate estimate, that the total confiscations from Jews in Germany was between seven and eight billion marks.

I had less experience with the manner in which the Nazis operated in industrial firms. However, from the accounts of numerous American businessmen with manufacturing plants in Germany, accounts which agreed with the information which I had with respect to similar activities in German factories, I know that the Nazis used their Party position to obtain authority and power. Many American businessmen told me that they had serious troubles operating their factories because the Nazi officials in the establishment, usually recruited from the workmen, attempted to take over the management themselves, and engaged consistently and ruthlessly in acts of persecution against non-Nazi workmen. Many German firms were actually dominated by fanatical Nazis, usually persons who had had no previous position of importance, such as janitors, timekeepers and the like. Their position in the Nazi hierarchy gave them importance in the enterprise out of all proportion to their standing and position.

[Signed] Raymond H. Geist

Subscribed and sworn to before me William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.

[Signed] William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of America Service No. 6684 Tariff No. 38 No fee prescribed.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 1760--PS

United Mexican States } Mexico Federal District } Embassy of the United } SS States of America }

George S. Messersmith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the circumstances of the period.

In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high officials of the German Government because of unsettled state of affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the Government, as a matter of further duty I had contact with individuals in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our Government currently informed with regard to developments in the political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an informed character with persons in the National Socialist Party for the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives, but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.

Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the Party came to power, for information purposes.

It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve with regard to the aims of the regime.

It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course they were pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of these high Nazis and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably revealed to other foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any concealment of their aims.

* * * * * * *

[Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the names, and states his impressions of, the following:

1. Hermann Goering 2. General Milch 3. Hjalmar Schacht 4. Hans Frank 5. Wilhelm Frick 6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk 7. Joseph Goebbels 8. Richard Walther Darre 9. Robert Ley 10. Hans Heinrich Lammers 11. Otto Meissner 12. Franz von Papen 13. Walther Funk 14. General Wilhelm Keitel 15. Admiral Eric von Raeder 16. Admiral Karl Doenitz 17. Dr. Bohle 18. Dr. Stuckert 19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen 20. Dr. Davidson]

In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset due, undoubtedly, to the fact that when I came to Austria it was already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as having no immediate concern in Austria’s foreign relations, I received much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained information were the following:

President Miklas Chancellor Dollfuss Chancellor Schuschnigg Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg Police President and Minister of Security, Hofrat Skubl.

In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and with whom I was in frequent contact.

Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as well as acquiring new Austrian ones.

I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted by the sum total of information which I received from all sources.

From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means were necessary”. Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was “how” and “when”.

At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threat which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished through force through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany--obtain a foothold in the cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials.

In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts. My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl, the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient in all of Europe.

The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the first two of these periods--in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, were one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.

While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when some of these Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had committed these acts.

At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation, reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations from some of these despatches are as follows:

Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight. The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.

An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna, wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being held, slightly wounding a woman.

Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.

During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which are described below, was the source of serious concern to the authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into Austria.

In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number of other bomb outrages at Brannau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram. While the damage to both life and property was small--no lives were lost--the Government admitted its inability to cope with the situation with the existing measures of security.

The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which caused considerable damage. At Monag, near Salzburg, on May 23, a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in Anleiten, near Ried.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.

The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite of the Government’s notification regarding the application throughout Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes, now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order, and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services of the State.

The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church, which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization opposing the Nazi regime.

In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop’s palace in Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an annex to the Archbishop’s palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion broke windows in the churches and vicarages of St. Paul in Carinthia.

In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension of the electric service.

Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of telephone and newspaper kiosks.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.

The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the peace and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an exceedingly important item in Austria’s economic life. The attempts to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria, as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers, occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters. After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.

The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character. The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less against the railway communications. Additional stores of explosive materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere.

* * * * * * *

A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi outrages, the school has been closed for one week.

In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply of explosives bearing labels of “Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld, G.m.b.H.”, “Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.”, and “Fabrik Wurzendorf”, explosive factories domiciled in Germany.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.

During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions, attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.

A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg, in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church institutions in different parts of the country.

A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals, which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and Tyrol.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.

A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600 schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway station.

Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.

In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the “Austrian Legion”. This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities.

After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the British Military Attaché in Vienna of a conversation which he had had with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, General Muff. It may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military Attaché that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had several conversations with Hitler. He said then--in August 1934--that the Austrian Legion had not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal to the British Military Attaché the fact that the Austrian Legion had been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been with the British Military Attaché.

The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been successful.

It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein.

As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch, a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared that the Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.

For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects and which stated:

“The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:

“During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the for him desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria’s independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.

“The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German ‘Ortsgruppen’ of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.

“He was also informed that an effort would be made through the easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels or inns.”

This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford for the time being to take open action.

That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. Bartholomew’s massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with “Now you are in my legation and I can control the conversation”. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.

Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference.

“A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria.

“The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.

“Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create better contact between the party leadership and its members as well as with respect to new propaganda measures.

“One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the entire Austro-German frontier.

“From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to a uniform and common procedure.

“The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

“When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

“In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

“A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

“B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier.”

The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.

On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few “nationally-minded” Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.

In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked “Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer”. The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen “I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny.” Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the “Grossdeutschtum” idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.

Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at would be respected.

The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, the public text is as follows:

“Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.

“It is therefore declared:

“1. In the sense of the statement made by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.[2]

FOOTNOTES:

[2] On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated with respect to Austria (I quote from Documents on International Affairs, Vol. I, 1935, published by the Royal Institute of National Affairs, (London, 1936) p. 171):

“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an ”Anschluss“. The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently.”

“2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.

“3. The Austrian Federal State Government’s general policy and its policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the said protocols are not hereby affected.

“Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions.”

Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the “national opposition” a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting from an official dispatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor Schuschnigg was reported as having with the “moderate Nazis”, Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:

“It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, these conversations will be followed with interest. A major consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear--through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what element of weakness.

“The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore, not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance without the country * * *”

The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.

Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian Cabinet.

The Leopold memorandum is as follows:

For the Internal Pacification of Austria.

* * * * * * *

[In Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit there appears at this point the body of Captain Leopold’s lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold’s statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.]

Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian Government, demanding authorization to form a “nationalistic party”, which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence.

The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany’s emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath’s visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order that he might exercise “a restraining influence” and render service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.

Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet.

About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called “Committee of Seven”, consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss “nationalistic ambitions” with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the “Nationalists” could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria’s independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister’s conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria’s independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria’s independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence.

[Signed] G. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.

[Signed] William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of America

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS

The commissioner for the four year plan Plenipotentiary for special missions

Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43 SECRET

To

1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German Reich--commissioner for the four-year plan--

a. Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative

b. Attention the ministerial dirigent Dr. Gramsch or his representative

c. Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his representative

d. Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative

2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention state councillor Schieber or his representative.

3. The high command of the armed forces

a. Office of economics--attention General Thomas or his representative

b. Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative

c. Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or his representative

d. Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his representative

e. Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Tischbein, or his representative

f. Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General Dr. Biehler, or his representative.

4. The High Command of the army--Quartermaster General, attention Maj. Gen. Wagner or his representative.

5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative

b. Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav or his representative

c. Dept. GI--attention chief engineer Sellschopp, or his representative

6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or his representative.

7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police

a. SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS brigadier General Loerner, or his representative.

b. SS-Office for raw materials--SS-Colonel Kloth, or his representative.

8. The Foreign Office

a. Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative

b. Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative

c. Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative

9. The Ammunition Ministry

a. Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative

b. Attention Commercial Attaché Ruckenbrod, or his representative

10. Reich Minister for Nutrition

a. Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative

11. Reich Minister of Finance

a. Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his representative

c. Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative

12. The Reichsminister of Economy

a. Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his representative

b. Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his representative

c. Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative

d. Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his representative

e. Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or his representative

13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA]

a. Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative

b. Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative

14. The Reich Commissioner for price control

a. Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative

b. Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative

15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich

a. Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his representative

b. Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative

16. The Military Commander in France

a. Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative

b. Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative

c. Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative

d. Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative

17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France

a. Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his representative

c. Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his representative

18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories

a. Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative

b. Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative

c. Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his representative

19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands

a. General Christiansen, or his representative

b. Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or his representative

20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Consul General Neuhausen, or his representative

21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his representative, two copies

22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or his representative, two copies

23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his representative, two copies

24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or his representative, two copies

25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his representative, two copies

26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his representative

Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request for acknowledgement.

Heil Hitler signed: J. Veltjens

Col AC certified:

Hillmann office employee

The commissioner for the four-year plan plenipotentiary for special missions

SECRET

2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions

A. Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia.

I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions.

II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942.

1. General

2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.

3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942).

III. The further development

B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants.

I. Harbor installations

II. Machines

C. Christmas action.

D. Miscellaneous.

# # # # #

A. Providing of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia.

I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions.

The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.--The following reasons have necessarily led to its rise:

1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values (particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of sabotaging the German Military power.

2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and wages on the other.

3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory organizations.

4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France.

5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal authorities.

6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population.

This development was accelerated--particularly since the year 1942--by the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures. Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated the prices.

Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy. The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was not--at any rate not primarily--inserted at the price side because this promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions) here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs in Holland in conjunction with the department “four year plan” of the Reich commissioner on the one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to them accordingly, but this was only done in part.

Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first time.

II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942.

1. General.

The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end.

The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all, disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided. One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for special missions or other departments, but--as is shown under I--has developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any question about it.

But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the frame work of the normal supply--and then much cheaper,--is incorrect. A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French who had complained about the German buying activity on the black market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally, will never again become “white”. What is done cannot be undone, the black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt if not a single German department would work in this field. The black market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand from the supply side, and

1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence,

2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously (this subject will have to be investigated later on more in detail),

3. in France--at any rate up to date--through continuous supply from the unoccupied territory;

on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every item finds a buyer, either from the civilian population or industry, or through purchase on the part of the Italians, Swiss, Spaniards; yes, numerous purchases could even be ascertained--in particular in unoccupied France--by the English or--evidently through British instigation--from neutral sources, as for instance the Portuguese which do not serve any other purpose than that of depriving Germany of the merchandise.

The consequence of such sudden cessation of purchases through the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would therefore only be that a so far not inconsiderable source of raw materials and war important finished products dries up without achieving on this account the end of the black market. Besides, it has to be doubted with good reason that it would be possible to keep up the prohibition of purchases which was issued to the German departments in the occupied territories, if the delivery by the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would suddenly cease. This applies particularly for the cases of the so-called immediate-need [Sofort-Bedarf]. The conception that the black market will come to an end if no more is bought on the part of the Germans, is incorrect. [Marginal notation in handwriting is inserted here: “Yes, our work has to begin here; with it we hit then the French black market primarily”.]

The central purchasing organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions for instance does not buy agricultural products (only some particularly reasonable items in price have been bought, which however are not at all worth mentioning within the framework of the total supply) and nevertheless the black market is the most significant just on this sector.

It has been explained that further activity on the black market at the scale up to date will in the long run not be bearable any more for the budget of the Reich. However, in this respect it has to be pointed out that the greatest part of the purchases--that is the ones made in France--have been financed from the French costs of occupation. Of RM 1,107,792,819----the total amount of purchases, RM 929,100,000 have been financed from French occupational funds. Therefore a debit to the budget of the Reich did not arise to this extent.

The claim that the black market or the activity of German departments on the black market would bring about an increasing decline of the currency in the occupied territories, cannot be recognized as the truth. The decline of the currency which has in part actually occurred already, is not a consequence of the black market, but on the contrary, the inflationary tendencies accompanying the increasing scarcity of goods have evoked the rise of the black market.

At this place it will not be necessary to elaborate on the advantages of a centralized obtaining of the purchases on the black market; only two points of view shall be emphasized:

1. While in the time before the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions, the prices on the black markets rose always further,--for the most part a consequence of the mutual competition of the individual German buyers--it has since been possible, to stabilize the prices of most goods, and this in spite of the fact that the general level of prices in the occupied territories has risen further.

2. While until the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions, the individual German departments received and used the goods purchased by themselves uncontrolled, without regard to the degree of necessity, the distribution now takes place within the scope of total planning by the Reich according to the degree of urgency.

In summarizing, it has to be said that in the face of the supply situation of the Reich, it cannot be refrained from skimming the black market now as before as long as there are still concealed stocks of war important goods. With regard to this higher interest all other points of view have to remain in the background.

2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.

In his report at the end of August 1942, the plenipotentiary for special missions has presented in detail the organization created by him for the getting hold of and centralized control of the black market. Therefore here a short review only shall be given.

The general control and supervision of the purchasing activity is the task of the supervising offices newly created for this purpose.

They are:

a. the supervising office France with its seat in Paris

b. the supervising office Belgium and Northern France with its seat in Brussels

c. the supervising office Belgium and Northern France, Lille branch, with its seat in Lille

d. the supervising office Netherlands with its seat in the Hague

e. the supervising department Serbia with its seat in Belgrade.

Principle and directives for the execution are on the one hand “the instructions for the winding up of stocks of merchandise of uncertain origin” issued by the plenipotentiary for special missions in agreement with the military commanders of the Reich commissar for the occupied Dutch territories and on the other hand the contracts concluded by the Roges raw material trading company Ltd. with the purchasing organizations. The purchases themselves are made by a restricted number of authorized purchasing organizations, of which there are in France 11, in Belgium 6, in the Netherlands 6 and in Serbia 3. Thereby the total purchasing activity is subordinated to the central supervision of the plenipotentiary for special missions. Each purchasing organization is only authorized for a quite definite kind of goods. The engagement of a number of purchasing organizations which will on first sight appear comparatively high was necessary, because the black marketeers by experience want to sell for the most part only to certain departments, with which they have cooperated before and because they refuse to cooperate with other buyers whom they did not know previously; it had to be taken care, however, that none of the existing sources dried up. Participation has been prohibited to all other departments by corresponding orders of the central authorities in the Reich and the military commanders of the Reich commissioner.

The financing of purchases and the transportation of the goods will be taken care of by the Reich-owned Roges Ltd.; the goods are then distributed according to the urgency of the individual consumers in agreement with the instructions of the centralized planning or the departments charged by the centralized planning. It is the additional task of the Roges Ltd., to level the purchasing prices down to the German internal price; lower prices, however, will not be granted for deliveries to the armed forces, authorized and--in case of investment goods--to big plants. The adherence to the directives is guaranteed by the fact that the purchasing organizations at each offer may only then perform the transaction, if the supervising department has given its permission through an expert. The experts for their part will make their decision on the basis of the price and quality limits given by the plenipotentiary for special missions or the Reich departments.

3. Scope of the previously made purchases (up to 30/11/1942).

a. Since the beginning of the action (that is since purchases have been directly centralized by the military commander or the Reich commissar with centralized distribution of goods in the Reich).

Up till now since the beginning of the action purchases have been made in the total amount of RM 1,107,792,818.64, of which

in France RM 929,100,000.00 in Belgium RM 103,881,929.00 in Holland RM 73,685,162.64 in Serbia RM 1,125,727.00

Payment takes place in France from the funds for occupation, in the other countries through clearing.

In the following is a statement of the quantities involved:

1. Metals:

66,202 tons to the value of RM 273,078,287.00 of which there are

a. non-ferrous metals 58,742 tons, in particular copper and copper containing material (34,000 tons), lead and lead alloys (14,500 tons), furthermore (in the succession of their quantity) zinc, aluminum, tin, nickel, magnesium, antimony, manganese ore;

b. material containing iron (tools, junk, etc.) 7,460 tons.

2. Textiles:

To the total value of RM 439,040,000.00, of which there are 22,672,000 pieces of linen, suits (particularly workers’ clothing), overcoats, etc., 5,488,000 kg yarn and miscellaneous, 40,642,000 m cloth and ribbons, 10,072,000 pairs of gloves, suspenders, etc.

3. Leather, skins, and hides:

To the total value of RM 120,754,000.00, of which there are 5,053,000 kg raw hides, 3,390,000 square feet of finished leather, 1,783,000 pieces of hides, chamois, etc., 801,000 pairs of shoes, and 694,000 kg leather for soles and other shoe soling articles.

Furthermore was bought:

industrial oils and fats (1,330 tons) food oils and fats (346 tons) wool household articles PS goods including paper articles wines and alcoholic drinks equipment for engineers sanitary necessities sacks

The factors leading to excessive raising of prices of essential goods are at the present time the following:

-----------+--------+---------+------------- | | | The | France | Belgium | Netherlands -----------+--------+---------+------------- Metals | 9 | 9 | 5-6½ Textiles | 4 | 6½ | 5 Hides | 6½ | 6 | 4 Leather | 6½ | 6 | 6 -----------+--------+---------+-------------

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in France--against payment from occupation funds:

Metals RM 248,000,000.00 Textiles RM 340,000,000.00 Hides, skins, leather RM 112,000,000.00 Wool RM 3,000,000.00 Oils & fats (for industrial and food purposes) RM 12,000,000.00 Household goods RM 46,600,000.00 PK goods RM 33,000,000.00 Wines and alcoholic drinks RM 50,000,000.00 Sacks RM 10,500,000.00 Paper and packing material RM 5,000,000.00 Food and pleasure items RM 33,000,000.00 Chemical products RM 8,000,000.00 Sanitary necessities RM 12,000,000.00 Miscellaneous RM 16,000,000.00 ------------------- TOTAL SUM RM 929,100,000.00

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in Belgium--against payment by clearing:

Metals RM 13,784,000.00 Textiles RM 43,755,000.00 Leather, skins & hides RM 4,030,880.00 Wool RM 2,179,720.00 Industrial oils & fats Chemical products Food-oils & fats RM 3,815,159.00 Household goods RM 2,512,912.00 Furniture RM 418,035.00 Paper & packing material RM 5,561,268.00 Food & pleasure items RM 3,393,955.00 Engineer equipment RM 7,500,000.00 Miscellaneous RM 16,931,000.00 -------------------- TOTAL SUM RM 103,881,929.00

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in the Netherlands--against payment through normal bank transactions:

Non-ferrous metals RM 6,706,744.00 Textiles RM 55,285,568.00 Wool RM 753,878.00 Leather, hides & skins RM 4,723,130.00 Wooden barrels RM 254,982.00 Furniture RM 272,990.00 Food-and pleasure items RM 590,859.00 Chemical-and cosmetic articles RM 152,191.00 Various iron-and steel goods RM 3,792,166.00 Rags RM 543,416.00 Motor oil RM 52,284.00 Raw diamonds RM 25,064.00 Miscellaneous RM 531,890.00 -------------------- TOTAL SUM RM 73,685,162.00

In Serbia was bought against payment through clearing:

Non-Ferrous metals in the amount of RM 1,125,727.00

The action began here only in the month of November. Up to date the goods charged to the receivers amounted to a total of RM 86,084,910.06.

The reasons why, at a total delivery of RM 1,107,792,819.00 no larger quantities could be completely wound up, are various (aggravation of the winding up through the procedure in fixing the prices, difficulties in transportation, lack of personnel). The Plenipotentiary for special missions has instigated measures, in order to accelerate the wind-up in the future.

b. Since the beginning of the activity by the plenipotentiary for special missions, on the 1/7/1942, the following was bought (up to 30/11/1942):

Altogether for RM 840,382,893.00 of which metals RM 174,982,697.00 textiles RM 318,013,354.00 leather, skins and hides RM 82,265,070.00

The figures mentioned above comprise roughly about the same period of time (1/7/-30/11, i.e., five months) as the purchasing action of the military commander or the Reichs Commissar before commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions (in France 6 months, in Belgium 2 months, in the Netherlands 7 months); the figures are however several times higher (RM 840,382,893.00--in contrast to RM 267,409,926.00). This proves more than anything else that and to what degree, the concentration of purchases on the black market through the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions and the placing of the purchased goods at the disposal of the total planning of the Reich succeeded.

III. The further development.

There is not any doubt that the black market as such from the viewpoint of political economy is extremely undesirable and that therefore everything has to be attempted to bring it to an end. In this respect it is also necessary that the German purchasing activity be stopped as soon as possible. But on the other hand, as has already been explained above in detail, the delivery of war important raw materials and finished products cannot be refrained from. The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore made his own suggestions to the departments involved to the effect the purchasing activity be abandoned by degrees if the black market is suppressed by corresponding measures; in this respect it must be certain however, that the quantities of goods which flowed up to date to the black market will now go into the “white” production and into normal trade. Naturally, however, repressive measures have to precede this; only then can the gradual abandoning of the purchasing activity take place in order to impair the total influx of goods as little as possible.

In examining the measures to be taken for the fight against it, a distinction must be made between the sources, from which the black market is fed. First, there are the concealed stores established for most varied reasons whose sale will bring a one time flow of goods. Second, the black market is fed by continuous illegal production. It is certain that with continued duration of the war the second mentioned source will gain more and more in importance; therefore special attention has to be paid to it.

The illegal production has its cause--aside from the general lure of higher prices--in the fact that the price divergence between raw materials and finished products has partly become so great that it cannot be bridged any more within the framework of normal production without endangering the solvency of the enterprise. Often the capacity of the enterprise is exploited only incompletely so that the entrepreneur, even if it is only in order to avoid a shut-down, turns to procurement of raw materials illegally in order to produce beyond his quota, that is, illegally. Previously the purchases in unoccupied France which were sent on special routes into the occupied territory, formed a third and considerable source. It remains to be seen, whether it is now possible to supervise production in the up to now unoccupied part of France on a stricter basis so that, here also, the fight against the black market can be initiated.

According to the conception prevailing here, the following measures for the removal of the black market would have to be effected:

1. Enlargement of the price supervision.--As an increase in personnel of the German departments entrusted with the supervision does not or only at a restricted scale seem possible, the administrative authorities of the individual state have to be constrained to show more activity.

2. The enactment of severer penalties for violations against measures of economic management taken in accordance with the German example because only then can the lack of discipline in the civilian population resulting from their individualistic and liberalistic attitude be removed. A supervision of the verdicts of the penal authorities of the individual states seems to be recommendable.

3. The announcement of awards for reporting violations against measures of economic management amounting to a not too small percentage of the value of the objects confiscated on the basis of the report.

4. Engagement of spies and agents provocateurs.

Besides for the prevention of illegal production:

5. Shut down of all plants which are not manufacturing for war purposes.

6. Stricter shut-downs or merger of plants whose capacity is exploited immediately only.

7. Stronger supervision of the production in factories.

8. Stricter scrutiny in the allotment of raw materials for the distribution of orders.

9. A price policy which gives to the enterprises sufficient prices and guarantees them the existence.

In order to create for the purchasing organizations of the plenipotentiary for special missions the basis for purchasing activity on the black market in the face of the administrative authorities of the individual state in the occupied territories, the plenipotentiary for special missions has in Belgium and in the Netherlands effected a “decree on the clarification of unexplained goods” or a “general decree”. Hereby the supervising departments and their purchasing organizations were given simultaneously the possibility of approaching through purchases of goods the source of error in management and control. In accordance with it a suggestion was made by the plenipotentiary for special missions also to Ambassador Hemmen for France, which will result in the issue of such a decree for France also in cooperation with the military commander.

Most important and promising of success for the beginning appears the measure outlined in 2 whereby the initial effort should be made toward commerce and there again first toward retail business. As soon as a number of draconic penalties has occurred, the retail dealers will in their own interest refrain from buying excessively priced merchandise from the wholesalers and manufacturers. The latter face then only the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions; then it could be started by degrees to let the illegal producers crack up. The plenipotentiary for special missions has in this respect already performed certain preliminary work by directing part of the purchasing organizations to try to approach the manufacturers by eliminating of the black market traders.

The repressive measures mentioned above--particularly under 1 and 2--have to be performed in close cooperation with the individual state authorities; it is recommendable that as soon as possible proper measures be taken on the part of the German occupation authorities. The measures have to be accompanied by purposeful propaganda of press and radio (branding the black market as a crime against one’s own people); in order to build psychologically foundation for the strict measures with the population and to rouse it to cooperation.

Further, French and Belgium government--and economic circles--among others also the French chief of government--have lately found it necessary to complain about the organized German purchasing activity. In the face of such representations--aside from various other arguments--it should be pointed out that also on the part of Germany the greatest interest exists in the disappearance of the black market, but its existence is, in the main, the fault of the government authorities themselves, through their incapability in the supervision of prices and their laxity in penal prosecution, whereby, lack of discipline is bred within their own population.

B. Providing of fort installations and machines from shut-down plants.

I. Harbor installations.

A large amount of harbor equipment exists in the occupied western territories, which at the present time is not or is insufficiently used. On the other hand, in the eastern territories as well as partly in the Reich there exists an urgent need for such harbor installations. The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore received the directive to seize these idle potentialities, in agreement with the departments involved. The determination of the objects to be shipped is up to the Reich commissar for navigation or those needing the goods after confiscation by the responsible navy departments, the plenipotentiary for special missions effects the financial settlement and puts the objects for installation at the disposal of those needing them. So far installations of that kind could already be provided for Oslo and for Hamburg; further transactions are in the process of being executed.

II. Machines.

Another task of the plenipotentiary for special missions is the seizure of machines from closed down plants. It is certain that large potentialities, particularly in machine-tools which are badly needed at home for the armament productions, are at the present time still idle. In agreement with the plenipotentiary for special missions, the military commander and the plenipotentiary for the production of machines a so-called “arbitration offices for machines” is anticipated in Belgium and the Netherlands. One of the main difficulties in this field lies in the overcoming of the resistance of both the owner of the plants involved and the individual state authorities in the occupied territories. Here the occupational authorities will have to employ all their initiative in order to break this resistance.

C. Christmas-Action.

At the end of August 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions received a further special task, i.e. the providing of Christmas presents for the German people. Initially the action was calculated to amount to RM 300,000,000 (internal price). This task was undertaken immediately with all possible vigor, though it could be foreseen that providing and transportation of such quantities of goods in the comparatively short time available until Christmas could hardly be achieved; as the providing should if possible take place in the normal way--by payment through clearing also in France--and not on the black market, an organization had first to be created in order to master this task.

Actually it was possible to provide goods to the value of approximately RM 244,000,000 (purchase price) up to the 20 December 1942. But on account of the difficulties of transportation occurring in conjunction with the political events in France as well as the procedure necessary for fixing the prices and other reasons, it was impossible to bring all of these goods to Germany and to make them available for sale on time. 2,306 box-cars with 11,138,229 kg and further by ship 6,335 bales of goods with over 100,000 kg arrived in Germany. In the first place they comprise cosmetics, toys and in general gift-articles. Distribution was primarily made in the bomb-damaged regions as well as in the big cities Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Breslau, Koenigsberg and in the industrial region of Waldenburg and Upper Silesia. A conclusive report in the Christmas-action will be presented in the course of the month of February. If an identical action should be contemplated in the year of 1943 on the basis of experiences made it would have to be started in the course of the month of March.

D. Miscellaneous.

Recently a report has been made to the commissioner for the four-year plan on the other fields of activity of the plenipotentiary for special missions insofar as the providing of additional shipping space for war important purposes is concerned.

A report on the special imports by way of blockade running is anticipated.

On the orders issued recently

a. in the field of the so-called “commodity-arbitrage” b. the economic use made of enemy property,

a report shall be rendered at opportune time.

Signed: J. Veltjens Colonel of the Air-Force.

Berlin, 15 Jan. 1943

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1770-PS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 161

Law concerning Factory Representative Councils and Economic Organizations of 4 April 1933

The Reich Cabinet has decided the following law which is hereby made public:

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Chapter I

Factory Representative Councils

Article 1

1. The Highest Authority of the Federal State can postpone the elections for the Legal Factory Representative Council for the Federal State, parts of the Federal State or for individual enterprises until 30 September of this year at the latest for reasons of public safety and order.

2. The Factory Representative Council existing up to date remains in office in the case of postponement of the elections. Filling of vacancies in Factory Representative Councils caused by dismissal of members is only necessary if the number of its members has fallen below half of the legal number of members or if they number less than three. The new members of the Factory Representative Council required for its minimum strength will be nominated from the eligible workers by the highest authority of the Federal State or the authority appointed by it.

Article 2

The highest authority of the Federal State can cancel the membership of members who have been appointed contrary to the spirit of State and economy [die in Staats- oder Wirtschaftsfeindlichem Sinne eingestellt sind.] It can appoint new members for the Factory Representative Councils from the eligible workers to replace the eliminated members.

Article 3

The aforementioned regulations will be applied accordingly to the “United Factory Councils”, created according to Article 50 of the Factory Council Law and to the “Special Representations” formed according to Articles 61 and 62. Article 93 of the Factory Council Law will not be applicable in the case of disputes concerning the execution of the above-mentioned regulations.

Article 4

The competent highest Reich authorities will be appointed to exercise the powers for the highest authority of the Federal State contained in Chapter I, in the case of the administrations and enterprises of the Reich, including the German Railroad Company and the Reichsbank.

Article 5

The regulations contained in Article 1, para. 2 and Article 2, 2nd sentence are also applicable to measures taken before the effectiveness of this law.

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Chapter II

Dismissal of Workers

The right to oppose dismissal of a worker contained in Article 84 of the Factory Council Law is not applicable if the dismissed is suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the State. The worker can appeal within a week to the authority declared competent according to Chapter I, Article 2. That authority decides, after hearing all those concerned, whether the suspicions are justified or not. The dismissal is cancelled if its findings are negative.

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Chapter III

Representation of Economic Organizations within the Miners Insurance

Article 1

Article 184, Article 157, sentences 2 and 3 and Article 180, part 3 of the Reich Mining Law are hereby revoked.

Article 2

The Reich Labor Minister can charge members of the insurance or mine supervision authorities, as commissioners with the tasks of the instances which are in office at the time; the commissioners are under the authority of the Reich Labor Minister.

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Chapter IV

Legal Representation before the Labor Court

The following part 3 is added to Article 11 of the Labor Court Law:

The Reich Labor Minister can, in agreement with the Reich Economy Minister and the Reich Minister of Justice, put other organizations on the same level for legal representation as the organizations named in parts 1 and 2.

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