Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 7 of 8)

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 7 of 8)

Another member, viz: from Virginia, WILLIAM A. BURWELL, appeared, and took his seat.

WEDNESDAY, December 9.

Imprisonment of American Seamen.

Mr. BASSETT offered to the House the following resolution:

Whereas, It is represented, that Great Britain has seized sundry persons fighting under the American flag, laying claims to them alike incompatible with justice and the rights of the United States as an independent nation:

Resolved, That the President be requested to lay before this House the information he has received on that subject, and the measures taken to redress an evil which violates the rights and interests, and outrages the feelings of a free and independent people.

Mr. BASSETT stated that several cases had come to his knowledge in which the British naval commanders had seized persons taken on board of American armed vessels, and confined them, in one instance, in irons, and in another had transported them to England for trial. It was not his intention now to go into an examination of these cases. Such an examination was not necessary to authorize the House to call for the information required. He had given its present form to the motion he had offered, because its adoption would go to show that the councils of the nation were not indifferent to this subject. It would, he trusted, further enable the Executive to show that it never slumbered on any occasion in which the rights of the people were concerned; and he had no doubt the information to be received would show it. When it was received, the House might take what course it pleased; perhaps no legislative act would grow out of it. But it was proper, in any event, that the House should be in possession of information required.

Mr. MILNOR said he had no objection to the call for information, but he excepted to the form of the resolution, for two reasons. It was prefaced by a preamble, which was not usual in such cases, which preamble, moreover, assumed as fact circumstances of which the House had no official or authentic information. His other objection was, that it expressed an opinion on a point on which he was not ready to express one. Mr. M. said he knew not the extent of the evil of which the gentleman complained. If it was merely that Great Britain laid claim to her own subjects fighting our battles against her, he would at least not say that this was an act on the part of Great Britain deserving all those severe epithets which the gentleman had thought proper to attach to it. The resolution stated facts not before the House, and expressed an opinion on an act the degree of enormity of which depended on the circumstances respecting which it was proposed to ask for information. Mr. M. wished that the House should not lightly be compelled into a discussion of this subject, and especially as the gentleman had intimated the probability that no legislative act was to grow out of the information called for.

Mr. SEYBERT said, as his colleague's principal objection to the motion appeared to be a difficulty as to facts, he hoped to procure his vote for its adoption by stating at least one which had come to his knowledge. I, said Mr. S., had the honor to have a nephew on board the ship Wasp. He informed me this morning that after they had been carried into Bermuda, several of their crew were taken and confined in irons; that he saw them in that situation; and that their crime was, having fought the battles of our country. What may be my colleague's feelings on this occasion, I know not--I hope they are honorable to himself and the House--for myself I wish the subject investigated. Mr. S. concluded by expressing his hope that the resolution would pass.

Mr. MACON said he was anxious to obtain information on this subject, but doubted the propriety of the preamble. After the information was received, it would be time enough to express an opinion on the subject. He had no doubt that we must at last come to the determination to protect every man that is on board of a ship of the United States. It is what Great Britain herself does; and in this respect we ought to follow her example. If these people undertake to fight our battles, we ought to protect them. Mr. M. said he was opposed to the preamble, because he did not wish to give reasons to the departments of the Government for any call for information the House thought proper to make; it was enough that the House should ask for it, and the President should give or withhold it. The practice heretofore was against the course now pursued.

Mr. BIGELOW said he had no objection to the call for information, divested of the preamble and the opinion expressed in it, except that it did not go far enough. He proposed to amend it by adding thereto the following words, "accompanied with all the evidence in his possession, which will tend to show whether such persons are American citizens or British subjects."

Mr. BASSETT said he was indifferent as to the form, provided he obtained the substance; he, therefore, should submit to such modification as the gentleman from North Carolina should think proper to make. But, said Mr. B., as it has been said that there is no information before the House, I state that I understand, and it is my belief, that six men of the crew of the United States brig Nautilus were detained and sent to England for trial; and that Commodore Rodgers had detained as hostages for their safety twelve British subjects. I state also to the House that I understand and believe that six seamen of another armed vessel have been detained, and that General Pinckney had detained a like number of British subjects. I state that I have received information that the boatswain of the Wasp had been put in irons after she was taken. These violations of humanity and the law of nations I believe to require retaliation. When I voted against a bill on this subject (Mr. WRIGHT'S) it was not because I was opposed to retaliation. No, sir; retaliation in war is often mercy--it puts an end to those cruelties which would otherwise frequently disgrace parties at war, and is indispensable in the conduct of hostilities.

Mr. B. having withdrawn his motion, it was substituted by the following, offered by Mr. MACON:

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before this House any information which may be in his possession touching the conduct of British officers towards persons taken in American armed ships."

Mr. RANDOLPH said he trusted that the resolution now before the House would meet with no objection; although against the resolution as first proposed, he must have voted for it, notwithstanding all the odium which might have attached to such a vote. He hoped, he said, that rigorous retaliation would take place if our countrymen found in arms had been treated as criminals and not as prisoners of war. He hoped we should have ample atonement for every drop of American blood which should be spilt in such manner. Having taken occasion to pay a handsome compliment to the gallantry of our Navy, which was not heard with sufficient distinctness to be reported, Mr. R. concluded by hoping there would be no objection to the resolution.

Mr. MILNOR said he thought it due to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BASSETT) to state that, owing to the noise which prevailed in the House, he had not before heard the statement which the gentleman had now been kind enough to make. He had heard of no such case as that alluded to by his colleague; but he trusted he had been sufficiently guarded not to commit himself, even to the most invidious construction, as opposed to a proper investigation of this subject. To the present motion he yielded his perfect acquiescence. Mr. M. said he trusted that in any thing that related to the honor of the country in the contest in which we are now engaged, whatever might have been his opinion of the propriety of entering into it, he should not be found more backward than other gentlemen in sustaining the just rights of the nation.

Mr. SHEFFEY said, if American citizens had been treated in the manner represented, he was clearly of opinion that severe retaliation ought to follow. But did gentlemen pretend that a British subject, running away from a British vessel, and found on board of one of ours, was to be considered as entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war? Could this doctrine be asserted by any gentleman? He presumed not. The resolution, as it now stood, would not elicit the facts material as to this point. He, therefore, moved to amend it, by inserting, after the word "persons," the words "other than British subjects."

Mr. SEYBERT said he was happy to hear the declaration last made by his colleague, (Mr. MILNOR.) He hoped the amendment first offered would be rejected with disdain. [The SPEAKER declared that such language was not proper in debate, the expression being too strong, and such as sometimes led to a personal altercation, always to be avoided.] Mr. S. thanked the Speaker for his caution; he meant no personality; but he thought it did not become this House to debate whether the persons in question were British subjects or not, when they had been put in irons for fighting the battles of the country. Let the proof rest on the aggressor on national law and the violator of the rules of war. He hoped the House would without hesitation reject the amendment. I may go too far, said he, by stating too much; but I will say thus much without risk of contradiction: that the boatswain of the Wasp, a warrant officer of the United States, had been twelve years within the United States and has a wife and children here. These, I hope, are sufficient characteristics to insure him our support: I will give him mine, and have no doubt the House will do the same.

Mr. RANDOLPH said that the proposed amendment brought strongly to view the impropriety of the House, on the rude suggestions of any member, committing itself hastily by a definite determination which to-morrow they might be disposed to retract. He believed this was one of those cases in which there was no necessity for haste. The House would be as competent to-morrow, to decide on the subject of the resolution and the proposed amendment, and in a manner to redound, at least, as much to the credit of the House and the national good, as now. With regard to his own opinions, if they were of any importance with his worthy colleague, he would at once say they were on this subject the opinions of that man, from whom he never did dissent but upon one question, without being wrong--that man who was emphatically called for eight years our Commander-in-chief--the founder of this nation--the author of the constitution--our first President--the man who was made for the office, and the office for him--the man who discharged all its duties so perfectly, as if it had been only to show those who come after him their incompetency. Mr. R. said he would ask his worthy colleague, what he supposed would have been the fate of a certain Benedict Arnold, had he been brought alive to the American camp, after his desertion from it? On that subject there can be but one opinion. On another question, if his opinion was of any value, he would state it. It was not a loose thought, taken upon the impulse of the moment; but the result of meditation and reflection. As long as foreigners, naturalized by our laws, remain on our soil, he was ready to throw over them the mantle of the constitution--he would protect them, as he would protect the native citizen, at the hazard of the last shilling of the public revenue, and the last drop of the blood of our people. But, when they go abroad on the high seas; when they come to this country to acquire a neutrality of character, now indeed no longer to be found here; when they come here only to neutralize goods in the Baltic, at Heligoland, in the Black Sea, the White Sea, and the Red Sea, and the passing to and fro on the highway of nations; if it please God, their old master George the Third, or Napoleon, or Alexander of Russia, should lay his hand on them, they were welcome, Mr. R. said, for him. He would not spend one shilling, one drop of American blood, to redeem such a man; much less would he have retaliation executed on subjects of the nation claiming him, with whom we should happen to come in collision, which might have to be expiated by the native blood of these States. I would not, said Mr. R., have the New England man or old Virginian executed by any despot, limited or unlimited in authority, in order to secure to us the worthless property in the man who is a Christian in Christendom and a Mussulman in Turkey. But, Mr. R. asked, did not this question assume a different shape, when this man was not going to and fro on the high seas in search of plunder, which he calls patriotism, but, when he is found in a public ship of war of the United States? On that subject--for it was a new question--he was not prepared to decide. It was not, Mr. R. said, and the House might rely on it, the sentiment of the people of these States--it might be of some comparatively small, and therefore only insignificant section of the community--that we should enter into a contestation with France and England for property in their subjects.

Mr. R. here drew a comparison between the practice of harboring slaves in some of our Northern cities, Philadelphia for instance, and the countenance given in this country to European emigrants. As to these foreigners, Mr. R. said he owed them nothing. He was sorry they had ever found refuge here--he wished he had driven them from our shores--or have permitted, as we have the merchants, to go out where they pleased, without attempting to protect them.

Mr. QUINCY rose, he said, simply to express his regret, that a debate in this form and manner should have arisen. The question which had been touched, was one which required all the information and light which could be shed on it. The principles connected with it were so numerous and critical, that it required all the reflection of which gentlemen were capable, to enable them to discuss and decide it in a proper manner. He rose also to express his regret that a motion for amendment should be made by a gentleman with whom he frequently coincided in opinion, which went to exclude information of the manner in which officers treated persons other than British subjects. He could not vote against receiving information of any kind--particularly on a subject so interesting. Mr. Q. was proceeding in his remarks, when--

Mr. SHEFFEY withdrew his motion.

Mr. BASSETT explained his ideas of expatriation. He would not protect the man who had left the country with an intention not to return, &c., but he would protect the man who went out to fight the battles of the country.

Mr. RANDOLPH rose for the purpose of moving an amendment. He adverted to the language of the resolution, and drew a distinction between the character of privateers and of our public armed vessels. Was it competent, he asked, to the Government to receive as testimony the statement of the commander or crew of an American corsair? It was well known, too, he remarked, that the high wages which had been paid to the crews of the privateers, was one of the reasons why the American Navy was in some degree unmanned. And, was it not a different question, whether we should interpose our authority between the subject of a foreign nation and his Government, when that subject is fighting your battles, bleeding on the deck of your public ship, at twelve dollars a month, and when he is decoyed into a corsair by the temptation of eighty, fifty, or forty dollars a month? There is a difference, sir, said Mr. R. I trust, said he, if we receive the information we are about to ask, we shall get it from a pure and authorized source, such as no man can question. I mean the commanders of our public ships of war. Mr. R. concluded by moving to strike out "American," and insert "public," so as to read "public armed ships."

Mr. WIDGERY expressed his surprise at the various expedients resorted to, to embarrass this question; and hoped this would have the same fate as the other. He said he could tell the gentleman that many privateers had been manned without a cent of wages. But, suppose they had been manned in other ways, were not privateers as useful in annoying the enemy as public ships? No man that knew any thing about maritime affairs would deny it. Whereever our privateers had come across an armed vessel of the enemy, of any thing like equal force, they had done their duty like American tars. We are at war, Mr. W. said, and ought to check the enemy wherever we come in contact with them. He believed the privateering carried on had been of great advantage to us and injury to our enemy. As to the objection which had been offered to receiving the statement of their commanders, what were gentlemen afraid of? No disparagement to the commanders of the navy, (for he respected them all,) he knew gentlemen commanding privateers whose opinions were entitled to as great respect as that of any other, and whose word could not be questioned. In relation to the cases referred to in the resolve, particularly that of the boatswain, Mr. W. said we were bound by every principle of the law of nations to support him to the last cent of our money, more especially as he had a warrant under the seal of the United States. The conduct of our enemy was the less justifiable, as she manned her own ships with people of all nations.

Mr. RANDOLPH'S proposed amendment was negatived by a large majority; and the resolution was agreed to without further debate or opposition.

FRIDAY, December 11.

Macedonian and Frolic.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to Congress copies of a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, from Captain Decatur, of the frigate "United States," reporting his combat and capture of the British frigate Macedonian. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on that officer and his companions on board, for the consummate skill and conspicuous valor by which this trophy has been added to the naval arms of the United States.

I transmit, also, a letter from Captain Jones, who commanded the sloop-of-war Wasp, reporting his capture of the British sloop-of-war, the Frolic, after a close action, in which other brilliant titles will be seen to the public admiration and praise.

A nation feeling what it owes to itself and to its citizens could never abandon to arbitrary violence on the ocean, a class of them which gives such examples of capacity and courage, in defending their rights on that element; examples which ought to impress on the enemy, however brave and powerful, a preference of justice and peace, to hostility against a country whose prosperous career may be accelerated, but cannot be prevented, by the assaults made on it.

JAMES MADISON.

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1812.

U. S. SHIP UNITED STATES, AT SEA.

October 30, 1812.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, on the 25th instant, being in the latitude 29° north, longitude 29° 30' west, we fell in with, and, after an action of one hour and a half, captured His Britannic Majesty's ship Macedonian, commanded by Captain John Carden, and mounting forty-nine carriage guns, (the odd gun shifting.) She is a frigate of the largest class, two years old, four months out of the dock, and reputed one of the best sailers in the British service. The enemy being to windward, had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance; which was so great that, for the first half hour, we did not use our carronades, and at no moment was he within the complete effect of our musketry or grape. To this circumstance, and a heavy swell which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action.

The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman, and marine, on board this ship, on discovering the enemy, their steady conduct in battle, and the precision of their fire, could not be surpassed. Where all have met my fullest expectations it would be unjust in me to discriminate. Permit me, however, to recommend to your particular notice my first lieutenant, William H. Allen; he has served with me upwards of five years, and to his unremitted exertions in disciplining the crew is to be imputed the obvious superiority of our gunnery exhibited in the result of this contest.

Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on both sides. Our loss, compared with that of the enemy, will appear small. Among our wounded you will observe the name of Lieutenant Funk, who died a few hours after the action; he was an officer of great gallantry and promise, and the service sustained a severe loss in his death.

The Macedonian lost her mizzenmast, fore and main-topmasts, and main-yard, and was much cut up in her hull.

The damage sustained by this ship was not such as to render her return into port necessary; and had I not deemed it important that we should see our prize in, should have continued our cruise.

With the highest consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient humble servant.

STEPHEN DECATUR.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States.

Thomas Brown, New York, seaman; Henry Shepherd, Philadelphia, seaman; William Murray, Boston, boy; Michael O'Donnel, New York, private marine; John Roberts, private marine--killed.

John Mercer Funk, Philadelphia, lieutenant, (since dead;) John Archibald, New York, carpenter's crew; Christian Clark, ditto, seaman; George Christopher, ditto, ordinary seaman; George Mahar, ditto ditto; William James, ditto ditto; John Lawton, ditto, private marine--wounded.

On board the Macedonian there were thirty-six killed, and sixty-eight wounded; among the former, were the boatswain, one master's mate, and the schoolmaster; and of the latter were the first and third lieutenants, one master's mate, and two midshipmen.

NEW YORK, November 24, 1812.

SIR: I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the capture of the Wasp, on the 18th of October, by the Poictiers, of seventy-four guns, while a wreck from damages received in the engagement with the British sloop-of-war Frolic, of twenty-two guns, sixteen of them thirty-two-pound carronades, four twelve-pounders on the main deck, and two twelve-pound carronades on the top-gallant forecastle; making her superior in force to us by four twelve-pounders. The Frolic had struck to us, and was taken possession of two hours before our surrendering to the Poictiers.

We had left the Delaware on the 13th; the 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and two men; half-past eleven on the night of the 17th, in latitude 37 degrees north, and longitude 65 degrees west, we saw several sail, two of them appearing very large; we stood for them for some time, then shortened sail, and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight, on Sunday the 18th, we saw them ahead; gave chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a sloop-of-war; four of them large ships, mounting from sixteen to eighteen guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven A. M., we engaged the sloop-of-war, having first received her fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well-supported fire of forty-three minutes; and although so near, while loading our last broadside, that our rammers were shoved against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecastle, so that no loss was sustained on their side after boarding.

Our maintop-mast was shot away between four and five minutes from the commencement of the firing, and falling, together with the maintopsail-yard, across the larboard fore and fore-topsail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At eight minutes, the gaff and mizzen topgallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the beginning of the action every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell upon deck; the main-mast going close by the deck, and the foremast going twelve or fifteen feet above it.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rogers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, showed, by incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight, and every other officer, acted with a courage and promptitude highly honorable, and I trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had fallen on deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states that, from what he saw, and from information from the officers, the number killed must have been about thirty, and that of the wounded about forty or fifty; of the killed, is her first lieutenant and sailing-master; of the wounded, Captain Winyates, and the second lieutenant.

We had five killed and five wounded, as per list: the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained on deck, and showed, by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.

I am, respectfully, &c.

JACOB JONES.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON.

The Message and documents having been read--

On motion of Mr. RANDOLPH, they were referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, with instructions to report a suitable expression of the Legislative approbation of the services detailed.

Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to limit the committee to reporting a resolution; or to preclude them from expressing approbation in a more substantial manner.

WEDNESDAY, December 16.

Navy of the United States.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, which had been previously twice read in the House.

Mr. SAWYER made a motion to add the word "teen" to "four," so as to make it fourteen 74 gun ships.

Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the question whether we were to have a navy or not. He took the occasion to congratulate the House upon the repeated victories of our little navy over the enemy; and of the grateful prospect of a speedy termination to the despotism of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated, and all nations permitted to traverse their great highway in safety. The thing can be done; and if we say so, with the will of God, will be done. The experiment upon which the proof hangs has been made. British arms cannot withstand American upon the sea. The bully has been disgraced by an infant; and fear shall no longer restrain an abject world from vindicating its long violated rights. Give us but a respectable fleet, and it is all we ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours? They are a mere mockery. If we do mean to make a serious stand upon the ocean, such a force must be out of all character. If we mean merely to annoy her trade, (and he trusted we meant more,) frigates will do; but, to make any serious impression that way, we must have a respectable fleet; at least, in his opinion, fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would give us a preponderance on our own coast, and enable us to bring in our prizes with safety. Who can bear the idea of our being obliged to burn or sink all the ships we may take away from the enemy, for fear of their being recaptured? He thought we should save enough by the protection they would afford to our prizes to support the expense of them. We can easily support such a force. The expense, distributed over our widely-extended population, would be less than a dollar a head; and, where is the American who would grudge such a sum for such an object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully pay it, because we are now at war, and a navy is found the most efficient weapon in our hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted that if it was the disposition of the House to have a navy, they would establish such a one as would answer some purpose.

Mr. SEYBERT said he did not anticipate that the bill from the Senate would have been called for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval Committee; notwithstanding he had bestowed some attention on the subject, he confessed his remarks would be made in a manner not entirely satisfactory to himself; he would, however, proceed with them.

Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy to build, equip, and man the seventy-fours, as it will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as is proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina. So far from adding to the number of these ships, contemplated by the bill, he had intended to move that no seventy-four gun ships should be, at this time, authorized by the Legislature.

On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when a naval establishment was the subject under consideration, he stated at length his reasons for opposing the propositions before the House. The opinions which he then advanced concerning an extensively permanent naval establishment for the United States were still believed to be well grounded. He did not hesitate to declare his intention, at this time, and under the pressure of present circumstances, to yield much to general feelings, and the sentiments of the nation; nevertheless, he should guard against being carried too far by the current of popular opinion. It is equally my duty, said he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the permanent and vital national interest. He declared a uniform opposition to that establishment, which could not be brought within the means and resources of the nation to maintain it. We have made war, said he, to guarantee the honor and independence of the nation, as well as for the support of the just rights of our citizens; with these objects in view, he had consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000 men, and advocated one more numerous, though in principle he was opposed to standing armies. If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens deem an increase of the Naval Establishment essential to promote the great work, why should it be refused on my part? No opposition would be made by him to the principle or spirit of the bill before the House, though, he confessed, he did not approve the provisions as to the kind of force therein contemplated.

Mr. S. continued.--At this time our principal object should be, to authorize that species of force which can be furnished in the shortest period, and which promises to be the most efficient in the present contest. If the views of the Government were not now confined to the present war, he considered it inexpedient to build public ships. It was necessary that the revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be employed so as to carry on the war with vigor, he would not shrink from any appropriation which could tend to produce that effect; by protracting the contest for the want of means, expense will be accumulated, and we should achieve nothing.

Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the navy, with a view to reconcile other measures to the opposition--to him that vote promised no such result. Our political opponents, continued he, will tell us, as regards the navy, you are doing right to add to it; thus far we will go with you; we always maintained this to be the proper course; as to your golden dreams in Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves exclusively. Such were his present impressions; it would gratify him to find himself to have been mistaken. He declared his intention to oppose the building of 74's, or double-decked ships, and to advocate a greater number of the largest class frigates. If, however, his statements should not prove satisfactory to the House, he declared the failure would not induce him ultimately to vote against that species of force which a majority might deem expedient.

If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying the keels of the double-decked ships, be (as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by high authority) to test the intentions of the legislature as to a permanent naval establishment, he, for one, declared, he would not thus be tested, nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor of the proposition; he would always be governed by circumstances.

The declaration of the committee, that it was proper to meet "like with like," or, in other words, because the British have seventy-four gun ships, the United States should have them of the same class, would have no effect on him. We might as well say, because there are ships in the British service, which carry one hundred and twenty guns, we should also have such. This reasoning is fallacious. No one has attempted to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting that you had four seventy-four gun ships on your navy list, he maintained, they would answer no good purpose. In the course of the following year, their number will be more than doubled and trebled on the part of the enemy. The consequence would be, that your most expensive ships must either combat under very unpromising circumstances, or they would be blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse than useless; they must be kept at a heavy expense, and their crews would deprive other ships of the men necessary for their equipment. He said, the opinions which he had just advanced were not the result of idle speculations at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent commanders, and rested upon the firm base of experience; they were confirmed by the conversations of some whose splendid achievements adorned the pages of our Revolutionary history, and by others, who rank as heroes of the present war. He asked, why need we resort to other authority, when that of the head of the Naval Department can be brought to bear testimony in favor of the propositions laid down? In the year 1798, the Secretary of the Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, "would probably be found sufficient to insure our future peace with the nations of Europe." In 1811, it was declared that, "twelve sail of seventy-fours and twenty well-constructed frigates, with our smaller vessels," were necessary to annoy the commerce of the enemy, and guard our coasts. To this he added that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace with the United States, the British had seven ships-of-the-line on the American stations, independent of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels; at the same time, they had thirty-nine ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell me, said he, what is to keep a great proportion of them from your coast in 1813?

Mr. MCKEE said, he had not expected this subject would have been taken up to-day, or to say any thing on it when it should be taken up. But, said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled to ask, are you going to build these vessels? Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars, in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures, to protect commerce? Will this old argument, in favor of a navy, now be used, which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir, where is your commerce now to protect? Will you protect that clandestinely destined to Great Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined to the coast of France? Let us reflect what commerce you can carry on with France. None worth protection, or of any moment to the great body of the American people. Does France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which heretofore have found a market there? She has never been a purchaser of provisions or breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between us and France? Your cotton, in France, is taxed with enormous duties. No man who is not under the influence of the moon would, at this time, think of making a shipment there. Would you ship your commerce there merely to surrender so much property into the grasp of the Emperor? It would be the extreme of folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce? To the Baltic, sir? You can carry on in that quarter no commerce at all interesting to the great body of the American people. In what does your export to that region consist? In articles of colonial produce; not in articles the produce of your soil. Will you tax the great agricultural community for the purpose of protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if the people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the Middle States, or any other portion of the American people, will be content to be taxed to support a navy for the protection of a commerce in foreign produce, by which but few individuals in the nation can be benefited? There is no commerce to protect, unless it be that which exchanges specie for the production of the East Indies, and benefits no part of the community. Having no valuable commerce now to protect, the object of adding vessels to your navy, must be to fight your battles at sea.

If you would propose a navy as a means of carrying on war, bend your resources to that object. We have been told that the trident of Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir, the sovereignty of the ocean is not to be acquired by four ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates. You can have no legitimate object in building such vessels as proposed, unless it be to carry on the war. If that be your object, make your means commensurate to the end you have in view.

Do you yet contend that the object is to protect commerce? Your commerce is not worth the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants? No, sir. They will pay only their proportion. I recollect, when a boy, to have seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures more than the reading, in which were the representations of a king, a priest, a soldier, and a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of each contained these words: The king says, "I govern all;" the priest, "I pray for all;" the soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I pay for all." This, sir, is perfectly true as regards the American farmers--they pay for all. And what advantage do they derive from it? What advantage are my constituents to derive from the expenditure of this money?

THURSDAY, December 17.

Increase of the Navy.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.

Mr. SEYBERT moved to amend the first section of the bill by striking out "four seventy-fours and," so as to erase the provision for building vessels of that description.

Mr. GOLD.--The provision in the bill to introduce ships-of-the-line into the Navy, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy of a navy under this Government. Frigates we have had, but in common with petty nations; for the Barbary Powers have frigates; the provision now offered rises higher and promises something worthy of the constitution, something honorable to the Government. I rejoice, Mr. Chairman, at the favorable circumstances, and hail the auspices under which we now meet this question; we are no longer left to erring speculations, to uncertain reasoning, but have under our eyes the sure and infallible test of experience, of practice in war with a naval force. Within a few weeks our tars have thrice grappled with the enemy, and thrice have they triumphed in combat; the success has swelled the American bosom with joy from Orleans to Maine--all without exception of party, vie in demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of honors upon the victors.

While such a scene is presented here, gloom and dissatisfaction prevail in the metropolis of Great Britain--those who have been so long accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of the Guerriere with as much astonishment as they would behold a suspension of the laws of nature. A strange event to Britons!

How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed within these walls, that it would be in vain to attempt any thing with a navy against Great Britain, unless we could bring ship to ship and man to man--could equal our enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken have gentlemen been; how vain is human reason! The earliest stage of the first war under the Government has yielded a clear, full, and incontestable refutation of the argument. While the American arms have suffered disgrace upon disgrace on what was deemed the natural and proper theatre for the display of our power; while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy, a handful of men, has nobly sustained us upon the ocean, and banished that despondency which our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.

If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming evidence of the efficiency of a navy, this question is to be put by, I shall despair of a navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of frigates, but shall do nothing worthy of a community of eight millions of souls, placed by Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce and naval power.

The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little amusing. Do you move the question in peace, it is objected, that commerce flourishes and you want not protection; at another time it is said not to be worth the expense of a navy, and lastly a navy will draw America into the European vortex and involve us in a war. Now that we are in war, a new book of logic is opened, and it is objected, that you have not time to build a navy, the war will be over before ships can be finished. It is thus, sir, that the arguments against a navy are made to answer and refute themselves; nay, more, the argument in war is a satire and reproach to the objection in peace. "There is not now time to build a navy," reproaches us for not having passed the requisite laws at the last session.

I have always considered the great policy of a navy settled by the constitution; need I spend time to show, that no great specific power was delegated to the General Government unless it was deemed necessary; not necessary for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general protection and welfare. This was the polar star--the test and criterion that governed in the delegation of powers by the States--powers not necessary to be exercised for the general good were retained by the several States. What greatly strengthens the argument is, the power to provide a navy is not only given to the General Government, but taken away or denied to the several States. In adopting the constitution, this question was considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the necessary consequence of this power; in the Virginia Convention, where great talent and ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the point was so considered, and the objection rested on that ground; the consequence of adoption was supposed to be an unequal strengthening of the commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed was President WASHINGTON with the importance of a navy, and so true to his duty and just claims of commerce for protection, that he could not consent to quit his high station in the public councils without placing on record his sentiments for the good of his country--this he did in his speech to the fourth Congress (second session) in language that well attests his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for his country. He recommended and urged the policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and I will not believe that the parting lesson of that great and good man will be lost to his country--there is certainly too much respect for his memory to disregard his solemn advice and counsel on any subject. In this policy Mr. JEFFERSON also concurred at a period most auspicious to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment; it was before the tempest of party arose, to obscure the great luminary of truth and blacken the political horizon.

Mr. WIDGERY.--Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected that I was last session of Congress opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until we had got more frigates. I have been rather opposed to them in the Committee of Naval Affairs, not because I was opposed to an augmentation of the Navy, but because I thought it more to the advantage of the country to build frigates and sloops of war at present; and if, hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man the large ships with, it should be thought best to have larger ships, it may be very well to build them; but, at present, our resources are inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the ten frigates, and say eight or ten sloops of war, which are absolutely necessary for the protection of our seacoast, in order to keep off the British gun-brigs or privateers. The ships-of-the-line will not answer this purpose, when they are at sea; they must keep deep water; they cannot, with safety, follow in under the land those small vessels which annoy our coasters, and capture them all along shore. Within a few days, I have accounts of a small privateer, of eight guns, having captured twenty or thirty sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight to see a public armed ship of the United States anywhere on our shore to the eastward of Boston--a seacoast of 200 miles--when the enemy can take every thing that passes out to sea, and a country in which there are the best of ship-harbors, where they might cruise with safety, always having a harbor handy to run into. I cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours, to the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we are so much in want at this time. If you had the money in your chest, and all ready for the building four seventy-fours, and all the timber in the yard--which you have not--still I should have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you had those ships built, could you send them to sea? I presume not, if at war with England, because she would always blockade your harbors wherever they were; and if you sent them out, perhaps you would never have to man them again; not because our ships in single combat are not a match for hers, but, because they have more ships than they know what to do with; they would always outnumber you at sea, and they would be able to come up with and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose are you to send them out? Certainly, not to take merchantmen. They are not calculated for that purpose, unless you had more than four of them. In case you had a number sufficient to intercept their East India fleet, which, generally, are under strong convoys of heavy ships, then it might be an object to send them to sea. If you are to keep them in port, for the purpose of harbor defence, you must always keep them manned; it will be too late to man them after the enemy comes in sight. And there is, in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning these heavy ships, you will have to impress men to go on board of them, or raise the wages up to what is given in a merchant ship; because the sailors will not be willing to go on board large ships, when they have no chance for prize money. On the other hand, they will be very willing to enter on board cruising ships, such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a sufficient number of sailors to man what smaller vessels we want. If you build frigates and sloops of war, they can be furnished without your advancing the money; the merchants will build them, and loan them to the Government. The frigates and smaller vessels can be put afloat in six months from the time they are agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not be finished in less than two years; and if they do not cost 30 per cent. more than they are calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth towards them for nothing. I am willing to go for almost any number of frigates, because I know you can have them built without advancing a dollar until they are ready for service, and because I am convinced they are most for our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has great weight at times; let us not be carried off on the wings of enthusiasm; we are at present at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently with our finances, or they will soon become low. At the same time, I cannot agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says he is opposed to any augmentation of the Navy, and asks if you are willing to tax the planters for the building a Navy, and the protection of the merchant? Sir, will not the same reasoning apply against the maritime towns being taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the West? Gentlemen say, stay on shore, and you will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say to the gentlemen who are settling the cheap lands of the interior, keep among us; go not into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to defend you. This reasoning will apply with as much force against the interior as theirs does against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one people, and, in order to remain so, we must be willing to defend at all points.

Mr. BASSETT spoke several times in the course of the debate. The following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force, of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into such puny hands. For the cause, then, will they hear me, and for their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience--I cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land--but, yet, we are not quite deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step) the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science, and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent, extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly heritage.

We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.

I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it, and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.

Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests. What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then? She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection. Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year. And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor, viz: ---- dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as will be seen by reference to the Annual Register. In corroboration of this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my predecessor, of which I will avail myself.

Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the Government--say twelve millions of dollars--or a fourth less than the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue this argument.

To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find, having that force, that you could make any small addition that was requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others, in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be $1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman, the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had; and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty of money.

With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship, $202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.

It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my friend from South Carolina.

The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we cannot but turn in disgust.

Mr. STOW said he should not consider the motion made by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SEYBERT) as going to defeat the main object of the bill, which was a liberal increase of the navy, because he understood his intention to be to move a larger number of frigates if the clause for seventy-fours should be stricken out. The question then he should consider as simply whether it was best at present to build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine our exertions to frigates only? He said his own opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter side till, as a member of the Navy Committee, he had been led to a more careful examination of the subject; and he confessed that that examination had fully convinced him of the utility, and he might say necessity, of building some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of building them, as well as a proportion of lighter ships, grew out of the different objects to which they were to be applied. There could be no doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and sloops of war when employed in cruising against our enemy's commerce, but whenever the object is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line ought to be resorted to. They form batteries infinitely more effective in proportion to their expense than frigates. To illustrate this--the cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third more than that of a forty-four gun frigate, yet the force is as three to one, or according to the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one. This is easily explained when we consider that to make a seventy-four is little more than adding another deck to a large frigate. It would then appear evident, that unless we resorted to this kind of force, we should fight our enemy on the most unequal terms. She could at any time lay a few heavy ships at the mouths of our harbors and in our narrow waters, and thus effectually destroy not only our foreign trade, but what was of infinitely more importance, she could destroy the whole of our coasting trade.

Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have no powerful ships, she can easily protect by convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to the enormous expense of convoying every fleet of merchantmen sailing to any part of America by five or six seventy-fours, or they would be exposed to capture by our fleet.

But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would be blockaded. This objection was equally against frigates; but he was perfectly willing to put it upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt to blockade them. What then would be the case? She must employ six blockading ships, supported at an enormous expense, at such a distance; and as had been fully shown by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,) last year, six more ships at least must be occupied in preparing and sailing to replace the first six--thus employing twelve ships to four. And after all, the attempt to confine our ships would frequently be rendered abortive by storms. Again, it has been objected that we had no harbors south of Montauk Point, in which, if pursued, our ships could take shelter. If by this was meant barely that we had no harbor properly fortified, he admitted it was true; and it was also equally true as applied to our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that there was no harbor in which ships could enter that was capable of being properly defended, it was entirely erroneous. For many such there were, and where sufficient works could be erected in a few months.

Mr. S. said a strong reason for building seventy-fours, and to which he particularly requested the attention of the committee, grew out of the state of our preparation. We have timber for four seventy-fours, seasoned and ready for use, which could not be applied to frigates, without great loss. And this explained the fact, that we could build seventy-fours sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided should be cut up, which, after years of deliberate preparation for seventy-fours, would appear like children's play. He said in a case of this kind, he thought great respect was due to experience. That many years ago all the ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe were small, but that, without one exception, they had resorted to a certain proportion of heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well as from the uniform opinion of our own officers, he inferred that these were the most conclusive reasons in favor of them.

The question was then taken on the motion to strike out the seventy-fours, and negatived. The committee rose and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, December 18.

Increase of the Navy.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.

Mr. CUTTS then moved to strike out the seventy-fours, with a view to increase the number of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a number of sloops of war.

Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support of his motion, and in favor of frigates and sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun ships.

The question was then taken on striking out the provision respecting seventy-fours, and was carried--for the amendment 56, against it 53.

Mr. CUTTS moved an amendment authorizing the building of ten ships of war, of forty-four guns, and ten sloops of war.--Motion lost by a great majority.

MONDAY, December 21.

On motion of Mr. BASSETT, the petitions of J. A. Chevallie, attorney of Amelie Eugene de Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December, 1805, and 2d of April, 1806, together with all the documents concerning the said claim, were referred to the Committee of Claims.

Encouragement to Privateering by Public Armed and Private Armed Vessels.

Mr. BASSETT, from the Committee on the Naval Establishment, presented a bill relating to captures; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The bill is as follows:

A Bill relating to captures.

Be it enacted, &c., That where any ship or vessel in the service of the United States shall have captured, or may hereafter capture, a ship or vessel belonging to an enemy, of equal or inferior force, and it shall become necessary to destroy such prize to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy, or for the security of such ship or vessel so in the service of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy is hereby required to issue his commission to one or more fit person or persons, who, on the best evidence that can be procured, shall proceed to estimate the value of such ship or vessel, prize as aforesaid, in the port into which the capturing vessel shall first enter, and make return on oath of said estimate or valuation to the Secretary of the Navy.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Navy shall thereon proceed to apportion the sum, which shall be equal to one-half the said valuation or estimate, as prize money, among the officers and crew making such capture, and cause the same to be paid to them accordingly.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That each commissioned officer shall receive six dollars per day for each day he shall be employed in making the aforesaid estimate: Provided, His compensation shall in no case exceed ---- dollars.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That every captain or commanding officer of any vessel in the service of the United States immediately on his coming into port, after having captured a ship or vessel of equal or superior force, shall make report thereof to the Secretary of the Navy, describing particularly the size and equipment of the ship or vessel so destroyed, and the nature and extent of the damage done her in the action, as also the causes and inducements for destroying his prize, which report, in part, shall be received as evidence by the commissioners aforesaid.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Navy shall cause the account of the money so by him ordered to be paid, to be settled at the end of one year, and all the unclaimed dividends he shall cause to be paid over to the Navy Hospital Fund.

Mr. BASSETT, from the same committee, also presented a bill regulating pensions to persons on board private armed ships; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next. The bill is as follows:

A Bill regulating pensions to persons on board private armed ships.

Be it enacted, &c., That the two and a half per centum reserved in the hands of the collectors and consuls by the act of June, eighteen hundred and twelve, entitled "An act concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods," shall be paid into the Treasury, under the like regulations provided for other public money, and shall constitute a fund for the purposes of this act, and such other purposes as Congress may direct, for the aid and comfort of the seamen of the United States.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Navy be authorized and required to place on the pension list, under the like regulations and restrictions as are used in relation to the Navy of the United States, any officer or seamen who, on board of any private armed ship or vessel, bearing a commission or letter of marque, shall have been, in the line of duty, wounded or otherwise disabled; if an officer, allowing him one-half his monthly pay for the greater disability, and so in proportion; and if a seaman, or acting as a marine, the sum of six dollars per month for the greater disability, and so in proportion; which several pensions shall be paid, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, out of the fund above provided.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the commanding officer of every vessel having a commission, or letters of marque and reprisal, shall enter in his journal the name and rank of any officer, and the name of any seamen who, during his cruise, shall, in the line of his duty, have been wounded or disabled, describing the manner and extent, as far as practicable, of such wound or disability.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That every collector shall transmit quarterly to the Secretary of the Navy a transcript of such journals as may have been reported to him, so far as they give a list of the officers and crew, and the description of wounds and disabilities, the better to enable the Secretary to decide on claims for pensions.

Duties on Privateer Prize Goods.

Mr. CHEVES, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred the bill from the Senate directing the Secretary of the Treasury to remit certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures, reported the same with amendments, the principal one of which is to strike out the words "and the dependencies thereof," so as to exclude from the operation of the bill, the cases of goods brought in from Canada, &c.--The bill was referred to a Committee of the Whole.

Mr. C. also introduced the following report:

The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom were referred so much of the petition of the owners and agents of sundry private armed vessels fitted out of the port of New York, as prays the reduction of the duties on prize goods, and the petitions of sundry owners of private armed vessels fitted out of the port of Boston, and of sundry owners of like vessels fitted out of the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, also praying a reduction of the duties on prize goods, report:

That a letter from John Ferguson and John L. Laurence, agents for the petitioners from New York, and a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, both addressed to the chairman of the committee, and which accompany this report, contain all the facts and views which will probably be found material in the examination and consideration of this subject; and that this committee, having maturely considered them, are of opinion, that a reduction of the duties on prize goods, without embracing, at the same time, all importations made in the prosecution of the ordinary commerce of the country, cannot, consistently with sound policy and rational legislation, be made, and that a general reduction would diminish a revenue, where it does not distress the consumer, and would not produce any material increase of gain to the captors. The committee, therefore, recommend the following resolve:

Resolved, That it is inexpedient to grant the prayer of the petitioners.

Documents referred to in the above report.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23, 1812.

SIR: We take the liberty of enclosing to you, for the inspection of the Committee of Ways and Means, sundry papers connected with the application by the owners of privateers in New York, for a reduction of duties on prize goods. They are as follow:

No. 1, exhibits the proceeds of the schooner Venus and cargo, captured by the privateer Teazer.

No. 2, is a statement of the cost of the privateers General Armstrong and Governor Tompkins.

No. 3, contains extracts of letters from several privateer agents.

The Committee of Ways and Means are (including the accompanying documents) in possession of three statements of prize sales, where the property was, in each case, of a different character from the others. The cargo of the New Liverpool consisted (contrary to our impressions when before the committee) altogether of wine, amounting to 27,959 gallons, whereon the duty was 46 cents per gallon, which consumed more than one-half of the proceeds of vessel and cargo, and, connected with the other charges, left the owners of the privateer about one-sixth of the captured property. The Industry was laden with 152 bbls. salmon; and the benevolent intentions of the privateersmen to restore to an indigent owner the amount of her loss, terminated, in consequence of the high duties and charges, in an inability to present her with more than a paltry sum, scarcely worth her acceptance. The Venus had a cargo of rum, sugar, fruit, and preserves, which produced $17,637 68, and was charged with duties amounting to $8,287 63. The vessel, being well calculated for a privateer, was bought in by the captors for that business. But, experience teaching them that the profits of private naval warfare are by no means equivalent to the hazard, they have abandoned that intention, and are now offering the Venus for sale in the public newspapers, but cannot find a purchaser.

We would respectfully suggest to the Committee of Ways and Means that great anxiety exists in New York, that Congress may give the question of a reduction of prize duties a speedy decision; which, if favorable, will revive the spirit and zeal, now expiring, with which privateering was undertaken at the commencement of the war; and, if unfavorable, will prevent those who have purchased vessels for warlike enterprises, in which they cannot now dispose of any interest, from incurring losses accumulated under fruitless expectations.

We have taken the liberty of reminding the committee that no naval force of any efficiency can be supported by the Government but at an expense far greater than the amount of the duties of which we pray the remission; and that there is probably no other species of naval armament half so destructive as privateers to the commerce of an enemy.

The employment of a great number of experienced masters of vessels and seamen necessarily engaged in them, whose services could not probably be obtained in any other way, and whose skill and intrepidity produce so much honor to the country, forms another important consideration.

To these may be added, that, in no other way, can the mercantile interest be so effectually united in the support and prosecution of the war, as by offering inducements to the investments of its otherwise unemployed capital in such enterprises.

We are, sir, with great respect, your obedient servants,

JOHN FERGUSON, JOHN L. LAWRENCE.

Hon. L. CHEVES, Chairman, &c.

TUESDAY, December 22.

Imprisonment of American Seamen.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following Message from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the Secretary of State, complying with their resolution of the 9th instant.

JAMES MADISON.

DECEMBER 21, 1812.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Dec. 19, 1812.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting information touching the conduct of British officers towards persons taken in American armed ships, has the honor to lay before the President the accompanying papers marked A, B, C, from which it appears, that certain persons, some of whom are said to be native, and others naturalized citizens of the United States, being parts of the crews of the United States armed vessels the "Nautilus" and the "Wasp," and of the private armed vessel the "Sarah Ann," have been seized, under the pretext of their being British subjects, by British officers, for the avowed purpose, as is understood, of having them brought to trial for their lives, and that others, being part of the crew of the Nautilus, have been taken into the British service.

The Secretary of State begs leave also to lay before the President the papers marked D and E. From these it will be seen, that whilst the British naval officers arrest as criminals such persons taken on board American armed vessels as they may consider British subjects, they claim a right to retain on board British ships of war American citizens who may have married in England, or been impressed from on board British merchant vessels; and that they consider an impressed American, when he is discharged from one of their ships, as a prisoner of war. All which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES MONROE.

(A.)

Sir John Borlase Warren to Mr. Monroe.

HALIFAX, September 30, 1812.

SIR: Having received information that a most unauthorized act has been committed by Commodore Rodgers, in forcibly seizing twelve British seamen, prisoners of war, late belonging to the Guerriere, and taking them out of the English cartel brig Endeavor on her passage down the harbor of Boston, after they had been regularly embarked on board of her for an exchange, agreeable to the arrangements settled between the two countries, and that the said British seamen so seized, are now detained on board the United States frigate President as hostages; I feel myself called upon to request, sir, your most serious attention to a measure so fraught with mischief and inconvenience, destructive of the good faith of a flag of truce and the sacred protection of a cartel. I should be extremely sorry that the imprudent act of any officer should involve consequences so particularly severe as the present instance must naturally produce, if repeated; and although it is very much my wish, during the continuance of the differences existing between the two countries, to adopt every measure that might render the effect of war less rigorous, yet, in another point of view, the conviction of the duty I owe my country would, in the event of such grievances as I have already stated being continued, not admit of any hesitation in retaliatory decisions; but as I am strongly persuaded of the high liberality of your sentiments, and that the act complained of has originated entirely with the officer who committed it, and that it will be as censurable in your consideration as it deserves, I rely upon your taking such steps as will prevent a recurrence of conduct so extremely reprehensible in every shape.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN,

Admiral of the Blue, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

JAMES MONROE, Esq., Secretary of State.

Mr. Monroe to Sir John Borlase Warren.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Oct. 28, 1812.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th September, complaining that Commodore Rodgers, commanding a squadron of the United States Navy at the port of Boston, had taken twelve British seamen, lately belonging to His Britannic Majesty's ship the Guerriere, from a cartel in the harbor of Boston, and that he had detained them on board the President, a frigate of the United States, as hostages.

I am instructed to inform you, that inquiry shall be made into the circumstances attending, and the causes which produced the act, of which you complain; and that such measures will be taken, on a knowledge of them, as may comport with the rights of both nations, and may be proper in the case to which they relate.

I beg you, sir, to be assured that it is the sincere desire of the President to see (and to promote, so far as depends on the United States) that the war which exists between the two countries be conducted with the utmost regard to humanity. I have the honor to be, &c.,

JAMES MONROE.

Sir JOHN B. WARREN, Admiral of the Blue, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

(B.)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17, 1812.

SIR: I have the honor to annex a list of twelve of the crew of the late United States sloop of war Wasp, detained by Captain John Beresford, of the British ship Poictiers, under the pretence of their being British subjects.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

GEORGE S. WISE, Purser.

Hon. PAUL HAMILTON, Sec'ry Navy.

[Here follow several other documents, not deemed of material importance, except the following:]

(C.)

_Extract of a letter from Major General Pinckney to the Secretary of War, dated_

HEADQUARTERS, CHARLESTON, November 4, 1812.

"Information having been given upon oath to Lieutenant Grandison, who at present commands in the Naval Department here, that six American seamen, who had been taken prisoners on board of our privateers, had been sent to Jamaica to be tried as British subjects for treason, he called upon the marshal to retain double that number of British seamen as hostages. The marshal, in consequence of instructions from the Department of State, asked my advice on the subject, and I have given my opinion that they ought to be detained until the pleasure of the President shall be known. The testimony of Captain Moon is herewith. I hope, sir, you will have the goodness to have this business put in the proper train to have the President's pleasure on this subject communicated to the marshal."

The Message and documents were, on motion, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

WEDNESDAY, December 23.

Another member, to wit, from Louisiana, THOMAS BOLLING ROBERTSON, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

Increase of the Navy.

The bill from the Senate to increase the Navy of the United States, was read a third time; and the question, being stated, "Shall the bill pass?"

Mr. MCKEE spoke at considerable length against its passage, and concluded by moving to postpone it to Monday, with a view to obtaining further information on the subject of the materials, &c.

The motion to postpone was supported by Mr. ALSTON and Mr. SEYBERT, and opposed by Mr. MILNOR, Mr. BASSETT, and Mr. WIDGERY. The votes were for postponement 51, against it 73.

So the motion was lost.

The question recurring on the passage of the bill,

Mr. POTTER said, as he represented a commercial State, and his constituents at present were very anxious for a navy, he felt it his duty to assign his reasons for the vote he was about to give. He said, when he saw his political friends, with only one exception, in favor of the bill under consideration, and the anxious solicitude of the gentleman on the other side of the House for its fate, he felt himself much embarrassed; but while he was by his feelings at times almost impelled to vote in its favor, his judgment compelled him to vote against it.

Mr. P. said his objections to a navy were that it would cost more than ever it would be worth to the nation; that we could not build, man, and support the ships contemplated, in addition to our present establishment, without resorting to the same means for their support as other maritime nations had done; that it must be supported by impression or oppression; we must either impress our citizens to man our Navy, and compel them to serve against their wills for almost nothing, or oppress the nation with taxes not to be endured, to enable the Government to give such wages as would induce our seamen to enter voluntarily into our service. He said it had been observed by the friends of the bill, and particularly by his friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MILNOR,) that the Navy was at this time very popular with all parties, in this House and the nation; that they had done honor to themselves and to their country, while our army had, in almost every instance, been defeated and disgraced. Mr. P. said we had been very unfortunate in the selection of some of our commanding officers, who had, as it would seem, been appointed more because they wanted office, than because they were qualified for it; some of them were too old, and others too young; but he believed we had as good officers in our Army as we had in the Navy, and whenever the time should arrive that would afford them a fair opportunity, that they would equally distinguish themselves.

Mr. P. said there was a kind of popular delusion at this time about a Navy, that he found difficult to oppose. He said it was at least popular with all those who expected to make money out of it, and with many from the most honorable motives. But he believed, when the people, who were to pay all, and receive nothing, come to see that we had spent for them the last year upwards of twenty millions of dollars, and that notwithstanding all the moneys we had received, by double duties, and otherwise, that we had increased the national debt, in that year, ten millions six hundred thousand dollars, and that we want, for the expenses of the present year, agreeably to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, $31,925,000, exclusive of the expense of the contemplated increase of our Navy, and for losses and war contingencies--that when they should put those sums together, and apportion them to the several States, agreeable to the constitution, and see that but few individuals, and not many States, would have personal property sufficient to pay their proportions--that this delusion as to those who have eventually all this money to pay would at least vanish.

It was likewise said that the spirit of the nation demanded this increase of our Navy. He remembered very well that it was so said on a former occasion, and that the finger of Heaven pointed to war, but it was very soon found that the finger of the people pointed to peace. It was then said, as it is now said, that we were a divided people, and it was necessary to convince foreign nations that we would support our own Government. The then Executive was addressed from all parts of the United States, with pledges of life, fortune, and sacred honor, in support of what he had done, or should do. This was intended to correct the error abroad as to our being a divided people, and for no other purpose. Its object was entirely misunderstood by the then President. He thought they were uneasy and wanted something to steady them. An army was raised, and taxes laid for their benefit;--a navy was provided which did honor to themselves and the nation, that protected our commerce, and caused our flag to be respected in every sea, in consequence of which our revenue continued to increase, notwithstanding all the depredations committed on our commerce, and the nation appeared to be prosperous and happy; but when the people were called upon to test the sincerity of their pledges and promises, by the payment of a tax of only two millions of dollars, they said they had been entirely misunderstood, that those pledges were intended to have an influence abroad, and not for the purpose of trouble at home, and that they would not pay taxes to support a navy or army; and, the first opportunity they had, they changed the Administration. If they would not then pay two millions of dollars, to support that Administration, can they be expected to pay nearly fifty millions for the support of this, for the same purposes?

Mr. P. said this Administration, during the last session of Congress, was addressed from all parts of the Union, and from many of the States in their legislative capacities, promising to support them with their lives, fortunes, and sacred honors, in common form. This perhaps was to have its influence abroad. The Administration, believing them sincere, have been induced to declare war, and are left to carry it on without money. They find that those pledges and promises cost but little, and are worth nothing; and the consequence will be, that when the people are called upon to pay those enormous expenses, the present Administration will share the same fate from them as the former did.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CUTTS) said the expense of this Navy would swamp the present, as it had done a former Administration; that, Mr. P. said, was a business of their own, it was no concern of his; but if with their means they could not manage the affairs of the nation, with their present experience, having seen the rock on which a former Administration split, they would richly deserve it; his only object was to keep his constituents from being mired down with debt and taxes.

Many gentlemen support this bill upon the principle that this settles the question; that we are to become a great naval power, and to have a permanent Naval Establishment; to this Mr. P. said he objected for the reasons he had assigned; he said he had found mankind much the same: give them power, and they would not only use, but abuse it--give them money, and they will spend it, and want to borrow; and, he said, if an Administration like the present, without money, without an army, or navy, would plunge this country so unprepared into a war, and continue it for the present existing cause, and extend their views of conquest to the Floridas, the Canadas, Quebec, Halifax, and Nova Scotia, whenever they should have money, an army, and ships; the next thing they would want colonies, as other nations had done, and that Bermuda and New Providence would be in our way; and we must have Jamaica to get good rum and sugar. And instead of this country enjoying peace, which is above all things the most desirable, we should be involved like other nations in perpetual war.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill till to-morrow.--Lost.

So the bill was passed.

Medal to Commodore Preble, &c.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the Secretary of the Navy, complying with their resolution of the 16th instant.

JAMES MADISON.

DECEMBER 23, 1812.

The following is the report referred to in the above Message:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Dec. 21, 1812.

SIR: On the subject of the resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives, of the 16th instant, I have the honor to state, that, in pursuance of the resolution of Congress of the 3d March, 1805, a gold medal, emblematical of the attacks on the town, batteries and naval force, of Tripoli, by the squadron under Commodore Preble's command, was presented to Commodore Preble, in the manner stated in the enclosed letter, dated May 17, 1806: That one month's pay was allowed, "exclusive of the common allowance, to all the petty officers, seamen, and marines, of the squadron, who so gloriously supported the honor of the American flag, under the orders of their gallant commander, in the several attacks:" That no sword has been presented to either of the commissioned officers or midshipmen, who distinguished themselves in the several attacks: And that it is not known to this Department that there ever was made by Congress a specific appropriation of $20,000 for the purpose of carrying into effect the resolution referred to.

With respect to that part of the resolution which requests the President to cause a sword to be presented to each of the commissioned officers and midshipmen who distinguished themselves, it is presumed that the President saw what to his mind appeared difficulties of great delicacy, from the peculiar language of the resolution. By the resolution, he was requested to present swords to such only as had distinguished themselves; and all having been represented to him as having acted gloriously, he could not in justice draw with precision a line of discrimination. He felt, it is presumed, a repugnance to the making of a selection, which, by implication, would necessarily have cast an unmerited reproach upon all not therein included. A degradation of that kind might have greatly injured the service, and could not possibly have been grateful to the honorable feelings of the favored officers.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your obedient servant,

PAUL HAMILTON.

To the PRESIDENT.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 17, 1812.

SIR: In pursuance of the resolution of Congress of the 3d March, 1805, requesting the President of the United States to cause a gold medal to be struck, emblematical of the attacks on the town, batteries, and naval force, of Tripoli, by the squadron under your command, and to present it to you in such manner as in his opinion would be most honorable to you, the medal, which will herewith be delivered to you by Lieutenant Jones, has been struck. You will receive it, sir, as a testimony of your country's estimation of the important and honorable services rendered by you; and you will be pleased to accept an assurance of the great pleasure I have in the honor of presenting it to you.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

R. SMITH.

To Com. EDWARD PREBLE.

From the records of the Navy Department.

PAUL HAMILTON.

After some conversation as to the proper course for this business to take, it was referred to a select committee, to consist of seven members, to consider and report thereon.

Mr. QUINCY, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. ROANE, Mr. LACOCK, Mr. TROUP, Mr. EMOTT, and Mr. DINSMOOR, were appointed the committee.

MONDAY, December 28.

_Public Lands--Cash System and Reduction of Price._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee on the Public Lands, made on the second instant, respecting an extension of the time limited by law for the payment of lands purchased of the United States.

The report concludes with the following resolutions, the adoption of which the committee recommend:

"Resolved, That such part of the laws for the sale of public lands as allow a credit on part of the purchase money, be repealed; and that the price at which lands shall be offered in future shall be one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.

"Resolved, That in future sales a portion of the public lands be offered in tracts of eighty acres.

"Resolved, That two years be given in addition to the time allowed by law to the purchasers of public lands, whose time of payment shall have or may expire on or before the first day of January, 1814, on condition that all the interest that has accrued or may accrue on or before the 18th day of March next, shall be paid at that day, and the interest that may become due thereafter shall be paid at the day on which the time, according to existing laws, shall expire for making payment."

Considerable desultory debate took place on these propositions; but the committee rose without coming to any decision thereon, and obtained leave to sit again.

TUESDAY, December 29.

Additional Military Force.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill "supplementary to the act for the more perfect organization of the Army of the United States," and on the bill "in addition to the act for raising an additional military force."

The bills having been read through, a motion was made by Mr. DAVID R. WILLIAMS to fill the blanks in the first bill, for the amount of bounty, &c., and the question having been stated--

Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS said, the embarrassment which he felt on the present occasion, was not of an ordinary kind; he was so solemnly impressed with the importance of the subject before the committee, he was fearful its success might, in some degree, depend on his efforts to sustain it; and, feeling that the interest, perhaps the character of his country, might be committed by the decision, he was humbled that its cause could not by him be more ably supported. He felt, however, some confidence from the circumstance that the Military Committee was entitled to the candor of the House, because it had not presented mere fragments, to be acted on in detail, but a system on which to rest the future prosecution of the war. An explanation of its merits, from the relation in which he stood to that committee, was probably expected of him.

Without going back to the unavoidable and just causes of the war in which we were engaged, he would presume it was the object of all to terminate it successfully, and that there now remained no other mode than to call into the field a force adequate to the command of every honorable object. The force was abundant throughout the community, to secure, if directed with skill, spirit, and enterprise, our defence everywhere; and, by offence, to make the enemy feel it had become his interest to abstain from plunder and oppression.

The character of our Government had been so depressed in Europe, not more by foreign than domestic misrepresentation, as much even within these walls as without them, it had become necessary to make war to place our backs against the wall and prove to European marauders there is a point beyond which we will not recede. This good the war has accomplished; but it has become more than ever necessary to prove that we will not only declare war, but can prosecute it with energy and courageous enterprise. The honor, the character of the nation, require that the British power on our borders shall be demolished in the next campaign--her American provinces once wrested from her, every attempt to recover them will be chimerical, except through negotiation. The road to peace then lies through Canada. When we shall once be in possession of it, peace, honorable peace, the sole object of us all, is secured. But some gentlemen affect a sympathy for the Canadians--why, say they, will you make war on them? They have not injured us. Nor, sir, has the British tar injured us, although he is the instrument of plunder and impressment. It is to conquer the sovereignty of the soil, to raze the British power, to reach, by such means, her profligate and unjust ministry, that war is waged at all--the unarmed will never fall on American bayonets; it is not against the people of either Canada or Great Britain, but against the English subject in arms, that the war is directed. By physical force then alone can we proceed.

Having shown the necessity of augmenting the regular forces, it was equally material to provide for filling the ranks, and for keeping them at their full complement when filled. With this view was the 1st section introduced. The greatest evil, incident to the recruiting service, results from the number of persons to whom the public money was necessarily distributed; in proportion to the number of persons with whom it is intrusted, will be its misapplication. To remedy this it is proposed to appoint officers to each regiment, for that particular purpose, in no way different from those already appointed, who shall be employed in recruiting for their respective regiments; these to be under the order of a major, who shall receive and be accountable for the issue of money and clothes for that service. The ranks filled, the presence of all the officers on the present establishment will be indispensable, as in our service the proportion of privates to the officers is greater than in any other service whatever. The new organization which was given to the Army at the last session increased the number of privates in each company, without a corresponding increase of officers. If two lieutenants were necessary in a company, for the purpose of discipline and recruiting, when it consisted of only sixty-four privates, assuredly three are as much so now it is raised to ninety. The recruits, as fast as they are enlisted, may be concentrated under the eye of the major, where they may be exercised and drilled, so that when he joins the regiment, they will be qualified to enter the ranks and face the enemy.

One other objection he could anticipate--perhaps those who can sneer at the disasters and misfortunes of the late campaign may object that there is no encouragement to vote additional forces, seeing those which have been already raised have been so illy employed. It becomes us all to be equally faithful to our country, whether her arms are victorious or not; it is in times of discomfiture that the patriot's resolution and virtues are most needed. It is no matter by what party names we are distinguished; this is our country--we are children of the same family, and ought to be brothers in a common cause. The misfortune which befalls one portion, should sink deep in the hearts of the others also. What misfortune so great as the loss of character? If we shall forget our impatience under disgrace, and look back on the events that have passed, with only as much candor as becomes us, this objection must vanish. Under the circumstances in which it found itself, without experience, either in itself or others to guide it, Administration ought not to be censured for the bad military appointments it may have made, however much it may deserve, if it shall retain men in employ, when found incapable to discharge the duties intrusted to him. He was fearless of contradiction in declaring, all our disasters sprung from a cause which no man in the nation could have anticipated. It was next to impossible any human being could have foreseen, much less provided against it. It was with pain and reluctance he felt it his duty to speak of an officer fallen and disgraced; he wished he could discover any cause for the surrender of Detroit, less heinous than treachery or cowardice--between them he saw nothing to choose. Justice will hereafter, if party heat denies it now, pronounce the plan of the campaign, as intrusted to General Hull, easy to be accomplished and judicious in its objects. The commandant was furnished with every means necessary for success--with money, men, provisions, and munitions of war, in abundance. What better mode could have been adopted, to prevent Indian hostility and intercept British supplies of the instruments of massacre? That your army had not been protected beyond the point with which communications could have been maintained, is evident from the events which followed. What was there to mar success? The commandant at Maiden needed only an apology to surrender! What if the other Hull had commanded? Every thing would have fallen before him--great science was not necessary; courage and faithfulness would have accomplished every thing. A train of heavy artillery was not required to batter a breach for the assault; it was not necessary to fire a single gun--not a cartridge need have been expended--the bayonet alone was adequate to have taken Maiden at any hour from the moment the American army crossed into Canada, till its most shameful retreat. The fort was not enclosed--one entire side was open to assault. Yes, sir, had the brave Hull, who bore your "thunder on the mountain wave," directed the valor of the army, he would have poured the storm of victory resistless on the foe. This black deed, without a battle, was consummated in the solicitous surrender of the brave corps which were hastening to his relief; these, too, were arrested and thrown back on the community, leaving the whole Western frontier exposed to savage inroad. Hence all our misfortunes! After this, will it be contended that the accidental appointment of an improper agent shall cause a refusal of the force necessary to drag our drowned honor up from the ocean of infamy into which it has been plunged? Impossible! Economy of life and treasure call for a vigorous campaign--away with lifeless expedients; miserable inertness must be banished--zeal and energy must be infused everywhere. One protracted campaign will cost twenty-fold more than the expenditure now asked for. Let this be the signal for resolution--the first evidence of energetic policy. Let us suppose ourselves leading the forlorn hope, and assume the spirit and vigor characteristic of such an enterprise--the army will feel it--the people will feel it--disaster and disgrace will then disappear. It is to save the public treasure--the people's blood; it is for the reclamation of character, I ask for high bounties and premiums; and, so asking, I hope not to be denied.

The question was then taken on filling the several blanks in the first bill, and carried.

Mr. H. CLAY congratulated the committee and the nation on the system which had been presented to their consideration, and the prospect of prosecuting the next campaign with a vigor which should insure a successful result. He rose at this time, however, to propose an amendment to the bill, the object of which was to repeal so much of former laws as authorizes a bounty of land to the recruits. He was satisfied that, as respected the nation, this was a waste of its capital, without producing a single provident result. As to the recruiting service, he was convinced, from what he had heard, that it added scarcely any inducement to the recruit--that it had not added a hundred men to the army. He confessed he had been much mistaken as to the effect it had been expected to produce, &c. Mr. C. added many remarks going to support his positions, stating, among other things, that the land would in the end get into the hands of speculators, and the individuals for whose benefit it was intended would derive no advantage from it. Now that it was proposed to increase the bounty in money, he thought it would be a proper occasion to repeal so much of the existing laws as allowed a bounty in land, on which the recruits set generally as much value as if it were located in the moon. Mr. C. concluded by making a motion to that effect.

Mr. TROUP and Mr. BIBB stated objections to the motion, as going to withdraw what was certainly, in many parts of the country, an inducement to enlistments, at a time when every means ought to be called into action for the purpose of filling the ranks of the army.

Mr. CLAY'S motion was then agreed to by the committee.

The other bill before the committee, going to authorize the raising an additional force of twenty thousand men for one year, was then taken up, and the blanks therein severally filled.

Mr. PITKIN, adverting to the provision of the bill which gives the appointment of officers below the rank of colonel to the President alone, inquired the reasons why, contrary to the general usage, the Senate were precluded from concurrence in these appointments?

Mr. WILLIAMS stated that the motive of the committee in proposing this provision was, to avoid the delay incidental to the minor appointments, which could be much more easily and effectually made by the colonels of the regiments, respectively, who would be personally acquainted with, and responsible for, the good conduct of those who were appointed.

Mr. TALLMADGE moved to strike out the section of the bill which directs the manner in which the company officers shall be appointed. He said he had hoped that the committee would have risen and given at least one day for consideration; that they would have maturely weighed and deliberately made up their minds on this question. It is true that, in 1798, there was a power given to the President of the United States to appoint all officers for ten thousand men under the rank of field officers; but the appointment of all field officers was retained to the President and Senate. Mr. T. said he knew how perfectly easy it was to go on step by step, and yield power till it all passed out of our hands. The argument now is a plea of urgency. What was the case in 1798? Not the same as now. Congress had been making preparations on the contingency of war. The language of the law which has been referred to is to this effect: in case of war being declared by any foreign power, or the country actually invaded, then the President shall have the power of appointing these officers. Such a provision was very different from that now proposed. Mr. T. was also opposed to this section in the bill, because he would not pass a bill going, as far as in the power of this House, to take away the power of appointment from the Senate. It was a disrespect he would not offer to them, to call upon them to ratify a law depriving themselves of a power they have uniformly possessed and exercised.

The question was taken on Mr. TALLMADGE'S motion to strike out the section, and lost.

The committee rose and reported the two bills and the House adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, December 30.

Additional Military Force.

The question was then taken on engrossment of the bill for a third reading, and passed in the affirmative--yeas 70, nays 37, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jr., Stevenson Archer, Daniel Avery, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, William Barnett, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, John C. Calhoun, Francis Carr, Langdon Cheves, Matthew Clay, James Cochran, John Clopton, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, Roger Davis, Joseph Desha, Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, William Findlay, James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Charles Goldsborough, Isaiah L. Green, Felix Grundy, Bolling Hall, Obed Hall, John A. Harper, Aylett Hawes, John M. Hyneman, Joseph Kent, William R. King, Abner Lacock, Peter Little, Aaron Lyle, Nathaniel Macon, Thomas Moore, William McCoy, Samuel McKee, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel Pickens, James Pleasants, jr., Benjamin Pond, William M. Richardson, Thomas B. Robertson, John Rhea, John Roane, Jonathan Roberts, Ebenezer Sage, Thos. Sammons, John Sevier, Adam Seybert, George Smith, John Taliaferro, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Robert Whitehill, David R. Williams, William Widgery, and Richard Wynn.

NAYS.--John Baker, Abijah Bigelow, Harmanus Bleecker, Adam Boyd, James Breckenridge, Elijah Brigham, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, John Davenport, jr., William Ely, James Emott, Thos. R. Gold, Edwin Gray, Jacob Hufty, Richard Jackson, jr., Lyman Law, Joseph, Lewis, jr., George C. Maxwell, Archibald McBryde, Jonathan O. Mosely, Thos. Newbold, Joseph Pearson, Timothy Pitkin, jr., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, William Reed, Henry M. Ridgely, William Rodman, Daniel Sheffey, Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, and Thomas Wilson.

So the bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

The House then proceeded to the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on the other bill reported by the committee, entitled "A bill in addition to the act to raise an additional military force, and for other purposes"--the first section of which is as follows:

Be it enacted, &c., That, in addition to the present Military Establishment of the United States, there be raised twenty regiments of infantry, to be enlisted for the term of one year, unless sooner discharged.

[The remainder of the bill is mere detail; the bounty on enlistment sixteen dollars.]

Mr. GOLD said this was a bill involving questions of great importance, as well in principle as in its details. There was one feature especially of the bill which required mature consideration; he alluded to the limited period of service of the proposed additional force. There was no pressing emergency to hurry the bill; and he, therefore, moved to postpone the further consideration of it to Monday, which was negatived.

Death of Mr. Smilie.

So soon as this decision was declared--

Mr. FINDLAY rose.--It is my melancholy duty, said he, to announce to this House that my venerable colleague and old friend and associate, JOHN SMILIE, is no more. He departed this life at two o'clock this afternoon.

A committee was then appointed to superintend the funeral of the deceased, consisting of Messrs. FINDLAY, LYLE, BROWN, ROBERTS, DAVIS, LACOCK, and HYNEMAN.

A resolution was unanimously adopted, requesting each member of the House, in testimony of their respect to the memory of JOHN SMILIE, to wear crape on the left arm for one month.

And, on motion of Mr. FITCH, the House then adjourned.

THURSDAY, December 31.

On motion of Mr. FINDLAY,

Resolved, unanimously, That the members of this House will attend the funeral of the late JOHN SMILIE, this day, at two o'clock.

Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to notify them of the death of John Smilie, late a member of this House, and that his funeral will take place at two o'clock, this day.

And then the House adjourned.

SATURDAY, January 2, 1813.

Additional Military Force.

The House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on the bill in addition to the act for raising an additional military force.

The amendments made by the House having been agreed to, the question was stated, Shall the bill be engrossed, and read a third time?

Mr. MOSELY said that, in stating concisely some of the reasons which would induce him to vote against the present bill, he should not attempt to enter into a consideration of the justice or expediency of the war, nor the policy of continuing it. War is declared, and it appears to be the determination of those who have the control of our public concerns to prosecute it with the utmost vigor; yes, sir, with a vigor that, within twelve months from the enlistment of the twenty thousand men to be raised by this bill, we are told must bring it to a successful termination. Really, Mr. Speaker, when I listened to the confident assurance of the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee, that with these twenty thousand men, in addition to the troops already raised, and voted to be raised, we should in a single campaign be able to conquer Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and that the object of all these conquests was to procure an honorable peace, I almost felt myself persuaded as a peace man to join the honorable gentleman in his project of fighting for peace one year, with such a certainty of obtaining it at the expiration of that period; but unfortunately I could not but recollect the fate of similar assurances made on former occasions. When we were about declaring war, I very well remember that we were told with equal confidence by gentlemen anxious to engage in it (and who would listen to no arguments, even for delay, against the measure) that we had only to declare war, and Canada would, in the course of a few months, at most, be ours; that the militia alone, with the aid of a very few regulars, would be competent to the conquest of the whole country, except the fortress of Quebec; and that that must very soon fall of course. An honorable gentleman from Vermont (Mr. FISK) informed us that the people of those Provinces would almost conquer themselves; that they were at least pre-disposed to be conquered--to use his own expression, that they were "panting" to participate in our liberty.

Experience has now proved the fallacy of these predictions. Gentlemen must now be convinced that Canada is not to be conquered quite so easily as they had imagined--that it is not to be subdued with a few thousand militia, regulars, or volunteers, though aided by proclamations. I mention proclamations, because they seem to be considered as an indispensable auxiliary on all great emergencies. What can be done by proclamation, I will readily concede we are competent to do. No nation, I believe, ever arrived at greater perfection in the art of proclamation-making than we have done; and if history is faithful to record them, we shall in this particular at least bear the palm from all the world.

Sir, it can afford pleasure to no man, who feels as he ought for the honor and interest of his country, to dwell unnecessarily upon the disasters and disgrace which have everywhere attended our military operations from the commencement of the war to the present time. I mean upon land; for to our little Navy too much praise cannot be given. Our gallant seamen have not only afforded to their countrymen examples of valor worthy of imitation, but they have also taught us a lesson of wisdom, by which I am happy to find we have manifested a disposition to profit. But, sir, while gentlemen must feel mortified at the miserable termination of all our boasted military exploits thus far, and might wish to draw a veil over the disgraceful scenes which have taken place, it cannot be done; it would be unwise to attempt it. We ought rather to look at the causes which have produced our misfortunes, and pursue a course in future which may not expose us to similar evils.

Mr. GOLD said the annals of this Government, the last six months, commencing with the declaration of war, would be found the most interesting, the most deplorable.

In that period, we have seen a war declared, precipitately and prematurely; for, notwithstanding all the arguments urged on that occasion, with so much zeal and eloquence, time has dissipated all; the illusion has vanished; your army, so confidently expected, did not, under the magic of that declaration, spring into existence; the condition of your enlistments would not, I apprehend, at this hour, justify the declaration of war. We have seen, sir, that war conducted in a manner well to comport with the spirit in which it was declared; disaster upon disaster in rapid succession have followed; the tone and heart of the country broken; universal disgust at the past, and deep concern and anxiety for the future, prevail everywhere.

And what, Mr. Speaker, is now proposed for the future--what is to retrieve our affairs--on what are our hopes to rest? An army of twelve-months' men! A broken reed! An army and term of service, which well nigh lost the country in the Revolutionary war; an army which in every step and stage of that war received the uniform and reiterated censure and condemnation of Washington, and every intelligent officer of that period; an army that stands recorded by every historian of that war with deep reproach and reprobation. Such is the foundation of our future hopes; shutting our eyes upon the lessons of experience, we live but to repeat former errors and renew our sufferings. Shall we never learn, that a soldier is not the creature of an hour; that he must be seasoned to the hardships of war; that to remove your recruit from his fireside, from his plentiful board, and all the comforts with which he is surrounded, to the theatre of service, there to sleep on the ground in tents, with two or three articles of subsistence only, is to give him up a victim to disease, to consign him to the grave? This precise result is presented to the mind by the melancholy review of the last campaign; disease and death have walked abroad in our armies on the frontier; they have been swept to the grave as by the besom of destruction. It has not stopped with your army; the frontier inhabitants, infected by the diseases of the camp, fly from the deadly theatre as from a destroying angel! Shall we never learn the difference between our situation, and that of nations who have a competent military establishment, sufficient at all times for both offensive and defensive operations?

The slender Military Establishment of the United States, whilst it consults economy, and favors the genius of the Government, forbids a hasty resort to war, especially extra-territorial and offensive war; time for preparation, after the measure is resolved on, is indispensable; and a disregard of our situation in this respect cannot fail to induce defeat and disaster--to produce such a campaign as has just now closed.

But, Mr. Speaker, wherefore change the term of enlistment, from five years, or during the war, to one year? The sole avowed object of the war by land was the conquest of the Canadas. Are you at this hour nearer your object than on the day you declared war, or has that object, with a steady and sure pace, constantly receded from you as you have advanced in the war? Is Canada so far conquered that you can now reduce the term of enlistment? It is impossible to shut our eyes on the past; while all is disgust and despondency with our own citizens--sick of the past, and concerned for the future; while every post brings to the Cabinet fearful and alarming changes in the sentiments of the people under this ill-fated war; your enemy, the Canadians, take courage, their wavering sentiments have become resolved, and union in defence of their firesides, the land that gives them bread, is spreading and cementing all in the patriotic vow.

There was a time, sir, when you had friends in the Upper Province; there were many who wished well to your arms, and would have greeted your approach, but that ill-fated policy which precipitated every thing, which in zeal for the end overlooked the means, has blasted all our hopes from that quarter. The Canadian, while he knows your power, distrusts your wisdom and your capacity to conduct the war; he dares not commit himself, his all, to such auspices. Hence, sir, difficulties thicken on every side, and at least three times the force is now necessary to effect the conquest, which would have been required at the commencement of the war. Have we made an impression on the Prince Regent and his Ministry? are they now more disposed to succumb and accept your terms than before the war? How stand the people of the British Empire? Instead of their coercing the Government into our terms, which we fondly anticipated, the late election to Parliament shows them disposed to go hand in hand with the Government in resisting our claims and inflicting on us all the evils of war. "Maritime Rights" are echoed and re-echoed with applause throughout the Empire. Such, sir, are the bitter fruits of your policy, and to what farther point the same hand shall conduct the destinies of the country, remains to be seen.

I seek not to aggravate the misconduct of the war, nor to commend our enemies, but only wish, sir, that we may see things as they are, our actual situation, and thus look danger in the face. Do you persevere in the conquest of Canada? Pass not the barrier with an army of less than forty-five or fifty thousand men: if you do, in my apprehension, the defeats and disasters of the past campaign will be visited upon you; another army will be made to pass under the yoke, and at the end of the year, you will find yourself still further removed from your object. The tug of war is now placed fairly before us, we cannot advance without meeting it. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the grounds on which I object to this twelve-months' army; it is not adapted to the professed object of the war, the conquest of Canada. Is there, sir, any other object in contemplation of the Government; any other land of leeks and onions, which Heaven has given us, or to which our destinies lead? Is the South of easier access than the North, and is the circle of hostility to be extended to that quarter? We profess a pacific policy; moderation and justice are our boast; let us beware how we commit to the hazard this high and enviable character; how we yield, on specious grounds, to the mad and destructive policy which we reprobate in others; a policy which has in all periods overwhelmed nations with calamity, and swelled the tide of human misery.

I fear there are points in our neutral course, in our relative conduct towards Great Britain and France which will not bear examination. You proclaimed the Berlin and Milan decrees revoked, and put upon Great Britain the threatened alternative of non-intercourse. Was the fact so? You took a promise for the fact; you proclaimed the fact, while France herself, the author of the deed and party to be benefited, denies and disowns it as done at the time. Here was a fatal error, a departure from the straight line of justice; and when our error in this was palpable to all the world, we gave no explanation, no excuse, but persevered in a measure which led to war. It is this course, sir, this departure from even-handed neutrality between Great Britain and France, that has lost you the support of your own citizens to a great and alarming extent, and at this moment sustains the British Ministry in the hearts of Englishmen. It is this belief of our Government's leaning to France, that has carried that Ministry so triumphantly through the late elections to Parliament.

If any thing could add to the gloom and sicken the mind under the prospect before us, it is the inauspicious conjunction of events. America and France both making war at the same time on Great Britain; we making the enemy of France our enemy, and this at the ill-fated moment when the all-grasping Emperor of that country is rolling a baleful cloud, charged with destruction, north upon the Russian Empire; upon a power always just to America; upon our truest and best friend in the European theatre. Against such a friend, at such a period, we have beheld the march of the Corsican through rivers of blood; his footsteps are traced over the ashes of the proudest cities, and he sits himself down, at length, at Moscow, like Marius over the ruins of Carthage.

The question was then taken on Mr. CLAY'S motion, and negatived.

Mr. MACON moved to strike out one, and insert five years as the term of enlistment. He regretted as much as any one the disasters which had befallen the country; and there was but one way to obviate their effects, and that was by rising superior to them, as a part of the nation had already done--he meant the Western country, where a patriotism had been exhibited equal to that which might have distinguished Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to their bravery--and the only drawback on their enterprise was the difficulty of finding something to eat in the wilderness. We must rise after reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would have become of Rome, had she desponded when Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon it and became the mistress of the world. What would have been the situation of our cause in the Revolution, if, after the British successes in Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of Pennsylvania and New Jersey rose on it, and victory and triumph followed. Our object now ought to be to recover the ground we have lost, and meet the enemy with troops that will insure success. We are told, sir, this war has united England to a man. Sir, I never expected aid from our enemies. Let us follow so good an example, and unite to a man; let us remember the old Continental maxim--"United we stand, divided we fall." If we were as united in defence of our rights, as England is in her usurpations, this war would not last a single campaign--and I hope in this respect we shall, at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The calculations about one or two campaigns, however, in present circumstances, are visionary. We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of yielding very soon. But, if we were to unite, the question would soon be settled. The cause and object of this war has been more concisely stated by one of those actively engaged in it, than by any other person--I mean Captain Porter's motto--"Free trade and sailors' rights;" no man could have given a better definition of it. It appears to me that one part of this continent ought to be zealous for the rights of seamen--another part for a free export trade; and, if we were, as we ought to be, united, the war would be carried on with energy and with success. I agree with the gentleman from New Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing we can do, is to raise men for five years. Let the Legislature of the country do its duty. If the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized, be not enough, let us get as many as will be adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen have thought proper to review former transactions. I would be willing to pass them over. I believe almost every measure adopted by the General Government would have had its destined effect if adhered to. You have always got the better of the argument; you have better proclamations; but what avails all this? Britain has impressed your seamen, and given you blows for good words. You have been heretofore told your paper measures were worth nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow for blow, what is said? That you are departing from the pacific system, which the same persons before reprobated, and to which they have become friendly only after every attempt at pacification has failed. Sir, we are now engaged in war, and we must succeed or we must yield the rights of sailors and free trade. Does any man doubt that the war is justly undertaken? Is there a man in the nation--I care not of what political sect, many as there are--who believes that the war is not undertaken on just grounds--that we had not borne with their indignities till we could have borne them no longer? After plundering your property and impressing your seamen on the ocean, their agents have been sent into this nation to sow divisions among us, who ought to be but one family. What crime has been left undone? what injury have we not suffered? Could one be added to the catalogue? It seems to me not. No man loves peace more than I do, and if it had not been for Great Britain sending her agents to our firesides, I do not know but I should have voted against the war. It seemed to me like an attempt on a man's daughter. Not content with vexing and harassing you whenever you went from home, they came here to put strife into your family. You have been told that the Prince Regent and his Ministers are firm. Sir, we never calculated on their receding, but on the energies and force of the nation to obtain redress, and if we had been united, we should have equalled our most sanguine expectations. Let us follow their example, and determine to maintain our national rights, as they do to maintain their usurpations on them.

Mr. M. CLAY seconded the motion of Mr. MACON to strike out "one year" and insert "five," as the term of enlistment. He said an army ought to be seasoned before it was carried into the field. We have heard much said, observed he, about sickness in your army; much of the sickness, some time ago, at New Orleans, and much lately of the sickness at Plattsburg. Have you ever heard of an army on earth that was carried into the field before it had been seasoned in the camp? It must, to be good for any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become inured to the mode of living and the fare of soldiers. It will take some time to season men to the change in their mode of living which must take place on going into camp. It will take a year to prepare them for the field. Without discipline they will be useless. Your seamen are brave and successful because they know what they go to sea for. Take a landsman on board a ship, and what sort of a sailor will he make? Such as the French have on board their vessels. We take no man into the Navy but who understands his business and the purpose for which he goes there, and we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood, sir, if I vote against the bill, that I am opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a righteous war, into which I go with hand and heart. We may differ about the mode, but that is all. I speak from experience more than from any thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to serve during the war, be it long or short. It is absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as much under our command as she has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask them no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now, and having no place of resort in the North, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land as their whole navy could conquer ours on the ocean. As to coping with them at sea, we cannot do it. We can annoy them, but not meet them on the open sea. I would meet them and hurt them, however, where we can. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do. God has given us the power and the means; we are to blame if we do not use them. If we get the continent, she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I hope, sir, the amendment of my friend from North Carolina, going to make this army more efficient, may be adopted.

Mr. PLEASANTS said, before the question was taken, he wished to submit a few of the reasons why he was opposed to the amendment. The question before the House, if he correctly understood it, was not, what were the best materials of which to make an army; whether men for the war, for five years, or for twelve months; but the question was, what is the kind of force, and for what length of time can you raise an army to take the field at the earliest period? I hesitate not a moment, Mr. P. said, to declare, that if it were within the compass of our ability to raise an army for five years by voting it, I would authorize it. Not a moment should I doubt on the subject. The history of the world is strongly in favor of such an army. But we perfectly know, from the progress of the recruiting service, that we have already authorized as many men of that description as we shall probably be able to raise. This force is wanted to render the next campaign efficient. I consider the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer system heretofore pursued. Of what materials will this army be composed? Of young men ready to volunteer their services for one year in the form of regulars; and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, men will enlist in this corps who would not enlist for five years, or for the war. I am sanguine in the opinion, that this measure, if now adopted, will do away the defects of the present volunteer system, and I am fully of opinion, that under it, a force may be drawn into the field ready to act efficiently in the next campaign. I am not one of those, sir, notwithstanding the accounts we have heard of our disasters, who despair of the Republic. If we turn to history we shall find that we have never engaged in any war in which we have come out better in the first campaign than we have in this. Look at the war undertaken under the auspices of Gen. Washington against the Indians. What was the history of it? We all recollect the campaign under Harmar, and its bloody scenes. The campaign under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We then suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster, in the course of the war, which was not terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in 1795, though it may be said to have virtually terminated by the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty. If this country be willing to go into the contest heart and hand, we shall in a very short time demonstrate to the enemy all we want to convince her of, that it is in reality her interest to be at peace with this country. I hope, sir, the motion to amend the bill will not prevail. I am perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will enable us to call a valuable force into service, and I am sanguine in the hope, that, with its aid, together with the other force we shall have, we may clear the continent of the enemy's dominion in one campaign, though I do not undertake to predict that we shall.

The question was then taken on Mr. MACON'S proposed amendment, and lost.

The question recurred on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. PEARSON said, not unfrequently it happens, Mr. Speaker, both in private and political life, that men of the clearest perceptions and most correct motives, experience much difficulty and embarrassment in determining on the course best to be pursued, or the application of means best calculated to produce a given object. The object most devoutly wished for by myself, and, no doubt, equally desired by every honest and honorable man in this community, is, that my country should once more be restored to the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of existing circumstances, involved in a war with a powerful nation--a war now prosecuted for a doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted question of national right--a war, the prosecution of which, so far as relates to our military operations, has everywhere, and on all occasions, been attended with disgrace, defeat, or disaster; under such circumstances, I confess, sir, I am not free from embarrassment in determining on the course demanded by genuine patriotism, or best calculated to restore the blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS) declare, the other day, that his object was also peace. It must be a source of gratification to the country to learn that some of the strongest advocates for the declaration of war begin now to think and talk of peace.

The honorable gentleman, however, urges the passage of the bill under consideration, (which authorizes the enlistment of twenty thousand additional regular troops for one year; and provides for the appointment of proportionally an unusual number of officers, with all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,) as the means best calculated to produce the end in view. Did I believe, sir, that the passage of this bill, or (what is more difficult and less likely to happen) the actual enlistment of the proposed additional force would secure to us our object, I would not only consent to give this force, but ten times the number, if it were by force alone to be obtained; but when I reflect on the special and sole cause for which it is avowed the war is now prosecuted; when I consider the relative strength, situation, and disposable force, by sea and land, of the two nations, and especially when my recollection is assailed (for we cannot, nor ought we to close our senses against such damning facts) with the heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion and insubordination which has pervaded many parts of your army; the extraordinary expense already incurred, and the uniform disasters which have marked all your military operations, I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the force now proposed can produce any desirable effect.

Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to the declaration of war, and as much as subsequent events have convinced me of the correctness of the vote I gave on that momentous question, it is not my purpose on this occasion to question the policy of that unfortunate act. My mind is bent on peace; to that object my efforts are directed. The impression is strongly fixed on my understanding, that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without the further effusion of human blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but justice, humanity, and sound policy demand that nothing should remain undone, on our part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed. I have said, sir, that it is my impression that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without a further appeal to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not mean to be understood as identifying the honor of the nation with the honor of those by whom the war was declared; or, in other words, I do not admit that the national honor rests solely in the hands of those who may happen to be in the Administration, or who may happen to constitute a majority in Congress. No, sir, this is an elective Government--the power and ultimate responsibility rest with the people; they cannot be dishonored unless they pertinaciously approve of unwise or wicked measures, and continue to support the authors of such measures. It is, therefore, not with me a primary consideration, in the suggestions I am about to make, how far the honor or reputation, for political wisdom, of any individuals may be affected by the adoption of the plan for peace which has occurred to my mind. I do not know that any honorable gentleman will be affected by it, should it be adopted. I hope he will not; to me it is perfectly indifferent who are in power, so that the affairs of the nation are well conducted.

Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the original causes for the declaration of this war, we are now taught to believe that the question in contest is reduced to a single point. The British Orders in Council were repealed on the 21st of June, three days after our declaration of war; and, of course, without a knowledge of that event, the blockade of May, 1806, had long ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore, remaining, and for which the war is now carried on, is the practice of impressment from on board our merchant vessels. This subject has for many years engaged the attention of both nations; it has been a fruitful theme of execration and declamation for almost every editor and orator of the age. Great as our cause of complaint may have been, (and I am not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted by all who understand the nature and true bearing of the question, that it had been subjected to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir, to remark, that notwithstanding the importance, the difficulty, and delicacy which have been justly attributed to this subject, and the unwillingness at all times manifested on the part of the British Government to abandon or derogate from the abstract right of impressing her own seamen from on board neutral merchant vessels, it is very far from being certain that she has not been willing to enter into such arrangement with this Government, as would place the question of impressment on a basis both safe and honorable to this nation. By a reference to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British Commissioners, which preceded the treaty concluded by those gentlemen in the year 1806, but which was unfortunately rejected by the then President, it is evident that the interest of impressment was, in the opinion of those gentlemen, placed on a footing well calculated to secure our own seamen from the abuse against which we had complained, and against which it was our duty to protect them. This opinion was not only expressed in forcible and decisive language at the time of entering into the arrangement, but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. The language of that gentleman, now your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic, and must be within the recollection of every gentleman in this House. Without troubling the House with the reading of the documents referred to, it is sufficient for me to state, that your present Secretary of State did, in a letter addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28, 1808, declare "that he always believed, and did still believe, that the ground on which the interest of impressment was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of the 8th of November, 1806, and the explanations which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States."

Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of a disposition on the part of the British Government, at one period at least, to advance considerable length towards an adjustment of this long-contested question; and as we have no evidence that different principles and claims are now asserted from those then advanced; I think it fair to conclude, that it is still in our power to put an end to this controversy with safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation. Instead, then, of passing this bill, and spending the blood and treasure of our countrymen in the prosecution of this war, I conceive it our duty to make an effort for the sanction of our just rights, and the restoration of peace, without a further appeal to force. It is my decided opinion that such an effort, if fairly and liberally made by this House, and the Executive branch of the Government, would not fail in producing the desired effect.

The peculiar nature of the question, which now constitutes the sole object for continuing the war; the intimation given by the Executive in the correspondence with the British Government, since the declaration of war, together with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary of State of January 3, 1807, all tend to confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of Congress to pass a law which would not only check desertions from the British service, by excluding persons of that description from employ in our service, but also deprive the British Government of the apology alleged for impressing American seamen, by excluding British subjects from the commercial and public service of the United States. Having alluded to the letter of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d of January, 1807, I will take the liberty of reading from it a short extract. After stating the opinion they had formerly expressed, that although the British Government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not completely, abandoned, they observe: "That opinion has since been confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British Commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their Government had adopted, in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend, in a great measure, on the means which may be taken hereafter by the Congress to check desertions from the British service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding is produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their Governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty."

Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each nation ought to have known the ultimatum of the other and not waited for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not surprised at the result of this war negotiation--every thing was demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared, even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House. I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain--a promise is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This, then, is what I ask you now to do--pass a law effectually to exclude all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of your power.

MONDAY, January 4.

EDWARD HEMPSTEAD, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

Additional Military Force.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for raising for one year an additional military force of twenty thousand men.

The question was stated on the engrossment of the bill for a third reading.

Mr. BRIGHAM.--Mr. Speaker, the bill under consideration, if passed into a law, will deeply affect my constituents and the public in general. It provides for prosecuting this war on a more extensive scale--it is a kind of second declaration of war. The objects of conquest are multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged; the Army must be increased with the addition of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments encouraged by additional bounty and wages. Sir, this is the system of arrangement to prosecute the scheme of foreign invasion. One error frequently prepares the way for another; we are now unhappily involved in the calamities of war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute and support it.

Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in principle, opposed to this war, and of course opposed to all the measures connected with it; that, in his opinion, this war was both politically and morally wrong; that it was declared without suitable preparation, without necessity, without an army, without adequate resources, and without unanimity; it has been prosecuted without success; we have also gained nothing but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are alarmed at the loss of their peace, distressed with the fruits of the war, and have serious apprehensions of what may be the future measures of Congress on this subject.

Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive character; it is a war of conquest, totally inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present divided state of the country, I fear it may be fatal to our most valuable institutions. Republics, sir, ought never to be engaged in a foreign, offensive war; they are calculated only for defensive war.

Sir, there is something unaccountable, that the disposition to prosecute this war should increase, as the causes of the war decrease, and the means and ability to carry it on lessen. The war which we now have on hand is predicated principally on the Orders in Council. The impressment of seamen, during the last session of Congress, was considered of minor importance and as a proper subject of negotiation between the two nations, and was so considered in the days of General Washington, in those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by Mr. Madison?

Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered with our neutral rights are revoked. The President, in his Message at the commencement of this session, declared the fact, and the war now rests solely on the subject of impressment. I do not believe that the prosecuting of this war will have a tendency to bring about an amicable and satisfactory adjustment on this subject, and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases, this question of impressment must be settled by treaty.

Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances, we are called on to augment our standing army to the number of 55,000 regular troops, to prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some say, for glory.

Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into effect, we shall unavoidably create an annual expense of forty millions of dollars; and where is your money to defray this expense? Why, you must take it from the pockets of our constituents, and from those who are opposed to this war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary loans, you must stop payment; the nation will become bankrupt, and future generations will be loaded with an enormous debt.

Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of the American people; can it be for the satisfaction of our constituents; are they in love with this war? Are they prepared to barter away their property and their peace for the hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which promises nothing but poverty and distress? It is impossible. Sir, it is said that we are now about to make one sublime military effort, which shall do honor to this nation; that with these troops we are to take, not only the Canadas, but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for aught I know, East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe expedition, and exterminate the Indians. Mr. B. said that he never had known the incipient cause nor by what authority General Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness, beyond where the United States had extinguished the Indian titles, and destroyed the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the time would come when he should know the merits of that enterprise.

Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of the war could accomplish their darling object, subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and all the other British provinces in North America, in his opinion it would be a great public misfortune--fatal to the civil liberties of the country, and change the character of our Government.

Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate the taking of the Canadas, or the other British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty and the ruin of this country. This war cannot be perpetuated and prosecuted without violating the laws of humanity and justice, the laws of religion and morality--and these laws are to be respected as well by nations as by individuals; and we have not only reason to believe, but do believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends the concerns of men, will give success to our arms, or blast our enterprise, according to its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued and conquered, it must be done by force of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those provinces been guilty of, which warrant this Government in putting them to the sword?

Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly pursuing their own business; they are content under their own Administration; they are protected by their own Government, and are not panting for the liberties of this country, as was vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask us to relieve them from the oppression of their own Government, which General Hull, in his tender mercy, promised them in his pompous proclamation, on the condition that they would revolt from their rightful Sovereign, and put themselves under his gracious protection; nor were they terrified by the threat of extermination, if found fighting in their own defence by the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced from their allegiance by promises which could not be performed. No, sir, nor do they ask any favor but that you cease from troubling. Sir, they will not submit, and they have told you, by their actual resistance, that they will defend themselves, their councils, their firesides, their wives, and their children, their rights and their property; and they are not to be subdued but at the price of blood. And where is your authority, where is your right to go home, invade, and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter-house for the brave sons of America; there spill your blood, and expend your treasure, destroy cities, and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants, and waste the substance of the industrious and the innocent? Sir, there is no right but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and not that which reason approves.

Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more and more unpopular in the Eastern States, especially in the State which he had the honor to represent; and they had, in their late elections, come forth and declared it in a voice and language which cannot be misunderstood. And whether there will be a majority in the next Congress in favor of this war was uncertain--he hoped not.

Mr. RIDGELY said he claimed the patience of the House while he assigned the reasons that would influence him to vote against the bill now under consideration. He considered the force contemplated to be raised by the bill as unnecessary. The present Military Establishment of the United States consisted of various descriptions of troops; they were the regular army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia. The regular army was made up of the Peace Establishment, authorized by the acts of the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April, 1808, containing about 10,000 men, including officers, and of the "additional military force," which was directed to be raised by the act of the 11th January, 1812; these different establishments were incorporated by an act passed on the 26th of June last; and the present regular army of the United States, as authorized by law, consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry, three regiments of artillery, two of light dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery, containing in all about thirty-six thousand men, including company officers and privates; of these the President might have not exceeding fifteen thousand enlisted for eighteen months, and the residue enlisted for five years, unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there were seven companies by the acts of 27th January, and 1st July, 1812, and about four or five hundred men. By the act of the 6th February last, the President was authorized to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might offer their services to the number of fifty thousand men; their commissioned officers were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories to which they might respectively belong, and they could only, according to the fair construction of this act, be considered as militia, liable to be called on to do military duty at any time within two years after they were accepted by the President, and bound to continue in service one year after arriving at the place of rendezvous. By the law of the 6th of July last, the President was empowered to appoint and commission the officers of the volunteers who had or should offer their services, and to form them into battalions, squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted from militia into a species of regular force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the President was authorized to call on the several States and Territories for their respective proportions of a detachment of one hundred thousand militia; and the call has been made, I believe, on every State and Territory. The present military force, then, of the United States, as authorized by existing laws, consists of upward of one hundred and eighty-six thousand men, all of whom, when in service, are subject to the rules and articles of war. Of these, the militia can only be used in the prosecution of this war for defensive purposes; the regulars and the volunteers may be ordered to act offensively against the enemy. They may amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand men; and if Canada be as weak and badly defended as gentlemen seem to suppose, and the Administration should persist in their determination to conquer it, they should, I think, be satisfied with such a force to obtain an object so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R., our present Military Establishment is certainly sufficient for all purposes of defence; and I wish to see no land forces raised for any other purpose. I have no hesitation in declaring that I should lament to see Canada or any of the British provinces on this continent in our possession, or forming a part of the American Republic. They will never be worth, to this nation, in any point of view, the blood and treasure that their acquisition will cost us. It has been said by the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, that there are now in Canada twelve thousand regular troops, and that the militia amount to six thousand. To any thing that gentleman should say, as matter of fact within his own knowledge, I should give the most implicit credit. But his estimate of the militia of Canada must be too low. His sources of information on this point must have been incorrect. The population of Canada (and when I speak of Canada, I mean both Upper and Lower Canada) has been variously stated, from three to five hundred thousand souls; according to no account, I believe, can it be less than three hundred thousand; and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will say that estimate is too high. Take, then, the population of Canada to be 300,000 souls; what number of militia should this population furnish? We will take the State of New Jersey as a guide for our calculation; according to the census of 1810, the population of that State is 245,255, and its militia, by the return for the same year, 33,740, and the militia bears about the same proportion to the population in the States, generally, as it does in this State. If, then, the militia of Jersey, with its population, amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may, I think, without danger of contradiction, estimate the militia of Canada (with a larger population) at between thirty and forty thousand; to these add the twelve thousand regular troops, and, in all probability, before we can act offensively against them in the Spring, the number of these troops will be greatly increased, and they may have an efficient force of about fifty thousand men to oppose an invading army. It ought to be recollected, also, that a generous people, contending in their own defence, are actuated by far different and more worthy motives than an army of soldiers can be who attempt their subjugation. The Canadians will contend for their homes, their wives, their children; for every thing that can or that ought to be dear to the human heart. They will be excited in such a cause to the boldest deeds. Instead of traitors, we shall find them true to their country and themselves, and able and ready to exert all their energies in their own defence. If we conquer them, it must be by great exertions, and with immense loss. To subdue a people acting under the impulse of such considerations as will operate on them, will require a force at least double to that which they can oppose to us. But can any man imagine that, if we invade the British colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride of Britain, powerful as she is at sea, and ready at any moment to meet every emergency, permit her tamely to look on and see her provinces wrested from her, without exerting herself with all her energies for their security? Will she make no diversions in their favor? Will she suffer us to carry the war into her territories, and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no opportunities of attacking us? Do our rich and flourishing cities, exposed without defence on the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of war, furnish her with no objects worthy her attention? Will the city of New York, laid in ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or, will the acquisition of Canada compensate to us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R., ten Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth to this nation that single city.

But of what value would these provinces be to us, if they could be easily acquired? Shall we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for which this war is waged? Shall we thereby secure our commercial rights? Not at all, sir. On the other hand, if the British Government would offer them to us, it would be our true policy to refuse to accept them. It is known to everybody that the population of several of the Eastern States is now full, and that great numbers of their citizens are constantly emigrating. The direction this emigration takes, it is also well known, is South and West. This surplus of population of the Eastern States settles on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, and carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if you please, its Eastern prejudices. They become connected and united with the people of the South and West. This union and intercourse will tend to render as the brothers of one family the citizens of this extended Empire. The prejudices of the South against the North, and the North against the South, are weakened daily and will be destroyed. The course this emigration takes is just as it should be. The currents flow from the extremities into the centre of the country. The operation is most beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to strengthen and cement the union of the States. But if the British provinces should be conquered and become incorporated into the Republic, the direction of the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States will be at once changed. It will take a North instead of a South course. It will go just where it ought not to go. The strength of the nation, already too much scattered, will be still more weakened by a further expansion of its territory and population. The Northern and Eastern States, at present possessing more than their proper proportion of wealth, population, and strength, and having different habits, pursuits, and interests, from the Middle and Southern States, will, by the addition of these provinces, and the settlement of their surplus of population in them, acquire a weight and influence that this Union cannot control. It will exist only at their pleasure, and, in a few years, the destruction of this Government and a separation of the States will be the inevitable consequence.

Mr. PITKIN rose and said:--Before, Mr. Speaker, we give our sanction to this bill; before we agree to add so large a force to our present army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand men, is it not a duty we owe to ourselves and to our constituents, seriously to inquire into the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as well as into the present state of our relations with that nation against which we have declared war? Almost at the very instant when Congress declared war against Great Britain, the Orders in Council, and the blockade of May, 1806, the most prominent causes of the war, were removed. I have always, sir, considered the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse between the two countries. Had this obstacle been removed before the declaration of war, no one can believe that the Executive would have recommended, or that a majority in either House of Congress would have adopted a measure always fraught with evils in all governments, and which, in a Government like ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the last extremity. I cannot believe that the President, in that case, would have recommended it, when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through the Secretary of State, he informed the British Minister that, on the revocation of the Orders in Council, the non-importation law would be removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse would be restored between the two nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the President should, in one moment, restore a free intercourse between the two countries, and, in the next, recommend to Congress a declaration of war, solely on account of another topic remaining in dispute. And, in case such recommendation had been made, if any confidence is to be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen, many who voted for the war would not, under such circumstances, have given it their support. Unfortunately for the country, the President did not embrace the opportunity, presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council, to remove the non-importation law, and thereby smooth the way for a complete restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the United States. Sir, this would have been done, and the remaining subject of dispute been left in the same situation as before the declaration of war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements. But, sir, as this was not done, it remains for us, it remains for the people of the United States, to determine whether they will encounter all the evils, all the calamities of war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest prospects, and the best interests of this rising country, on the point now in dispute with Great Britain.

In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir, and to the House, it is not my intention to go into the consideration of all the original avowed causes of the war; but to confine myself to the new aspect of affairs, presented to us since the declaration of war by the removal of the Orders in Council and blockades.

On the subject of impressments, for which alone the war is now to be continued, what, let me ask, is the principle for which our Government contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of the merchant vessel shall cover all who sail under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall protect all the foreigners our merchants may think proper to employ in their service, whether naturalized or not. Before we raise immense armies, before we sacrifice any more of the lives of American citizens, let us inquire--

1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us to-morrow, would benefit our native seamen, or would promote the real permanent interests of their country.

2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this principle by a continuance of the war.

The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course, were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then, the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen; and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the country.

Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time of danger?

This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?

The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain. And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and, indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?

By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies." Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars, proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries. During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain, by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however, observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and distinguished European writers on public law.

With respect to foreigners, who have been naturalized under our laws, the question is of a more distinct nature, and presents greater difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill all our obligations towards them. What these obligations are, and how far they extend, are questions about which a diversity of sentiment may prevail.--While they remain within our territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction, they are shielded by the general principle, that all within our dominion and exclusive jurisdiction, are, of course, protected against all claims whatever, and never to be molested in any way without our consent. But, sir, when they go without our territories, and beyond our exclusive jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the claim of their former Government, the opinion of the best writers on public law seems to be, that the obligation of the country, under whose laws they have been naturalized, does not extend to guaranty them against such claims, unless their allegiance was changed with the consent of their former Government. But, sir, whatever speculative opinions may be entertained on this subject, the number of naturalized seamen is so small, that few, if any, can be of opinion that we ought to have declared war, or that we ought to continue it on their account alone. The whole number of seamen naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by the returns made to the Department of State, is 1,332. This includes those of all nations. What proportion of these were British, or how many of them are now in our service, it is impossible to determine. I presume, however, the number of naturalized British seamen now in our employ does not exceed two or three hundred. Shall we, sir, continue the war for these men?

I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment from our merchant vessels, abuses have happened, that although the right of taking American citizens is not claimed, the British commanders have not been scrupulous whether they took British subjects or American citizens. Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will justify. I am satisfied, however, that they have been exaggerated.

But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really intended to protect foreign seamen under our flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence, to say the least of it, towards our native seamen? whether, by our laws, and the practice under them, we have afforded them all that protection and security to which they are entitled?

In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief and protection of American seamen. By this act, the collectors of the several ports were directed, on application, to enter the names of seamen, being citizens of the United States, to grant them certificates, in a form given in the act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe the person of the applicant: also, to declare that, on proof produced to him agreeable to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the United States of America.

It is not a little singular that, although the proof of citizenship to be produced to the collector must be agreeable to the directions of the act, the act itself nowhere directs what that proof must be. Every collector, therefore, has, under this act, used his own discretion, or has pursued such directions as he may have received from the Government as to the kind of proof. What, sir, has been the practice under this law? Have those certificates, or protections, as they are commonly called, been confined to bona fide American citizens? No, sir; we cannot, we ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too notorious to be concealed or denied. Under this act, made expressly for the protection of American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost, at the moment of setting his feet on our shores, has obtained a certificate from some collector, that he is a citizen of the United States; and, with this certificate in his pocket, although perhaps a deserter from his own Government, he enters a public or private vessel, as an American seaman. The mode of obtaining proof of citizenship is well understood. Among other modes, some of which are too disgraceful to be mentioned in this place, those foreign seamen will go before a magistrate, and, although hardly able to speak the English language intelligibly, will swear, for each other, that they were born within the United States, and are American citizens. On such proof, a proof of this sort, the collector issues his certificate.

It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was brought before this House during the last session, in a case from Philadelphia, when a certificate of this kind was obtained by the most flagrant and avowed act of perjury on the part of a foreigner who had just arrived in this country. It was found, on inquiry, that there was no law, either of Pennsylvania or of the United States, to punish the man for this act of false swearing. Not only have these protections been thus obtained by fraud and perjury, but they have also, long since, been an object of barter; they have been bought and sold, and transferred from one to another, not only in this country, but in foreign countries.

To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's protections, permit me to state some facts, of which I have no doubt, knowing the source from whence I have derived them. An American captain having a ship in Bristol, in England, without a crew, he applied to a man who kept a boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew of American sailors in port; he showed him a great number of American protections, which he agreed to sell him for two guineas each, and with the aid of these to procure him a crew. By high wages, and by suiting these protections to the description of British sailors, he procured this captain his ship's crew; not only so, but when the ship was about to sail, and it was doubtful whether those who had engaged for the voyage would actually go on board, this man actually procured some of a press gang to take them as American sailors, who had deserted from their ships, and put them on board. When we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates, when we know that they are thus obtained by fraud and perjury, can we expect that foreign nations will give credit to them? Instead of being a shield and protection to the real American sailor, they have become a dangerous weapon of offence.

If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of the United States to employ so many transient foreign seamen, we ought long since, not only to have refused these false protections, but to have passed laws for the encouragement of our native seamen, similar to those which have been adopted in commercial countries, and are commonly called navigation acts. This would, in some measure, have relieved us from the evils which we now experience, in consequence of the employment of so many foreign seamen.

TUESDAY, January 5.

Additional Military Force.

The House resumed the order of the day on the bill for raising an additional military force of 20,000 men for one year, the question being on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. BOYD.--Mr. Speaker: It is with great diffidence that I address the Chair. When the bill now before the House was under discussion on Saturday last; that is, the then proposed amendment to insert eighteen months, instead of one year, I was offering my reasons why I thought that that amendment ought to prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I was considered as taking too great a latitude, and prevented from connecting my remarks. As there is little difference, in point of principle, as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this opportunity to make up that deficiency, and will now take care to stick as close as possible to the text.

Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third reading, because I believe it to be altogether inadequate to the purpose intended to be accomplished by it. Sir, when I last addressed the Chair, I then took a retrospective view of our past expectations, plans, and propositions, from which we expected to derive great advantages. Such were the expectations of that time, that I did not accord with them. Those expectations have not been realized; but, instead thereof, we have met with disappointments and misfortunes. I thought that viewing the errors of the past was the most certain way to avoid the future; and I am not at this time sensible of that being erroneous.

Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the habit of public speaking; and if I have not the faculty of composing my arguments in so connected a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I hope the House will excuse me, and grant me their indulgence to do it in such form as my capacity will admit of.

[The SPEAKER observed that it was unpleasant to the Chair that the gentleman should indulge in such remarks; he had certainly no wish not to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B. said he stood corrected, and was allowed to proceed.]

Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty, making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service, or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe, that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition. If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated, will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full. It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia. According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months, and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man engaged, or a derangement must take place--always a disagreeable occurrence in an army.

Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition, invade it not: act on the defensive until you have engaged your men, and for a term of time sufficient to answer your purpose; then may you count upon success and honor. I do not say that I believe land conquests will produce an acknowledgment of our rights on the ocean. I believe it will not; but unless you act with great regularity, system, and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must meet with nothing but disappointments and disgrace.

Mr. LAW said as he was originally opposed to the war, and the preparatory steps which led to it, he could not admit the principle, that because war was declared he was bound to acquiesce, and lend his aid to promote every plan for prosecuting the war which might be proposed, however wild and extravagant the same might appear. He said he felt it a duty, and he claimed it as a right, (although he was not ambitious very often to exercise the right,) to offer objections to any measures which might be introduced, if he supposed they were not calculated to produce the effect intended, although he might not be in favor of the object itself; or if he believed the measure proposed would be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this important occasion it would be wise for a moment to look back, and if we can bear the pain of retrospection, consider what this nation once was, what it might be, and what it in fact is. Time was, and that within the recollection of us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity, and peace, gladdened the hearts of this once happy people, and the use of arms was known only as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some individuals, could not bear the intoxicating influence of prosperity. It might have preserved its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned under the weight of national blessings; it submitted to regard the sinister views and malign influence of foreign powers; it listened--fatally listened--to a serpent more fell than the serpent of old. And now how sad is the reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation answer; in the past, we see departed comforts; before us, we behold ruin and distress. The unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has been progressive. Had the transition been sudden, the nation would have been driven to desperation. We have been often admonished by those who foresaw the present evils; and had we been wise, might have avoided the calamities in which the country is now involved, and from which there is at present no prospect of speedy relief.

Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past; we will now briefly notice the causes which were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately preceded the declaration of war, and what was said to be the object, and attempt to show that the bill now under consideration is unnecessary for the attainment of the original object; that it will be injurious to the militia, and may endanger the liberties of the country.

As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared, he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains, and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain. The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.

What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the war dare avow it.

The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill, and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will, however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.

The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada. This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) the organ, as is admitted, of the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.

The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and honorable peace.[31]

Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its resources.

I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon this subject either in the House or in the nation. Whosoever considers the object of this bill to be any other than that which has been avowed, is mistaken. Whosoever believes this bill to be a means of peace, or any thing else than an instrument of vigorous and long-protracted war, is grievously deceived. And whoever acts under such mistake, or such deception, will have to lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one of the most critical errors of his political life. I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those honest men, of whom I know there are some, who, paying only a general attention to the course of public affairs, submit the guidance of their opinions to the men who stand at the helm, not to vote for this bill under any belief that its object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let such gentlemen recur to their past experience on similar occasions. They will find that it has been always the case, whenever any obnoxious measure is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted by the aid of some such collateral suggestions. No sooner do the Cabinet perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions are alive lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity, than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients while the dose is swallowing. The language always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors. The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way." After this manner the fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of the Administration are attained under suggestions very different from the true motives. Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources." So, also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain, members of the House were known to state that they voted for it under the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days: that it was known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements, in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now an army, which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force, to make negotiation successful; that it is the incipient state of a project for a grand pacification!

I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask where are the men--where is the money to be obtained? And they talk very wisely concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with much learning, how this attempt is an offence against both the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot to be an observer of the character and conduct of the men now in power for these eight years past. And I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the chance is rather increased that it will be successful.

I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent; the present war, and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain was proposed at the last session, there were thousands in these United States, and I confess to you I was myself among the number, who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned notions of common sense, and common prudence. That a people, which had been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should engage in a war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like considerations, the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcilable to any previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it or how to believe it. Even at this moment my mind is very much in the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans, of whom I have heard it asserted that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders, and do at this moment consider the allegation, that war is at present existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal falsehood."

It was just so with respect to the invasion of Canada. I heard of it last June. I laughed at the idea, as did multitudes of others, as an attempt too absurd for serious examination. I was in this case again beset by common sense and common prudence. That the United States should precipitate itself upon the unoffending people of that neighboring colony, unmindful of all previously subsisting amities, because the parent State, three thousand miles distant, had violated some of our commercial rights; that we should march inland, to defend our ships, and seamen; that with raw troops, hastily collected, miserably appointed, and destitute of discipline, we should invade a country defended by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of numbers, to the invading army; that bounty should be offered and proclamations issued, inviting the subjects of a foreign power to treason and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter of the country upon which a retort of the same nature was so obvious, so easy, and, in its consequences, so awful; in every aspect, the design seemed so fraught with danger and disgrace, that it appeared absolutely impossible that it should be seriously entertained. Those, however, who reasoned after this manner were, as the event proved, mistaken. The war was declared. Canada was invaded. We were in haste to plunge into these great difficulties, and we have now reason, as well as leisure enough, for regret and repentance.

The great mistake of all those, who reasoned concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they never took into consideration the connection of both those events with the great election for the Chief Magistracy which was then pending. It never was sufficiently considered by them, that plunging into war with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the support for the Presidency was made dependent. They did not understand, that an invasion of Canada was to be in truth only a mode of carrying on an electioneering campaign. But since events have explained political purposes, there is no difficulty in seeing the connections between projects and interests. It is now apparent to the most mole-sighted how a nation may be disgraced, and yet a Cabinet attain its desired honors. All is clear. A country may be ruined, in making an Administration happy.

I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes, apparently irreconcilable to common sense and common prudence, were, on that very account, more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity, which sometimes stands men instead both of genius and strength. And most assuredly, he is most likely to perform that which no man ever did before, and will never be likely to do again, who has the boldness to undertake that which no man ever thought of attempting in time past, and no man will ever think of attempting in time future. I would not, however, be understood as intimating that this Cabinet project of invasion is impracticable, either as it respects the collection of means and instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the contrary, sir, I deem both very feasible. Men may be obtained. For if forty dollars bounty cannot obtain them, a hundred dollars bounty may, and the intention is explicitly avowed not to suffer the attainment of the desired army to be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy. Money may be obtained. What by means of the increased popularity derived from the augmentation of the navy, what by opening subscription offices in the interior of the country, what by large premiums, the cupidity of the moneyed interest may be tempted beyond the point of patriotic resistance, and all the attained means being diverted to the use of the army, pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample at least for the first year. And, sir, let an army of thirty thousand men be collected, let them be put under the command of a popular leader, let them be officered to suit his purposes, let them be flushed with victories, and see the fascinating career of military glory opening upon them, and they will not thereafter ever be deficient in resources. If they cannot obtain their pay by your votes, they will collect it by their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly observe any air-lines or water-lines in enforcing their necessary levies; nor be stayed by abstract speculation concerning right, or learned constitutional difficulties.

I will now proceed to discuss those topics which naturally arise out of the bill under consideration, and examine the proposed invasion of Canada, at three different points of view.

1. As a means of carrying on the subsisting war.

2. As a means of obtaining an early and honorable peace.

3. As a means of advancing the personal and local projects of ambition of the members of the American Cabinet.

Concerning the invasion of Canada, as a means of carrying on the subsisting war, it is my duty to speak plainly and decidedly, not only because I herein express my own opinions upon the subject, but, as I conscientiously believe, the sentiments also of a very great majority of that whole section of country in which I have the happiness to reside. I say then, sir, that I consider the invasion of Canada as a means of carrying on this war, as cruel, wanton, senseless, and wicked.

You will easily understand, Mr. Speaker, by this very statement of opinion, that I am not one of that class of politicians which has for so many years predominated in the world, on both sides of the Atlantic. You will readily believe, that I am not one of those who worship in that temple, where Condorcet is the High Priest and Machiavel the God. With such politicians the end always sanctifies the means; the least possible good to themselves perfectly justifies, according to their creed, the inflicting the greatest possible evil upon others. In the judgment of such men, if a corrupt ministry at three thousand miles distance shall have done them an injury, it is an ample cause to visit with desolation a peaceable and unoffending race of men, their neighbors, who happen to be associated with that ministry by ties of mere political dependence. What though these colonies be so remote from the sphere of the questions in controversy, that their ruin or prosperity could have no possible influence upon the result? What though their cities offer no plunder? What though their conquest can yield no glory? In their ruin there is revenge. And revenge to such politicians is the sweetest of all morsels. With such men, neither I nor the people of that section of country in which I reside hold any communion. There is between us and them no one principle of sympathy either in motive or action.

That wise, moral, reflecting people, which constitute the great mass of the population of Massachusetts--indeed, of all New England--look for the sources of their political duties nowhere else than in those fountains from which spring their moral duties. According to their estimate of human life and its obligations, both political and moral duties emanate from the nature of things, and from the essential and eternal relations which subsist among them. True it is, that a state of war gives the right to seize and appropriate the property and territories of an enemy. True it is, that the colonies of a foreign power are viewed, according to the law of nations, in the light of its property. But in estimating the propriety of carrying desolation into the peaceful abodes of their neighbors, the people of New England will not limit their contemplation to the mere circumstance of abstract right, nor ask what lawyers and jurisprudists have written or said, as if this was conclusive upon the subject. That people are much addicted to think for themselves, and in canvassing the propriety of such an invasion, they will consider the actual condition of those colonies, their natural relations to us, and the effect which their conquest and ruin will have, not only upon the people of those colonies, but upon themselves, and their own liberties and constitution. And above all, what I know will seem strange to some of those who hear me, they will not forget to apply to a case occurring between nations, as far as is practicable, that heaven-descended rule which the great author and founder of their religion has given them for the regulation of their conduct towards each other. They will consider it the duty of these United States to act towards those colonies as they would wish those colonies to act, in exchange of circumstances, towards these United States.

The actual condition of those colonies, and the relation in which they stood to the United States antecedent to the declaration of war, were of this nature. Those colonies had no connection with the questions in dispute between us and their parent State. They had done us no injury. They meditated none to us. Between the inhabitants of those colonies and the citizens of the United States, the most friendly and mutually useful intercourse subsisted. The borderers on this, and those on the other side of the St. Lawrence, and of the boundary line, scarcely realized that they were subjects of different governments. They interchanged expressions and acts of civility. Intermarriages took place among them. The Canadian sometimes settled in the United States; sometimes our citizens emigrated to Canada. After the declaration of war, had they any disposition to assail us? We have the reverse expressly in evidence. They desired nothing so much as to keep perfect the then subsisting relations of amity. Would the conquest of those colonies shake the policy of the British cabinet? No man has shown it. Unqualified assertions, it is true, have been made, but totally unsupported by any evidence, or even the pretence of argument. On the contrary, nothing was more obvious than that an invasion of Canada must strengthen the Ministry of Great Britain, by the excitement and sympathy which would be occasioned in the people of that country in consequence of the sufferings of the innocent inhabitants of those colonies, on account of a dispute in which they had no concern, and of which they had scarcely a knowledge. All this was anticipated--all this was frequently urged to this House, at the last and preceding sessions, as the necessary effect of such a measure. The event has justified those predictions. The late elections in Great Britain have terminated in the complete triumph of the friends of the British Ministry. In effecting this change, the conduct of the United States in relation to Canada has had, undeniably, a mighty influence, by the disgust and indignation felt by the British people at a step so apparently wanton and cruel.

As there was no direct advantage to be hoped from the conquest of Canada, so also, there was none incidental. Plunder there was none--at least, none which would pay the cost of the conquest. Glory there was none. Could seven millions of people obtain glory by precipitating themselves upon half a million, and trampling them into the dust? A giant obtain glory by crushing a pigmy! That giant must have a pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory from such an achievement.

Surely a people, with whom we were connected by so many natural and adventitious ties, had some claims upon our humanity. Surely if our duty required that they and theirs should be sacrificed to our interests or our passions, some regret mingled in the execution of our purpose. We postponed the decree of ruin until the last moment. We hesitated--we delayed until longer delay was dangerous. Alas! sir, there was nothing of this kind or character in the conduct of the Cabinet. The war had not yet been declared, when General Hull had his instructions to put in train the work of destruction. There was an eagerness for the blood of the Canadians--a headlong precipitation for their ruin, which indicated any thing else rather than feelings of humanity, or visitings of nature, on account of their condition. Our armies were on their march for their frontier, while yet peace existed between this country and the parent State; and the invasion was obstinately pursued, after a knowledge that the chief ground of controversy was settled by the abandonment of the British Orders in Council; and after nothing remained but a stale ground of dispute, which, however important in itself, was of a nature for which no man has ever yet pretended that for it alone war would have been declared. Did ever one Government exhibit towards any people a more bloody and relentless spirit of rancor? Tell me not of petty advantages--of remote, and possibly useful contingencies which might arise from the devastation of those colonies. Show any advantage which justifies that dreadful vial of wrath which, if the intention of the American Cabinet had been fulfilled, would, at this day, have been poured out upon the heads of the Canadians. It is not owing to the tender mercies of the American Administration, if the bones of the Canadians are not at this hour mingled with the ashes of their habitations. It is easy enough to make an excuse for any purpose. When a victim is destined to be immolated, every hedge presents sticks for the sacrifice. The lamb who stands at the mouth of the stream, will always trouble the water, if you take the account of the wolf who stands at the source of it. But show a good to us bearing any proportion to the multiplied evils proposed to be visited upon them. There is none. Never was there an invasion of any country worse than this, in point of moral principle, since the invasion of the West Indies by the Buccaneers, or that of the United States by Captain Kidd. Indeed, both Kidd and the Buccaneers had more apology for their deed than the American Cabinet. They had at least the hope of plunder; but in this case there is not even the poor refuge of cupidity. We have heard great lamentations about the disgrace of our arms on the frontier. Why, sir, the disgrace of our arms on the frontier is terrestrial glory, in comparison with the disgrace of the attempt. The whole atmosphere rings with the utterance, from the other side of the House of this word "glory"--"glory" in connection with this invasion. What glory? Is it the glory of the tiger, which lifts his jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess and his spoils? Such is the glory of Genghis Khan, and of Bonaparte. Be such glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be accursed with such fame.

"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil, Nor in the glistering foil Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies, But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes, And perfect witness of all-judging Jove, As he pronounces lastly on each deed."

May such fame as this be my country's meed!

But the wise and thoughtful people of our Northern section will confine their reflections to the duties which result from the actual condition of those colonies, and their general relations to the United States; they will weigh the duties the people of the United States owe to themselves, and contemplate the effect which the subjugation of those Canadians will have upon our own liberties and constitution. Sir, it requires but little experience in the nature of the human character, and but a very limited acquaintance with the history of man, to be satisfied that with the conquest of the Canadas, the liberties and constitution of this country perish.

Of all nations in the world, this nation is the last which ought to admit, among its purposes, the design of foreign conquests. States such as are these, connected by ties so peculiar; into whose combination there enters necessarily numerous jealousies and fears; whose interests are not always reconcilable; and the passions, education, and character of whose people, on many accounts, are repugnant to each other; with a constitution made merely for defence; it is impossible that an association of independent Sovereignties, standing in such relations to each other, should not have the principles of its union, and the hopes of its constitution, materially affected by the collection of a large military force, and its employment in the subjugation of neighboring territories. It is easy to see that an army collected in such a state of society as that which exists in this country, where wages are high and subsistence easily to be obtained, must be composed, so far as respects the soldiery, for the most part of the refuse of the country; and as respects the officers, with some honorable exceptions indeed, must consist, in a considerable degree, of men desperate sometimes in fortune, at others in reputation; "choice spirits;" men "tired of the dull pursuits of civil life," who have not virtue or talents to rise in a calm and settled state of things, and who, all other means of advancement or support wanting or failing, take to the sword. A body of thirty or fifty thousand such men, combined, armed, and under a popular leader, is a very formidable force. They want only discipline and service to make them veterans. Opportunity to acquire these, Canada will afford. The army which advances to the walls of Quebec, in the present condition of Canadian preparation, must be veteran. And a veteran army, under a popular leader, flushed with victory, each individual realizing, that while the body remains combined, he may be something, and possibly very great; that if dissolved, he sinks into insignificance; will not be disbanded by vote. They will consult with one another, and with their beloved chieftain, upon this subject; and not trouble themselves about the advice of the old people who are knitting and weaving in the chimney corners at Washington. Let the American people receive this as an undoubted truth, which experience will verify. Whoever plants the American standard on the walls of Quebec, conquers it for himself, and not for the people of the United States. Whoever lives to see that event--may my head be low in the dust before it happen!--will witness a dynasty established in that country by the sword. He will see a King or an Emperor, dukedoms, and earldoms, and baronies, distributed to the officers, and knights' fees bestowed on the soldiery. Such an army will not trouble itself about geographical lines, in portioning out the divisions of its new empire; and will run the parallels of its power by other steel than that of the compass. When that event happens, the people of New England, if they mean to be free, must have a force equal to defend themselves against such an army. And a military force equal to this object will itself be able to enslave the country.

Mr. Speaker--When I contemplate the character and consequences of this invasion of Canada; when I reflect upon its criminality and its danger to the peace and liberty of this once happy country; I thank the great Author and Source of all virtue, that through His grace that section of country in which I have the happiness to reside, is, in so great a degree, free from the iniquity of this transgression. I speak it with pride, the people of that section have done what they could to vindicate themselves and their children from the burden of this sin. That whole section has risen, almost as one man, for the purpose of driving from power, by one great constitutional effort, the guilty authors of this war. If they have failed, it has not been through the want of will or of exertion, but in consequence of the weakness of their political power. When in the usual course of Divine Providence, who punishes nations as well as individuals, His destroying angel shall on this account pass over this country--and sooner or later, pass it will--I may be permitted to hope that over New England his hand will be stayed. Our souls are not steeped in the blood which has been shed in this war. The spirits of the unhappy men who have been sent to an untimely audit, have borne to the bar of divine justice no accusations against us.

This opinion, concerning the principles of this invasion of Canada, is not peculiar to me. Multitudes who approve the war, detest it. I believe this sentiment is entertained, without distinction of parties, by almost all the moral sense, and nine-tenths of the intelligence, of the whole northern section of the United States. I know that men from that quarter of the country will tell you differently. Stories of a very different kind are brought by all those who come trooping to Washington for place, appointments, and emoluments; men who will say any thing to please the ear, or do any thing to please the eye of Majesty, for the sake of those fat contracts and gifts which it scatters; men whose fathers, brothers, and cousins, are provided for by the Departments; whose full-grown children are at, suck at the money-distilling breasts of the Treasury; the little men who sigh after great offices; those who have judgeships in hand or judgeships in promise; toads that live upon the vapor of the palace, that swallow great men's spittle at the levees; that stare and wonder at all the fine sights which they see there; and most of all wonder at themselves--how they got there to see them. These men will tell you, that New England applauds this invasion.

But, Mr. Speaker, look at the elections. What is the language they speak? The present tenant of the Chief Magistracy rejected, by that whole section of country, with the exception of a single State unanimously. And for whom? In favor of a man, out of the circle of his own State without much influence, and personally almost unknown. In favor of a man against whom the prevailing influence in New England had previously strong political prejudices; and with whom, at the time of giving him their support, they had no political understanding; in favor of a man whose merits, whatever in other respects they might be, were brought into notice, in the first instance, chiefly so far as that election was concerned, by their opinion of the utter want of merit of the man whose re-election they opposed.

Among the causes of that universal disgust which pervaded all New England, at the Administration and its supporters, was the general dislike and contempt of this invasion of Canada. I have taken some pains to learn the sentiments which prevail on this subject in New England, and particularly among its yeomanry, the pride and the hope of that country. I have conversed with men, resting on their spades and leaning on the handles of their ploughs, while they relaxed for a moment from the labor by which they support their families, and which gives such a hardihood and character to their virtues. They asked--"What do we want of Canada? We have land enough. Do we want plunder? There is not enough of that to pay the cost of getting it. Are our Ocean rights there? Or is it there our seamen are held in captivity? Are new States desired? We have plenty of those already. Are they to be held as conquered territories? This will require an army there. Then, to be safe, we must have an army here. And with a standing army, what security for our liberties?"

These are no fictitious reasonings. They are the suggestions I doubt not of thousands and tens of thousands of our hardy New England yeomanry; men who, when their country calls, at any wise and real exigency, will start from their native soils and throw their shields over their liberties, like the soldiers of Cadmus, "armed in complete steel;" yet men, who have heard the winding of your horn to the Canada campaign, with the same apathy and indifference with which they would hear in the streets the trilling of a jews-harp, or the twirring of a banjo.

The plain truth is, that the people of New England have no desire for Canada. Their moral sentiment does not justify, and they will not countenance its invasion. I have thus stated the grounds on which they deem, and I have felt myself bound to maintain, that this contemplated invasion of that territory is, as it respects the Canadians, wanton and cruel; because it inflicts the greatest imaginable evils on them, without any imaginable benefit to us; that, as it respects the United States, such an invasion is senseless, because, ultimately, ruinous to our own political safety; and wicked, because it is an abuse of the blessings of Divine Providence, and a manifest perversion of His multiplied bounties, to the purpose of desolating an innocent and unoffending people.

I shall now proceed to the next view I proposed to take on this project of invading Canada, and consider it in the light of a means to obtain an early and honorable peace. It is said, and this is the whole argument in favor of this invasion, in this aspect, that the only way to negotiate successfully with Great Britain, is to appeal to her fears and raise her terrors for the fate of her colonies. I shall here say nothing concerning the difficulties of executing this scheme; nor about the possibility of a deficiency both in men and money. I will not dwell on the disgust of all New England, nor on the influence of this disgust with respect to your efforts. I will admit, for the present, that an army may be raised, and that during the first years it may be supported by loans, and that afterwards it will support itself by bayonets. I will admit farther, for the sake of argument, that success is possible and that Great Britain realizes the practicability of it. Now, all this being admitted, I maintain that the surest of all possible ways to defeat any hope from negotiation, is the threat of such an invasion, and an active preparation to execute it. Those must be very young politicians, their pin-feathers not yet grown, and however they may flutter on this floor, they are not yet fledged for any high or distant flight, who think that threats and appealing to fear are the ways of producing a disposition to negotiate in Great Britain, or in any other nation which understands what it owes to its own safety and honor. No nation can yield to threat, what it might yield to a sense of interest; because, in that case, it has no credit for what it grants, and what is more, loses something in point of reputation, from the imbecility which concessions made under such circumstances indicate. Of all nations in the world, Great Britain is the last to yield to considerations of fear and terror. The whole history of the British nation is one tissue of facts, tending to show the spirit with which she meets all attempts to bully and brow-beat her into measures inconsistent with her interests or her policy. No nation ever before made such sacrifices of the present to the future. No nation ever built her greatness more systematically, on the principles of a haughty self-respect, which yields nothing to suggestions of danger, and which never permits either her ability or inclination to maintain her rights to be suspected. In all negotiations, therefore, with that power, it may be taken as a certain truth, that your chance of failure is just in proportion to the publicity and obtrusiveness of threats and appeals to fear.

The American Cabinet understands all this very well, although this House may not. Their policy is founded upon it. The project of this bill is to put at a still further distance the chance of amicable arrangement, in consequence of the dispositions which the threat of invasion of their colonies, and attempt to execute it, will excite in the British nation and Ministry. I have some claim to speak concerning the policy of the men who constitute the American Cabinet. For eight years I have studied their history, characters, and interests. I know no reason why I should judge them severely, except such as arise from those inevitable conclusions, which avowed principles and distinct conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say, then, sir, without hesitation, that in my judgment, the embarrassments of our relations with Great Britain, and keeping alive between this country and that a root of bitterness, has been, is, and will continue to be, a main principle of the policy of this American Cabinet. They want not a solid settlement of our differences. If the nation will support them in it, they will persevere in the present war. If it will not, some general arrangements will be the resort, which will leave open opportunities for discord; which on proper occasions will be improved by them. I shall give my reasons for this opinion. I wish no sentiments of mine to have influence any farther than the reasons upon which they are founded justify. They are public reasons, arising from undeniable facts; the nation will judge for itself.

The men who now, and who, for these twelve years past, have, to the misfortune of this country, guided its councils and directed its destinies, came into power on a tide, which was raised and supported by elements constituted of British prejudices and British antipathies. The parties which grew up in this nation took their origin and form at the time of the adoption of the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794. The opposition of that day, of which the men now in power were the leaders, availed themselves, very dexterously, of the relics of that hatred towards the British name which remained after the Revolutionary war. By perpetually blowing up the embers of the ancient passions, they excited a flame in the nation; and by systematically directing it against the honorable men who at that time conducted its affairs, the strength and influence of those men were impaired. The embarrassments with France, which succeeded, in 1798 and 1799, were turned to the same account. Unfortunately, those who then conducted the public affairs attended less to the appearance of things, than to their measures; and considered more what was due to their country than was prudent, in the state of the prejudices and jealousies of the people, thus artfully excited against them. They went on, in the course they deemed right, regardless of personal consequences, and blind to the evidences of discontent which surrounded them. The consequences are well known. The supreme power in these United States passed into the hands which now possess it; in which it has been continued down to the present time. The transfer of power was effected, undeniably, principally on the very ground of those prejudices and antipathies which existed in the nation against Great Britain; and which had been artfully fomented by the men now in power, and their adherents, and directed against their predecessors. These prejudices and passions constitute the main pillar of the power of these men. In my opinion, they never will permit it to be wholly taken away from them. They never will permit the people of this country to look at them and their political opponents, free of that jaundice with which they have carefully imbued the vision of their own partisans. They never will consent to be weighed in a balance of mere merits; but will always take care to keep in reserve some portion of these British antipathies, to throw as a make-weight into the opposite scale, whenever they find their own sinking. To continue, multiply, strengthen, and extend these props of their power, has been, still is, the object of the daily study and the nightly vigils of our American Cabinet. For this the British Treaty was permitted to expire by its own limitation; notwithstanding the state of things which the Treaty of Amiens had produced in Europe was so little like permanent peace, that the occurrence of the fact, on which the force of that limitation depended, might easily have been questioned, with but little violence to the terms, and in perfect conformity with its spirit. For this a renewal of the Treaty of 1794 was refused by our Cabinet, although proffered by the British Government. For this the treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney in 1807 was rejected. For this, in 1811, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of the public Treasury to John Henry, for the obvious purpose of enabling the American Cabinet to calumniate their political opponents, on this very point of British influence, upon the eve of elections, occurring in Massachusetts, on the event of which the perpetuation of their own power was materially dependent.

Mr. Speaker, such men as these never will permit a state of things to pass away, so essential to their influence. Be it peace or war arrangement or hostility, the association of these British antipathies in the minds of the mass of the community, with the characters of their political opponents, constitutes the great magazine of their power. This composes their whole political larder. It is, like Lord Peter's brown loaf, their "beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge, plum-pudding, and custard."

From the time of the expiration of the British Treaty of 1794, and the refusal to renew it, the American Cabinet have been careful to precede negotiation with some circumstances or other, calculated to make it fail, or at least to make a successful result less certain. Thus in 1806, when, from the plunder of commerce, by British cruisers, a negotiation, notwithstanding the obvious reluctance of the Cabinet, was forced upon them, by the clamors of the merchants, the non-importation law of April, in that year, was obtruded between the two countries. In the course of the debate upon that law, it was opposed upon this very ground, that it was an obstacle to a successful negotiation. It was advocated, like the bill now under discussion, as an aid to successful negotiation. It was also said by the opponents of the law of 1806, that Great Britain would not negotiate under its operation, and that arrangement, attempted under proper auspices, could not be difficult, from the known interests and inclinations of that nation. What was the consequence? Precisely that which was anticipated. The then President of the United States was necessitated to come to this House, and recommend a suspension of the operation of that law, upon the openly-avowed ground of its being expedient to give that evidence of a conciliatory disposition; really, because, if permitted to continue in operation, negotiation was found to be impracticable. After the suspension of that law, a treaty was formed. The merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope of my present argument to discuss. It is sufficient to say, it was deemed good enough to receive the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney. It arrived in America and was rejected by the authority of a single individual; apparently because of the insufficiency of the arrangement about impressment. Really because a settlement with Great Britain, at that time, did not "enter into the scope of the policy" of the American Cabinet. The negotiation was indeed renewed, but it was followed up with the enforcement of the non-importation law, and the enactment of the embargo. Both which steps were stated at the time, as they proved afterwards, to be of a nature to make hopeless successful negotiation.

In this State the Executive power of this nation formally passed into new hands, but substantially remained under the old principles of action, and subject to the former influences. It was desirable that a fund of popularity should be acquired for the new Administration. Accordingly, an arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, and no questions asked, concerning the adequacy of his powers. But, lest this circumstance should not defeat the proposed arrangement, a clause was inserted in the correspondence containing an insult to the British Government, offered in the face of the world, such as no man ever gave to a private individual whom he did not mean to offend. The President of the United States said, in so many words, to the person at the head of that Government, that he did not understand what belonged to his own honor, as well as it was understood by the President himself. The effect of such language was natural, it was necessary; it could not but render the British Government averse to sanction Mr. Erskine's arrangement. The effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then acting as Secretary of State. He objected to its being inserted, but it was done in the President's own handwriting. As Mr. Erskine's authority was denied by the British Government, it is well known that in fact, on the point of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement turned. Can any one doubt that our Cabinet meant that it should have this effect? I send you word, Mr. Speaker, that I have agreed with your messenger, and wish you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gentleman, notwithstanding; and that you do not understand, as well as I, what is "due to your own honor." What think you, sir? Would you ratify such an arrangement if you could help it? Does a proffer of settlement, connected with such language, look like a disposition or an intention to conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of mankind on the point.

The whole stage of the relations, induced between this country and Great Britain, in consequence of our embargo and restrictive systems, was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of the British Cabinet. For, notwithstanding those systems were equal in their terms, so far as they affected Foreign Powers, yet their operation was notoriously almost wholly upon Great Britain. To yield to that pressure, or to any thing which should foster, in this country, the idea that it was an effectual weapon of hostility, was nothing more than conceding that she was dependent upon us. A concession, which, when once made by her, was certain to encourage a resort to it by us on every occasion of difficulty between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the known nature of things, and the plain interests of Great Britain, it was foretold that, during its continuance she would concede nothing. And the event has justified these predictions. But the circumstance the most striking, and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence of the indisposition of the American Cabinet to peace, and their determination to carry on the war, is that connected with the pretended repeal of the French decrees, in November, 1810, and the consequent revival, in 1811, of our restrictive system against Great Britain.

If ever a body of men were pledged to any thing, the American Cabinet, its friends and supporters, were pledged for the truth of this fact; that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitively repealed as it respects the United States, on the first of November, 1810. If ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any point, our Cabinet did it on this. They and their partisans asserted and raved. They denounced every man as a British partisan who denied it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect of the proclamation. But lest the courts of law should not be as subservient to their policy as might be wished, they passed the law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being definitive. The British Government refused, however, to recognize the validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between the British Ministry and our Cabinet. The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to revoke their Orders in Council. But they denied that repeal to exist. Our Cabinet, on the other hand, admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the question between the two countries on this point. And it is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the British Government to repeal their Orders in Council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted by the American Cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of war between the two countries. So that in truth, the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that fact; for if that fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet did not pretend that, in the position in which things then stood, they had a right to declare war, on account of the continuance of the British Orders in Council.

Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the restrictive system and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has proved that in relation to that fact the American Cabinet was, to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitively repealed, as relates to the United States, on the 1st of November, 1810. He also declares that they are then, on that twenty-eighth of April, for the first time, repealed. And he founds the issuing of this decree on the act of the American Congress of the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the 1st of November, 1810; and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American Government were bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal.

Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the American Cabinet, in this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This, this was "the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches upon a man who has thus made them stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness that would be remarkable, if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All the Executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say, in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous allegations and asseverations, is, that "This proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"

I have referred to this subject as being connected, with future conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American Cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any nation had a claim for liberal treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American, after the discovery of the error of the American Government, in relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, 1810. In consequence of that error, the American Cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival of the non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain, under circumstances which now appeared to have been fallacious; and they had declared war against her, on the supposition, that she had refused to repeal her Orders in Council, after the French decrees were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears that they were in fact not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the British Orders in Council were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American Cabinet at once extended the hand of friendship; met the British Government half way; stopped all farther irritation; and strove to place every thing on a basis best suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No, sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary, the question of impressments is made the basis of continuing the war. On this subject, a studied fairness of proposition is preserved, accompanied with systematic perseverance in measures of hostility. An armistice was proposed by them. It was refused by us. It was acceded to by the American General on the frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No consideration of the false allegation on which the war in fact was founded; no consideration of the critical and extremely consequential nature to both nations of the subject of impressment; no considerations of humanity, interposed their influence. They renewed hostilities. They rushed upon Canada. Nothing would satisfy them but blood. The language of their conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of infancy:

"Fee, faw, fow, fum, I smell the blood of an Englishman; Dead or alive, I will have some!"

Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result, the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention, and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.

I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war, and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time, beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter. Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.

As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet, in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say to you--"Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way, and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant? If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury, would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war, the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed, they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale. Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the real policy of the American Cabinet.

I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country. Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic--as they comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection, there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not, there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.

Mr. ARCHER said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House, so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of the House.

And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted first to notice the charge which had been confidently made by a gentleman from New York (Mr. GOLD) against the majority of the House. He had asserted (and he seemed to dwell upon the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that war had been declared by Congress prematurely and without due preparation; that to embark in a war with a powerful nation, without a large standing army, was impolitic in the extreme. This principle, said Mr. A., in the general might be true, but it had certainly no application to this country. Our Government was founded on the broad basis of popular opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first appearance of any system which might be calculated to destroy the liberties of the people. A laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in the heart of every man in the country, who would seize the first opportunity to change an Administration that would raise a standing army in time of peace, whatever might be the professed objects of such an Administration. From this jealousy the natural result would be, that the men who raised the army would never declare the war which it was intended to wage. He would refer to the Administration of Mr. Adams. An army had been then raised, or attempted to be raised, to defend the country against an anticipated French invasion. The professed object was disbelieved, and the people, apprehending an invasion of their rights, removed from power the men who had voted for the army. All our institutions were repugnant to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated invasion would seldom justify it, because it might be made a pretext for the purpose at all times, and with the most dangerous views. What had been said by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY) seemed to confirm this position, for he had expressed his fears of the army, even in a state of declared war, when that army was to be employed out of the limits of the country; and if jealousy existed at such time, the conclusion would naturally follow that it would exist to a greater degree in a time of peace. The argument then of the gentleman, if it proved any thing, proved too much, because its effect would always be to frustrate the views of the Government, and prevent it from going to war to avenge even the grossest insult, or to assert even its most indisputable rights. But an appeal had been made with much confidence to the history of all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he had made, and it had been said that no instance of a nation's engaging in a war without having a well-regulated and disciplined army could be adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted, but he presumed it was incumbent upon the gentleman to show that some analogy existed between the Governments of Europe and that of the United States, before his argument could have any application to the subject. There the people had no voice in the selection of their rulers. There the arbitrary will of the monarch was the law of the land, and his decrees, however oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by the hand of power, without a murmur or complaint. There each Government is surrounded by kingdoms powerful and strong, the ambition of whose rulers prompts them to seize upon every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of their dominions. For one of these powers, even in the most peaceful condition of the world, to be destitute of a powerful and permanent military force, would evince an inattention to its own security and independence, which would demonstrate the incapacity of its monarch to govern his subjects, or to preserve the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity of the Government and situation of the United States would show the inapplicability of the gentleman's maxim to this country. Here we have no powerful neighbor whose incursions we dread. Here we are happily removed, by a wide-extended ocean, from those nations who, upon a declaration of war by us, could overrun the country with a military force, or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have a people proudly jealous of their liberties, who will put down constitutionally every attempt in a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment. To have delayed, then, the declaration of war against England, until the ranks of the army authorized to be raised had been completely filled, would have been a most certain course to have defeated the object which Congress had in view. The jealousies and fears which would have been the necessary consequence of such delay, would have brought into power men of far different views; men who, if the natural conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of some of them could be admitted, would sooner submit to all the indignities we had received from Great Britain, than resist her. The war was therefore not declared prematurely, but was delayed to as late a period as the nature of our institutions would permit. And, if what he had said would not be sufficient to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his error, the army that was so shamefully surrendered at Detroit, if it had been commanded by a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before this, by the possession which it would have given us of an important province of the enemy, have convinced him that war was not declared without preparation. But, for having said so much upon this point, some apology seemed to be necessary upon his part, and he could only say that he had been induced to do so, because, having been one of the majority who voted for war against England, the charge seemed to be an imputation against his character, which the duty every man owed to himself bound him to repel.

It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. PITKIN) that the nature of the war had been changed; the principal cause had been removed by the British Order in Council of June 23d, 1812, by which her previous orders were repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact that war would not have taken place if this intelligence had reached the United States before its declaration; and that the Executive ought to have acceded to the terms proposed through Admiral Warren, and have terminated the contest. These were grounds which demanded some consideration, and he trusted that he would be able to show, from authentic documents, that his premises were erroneous, and that of course his conclusions did not follow. But he would now admit, for the sake of argument, (what he should hereafter prove incorrect,) that the Orders in Council were the principal cause of the war; he could not, for himself, see how, even then, the war ought in justice to have terminated. Did it follow that minor considerations should be placed out of view or yielded up entirely? Would it have been proper for the Government to have entered into no stipulations for the security of American seamen? Would it have been proper in them to have claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity for the vast amount of spoliations which have been made on the property of American merchants? Unquestionably not. Until these considerations, admitting them to be of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily adjusted, to have made a peace, in his opinion, would have been the height of impolicy. Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the injury should cease, but that ample compensation should be made for the commission of the wrong. This was the case every day between individuals in civil society, and why ought not the rule to apply with equal force to States, in their relation to each other? Justice was its foundation, and that would operate upon the one as well as the other. These considerations alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to show that the course the gentlemen would have taken would have been unwise. But, supposing them to have no weight, he thought it might be satisfactorily shown that, to have acceded to the terms proposed by the British Government, would have been an actual abandonment of the principal cause which had induced hostilities. To have negotiated without entering into an arrangement in relation to the important interest of impressment, would unquestionably have been a relinquishment of the right which we claimed, to be exempted from its exercise. But it was said that was a secondary consideration. From whence was this conclusion drawn? Were we more regardful of the property than the personal liberty of the citizen? Was it taken from an impression which had gone abroad in the country? or from the unofficial conversation of the members of the House? These opinions (if the expression were allowed) he would call extra judicial, and entitled to no consideration. But to show that impressment was the principal cause, he would resort to the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. He would appeal to the archives and records of the country, which, in his opinion, would be conclusive, to show what the opinions of Congress were upon that subject. And, in the first place, would call the attention of the House to the report of the committee to whom our foreign affairs were intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November, 1811. After commenting on the operation of the Orders in Council, they say:

"That they are not of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating avarice, and while they are laying before the House the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, they cannot refrain from presenting to the justice and humanity of their country the unhappy case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what would be dearer to Americans than life) their liberty; although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents have of late been drowned in the louder clamors at the loss of property; yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of the country by protecting the property of the merchant, then, indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are employed equally with those of the merchants, in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country."

Again, the same committee, in the report which they made to the House, detailing the causes which should induce the House to declare war, say, (after speaking of the evils flowing from the Orders in Council:)

"That they will proceed to the consideration of another wrong, which has been still more severely felt. This is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution. That they cannot convey, in adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, Americans were seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends, were taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens were wantonly snatched from their own country and their families; deprived of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage; compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. That while this practice is continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation, for every case produces a new proof of their degradation."

These reports, by the adoption of the measures they recommended, were sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, and may be considered as furnishing strong, if not full and complete evidence, that the Legislative department of the Government considered the impressment of our seamen as the principal cause which impelled them to have recourse to the last resort of injured nations. The opinion of the Executive had been manifested in clear and explicit terms upon the subject, in the Message of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812. Thus we have these concurrent proofs against the assertions of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. PITKIN.) If, then, as it appears clearly to have been, from the documents before alluded to, that impressment was the principal cause of the war, that it was an injury which no independent nation could submit to without surrendering a portion of its sovereignty, would it not be admitted, even on the ground which had been taken, that, to have terminated the war by acceding to the propositions alluded to, would have been degrading to the nation, and have manifested the incompetency of the Executive to have conducted with firmness the helm of State which had been submitted to his guidance and direction? And no doubt could be entertained had such an event taken place, but we should have heard denunciations against the Administration proceeding from the very quarter whence they now flow. Then they would have been made with infinitely more justice, because they would have been supported by reason and by truth. We should have then found the opposition appealing to the sympathies of the people, and proclaiming that their most inestimable rights had been surrendered by Government in the pacification; that although they were originally opposed to a war, when it had once been declared they would have prosecuted it until the claim had been abandoned by the British Government. For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the present contest, Great Britain can be compelled to relinquish her claim to the right of impressment, unless it be made the sine qua non by the American Government, to any arrangement of the existing differences between the two nations, our claim to exemption from the practice must be forever given up, and Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to continue to exercise it with ten-fold rigor and severity.

Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the clamor of French influence and French alliance, he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as he was well convinced it was not the intention or wish of our Government to engulf us in the unfathomable vortex of European warfare. One word to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GOLD) and he had done. It had been considered by him as a most unfortunate circumstance that we should be engaged in a war with Great Britain when Russia was struggling for her independence. The most amicable relations existed, it was true, between Russia and the United States; but would the gentleman have us on that account to submit to every species of indignity from the ally of that power? He beheld with as much detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as any man could possibly do. His ambitious progress was everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance of Heaven, he trusted, would arrest him in his career to universal conquest and dominion. The present condition of Russia, although her people groaned under a despotism of the most unrelenting nature, must excite the sympathy of every man in this country, because she was contending for her independence, and he would wish her complete success in the war in which she was now engaged, but that her triumph would protract the restoration of peace to his own country.

Mr. GRUNDY.--Mr. Speaker, had this debate been confined to the bill before you, I should certainly not have troubled the House with any remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed to the war in which we are engaged have selected this as a fit occasion to bring before this House and the nation a full view of all the relations which exist between this and other countries, an apology at least is furnished for a member of that committee, to whose examination these subjects have been confided, to give his ideas upon the various points suggested. This I shall endeavor to do with temper and moderation.

I will now proceed to state, as accurately and as concisely as I am able, the manner in which the points in difference between the two nations ought to be considered.

Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for instance, that of impressment, negotiation had been tried unsuccessfully for twenty years, as I will show before I sit down, from the public records of the country; on others it had been tried for a shorter period. At the last session of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice in any other way was lost, the United States declared war, not to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for the unjust spoliations which had been committed on the property of American citizens, and to cause Great Britain to cease the practice of impressment. Other causes of irritation existed, but these were the prominent causes of the war. It may be taken as granted, in this discussion, that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding the objectionable manner of the revocation. You are now asked to lay down the sword before you have obtained any of the objects of the war, except the abolition of these obnoxious orders. I request gentlemen to reflect, whether this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of the other points in dispute? Do you not, by ceasing to prosecute the war which is already commenced, declare, in the strongest possible terms, that you will not make war for the injuries which remain unredressed? Can any man persuade himself that you will obtain that by negotiation for which you have determined you will not fight! and that, too, from a nation at all times disposed to depress this growing country? That politician must have a very imperfect knowledge of the considerations which influence all Cabinets, who does not know that the strongest inducement which can be brought to operate in favor of an injured nation, is the apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained by the other party. I cannot, perhaps, establish this more clearly in any other way than by recurring to the history of a transaction which took place between the United States and Great Britain. Immediately after the attack on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded reparation. The terms proposed were reasonable, and such as a nation, inclined to act justly, would promptly have acceded to. For five years, or more, did the British Government refuse, or rather fail, to make that arrangement, which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was justice so long delayed, and why was it at last obtained? The British Minister discovered a determination in Congress to submit no longer. He saw that, unless something was done, friendly relations between the two countries must immediately cease. He saw that public sentiment called so loudly for an opportunity of obtaining that justice by force which had been refused to fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable satisfaction which had been so long withheld. Sir, had he not seen the approaching storm, no atonement for that wanton outrage on our national sovereignty had yet been made. If you now say that you will not prosecute the war, the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced by this Government, that war shall not be waged by the American nation for the impressment of her citizens, or for depredations committed on commerce. It might as well be said, in plain, intelligible language, that the ocean is to be abandoned by the people of the United States, except so far as depends on the will of Great Britain. If both the property and liberty of American citizens on the ocean are subject to her disposal, you cease to possess the rights of a sovereign and independent nation. For my own part, if we have the right to claim security for the liberty and property of our citizens against that nation, of which no man dare express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the object is attained, or the ability of this nation fails; of the latter I have no fear.

It is pretended that this Government is not desirous of peace, and that this is a war of conquest and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain from making statements which they themselves do not believe. After the declaration of war, what has been the conduct of the Executive? Through Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at London, they have offered to conclude an armistice on terms which would remove every pretext for complaint on the part of Great Britain. He proposed that this country should exclude from her service British seamen. It is true that Lord Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's want of powers, and stated that the American Congress alone could make the necessary provisions on that subject. If, however, sincerity had existed with the British Ministry, a temporary arrangement could have been made, by which hostilities would have been suspended until the legitimate authorities of this country could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had not adequate powers to conclude an armistice, the proposition made by Mr. Monroe to Admiral Warren was not liable to the same objection. In substance, both propositions were the same; to the latter, no offer of compliance has been tendered. If I have any objections to the late overtures made by the Executive, it is that too great an anxiety for peace is manifested; but when the nature of our institutions is consulted, a strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered; and, therefore, the Administration should be indulged in any measure calculated to restore harmony between the two countries, provided the honor and interests of the nation are not compromitted.

I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside party feelings, and reflect whether, if we now recede, points are not conceded to the enemy, which they would not yield if in power. They affect to be the followers of WASHINGTON. I will show them what his opinions were on the subject of impressment. From them the pretended Washingtonians of the present day will discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father of his Country too well understood the value of liberty ever to consent that the most obscure individual of his country should be deprived of it by a foreign despot. So early as the year 1792, the British nation commenced the practice of impressment, as now exercised by it. On the 11th day of June, in that year, the then Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr. Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in which the practice of impressment is strongly reprobated; and let it be remembered, that although this letter was written by the Secretary, it contained the sentiments of the President of the United States. In order that the House may more fully comprehend what were the sentiments of that man, whose memory we all venerate, I will read so much of the letter referred to, as relates to this subject:

"The peculiar custom in England of impressing seamen on every appearance of war will occasionally expose our seamen to peculiar oppressions and vexations. It will be expedient that you take proper opportunities in the mean time of conferring with the Minister on this subject, in order to form some arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was the subject of a conversation between Mr. Morris and him; which was, that our seamen should always carry about them certificates of their citizenship. This is a condition never yet submitted to by any nation--one with which seamen would never have the precaution to comply. The casualties of their calling would expose them to the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence; and thus the British Government would be armed with legal authority to impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board her are such."

If, at so early a period, the right of search for men was objected to by this Government, how much more forcible is the objection now? We were then a young nation; we have since increased in resources by which our rights can be maintained; whilst the violation of those rights have been augmented in a greater degree. On the 6th of November, 1792, the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister at London a letter, in which, when speaking on the subject of impressment, the following language is used: "It is unnecessary to develop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility of letting it go on. I hope you will be able to make the British Ministry sensible of the necessity of punishing the past and preventing the future." I know, Mr. Speaker, that there is danger of fatiguing the House by recurring to documents of this sort, but my apology is a good one: those to which I refer have never been printed for the information of the members of this House, nor have the public had an opportunity of inspecting them. I hope, therefore, to be indulged in pursuing the sentiments of former Administrations further on a subject of so much interest. On the 20th of February, 1800, Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, addressed the President of the United States on the subject of a proposed treaty between the two countries, upon which occasion he makes the following remark: "That he transmits Mr. Liston's note of the 4th of February, together with his project of a treaty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters; which appears to the Secretary utterly inadmissible, unless it would put an end to impressment; which Mr. Liston seemed to imagine, while the seventh paragraph of his project expressly recognizes the right of impressing British subjects, and consequently American citizens as at present." Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, when giving his opinion to the President, says--"That the project of a treaty proposed by His Britannic Majesty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters from the land and naval service, does not sufficiently provide against the impressment of American seamen, and is therefore deemed inadmissible."

Mr. Stoddert, who acted as Secretary of the Navy, at that period, when advising the President on the same subject, says--"That the Secretary is clearly of opinion that it is better to have no article, and meet all consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels, on the high seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered in search of deserters."

The letter of the present Chief Justice of the United States to Mr. King, Minister at London, dated on the 20th of September, 1800, places this subject in a strong light; he says--

"The impressment of our seamen is an injury of very serious magnitude, which deeply affects the feelings and the honor of the nation. This valuable class of men is composed of natives and foreigners, who engage voluntarily in our service. No right has been asserted to impress the natives of America. Yet they are impressed; they are dragged on board British ships of war, with the evidence of citizenship in their hand, and forced by violence then to serve until conclusive testimonials of their birth can be obtained. These must most generally be sought for on this side the Atlantic. In the mean time acknowledged violence is practised on a free citizen of the United States by compelling him to engage and to continue in foreign service. Although the Lords of the Admiralty uniformly direct their discharge on the production of this testimony, yet many must perish unrelieved, and all are detained a considerable time in lawless and injurious confinement. It is the duty as well as the right of a friendly nation to require that measures be taken by the British Government to prevent the continued repetition of such violence by its agents. This can only be done by punishing and frowning on those who perpetrate it. The mere release of the injured, after a long course of service and of suffering, is no compensation for the past and no security for the future. It is impossible not to believe that the decisive interference of the Government in this respect would prevent a practice, the continuance of which must inevitably produce discord between two nations which ought to be friends to each other."

In another part of the same letter, Mr. Marshall observes, "the United States require positively that their seamen who are not British subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall be exempt from impressment."

From these documents we clearly collect what was the view which the first and second Presidents of the United States had on this subject, and that of the principal officers of the Government. It appears that this exemption from impressment is no new claim set up by men now in power. It is as old as the Government itself, and there never has been, nor can there be, an Administration in this country who dare surrender this point to any foreign power. Once relinquished, we had as well abandon the ocean altogether. If the liberty of American citizens is to be subject to the will, not of the English Government, but what is infinitely worse, of every petty officer that navigates a British ship, it is in vain that we boast of freedom; we do not possess it; and only let the British Government understand you distinctly on this point, and you need talk no more of American commerce.

It has been said, by a gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. PEARSON,) that, if we exclude British seamen from our service by law, one of two things must happen--either a peace would be the result, or the people of this country all unite in a vigorous prosecution of the war. If I have mistaken the meaning of the gentleman, I wish him to correct me at this time, and answer the question directly, if, in that event, he will support the war? [Mr. PEARSON explained.] Mr. GRUNDY proceeded: Sir, from the explanation given, it will, I fear, be as difficult to come to an understanding with that gentleman, as it is to accommodate the points in dispute with the British Ministry; for, although the gentleman says he will not surrender an essential right of the country, a question might be made by him as to what were essential rights. I will, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, make one more effort to elicit the opinion of the gentleman on this subject. I ask him whether he considers the impressment of American seamen "a violation of an essential right of this country?" [Mr. PEARSON said he so considered it.] Then, said Mr. GRUNDY, from the gentleman's own declaration he is bound to support us in the war, if the principle of impressment is not relinquished by Great Britain. I have no hesitation in saying that, in a time of peace, I am willing British seamen, not naturalized in this country, should be excluded from our service. I believe that such a regulation would inflict no injury or inconvenience on the country. Whenever, therefore, a proposition to this effect is made, so as to take effect at the conclusion of the war, I shall vote for it. I consider it a direct encouragement to our own seamen, calculated to foster and cherish the enterprise and industry of that important class of our citizens.

THURSDAY, January 7.

Mr. BLEECKER.--Mr. Chairman: I have a very few, very desultory, and I fear very unimportant observations to make on the subject now before the committee. They will be few, not because the subject does not abound with various fruitful and interesting topics, but because an indisposition of some days has unfitted me for any considerable effort of memory.

I was opposed to the war when it was declared, because I was confidently persuaded that the evils of which we complained were of a nature not to be remedied by war. I thought, too, sir, that by entering into war, we were plunging ourselves into evils a million fold greater than those from which we sought to be relieved. I was opposed to the war, because I thought that, notwithstanding all the decrees and orders of the belligerents affecting our neutral rights, we might enjoy a commerce more extensive and profitable than we could have in a time of European peace. The war in Europe was, in fact, a blessing to this country. I was opposed to the war, because I knew that the whole of one of the great political parties in the Northern and Eastern, the most commercial section of the country, which was most interested in the avowed objects of the war, openly condemned it; and I believed that a great portion of the other party was secretly opposed to it. This objection was to my mind perfectly conclusive. If there had been no other reason against the war, this was enough. What, sir, go to war when that part of the country which has most of its wealth, strength, and resources, is decidedly opposed to it! go to war for commercial and maritime rights, when the people of that part of the country which is principally interested in its commerce and navigation, openly execrate war!

It seemed to me that it became legislators who were disposed to exercise a paternal regard over the interests of the nation, to give up their own opinions, their prejudices and partialities, rather than go to war with a people thus divided. And permit me to say, sir, without any disparagement to the members of this House, that thousands and tens of thousands of the inhabitants of that part of the country of which I have been speaking, are as competent to understand the true interest and honor of the nation, as gentlemen who happen to be members of Congress.

I was opposed to the war, because I thought it might expose our happy form of Government--our excellent political institutions--to a dangerous trial. I was afraid, sir, that the war might produce a pressure upon the Government which it would not be able to sustain. I was opposed to the war, and this was the bitter draught, because it brought us into concert and co-operation with the great destroyer, the grand enemy of freedom and humanity throughout the world. I was opposed to the war, because I believed the state of things in Europe, out of which our difficulties arose--a state of things which the United States had no power to control--was in its nature transient. Rather than plunge ourselves into the vortex of European politics; rather than encounter the evils and dangers of war, I thought it would be wise and prudent to wait until "the troubled waters should subside, and the ancient landmarks of the world reappear above the flood;" with a living statesman, I thought I saw in the very cloud which blackened all our horizon, the bow which was set for a token, that the tempest would not be forever.

But, sir, war was declared, and the doctrine has since been promulgated, that it is now the duty of every man to support it; that all inquiry must be hushed, and all examination of its expediency and propriety cease. So far as this doctrine inculcates obedience to the laws, it has my cordial approbation; but inasmuch as it denies the right of the citizen to examine into the causes of the war, to express and publish his opinions respecting its policy, it is an insult to the understanding of an intelligent people, and inconsistent with the character and spirit of the constitution. War is declared by law. How shall the law be repealed? How can we get rid of the war, if we may not say that it is inexpedient, impolitic, and ruinous? How abominable the doctrine is, that the declaration of war shuts the door against all inquiry, is manifest from the consideration, that it would enable a wicked Administration to perpetuate its power by declaring war. Again, sir, I would ask the advocates of the doctrine I am reprobating, when will it be proper to show the folly and ruinous consequences of the war? Suppose the war to have continued five or ten years, and the country to be impoverished, its commerce annihilated, its resources exhausted, its best blood expended in wild and fruitless projects of conquest, the people oppressed by debts and taxes, will it then be deemed improper to expose the absurdity and mischief of continuing the war? Surely, sir, it will be patriotic and laudable to alarm the people, to entreat them to put an end to that which is the cause of their calamities. And if such conduct will then be proper, it must be laudable and patriotic now to show them their evils and dangers, and to point them to the means of escape.

But, sir, what has been the state of the country since the declaration of war? I speak again in reference to public opinion. The people of the North and East have poured out their feelings and opinions, their complaints and groans, in addresses, petitions, resolutions, and remonstrances against the war. Look, sir, at the Presidential election, and you see all the Northern and Eastern States; with the exception of Vermont, arrayed against the Administration. You see the people disregarding the old line of party division and distinction. Yes, sir, in spite of such division and distinction, "burying their mutual animosities," their ancient prejudices, "in their common detestation" of the policy of the Government, rising up in their might and strength to manifest their hostility to the course of measures it has pursued. This, Mr. Chairman, is a state of things which ought to arrest the attention, and engage the reflection of the National Legislature, for without that section of country our strength is weakness. I know how ungracious and invidious topics of this kind are to some gentlemen. But, sir, we cannot help it that the country is made up of sections. We are legislating for such a country, and it is our business and duty to regard the circumstances, the interests, and feelings of the people of different parts of the Union. We declared war for commerce; the people most interested in commerce were opposed to it. We continue the war for sailors' rights, and three-fourths of our native American seamen belong to New York and the Eastern States, the people of which are sighing for peace. It ought to be remembered, too, sir, that the war itself must have the effect of driving a vast portion of our sailors out of the country into foreign service.

But, Mr. Chairman, whatever may have been the reasons for declaring war, the question is not now what it was when war was declared. Our relations with the belligerents have materially and essentially changed. So much have they changed, that I declare, without fear of contradiction, that had they been on the 17th of June last what they now are, we should not have gone to war. I hope no gentleman of this committee will deny this. But if any gentleman should deny it, the nation will not believe him. Sir, we have received new, important, and interesting evidence of the true state of our foreign relations since the declaration of war. Facts which were then unknown, and which have shed a flood of light upon the situation and policy of the United States, have since been published to the world. The repeal of the Orders in Council itself, by removing the principal cause of the war, has produced a most material change; for had they been repealed before the war was declared, there would have been no war; and let it be remembered, that they were repealed before the war was known in England. But this is not all to which I refer. I mean to speak of the evidence we have received respecting our relations with France; and I hope gentlemen will not be startled or offended by what I am about to say. I declare confidently and boldly that Napoleon has inveigled us into the war. He has cajoled and deceived us. But for his arts, intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now have been at war with Great Britain. Yes, sir, he has led us on step by step, until he brought us to the edge of the precipice, and plunged us into the abyss. We have been humbled and mortified. He has triumphed over our character, our honor, our rights, our independence. I do not say these things hastily, carelessly, or lightly. And I will add, that after the discovery of the deceit and duplicity which the Emperor of France has practised upon us, it became the duty of this Government to go back to the ground it occupied before the President's proclamation of November, 1810, or to declare immediate war against France. A proper regard to the honor, the character, and independence of the country, demanded this of its Government.

Sir, the proof of what I have said is plain; and it is time that it be stated here, and spread before the nation. I beg the attention of the committee to the facts on which it rests. I need not go back farther than to the law of May, 1810, which provided that the non-intercourse act should cease, as to that belligerent which should first repeal its decrees violating our neutral rights, and that it should operate on the other, which should fail so to do, within three months after the President's proclamation of the fact of such repeal. This law, and the conduct of the President under it, are the immediate cause of the war, and the present unhappy state of the country. On the 5th of August, 1810, the Duke de Cadore wrote his famous letter to General Armstrong, the American Minister in Paris, stating that the Berlin and Milan decrees would, upon certain conditions, cease on the first of November then next. On the authority of this letter, the President of the United States issued his proclamation, declaring the fact, that the French decrees were repealed. But the British Government, not considering the letter of the Duke de Cadore sufficient evidence of their repeal, did not revoke their Orders in Council, and, in consequence, our non-intercourse act went into operation against Great Britain the February following. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the President, great doubts existed in this country, whether the French decrees were in fact repealed. To remove these doubts, to confirm the proclamation, to prevent inquiry and investigation in the judicial tribunals of the country, the act of March, 1811, was passed. Yet, sir, it has ever since been denied that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed. The public prints have teemed, and the tables of this House have been loaded with the proofs of their existence and execution. You remember, sir, an impressive argument, in many respects original, an unanswered and unanswerable argument of the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) on this subject in this House, towards the close of the last session. But, sir, notwithstanding all this, this Government persisted in declaring that the French decrees were repealed. I do not mean to discuss that stale matter. The statement I make is necessary to my present purpose. The question of their repeal was the subject of a very voluminous and long-continued correspondence between Mr. Foster, the British Minister, and our Secretary of State. The discussion, I believe, was protracted to the last moment of peace. War was declared on the 18th of June. Some weeks afterwards, appeared in this country a decree of Napoleon, issued in May last, and bearing date the 28th of April, 1811. This is an extraordinary paper, and deserves some attention. I will read it:

"APRIL 28, 1813.

"Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c.

"On the report of our Minister of Foreign Relations:

"Seeing, by a law passed 2d March, 1811, the Congress has ordered the execution of the provisions of the act of non-intercourse, which prohibits the vessels and merchandise of Great Britain, her colonies and dependencies, from entering the ports of the United States.

"Considering that the said law is an act of resistance to the arbitrary pretensions consecrated by; the British Orders in Council, and a formal refusal to adhere to a system invading the independence of neutral powers and of their flag; we have ordered, and do decree, as follows:

"The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively, and to date, from 1st November last, considered as not existing in regard to American vessels."

Now, sir, did this decree exist at the time of its date? No, sir, the date is false. If the decree existed in April, 1811, why was it not communicated to this nation, the only one interested in the subject? Why was it not communicated to Mr. Russell, who so strongly urged upon the French Government the necessity of furnishing some evidence of the repeal of the decrees. For the purpose of communicating some satisfactory information on that subject to this country, he detained the John Adams in France, in July, 1811. You will remember Napoleon's decree is dated in April. Permit me here to read a passage of Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 15th of July, 1811.

"On the 14th of June, Mr. Hamilton, of the John Adams, reached Paris, and informed me that this vessel had arrived at Cherbourg. Unwilling to close my despatches by her, without being able to communicate something of a more definite and satisfactory character than any thing which had hitherto transpired, I immediately called at the Office of Foreign Relations, but, the Minister being at St. Cloud, I was obliged to postpone the interview which I sought until the Tuesday following. At this interview, I stated to him the arrival of the frigate, and my solicitude to transmit by her to the United States some act of this Government, justifying the expectation with which the important law which she had brought hither had, undoubtedly, been passed."

After Mr. Russell had left Paris, he wrote from England to Mr. Barlow, who succeeded him, "for additional proofs of the removal of the decrees." Mr. Barlow seems to be very anxious "to get the treaty through, carrying an unequivocal stipulation, that shall lay that question to rest."

But it was all in vain; no authentic evidence of the repeal was furnished. This decree did not exist; and why was it not issued? Why was the evidence of the repeal of the decrees withheld? The answer is obvious. The United States were not yet committed to go to war with Great Britain. Napoleon knew very well that when proper evidence of the repeal of his decrees was furnished, the English Orders in Council would be repealed, and the United States would not go to war with Great Britain. For, sir, he knew very well, and we know very well, that for the subject of impressments alone, this country would not go to war. It cannot be denied, that for this cause we should not have declared war. This Government has never been disposed to go to war on that ground alone. The present President of the United States made an arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which gladdened the heart of every man in the nation, without any provision on that subject, without any mention of it; and there was not a murmur in the country, on account of its omission. Mr. Pinkney, too, as stated by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. TROUP,) yesterday, again and again, offered to accommodate with England, on the rescinding of the Orders in council, without any reference to impressments.

Sir, this decree itself is an insult to this Government. It is issued expressly, because we had taken our stand against England; it is declared to be issued in consequence of our act of March, 1811, when, in fact, the President's proclamation and the act of March were founded on the repeal of the decrees. To show the correctness of my remarks on this part of the subject; to show that Napoleon has triumphed over our honor and character, I beg leave to call the attention of the committee to Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of June, 1811. His language does credit to his understanding and feelings:

"To have waited for the receipt of the proclamation, in order to make use of it for the liberation of the New Orleans Packet, appeared to me a preposterous and unworthy course of proceeding, and to be nothing better than absurdly and basely employing the declaration of the President, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked, as the means of obtaining their revocation. I believed it became me to take higher ground, and without confining myself to the mode best calculated to recover the property, to pursue that which the dignity of the American Government required.

"A crisis, in my opinion, presented itself, which, was to decide whether the French edicts were retracted as a preliminary to the execution of our law; or whether, by the non-performance of one party, and the prompt performance of the other, the order in which these measures ought to stand was to be reversed, and the American Government shuffled into the lead, where national honor and the law required it to follow."

It would have been base to have employed the President's proclamation, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked as the means of obtaining their revocation. But what, sir, is the price we have at length paid for the repeal? The President's proclamation was not enough; the act of March added to it was not enough; we could not procure the revocation till we went to war. For, sir, the Emperor would not issue this decree till he knew that we were pledged and committed to go to war with Great Britain. How he knew this, sir, it is not for me to say. We all know, however, that he had all the acts of this Government to satisfy him of the course we were pursuing--the step we were about to take. He had the President's Message, the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the war speeches of the members of this House, the laws for raising armies, and the embargo. In the month of May, then, when the policy of this country in relation to Great Britain was settled, he issued his decree, just in such time, too, sir, that it could not reach this country till we had plunged into the war. And well, in such a state, might he repeal his decrees, which, by the war itself, would be superseded--would become a nullity.

Thus, sir, believing the French decrees to be repealed, we departed from our neutral stand by enforcing the non-intercourse law against Great Britain. We have in vain waited for such evidence of their repeal as would have induced Great Britain to rescind her Orders in Council--the great cause of the war. Their revocation depended upon the repeal of the French decrees; and had they been revoked, there would have been no war between the United States and Great Britain. The decree, declaring the edicts of France to be revoked, is at length issued, when the Emperor knows it is too late to prevent the war. The decree is communicated to the English Government, the Orders in Council are revoked on the ground of the repeal of the French decrees, but the United States have declared war. How, sir, can I make this matter plainer? Our whole course against Great Britain has proceeded from the belief of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but that evidence of their repeal, which would have stopped our course, by means of which the Orders in Council would have been revoked, and the war would have been avoided, is withheld till the Emperor knows that war is inevitable. Thus, sir, have we been duped, deceived, and inveigled.

I repeat it, sir, had we, on the 17th June, understood our foreign relations as we now understand them, we should not have declared war. And would it not have been just and magnanimous in this Government, when all doubt was removed on the subject of the French decrees, to have acknowledged its error? Did not the honor, the character, the independence of the country require of us to go back to our original neutral ground? I rose principally for the purpose of presenting this view of the arts and deceit of the French Emperor to the committee. I regret that I have not done it more fully and clearly; and I hope that some gentleman more competent to a proper examination of the subject will yet take it up before we get through this discussion.

Mr. TALLMADGE said he felt a peculiar embarrassment in rising to offer to the consideration of the committee some of his own reflections on the important subject now under debate, from a twofold consideration. In the first place, the magnitude of the question might claim the aid of more exalted talents than he pretended to possess, and, therefore, to do it justice, he feared, would not be in his power. For, said Mr. T., in the extensive range of debate which has been permitted by the Chair, the whole field of our foreign relations has been open to examination, and the policy of our own Government in relation to Great Britain has been deemed fairly within the range of discussion.

In the second place, the gentlemen who had preceded have occupied the ground so ably, and discussed the subject so extensively, that it was somewhat difficult to present arguments entirely novel to arrest the attention of the committee. Having a belief, however, that there were some important considerations, in relation to the bill now under debate, which had not yet been brought into view, he begged the attention of the committee while he endeavored to lay before them the views which he had taken of the subject, and which constrained him most decidedly to oppose the passage of the bill.

Before I enter upon the merits of the subject, said Mr. T., I take occasion to express my hearty assent to declarations made by honorable gentlemen that this is no time to indulge the bickerings of party; and that it is greatly to be desired that all distinctions of this sort were entirely laid aside and forgotten. Sir, I should consider it the most auspicious event of my life if I could see every gentleman on this floor determined to take and maintain the true old American ground occupied by the patriots of '76. Although it may be painful to the feelings of an honorable mind to be assailed with odious appellations, and charged with duplicity and falsehood, yet the mind which has virtue for its basis, a conscious integrity for its support, and firmness sufficient to enable the man to do his duty, may hope to pass unhurt by such malicious darts.

Standing, as I do, in the highly-responsible situation of one of the legislators of this extensive country, I hope to have stability and integrity sufficient to enable me to discharge my duty to my constituents. If, after having passed through the Revolutionary war, and having never changed my political creed to the present day, an odious epithet could induce me to alter my course, I should be unworthy the confidence of my country. But whence, Mr. Chairman, proceeds this system of slander and abuse? From the foul presses of our country. To whom are some of the fairest characters which have ever adorned this or any other country indebted for the odious epithets of monarchists, foreign agents, tories, and the like? To your imported patriots, who, weary of the dull pursuits of industry on their native soil, or escaping from the justice of the laws of their own country, have fled to this happy land to instruct its inhabitants in the true principles of liberty and equality.

To this set of newly-fledged politicians, and men of a similar stamp, is this once happy country indebted for one-half the miseries and much of the disgrace which it suffers.

I have been led into this digression in consequence of remarks which have fallen from the other side of the House, but will now return to my subject.

A gentleman from New York, (Mr. STOW,) who addressed you early in this debate, told us that he reprobated the war, and had no confidence in the Administration to conduct it to a successful issue, but should vote for the bill to enable them to carry it on. This is strange political logic to my understanding. While I subscribe fully to his premises, the reasonings of my mind bring me to a very different result. Because I deprecate this war as pregnant with great evils, if not ruin to my country, I will, therefore, take all constitutional measures to bring it to a speedy and honorable close; and because I have no confidence in the Executive department of our Government, nor in the subordinate agents who have been appointed to vote for this bill, which, if adopted, will enlist still greater evils on this devoted country.

In presenting the subject to this honorable committee, in its most appropriate form, it may be proper to examine into the prominent causes of our dispute, which has terminated in open war with Great Britain. These I take to be three, viz:

1. The Orders in Council.

2. Impressment of our seamen.

3. The attack upon the Chesapeake.

That we may narrow the point in controversy as much as possible, I remark that ample and satisfactory atonement having been made for the violation of our rights by the attack on the Chesapeake, one cause of disquietude and a prominent one too, has been finally removed. It has indeed been frequently remarked on this floor, that the satisfaction offered for the unauthorized attack on the frigate Chesapeake was long delayed, and very reluctantly offered. However painful it may be to censure the conduct of our own Government, yet a sense of justice obliges me to say, that to every overture made by Great Britain to accommodate this unpleasant affair, our Administration attached some exceptionable condition which closed the door to an amicable adjustment. The committee cannot have forgotten the early disavowal of this wanton aggression on the honor of our flag by the British Government, and the tender of satisfaction which was made, but failed because our Minister was instructed to couple with this complaint the subject of impressment; nor can they have forgotten how indignant the Ministry and nation were when the President assumed the right of judging what would best comport with the honor of their King. Few, I believe, who read the offensive remark, expect a different result from that which ensued. And while I am upon this subject I take occasion to remark, that in all our attempts to negotiate with the British Government there seems to have been some untoward circumstance, some unfortunate condition, either accidentally or intentionally, attached to the question at issue, which has defeated the negotiation.

It would be within the scope of my present plan to take a particular review of the British Orders in Council, as well as the subject of impressments. But inasmuch as the documents relating to these two subjects have been laid on every gentleman's table; and more especially when I reflect that both topics have been very ably discussed by some gentlemen who have preceded me, and especially by the gentleman who has just sat down, (Mr. BLEECKER,) I shall content myself with taking but a brief review of these prominent, and I may add, the only remaining causes for the present war. As to the Orders in Council, it ought not to be forgotten, that during several lengthy discussions to obtain their repeal, as well by our Ministers in London, as at this place, they have been considered as the prominent point in dispute. So, again, as to the origin of our restrictive system; it cannot be forgotten that the friends and abettors of those measures uniformly professed that they were adopted as retaliatory for the Orders in Council. From the first partial non-importation act, which passed on the eighteenth of April, 1806, down to the law of the second of March, 1811, the object has been, on the very face of the law, to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council, and of the Berlin and Milan decrees. If any doubt should remain on the mind of any member of this committee as to this fact, I beg him to turn his eye to the restrictive code, and I presume he will find the evidence to be abundant and complete. In this system of anti-commercial regulations, I find the origin and progress of our present political calamities. And here, Mr. Chairman, I shall readily admit, that we had grievances and complaints, great and heavy, against both of the belligerents; nor have I the least inclination to palliate or excuse them. My object is to show, what I have uniformly expressed on this floor, that our system of non-importation, non-intercourse, and embargo, have been directed against the Orders in Council, as to Great Britain, and nothing else; and finally, have brought this country into a ruinous war. Is there a man within these walls, who does not now believe (as was fully predicted when the law passed) that the conditions held out to the two great belligerents, to induce them to repeal their obnoxious edicts, violating the neutral commerce of the United States, placed the execution of our law in the hands of a foreign Government? Is there a man of ordinary capacity in the United States, having the means of information, who now believes that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, according to the proclamation of the President of the United States, solemnly announcing that fact; and that they thenceforward ceased to violate our neutral commerce? Does not candor constrain all to confess that, long after the pretended repeal of the aforesaid decrees, our commerce was harassed in every sea where French cruisers could reach it? Need I point you to the piratical seizures and burning of American property in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic seas, by the privateers and fleets of the French Empire; subsequent to this pretended repeal, and sanctioned expressly by its authority? If all other evidence should be deemed insufficient, I inquire whether the French Emperor himself has not sufficiently humbled this country (if indeed our cup of humiliation had not been full before) by his own formal antedated repeal of his Berlin and Milan decrees, long subsequent to the time imposed on the President by the Duke of Cadore?

It cannot have escaped the attention of the committee, or of the nation, that Napoleon's decree, respecting the Berlin and Milan decrees, bears date the 28th of April, 1811, and is explicitly bottomed on the law of Congress passed March 2, 1811; the sole object of which law was to confirm the proclamation of the President which had then been issued more than four months, and the legality of which had become very questionable. This decree may be found among the documents accompanying the President's Message of November 4th, 1812, and on the forty-sixth page of those printed papers.

If further evidence should be needed to prove the abominable fraud of this transaction, it may be found in the correspondence of our Minister at Paris, in the summer of 1811, wherein he remarks, that he had repeatedly demanded evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, but none could be obtained. And yet, forsooth, we are now furnished with a decree dated in April preceding, but not issued until we are so entangled in French toils, that war with Great Britain was inevitable. If this fact alone had been understood, I put it to the candor of this honorable committee to say, whether they would have consented to the declaration of war against Great Britain at the time and for the reasons which were given? I say, without fear of contradiction, that they would not. If my premises are true, and the inference undisputed, since the Government has been grossly deceived and drawn into this war, for reasons and causes which did not then exist, most assuredly it becomes our duty as well as interest to relieve the country from its pressure as soon as possible.

In addition to all this, it is a singular fact in the history and progress of this war, that in five days after its declaration, (viz. on the 23d of June, 1812,) and as soon as the aforesaid decree of the French Emperor was made known to the British Ministry by Mr. Russell, an Order in Council was issued, repealing the former obnoxious orders, which had been ostensively the most prominent cause of the war; and yet the President has never issued his proclamation announcing that fact, as by the terms of the law of March 2d, 1811, he was expressly bound to do. On this failure of the President to do what the law enjoined on him to perform, as well as having issued his proclamation of November, 1810, without possessing the facts required by the law to support him, I make no comment. The account is still unsettled between him and this injured country.

The Orders in Council having thus been revoked, the continuance of the war seems to rest upon the impressment of our seamen alone. Give me leave then to inquire into the grounds of this practice, as claimed by Great Britain. Is it not bottomed on the ancient doctrine of perpetual allegiance--or in other words, that the native-born subject can never so expatriate, as that the mother country may not claim his service in time of war? Is this a novel doctrine, either as to time, or the nation who now attempts to enforce it? I venture to say that Great Britain has practised upon this principle ever since she has been a nation; and it is farther manifest that France, and all the maritime powers of Europe, have maintained the same doctrine. Nay, sir, we maintain the same doctrine in our own country; in proof of which, witness the President's proclamation at the commencement of this war; and notice also the recent case of Clark the spy, who was condemned to suffer death by a court martial, and was pardoned by the President on the ground of his owing allegiance to the United States, although residing in an enemy's territory, and having been naturalized or sworn allegiance to the King of Great Britain. Hence it would seem, that the principle set up was not novel nor singular. But what is the principle in contest between the two Governments? Great Britain claims the right to visit neutral merchant ships on the high seas; and if she finds any of her natural born subjects, to take them into her service. The Government of the United States denies to her this right, and asserts, that a foreigner naturalized in this country, is absolved from all allegiance to the parent State. The practice of Great Britain under her principle, has undoubtedly subjected some of our native citizens to capture and involuntary service, from causes which I need not here repeat. In all such cases, I take it to be admitted on all hands, that she sets up no claim, and therefore every abuse of this sort is capable of remedy. But on this head I have no hesitation in expressing my unqualified belief, founded on documents which have been laid on our tables, that the list of such impressed seamen is greatly exaggerated. Out of the number six thousand two hundred and fifty-seven of American citizens said to have been impressed, and forming a standing head piece to the list of our grievances, I very much question if five hundred native Americans can be found among them all. The documents lately furnished by the Secretary of State, if carefully examined, will serve very much to substantiate this fact. Many names are there returned who have only forwarded their claims to our Consul at London, and who, very probably, never set foot on American ground. Others again are continued on the list who have been discharged years ago, and others who have voluntarily engaged in her service.

The question then at issue, I take to be this--Shall the war with Great Britain be continued to oblige her to relinquish the practice of taking from our merchantmen her native British sailors? If we could obtain the principle by continuing the war, I think it can be demonstrated, that it would be injurious to the American seamen to have it so established, inasmuch as it would, by increasing the number of our seamen, necessarily diminish their wages. But, circumstanced as Great Britain is, contending for her existence against the most formidable power on earth, and resting her last hopes upon her navy, I presume she will never relinquish the principle.

The inquiry has been made, with some solicitude, what will you do with naturalized foreigners? I answer, treat them hospitably, and extend the arm of protection and all the blessings of government to them while they continue within your territorial jurisdiction; but if they leave your territory, and choose to go upon the great highway of nations, the risk and the choice are their own, as will be the peril. Put the case fairly to the yeomanry of our country, and let them understand the subject, that this war is to be carried on for the purpose of protecting foreigners while sailing on the high seas, and I very much incline to the opinion, that they would, dismiss the authors of this war from further service, or oblige them soon to bring it to a close. Sir, I will not consent to waste one drop of pure American blood, nor to expend a single dollar, to protect, on the high seas, all the vagabonds of Europe. Valuable as may have been the acquisition in obtaining many great and good men as emigrants from Europe, still I must maintain the opinion, that all the blessings of liberty and domestic government, which are secured to them in common with our native citizens, ought to be an ample compensation. I know it is no easy matter to draw the precise line where protection shall cease; but in a question of such moment as peace or war, the prosperity and happiness, perhaps the misery and ruin of our country, I cannot hesitate as to the course proper to be pursued.

With respect to protections, they have become so much a matter of bargain and sale, that having been counterfeited and sold in almost every port in Great Britain, as well as in America, they have long since ceased to answer any valuable purpose. It has been a fact long since well established, that a foreigner, who could scarcely speak our language, could procure a protection in Great Britain purporting to be evidence of his American citizenship. This then may account for the light and contemptuous treatment given to this species of evidence by the officers of the British navy.

FRIDAY, January 8.

Mounted Rangers.

Mr. JENNINGS said that it must be recollected by the House, that the act which was passed at the last session of Congress, for the raising certain companies of rangers for the protection of the frontiers, had expired. Those rangers were raised under the apprehension of attacks from the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately been realized far beyond the general anticipation. When those companies were raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to have taken possession of the British Province of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted the connection and communication between the British and the northwestern Indians. It will therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence of our disappointed expectations in that quarter, the northwestern frontier will be more exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at the opening of the approaching spring, than they have been heretofore. This description of force, if again organized, and stationed at suitable points without the frontier settlements, will render it more efficient, and in a better situation to range the woods and prevent the unapprised attack of the savage upon the helpless women and children. If we had to expect invasion from a civilized foe, our situation would not excite so much terror, but the savage character draws no distinction between the helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under such circumstances, no calculation of expenditure ought to have any weight against a measure calculated to afford a necessary and proper protection to such an important and extensive frontier of the United States. The secrecy and facility with which the savages can assail that frontier, renders it improper that we should depend entirely for protection upon the volunteers and militia of an adjoining State. They carry with them their prejudices, and too often forget the sacred rights of private property. This fact has unfortunately been verified by a petition which I presented yesterday from the territory which I represent. But I cannot believe that such is the character of the citizens of Kentucky, although I do believe that the cause of that plundering, so far as it did take place in the western part of the territory of Indiana, by a portion of the Kentucky volunteers, may be found in the unhallowed exertions of local political purposes, to impress on the minds of at least some of those volunteers, that they were to defend British agents, British partisans, and persons having connection with the savages.

I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the House the following resolutions which I have prepared, as well for the purpose of offering a bounty in lands to those who would volunteer their services as rangers for the protection of the northwestern frontier, as for the purpose of inquiring into the expediency of paying the militia and volunteers who have already rendered important services in shielding the helpless from savage cruelty:--

"Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be, and they are hereby, directed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President of the United States to raise at least twelve companies of rangers, by the acceptance of volunteers or enlistment for one year, to be mounted or otherwise, as the service may require.

"Resolved, That the said committee inquire into the expediency of allowing a bounty in land to those who shall tender their services as rangers, and be accepted by the President of the United States.

"Resolved, That the said committee inquire likewise into the expediency of making provision for compensating the militia or volunteers, who may have been called out, or whose services may have been accepted by the Executives of either of the territories of the United States."

The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men, for one year, if in the opinion of the President of the United States the public service shall require it.

Mr. WHEATON said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent man, whose age has given him an opportunity of combining experience with observation, must know that there are times when, on certain questions relating to the great interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances of truth and reason are of little or no avail against the misguided impetuosity of public prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already arrived, it is greatly to be feared that we are fast approaching. To float along the current of popular opinion requires very little exertion; but the man that is placed in a situation where the public safety demands that he should stem the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect, with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal task he has to perform. The bill, now under consideration, has opened a field of discussion on the general policy of the war, in which its advocates and opponents seem to have given full range to their imaginations; and the arguments, on both sides, have apparently been attended with various success. There can, however, be little doubt on which side the victory will finally be declared. It is well known that the majority are determined, and the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to take no part in the dispute, but to content myself with giving a simple vote. But, reflecting that I am called upon to act on a subject by me deemed important, not only for myself, but for the good of the people whom I have the honor to represent, who will be equally interested in the result, I have felt myself impelled, both by duty and inclination, to state some of the reasons on which that vote will be grounded.

The bill proposes giving authority to the President of the United States to raise twenty thousand regular troops, in addition to the thirty-five thousand already authorized by law. This may be right or wrong, proper or improper, according to times and circumstances, and the objects which the measure is contemplated to effect. Were the country invaded by a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to make this additional number of troops necessary for its defence, I should say it were right and proper to raise them, whatever expense it might be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of the bill profess, these men are to be enlisted, and, together with those heretofore authorized, are to form a powerful army for the purpose of foreign conquest, I have no hesitation in giving it, as my opinion, that it is improper and wrong, or, at least, as the President has told us respecting the French decree repealing those of Berlin and Milan, that "the proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections." Objections, it is apprehended, may arise from want of powers given to Congress by the constitution, either expressed or implied, to do this thing, with its professed object in view--that is, foreign conquest. And if these are unavailing, common reason and common sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to the expediency of our undertaking such enterprises. Objections, for want of sufficient powers given by the constitution, may be considered as novel; but, if sound, they should nevertheless prevail. The war itself is novel, this being the first of the kind that ever we have undertaken since that instrument was formed, or since we became an independent nation. If the constitution gives Congress any power to carry on foreign wars, those powers must be collected from expressions it contains, or from some clear and necessary implication from something that is therein expressed. It will be very readily admitted, that our national Government is a Government of a very simple construction, and that it possesses very limited powers; being established by compact, not by conquest, it has not all the powers incident to the sovereignties of other countries; not produced by conquest, it was not made for conquest. "The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people; and the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The framers of this constitution took particular care, not only to define the powers they intended to give, but the objects to which that power should be applied, and therefore, but for those defined objects, Congress have no powers at all. The objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly, and then the powers necessary to their attainment. The people of this country, after having effected the Revolution and established their independence, considering their great transmarine distance from the nations of the Old World, and all their jarring and rival interests, flattered themselves with the expectation of long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked at home, they had no idea of making war for the purpose of conquest abroad. "Peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," was their motto, and the same sentiment has been sanctioned by a man, whom the advocates of this war have never ceased to admire. An aversion to standing armies was among the causes that induced the Declaration of Independence; without standing armies, it was then believed, and we now know full well, foreign wars cannot be carried on. Foreign wars did not, therefore, come within the scope of that policy that dictated the constitution. I am not insensible, that, by the constitution, a power is given to Congress to declare war, (not to make it,) but their power is not to be exercised but in the spirit of that instrument, and for the attainment of some or all of the objects for which it was framed. And what are those objects? Why, and for what was the constitution made? Its authors have told us. It was for "the forming of a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," and all these benefits for the people that then did, or who thereafter should, belong to, or reside in the territory then embraced by the United States, and none other. The constitution was not made for any other, nor can it give jurisdiction over any other. If all or any of these objects are endangered, and it can be made to appear that raising the additional army proposed by this bill be necessary to the preservation and security of them, and can afford a rational prospect of producing such an effect, then my objections to the measure, so far as they arise from the apprehension of the want of constitutional authority, will be obviated. But here, permit me to ask, whether adding twenty thousand new troops to our present regular army, will be likely to have the effect of forming a more perfect union among the people of these States, or whether the little progress already made in the war has not produced fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse? If justice be not already established in our country, can there be any probability that a more formidable army will effect an object so desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim, as true now as in those ancient times when it was written, that "Inter arma leges silent." So romantic an idea, as being able to establish justice through the world, could not have entered the heads of those that framed the constitution. Much has been said respecting the laws of nations; but they are now nowhere to be found, but in those books that treat on that subject; they were formed by the nations of the civilized world, and evidenced by the treaties, compacts, and agreements, entered into by them; but the Governments of Europe, in their struggle for power and dominion, seem to have disregarded or broken them down; and they being the majority in number, and superior in strength, it is not at present in our power to build up and enforce them. The unavoidable state of the world must be submitted to, until human nature shall, by its Great Author, be corrected. Nor can we, from what we have experienced, promise ourselves, from foreign war, an increase of tranquillity at home. But we are authorized, and are bound to provide for our common defence, and to raise armies, as well of regulars as militia, for that purpose, whenever the unfortunate situation of our country may render such a measure necessary; and our raising of a regular army could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution for any other purpose, and therefore give no authority so to do, and, as if conscious that this were the case, the committee that penned the act passed by Congress in June last, declaring war, made use of a form altogether unusual in other countries on similar occasions. The act declares that "war exists between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon the idea, that hostilities had then been actually commenced against us by that Government, and our country invaded by a British armed force. Such a doctrine would have been very proper, and it might have been proper to raise armies in pursuance of it, had it been true. But such was not the fact. No hostile invasion of the country, by the British Government, had then been made, attempted or threatened. But some may say, and do say, that, if it were not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore, if we had no right to raise regular armies then, it being a time of peace, we may feel ourselves fully authorized now, since war has been declared, to raise new ones, or make additions to the old. This, indeed, would be contrary to a principle universally received and adopted, that no one should be permitted to take the advantage of his own wrong.

I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party in this country, both in and out of this House, are every day zealously endeavoring to inculcate, that even admitting the war to have been wrong, at its commencement, it has now become the constitutional duty of its original opponents to afford every aid and encouragement to its prosecution. But this is a doctrine that I think no one can yield his assent to, till he is made to believe that two lines, constantly diverging, may finally meet in the same point. If our country has been in any degree invaded, and such invasion be in consequence of our having first invaded the territories of the invaders, it is proper for us, by withdrawing the cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and not the least object of the powers given by the constitution, is "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency of foreign wars to destroy liberty. I believe history does not furnish an instance of any people long free, after engaging in the mad projects of foreign conquest. While Rome was content with her ancient boundaries, her inhabitants were blessed with freedom; but, afterwards, jealousies, tumults, insurrections, and seditions, and those two great plagues and scourges of mankind--anarchy and tyranny--following in the train, destroyed every vestige of liberty among that people. Is there any liberty left among the people of France, or of those countries that France has conquered? Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened than we are; for, in such case, though slaves, they may not be quite so miserable ones. "The very age and body of our constitution, its form and pressure," indicative of the genius and temper of the people that adopted it, are all opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest. Such enterprises must not be undertaken, or the constitution must be destroyed. Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute the disgrace and defeats that have hitherto marked our progress in this war, rather to the form and constitution of our Government, than to the weakness and folly of its Administration. The French Emperor has been extolled, and his mode of conducting wars has been more than intimated as being worth our imitation. If, in making foreign conquests, we would have his success, we must make use of his means, and then we may bid adieu to our former happy institutions, our laws, and our liberty. On this ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress of this war. But if I had not a scruple left, as to the authority given to Congress by the constitution to make this war for conquest, (and perhaps I ought not to have,) my sense of its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard for the welfare and prosperity of my country, will forever forbid my giving it the smallest aid.

Mr. H. CLAY (Speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a Committee of the whole House, from two considerations: one, since it afforded to him a slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He regretted, however, the necessity under which the Chairman had been placed of putting the question,[32] precluded him from an opportunity he had wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable to the committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points it was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was to speak on this day, of which he was more sensible from the ill state of his health, he would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.

I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C., when I found this bill permitted to pass silently through the Committee of the Whole, and that, not until the moment when the question was about to be put for its third reading, was it selected as that subject on which gentlemen in the opposition chose to lay before the House their views of the interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of some part of the debate, at the latitude in which for once they have indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of the House, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing, with the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments. Perhaps in the course of the remarks which I may feel myself called upon to make, said he, gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too harsh an aspect; I have only now to say that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any intention on my part to wound the feelings of any gentleman.

Considering the situation in which this country is now placed, in a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the earth, it may not be useless to take a view of the past, of various parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful posture. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result--an honorable peace--which must be the sincere desire of every friend to America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration of the Government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the Administration to preserve peace. Their duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an infant people, their genius and their habits. Their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the people. The Administration has not been forgetful of these solemn obligations. No art has been left unessayed; no experiment, promising a favorable result, left untried to maintain the peaceful relations of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would have attained its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came a law of non-intercourse, and a general non-importation followed in the train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized with avidity by the Administration--the arrangement with Mr. Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition. No matter with what sincerity the Administration cultivates peace, the opposition will insist that it alone is culpable for any breach between the two countries. Because the President thought proper, in accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate that it would have better comported with the justice of the King (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees in that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine's arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypercritical ingenuity which they displayed to divest Mr. Jackson's correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen would only reserve for their own Government half the sensibility which is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation has been resorted to, until longer to have negotiated would have been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions of war; the proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's honor; the exclusive men of vigor and energy. The Administration, on the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous--"incapable of being kicked into a war." The maxim, "not a cent for tribute, millions for defence," is loudly proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation? The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to draw the sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When, at length, foreign nations, perhaps, emboldened by the very opposition here made, refused to listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated and reiterated by the Administration, to their justice and to their interests; when, in fact, war with one of them became identified with our independence and our sovereignty, and it was no longer possible to abstain from it, behold the opposition become the friends of peace and of commerce. They tell you of the calamities of war; its tragical events; the squandering away of your resources; the waste of the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion! Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of the forest. Now the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for war, and no restrictions, when the Administration is for peace; they are for peace and restrictions, when the Administration is for war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose: to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.

During all this time the parasites of opposition do not fail by cunning sarcasm or sly inuendo to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false; which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is, by the lie direct. The Administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The Administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! how is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation, does it rest? Is it on similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues; we speak the English language. On the resemblance of our laws! No! the sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told the fact) that an honorable member of this House, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a story in his district, that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge was rested on a statement of facts which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question it was alleged had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who some years ago was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now, taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily followed!

Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition had been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature--the application of every vile epithet, which our rich language affords, to Bonaparte. He has been compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that of the Revelations to the most insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind, the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, and--Heaven knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure lady in a city, not very far off, who also took it into her head, in conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of power, stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor; called him the curse of mankind--the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness: "Madam, it would give my master, the Emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him."

Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that they stand on American soil; that they are not in the British House of Commons, but in the Chamber of the House of Representatives of the United States; that we have nothing to do with the affairs of Europe--the partition of territory and sovereignty there--except in so far as these things affect the interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage, with European sensibility, in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen ask me, if I do not view with regret and sorrow the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe. And if I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say that Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural boundaries--the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine--and make her a secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime power, raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers, and preserve the integrity of the Empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other countries or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation is much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united, we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we are separated, and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will not be worth preserving.

In one respect there is a remarkable difference between Administration and the Opposition--it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression. True to theirs, they oppose the war for this object. They have indeed lately affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it is evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom. Their brogue betrays that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition, who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless army to fight an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one raised for a known specified object--the attack of the adjoining provinces of the enemy? The gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the danger of our liberties from this very army!

I mean to speak of another subject, which I never think of but with the most awful considerations. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with Cabinet plots, Presidential plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot of a much more serious kind--a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our Union--had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who had paid any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in a particular quarter of the Union for several years past, can doubt the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention to charge the opposition with such a design. No, he believed them generally incapable of it. He could not say as much for some who were unworthily associated with them in that quarter of the Union to which he referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment, uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" in and about the same time Henry's mission to Boston was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to be concealed by directing the public attention to the price which the gentleman says was given for the disclosure. As if any price could change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or could extenuate in the slightest degree the offence of those citizens who entertained and deliberated upon the infamous proposition! There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to. In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the Union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to American officers that this very neutrality would take place? That they have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship to peace and commerce on the one side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities on the other. The affections of the people are to be gradually undermined. The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical parties, in this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience to whom they address themselves are silent, applaud or hiss. I was astonished, sir, to have lately read a letter, or pretended letter, published in a prominent print in that quarter, written not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and deliberately, in which the writer affects to reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate its advantages to different sections of the Union, deploring the existence now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival of the period when they shall be eradicated.

The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council--a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact that transpired--an important fact material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. MCKEE) moved, in Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the other.

It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other States, upon condition that France would except singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an examination of the grounds for continuing the war.

I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice--no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle--a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son, fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,

"Hard, hard, is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed, Was as happy as happy could be! Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!"

I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection!

It is said that Great Britain has been always willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King had nearly concluded one prior to his departure from that country. Let us hear what that Minister says upon his return to America. In his letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen, and his interviews to this end with Lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up (the mare clausum,) he concludes: "I regret not to have been able to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very great importance to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent." The sequel of his negotiation, on this affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh, communicated to Congress during its present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:

"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that an arrangement in regard to it has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in Congress--I mean those who were opposed to going to war with us--have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American Government. This error probably originated with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles. This is obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed to Sir William Scott at the time."

Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which Lord St. Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment, confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for counsel and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded Lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject was entirely unfounded."

Thus, continued Mr. CLAY, it is apparent, that, at no time, has the enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the Administration since the war.

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown, and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I cannot trust my feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But this much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could have anticipated, and for which the Administration cannot be justly censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced on land. But for it the Indian war would have been in a great measure prevented or terminated, the ascendency on Lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed perhaps to Montreal. With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition under the command of Governor Edwards and Colonel Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So was that of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed the Prophet's town. We have just received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of Colonel Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the source of the Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated far beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign during the former Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed than that by Newnan's party from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit, and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to our maritime or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of Lieutenant Elliott, has never been surpassed.

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future. The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month later, anticipating a possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice, having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. PITKIN) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected as absolutely inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell's powers, and the want of an act of Congress is intimated. And yet the constant usage of nations I believe is, where the legislation of one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If he fails to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our Government is misinterpreted and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war. The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose that the Government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and instructions for any acts of hostility whatever against the territories of His Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects. That small affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war of His Majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket, not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to receive our homage, the contrite retraction of all our measures adopted against his master! And in default, he does not fail to assure us, the Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived. Administration, still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which such a proposal ought to have created, and in its answer concludes by informing Admiral Warren, "that if there be no objection to an accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject." Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PEARSON) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men--lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free trade."

Mr. MCKEE moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.

MONDAY, January 11.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men for one year.

Mr. SHEFFEY said he felt grateful for the opportunity which had been afforded him, to deliver his sentiments on the subject before the committee. It was now about a year ago, when he had stated his reasons at length on the question of the war then meditated against Great Britain. Since that time, he had been generally a silent, though not an inattentive spectator. Conscious that there had fallen to his share a full portion of the frailty common to man, he felt disposed to distrust his own opinion. He had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had hoped that experience would prove the fallacy of his apprehensions; that the predictions of gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment, would be realized; that the rights of the country would be secured by arms, to which the majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated would vanish before us. On a review, however, of the reasons which had then influenced him, aided by the experience of the last year, he found his opinions, not only unshaken, but strongly confirmed.

The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates an addition of twenty thousand men to the army heretofore authorized to be raised. By the measures preparatory to the war, upwards of thirty-six thousand men were directed to be enlisted; with the addition now contemplated, our regular army will amount to more than fifty-six thousand men. The question which at once presents itself to every mind disposed to inquire, is, what is the object of this vast military force? We are here not left to conjecture; this inquiry has been anticipated, and we have been directly told by the chairman of the Military Committee, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) that it is intended for offensive purposes; that the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is to be achieved. If I have any right to deliberate on this subject, and to express the opinion which my view of the real interests of the country dictates, I at once say, that I cannot give my assent to raise such a force for such a purpose. Was an augmentation of the army required to defend us against any enemy, either on the maritime or inland frontier, no member of this House would more readily accord the means of defence and protection than myself. In such event, I shall not inquire how we got into the situation, or by whose temerity the enemy has been brought on our borders. I shall consider defence as a matter of imperious necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means and consequences. But, as it is admitted by all, that the force already authorized is more than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as it is expressly avowed that it is required for offensive operations in the territories of the enemy, the question assumes a different shape; it is stripped of the overruling influence which attends necessity; it becomes a mere question of expediency, controlled by the various considerations which reason and policy may dictate. So far as my conduct is concerned, before I can consent to the prosecution of the war, in the manner contemplated, I must be convinced that the objects in controversy are not only just, but of sufficient importance in their practical effect on the community to justify such an experiment, and not attainable in any other way; that there is a reasonable probability that such a war will secure to us those objects; and that we are not endangering the greater good, to obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding certain great rights, to secure others of far inferior importance.

I regret that I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, yield the unlimited confidence in their measures, which the majority demand. My reason must be convinced, before my confidence can be bestowed. There are, indeed, cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested by long and successful experience, have a strong claim to our confidence. But this, in my opinion, is not the case here. A retrospect of the transactions of the last eight years, will show how much gentlemen have been mistaken and disappointed in their views of our foreign policy; particularly that part which is connected with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves, and which may be said to be the groundwork of them. In making this declaration, and in leading your attention to the facts, it is not my object to give offence to any one. I believe gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives, and sincerely disposed to render essential service to the country. I speak of facts only, intending to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or vicious course.

Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced soon after the treaty of 1794 (generally called "Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation, in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About that time the British Government offered to our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal of the treaty. That instrument had been negotiated under the auspices, and received the sanction of WASHINGTON, the father and benefactor of his country. It is true, that its stipulations did not embrace every subject which we could have wished; and those that were embraced, were not so advantageously settled as might have been done, had we had it in our power to have dictated the terms. But it is equally true, that experience refuted all the speculations, and dissipated all the apprehensions, with which the country was filled at the time of its ratification. During its operation we enjoyed a degree of prosperity unexampled in this or any other country. Our leading interests flourished in a manner unknown before, and unexperienced since; our agriculture was encouraged by high prices and ready markets for its products; the freedom of navigation, and the enterprise of our people, carried our commerce to every part of the globe. I ask this House and this nation, whether their hopes or wishes extend beyond what we then enjoyed? If they do, they hope for that which is opposed by all human probability, and they wish for that which has scarcely ever fallen to the lot of man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every evil, or gratified by every possible good. What nation or individual ever reached that state? But the great essentials of national prosperity were in our possession. Our Government, however, was not satisfied. The overture of the British Government was rejected, under the impression, no doubt, that better terms could be obtained; that the situation of Great Britain would compel her to yield to our demands, however extensive.

Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great Britain assumed the right to interdict the trade in the products of her enemies' colonies, when taken directly from those colonies to the mother country, conformably, as she asserted, to the principles adopted in the war of 1756. In consequence of which, our Government, with a view to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions, passed the partial non-importation act of 1806. It had not the intended and promised effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and repealed the restriction. About this time, a change happened in the British Cabinet, highly auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes, our old friends, who had espoused our cause in time of peril and danger, who had defended our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution, and who had manifested their friendship for us on every occasion since, got into power. With these men, a negotiation was opened by our Government through the instrumentality of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own Ministers declared, "both honorable and advantageous to the United States," and the best that could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous" as it respected our commerce, but the informal understanding which accompanied it, would have secured us against the abuses of impressments; so our own Ministers believed. But it was rejected without being even submitted to the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed to the nation. I presume, however, that it was confidently expected that such was the situation of Great Britain, that any terms that we should dictate would be granted.

The terms which our Government demanded not being accorded on the part of Great Britain, a new policy was resorted to by our Government, which was held up to the nation as a sovereign remedy for all our difficulties, which were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited in its duration, was laid on our shipping. The prominent virtues of this remedy were supposed to be--that it would coerce the belligerents, but particularly Great Britain, into an abandonment of their injurious measures; and above all, that it would save us from being involved in war. The experience of one year, however, manifested how little its supporters understood of the means and resources of other nations, and of the character of our own. The privations to which a great portion of our people were subjected in consequence of this measure coerced our Government into a repeal, long before any sensible impression could be made on Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned, because the people would bear it no longer, and the non-intercourse system was adopted in its stead. This also had its day--but this, like the embargo, experience condemned as injurious and ruinous policy; and the public voice called for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of the first of May, 1810, the source of our present difficulties.

When this act passed this House, we were told that its provisions held out the strongest inducement to each of the great belligerents, to precede its rival in the abrogation of the injurious edicts affecting the commerce of this country, and that whoever might lead the other would unquestionably follow. It required very little sagacity to penetrate this subject. It was easily foreseen that this measure would be employed to detach us from our neutral situation, which it was so much our interest, and had been so much our desire, to maintain. This apprehension experience has realized. We now feel the consequences in their fullest extent.

After we had become the dupes of French perfidy, by putting in force the non-importation system against Great Britain, under the belief, that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed, the falsehood of which has since been placed beyond all rational doubt, it happened as had been anticipated, that finding the inefficiency of the restrictive system against Great Britain, the nation was called on, about the commencement of last session, to assume a threatening attitude towards that power. We were then told by the supporters of our foreign policy, that war would not be necessary. That justice was withheld from us by the Government of that nation under the impression that force would not be used to maintain our rights, which impression it was only necessary to remove by manifesting a determined spirit in making warlike preparations. This prevailed with many, and the army was voted. But it did not intimidate our enemy. We were then told, that it was necessary to declare war, as affording conclusive evidence of our sincerity: but that it would not be necessary to continue it beyond a few weeks, when our objects would be attained by a just and honorable peace. We were also told, at the same time, that in six weeks after the declaration of war, we should be in possession of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All these promises have been disappointed. We have effected nothing by commercial restrictions, nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation; and, if there is not a change in our policy, the war promises to be perpetual.

Having detained you thus long with these preliminary topics, permit me to draw your attention to those that grow directly out of the bill before the committee. I have said, that the causes ought not only to be just, but important in their effect on the community, to justify a resort to arms. I will say more. A nation situated as this is, who has so much to lose, and so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are the causes which existed at the time when this war was declared, of that character which, according to this idea, justified its commencement; and are those now remaining sufficient to sanction its continuance?

I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.

Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal which has since taken place had happened and been known here before we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority. The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any other object.

The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged. The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy, &c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French "municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance. The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce--when she adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.

The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. CLAY,) because the right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations, and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the subject of impressments.

This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably an interesting subject. Not that I place entire confidence in the sympathetic descriptions of the magnitude of the evil, which we have so often heard and daily heard in this House. I am inclined to believe fancy has colored the picture too highly. There is one reason, above all others, which leads me to that conclusion. It is this: In that section of the United States of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives, there is a strong, overwhelming current of opinion against this war. Can it be possible that the country where dwells the kindred of those who are said to be incarcerated in great numbers in the "floating dungeons" of Great Britain is not only indifferent about the fate of its children, but opposes, as ruinous, the war waged for their protection? It is certainly a curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's rights come from those portions of the Union that have little commerce, and few, if any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that those gentlemen do wrong in espousing the cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter they may belong; but I state the fact to show that their sympathies may possibly have magnified the evil--and to infer from it, that the opposition of those most immediately interested is to be ascribed, not to their insensibility, but to their apprehensions that this war, instead of securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen into foreign service.

The controversy between this country and Great Britain seems to have been brought to a single point. She claims the service of her seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government admits this right. To give effect to the right thus claimed and admitted, she insists that her officers may go on board our merchant ships on the high seas, or in her ports--search for and take her subjects. This our Government deny, and claim the immunity of the flag so far as persons are concerned; because, under the pretext of taking British subjects, American citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed, not distinctly appear in the late communication from our Executive to the British Government, that they mean by the terms American citizens, whether it includes naturalized persons as well as natives. With respect to those of the first description, I confess I feel no great interest for their immunity abroad or on the high seas; I am one of those who think that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer them any asylum from the oppression or poverty of their own country, receive them into our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages belonging to us; and so long as they remain within our territorial limits, they shall, with my consent, have the full benefit of the protection which our laws afford to all. But I cannot consent that the native blood of this country shall be profusely wasted to protect aliens born, wherever they may ramble. We all profess a deep solicitude for the interest of seamen. To describe their distresses and to eulogize their valor and patriotism, is one of the topics of the day. And yet we are contending for principles which, if successful, will bring a host of foreigners in competition with them to elbow them out of employment. But it is said that Great Britain does the same--that by the act passed during the reign of George II., foreign seamen are naturalized who have been in the King's service for two years, and that she has no right to object if we imitate her conduct. It is true she has adopted such a regulation. But I have never heard of any instance where she has contended that such a person is absolved from his natural allegiance, if he comes within the power of his original sovereign. I have understood that act to mean that such persons should become entitled to certain rights--not absolved from any duties towards others, should they leave the country. That they should have the right to hold lands--be admitted under the regulations of the navigation act as British seamen on board merchant ships, and participate in the pension and hospital provisions. Should I be mistaken, however, I am not inclined to relinquish my opinion, merely because the practice of Great Britain is opposed to it.

Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration for insisting on the immunity of our flag, as it respects the seamen. I approve of the principle. It is of that character which at a proper time and with proper means is (in effect and to all general purposes) attainable, if we do not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate it. It is supposed that the present is the auspicious moment to insist on our rights. That pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful enemy the world ever saw, who threatens her very existence; the impression which we can make upon her by our arms, will be greater than at any other time. This very circumstance renders the attainment of our object more difficult, and makes our case hopeless. Her danger forbids a compliance with our demands. In her present struggle, her naval power constitutes her security. Without that she would long since have become a French province. This every man in England knows and feels. It is well known that four-fifths of her seamen on board her navy render not voluntary but compulsory service. Should this principle be established, which in all cases would afford a secure asylum in our merchant ships, it is dreaded by British statesmen and the British people, that their seamen, allured by higher wages and easier employment, would abandon their service, and thus render their country accessible to their enemy. Hence you see every Ministry, of whatever political party or distinction, tremblingly alive to this subject. They dare not touch it in the present state of that country. No man could maintain his power a moment after having hazarded the public safety by making an experiment, the effect of which could not be foreseen, and may be productive of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is manifest in all the communications from the British Cabinet to our Government. We have seen the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland, Lord Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions were in our favor, and who on almost every other subject supported our pretensions. On this subject they resisted our demands, because they dared not grant them. While I conceive the claims of our Government as not going too far, I doubt their prudence as to the time and manner of giving them effect. I fear that instead of realizing our wishes the measures pursued are calculated to deprive us of every hope hereafter. In the present unexampled state of the world, according to my limited conception of our true interest, we ought to have seriously avoided all hostile collision with foreign powers. We ought to have cherished the resources within our grasp. Nothing is more obvious than the remark made by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. BLEECKER,) that, with all the injuries which we received from the belligerents, our commerce was more extensive and more profitable in the aggregate than if Europe had been at peace. We might have obtained (and we ought not to have rejected) such temporary arrangements with England, (with whom our commerce was chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not embrace all our interests, would have secured those of first importance and kept us at peace. The benefits of such a policy are to my mind self-evident. Should Europe be restored to tranquillity and assume something like its former appearance, (and I do not believe the present state of things durable,) we should have been able to have effected every valuable object, because such a change will probably bring with it a respect for the rights of nations, which have now no existence but in name. And should an imposing attitude have been wanting to give effect to our claims, we should have exhibited an unbroken spirit and unexhausted resources.

An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. GRUNDY,) the other day, read some extracts from the instructions transmitted to our Minister in London, in 1792. His object was to show the deep interest which the great man who then presided over this nation felt on the subject of impressments. I sincerely wish that while gentlemen resort to his opinions to support theirs, they would consent to imitate his conduct. Nothing can be more strikingly different than his policy and that which is now pursued.

In 1793 the subject of impressments did not form the only complaint against Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on her part. To that was added the great injury which our commerce sustained by the extensive captures made by her cruisers during that year. The interest which was felt for the success of the French Revolution, against which Great Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs, and ripen it for war. But the wisdom of WASHINGTON saved us from being drawn into the vortex, which has since devoured all who approached it. His genius considered the true interests of his country to consist in the preservation of its peace; and he had firmness enough to preserve it, though opposed by the strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding the accumulated wrongs which we had received, he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately gave his assent to a treaty in which there was not one stipulation even to restrain the abuses of impressments, which the year before he had declared could not be longer tolerated. Why was this done by him, who, to say the least, had as much affection for his country's rights, as the politicians of the present day--whom fear never influenced--and who could safely calculate on the support of the people, should he resort to arms? The answer is obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was better than a hopeless, endless contest. What a contrast does his example present to the conduct of those who now direct the destinies of this nation, and who, while they reject his policy, resort to his opinions to support their own?

Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects connected with it, the opinions of gentlemen of the majority have certainly undergone a strange revolution since they came into power. Little more than twelve years ago, they deprecated foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, and the genius of our Government. Nothing short of self-defence, when attacked in our own country, was considered as a justification for abandoning our peaceful pursuits, and mingling in hostility with European powers. Every other object was deemed subordinate to the preservation of peace, because with it was connected every benefit which it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us, and which our detached situation rendered secure. We now hear those very gentlemen talk of Rome and Greece in their proudest days, when they inspired terror into the inhabitants of distant climes and carried their arms to every quarter of the globe; and their example is held up for our imitation. The almost boundless extent of our territory is become too limited, and we hear of conquests in the North and South, as essential to our security and happiness. In taking a retrospect, and contrasting former opinions with present conduct, a person would almost be inclined to distrust his observation, was there not left on record monuments with sentiments of former times entertained by gentlemen in the days of humility, when they were struggling against power. Permit me to call your attention to a resolution of the Virginia Assembly, adopted in 1798, said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now President of the United States, upon this subject. It was then considered the standard of Republican opinion, by all who professed to be of that party. It in substance declares, that though the General Assembly view with indignation the violations of our commerce, the impressment of our seamen, and other wrongs committed by foreign nations, yet detached as the United States are from European concerns, they should deprecate a war waged for any other object except self-defence, in cases of actual invasion. This resolution had an eye to our relations with France, from whom we had then received every injury and indignity she could inflict, and with whom we were in a state of partial hostility; but it explicitly declares, that we ought to engage in offensive war, for no object whatever. Let the sentiment be compared with the conduct of the same men now they are in power.

Sir, I am one of those who doubt our capacity to obtain the conquest of the British provinces. I believe that the opinion, that we are a very powerful nation abroad, is a fanciful delusion. To be powerful abroad, requires a Government of sufficient energy, not only to bring into action all the physical and pecuniary resources of the country, but to command them promptly. The very nature of our Government, where every thing depends immediately upon the people, forbids the idea that you can effect one or the other. The inconveniences and privations to which they must be subjected, are sufficient causes with the great body of the community, who do not perceive very distinctly how they are to be benefited by an offensive war, to turn their faces against it. Their Representatives, knowing their feelings, dare not press them with a heavy hand, which at once destroys every thing like energy. Besides, the want of promptitude, the characteristic defect of such a Government, whose powers are divided into many hands, prevents the resources even within their reach to be obtained and applied in time to insure success. The consequence of all this is--imbecility in obtaining, and want of celerity in applying the necessary means. This may be considered as a very great evil, particularly to those who have presented to us the example of Rome in her proudest days, when she was mistress of the world, for our imitation. Sir, I rejoice that such is the state of my country. It is the legitimate offspring of our free institutions. The people are strong and the Government is weak; whenever this state of things shall be reversed, then shall we be able to inspire terror into other nations. But until that period shall arrive, we shall exhibit weakness and slowness of action, as to all offensive and external purposes.

To retain the British provinces as an indemnity for our losses, is an event which I cannot wish, because I can see no possible benefit resulting from it. Have we not already territory enough? Is it desirable to incorporate with us a people composed of heterogeneous materials, who are not only unaccustomed to our institutions, but many of whom entertain an unconquerable hatred for them? I believe it would have been better had we never acquired any foreign territory at all. If we had been contented with the limits embraced by the old thirteen United States, the prospects of remaining a united people, and preserving our free institutions, would, in my conception, be much more flattering. I am, therefore, opposed to new acquisitions. But it is repeatedly urged that the possession of Canada is necessary to secure us from the hostilities of the savage tribes on our northwestern borders; was this the fact, I might yield my assent to prosecute the war to attain that object. But experience has shown that we can have peace with them, though Canada is in the possession of a foreign power. For seventeen years after the Treaty of Greenville we were entirely exempt from Indian hostilities; and not until we waged war ourselves, did they become troublesome upon our frontiers.

My apprehensions are not solely confined to the danger resulting from military power; there are other consequences equally to be dreaded, which I fear may overwhelm us, should we continue in this course. There is one peculiarly delicate, but equally important--so delicate, that gentlemen have supposed it ought not even to be mentioned. Sir, shall I not be permitted to point to the yawning gulf beneath? Shall I not attempt to arrest your progress in the path where lies a serpent that will sting you to death? I deprecate disunion as an event pregnant with every evil. The moment it happens, civil liberty is banished from this country. I feel deeply interested that it should not happen. Permit me, however, to observe, that a union is connected by a consciousness which is felt that the various interests of the different sections are consulted and protected, and not by force. If you wish to perpetuate the Union, you must preserve that opinion. The moment that it shall no longer exist, the ties that bind us together become feeble indeed. The present war, though ostensibly waged for principles in which the Northern and Eastern people have a deep interest, is considered by them--and they certainly understand their interest best--as calculated to prostrate it. They feel the evils of your measures daily, and they see no prospect that they ever will be benefited by them. The physical power of the country is in their hands, and it requires nothing but public sentiment, which quickly follows public interest, and you ripen them for a state of things most of all to be deprecated. I hope we shall avert the evil by banishing the cause of discontent.

Besides the immediate physical evils which present themselves as probably resulting from our measures, there are other moral evils which I must dread. Our Government was made to secure the happiness of the people, and every thing which even remotely is calculated to impair their moral sense, will have an effect upon their situation. When the people shall become attached to principles inconsistent with morality, or with their tranquil, civil pursuits, their prosperity and their freedom are at hazard. The spirit of conquest and of military glory, however fascinating, is baneful to the prosperity and liberty of every country. This spirit has shown itself in our country, of late, in an unusual degree. We have become tired of the peaceful character of our pursuits; and we want nothing but success on this first attempt to encourage us to become a great military nation, attempting conquest in every quarter. Whenever that happens, we shall share the destiny of other nations. When the same spirit and the same councils prevail, the misery of the mass of the people is the support of the national glory.

One of the evils which I dread, as attending the war, and in my opinion not the least, Mr. Chairman, is, that we have united our exertions with the efforts of the great destroyer of mankind, who, having prostrated the independence of almost every nation on the continent of Europe, has drawn us into our present situation, to assist him in humbling his remaining enemy, whose destruction is, above all others, nearest his heart. I do not believe that gentlemen are so far lost to all sense of their country's interest, as designedly to unite the destiny of this nation with him, who lives only to destroy. I believe them, when they declare that such is not their intention. But we are united in fact. His ostensible object is the liberty of the seas: so is ours. His successes are our successes, and his defeats are our defeats. Being thus associated in fact--having one common object--if the war continues any time, we shall be associated in name also. When pressed beyond our present expectation by our enemy, we shall not make any difficulty in submitting to arrangements which may appear to us advantageous, but which are calculated to fasten us to the car of the conqueror. We may want men to enable us to obtain the object of our offensive operations in the North; France can furnish them. We may want ships to defend our coast; we can obtain them from the same quarter. But, for these things, we must stipulate an equivalent; and what can that be, but to unite in striking England from the list of independent nations?

Mr. ROBERTSON.--Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that the House will listen (if it listens at all) with much reluctance to a further discussion of the subject under consideration. Nevertheless, it is my intention explicitly, but concisely to state some of the reasons, which influence me to support the measure proposed; some of the views connected with them, which command my approbation, and induce my aid. Sir, I propose to make a few remarks on the bill itself, and subsequently, without following gentlemen in the wide and expansive range of argumentative, declamatory, and defamatory eloquence, in which they have thought fit to indulge, to reply to some of the observations which struck me with most force, and which my memory still retains.

The honorable Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs is entitled to the thanks of this House, and of the nation, for the able and lucid exposition he has given, of the plan intended to be pursued by the Government in the prosecution of the war in which we are engaged, and of the objects for the attainment of which an increase of the Military Establishment is deemed necessary. What is that plan, and what are the objects in contemplation? The power of the nation is to be called out; a portion for a defence of our seacoast and extensive frontier; the residue to be sent forth to battle against our implacable foe, to drive him from the American continent, and thus to insure our future peace, if not our Union and independence. These objects are avowed, and efforts and energy are necessary to their success.

The propriety of defending our country can be denied by none. This proposition is clear. Even the gentlemen on the other side of the House (as it is fashionable to speak) do not oppose it. For myself I do not hesitate to say, it presses itself on my feelings with irresistible force. When I take into consideration the exposed situation of the people whom it is my pride and honor to represent, when I view them surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, skirted by strongholds in the possession of a nation devoted to our foe, containing in the bosom of their country a class of beings always on the watch to overwhelm them in ruin, I lose sight of other considerations, and am compelled to urge, as I do most earnestly, that no obstacles may be thrown in the way of our complete protection. I have lived for some years in the country to which I have called your attention. I have not been altogether an inattentive observer, nor indifferent to its interests. The neglected state of the militia under the territorial government, its present unorganized and unarmed state, have not escaped my notice. But we must "blame the culture, not the soil." The inhabitants are brave, expert in the management of the horse and in the use of arms. The materials are good. It is unnecessary to dwell on these, or to mention other circumstances of an internal nature. Suffice it to be observed, our situation is insecure. I have stated, sir, that we are surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians. I will not recount their numbers, nor blazon their powers of doing mischief. Those facts are too notorious to require repetition. I have stated that strongholds in our immediate neighborhood are in the possession of a people devoted to our enemy. The Spaniards on our eastern frontier are under their perfect control. They considered the English as fighting for the independence of Spain, their native country, their religion, and their King. In their towns an extensive British trade is carried on, and from their ports, where they refit, issue forth the armed vessels of that nation to the annoyance of the commerce of our country. The Indians too are excited against us. On my journey from New Orleans to this place, passing through the Creek confederacy, I received certain information that the Spanish commandant at St. Marks had assured them that their friends the British were expected soon in considerable force at that place and at Pensacola, and that they should be furnished with arms and other munitions of war to be used against the Americans. Sir, humanity to that people, as well as the irresistible claims we have to protection, require that a force should be stationed on the Mobile and Mississippi sufficient to prevent the effect of British and Spanish machination, or to throw back on themselves the evils of hostility.

I now proceed to examine some of the objections which have been made, not to the bill, but to the further prosecution of the war. The war is denounced as unconstitutional, cruel, the effect of French influence, and as intended to place James II. on the throne of America. In making the first objection, gentlemen could not have been serious; they could not have expected that it would have been deemed worthy of an answer. The power to make war belongs to all nations; is of the essence of Government; but the Constitution of the United States gives it expressly, in so many words: "The Congress shall have power to declare war, to raise and support armies." Whether the war be defensive or offensive, depends on circumstance and accident, but cannot affect the right. If war be defensive and offensive, still the whole is equal to its parts. But to what does this doctrine lead? Do gentlemen believe it to be true? Then it becomes their duty to move for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the capture of the Macedonian, and if it be discovered that she was taken at more than a marine league from the shore, to cashier the American officer, declare the attack and capture unconstitutional, and restore the vessel to her former master. Then an enterprise, giving rise to a new era in maritime history, and entwining round the brows of the United States a wreath of imperishable laurel, turns out to be a violation of that instrument on the sacredness of which depends the Union and happiness of America. The war is not unconstitutional, nor can it, by any possibility, be so considered.

But it is said that, as the Orders in Council are repealed, the question of impressment is the only one in controversy between the United States and Great Britain; and, on the subject, the honorable gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. PEARSON,) has, without difficulty, settled principles about which jurists have differed in opinion. He contends that individuals cannot divest themselves of their allegiance; that the right of expatriation does not exist; that the practice of naturalization is wrong. These opinions are as erroneous as they are repugnant to every principle of human liberty, and owe their origin to feudal times and feudal States; times and States, the prolific sources of the vilest principles in politics and morals.

I believe that every civilized nation under the sun is in the practice of naturalizing foreigners. The omnipotent Parliament of Great Britain exercises this right. The rights of all independent nations are equal. Whatever course Great Britain pursues in relation to the subjects or citizens of other countries, these countries are authorized to pursue in relation to the subjects of Great Britain. Whatever her admirers may say to the contrary, if she does not acknowledge, she is compelled to act in conformity to this principle. Where is there in her history an example of her punishing as a traitor, a Briton naturalized by a foreign Government, although found in arms against her? If a subject could not divest himself of his natural allegiance; if once a subject always a subject, were true, how is it that Napper Tandy was suffered to escape punishment? Why was he not hanged as a traitor? He was born in Ireland, became a French citizen, served in war against his native country, was taken, tried, and found guilty of high treason; but when a terrible retaliation was threatened by France, in the event of his execution, that nation, which never yields to threats, restored him to his then adopted country.

But gentlemen are opposed to the further prosecution of the war. Do they contend that the causes which rendered it necessary have been removed? Have we obtained the objects for which it was commenced? Is the new and before unheard-of system of blockade abandoned? A system which, under the pretence of being a military measure, was converted into a commercial scheme beneficial to the belligerents, and destructive alone to the rights of the neutrals. Have our citizens been restored to their country? Is any disposition evidenced to omit tearing them from their homes and families in future? What will be the consequence of laying down our arms, of shrinking from our present attitude? We are at the feet of Great Britain: and after having for years attempted in vain to obtain justice, we are to recommence fruitless negotiation. Admit that we are unable to enforce our demands, to support our independence, that we cannot carry on war, that the friends of the British Government in this country (to use their own expression) will not permit us; in such a situation, with such admission, to expect justice would be folly in the extreme. England would return to her habitual spoliations, would re-establish that state precisely the most beneficial to herself, the most injurious to us: infinitely better to her than peace on fair terms, for then the opportunity would be lost of feeding and enriching her navy at our expense; better than war, as the numerous prizes brought into her ports of late very clearly prove. Formerly the losses were exclusively ours. Yes, sir, willingly would she return to, and forever continue, her former career of depredation; and the next ten years would add another thousand to the thousand American vessels already carried into her ports.

Too long did we suffer disgrace and degradation. Peace, with all its blessings, may be enjoyed at too dear a price. But yet, while it was possible to preserve it, we shut our eyes against the most flagrant injuries; we affected not to hear the loudest insults. Peace was congenial to our habits, favorable to the principles of our Government. It was not to be apprehended it would be, nor cannot be now believed that it was wantonly abandoned. Whilst tranquillity prevailed it was wise to dwell on its advantages. Now, that in spite of all our efforts we are at war, it is well to inquire whether circumstances may not grow out of it favorable to our future happiness and prosperity.

The British possessions in America present themselves to our view and invite a conquest. I am struck with the contrariety of opinion which prevails among gentlemen. Some of them speak of the country as barren, the climate as inclement, the inhabitants thereby scattered over the face of the territory. If this be true, it will not be considered as worth defending, and as by its loss Britain loses nothing, the sympathy which she seems to have excited, and the doleful jeremiads to which her anticipated disasters have given rise, are as unnecessary as they are misplaced. But others say, no doubt from its importance to its European sovereign it will be defended to the last extremity; that the United States cannot take it; that the army we propose to send into the field will prove insufficient. When gentlemen differ so widely, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from their opinions. Sir, Canada will be defended, and it is from a belief of that fact, and from a knowledge of the force which Great Britain may bring into the field, that the troops now demanded become necessary. We have heard an estimate of that force too often to be again repeated. It has lost nothing of its magnitude and importance. Its valor has received the highest praise, and we are triumphantly asked if we expect to intimidate Great Britain.

Sir, none but cowards calculate on the cowardice of their foe. We do not expect to intimidate her. We expect to meet her armies in the field and to vanquish them. The power of Britain must be extinguished in America. She must no longer be permitted to corrupt the principles and to disturb the peace and tranquillity of our citizens. Our frontier inhabitants must not be kept in dread and danger from her Indian allies. And never shall we be secure among ourselves, and exempt from the mischievous intrigues of Europeans, until European power is expelled across the Atlantic. The gentleman from Massachusetts says, that Canada entered into the scheme of the war. It certainly does now enter into the scheme of the war. Sir, no citizen of the United States would have given his consent to an unprovoked attack on that country merely for the purpose of getting possession of it. But I do, for one, rejoice that, under present circumstances, we thus have an opportunity afforded us, not only to make our enemy feel our power, but to drive him from this continent, and to remove one of the most frequent causes of war among nations--neighborhood and contiguity. The evils of peace, on the terms of gentlemen in opposition, cannot be borne. Let us then, with firmness, persevere in the contest in which we are engaged, until it can be terminated on principles compatible with the rights and honor of the nation.

The committee now rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

TUESDAY, January 12.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, on the bill to raise an additional army of twenty thousand men, for one year.

Mr. EMOTT addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I mean no common-place remark, when I declare to you, that I address you on the subjects which have been brought into this debate, and as I think properly so brought, with great reluctance. My general deportment since I have been honored with a seat on this floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee that I feel an unwillingness to mingle in the war of words which is carried on here. There are causes which add to this repugnance on the present occasion. The debate has been continued for such a length of time, and in part has been conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have become fatigued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly appreciate the difficulties which, under such circumstances, surround and face the speaker. But, sir, there are considerations of public duty, and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand of me, to ask your patience, and the indulgence of the House, while I present to you and to them my view of the great subjects involved in this discussion.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware that, in the discussion I am about commencing, I shall render myself obnoxious to the wit of gentlemen who think that, to bring into view other topics than those which arise out of the details of the bill now on your table, is to go beyond the range of legitimate debate. The bill contemplates the raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men; thus increasing the Military Establishment, or the standing army of the country, to upwards of fifty-five thousand men. Now, sir, with the details of this bill I have nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that I like the bill as it stands, providing for enlistments for one year only, better than I should were it amended, as has been proposed, by prolonging the terms, precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient and dangerous, and more under legislative control. I meddle not with the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of other men; but, being opposed to the continuance of the war offensively, as I was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant any further force to carry it on. The only check, or control, which the Legislature can constitutionally have over a war after it is begun, is in withholding the means; and, in voting the means, either in men or money, every member of the Legislature ought to be satisfied of the necessity of prosecuting the war.

According to my best judgment, sir, this war was improperly commenced, and it is unnecessarily continued; and I shall now proceed to explain the grounds of that judgment by an examination of the causes of the war, as they existed at its commencement, and as they now remain. As this is the first time the subject has been brought into debate, and, indeed, the earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of an open discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned for going into detail, if I even should be tedious, as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons and motives for the votes which I have given, and may give, in relation to the war, after what has been said in this House, and out of it, about the opposition to the views of the Administration.

In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief a manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint against Great Britain; her orders of blockade, her Orders in Council, and her practice of impressment. But for one or all of these, the war certainly would not have been declared; and I may assume that, for but one or all of these, the war ought not to be continued. I cannot, indeed, but recollect, that the gentleman from Louisiana has mentioned the conquest of Canada, and of the Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the war. As respects the Canadas, I have heretofore understood that their reduction might be a consequence of the war, but never until now did I know that it was to be shifted into a cause for carrying it on. And, in regard to the Floridas, I will not consent that their conquest should, in the existing relations of this country, be either a cause or consequence of war. I will confess to you, that an invasion of the colonies of Spain at this time, under the stale excuses of convenience or necessity, strikes me with abhorrence. It is not only against the genius of our Government, and, as I hope, the character of our people, but, if persisted in, will be a foul blot in our national history.

[Here the speaker entered into an elaborate documentary investigation to show that the Decree of Blockade, and the Orders in Council, were not adequate causes for war at the time it was declared--and that both these causes had since ceased to exist, the Orders in Council having been revoked, and the fictitious, or paper blockades, discontinued.]

Impressment of Seamen.--The injury done to our seamen under the British practice of impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the eye, at least, it is the only one which now remains.

Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state of the country. The public mind, in some sections of the Union, is in such a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of bondage worse than negro slavery, and of condemnation without trial, that the person who is willing to "hear the other party," is at once branded with foreign partialities, and threatened with the trial by mob. Besides, sir, it is intimated that a negotiation is to be had, or may possibly be attempted, which may be affected by an open discussion of the topic. In point of duty, I feel myself called upon to take some notice of the subject, but my view of it will be less perfect than in a different situation I should think desirable.

The President, in the war Message, thus introduces the subject: "British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects." As this does not present the case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of the two nations, give you an extract from the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th of January, 1804, containing instructions for a treaty with Great Britain: "With this exception, (persons in the military service of an enemy) we consider a neutral flag on the high seas, as a safeguard to those sailing under it. Great Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to search for and seize her own subjects; and under that cover, as cannot but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the United States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navigating the high seas, under the protection of the American flag."

The claim, then, on the part of the British is, that in time of war they have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the high seas, to search for and seize their subjects, being seamen. On our part it is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and protect all sailing under it, whether British subjects or American citizens. These are distinctly the claims of right on the part of the two nations, and I shall so consider them, without regard to practice apart from right.

One or two remarks, sir, before I enter upon the subject. The first is, that I do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights of our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards them. But this I will say, that I am willing to give them all the protection which the situation of the country and its true interests will justify. I know that the unruly passions and the meddling dispositions of some foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds of many persons against all foreigners. But I know, also, and I speak without reference to political opinions or prejudices, that among our naturalized citizens are to be found men, and many men, too, of great worth and respectability, and who are extensively useful to the country. These men have my good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting at hazard the great interests and the permanent welfare of the country. But, sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they are to be protected on the high seas by our flag, is really of little importance. Our claim never was, and I am sure never will be, that they are to be protected, if they put themselves within the power of their former Sovereign, by going to his ports, or placing themselves on his territories. And yet such is the state of the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the other hemisphere, that the vessel will not at some time be in a British port, and the crew on British ground; our right of flag will not then save our adopted citizens from impressment. For the slight benefit, therefore, to our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our claim, if established, I am sure the well-meaning and reasonable part of them will not ask the country to continue the war on their account.

Another remark which I wish to make is, that I am most decidedly the friend, nay, sir, if you please, the partisan, of the seamen of the country. I have no doubt that this nation is destined to be a great maritime power; and that, in times not very far distant, we are to owe our prosperity, as a commercial people, and possibly, under Providence, our security, to our seamen. I am therefore a friend to "seamen's rights," properly understood and fairly enforced; but this shall not blind me to the rights of others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for seamen alone, and that, too, on the abstract question of the right of flag, I can see great danger to the seamen in their just claims to protection; and, I must beg their friends, in and out of this House, to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is continued on this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular, and their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon the country, and press they will; when the many lives sacrificed, and the countless millions expended, shall be brought to view, is it not to be apprehended that seamen and their claim will be remembered, only as the cause of the scenes of expense and blood through which we are to pass? It is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make them the scape-goats of this war.

The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their seamen out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas.

Is this claim a novel one? That the claim is novel, is certainly intimated by the Committee of Foreign Relations, when they say that the impressment of which we complain, is "a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution." Indeed, it has been most roundly asserted, and by many it is believed, that the British claim was made for the first time after our war; that it originated in views hostile to our commerce and maritime rights; and that in practice it is only brought to bear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice of the claim, it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or less degree, been practised on in all the wars in which England has been engaged for the two last centuries.

The instructions to armed ships are not frequently made public; but it so happens, that we have in print an instruction on this very point, given in 1646, by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, which goes beyond the present claim: "As you meet with any men of war, merchants, or other ships, belonging to any foreign Prince or State in any road where you, or any of His Majesty's fleet, may happen to come, you are to send to see whether there be any of His Majesty's subjects on board; and if any seamen, gunners, pilots, or marines, (whether English, Scotch, or Irish,) be found on board, you are to cause such of his Majesty's subjects to be taken forth, and so disposed of as they shall be forthcoming, to answer their contempt of His Majesty's proclamation in that kind." These instructions were modified in the reign of Charles the Second, so as to exclude public armed vessels, and with this modification they have come down to the present times. If it were at all necessary to the purposes of my argument, I might show that this right has been exercised both towards France and Holland, long before we had existence as a nation. Their vessels have been searched, and British seamen taken from them. But enough has been said to prove that the claim, if unjust, is not novel.

Is the claim peculiar to the British? I am justified in saying that this claim, in time of war, to search for and seize seamen in neutral merchant vessels, on the high seas, has been made and exercised by every maritime nation in Europe. To be more particular--I assert, and stand ready to prove, that it has been made and enforced by France as well as England, and is now. It would be a waste of time to go very much at large into the French usages on this subject. I propose to do little more than to refer to one or two French ordinances, and then show from our State papers their practical application to us.

By the French laws, and they are ancient laws, the seamen of the country are all classed, and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, an edict was made which is still in force, declaring, that any classed seaman, who shall, in time of peace, be found serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced to fifteen days' confinement, and reduced to the lowest wages, and serve two years extraordinary at the lowest rate; but those who, in time of war, shall be arrested in foreign ships, or passing into foreign countries, shall be sentenced to three years' service in the galleys. Under the authority of this, and similar ordinances, the French have taken their seamen out of our vessels, and in some instances our seamen with them.

Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the committee, is the impressment document of January last, known to the American people as the 6,057 document. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, at the close of the introductory report, says, "it is equally impossible, from the want of precise returns, to make an accurate report of the names or number of citizens of the United States, who have been compelled to enter into the French service, or are held in captivity under the authority of that Government, whether taken from vessels captured on the high seas, or seized in rivers, ports, or harbors; the names of a few only, greatly below the number believed to be so detained, being within the knowledge of this Department. A detail therefore is not attempted, with respect to this part of the call of the House of Representatives." Yes, sir, it is known to the Administration, that some of our citizens have been compelled to enter into the service of the French Emperor, while others are held in captivity by him. Ask, however, for their names, and you have for answer, that all the persons detained are not known to the Government, and therefore it cannot be material that you should have the names of any. Say to gentlemen, here is a case of American rights violated, and you will be told, that the injury, in practice, is not of sufficient importance to justify strong measures against the French Government. Be it so. But attempt to prove to the same gentlemen, that the practical operation of British blockades and Orders in Council, is not such as to require war, you will then hear, that it is necessary to fight about the principle.

I have one other paper to lay before the committee, on this subject. For some years back, the information about French impressments has been general and vague, or altogether withheld. Formerly this was otherwise. In a report respecting the impressment of seamen in 1797, made by the Secretary of State to this House, on the 27th of February, 1798, we have the names of upwards of twenty American citizens, taken out of American vessels, on the high seas, by French privateers. We have more, sir. This same report states, that two French seamen named Lewis had been impressed from on board the American ship Bryseis by a French Commodore's ship; that Francis Gibbons, a native of France, but married and resident at New London in Connecticut, was impressed from the American ship Edward, at Rochefort, by authority of the French Republic, and put on board a French ship of war: and that Henry Doughty, an American, was impressed at sea from the American brig Elsa by the French frigates Lapancy and Thetis. I could instance other cases, but these are sufficient to show, that neither the claim nor the exercise of it is peculiar to the British.

If this right, or claim of right, however, is made a mere pretext by any nation to seize and detain our seamen, I am willing to allow that it would be a cause of war. But even in this case, war ought not to be waged until we have done our duty to our seamen and the offending nation, by making suitable regulations to prevent the employment of the seamen of such nation. Have we done this, as respects Great Britain? Perhaps some such regulation is to be found in the law which defines what vessel is an American vessel, and which, as such, is entitled to hoist our flag. Look at it, sir. According to the act of December, 1792, an American ship is one wholly owned by an American citizen, and commanded by a person also a citizen. The crew may be all foreigners--all Englishmen, if you please--all English deserters. In this, therefore, we find no security to the British Government.

But, we have also the law of May, 1796, which provides, that the collectors may register seamen calling themselves American, and grant certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it is presumed, has grown the practice of granting protections, as they are called--papers procured from notaries and magistrates, ofttimes on the most barefaced perjuries, and always considered as a species of negotiable property for value received. Sir, these protections, in their abuse, are a scandal to the nation. It has made false swearing an employment, and the granting of false papers a business. The price of such a paper is as well known in the great seaport towns as is that of your stocks. All ages and complexions and tongues may have this badge of citizenship, by paying the charges in such cases provided. If this, however, was not so; if protections were only granted to real Americans; it is difficult to see how this is to prevent the employment of British sailors. It is not necessary that the persons navigating an American vessel should have them.

This act of ours was presented to the British Government by Mr. King, in January, 1797, and Lord Grenville, on the 27th of March following, in a manner highly conciliatory, and certainly with much force, stated specific objections to the law. The Executive, when in July last he answered the call of the Senate for papers relative to impressments, omitted this letter of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter from the then Secretary of State, to our Minister at the British Court, of the third of October, 1797, in which the force of the objections seems to be admitted: "Lord Grenville's observations on the act of Congress for the relief and protection of American seamen, present difficulties which demand consideration at the ensuing session." Nothing was, however, done at that or any future session. In truth, we have done nothing to prevent the employment of British seamen in our public or private ships; and they are to be found in both. And yet, with this fact staring us in the face, we are called upon to say that the war is altogether just on our part!

It will probably be urged that the British practice under this claim, in its application to us, was sufficient to prove that the reclamation of their seamen was not so much the object of the British Government, as the seizure of our seafaring citizens: that it had become so outrageous as not only to justify, but to require war. Without, sir, meaning to excuse or to palliate the taking even the cabin boy, if done knowingly and wittingly; and being willing to admit, that about the period of the attack on the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause to complain on the subject, I must be permitted to say that I have not evidence to satisfy me, that when we declared war, the practice of the British was such as to prove that the claim on their part was a mere pretext to take our sailors. In truth, I believe, if the Administration have not deceived themselves on this subject, that they have attempted a gross deception on the public.

The instructions given at this day, by the British Admiralty to a naval commander, on this subject, directs him, "when he meets with any foreign ship or vessel, to send a lieutenant to inquire whether there may be on board of her any seamen who are the subjects of His Majesty; and if there be, to demand them, provided it does not distress the ship; he is to demand their wages up to the day; but he is to do this without detaining the vessel longer than shall be necessary, or offering any violence to, or in any way ill-treating the master or his crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize in this, the instructions shown to him after his arrangement, and of which he declared himself satisfied; but whether he does or not, it must be conceded that it provides for a moderate exercise of the right. The person who is to make the search is an officer of some standing; he is only to take seamen who are British subjects, excluding thereby, not merely our citizens, but all foreigners; and he is not to take even British seamen, if, by it, he destroys the crew, or endangers the vessel. Allowing the right to exist, it is difficult more fairly to regulate its exercise.

But it may be urged that the practice of the British commanders does not correspond with these instructions; that they search and seize at large, according to their will and pleasure. I know, sir, that the habits and education of a military man, not unfrequently make him act as if power and right meant the same thing: and I, therefore, have no doubt that there have been abuses. But I do most conscientiously believe that these abuses have been greatly magnified, and are, even by the well meaning, vastly overrated. I am aware that I shall be referred to the impressment document of last session. This document, sir, is so illy understood, and has been the source of so much misrepresentation, that I must be allowed slightly to review it.

The Secretary, in the report says, that the list transmitted had been received from our agent at London, and "contains the names of American seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held in bondage in His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, for the several quarters of 1809 and 1810." The list is headed, "A return or list of American seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held on board of His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, from 1st of April to the 30th of June, inclusively," and so of the other quarters. Now the plain meaning of this is, if any meaning it has, that the persons whose names were thus sent to us were impressed and made to serve on board British armed ships, at some period in the years 1809 and 1810. Indeed, this has been so stated in this House, and in the Administration prints. And yet the most superficial examination will show that this is not true. Let me read to you one or two names: "4868. David Wiley." In the column of the "result of applications and remarks," we have this explanation of his case: "Impressed on shore at New Brunswick, and taken on board the Plumper, was detained two days, when the commander put him on board a vessel bound to Aberdeen, from thence worked his passage to London, and appeared at this office 29th August, 1805; is evidently an American. Discharged." Here, then, we have a man who was not on board a British ship in 1809, and whose "bondage" did not probably continue more than two days.

Again, "4936. Richard Butler, representing himself of Petersburg, Pennsylvania. Impressed 1797 at the Cape of Good Hope, from the Mercury of Baltimore, and detained on board the Garland." Remark: "Remained on board the Garland two months, then draughted to the Tremendous, in which he served two and a half years, was then discharged; has never received his wages or prize-money; says he was well used on board both ships. Was discharged as an American citizen at the Cape of Good Hope; his pay and prize-money lists were given to the consul at the Cape. Discharged." This man, therefore, according to the statement of our Consul, so far from having been impressed and held on board a British ship in 1809, had been impressed in 1797, and discharged in 1799. I might, sir, give you many other cases equally strong, but these are sufficient to prove that, by design or mistake, the document is wrongly headed; that the persons named in the list were not all on board British ships in 1809 and 1810; and, therefore, that, in its general results, it does not show the state of the British practice in those years.

In truth, the list is nothing more than the return of the names of persons who, within the year, had applied to Mr. Lyman, our Consul and agent for seamen, for protections against future, or for his aid in getting released from present impressment. It was his duty, as I do not doubt it was made his interest, to receive all applications, and when necessary, to lay them before the proper British authority. Jew and Greek, Turk and Christian, the growth of our own soil, and the produce of other countries, all threw themselves upon Mr. Lyman, and he, laboring in his vocation, granted patents of citizenship, or made his claim on the British Admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in practice or by inquiry, has made himself acquainted with the manner in which this business is transacted, but knows that many foreigners who never saw this country, or sailed under its flag, have attempted, by application to our agents abroad, to shield themselves against British impressment. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, needs no information on this subject, having himself resided in London as our Minister. It was the duty of our agent to send home some account of his proceedings, and I have no objection to his making such a list as we have before us. But I do object to its being palmed on the American nation as a true history of British impressments affecting our people and nation. I pray you look at this list. In the year commencing in April, 1809, and ending in March, 1810, we have about nine hundred and forty names; and of these, about seven hundred are given with blanks in the columns for the "towns and States of which they represent themselves to be citizens"--"when impressed"--"where impressed"--"ships from whence taken"--"nations"--"masters." The time and the result of the application are only given. And from these entries in Mr. Lyman's book you are called upon to admit that the applicant was an American, and that he was impressed in the year 1809 by the British, on the high seas, out of an American vessel. Really, this is asking too much.

Mr. Chairman, I have examined the list from April, 1809, to April, 1810, with great attention, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of impressments which took place in that year, and I will now make to you one or two statements, which may cast some light on the subject of the British practice. The number which, by the list, appears to have been impressed in that year, is one hundred. It will be understood that in this number I do not include those whose names are carried out in blank, as has been stated. It is uncertain whether such persons ever were impressed; and, at all events, it is fair to presume, that their service on board British ships had commenced before 1809, or otherwise there could be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the one hundred, seventy-six were discharged, and six had deserted, leaving less than twenty to be accounted for.

Another result: Of the persons thus taken, fifty-seven were impressed on shore, and forty-three at sea. Again: Thirty of these seamen, when impressed, made part of the crews of British vessels, and thirty-four American vessels; and of the thirty-four, twelve were taken on land; leaving about twenty-two persons taken from American vessels on the high seas. It is possible, sir, that in these statements I may not be perfectly accurate; I am certain, however, that I am substantially so.

I do not mean to represent that this is a full account of all the impressments which took place in 1809; on the contrary, I admit that it is not. Many impressments were certainly made of persons undeniably British subjects, who would scarcely think of applying to Mr. Lyman, and will not, therefore, be found in his book. Many persons, also, having a right to his interference, were not then known to him. My object in making these explanations, was to show that the 6,057 document does not furnish such strong evidence of British aggression as has been supposed.

The number of our seamen impressed by the British has been so variously represented, that I have, from motives of curiosity as well as duty, been desirous to arrive at something like a reasonable certainty on the subject. We hear of ten, twenty, nay, forty thousand of our citizens, confined in the floating dungeons of Great Britain, fighting her battles against their will. The evidence of this, however, is only to be found in the imagination of gentlemen. It is the old story over again, of the "six men in buckram." In part representing the greatest commercial State in the Union, it may be expected that I have some personal knowledge on this subject, but indeed I have none such to give. Is there not in this some proof that the evil has been magnified? I have sought for information in quarters where only it is to be found, among the shipping merchants and ship owners of the country. I will now furnish you with the opinion of an intelligent gentleman from Marblehead, whose means of information are ample, and whose veracity will not be doubted. I mean my friend from Massachusetts, who sits before me. (Mr. REED.) He has favored me with this statement.

"In answer to your inquiry relative to the seamen of Marblehead, I have to remark that the average shipping of that port, for the last twenty years, may be estimated at about 19,006 tons, of which it is fair to calculate ten thousand tons were employed in foreign commerce, and the residue in the fisheries and in the coasting trade. Allowing six men to every hundred tons, which is the usual estimate, it gives an average of eleven hundred and seventy-six seamen in all, and six hundred in our foreign trade, each year; the number of seamen, therefore, employed from Marblehead for the last twenty years, must have been considerable, say five thousand. I have resided at that place nearly twenty years, and, during the greater part of the time, have been actively engaged in commerce. According to my own recollection, aided by that of others who have the best means of information, I do not believe that twenty of the seamen of Marblehead, native or naturalized, have been impressed by the British within the twenty years, and it is not known that one has been demanded without being released."

As there is no reason to suppose that Marblehead has been more fortunate with respect to impressments than other places, we have here something whereby to form an estimate of the number of our seamen taken by the British. My own conviction is, that the American seamen, impressed and held by the British, at the commencement of this war, did not much exceed five hundred in all, and certainly did not amount to one thousand. Permit me, sir, to mention one circumstance which speaks loudly on this subject. If the practice of impressment had been as outrageous as has been represented, it must have fallen with great force on the Eastern States, as it is there the mass of our seamen are found. We are then to expect much feeling and passion on this account. The war must be popular when the cause of it is brought home to every man's door. No such thing, sir. The war is confessedly odious there. It is in States where seamen never grew that the war has its strongest advocates. It is there that you principally find the dark pictures of sailors' sufferings, and hear the loud and long appeals to the sympathies and passions of the people about seamen's rights and seamen's injuries.

I have now, sir, finished the remarks which I intended to make on the British claim and practice of impressment. We have for years past had so much idle declamation on the subject, that a dispassionate investigation of it appeared to me to be called for. In the course of these remarks, I have attempted to show that the claim was neither novel nor peculiar, and it is not wholly unsupported by reason; that our true interest calls more for a fair regulation of the practice than an abandonment of the rights; and that the conduct of the British, of late, has been such as to warrant an opinion, that an arrangement may be made, having for its object a proper regulation of the practice, leaving the rights of both nations, whatever they may be, untouched. Sir, with this view of the subject, it is not possible for me to consent to the adoption of measures, having for their object the further prosecution of the war offensively on our part; and I cannot, therefore, vote for the bill on your table. The war has not yet assumed a character. We have, indeed, added much, and are about to add more, to the public debt. Already a portion of our citizens are burdened with oppressive exactions in the form of duties, and heavy taxes are staring all in the face. But yet our homes and altars remain safe and unpolluted. Let us seize this moment to give the nation peace, and the people happiness. This is the appointed time, and if we do not improve it, I fear my country is to suffer in its prosperity and its institutions. For Heaven's sake let us pause!

Mr. MACON said after failing in his attempt to amend the bill, he had considered it of very little importance; indeed, in its present form, he was not anxious whether it passed or not; and he had intended not to have troubled the committee on the subject, but the strange course which the debate had taken had called him up almost against his own consent. He could truly say that he would not have offered a word to the committee, had not those who oppose the bill have brought into the discussion French influence, operating by a sort of magic on every act of the Executive. The conduct of the Executive had undergone the strictest scrutiny by these gentlemen, and their own arguments would, in his opinion, convince every impartial man, that it had been perfectly fair and upright to all foreign nations; the least attention to the documents, which have from time to time been published, would also convince every man of it, and satisfy all that the great object of the Government had been peace, and that peace was maintained until it could no longer be done without surrendering almost every national right worth preserving. Mr. M. said he would endeavor in his observations to follow the example which had been set the last two days: not to utter a word to wound the feelings of any one; nor would he refer to the documents, because every member possessed them, and they had been published for the information of the people; and he was sure that the committee must be tired with hearing a sentence here, and a paragraph there, read from them. The true way to understand them was to read the whole. But he had never been in the practice of making many quotations from books or documents, and he thought it unnecessary to make any now. He was clearly of opinion that the gentlemen who were opposed to the Administration had the right to say whatever they thought of it, and to select the subject on which they would speak; and as they had made the selection, he hoped they would have an opportunity now to deliver their sentiments. He, however, regretted that they had selected this bill; because, of all the bills which may be brought before the House the present session, not one, he thought, would require despatch more than this. The loss of a day now may be the loss of the next campaign. He had expected that this general debate, which seems to include every thing but the bill, would have been delayed until the loan should be under discussion.

The points made in the debate seem to be: impressment; the right to expatriate; the right to naturalize; and French influence; neither of which have any connection with the bill, which is to raise troops for one year. Sir, said Mr. M., I will not retort a charge of British influence, and so balance one assertion against the other, because I do not believe that there is much of either in the nation; but if I was to say there was none, I should not say what I believe. People may honestly differ in opinion as to the effect which the success of England or France over the other might have on the interests of the United States, without being under the influence of either; and this, no doubt, is the case with thousands.

I will, before I proceed further, notice some of the observations made by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT.) If I have not understood him or any other gentleman correctly, I hope that I shall be corrected; because it is my sincere desire to state their statements fairly; and it is not always possible to take down their own words. He said, if there was any English influence, it was the influence of Locke and Sidney. As well might he have spoken of the influence of any other patriots who lived before us. Their influence will be respected wherever their works shall be read; but that sort of influence is not the influence of which we have heard so much, and which I intend hereafter to notice. He also mentioned the influence which drove the first settlers to Plymouth. Yes, sir, that influence was truly British, and that sort of influence Great Britain has been exercising ever since the first settlers, by their own industry and exertions, got into a situation to be useful to her; and that influence, or rather that persecution, compelled the first settlers of Carolina to leave the other provinces, and to settle a second time in the woods, and, as soon as they were able, to pay taxes. That same influence followed them, and made their condition much worse. It pursued the people in every part of the continent, until they declared themselves independent; and, from that day to this, she has not treated the United States as she has treated other independent nations.

Mr. Chairman, I was astonished when the gentleman told us he was not a friend to standing armies; and, almost in the same breath, said that, at the last session, he voted for raising the twenty-five thousand men, and that he did not mean to go to war when he gave the vote. For what purpose, then, could they be wanted? Experience had already shown that the old establishment was quite sufficient in time of peace. Indeed, a very considerable part of that was raised soon after the affair of the Chesapeake, and under an expectation that war would follow, and not for a regular peace establishment.

The same gentleman told us, that impressment by the British Government was no new thing. This is certainly true as far as regards her own subjects, and from her own vessels; but the systematic impressment of foreigners from foreign ships, is a new thing; and that, too, when the men and the ships both belong to the same nation. That Government never attempted to impress Spaniards, Dutch, French, Swedes, or Danes, from vessels belonging to the same nation with the person; and it is this new doctrine, which operates solely on us, of which we complain. The question between us and England has nothing to do with the doctrine that free ships shall make free goods, or free men, if gentlemen please. And why draw that into the debate on the impressment of American citizens from American vessels? No law or precedent can be produced for this abominable and wicked practice. It was never attempted to be justified, notwithstanding impressment is no new thing with her. Every Sovereign, said the gentleman, has a right to the service of all his subjects in time of war. But this right is like some others which Sovereigns claim; it is without a remedy. Of what avail is the proclamation of the Prince Regent in this country, ordering the British subjects home? None. Many of them are still here, and, probably, will remain until the termination of the war, and the British Government will never dream of punishing one of them for disobedience. But, admit this right in Sovereigns to its fullest extent, and it does not give one Sovereign the right to impress the citizens or subjects of another; nor does it justify such an act; of course it does not touch the act of which we complain; that is, the impressing of American seamen from American vessels.

It is curious that, throughout this whole debate, there seems to have been drawn a distinction between the rights of a man who cultivates the soil, and of him who follows the sea, and that this distinction should have been drawn by those who claim to be the champions of commerce and of a navy, and who have told us that agriculture and commerce were inseparable. Ought it not, then, to follow, that the rights of those employed on land or water should also be inseparable? This strange doctrine, as was observed by the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. ROBERTSON,) may dust the eye, but cannot stagger the understanding of any one.

The same gentleman said, that we had taken no measures to exclude British seamen from American vessels. For what purpose were protections given to American seamen? Surely to protect them against impressment, and to show that we had no desire to protect others; and what more ought to have been done, he did not tell us. I ask, did any nation ever do more? Besides, has not the United States, over and over again, offered to make an arrangement with England on the subject of sailors, which should be satisfactory to both, by securing to each the use of their own sailors? and has she not always refused to make any arrangement about them? And it may be fairly asked here, what measures Great Britain has taken to prevent her officers from impressing our seamen? None that I have heard of, and she is the aggressor. We have not injured her, while she has been impressing our sailors whenever she wanted and could find them. If the United States wanted sailors ever so much, they could not impress one of hers, and she knows this; and she would not suffer one of them to be impressed by any foreign power; and we must determine to defend the rights of ours, or it will be idle to talk about navigation, commerce, and a navy. Indeed, if commerce and agriculture be inseparable, you must defend the rights of the persons concerned in both, or both must be injured. There are no neutrals able to carry our products to market, and if you will not protect your seamen, they will not carry them.

It is worthy of remark, that, for twenty years past, the Government of the United States has been trying to settle the question of sailors with Great Britain, and that every attempt has failed, and that it is just now discovered that we have always begun wrong. My colleague (Mr. PEARSON) and the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. PITKIN,) it appears, could settle this great question without much difficulty. If they can, I wish most sincerely they would. I am, however, apprehensive that they are a little mistaken, because General Washington, when President, having Major Pinckney, now Major General Pinckney, for Minister at London, tried without effect. Mr. Adams renewed it with Mr. King for Minister; Mr. Jefferson with Colonel Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, now the Attorney General; and Mr. Madison, with the last named Pinkney. All these Presidents and Ministers, with the aid of every Cabinet, have failed. Every description of political opinion, with the greatest talents, have been employed and done nothing. At the end of twenty years we have gained nothing, and lost our labor; the question is as unsettled as ever; and we have been worsted in this way, that, while we were negotiating, they were impressing seamen.

We have been told by my colleague, that it is not the right, but the abuse of impressment of which we complain. It is true, sir, that we do not complain of Great Britain impressing her own subjects; she may do as she pleases with them; that is no concern of ours; all we ask of her is to keep her hands off our people; and we deny her right to impress American citizens; and if the abuse be the impressing them, of that we do complain, and not without just cause, because she has impressed many of them, and compelled them to fight her battles; and I have understood, after we had declared that war existed between her and us, that she detained those she had before impressed as prisoners of war, and this may be a part of her public law. Indeed, we have heard much about universal law and public law, neither of which, from the statements made, seem to have much regard to right or justice, which ought to be the foundation of all law. One universal law seems to be, that Sovereigns can command their subjects to return home in case of war; another, that no person can expatriate himself; and Great Britain is no doubt willing to acknowledge another, by which she might impress sailors from all the world. As to the first, we need not trouble ourselves about it; and the second, the United States have not acknowledged; and we are now contending against impressment; and permit me here to observe, that the republicans have always considered the impressment of citizens a more serious injury than the spoliation of property.

I must return to Porcupine's paper,[33] which, as well as I now recollect, never contained a sentence in favor of the Revolution, or much in praise of the constitution, if it was praised at all; no outrage was committed which it did not approbate; a few of the outrages of that time shall be stated: The Rogue's March was played under the window of the man who drew the Declaration of Independence, The man who first took up arms after the fall of Charleston, and whose body had been almost riddled in defence of his country, was a member of Congress, and was insulted at the circus. Another member, of no common cast of mind, was insulted at the theatre; a man who will do his duty in whatever situation he may be placed. Another, returning home with his family, was insulted and almost mobbed; he is now one of the Cabinet, mentioned by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. QUINCY.) If I was not almost exhausted I would give some of the details of these then fashionable transactions. I will only add, it was nothing in those days for a few men to whip a printer whose publications they did not like. All these outrages and violations of law, it is believed, were not only approved by the editor of the before-named paper, but other Federal papers also. This same editor claimed to have more subscribers for his paper than any other editor in the Union. And after he returned to Europe, he wrote and published about some of his former supporters. Had this have been a French editor, and acted toward the Federal party as he did toward the Republican, and the subscribers to his paper Republicans, could not those who look at every thing now done to find French influence, have had as good a field to hunt in as any they have yet found? At the very time these events took place, the majority talked as much about French influence as the minority now does; they had clues, sub-plots, ocean massacres, and a hundred other equally ridiculous and unfounded tales, which circulated for a day. I have mentioned these things not with an intent to wound the feelings of any man living, but with a view of trying to persuade those who talk so much about French influence, to look at both sides of the question about foreign influence; and if they will, I hope we shall never hear of it again in this House.

Mr. Genet, when he was Minister of France, began to intrigue, for which he was dismissed. Mr. Liston, when he was Minister of England, began the same work, for which he was not dismissed. If the Republicans had then been in power, and Liston a French Minister, could not a strict examination of the documents have placed it as easily as many other acts have been to French influence?

While all these things were doing, and many others quite as strange, the gentlemen call themselves the followers of General WASHINGTON. If they be truly his followers, they ought to adhere to his principles, and attend to his last advice. Every act of his went to perpetuate the Union and to attach the States to each other. I fear the sentiments contained in his farewell address to the nation are getting out of fashion with those who claim to be his exclusive followers; or why do we hear within these walls, the foundation of which he laid for union, union, union; disunion spoken of, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" and why listen to idle and unfounded tales about foreign influence, which can never injure us as long as we stick to the old maxim--united we stand, divided we fall? Straws show which way the wind blows! What has become of the newspaper called the Washington Federalist? The name was, I have understood, changed to the Independent American; out of that, I believe, was raised the Federal Republican--all good names; but why lose the name of Washington to a paper supported by his exclusive followers? And this is the first time to my recollection that they have adopted Republican in their calendar.

I have heard that Federalism is not now the same that it was when Mr. Adams was President: we shall know more about this if ever they get into power again; be this as it may, every man has a right to change his opinion; it is a right which no Government can take from him, and when convinced that he is wrong, it is his duty to change. But I had thought, when Mr. Adams was President, we were told that he followed the plan of General Washington, and that he was then a favorite with the party who elected him, but a great change has taken place in regard to him. I always thought him an honest man, and I think so still. After Mr. Adams got out of fashion, Colonel Burr became so great a favorite with the Federal gentlemen who were then in Congress, that they voted thirty-five times for him to be President, when they must have known that not one elector who voted for him intended him for President. Afterward, Mr. Madison was a favorite; but, after the refusal of the British Government to ratify the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine, they examined the matter, and discovered he had not done right, and he got out of fashion. Then the late worthy and venerable Vice President and Colonel Monroe became favorites; Colonel Monroe got out of fashion about the time he was appointed Secretary of State; and, lastly, Mr. De Witt Clinton became a favorite. I hope he will not be injured by it, but he seems to be losing ground, as we have been told it was not his merit that induced the Federalists to support him for President, but the demerit of Mr. Madison. This does not appear to be a good reason, because they might have selected a man from their own party, who they thought had merit. But all these things may be the doings of those who, a former member of this House called ultra-Federalists; and it will be recollected that all these men became favorites, on the old doctrine of, "divide and conquer;" and it ought not to be forgotten that, when Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie returned from France, their political friends were a little shy of them; indeed, I should not be surprised if Messrs. Jay, King, Walcott, and Dexter, should not much longer be favorites. If we may judge from the public prints, Commodore Rodgers is no longer one, though he, like the others, is understood to be a Federalist; but these men will never say, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must." I would really thank any gentleman to tell me what is now meant by the party name, Federalist.

It is a fact on record, that General Washington did not approve of self-created societies, and I have understood that some of the people who claim to be his exclusive followers, have their self-created Washington Benevolent Societies, wherever they can establish them, and that they are political societies, and they were intended to oppose some other society; perhaps the Tammany. This could not justify the proceeding. As to myself, I do not care if there was one in every three miles square in the nation, so that I am left free not to be a member.

We naturalize, without hearing a complaint from any quarter, emigrants from Great Britain, of every trade and profession, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and even divines; to which may be added tradesmen and mechanics; they all go where they please, live among us, and take part in the politics of the day. If foreign influence could be introduced into the country by naturalizing, we should have more of British than of French; but naturalizing seems well enough for every body but a sailor, but do not permit him to become a citizen; he will be in the way of native sailors, who want encouragement; besides, we know that Great Britain will impress him, and we know as well, when her officers want men, they care not whether they are American or English. The native American has never complained that the naturalizing of foreigners of his trade or profession, injured him; nor has a complaint been heard from a native seaman against naturalizing foreign sailors; and we have had experience enough to know that our merchants could complain, and complain almost against their own complaint. Let their property be captured, or expected to be captured, under a new order in France or England, and more complaints will be made about it, than the impressing of a dozen citizens. The situation of the merchant, when plundered, is bad enough, but his property is not taken away without a trial of some sort before a judge learned in the law, whose duty it ought to be to decide according to law; he also employs lawyers to have justice done him. Not so with the sailor; when impressed, there is no learned judge to decide his case, or lawyer to have justice done; force is law to him, and his oppressor judge; he is put on board ships, and compelled to fight battles, in which neither he nor his country have any concern: deprived of the right to complain or petition; he is poor, friendless--Great God! can it be possible, that we shall yield the point of impressment, for the sake of carrying on a little trifling trade by hook or by crook!

All agree that we ought to fight for the rights of native seamen, and all agree that some of them have been impressed; why not all, then, join, heart in hand, to maintain their rights? Is it because the British officers impress from our vessels others besides natives? This cannot lessen their just claim to the protection of their country. We have, however, been told that only ninety-three persons were impressed in one year from American vessels; if only three of them had been the sons of the gentleman (Mr. EMOTT) who gave the information, I ask, would he have been contented with the long investigation of documents, to ascertain if any of the diplomatic meanders turned towards French influence? No, sir, he would not; he would have demanded of the National Government to have his children restored to his arms; he could demand this in a way to be heard. Far different is the case with these unfortunate parents who have had their sons impressed; they are too poor and friendless to be heard; the rights of the nation may be abandoned by little and little, until none be left; exactly as you may take a cent at a time from one thousand dollars, until none be left. All must determine to protect American seamen on board American vessels, or not hereafter pretend to claim any jurisdiction over the vessels when they are out of the limits of the United States. If a single citizen should be impressed on American land, the whole nation would be in a flame; the right to protection is the same, whether on American land or an American vessel.

It has been said that we do not act justly; that we encourage British seamen to run away, because we do not apprehend them and send them back, when they have run away from their vessels; they run away before our people see them, of course there is no encouragement to the running away. As to the sending them back, we are not bound to do it; and if it depended on me one should never be sent back, until the British ceased impressing and plundering our citizens, and I would agree that every man who engaged in the war on our side should have the right to be naturalized, though he fled from British naval tyranny.

It is remarkable that, while we hear not a word said to justify England for impressing and plundering the people of the United States, that so much should have been said to prove that we ought not to have gone to war with her, and that we were wrong in doing so. This is the best way that could have been devised to keep her aggressions out of view; not to say a word about them, and talk a great deal about the hardships of war, and the taxes which must be imposed to carry it on, winding up all their lamentations for the state of the country, with, if it was not for the war, a little trade could be carried on. Impressment, then, is a mere trifle, compared with this trade, and it may be that Great Britain understands it so, and is willing to gratify us with this trade for kin-sake, as long as we are contented to be impressed for kin-sake. The citizens who are impressed would tell her, if telling would release them, that nations are no kin.

This surely has been the most unfortunate Government from its establishment to the present time that ever existed; almost every thing that has been done is wrong: it was wrong to fix the seat of Government here; it was wrong to place this House and the houses for the offices so far from each other; it was wrong to give paper protections to American seamen; it was wrong to have a little mercy in the revenue laws; it was wrong to repeal the internal taxes; I believe that was called oppression--though I am no prophet, I venture to predict, that to lay them to carry the war on will be wrong also; to take Canada would be wrong;--indeed, it would be difficult to find any thing which has been done right, according to the modern Federal creed. How are we to get things right? Give up the chair you are in to one, the White House to another, and they will soon give you a sedition law which will put all right. The great discovery which these gentlemen have made, that so much has been wrong under every Administration, would surprise the people, were they not this moment astonished at the discovery of perpetual motion by Redheffer--two such great discoveries must add vastly to the character of the nation.

The attempt to take Canada is so wicked that some of the gentlemen are quite alarmed at it. We hear of the unoffending Canadians, but not of the unoffending sailor; at one time they are the most unoffending and loyal people in the world, at another they are French, and not fit to be united in our Government. We have heard much of the same sort formerly said about the people of Louisiana, and they have become a State, without any trouble to themselves or the Union. What has become of that high Federal spirit which disdained to buy Louisiana? Where is it when Canada is mentioned? The Federalism which desired to conquer Louisiana and keep it by force of arms, is changed when Canada is the question. The outrageous conduct of Great Britain is as much worse than that of Spain, as her impressment and plundering were worse than the refusal of the right of deposit. For one, I am willing to have Canada and Florida, and have them you must before many years. The situation of Mobile is such as to compel you before very long to take possession of it. Canada and Florida would rid us of bad neighbors, and make us more happy.

The committee then rose and reported the bill.

The several amendments made in Committee of the Whole were agreed to by the House.

Mr. FITCH again moved to strike out the 4th section, giving the President exclusively the appointment of all officers under the rank of field officers.

The question was decided in the negative by yeas and nays. For the motion 34, against it 74.

And the bill was then (half past six o'clock) ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, without a division.

And on motion, the House adjourned until to-morrow.

WEDNESDAY, January 13.

Additional Military Force.

The bill, in addition to the act passed at the last session "to raise an additional military force"--the object of which is to raise twenty regiments of men for one year, if deemed necessary by the President to the public service--was read a third time, and the question stated, "Shall the bill pass?"

Mr. KENT.--Mr. Speaker, it is with great reluctance I rise to trouble the House with any remarks of mine, at a time when their patience must be so completely exhausted, by the unusual length of the debate which has already taken place upon the subject before you. The bill on your table proposes to raise an additional military force of twenty thousand men, and it has been objected to on account of its expense, and the consequent danger growing out of it to the liberties of our country. We are, sir, in a state of war; and what is evidently the course which we should pursue whilst in that situation? We should advocate and support such measures as are calculated to bring that war, justly made on our part, to a speedy, honorable, and successful conclusion. Viewing the bill on your table as a measure of that description, I shall give it my support, regardless of that additional expense which gentlemen so emphatically dwell upon. Nay, sir, it is better to expend the thirty millions of dollars (even if that sum was necessary) so repeatedly spoken of on the other side of the House as the cost of the war for two years, to accomplish our object, than to expend the same sum in five years, even if we could effect our object with equal certainty.

However commendable economy may be in every other situation in life, in war it is inadmissible; it loses its character; it becomes parsimony: you might as well attempt to unite profusion and avarice as war and economy. All that the utmost prudence can require of you when in a state of war, is to make your means ample; lay your plans well; and to the judgment and the skill in these particulars only can you look for economy or for savings; for the want of an inconsiderable supply of men or money, a campaign might prove disastrous, to recover which would require an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure.

The Army has been represented as dangerous to the liberties of the country. At one moment we are told that, when it shall be completed, it will be unequal to the conquest of a petty province adjoining us, and not exceeding in population the State of Maryland; the next moment we are told that it will endanger the liberties of seven millions of freemen. Arguments thus paradoxical need no refutation. Sir, I do not pretend to have any military experience, and I am willing to concede the point to those possessing it, that men enlisted for three or five years are preferable to those enlisted for one year as proposed by the bill; yet I feel confident that every object will be accomplished by this bill that is intended. It is not proposed to rely solely on an army of this description to carry on the war; you have nearly a sufficient military force authorized for five years, and you want the men to be raised by this bill only as auxiliaries, till the ranks of that army can be filled. With these observations on the bill before you, I shall proceed to make a few remarks upon what has fallen from gentlemen on the other side of the House; in doing which I shall endeavor to confine myself to what has not been noticed by others, or, if attended to, not sufficiently so.

If I understood an honorable gentleman from Connecticut correctly, who addressed you the other day, (Mr. PITKIN,) he said we were contending for the employment of foreigners. We contend, sir, for nothing which, as an independent nation, we are not entitled to, and which the laws of nations do not guarantee to us. What have been the propositions heretofore made by our Government to Great Britain upon this subject? I find, by a recurrence to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with that Government, in 1806, that we made the following propositions, the most material of which were omitted yesterday (not intentionally I hope) by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT.) Here Mr. K. read the following proposals from the public documents of 1807 and 1808. We offered--

1. To afford no refuge or protection to British seamen.

2. To deliver them up if they took refuge among us.

3. To make laws for restoring them.

4. To aid in searching for, seizing, and restoring them.

5. To keep them in our prisons when requested.

6. To prohibit our citizens from carrying them off.

7. To prohibit their employment.

8. To make penal laws for punishing their employers.

9. To make it our duty to restore them.

10. To extend the foregoing provisions, not only to deserters, but to all seafaring people.

These propositions went completely to secure to Great Britain the services of all her seafaring subjects, except such as were naturalized under our laws, which amounted to but few, indeed; thirteen hundred British seamen only having been naturalized since the commencement of our Government, and, in all probability, an equal number of our seamen have been naturalized by Great Britain during the same period. Yet, to my astonishment, have I heard it stated, during this debate, that our Government had made no serious propositions to secure to Great Britain the services of her seamen.

But equitable as these propositions were, they were rejected. Notwithstanding, sir, our Government, anxious in their pursuit after peace, have gone still further; they have, through our late Chargé d'Affaires in London, (Mr. Russell,) proposed to Great Britain to exclude from our naval service, as well public as private, all her seamen, including those which may hereafter be naturalized; and notwithstanding the liberality and justice of this proposal, it, like all others, has been made without producing the desired effect. And what more, sir, could have been asked of us, required, or granted, than is contained in these offers? Nothing more, unless, indeed, they had asked for our independence, and, yielding to the requisition, we had granted it. When an American vessel is at sea, it is amenable to no laws but those of its own country and the laws of nations; and where, in either of these, will the advocates for impressment find their justification? Sir, had not the practice of impressment been treated as a casual, a trivial circumstance, during this debate, I should not have presumed to trouble the House with my desultory remarks; and my principal object in addressing the House, was to ask their attention to a document which appears to have been overlooked, and which, if necessary, will place the abomination of that practice in colors too strong to be mistaken.

Here Mr. K. read the following extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Monroe, dated January 4th, 1804--

"The whole number of applications made by impressed seamen to our Consul in London, between the month of June, 1797, and September, 1804, were two thousand and fifty-nine. Of this number, one hundred and two seamen only were detained as British subjects, which is less than one-twentieth of the whole number impressed. Eleven hundred and forty-two were discharged, or ordered to be so, and eight hundred and five were detained for further proof, with the strongest presumption that the greater part, if not the whole, were Americans, or other aliens, whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed."

It is, then, evident, from this document, that, for every British seamen obtained by this violent proceeding, a number of Americans, or other aliens, with whom Great Britain has no right to meddle, not less than twenty for one have been the victims to it. Sir, have we become so lost to the real independence and sovereignty of the country, that we are prepared to yield to this degrading, debasing, and humiliating badge of vassalage?

The Romans, of old, had a practice of making the governors of those countries they conquered pass annually beneath their yoke, as a mark of submission; but we, doomed to humiliation far greater, are made to pass daily, nay, hourly, beneath one much more galling. Some gentlemen object to the propositions made by Mr. Russell, and assert that he was not authorized. They should recollect that Mr. Russell's letter, containing this final offer to the British Government, was communicated to this House by the President, and, had it not met with his concurrence, it is presumable he would, in his communication, have expressed his disapprobation towards it. Nay, a similar offer has been made by the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren.

I know not whether the feelings of shame or indignation predominate in my breast, when I see gentlemen constantly laboring to place their own Government in the wrong; and, in contradiction to the official records of this House, insist that we are contending for the employment of foreigners.

The language of our Government upon that subject, is this, sir: that, if the oppressed and unfortunate inhabitants of Europe, escaping from their tyranny and panting after their long-lost liberty, seek a refuge in our happy country, upon their compliance with our naturalization laws, we are willing to extend to them those blessings we enjoy; but should they become dissatisfied with the advantages which the interior of the country affords them, and they think proper to depart from our shores, we say to them, we will not risk our peace for their protection beyond our territorial limits. So far from our contest with Great Britain being for the employment of her subjects, it is a contest for shielding a large and valuable portion of our fellow-citizens from British thraldom, under the lash of which they have too long labored; and who will dare discriminate in that protection which is equally due to all, that is due to the meanest individual in the community, and withhold it from a class of men who have done honor to the American character, and covered themselves with glory?

Mr. RANDOLPH rose, apparently laboring under the effects of a serious indisposition, and addressed the Chair.

I rise (said he) with a heart saddened by the disgrace of our common country, and sickened by the way in which the business of the State has been managed.

Of the temper and virulence which have manifested themselves in this debate, I shall not have any occasion to divest myself in the course of the very few remarks which I fear I shall be enabled to make, because towards them I have no purpose. Indeed, when I look around me, I am exceedingly sad; and I know not now if it will be in my power to go on.

I had intended, if time and health permitted, to address to this Assembly some few observations, confined principally to the change which has taken place in the relations of our country since the declaration of war, not only respecting that belligerent with whom we are engaged in hostilities, but her adversary also. But the course that this debate has taken imposes upon me a painful duty, which I trust God will give me strength to discharge: the duty of reviewing past transactions in the Government, which, from my heart, I would, instead of bringing them up on the present occasion, gladly discharge from my memory. But self-defence is the first law of nature. The merest reptile, the worm itself, will turn when trod upon. Nor is the force of the blow lessened by its being dealt, as in the present case, by the hand--I will not say under the garb and circumstances--of Friendship.

It was my lot, sir, and I may assuredly say my misfortune, to take some little share in those transactions which brought about a civil revolution in the Government of this country. I hope that I am understood. I feel I shall be understood, when I speak of this, by all wise and good men; and it is with them only that I wish to hold intercourse--to commune. It is of their good opinion alone that I am ambitious, if indeed ambition dwell any where in my heart.

Let me endeavor to recall to recollection the state of things about the period when I had the unhappiness to dedicate myself to political life.

Through the opposition, bold but just, which was made by myself, and those associated with me, to the measures of that Administration, an entire change was effected in the control of the Government. One Administration was ejected from power, and another took its place. Is it necessary for me to descant upon the topics of difference which then separated the two great parties in the Government? Is it necessary for me at this time of day to make a declaration of the principles of the Republican party? Is it possible that such a declaration could be deemed orthodox when proceeding from lips so unholy as those of an excommunicant from that church? It is not necessary. Those principles are on record; they are engraved upon it indelibly by the press, and will live as long as the art of printing is suffered to exist. It is not for any man at this day to undertake to change them. It is not for any man who then professed them, by any guise or circumlocution, to conceal apostacy from them, for they are there--there in the book. What are they? They have been delivered to you by my honorable colleague--what are they? Love of peace, hatred of offensive war; jealousy of the State Governments towards the General Government, and of the influence of the Executive Government over the co-ordinate branches of that Government; a dread of standing armies; a loathing of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness for the liberty of the citizen; jealousy, Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the President. From these principles what desertions have we not witnessed? Will you have a list of them? I shall not undertake it.

Principle does not consist in names. Federalism is a real thing--not a spectre, a shadow, a phantom. It is a living addition to the power of the General Government, in preference to the power of the States; partiality for the Executive power, in distinction to that of the co-ordinate Departments of the Government; the support of great military and naval force, and of an "energetic" administration of the Government. That is what is called Federalism. Yes, an energetic Administration, not in its real, but technical sense; for it has a sense as technical as any in our laws. That is Federalism. And, when I am opposing the course which looks toward the rearing up of great Military and Naval Establishments, of an extent not only incommensurate with the necessity but the ability of my country, I care not with whom I vote; I will be true to my principles. Let any man lay his finger upon a vote in which, since I have had the honor (if, indeed, it be an honor) of a seat in this House, I have departed from those principles, and I will consent that, quoad hoc, I am a Federalist. But it will be in vain to search for such a vote.

So strenuous, sir, had been the contest--so hot the spirit of rivalship between the two contending parties--that, after the Revolution of 1801, a curious spectacle was presented to this nation and to the world--a spectacle which, I am bold to say, never did before make its appearance in any Government, and never will appear again. It was this: that, as if the character that each party had borne when in collision with one another was indelible, the two parties, after power was transferred from one to the other, did actually maintain the same character which they had derived from impressions received during their late conflict: and the admiring world saw with astonishment the case of an opposition minority attempting to force upon a reluctant Administration patronage and power, which that Administration put by, and sternly refused to accept. Yes, sir; for a time so completely had the Republicans been imbued with the principles which they professed whilst in a minority, that, after becoming the majority, the Federalists pressed on their old adversaries power and patronage, to which they absolutely opposed themselves, repelling, for a season, every project of the kind. Is it necessary for me to allude to the reduction of the Army--to say by whom it was made? Sir, the proposition for it was originally made by the personage now addressing you; it came from what was then considered the Governmental side of the House. And by whom was it opposed? By gentlemen who had so long fought under the banners of a Government of "energy," that they were not content to submit to the diminution of its patronage or its power, even in the hands of their political opponents. I speak of facts. Such a case will never occur again. Nay, indeed, in a little time, the sweets of power had their effect on one side of the House, as the frowns of adversity had upon the other; and after awhile, the court and country parties as easily changed sides as right and left do when a man turns upon his heel.

Yes, sir, the tone of this House was soon changed. We succeeded, however, in the reduction of the Army; but I will trust to the recollection of gentlemen, upon all sides of the House, by what instrumentality this change was effected. The Commander of that Army was retained in his position. I have not leisure, health, or strength, to go into the details; gentlemen will remember them. Meanwhile, peace with this country was negotiated in France by the commissioners sent by Mr. Adams, and was followed up very soon afterwards by the short respite that the truce of Amiens gave to European combatants, wearied rather than satiated with slaughter. These events placed this country in the happiest condition. Of the proceeds of the direct and internal taxes voted by the predecessors of the administration of Mr. Jefferson, one moiety at least came into the Treasury after their dismissal from office. But these proceeds were not necessary to give an overflow of money into the Treasury, which we never ceased to have until we departed from those principles of government and that policy which brought us into power. We sailed on for some time in the full tide of successful experiment, unobstructed by squalls or adverse gales, if we except only the Yazoo breeze. That question was, if I forget not, the first cause of a breach between those persons who had a direct lead in the Government of the country. There were men who did not hesitate, in opposition to all the heads of your Departments, to throw themselves into the breach at that time attempted in the constitution of the country, to defend it, and to defend it with success. It appears, from some documents that have lately been laid upon our table, that errors of that day have been perceived, and that tender consciences which at that time revolted, are now entirely reconciled to the compromise which was then stamped with the reprobation of almost every honest man from Georgia to Virginia. There were considerations of personal feeling which gave to other parts of the Union, and to certain individuals therein, a bias on that subject; and I should be extremely sorry to be considered as passing any thing like general censure upon the advocates of that measure in or out of this House. I refer only, of course, to those who were not parties concerned in the fraud.

At that time, sir, all was prosperity and joy. At that time were accumulated in the Treasury those surpluses which, in one year, nearly equalled the sum for which, in the present year, the revenue is deficient, notwithstanding the loan of last year, and to make up which deficiency the head of the Treasury has been able to devise no other means than a resort to new loans. Yes, sir, there were then those surpluses in the Treasury, the ghosts of which lingered along its vaults for a time after their corporeal bodies departed, and were then heard of no more.

But to proceed. The expenditures of the Government, during the first four years of the Jefferson Administration, exclusive of payments on account of the public debt, averaged only eight millions of dollars a year. In the four last years of the Jefferson Administration, those expenditures were very greatly increased, amounting in the year 1808, (the last of the four,) without any increase of Army and Navy expenditures, to upwards of sixteen millions of dollars--rivalling the expenditures of any one year of Mr. Adams's war, and amounting to one-half as much as was expended by the Father of his Country in his eight years of the Presidency, during which he was called upon to establish public credit, to maintain a bloody Indian war, and to lay the foundation of that character of integrity which the Government has so long sustained abroad, notwithstanding the misconduct of its rulers. Yes, sir, it is a curious but notorious fact, that in 1808 and 1809--and I speak of 1809, for, although the present incumbent came into office on the 3d of March of that year, expenses were incurred and voted in his predecessor's time--the expenditures of the Government outraged all belief when compared with the objects on which they were lavished. And here, Mr. Chairman, let me put to you, and to the gentleman on my right, if it be within the compass of any man's powers to detract more from the merit of an administration of the Government of the United States in managing at least one branch of the revenue than has been done by that honorable gentleman? What has he said? I will not repeat his words; to do so would be odious, invidious; but I well know if what he did say had come from the other side of the House, it would have been set down to the rancor of party spirit; to personal spleen; or to want of respect for the White house, or the Red house, or some other house. What has become of that vast amount of money? No man knows; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, so help me God, no man will ever know.

I find, as I anticipated, a difficulty in dragging along my miserable body, and my feeble mind, in this discussion; a difficulty not less, perhaps, than that of dragging along with me the attention of members of this House. I ask its patience, its pardon, and its pity.

But to continue. In this prosperous state of our country, the war in Europe was renewed, or about to be renewed. The Government of the United States would naturally, from the situation of affairs in that quarter of the world, experience a temporary diminution in its revenue, which it need not feel or regard, because it had been enabled to make that noble provision for a sinking fund, for lessening the national debt, for paying off the mortgages on the estate of every man in the country and of those who are unborn. It had made that noble provision, which was attempted to be diverted to the necessities created by the policy of the last four years of Jefferson's Administration, and the actual diversion of which, I believe, was the first act of this Administration. It had made that appropriation of eight millions of dollars for a sinking fund, not to be touched for any other purpose, and which, at the time of the appropriation, no man dared to believe would be gambled away.

The war in Europe brought to this country, among other birds of passage, a ravenous flock of neutralized carriers, which interposed the flag of neutrality, not only between the property, but even between the persons of the two belligerent powers; and it was their clamor principally, aided by the representations of those of our merchants who saw and wished to participate in the gains of such a commerce, that the first step was taken in that policy of restriction, which it was then foreseen would lead to the disastrous condition in which we now find ourselves. Yes, it was then foreseen and foretold. What was then prophesied is now history. It is so. "You," said the prophet, "are prospering beyond all human example. You, favorites of Almighty God, while all the rest of the world are scourged, and ravaged, and desolated by war, are about to enter into a policy called preventive of war; a policy which comes into this House in the garb of peace, but which must end in war." And in war it has ended. Yes, sir, we have been tortured, fretted, goaded, until at last, like some poor man driven from his family by discord at home, who says to himself, "any thing, even exile, is better than this," we have said that we will take war; we will take any thing for a change. And when war came, what said the people? They said, "any thing for a change!"

At that time circumstances occurred, and I hope the House will pardon me for alluding to them. It is absolutely necessary that I should do so. They have been spoken of by others before me; they were at the time, and have been since, detailed in the most solemn manner on the floor of this body. A denial of them has been challenged and never received. At that time, I repeat, circumstances occurred which made it my duty to oppose the projects of the Executive Government of this country in its relations with foreign powers.

At that time nothing that the Spanish Government could do, not even the invasion of our own territory, not even the capture and carrying off, not from our decks, but our soil, a portion of our citizens, could rouse this House to a spirit which would, in my judgment, have comported not only with its honor, but was absolutely indispensable to its dignity. We were wanting in the assertion of the rights of our own country over its soil and jurisdiction, by which assertion, then, we might have averted the calamities which have since befallen us; but a project for that purpose, recommended by the committee to whom that subject was referred, did not meet the approbation of the House. And from that day and date, the black cloud has thickened over us; has become more and more dense. From that day and date, have we departed from those counsels--in my humble judgment, at least--from those principles, adherence to which had induced the people of the United States to clothe us with their power and confidence.

What have we done since? From that day, with a short interruption, the policy of this Government has actually subserved, as far as it could, the purposes of France. I speak of facts; of facts susceptible of proof, which may be felt, seen, touched, heard, and understood by all except those too indolent to examine them, or too ignorant for the light of truth to have any effect upon their understandings. I say, sir, that the policy of this Government has, from that time, subserved the purposes of France. And how do I prove it? Why, sir, by way of meeting the French decrees, which prohibit to us all intercourse with Great Britain, we cut off the intercourse between us and the whole world. We virtually held out to our great commercial cities--to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston--the same language as Bonaparte had held to his own cities: "I know that you are suffering, and unhappy; that the grass is growing in your streets; that the ships at your wharves are rotting, until they are fit only for fuel; that your trade is dwindling only to nothing; but what is all that to my continental system? What are a few seaport towns--enterprising, wealthy, and prosperous, as indeed they are--what are they, compared to my continental system?" And, sir, what was our "restrictive" system? Similar in point of effect--certainly cotemporaneous in point of time--to Bonaparte's "continental system." Sir, it is a matter susceptible of demonstration, if I possessed the physical power to go through with it, that the system recommended by the then President of the United States, of laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in our ports, for the purpose of "keeping in safety these essential resources," took place in consequence of a communication from our Minister in Paris to this Government, transmitting certain correspondence of his with the French Government. And although in the message to both Houses of Congress, recommending the measure, the President does use the term "belligerent powers," I do attest the fact, and I call upon other gentlemen, who know it, to attest it also, that, while the message purposely referred to both "belligerents," not one scrip of manuscript relating to the other "belligerent" accompanied that message; nor was there any thing contained in that message relating to that "belligerent," but a scrap from an English paper, about the size of a square of its columns, containing some speculations of a London editor; and I say that there did not exist in this House, nor in this nation--if there did, let the evidence be produced--any knowledge of the existence of the orders in council, which have been put forward as justifying the embargo. If their existence had been known at the time, would the President in his message recommending an embargo have failed to notice the fact? Would he not have used it as one of the strongest inducements to the adoption of this system? Would those "orders" not have been published in the National Intelligencer, which is considered--and certainly not without cause, in view of certain things which we have lately seen in it--to be the Court paper? Produce the National Intelligencer of that date; there is not one syllable to be found in it concerning the Orders in Council. No, sir, in his message on the occasion referred to, the President did not produce any acts of the "belligerents" referred to, but only the correspondence between General Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, and that Government, on the subject of the construction of one of its first decrees. It was in consequence of the more recent decrees of France, and not of the British Orders in Council, that the embargo was recommended and laid. And yet, in the discussion which came off on that measure, it was represented as a weapon against England, which would be more efficient than any war, and must bring her to our feet: it would give effect to the object which Bonaparte had in view, of destroying her by consumption, by cutting her off from the commerce of the world. Although I state these facts, I know that it may be proven--and I am sorry that it can--by reference to the journals of this House, and by a report, too, of an honorable and respectable committee of this House, that the embargo was designed to obviate the effects of the Orders in Council.

But, sir, it is indisputably true, that there was no mention in the embargo message of those Orders in Council--no allusion to them in debate upon it--no knowledge of them at the time that the embargo law was passed, that can be proven by any document whatsoever entitled to the least respect; and I will even go so far as to allow as evidence the authority of any newspaper. The members of that committee had heard so much of the Orders in Council, and the effect that it was pretended that the embargo would have upon them, that in their report, speaking of them, they absolutely transposed cause and effect. It is unfortunate that it should be so; but it is nevertheless true. Events subsequent to the period to which I have now brought myself have been detailed in this debate in a manner so clear, so lucid, so convincing, by two honorable gentlemen from New York, that there is no need of my repeating the narrative: but I must be permitted to say that the statement made yesterday by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,) will be refuted when Euclid shall come to be considered a shallow sophist, and not before. My honorable friend from the same State, who spoke a few days ago, called upon gentlemen to handle that part of the subject--the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the inveiglement thereby of this country into a war with England--in a manner more able than, he was pleased to say, he himself had done it. The attempt to do this would, indeed, be to gild refined gold, to paint the lily, to add to the perfume of the violet--in all cases a most ridiculous and wasteful excess. And yet, sir, the situation in which I unhappily stand, and in which it was my lot to stand at the conclusion of the last session of Congress, compels me to say a word on this subject. You will remember, sir, that it was my misfortune, during the first session of this Congress, to oppose the attempt to impress upon this House and the nation certain most preposterous, absurd, and false propositions; for the temerity of which effort I came under the censure--implied, at least, if not to say direct--of this honorable body. The contrary propositions, which I undertook to maintain, were, first, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the first of November, 1810, and that the only evidence of any such repeal, up to that date, was the President's Proclamation of the second of that month; and secondly, that the British Orders in Council did, in point of fact, establish no serious insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between that Government and the United States. Why, sir, I shall not here go into any argument on this point; if I had the ability, I have not the will; and, if I had the will, I have not the ability. Nor can it be necessary, when the Emperor of France himself comes into court, and cannot reject his own authority, as borne in his own laws. Yes, sir, he did come forth, and, in his antedated decree of the 28th of April, 1811--though it unquestionably ought to bear date full twelve months later--does, in the most offensive of all possible ways, establish the fact, not only that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed (as all the world knew except the President of the United States) on the first of November, 1810, but that they were in his mind when he issued his decree, dated 28th April, 1811. They were repealed, finally, in consequence--of what? Of your doing that which for years he had been attempting, by menace and blandishment, to induce you to do--that is to say, embark in war with England, taking sides with France, "causing," as the phrase was, "our flag to be respected:" And this, too, after your having posted up in the ledger of this House that war with one of the "belligerents" was equivalent to submission to the other!

My other proposition was, that the Orders in Council constituted no insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between this country and Great Britain. And what was the fact in regard to them? Why, that almost at the time that this position was taken on this floor--a few weeks only thereafter--the Orders in Council were repealed.

I put it to you, sir, and to the great mass of the people of this country--to the honest, laborious, unsuspecting, kind-hearted, confiding, generous, and just people--had the fact been known that the French decrees were not repealed, and that the Orders in Council were repealed, whether any man, in any station, would have had the confidence to propose a declaration of war against England, taking part against her, and siding with France in the conflict in which those nations are engaged?

And, whilst I am upon this subject, permit me to say, suppose the proposition which was repeatedly made--in more than one instance by the person who is now addressing you, and supported with the greatest ability by gentlemen on the other side of the House--to postpone our declaration of war against Great Britain until the autumn, when we might be in some state of preparation and readiness for it--had succeeded, what would have been the consequence? At this time we should have been at peace; we should have been lying secure in that snug safe haven of neutrality, in which the good sense of the greatest and best men of this country have always attempted to moor the public ship. Now, where are we? And shall this war be called a popular war; a war of the people; a war called for by the public voice, into which this country has been plunged, not more by the agency of the friends of Government than of its enemies, in the hope of the latter that this Administration would sink and founder in it, and they rise to power thereupon? Is it possible that that can be deemed a war of the people, a popular war, which has enabled a gentleman known to be of the most respectable connections, and possessed, I believe, of considerable talent--but who, put in competition with the veteran politician now at the helm of Government, is but a boy in politics--a person whose pretensions are so extremely inferior, to rival the present Chief Magistrate in the confidence of the people, and for a time, as you know, make him tremble for his re-election? It is, however, some consolation to reflect that, in all free Governments, the public voice will sooner or later be heard upon all their measures, and in condemnation of those which the opinion of that public detests and execrates. This is a great law of politics; it is to the political what gravitation is to the physical world; it cannot be counteracted. Statesmen know it, feel it; they do not reason to it, but from it; they never lose sight of it, but are guided by it in all their measures. And those of us who live to see the next Congress, will live to see the effects of that law in this House.

Sir, we have passed so many laws, we have had so many objects for enticing the belligerents on the one hand and coercing them on the other, and enticing and coercing them together, that I feel some little difficulty, in the present state of my brain, in referring to them by title or date; but it is the law passed on this subject, in consequence of which the celebrated letter of the 1st of August of the Duc de Cadore was written, to which I desire most particularly to refer. If, after the proclamation of the President of the United States of the 1st of November thereafter, issued in consequence of that letter, revoking so much of our non-intercourse law as related to France, an unbroken warfare being kept up by France on our commerce--a fact as notorious as the existence of any fact in nature--was it not good cause for reinstating the law in relation to France, and putting her on her ancient ground? Then I would be glad to know, for one, whether our continuing at war with England was any better cause for keeping up the interdiction in relation to her, after she had revoked her Orders in Council? In other words, it being admitted by gentlemen on one side, as it has been contended by gentlemen on the other, that the revocation of the Orders in Council by Great Britain was such a one as did satisfy the terms of the non-intercourse act, what was the reason that the proclamation required by our law in such case did not issue? Why, sir, the state of war between the United States and Great Britain being offensive on our part--being of our own making--was held to be a cause why we cannot execute our law as relates to her. Now, whilst the continued war upon us by France, by seizures of our merchant vessels and their cargoes, is not considered an obstacle to its execution in regard to her, is it not as clear as the noon-day sun, that if the making of war by France on the United States did not constitute any good cause for withholding the revocation as to her, when she professed to have repealed her Berlin and Milan decrees, there was no reason why it should not have been extended to Great Britain also, when she actually repealed her Orders in Council?

I am extremely at a loss to say whether my judgment, my memory, my imagination, or my command of words, fit me for the expression of the few scattered ideas I have on this subject; I fear that they may fail me. But I believe it will be conceded, on all hands, that if, after the revocation of the British Orders in Council, the President of the United States had, as he honorably might have done, made that repeal the basis of negotiation with Great Britain, there is not a man in this country--certainly there is none among his admirers and adherents--who would not have hailed him as the restorer of the peace and prosperity of the country, which had been so idly (I had almost said so wickedly) disturbed. But, regardless of every consequence, we went into war with England as an inconsiderate couple go into matrimony, without considering whether they have the means of sustaining their own existence, much less that of any unfortunate progeny that should happen to be born of them. The sacrifice was made. The blood of Christians enjoying the privileges of jury trial, of the writ of habeas corpus, of the freedom of conscience, of the blessings of civil liberty, citizens of the last Republic that ambition has left upon the face of a desolate earth--the blood of such a people was poured out as an atonement to the Moloch of France. The Juggernaut of India is said to smile when it sees the blood flow from the human sacrifice which its worship exacts; the Emperor of France might now smile upon us. But no, sir, our miserable offering is spurned. The French monarch turns his nose and his eyes another way. He snuffs on the plains of Moscow a thousand hecatombs, waiting to be sacrificed on the shrine of his ambition; and the city of the Czars, the largest in the world, is to be at once the altar and the fire of sacrifice to his miserable ambition. And what injury has the Emperor of Russia done to him? For what was he contending? For national existence; for a bare existence; for himself and the people who are subject to his sway. And what, sir, are you doing? Virtually fighting the battles of his foes; surrendering yourself to the views of his adversary, without a plea--without any thing to justify your becoming the victims of his blasting ambition.

Yes, sir, after having for years attempted to drive us by menace into war with England, when he has seen us fairly embarked in it, and the champions of human rights bleeding in his cause, the Ruler of France has turned with contempt from your reclamations; he has left your Minister, who was charged with those reclamations, to follow him in his Russian campaign, to whip up his jaded Pegasus, and, travelling at his heels, to overtake him if he can.[34]

For these injuries and insults what atonement has been made? What satisfaction has been received for your plundered property? And what is the relation in which you stand to France? At this moment, when it is well known that it would not require one additional man in the army or navy to make good, in the eye of nations, your character as an independent and high-spirited people, you are prostrate at the feet of your's and the world's undoer. Is there any thing yet wanting to fill up the full measure of injustice you have sustained? Gentlemen on all sides are obliged to admit that the provocation which we have received from France is ample; that the cup of it is overflowing. And yet, what is our situation in relation to that destroyer of mankind--him who, devising death to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree of life; who cannot be glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation of death; himself an incarnate death?

All this, I say, does prove--and if it does not I call on gentlemen to disprove the fact--that there is a difference in the standard by which we measure French aggressions and the aggressions of any other people under the sun. When Spain was the ally of France she was--what? She was secure from our indignation. There was not a murderer, a barbarian, in all our Western wilderness that was not safe under the Spanish cloak. For why? Because the King of Spain, such as he was--for he wore only the semblance of a crown--was in alliance with France; and he must not be touched.

But what has Revolutionary Spain done? What offence has she committed against France? That she is not only helpless, destitute of resources, unable to return a blow, but, above all, is coveted by France, are considerations which cannot justify, on the part of France, conduct towards her more infamous than that of the English at Copenhagen--conduct cowardly as it is unprincipled. But, sir, I forewarn gentlemen of the Southern country--I do beseech them, with a sincerity which no man can have a right to question--to beware how they transfer the theatre of war from the rocks and snows of Canada to the sandhills, the rice-fields, the tobacco plantations of the Southern States. For them to think of voluntarily consenting to make that region the theatre of the war, would compel me to believe that they are on the verge of that madness which precedes the destruction of all doomed by Heaven to perish.

Sir, I have just touched, with trembling and faltering hand, some of the preliminary observations which I had intended, at some time or other, to make, into which I have now been prematurely forced to enter, not more unexpectedly than unavoidably, by the strange turn which this debate has taken.

There are two other points--for, in respect to the Orders of Council, I shall not say a word about them--upon which I am very anxious to offer myself to your attention: the one the celebrated point of impressment, which, though it has been very ably handled, is not yet exhausted: the other the Indian war on our Western border. And I also wish to say something on the subject of negotiation. In the midst of a war with one of the greatest powers of Europe, why should the gleam of the tomahawk and the scalping-knife, the cries of massacred women and children reaching our ears--why should these fright us from our propriety? Why, we are told the Indians of the West have been stirred up to war with us by British agents. But what is the fact? That we have no Indian war, but a war of our own seeking, as I have already, in the course of this session, read to you certain proofs; and I will now give you another. It is this: It is agreed on all hands--no man has attempted to dispute it--that, in the affair of the battle of Tippecanoe, the commander and the officers distinguished themselves by the greatest gallantry. How has it happened, then, that while we have been freely voting medals to those gallant officers of our navy who have distinguished themselves on the ocean--and I hope we shall vote them something more substantial--not a whisper has been heard in relation to those who have been engaged in this expedition against the Indians? The subject has not been even inquired into.

Do we know, at this moment, as a Legislature, the causes of that disastrous business--I call it so from its consequences--or by whose authority this war was made? Or, is it come to this: that Governors of our Territories are to consider themselves as so many Hastings and Wellesleys of our country, and that, while they do not involve us in war with Christians like themselves, they may go to any extent in exterminating the Red Barbarians here as in the East Indies Governors and Proconsuls of the British Government do there in regard to uncivilized powers of that quarter of the globe? Is it discovered that our Territorial Governors may at pleasure invade the territory of other nations--for, inconsiderable and contemptible though they be, the Indian tribes are nations--in like manner that the British authorities make war upon those nations of the East? Yes, sir, not only is this a war of our own seeking--not only we had it in our power to keep the peace--but in the country which was the scene of the battle, and in the adjacent country, it was the most popular war ever waged. The frontier people of this country have been in the habit of driving the heathen before them; and to them the chase of the deer, the elk, and the antelope, is not so grateful as that of the red men they hunt. I believe that it is the cause of serious regret to many of the people of the West that there is now no longer any motive to drive them from their lands. As to the Red Men, the Big-Knives have, without any foreign prompting or instigation, driven them off from a country more extensive than that over which the Emperor of France wields his sceptre. So I put aside this item of Indian war altogether as a matter of account in the list of our grievances against the British Government. There is not a shadow of foundation for believing that these Indians were or could have been instigated to take up the hatchet against us until hostile arms had been taken up against them. When driven to the wall they must fight or die--the last alternative left to them--for which nobody can blame them.

It was, sir, a saying of one of the best men who ever wrote, in correspondence with a friend, that he had no time to write a shorter letter; and I can truly say that I have not time to deliver a shorter speech. I know that this question will be taken to-day, for I have been so admonished; and my own very severe and sudden indisposition, which I am almost ashamed to name, will compel me to detain your attention much longer than under other circumstances would have been the case.

A word, now, on the subject of impressment. Our foreign trade had grown beyond the capacity of either our tonnage or seamen to manage. Our mercantile marine was an infant Hercules; but it was overloaded beyond its strength: the crop was too abundant to be gathered by our hands alone. The consequence was, and a natural one too, that not only the capitalists flocked into our country from abroad to share in our growing commerce, but the policy also of our Government was adapted to it, and a law was passed to enable us to avail ourselves of the services of British seamen and seamen of other countries. And, in doing this, we availed ourselves of the pretext--which, as long as the countries to which they belonged winked at it, was fair for us to use--of taking these British seamen for Americans. It was in 1796 that commenced the act, to which reference has been made, and that system of "protections," as they were called, the very mention of which, at this day, causes a burst of honest indignation in the breast of citizens whose situation enables them to ascertain their true character. If these "protections," so termed, have not been forged all over Europe, it is only for the reason that the notes of a certain bank of which I have heard have not been forged, viz: that, the bank being broke, its notes were so worthless that people would not even steal them. The "protections" are attainable by everybody; by men of all ages, countries, and descriptions. They are a mere farce. The issuing of them has gone far to disgrace the character of the country, and has brought into question and jeopardy the rights of real American citizens. This question of impressment, delicate as it has been said to be--difficult as in one view it certainly is--is, of all others, in my judgment, the most compact. With the gentleman from New York, I will say that the tide of emigration has brought to the shores of our country many most valuable characters; some of them persons with whom I have the honor of being in habits, not only of intimacy, but friendship. I believe there does not exist one man of this description, who comes bona fide to this country to settle himself and children here, that would require you to go to war on his account. And, sir, I believe that the belligerent position itself in which you now find yourself will relieve you in a great degree of this evil, for many seamen who have so long, by virtue of these "protections," passed themselves off for American, will find it to be very convenient to be Portuguese or Swedish seamen, or seamen of some other State than the United States--some State that is not at war with England. Sir, there is a wide difference between the character of American seamen and seamen of every other country on earth. The American seaman has a home on the land, a domicil, a wife and children, to whom he is attached, to whom he is in the habit of returning after his voyages; with whom he spends, sometimes, a long vacation from the toils of maritime life. It is not so with the seamen of other countries. For the protection of men of the first description, I am disposed, if necessary, to use the force of the country, but for no other. I know, indeed, that some gentlemen who have spoken much on the subject of the principle of impressment, will tell you that the right to take from a neutral vessel one seaman, if carried to its extent, involves a right to take any, or all seamen. Why, sir, in like manner, it might be argued that the taking illegally of one vessel at sea involves the right to take every vessel. And yet, sir, who ever heard of two nations going to war about a single case of capture, though admitted not to be justified by the laws? Such a case never did and never will occur.

Of one thing we are certain: it rests upon no doubtful ground: that Great Britain, rather than surrender the right of impressing her own seamen, will nail her colors to the mast, and go down with them. And she is right, because, when she does surrender it, she is Samson shorn of his strength: the sinews of her power are cut. I say this openly in the House of Representatives; and I am not communicating to the enemy a secret of any value, because she has herself told us that she can never surrender it. She has told us so, not when she stood in the relation of an enemy toward us, but in the friendly intercourse of the British Ministry with our late Commissioners at London. Turn to the book: I wish the honorable gentleman, if he has it, would for a moment let me have the use of it. You are told in that book that every effort was made by the American Commissioners to effect a relaxation of this right; that the British Ministry evinced the sincerest desire to give satisfaction to them on this point: but what? The Admiralty was consulted; they waked up out of their slumbers the Civilians at Doctors' Commons to deliberate upon it; and they came to the conclusion that the Government of Great Britain could not give up that right. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, the Commissioners of the United States to negotiate a treaty with the Government of Great Britain, in their correspondence with their own Government, give this fact to excuse themselves for failing to accomplish their object, and to prove that every thing had been done that could be on their part, and every thing conceded on the other side that the most friendly disposition could warrant--and here I do not speak of masked friendship, but of real friendship. Although every thing possible had been done, this right of impressment of her own seamen was a sine qua non on the part of Great Britain--one which would not, could not, must not, be surrendered. And, sir, if this question of the right of impressment was one on which we were to go to war with Great Britain, we ought to have gone to war then; because we were then told by the highest authority in that Government that this was a point which never would be given up.

I find, sir, that I cannot trust my broken voice to read the book, now that it is in my hand, but must rely upon my recollection for facts.

Now, this question lies as I have said, in a very small compass. The right of Great Britain to take her own seamen from your merchant vessels, (if it be a right,) is one which she has exercised ever since you were a People, wherever occasions for its exercise have occurred. Will you not only go to war, but wage a bellum ad internecinum for it? Will you wage an endless war of extermination for this right, which, you have known for two and twenty years of your national existence, she will not relinquish? A gentleman from Tennessee, of whose capacity few men have more respectful opinion than myself, has quoted the diplomatic correspondence as far back as 1792, to show what General WASHINGTON's opinions were on this question of impressment, and this opinion of the Father of his Country is now held up to the people of the United States for the purpose of enlisting their prejudices in the conviction that, by involving the country in warfare, we are at this moment treading in the footsteps of that great man, and acting upon his principles. Nothing can be more untrue. To say that the Treaty of Louisiana was negotiated two years after the letter of instruction quoted from the Washington Administration, and that that treaty contained no provisions on this point, is a reply in full on this course of argument. But what does the correspondence referred to prove? What every treaty, what every negotiation, has proven: that England would not give up this point, although she made offers for guarding against abuse--offers more favorable to us than ours to her. And yet the Administration of this Government have had the hardihood or the folly to plunge the nation into a war for it--for a point on which General Washington, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jefferson, men differing from each other as may be in every aspect, had been content to negotiate, rather than go to war for its assertion.

What was the offer made to our Government by the British Ministry? If I do not forget, their offer was that they would not impress American seamen. Their offer to us was not accepted, but it was beyond question, in my opinion, more beneficial than the proposition which we on that occasion made to them.

But it may be said that the right of search cannot be endured; that the protection of our flag must be held inviolate; that if a search of our ships be permitted for British seamen, they may actually take American seamen. Sir, there is no doubt of the fact that by mistake, sometimes perhaps by wilful misconduct, on the part of officers engaged in the search, such a thing may happen. But, should we not think it exceedingly strange that the misconduct of an officer of the American Government, in one case in twenty if you will, should be a cause of war for any nation against us? It is one of those cases which does occur, and will forever occur, to a neutral power, whenever a general war is lighted up. It is one of the prices which this country has to pay for its rapid accession of wealth, such as is unheard of in the annals of any other nation but our own. And this, sir, is the state of things in which we have undertaken, in children's language, to quarrel with our bread and butter; and to identify ourselves with one of the belligerents in a war in which we have no proper concern. I will not touch at all the abstract question of the right of impressment: it has been so much more ably handled by others that I shall not say a word about it. I address myself to the common sense of the planter, the farmer, the agriculturist of our country--are you willing upon such grounds as these to continue this war? I have no doubt what will be their answer.

On these subjects I have delivered my sentiments more than once before in this House. I think of them with horror as the accursed cause of this war. Not that the men who are in power are worse men than other people, but that they have brought upon this land of peace and freedom issues the end of which it would be impossible for any human being to divine.

One thing is certain, that the right of search does practically exist, and has been acknowledged by all nations. The President of the United States and his Secretary of State, as great masters of the Law of Nations, will be among the first to acknowledge it; they have acknowledged it, and by our treaties with foreign powers, this country has heretofore acknowledged it, so far as concerns the right to search for contraband goods and enemy's property. Suppose that there are notorious abuses under this right: should we be justified in declaring that no search whatever of our merchant vessels shall be allowed? There is no doubt that, under the color of the right of search--for I am advocating its lawful purposes only--abuses have been committed on neutrals; and as long as men exist it will be so. The liability to abuse of this right is the price which neutrals pay for the advantages which they derive from their neutrality; and I should like to know whether it would be for me to join in the contest in which these belligerents are engaged for the recovery of my neutral rights. Where are those rights when great maritime powers become belligerent? There are neutral rights undoubtedly, but there are also neutral duties. And shall a neutral nation, a nation which has in that character prospered and flourished more than any people on the face of the globe, sacrifice those rights and those advantages, and resort to war against one of those belligerents--and for what? For a point of honor! Yet, whilst in this Quixotic spirit we have gone to war with England; although we have been robbed, reviled, contemned throughout by the Emperor of France, we can see no cause of war with him!

What shall we say of the French doctrine in relation to this subject of impressment? If that has been dwelt upon in this debate by any honorable gentleman of this House it has escaped my notice. What is the French doctrine on this subject--established at the time when the United States stood in relations of peace and amity to that power, when every heart beat high with sympathy for the success of French freedom; when some of those who have since transferred their admiration, I will not say their love, to the present head of the French Government, to the enemy of French freedom, and all freedom, to all commerce, and right, and religion--at the time when some of those who have since so lamentably changed on this subject felt an interest for freedom and France scarcely inferior to that which they felt for freedom and America? What were then the doctrines of the French Government? That all who spoke the English language should be treated as Englishmen, unless they could give proof to the contrary; the onus probandi lying on those who spoke the language of Locke, and Newton, and Milton, and Shakspeare. Yes, sir, whilst the English Government establishes no such doctrine, the French Government acts upon the principle that speaking the English language is prima facie evidence of your being a British subject, and would justify their treating you as an enemy, the burden of the proof to the contrary being thrown upon yourself.

And, sir, is it nothing to the bill which we are now debating, for raising an additional army of twenty thousand men--or is it a departure from order to hint on this floor at a circumstance which all men are employed and occupied in discussing at their firesides?--that this army, to constitute an aggregate of fifty-five thousand regular troops, is about to be put under the control of the man who was the author of the Anonymous Letters at Newburg at the close of the Revolutionary war, inciting a handful of men, the remnant of the old American army--perhaps not numbering six thousand altogether--to give a master to the nation? Is that a consideration to have no weight upon such a question as this? With me, sir, it is conclusive. I will tell gentlemen on both sides of the House that a Government or a man may despise a calumny--that the arrows of slander will fall blunt and harmless upon them--provided that the Government and the man be true to itself and himself. Yes, sir, ask yourself this question in regard to any man, to whom you are about to confide important trusts: Does he pay his just debts? Is he a man of truth? Does he discharge as he ought the duties of a friend, a brother in society? After having done that, be his politics what they may, and his peculiarity of opinion in politics what it may, he is a good man; he acquires the esteem of all who know him; he is impenetrable to mere vulgar calumny. This Government ought to employ men of real worth and capacity: it is not always that those showing qualities attracting attention in private life, or as companions, are of real capacity. Do those who administer the Government make it a rule to employ in the public service none but men of real capacity, or worth, of integrity, and of high character? Do they give their contracts and offices without fear, favor, or affection, to men of responsibility and character--to such men as you would in private life give your own contracts to? Or do they bestow them, as is done in some Governments differently constituted from ours, where church preferment and military preferment are sometimes made a dirty job of Parliamentary interest? Do they employ men of clean hands, with fair characters; or is every caitiff, without examination, welcome to their arms, provided he can bring with him the proof of his treachery to his former employers? It depends on these facts whether confidence is due to any Administration of the Government.

Sir, I have much yet to say which appeared to me, when I rose, not to be unworthy your attention; but I confess to you, with feelings something like contrition, that my opinion on this subject has undergone a change.

There is one point, however, on which I do not know how to speak in this place with the reverence which is due to it. I cannot pass it over, and yet I know not how to touch it. Yes, sir, there is one reflection pressing itself as a crown of thorns upon my own head, which I am bound to present to the consideration of this Assembly and this people. Is it fitting that the only two nations among whom the worship of the true God has been maintained with any thing like truth and freedom from corruption; that the only two nations among whom this worship has been preserved unstained, shall be the two now arrayed against each other in hostile arms in a conflict in which, let who will conquer in the fight, his success in one point, if that be an object, will have been attained: so much of human life, liberty, and happiness, will have perished in the affray--in the service of this scourge with which it has pleased God, in his wisdom and justice, not in his mercy, to inflict mankind? Is it fitting that those hands which unite in giving to idolaters and to the heathen the Word of God, the Book of Life--that those hands, and those alone, should be thus drenched in each other's blood? Will you unite as a Christian with your Protestant brother across the Atlantic for these noble purposes, and then plunge the dagger into his breast with whom you are associated in a cause so holy--one so infinitely transcending the low, the little, the dirty business we are called upon here to transact? I hope that the sacrifice may be stopped. We have nothing to expect from the mission of our Minister to the Ruler of France, whether at Moscow, or wherever else he may be. The Deity or Devil whom we worship is not to be mollified by our suppliant appeals. Let us turn from him--come out of his house--and join in the worship of the true and living God, instead of spilling the blood of his people on the abominable altar of the French Moloch.

Sir, I have done. I could have wished to continue my remarks further, but I cannot.

When Mr. RANDOLPH concluded, the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, January 14.

Additional Military Force.

The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of infantry for one year.--The question being on the passage of the bill.

Mr. STOW, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping for the approbation of my country and my God.

The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained? If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined--and the Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to censure this--it may be well for the people to have their political concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them. But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust." Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."

First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient. Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This is happily illustrated in mathematics--there every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. SHEFFEY,) which pointed out the distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind; because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world, before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a different course--but the nation has determined on war, and, though it was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.

I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded. It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows, that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen--it is a claim to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to see his country prostrated still lower?

Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy--of compelling him--to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies, receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in British papers--they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.

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