Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 4 of 8)

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 4 of 8)

I hope it will not be considered as savoring of egotism when I say that my appointment to the very honorable station I now hold was unsolicited by me. That my sentiments on the subject now under consideration had been by me unequivocally expressed at the last session of Congress, and were well known to those who appointed me. Nay, further, after my venerable and respected predecessor had resigned his seat here, and had declined, also, his appointment for the ensuing six years, pending the election of a successor to him, and when my name was held in nomination, a resolution was offered, similar to those which we have heard so much talk about, proposing to instruct the Senators of that State to oppose the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. This resolution, as I am informed, lay on the Speaker's table when the election was gone into. I was elected, and the proposers of the resolution had not power nor influence enough to raise it from the table on which it lay, and it died stillborn at the end of the session; and if I were to make an inference at all on these transactions, I should suppose I was tacitly instructed to vote for the renewal of the bank charter. But I seek not the avoidance of responsibility. It is here, sir, in my own bosom, I have instructions paramount to all others. My beloved country has rested the matter here, and my gratitude is superadded to all other moral obligations operating on me to perform this trust, and to execute this duty with faithfulness. I find the authority of Congress to grant this charter in the same sections of the constitution which the gentlemen who have gone before me have pointed out to you. In section seven, clause first, power is given to Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties shall be uniform throughout the United States."

Clause second gives power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." And, in the last clause of said section, power is also given to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof.

Let us understand the meaning of the words necessary and proper, to the last-quoted clause, for upon a correct knowledge of these depends, in my opinion, the correctness of our conclusions on this subject. The word necessary, in its technical and legal sense, in the meaning affixed to it in common parlance, established by usage, custom, reason, and the common law of the land, is different and distinct from the signification of the same adjective derived from the substantive necessity, as used by Hobbes, Hutchinson, Hume, and the other metaphysicians of the last century. It is well known that they used the substantive necessity as synonymous with the word fate, and which necessity, according to the opinions of one party, controlled omnipotence itself. This necessity was supposed by them co-existent with the Deity itself, not prospective nor discretionary, bending in one way, and in one way only, all substance, all matter, and all spirit. This meaning of the word is only to be found with these metaphysicians and philosophers; but in our law books, in the daily and hourly use of the word in common conversation, it has no such meaning. When the old Congress passed the conditional charter--which I admit they had not a delegated power to grant, but which is fully in point, both as to the signification of the word, and, also, of their opinion of the necessity, and even indispensableness of a bank for the administering the fiscal concerns of the nation--in the conclusion of the preamble they say that the exigencies of the United States render it indispensably necessary to pass the act, &c.; and in the laws passed during that period, when this Government was in the habit of following the English custom of beginning the laws by a preamble, you find the word necessary used as synonymous to expediency--practical expediency, (see Laws of the United States, vol. 1, page 247; idem, page 276,) in fact, among frail mortals with fallible judgments like ours. With any beings endued with less than omniscience, the word necessary must be only applicable to the honest judgment we can make up concerning the subject to which we apply it; in other words, it is resolvable into that sound discretion with which, as moral agents, we are in the first instance intrusted by our Maker, and in the instance now before us, we are intrusted with by the constitution and by the citizens who have sent us here to transact their business. But the rigid necessity which our opponents wish to enforce on us, this metaphysical necessity, must, from its very nature, be immutable; it must be unique, and could not exist in a greater or less degree; and, therefore, the word joined to it in the constitution (proper) could have no meaning at all. The laws, to be passed, must be necessary, is the only one way given under heaven by which you are to effect the end desired; in other words, the law must be imposed by Fate. It is perfect nonsense to say that there is a latitude left with us to judge whether such a law is proper or improper. I have, I think, brought the meaning of the word necessary to the level and within the comprehension of frail human intellect. The signification of the word proper I take to contain the description of the measure or law to which it is applied, in the following respects: whether the law is in conformity to the letter, the spirit, and the meaning of the constitution; whether it will produce the good end desired in the most ready, easy, and convenient mode, that we are acquainted with.

Great stress is laid on that amendment of the constitution which says, that all power not expressly granted shall be retained, &c. Either the general clause I have relied on gives power or it does not; if it did not give power, why was this amendment made? And if it did, and this power was offensive, why was it not stricken out when the amendment was made? But if it expressly gave power, which I contend, its being suffered to remain is proof that it was not the design of the amendment to take away the power given. Could not the Territory of Columbia have been governed without erecting a single corporation in it? I don't mean well governed. But was there that fatal necessity; that command from Jove,

"Ye fates fulfil it, and ye powers approve,"

to erect corporations? This legislation to erect corporations being, according to our opponents, sui generis, not of the ordinary kind, and only to be exercised where the express authority is given by the constitution, I ask gentlemen to show the clause in the constitution which expressly gives us the power to perform this sublimated act of legislation in this Territory any more than in any other part of the United States; and yet at this very session we have sent an armful of these high acts. The shelves of the office of the Secretary groan under the pile of charters we have granted.

I said it was easy to prove that the broad grant given to Congress to legislate for this Territory in all cases whatsoever, was restricted and paled in by the constitution. Congress cannot make the duties here on imports less or greater than elsewhere in the United States--imports and taxes must be equal, &c.--nor deprive the citizens thereof of the right to a trial by jury, nor grant them titles of nobility; and yet the incidents here alluded to would come under the description in the clause "of all cases whatsoever." In truth, sir, there is not a scintilla of the spirit, nor a single word or letter of the constitution, that loses its power and sanction upon our conduct in legislating in this particular. There is no more a power given us to legislate ad libitum on this Territory, nor to derive therefor powers by implication, than is given us in the laws we pass for the whole nation; and if this power, sui generis, of creating corporations, is properly defined by our opponents, they ought to go back to the works of yesterday, as well as to those of twenty years' standing, in order to introduce their new order of things. I might here draw a comparison of the tried scheme of using the United States' Bank, and the untried scheme of using State banks in aid of the operations of the National Treasury; but I should only be saying with less force what has been so fully and so conclusively said by the gentlemen who have preceded me. Suffice it to say, that for safe-keeping, for transmission and payment of the funds to any part of the nation, and for enforcing the punctual payment by the debtors to the customs, by addressing to those debtors the arguments to the sense of honor and shame, and also to their interest, to wit: by denying them credit in the bank on failure in punctuality--all these have been afforded to the Government without its incurring therefor one cent's expense. Are we sure the State banks can or will do this? I beg pardon of the Senate for detaining them on topics not new. As this is made a case of conscience, I deemed it necessary to be thus particular. I have no hesitation in saying, we have the right to act on this subject, inasmuch as I think the bank is both necessary and proper for the purposes above referred to.

To me it appears that this power is expressly granted; we derive it not by implication; but our opponents, in fact, are pressed to the necessity of using implication to come at the denial they set up against the exercise by Congress of this power.

I say, further, that this institution is necessary and proper for carrying into effect another general power, viz: The power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.

It is acknowledged on all hands that there is not specie enough in the nation, if applied solely to that purpose, to pay our annual impost. The operations of the Bank of Columbia in transferring the revenue derived from a part of Virginia (and of the land funds from the westward,) and of the Manhattan Bank in performing the same office in respect to the collections in Connecticut, have been dwelt upon by the honorable Senator from Maryland, (Mr. SMITH.) His arguments drawn from the facts would have been more conclusive if he could have instanced the same facilities afforded to the Government between banks disconnected by the effect of that neighborhood circulation and of that course of trade very apparent in the instances he has produced. But it is not conclusive at any rate. There is a neighborhood medium of circulation, (the State bank paper,) and there is a national medium, (the United States paper.) The latter, under the present state of things, corrects the operations of distant banks and renders their transfers easy; but, deprived of this, would any of them, situated at four and five hundred miles, or at one thousand miles' distance, agree to make these transfers for the Government free of expense? Could they, for instance, transfer the solid bullion belonging to the United States from Orleans to Boston or Philadelphia, without our affording compensation for freight, insurance, &c.? I have witnessed the advantages of this national medium in the State I live in; and in the months of autumn, when strangers are fearful of venturing to Charleston, our western friends, rather than carry the hard dollars, are in the habit of giving two or three per cent. for bills of the Bank of the United States. Destroy this national medium, you insulate the State banks, which are so far asunder as not to be within the influence of the neighborhood medium of circulation. The stroke of our dreadful wand disconnects the ligament by which they are bound together in their distant operations.

Mr. PICKERING.--I will now, Mr. President, make some observations on the main question under consideration. Whether Congress have the power by the constitution to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States?

It has been said that the power to incorporate a bank for the United States is a substantive and original, and not a derivative or implied power. This has been repeated, but I have heard no arguments in support of the position; it is naked assertion.

It has also been called "act of sovereignty;" as if to alarm and deter us by its awful magnitude. But, sir, the sovereign power of Congress is sometimes exercised on subjects of comparatively little moment. A few days since we passed a bill to authorize the erection of a bridge; and another, to change the name of an individual, to enable him to inherit an estate. The power of Congress is sovereign to all the purposes of the constitution. They can lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; borrow money, regulate commerce, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States. And they have the power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the foregoing and all other constitutional powers into execution. When proposing to exercise this general power, in any case not expressly mentioned, we have to consider whether it be "necessary and proper." It has been said that "necessary" here means indispensable; something without which a particular power expressly granted cannot be carried into execution. But, sir, I see no ground for this interpretation. In the affairs of a nation, or other community, whatever the public good requires to be done, is necessary and proper to be done. It is a moral, not an absolute necessity. It is necessary for me to be here in my place, because it is my duty to be here. Necessary and proper are opposed to unnecessary and improper. Congress should do no act unnecessary and improper; but, like State Legislatures, do whatever is necessary and proper to attain the objects for which they are respectively constituted.

In determining whether any proposed measure be necessary and proper to carry into execution any power expressly given to Congress, we have to consider whether that measure has a just or useful relation to the end. For instance, the constitution having prescribed no mode of collecting the revenues, it rested in the discretion of Congress to adopt such a mode or such modes as should appear to them best adapted to that object. Instead of appointing custom-house officers in the large commercial cities and towns, where a banking establishment could be supported, Congress might there have erected banks, as the most certain, punctual, and cheap mode of collection. Suitable officers of a bank might have performed all the duties of entering and clearing vessels, and all other duties pertaining to the custom-house, without any charge to the public; the deposits of the public moneys so collected in those banks, upon which the usual banking operations might be carried on, yielding an adequate compensation for all the services so performed.

The public revenues, when collected, must also be safely kept. An experience has demonstrated that, of all depositaries, banks are the safest. And the same experience has shown that, as the public moneys are required to be frequently transferred, for the public expenditures, from one State to another, the Bank of the United States, with its branches, has furnished the best mode of transfer; it being effected with despatch, with certainty, and without any risk or expense to the United States.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CLAY) asked, if banks are necessary for collecting the public revenues, why give them any other power? The answer is, that it is the essential nature of banks, which renders them so peculiarly fit to collect the revenues. The merchants, whose bonds are lodged in the banks for collection, are also borrowers of money from the banks; and if they fail of paying their bonds, as they become due, their credit will fail; they can obtain no more loans until their bonds are paid. This has just been presented to our view, in the most striking manner, by my colleague.

"To borrow money," is another of the great powers expressly vested in Congress. And in this, as in the power first considered, no mode of borrowing being prescribed in the constitution, Congress are to devise and provide the means in their judgment most sure, expeditious, and ample, to obtain loans. And this was one of the great objects for which the Bank of the United States was originally incorporated. The gentleman from Virginia, near me, (Mr. BRENT,) and the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. TAYLOR,) have, in very forcible language, displayed the impolicy of depending on State banks or individuals for loans, in public emergencies. At such times, these banks and individuals may be most hardly pressed by their usual customers. To suffer the Bank of the United States to dissolve, and to have recourse to State banks, will be so far going back to the condition of the United States under the articles of Confederation, when our Union was but a rope of sand. When the pressure of the Revolutionary war was over, indeed, while that pressure remained, Congress in vain made requisitions on the individual States; no money, or none in any measure adequate to the public exigencies, could be obtained. After the war, when the public treasury was empty, Congress importuned--implored the States, individually, to grant the power to raise a revenue from commerce, to defray the current expenses of the General Government, and to fulfil the public obligations, but the power could not be obtained. States, deriving large revenues from commerce, chose to retain them for their own treasuries.

It was this helpless, forlorn condition of our country, which forcibly convinced the nation of the necessity of forming a new system of Government; and our present Government was the fruit of that necessity.

"To regulate commerce" is a third great power vested in Congress. And it is conceived that the exercise of any power well adapted to give safety, facility, and prosperity to commerce, must be comprised in the power to regulate it. Hence the erecting of light-houses has been mentioned as an instance in which an implied power, incidental to the regulating of commerce, has been exercised. But it has been said that this power is expressly given in another part of the constitution; that by which Congress is vested with exclusive legislation over the district which is the seat of Government, and over places ceded to the United States "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." But if we had no commerce, no navigation, light-houses would not be "needful buildings," they would be of no use whatever. Hence it is clear that they have a direct relation to commerce and to nothing else; and, therefore, the erecting of them is properly adduced as an instance of the exercise of a power implied in the general express power to regulate commerce.

The safety and facility of commercial operations was also greatly to be promoted by means of a general currency which should have equal credit throughout the Union. This has been accomplished by the notes issued from the Bank of the United States, under the authority of Congress, exercising the power incidental to that of regulating commerce.

A fourth great power, which I mentioned to have been vested in Congress, is that of "making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States." This "other property" consists partly of money. And, as Congress have power to make any regulations concerning it which are needful, that is, which may, in their opinion, best promote the general welfare, this money may be (as some of it has been) vested in bank stock; and with the truest regard to its safety and good management, in the stock of a bank erected by Congress, of which they may have a suitable inspection; and where it may safely deposit the public revenues, there to await the public demand; and, in the mean time, usefully aid those banking operations which give facility to commerce and to public loans.

But as an evidence that the constitutionality of the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States was at least doubtful, we have been told by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. SMITH,) that President Washington doubted; that his mind was in suspense to the last moment, when the act was to be approved or disapproved. That while the then Secretary of the Treasury, (Mr. Hamilton,) a very great man, maintained the constitutional power of Congress to erect that bank, another man, (Mr. Jefferson,) equally great, then Secretary of State, and the Attorney-General, (Mr. Randolph,) a distinguished lawyer, maintained the contrary doctrine--that Congress had not that power. It is true, sir, that Washington, cautious and circumspect beyond any man I ever knew, did suspend his decision to the last day allowed him by the constitution. The confidence with which the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General supported their opinions on this question, was sufficient to excite in the President the greatest caution. Both were lawyers, and they raised many legal objections. The written opinions of these gentlemen were (as I have been well informed) put into the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury two days before it was necessary for the President to decide. And the reasoning of Mr. Hamilton, in his written argument, enabled the President to decide with satisfaction; with a full conviction of the constitutionality of the act.

The following are some of the objections offered by the Secretary of State: He said--"that the proposed incorporation (of the bank) undertakes to create certain capacities, properties, or attributes, which are against the laws of alienage, descents, escheat, and forfeiture, distribution, and monopoly. And that nothing but a necessity, invincible by other means, can justify such a prostration of laws which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence, and are the foundation laws of the State governments. "Washington, sir, was not a lawyer, and who can wonder that his fair mind was alarmed by such a solemn declaration? That it was kept in suspense by the assertion, that the act for establishing the bank would overturn the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence, and the foundation laws of the State governments? But, sir, it required only the knowledge of a lawyer at once to overturn these objections. The following are some of the remarks of the Secretary of the Treasury: "If these are truly the foundation laws of the several States, then have most of them subverted their own foundations. For there is scarcely one of them which has not, since the establishment of its particular constitution, made material alterations in some of those branches of its jurisprudence, especially the law of descents. But it is not conceived how any thing can be called the fundamental law of a State government which is not established in its constitution, unalterable by its ordinary legislature."

"To erect a corporation, is to substitute a legal or artificial for a natural person; and, where a number are concerned, to give them individuality. To that legal or artificial person, once created, the common law of every State, of itself, annexes all those incidents and attributes which are represented as a prostration of the main pillars of their jurisprudence. It is certainly not accurate to say, that the erection of a corporation is against those different heads of the State laws; because it is rather to create a kind of person, or entity, to which they are inapplicable, and to which the general rule of those laws assigns a different regimen. The laws of alienage cannot apply to an artificial person, because it can have no country. Those of descent cannot apply to it, because it can have no heirs. Those of escheat are foreign from it, for the same reason. Those of forfeiture, because it cannot commit a crime. Those of distribution, because, though it may be dissolved, it cannot die." Sir, I beg leave to add a few explanations. By the laws of most, perhaps of all the States, aliens are not permitted to hold real estate; but in all they are free to hold personal property of every kind, and particularly bank stock. The law of escheat relates to the property of a citizen who dies without heirs, near or remote, and without a will. In such case his property falls to the State. But instances of escheat do not occur perhaps twice in a century in any State, and, consequently, is of trifling moment. Although a corporation cannot commit a crime, it may violate the rules prescribed in the law for its establishment, and thus incur an immediate forfeiture of its charter. Or, if for such a violation of its fundamental law, or any mismanagement of the institution to the public injury, its charter be not forthwith taken away, the State may refuse to renew it. As to the law of distribution, that operates when a person dies intestate. But though a corporation cannot die, yet the individuals to whom its property belongs will die; and their bank property, equally with their other property, becomes liable to the law of distribution.

One of the injurious consequences of destroying the Bank of the United States has been stated to be, the withdrawing of seven millions of dollars from the active capital of the United States, and transmitting it to Europe, where that portion of the bank stock is owned. To this it has been answered, by the opposers of the bank, that these millions will not be withdrawn, but transferred from the United States' Bank to banks of the several States. How then, sir, shall we get rid of that dangerous influence of foreign stockholders which the same gentlemen urge as a reason for not renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States? Sir, it is well known that money in Europe is less valuable than in the United States. That moneyed men there are glad to loan their money at an interest of five per cent, or less, while in these States the legal interest is six per cent. And a multitude of our citizens find their account in employing that foreign capital, paying an interest of six per cent., by which, in the course of trade, they gain ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent.; that foreign capital, in the hands of our merchants, has resembled the five and the ten talents, wherewith they have gained other five and other ten talents.

The distresses which will follow the dissolution of the Bank of the United States, especially in the great commercial cities, have been forcibly described in the plain testimonies of the committee of mechanics and manufacturers from Philadelphia--a committee selected wholly from the democratic party; distresses which were sufficient to move a heart of stone. And why should this bank be dissolved? It has been said that the State banks are competent to all the necessary operations of the general bank. If the contrary had not been shown, it might be answered, that the Bank of the United States was incorporated when there were only three banks in the United States; one in Philadelphia, one in New York, and one in Boston. These were inadequate to the necessities and accommodation of the General Government and of the citizens. To supply this deficiency, it was necessary to erect the National Bank; and the dignity, honor, good faith, and credit of the United States stand pledged for the renewal of its charter. The institution having been well conducted, and found in the highest degree useful and beneficial to Government, and to the citizens at large, it ought to be continued. Individual citizens and foreigners became stockholders on a well-grounded expectation of the stability of the Government. It was in this just expectation that foreigners, Englishmen, purchased of our Government, itself, its remaining shares of the public stock in the Bank of the United States, and at an advance of forty-five per cent.; so that, for every hundred dollars laid out by the Government in the purchase of bank shares, the United States received of these foreigners one hundred and forty-five dollars. And how was it possible for these foreigners to conceive the Government capable of destroying the work of its own hands, and of reducing their property to one hundred dollars a share, for which, but eight years before, they had paid the same Government one hundred and forty-five dollars?

WEDNESDAY, February 20.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, 1791.

Mr. CRAWFORD said he regretted extremely, that at so late an hour, he was constrained to throw himself upon the indulgence of the Senate, especially as the subject was so much exhausted by the able and animated discussions which had for so many days attracted their attention. Before I enter upon the few remarks which I feel it my duty to make in reply to the numerous comments which have been made upon the observations which I had the honor to submit to the consideration of the Senate, at the commencement of this discussion, permit me, sir, to acknowledge the liberality and indulgence with which those observations have been generally treated. In the course of the few observations to which I intend to confine myself, it shall be my endeavor to exercise that indulgence towards others which has been extended to me. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CLAY) complains of the committee, because they have listened to the representations of two delegations from the city of Philadelphia who presented memorials to the Senate, who referred them to the committee; and because the committee have, in his opinion, given an adventitious importance to their representations, by the minuteness and by the pomp and parade with which they have been detailed to the Senate. It will be recollected that the committee did not seek the post which has been assigned them by the Senate, nor did they desert it after it was assigned to them. The object of referring petitions to committees is to collect that information which the Senate ought to have before it acts, and which in its collective capacity it cannot obtain. It has always been the practice of committees to permit the petitioners to be present at their meetings, to make such explanations, and to give such information touching the subject of their petition, as they think connected with it. It is the duty of committees to detail to the Senate the information which they collect, to enable the members to take a full view of the subject upon which they are called upon to act. The committee in the present case has done all this, and it has done nothing more. Had it pursued a different course it would have justly subjected itself to the animadversions of the Senate. To the information collected by the committee from these delegations, and laid before the Senate, my friend from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) has opposed a statement of facts, and his opinion founded upon those facts. As the situation and talents of that gentleman entitle his statements and opinions to great weight; as it is more than probable that the votes of several members will ultimately rest upon the weight of his authority, my honorable friend from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) will pardon me if I should examine his observations rather according to the rules of evidence, than those of logic. In making this declaration I wish to be explicitly understood, as excluding every idea of charging that gentleman with having made statements which he did not believe, or with having given opinions he did not entertain. I have no doubt but that he sincerely believes in the correctness of his statements, and in the accuracy of his opinions; but if, in the course of my observations, I shall prove incontestably that he is mistaken in some of his statements and opinions, it will teach the Senate the necessity of weighing the remainder of them with great circumspection. If I shall be able to show that he is mistaken in a case, the evidence of which is matter of record, that circumstance alone will induce the Senate to reject all idea of receiving his statements and opinions with implicit confidence.

The gentleman from Maryland has stated several cases in which the State banks, and the banks of this Territory have accommodated the Government where the United States had refused. The cases stated prove nothing, and ought to have no influence with this Government in establishing a permanent system of revenue. If the State and Territorial banks have upon several occasions received the bills of other State banks to accommodate the Government, it was because it suited their convenience at the time. It was a mere temporary transaction, and forms an exception to the general rule. The charter of no bank in the United States compels them to take the paper of other banks, and whether they do receive them or not will depend upon contingent circumstances, or upon whim and caprice. No reliance, therefore, ought to be placed upon the duration of any regulation which is not enforced by their charters. The gentleman from Maryland thinks that the United States will have the same influence over the State banks that it has had, and will have over that of the United States. If he is correct as to the extent of that influence, his conclusion may be correctly drawn. But, sir, is it true that the National Government has no other influence over this bank than that which can be produced by withdrawing of its deposits? If it is so, then it must be admitted that the United States will have the same influence over the State banks that they will have over one of their own creation, because they can as easily withdraw their deposits from the one as the other. But, sir, the United States have an influence over the Bank of the United States, which is wholly independent of, and unconnected with, the right of withdrawing their deposits from its vaults. The bank is dependent on them for its existence. By renewing the charter for short periods of time you create a state of dependency upon the Government, which will at all times make the bank completely subservient to all the legitimate objects for which it was created. How, sir, is it with the State banks? Upon whom are they dependent for legal existence and for length of days? Upon the State Governments. Suppose the authority from which they derive their existence should place itself in opposition to the Government of the United States; and suppose that this state of hostility should happen a year, or two before the time at which their charters were to expire, and the State Legislature should direct them to hold the deposit of public moneys against the demand of the National Government, what course would they pursue under such circumstances? Sir, the case which I have stated is not a mere possible case. The history of several of the large influential States proves that this state of hostility, which I have supposed, is not an imaginary one. Make yourselves dependent upon the State banks for the collection and transmission of your revenue, and that opposition, which has but seldom happened, will become more frequent. Their disposition to control the operations of the National Government will increase with every increase of the means of annoyance, which the folly and improvidence of Congress may throw into their hands. For whose benefit, sir, is the Government to strip itself of this right, so essential for the due administration of its finances? Is it for the benefit of the great mass of the American people? No; not one in a hundred of them have any interest in the State banks. They feel no interest in the question; their true interest is more effectually subserved by the operations of the Bank of the United States than it can possibly be by the State banks. This bank affords them a portable currency which is of equal value in every part of the United States, while the credit and currency of the State banks is local.

It is impossible to resist the conviction that the prompt and secure collection of our revenue is principally owing to the influence of the bank. But, sir, the bank has another direct influence upon the collection of your revenue. By the rules established in the bank at Philadelphia, every person whose bond to the Government is deposited there, has a right, upon getting an additional endorser, to claim a discount for half of the amount of his bond, and the part so discounted is immediately carried to the credit of the United States, and the bank takes upon itself the risk of the ultimate collection. In this way, sir, one-half of the bond is collected at the sole risk of the bank, without any possibility of loss on the part of Government. And yet, sir, it is contended that the bank has nothing to do with the collection of the public revenue. The gentleman from Maryland says that the scarcity of money, and the alarm and dismay which the delegation of mechanics had represented as existing in Philadelphia, could not be the effect of the contraction of discounts by the Bank of the United States, because that bank, as well as the State banks, are going on with their ordinary discounts. This is true, but the gentleman from Maryland has forgotten that this delegation stated that the bank, upon the rejection of their memorial by the House of Representatives, had contracted their discounts, and that a correspondent contraction had taken place in the discounts of the State banks which had produced the pressure; and that the pressure had spread alarm and dismay through the city. That before they left the city, the directors of the Bank of the United States had come to an understanding with the directors of the State banks, all of whom had determined to resume and continue their ordinary discounts until the last hour. Notwithstanding the banks had resumed their discounts, the panic which had been produced did not cease, and the scarcity of money, and the distrust which had taken place, still continue to exist in Philadelphia.

The gentleman from Maryland admits expressly that the transmission of your public money for the payment of the Army and Navy must be effected through the agency of banks, but contends that that object can be effected as well by the State banks as by a Bank of the United States. My friend from Kentucky (Mr. POPE) said, that the great characteristic difference between the present Government and that which existed under the old articles of confederation, is, that the present Government has within itself the means of executing its own measures, without relying upon the State governments; whereas the old Congress had to rely upon the States for the execution of the measures which it had previously devised and adopted.

The gentleman from Maryland, in speaking of the means which had been resorted to, to procure the renewal of the charter, says that we have not procured memorials to be presented to Congress praying that the charter might not be renewed--we have not procured pamphlets to be written, published, and laid upon the tables of members, proving the unconstitutionality and inutility of the bank--we have not imposed upon the credulity of honest mechanics and manufacturers, and by that means procured delegations to be sent to pray for the rejection of the bank memorial. Surely, sir, the gentleman did not by these declarations mean to insinuate that any one of those gentlemen who support the bill upon your table, have had any agency in procuring any application to be made in favor of the bank. I know that gentleman's respect for himself; his respect for the Senate; his respect for the individual members of this body, as well as his respect for the general rules of propriety, exclude the possibility of his making such an insinuation. [Mr. SMITH explained, by saying, I exclude every idea of such an insinuation.] Sir, I will tell the honorable gentleman from Maryland, what has been done by those who are opposed to the renewal of the charter. I do not mean the members of the Senate who are opposed to it, but those who have attempted to inflame public opinion upon this question. Letters, sir, have been written from this place to induce the State Legislatures to instruct their members to oppose the renewal of the charter of the bank. I will ask the honorable gentleman from Maryland whether he does not know that letters have been written for that purpose?

The gentleman from Maryland has said, and I am extremely sorry that he has, that the Bank of the United States had their agents in this city for two sessions, intriguing with members of Congress to obtain a renewal of their charter. I can assure that gentleman that I have had as little to do with the agents of the bank as he has had. If, sir, I was disposed to retort upon those who are opposed to the renewal of the charter, I would ask, if they have not seen published in the democratic papers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, extracts of letters said to be written in the City of Washington, charging the members of Congress who are in favor of it with being bribed and corrupted, and with being disposed to sell the sovereignty of the nation to British capitalists? Have they not seen, in the same papers, conversations detailed with great minuteness, which it is pretended have passed between members of Congress, calculated to excite public odium and indignation against the friends of the bill now under consideration? Sir, I will not for a moment indulge an idea that these letters have been written or these conversations detailed by any member of this body. The idea that such has been the fact is too humiliating, too degrading, not only to this honorable body, but to human nature itself; to be entertained but for a moment. And yet, sir, the author of a charge, as base as it is false, against my honorable friend from Kentucky, (Mr. POPE,) has, day after day, occupied a seat in a gallery of the Senate, to which no person has a right of access, but by an introduction of one of the members of this body. Sir, the highway robber, when compared with the infamous fabricator of this base attempt to assassinate the reputation of this honorable member, becomes a virtuous and estimable character. Such, sir, has been the warfare which has been waged against the renewal of the charter. Denunciations and charges of political apostacy are the measures by which we have been assailed from without and from within. Sir, I have shown that the bank question was no party question in its origin--that it was a question upon which an honest difference of opinion always has existed, and does now exist. And, shall I be charged with deserting the standard of the people, while I am treading in the footsteps of the great Father of his Country?

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) has said that he understood that a proposition was made in the Federal Convention to vest Congress with power to create corporations generally and without limitation. Had I been a member of that convention, I should most certainly have voted against the proposition, because it would have been unreasonable. Why should such a power have been delegated? Not certainly as necessary to execute the delegated powers, because they are very limited--a general power to create corporations would have enabled Congress to have created them ad libitum where there was no possible relation between them and any one of the delegated powers. The vote upon the incorporating the bank proves that if such a proposition had been submitted, it must have been rejected under a conviction that the power to create corporations is incident to such of the general powers as might require an act of incorporation completely to execute them, and fairly vested by the constitution in Congress; because ten of the members of that convention were in Congress, and voted for that bill--because General WASHINGTON signed that bill, because the only member of that convention now in Congress voted for the bill and is now in favor of renewing the charter; and because there were but eight members of that convention in Congress who voted against it.

Mr. President, I will now proceed to examine the objections which have been offered to the construction which I have given to several clauses of the constitution. In the observations which I made upon this part of the question when I was up before, I endeavored to prove that every construction that had been given to this instrument, upon the idea of its being perfect, was likely to be erroneous. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. WHITESIDE) still view it as a model of perfection. They are certainly at liberty still to entertain that opinion. Every man has a right to erect his idol in this land of liberty, and to fall down and worship it according to the dictates of his own conscience. I endeavored also to prove, that if we applied the same rule of construction to that clause of the constitution from which we endeavor to derive the right to create a bank, which has been applied to that from which the power to erect a light-house has been derived, the constitutional difficulty at once disappears. Until my friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) and my friend from Tennessee (Mr. ANDERSON) had otherwise declared, I had always understood the right to erect light-houses had been exercised as incidental to the power to regulate commerce. It seems, however, that I am mistaken, and that this right is incidental to that clause which gives Congress the right to exercise exclusive legislation in certain places. The clause reads in the following words:

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," &c.

Now, says my friend from Tennessee, this clause gives the right to erect dockyards; and as dockyards must be on the seacoast, therefore Congress has the right to erect light-houses, because they must also be on the seacoast. This argument is extremely logical, nay, syllogistical, in form, but it is extremely illogical in substance. The conclusion drawn from the premises, is as necessary, as though I were to say, that because two and two makes four, therefore five and five makes twelve. The conclusion in the latter case is as necessary as in the former. But my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) derives it from the authority given in this clause, to erect other needful buildings. But the question recurs, needful for what? Why, certainly, for the purposes before specified. What are they? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards. If this clause gives any authority to erect forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, the other needful buildings spoken of must be needful for the specified purposes. I should suppose that no man, who spends only a few days in this city, can be at a loss to determine what is comprehended under the term "other needful buildings." Let him go to the dockyard, nicknamed a navy-yard in this city, and he will there find a little town of "other needful buildings" in the words of the constitution. But, sir, I deny that this clause of the constitution expressly gives any right, but that of exercising exclusive legislation in the places to be accepted or purchased for the purpose therein specified. The right to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals, is fairly incidental to the right of declaring war, and of raising armies; and the right to erect dockyards is fairly incidental to the right of providing and maintaining a navy. But if for the sake of argument I should admit that the right to erect forts, &c., is given in this clause, how can it be proved that the right to erect a light-house is also given? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, are enumerated, and as the constitution says that all powers not expressly given are retained, if the right to erect forts, magazines, &c., is given in this clause, most clearly the right to erect light-houses is retained by the States, because it is not to be found in the enumeration contained in the clause. When I had the honor of addressing the Senate before I questioned the authority of the State governments to create banks; I then stated, and I again explicitly state, that it is with reluctance that I have felt it my duty to make any inquiry into the constitutional right of the State governments to incorporate banks. The State Legislatures ought to have recollected the Spanish proverb, which says that those who live in glass-houses ought not to throw stones. Before they undertook to question the constitutional authority of Congress, they ought to have thoroughly examined the foundation upon which their own right rested. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) says that the construction which I have given to that part of the constitution which prohibits the States from emitting bills of credit, would apply equally to promissory notes given by one individual to another under the laws of a State, as to a bank bill. Permit me to inquire of that gentleman whether he ever saw a law authorizing one man to give another his promissory note? He may search the pandects of Justinian; he may turn over the leaves of the musty volumes written upon the common law, from the days of Bracton and Fleta down to the present day, and his search will be in vain. For the right to make contracts, the right to give promissory notes, is antecedent to, and independent of all municipal law. The gentleman will find laws and decisions in abundance, regulating the effect of endorsements and other collateral circumstances, and prescribing the manner of enforcing the payment of promissory notes, but he will never find a law giving the right to execute the promissory note. But it is said that the bills of credit, which the States are prohibited from emitting, must be bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. If this distinction should be well founded, many of the State banks are still subject to the charge of unconstitutionality, because in many of them the States are directly interested, and wherever that is the case, their bank bills are bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. But the correctness of this distinction may well be denied, because the restriction is as general as it could possibly be made. But it is said that this restriction applies only to bills of credit which are made a legal tender in the payment of debts; that bills of credit, designated in the constitution, are ex vi termini a legal tender. For the correctness of this exposition, an appeal is made to the restriction which immediately follows it, which restrains the right of the States to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. It appears to me that the latter restriction excludes most emphatically the construction contended for. If the States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, it would have been, to say the least of it, wholly nugatory to say they should not make them a legal tender. If the bills are not emitted, it is impossible that they can be made a legal tender. To suppose that the restriction upon the right of the States to make any thing but gold and silver legal tender has any connection with or influence upon the restriction to emit bills of credit, is as absurd as to suppose that the Decalogue, after having declared that "thou shalt do no murder," should have added, but, if you will murder, you shall not rob and strike the dead. The construction of the restraint upon the right to make any thing but gold or silver a tender, is that they shall not make specific articles, as tobacco or cotton, a tender, as was the case in some of the States.

But it is said that the history of the States will show that the bills of credit specified in the constitution were those only which were a legal tender in the payment of debts. Let us examine this point, according to the rule of construction applied to another clause in the constitution by a large majority of both Houses of Congress during the present session. Another clause in the constitution gives Congress the power to admit new States into the Union under two limitations: 1st. That no new State shall be formed within the limits of any State without the consent of the State; and, 2d. That no new State should be formed by the junction of two or more States without the consent of such States, and also of Congress. These limitations prove that the formation of new States, within the limits of the United States, was in view of the convention at the time that this clause was adopted; and the subsequent clause, which gives Congress the power to make rules for the government of its Territories, proves that these Territories were at that moment under consideration. In addition to these reasons for believing that the framers of the constitution had no idea of forming new States, beyond the limits of the United States, those who were opposed to the admission of Orleans as a State contended that the history of the United States proves that the power to erect new States and admit them into the Union was intended to be confined to new States within the limits of the United States at the formation of the constitution, and that a different construction would disparage the rights of the original States, and, of course, be a violation of the constitution. What reply did the majority of Congress give to this train of reasoning? They said that the right to admit new States cannot be subject to any other limitations or restrictions than those which are contained in the clause which gives the right, and as there is no restriction upon the right to erect new States without the then limits of the United States, Congress have an unlimited right to erect and admit them into the Union. Let us apply the same rule of construction to the restriction of the right of the States to emit bills of credit. The restriction is a general one; it has no exceptions; and every attempt to make exceptions ought to be repelled by the answer which was given to those who opposed the right of Congress to admit the Territory of Orleans into the Union as a State. The construction I have contended for gains additional weight when we consider the restriction which immediately precedes that under consideration. No State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, &c. Bills of credit are but the representatives of money. The constitution gives Congress the right to coin money, and to regulate its value. It takes from the States the right to coin money and to emit bills of credit. Why give to Congress the right to coin money and regulate its value? Because the interest of the nation requires that the current coin of the nation should be uniform both as to its species and value. If this is the true reason why the right of coining money and fixing its value was given to Congress, does not the right to issue that which is to be the representative of this coin; which, in fact, is to usurp its place; which is to be the real currency of the nation, necessarily belong to Congress? Does not the right to create a bank, which shall issue this representative of money, come within the same reason? I think it does.

To the fervid imagination of my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. CLAY,) this power to create a bank appears to be more terrific than was the lever of Archimedes to the frightened imagination of the Romans, when they beheld their galleys suddenly lifted up and whirled about in the air, and in a moment plunged into the bosom of the ocean. Are these apprehensions founded in reason, or are they the chimeras of a fervid and perturbed imagination? What limitation does the constitution contain upon the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises? None but that they shall be uniform; which is no limitation of the amount which they can lay and collect. What limitation does it contain upon the power to raise and support armies? None other than that appropriations shall not be made for a longer term than two years. What restriction is to be found in it upon the right to provide and maintain a navy? None. What upon the right to declare war and make peace? None, none. Thus the constitution gives to the Government of the United States unlimited power over your purses--unlimited power to raise armies and provide navies--unlimited power to make war and peace, and you are alarmed; you are terrified at the power to create a bank to aid it in the management of its fiscal operations. Sir, nothing short of my most profound respect for honorable gentlemen, who have frightened themselves with this bugbear, could induce me to treat the subject seriously. Gentlemen have said that they are alarmed at the exercise of this power, and I am bound to believe them. Sir, after giving Congress the right to make war and peace; the right to impose taxes, imposts, duties, and excises, ad libitum; the right to raise and support armies without restriction as to number or term of service; the right to provide and maintain a navy without a limitation, I cannot bring myself to tremble at the exercise of a power incidental to only one of these tremendous grants of power. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CLAY) contends that we have attempted to give a degree of weight and force to what we are pleased to call precedents, to which they would not be entitled in those tribunals from which we derive all our ideas of precedents. I am happy to find that my friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) agrees with me in opinion upon this subject. Indeed the principal difference between that gentleman and myself is confined to the question of expedience. He thinks that the construction which has been given to the constitution ought to be considered as conclusive; and that great inconvenience will be produced by unsettling what ought to be considered as finally settled and adjudged.

Sir, I have closed the observations which I thought it my duty to make in reply to the comments which have been made upon the remarks which I had previously submitted to the consideration of this honorable body. If, sir, I preferred my political standing in the State which I have the honor to represent (and, sir, I do not profess to have any out of it) to the public welfare, I should rejoice at the success of the motion which has been made by the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. ANDERSON.) But, sir, as I believe the public welfare infinitely more important than any fleeting popularity which an individual like myself can expect to enjoy, I shall most sincerely regret the success of that motion. Sir, I have said but little about the degree of distress which will flow from the dissolution of the bank, because I have not that kind of evidence which would enable me to judge of it with any degree of accuracy. The convulsed state of the European nations; the immense losses which our commerce has sustained by the operation of the decrees and orders of the tyrants of the land and the ocean, imperiously admonish us to beware of making untried and dangerous experiments. By supporting this institution, the tottering credit of the commercial class of your citizens may be upheld, until the storm shall have passed over. By overturning this great moneyed institution at the present crisis, you may draw down to undistinguished ruin thousands of your unfortunate and unoffending fellow-citizens.

The question was then taken on striking out the first section of the bill, (equivalent to a rejection,) when it appeared that there were for the motion 17, against it 17, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Campbell, Clay, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, German, Giles, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Reed, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Whiteside, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Bradley, Brent, Champlin, Condit, Crawford, Dana, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, Pope, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Turner.

The Senate being equally divided, it became the duty of the VICE PRESIDENT to decide the question by his vote; previously to which he made the following observations:

GENTLEMEN: As the subject on which I am called upon to decide has excited great sensibility, I must solicit the indulgence of the Senate while I briefly state the reasons which influence my judgment.

Permit me to observe, that the question to be decided does not depend simply upon the right of Congress to establish under any modification a bank, but upon their power to establish a National Bank, as contemplated by this bill. In other words, can they create a body politic and corporate, not constituting a part of the Government, nor otherwise responsible to it but by forfeiture of charter, and bestow on its members privileges, immunities, and exemptions not recognized by the laws of the States, nor enjoyed by the citizens generally? It cannot be doubted but that Congress may pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the powers specifically granted to the Government, or to any department or officer thereof; but, in doing so, the means must be suited and subordinate to the end. The power to create corporations is not expressly granted; it is a high attribute of sovereignty, and in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication, but primary and independent.

I cannot believe that this interpretation of the constitution will, in any degree, defeat the purposes for which it was formed. On the contrary, it does appear to me, that the opposite exposition has an inevitable tendency to consolidation, and affords just and serious cause of alarm.

In the course of a long life I have found that Government is not to be strengthened by an assumption of doubtful powers, but by a wise and energetic execution of those which are incontestible; the former never fails to produce suspicion and distrust, while the latter inspires respect and confidence.

If, however, after a fair experiment, the powers vested in the Government shall be found incompetent to the attainment of the objects for which it was instituted, the constitution happily furnishes the means for remedying the evil by amendment, and I have no doubt that in such event on an appeal to the patriotism and good sense of the community it will be wisely applied.

I will not trespass upon the patience of the Senate any longer than to say, from the best examination I have been able to give the subject, I am constrained by a sense of duty to decide in the affirmative--that is, that the first section of the bill be stricken out.

SATURDAY, March 2.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. CLAY, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 25th February, the memorial of the stockholders of the Bank of the United States, praying that an act of Congress might be passed to continue the corporate powers of the bank for a further period, to enable it to settle such of its concerns as may be depending on the 3d of March, 1811, made the following report:

That your committee have duly weighed the contents of the memorial, and deliberately attended to such explanations of the views of the memorialists as they have thought proper to present through their agents. That, holding the opinion (as a majority of the committee do) that the constitution did not authorize Congress originally to grant the charter, it follows, as a necessary consequence of that opinion, that an extension of it, even under the restrictions contemplated by the stockholders, is equally repugnant to the constitution. But, if it were possible to surmount this fundamental objection, and if that rule which forbids, during the same session of the Senate, the re-agitation of a proposition once decided, were disregarded, your committee would still be at a loss to find any sufficient reasons for prolonging the political existence of the corporation for the purpose of winding up its affairs. For, as it respects the body itself, it is believed that the existing laws, through the instrumentality of a trust properly constituted, afford as ample means as a qualified continuance of the charter would, for the liquidation of its accounts, and the collection and final distribution of its funds. But should any inconvenience be experienced on this subject, the committee are persuaded it will be very partial, and such as the State authorities, upon proper application, would not fail to provide a competent remedy for. And, in relation to the community, if the corporation, stripped of its banking powers, were to fulfil bona fide the duty of closing its affairs, your committee cannot see that any material advantage would be derived. Whilst, on the contrary, if it should not so act, but should avail itself of the temporary prolongation, in order to effect a more durable extension of its charter, it might in its operations become a serious scourge.

Your committee are happy to say that they learn, from a satisfactory source, that the apprehensions which were indulged, as to the distress resulting from a non-renewal of the charter, are far from being realized in Philadelphia, to which their information has been confined. It was long since obvious that the vacuum, in the circulation of the country, which was to be produced by the withdrawal of the paper of the Bank of the United States, would be filled by paper issuing from other banks. This operation is now actually going on. The paper of the Bank of the United States is rapidly returning, and that of other banks is taking its place. The ability to enlarge their accommodations is proportionately enhanced; and when it shall be further increased by a removal into their vaults of those deposits which are in the possession of the Bank of the United States, the injurious effects of a dissolution of the corporation will be found to consist in an accelerated disclosure of the actual condition of those who have been supported by the credit of others, but whose insolvent or tottering situation, known to the bank, has been concealed from the public at large.

Your committee beg leave to present the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the memorialists ought not to be granted.

The report was ordered to lie on the table.

Claim of General Wilkinson.

Mr. BRADLEY, from the committee to whom was referred the memorial of General James Wilkinson, praying to be remunerated for moneys disbursed in the service of the United States, made the following report:

That the said Wilkinson has exhibited to them claims against the United States, to the amount of eleven thousand eight hundred dollars and ninety-six cents. It appears to your committee, from the documents and proofs produced by the petitioner to explain and support his claim against the public, that, of the above sum, $6,719.73 are claimed for his disbursements and expenses incurred pending Burr's conspiracy; $2,560 paid for a tract of land for the public service, now occupied by the troops on the Missouri river, near its mouth; $450, the amount of his passage from Baltimore to Charleston, when ordered on extra duty by the President; and $2,131.23, for losses of property sustained by his sudden transfer from St. Louis, where he was exercising the functions of a civil magistrate, to the Sabine, for the purpose of directing the arms of the nation against an invading force of the Spaniards.

Your committee have no hesitancy in saying that many of the charges appear to be legal and founded in justice, and may furnish a proper set off against the balance opposed to him by the War Department, and that the residue are entitled to equitable consideration; but, from the shortness of the time, and the pressure of business before the expiration of the session, your committee cannot find leisure to form that deliberate and clear judgment on the merits of the several items which justice to the petitioner and to the public require; they, therefore, beg leave to offer the following resolution:

Resolved, That the further consideration of the petition of General James Wilkinson, together with the accompanying documents, be postponed to the next meeting of Congress.

The report and accompanying documents were ordered to lie on the table.

The Senate adjourned to 6 o'clock this evening.

SUNDAY EVENING, 6 o'clock, March 3.

Adjournment.

Resolved, That Messrs. TURNER and CONDIT be a committee on the part of the Senate, with such committee as the House of Representatives may join, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him, that, unless he may have any further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn.

Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives therewith, and request the appointment of a committee on their part.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House concur in the resolution for the appointment of a joint committee to wait upon the President of the United States, and notify him of the intended recess, and have appointed a committee on their part.

Mr. TURNER, from the joint committee, reported that they had waited upon the President of the United States, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that the Senate, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn. Whereupon, the PRESIDENT adjourned the Senate without day.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE,

IN SECRET SESSION, AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE ELEVENTH CONGRESS.

THURSDAY, January 3, 1811.

The following confidential Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, by Mr. EDWARD COLES, his Secretary:

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I communicate to Congress, in confidence, a letter of the 2d of December, from Governor Folch, of West Florida, to the Secretary of State; and another, of the same date, from the same, to John McKee.

I communicate, in like manner, a letter from the British Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State, with the answer of the latter. Although the letter cannot have been written in consequence of any instruction from the British Government, founded on the late order for taking possession of the portion of West Florida well known to be claimed by the United States; although no communication has ever been made by that Government to this of any stipulation with Spain, contemplating an interposition which might so materially affect the United States; and although no call can have been made by Spain, in the present instance, for the fulfilment of any such subsisting engagement; yet the spirit and scope of the document, with the accredited source from which it proceeds, required that it should not be withheld from the consideration of Congress.

Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States, eastward of the river Perdido, to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress, the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory, in which they have, in different respects, so deep and so just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.

I recommend to their consideration, also, the expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary possession of any part or parts of the said territory, in pursuance of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities; and for making provision for the government of the same, during such possession.

The wisdom of Congress will, at the same time, determine how far it may be expedient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish authorities within the territory in question, and an apprehended occupancy thereof by any other foreign power.

JAMES MADISON.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1811.

The Message was read.

On motion by Mr. CLAY,

Resolved, That the Message from the President of the United States, of this day, which has been just read, be referred to a committee, with leave to report by bill or otherwise.

Mr. CLAY, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. SMITH of Maryland, and Mr. ANDERSON, were appointed the committee.

MONDAY, January 7.

Mr. CLAY, from the committee, appointed the 3d instant, on the confidential Message of the President of the United States, reported a declaration and bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes; which were read, and passed to a second reading.

TUESDAY, January 8.

The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes, was read the second time; and, on motion by Mr. CLAY, it was considered as in Committee of the Whole.

On motion, by Mr. BAYARD, to amend the bill, by striking out of the first section thereof the words, "In the event of such arrangement for that purpose as shall have been made with the local authority which may then exist;" and, in lieu thereof, to insert the words, "In case an arrangement has been or shall be made with the local authority of the said territory for delivering up the possession of the same to the United States:"

On motion, by Mr. GILMAN, a division of the question was called for: and the question being put on striking out, it was determined in the affirmative.

The question was then taken upon inserting the proposed amendment, and determined in the affirmative--yeas 20, nays 12, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bayard, Brent, Campbell, Condit, Crawford, Franklin, German, Gregg, Lambert, Lloyd, Mathewson, Pickering, Pope, Reed, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Clay, Cutts, Dana, Gaillard, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Leib, Robinson, and Whiteside.

On motion, by Mr. BAYARD, it was agreed to amend the fourth section of the bill, by inserting, after the word "enacted," the words, "That in case possession of the territory aforesaid shall be obtained by the United States, as aforesaid."

WEDNESDAY, January 9.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territory lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes.

On motion, by Mr. CLAY, it was agreed further to amend the bill, by adding to the first section the remainder of the original second section; and by adopting the original third and fourth sections, as the second and third sections of the bill; and having gone through the amendments, the President reported the bill to the House accordingly.

On the question, "Shall this bill be engrossed and read a third time, as amended?" it was determined in the affirmative.

Mr. ANDERSON submitted the following motion:

Resolved, That the subject-matter of the bill, entitled "An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes," be kept inviolably secret by the members of the Senate, until the Senate shall, by their resolution, take off the injunction of secrecy.

Which was read; and on the question to agree thereto, it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 20, nays 6, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bradley, Brent, Clay, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Gilman, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Pope, Reed, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Tait, Taylor, Whiteside, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Champlin, Dana, Goodrich, Lloyd, and Pickering.

Mr. CUTTS, from the committee, reported the bill last mentioned, correctly engrossed.

A confidential message was received from the House of Representatives, by Mr. MONTGOMERY and Mr. CUTTS, two members of that body, with the following resolution, in which they ask the concurrence of the Senate:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

In House of Representatives, Jan. 8, 1811.

Taking into view the present state of the world, the peculiar situation of Spain and of the American provinces, and the intimate relation of the territory eastward of the river Perdido, adjoining the United States, to their security and tranquillity: Therefore,

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States cannot see, with indifference, any part of the Spanish provinces, adjoining the said States, eastward of the river Perdido, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.

The resolution was read, and passed to a second reading.

THURSDAY, January 10.

So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass, and that the title thereof be, "An act to enable the President of the United States, under certain contingencies, to take possession of the country lying east of the river Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes."

On motion, by Mr. CLAY,

Resolved, That a committee of two be appointed to carry the said bill to the House of Representatives, and ask their concurrence therein.

Ordered, That Mr. CLAY and Mr. BAYARD be the committee.

Mr. CLAY reported that the committee had performed the service assigned them.

FRIDAY, January 11.

Mr. ANDERSON, from the committee appointed on the subject, reported the confidential resolution from the House of Representatives, with the following amendment:

Strike out all the words after the word "the," first mentioned in the first line of the resolution, to the end thereof, and in lieu thereof, insert "peculiar situation of Spain and of her American provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce:" Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to a future negotiation.

Which report was read, and considered as in Committee of the Whole; and, on motion to adopt the report, a division of the question was called for by Mr. DANA, and the question to strike out was agreed to, and the amendment was adopted; and the President reported the resolution to the House accordingly.

Ordered, That the resolution pass to the third reading, as amended.

ELEVENTH CONGRESS.--THIRD SESSION.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MONDAY, December 3, 1810.

This being the day appointed by the constitution for the meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared and took their seats, to wit:

From New Hampshire--James Wilson.

From Massachusetts--Ezekiel Bacon, William Ely, and Joseph B. Varnum, Speaker.

From Vermont--Samuel Shaw.

From Connecticut--Epaphroditus Champion, John Davenport, jr., Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jr., and Benjamin Tallmadge.

From New York--James Emott, Jonathan Fisk, Robert Le Roy Livingston, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

From New Jersey--Adam Boyd, Jacob Hufty, and Henry Southard.

From, Pennsylvania--William Anderson, David Bard, Robert Brown, William Crawford, William Findlay, Daniel Heister, Aaron Lyle, William Milnor, John Rea, Matthias Richards, Adam Seybert, John Smilie, George Smith, Samuel Smith, and Robert Whitehill.

From Maryland--Charles Goldsborough, Alexander McKim, Philip B. Key, Archibald Van Horne, John Montgomery, and Nicholas R. Moore.

From Virginia--James Breckinridge, William A. Burwell, Matthew Clay, John Dawson, David S. Garland, Thomas Gholson, Peterson, Goodwyn, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Newton, John Roane, and James Stephenson.

From North Carolina--Willis Alston, jr., James Cochran, James Holland, Thomas Kenan, Nathaniel Macon, Archibald McBryde, Joseph Pearson, Richard Stanford, and John Stanley.

From South Carolina--Lemuel J. Alston, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Thomas Moore, John Taylor, and Robert Witherspoon,.

From Georgia--William W. Bibb, Howell Cobb, and George M. Troup.

From Kentucky--Joseph Desha, Richard M. Johnson, and Samuel McKee.

From Tennessee--Pleasant M. Miller, John Rhea, and Robert Weakley.

From Ohio--Jeremiah Morrow.

Several new members, to wit: from Connecticut, EBENEZER HUNTINGTON, returned to serve in the place of Samuel W. Dana, appointed a Senator of the United States; from New Jersey, JOHN A. SCUDDER, in the place of James Cox, deceased; and from Maryland, ROBERT WRIGHT, in the place of John Brown, resigned; appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats.

A quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole House, being present, the Clerk of the House was directed to acquaint the Senate therewith.

On motion of Mr. DAWSON, a committee was appointed on the part of the House, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

The Clerk of the House was directed to procure newspapers from any number of offices that the members may elect, provided that the expense do not exceed the amount of three daily papers.

The House then adjourned until to-morrow morning eleven o'clock.

TUESDAY, December 4.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, RICHARD CUTTS, EBENEZER SEAVER, and CHARLES TURNER, jr.; from Rhode Island, ELISHA R. POTTER; from New York, THOMAS R. GOLD; from Pennsylvania, ROBERT JENKINS; and from Virginia, BURWELL BASSETT and JOHN W. EPPES, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

A new member, to wit, from New York, SAMUEL L. MITCHILL, returned to serve in the place of William Denning, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

JONATHAN JENNINGS, the Delegate from the Indiana Territory, and JULIAN POYDRAS, the Delegate from the Territory of Orleans, appeared, and took their seats.

A message from the Senate informed the House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business. They have appointed a committee on their part, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of this House, to inform the President of the United States, that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.

Mr. DAWSON, from the joint committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, reported that the committee had performed the service assigned them, and that the President answered that he would make a communication to the two Houses of Congress to-morrow at twelve o'clock.

WEDNESDAY, December 5.

Several other members, to wit: from New Hampshire, DANIEL BLAISDELL and JOHN C. CHAMBERLAIN; from Massachusetts, J. QUINCY, SAMUEL TAGGART, and LABAN WHEATON; from Vermont, WILLIAM CHAMBERLIN, MARTIN CHITTENDEN, and JONATHAN H. HUBBARD; from Connecticut, LEWIS B. STURGES; from New York, VINCENT MATTHEWS, PETER B. PORTER, and EBENEZER SAGE; and from Rhode Island, RICHARD JACKSON, jr., appeared, and took their seats in the House.

A Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, which was read at the Clerk's table.

[For this Message see Senate Proceedings of this date, ante page.]

The documents accompanying the Message having been read, in part, the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, December 6.

The SPEAKER laid before the House certificates of the election of EBENEZER HUNTINGTON, of Connecticut; JOHN A. SCUDDER, of New Jersey; ROBERT WRIGHT, of Maryland; and WILLIAM MCKINLEY, returned to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of John G. Jackson, of Virginia; which were referred to the Committee of Elections.

FRIDAY, December 7.

Another member, to wit, from New Jersey, WILLIAM HELMS, appeared, and took his seat in the House; also, a new member, to wit, from Maryland, SAMUEL RINGGOLD, returned to serve in the place of Roger Nelson, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

MONDAY, December 10.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, GIDEON GARDNER; from New York, GURDON S. MUMFORD; from Pennsylvania, JOHN PORTER; from Virginia, JOHN LOVE and DANIEL SHEFFEY; and from North Carolina, LEMUEL SAWYER, appeared, and took their seats.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a certificate of the election of WILLIAM T. BARRY, elected to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Benjamin Howard, of Kentucky; which was referred to the Committee of Elections.

TUESDAY, December 11.

Several other members, to wit: from New York, HERMAN KNICKERBACKER; from Virginia, EDWIN GRAY and JACOB SWOOPE; and from South Carolina, RICHARD WYNN, appeared, and took their seats.

WEDNESDAY, December 12.

Two other members, to wit: from North Carolina, MESHACK FRANKLIN and WILLIAM KENNEDY, appeared, and took their seats.

THURSDAY, December 13.

Another member, to wit, from Georgia, DENNIS SMELT, appeared, and took his seat; also two other new members, to wit: JOSEPH ALLEN, from Massachusetts, in the place of Jabez Upham, resigned, and WILLIAM T. BARRY, from Kentucky, in the place of Benjamin Howard, resigned, appeared, were qualified, and took their seats.

Apportionment Bill.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill to apportion the Representatives according to the third enumeration of the people of the United States.

The question recurring on filling the blank with the number of souls which should entitle to a Representative--

Mr. MACON said he was decidedly of opinion that the ratio ought to be fixed, before the result of the census was known. He had no objection to a moderate increase of the number of members; if they amounted to so many that one side of the House could not hear the other side speak, debate was at end, and the purposes of deliberative legislation defeated. He should have liked the bill better, he said, if it had declared that the House of Representatives should hereafter consist of a certain number of members, and had left the apportionment then to be made according to the population. On the subject of electioneering, he said it became him at least to say, that that portion of the people who sent him here, had not been concerned in it. Whatever might have been the practice elsewhere, so far as concerned his constituents, there had been no going about or haranguing. And, on the subject of electioneering, said he, wherever the people are free, there will be electioneering. It belongs to free government. Possibly different parts of the country may differ as to the mode. In some, men go themselves about electioneering; in others, their friends do it for them. In some, newspaper publications help an election; in others, they destroy it. In some places, I have heard, the sacred pulpit is not free from it; in others, a divine would be destroyed that would attempt it. There was not more electioneering South, Mr. M. believed, than elsewhere; certain he was that candidates could not there spend the sums of money which he had heard of being spent elsewhere in an election. He concluded by saying he was in favor of a moderate increase of representatives. He was not afraid that, from a multitude of counsellors, nothing would be done; it was quite as much to be feared from too few that they would act rashly.

FRIDAY, December 14.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, ABIJAH BIGELOW, elected to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of William Stedman, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

Apportionment Bill.

Mr. GOLD considered this bill as a very important one, as fixing the construction to be put on a provision of the constitution. While, on the one hand, it might be admitted that business would be in general better done by a small number of Representatives, yet, on the other hand, there were important considerations in favor of a large number, as gentlemen would find by referring to the discussions at the period of the adoption of the constitution. It was then feared by some that the representation of so great a people would be too small. If gentlemen would refer to a number of papers, drawn up by an association of gentlemen, at that time, and published under the title of "The Federalist," they would find various arguments used to induce the Legislature to make the representation full; so that, at that period, no apprehensions had existed of the Representatives becoming too numerous. On the contrary, it was supposed that the public confidence would be impaired by having a small delegation. In adverting to the relaxed state of the Union, and how much it was exposed to be shook by attempts to weaken it, it was supposed that public confidence would be inspired, and general satisfaction given, by the selection of a large number. It was true, Mr. G. said, that representation might swell so much as to operate to the exclusion of legislation; but the House of Representatives would not, even if the present ratio were retained, be so numerous as many other legislative bodies in the Union. He had no objection to increasing the numbers of the House of Representatives to such an amount as would permit public business to be done with facility. Gentlemen might differ as to the precise ratio; but, while they argued in favor of a small number, from the inconvenience of a large delegation, he hoped they would conceive with him that well-grounded apprehensions might be entertained of the evils which would result from its being too small.

Mr. MITCHILL said he was in favor of the largest number proposed; and, not having been able to obtain that, he should vote for the largest on which a majority could agree. In the district represented by his colleague (Mr. MUMFORD) and himself, there was probably one hundred and twenty thousand souls, and yet he had not heard any murmuring that they were not adequately represented.

Congress, Mr. M. said, did not convene here to legislate on all the subjects of the rights of citizens. Our Government is, he contended, a peculiar piece of machinery, an imperium in imperio. The Representatives to Congress left behind them Legislatures, whose province it was to take care of the personal rights and the rights of property of our citizens. With these concerns, said Mr. M., we have nothing to do. We meet here under a constitution expressly framed and devised for legislating on select subjects, which, on account of the generality of their nature, could not be confided to the several States. When, then, we consider the narrow grounds we have to legislate on, that our great privileges are left at home, we shall be convinced that there is no occasion that this body should be as numerous as if we were concerned in the great questions of property and right, which are secured by the constitution, under the guardianship of the State Legislatures, and of the courts for the furthering of justice. If I were to quote a precedent of a Legislature for commanding influence, and for wisdom and sagacity in carrying us through an arduous contest whilst struggling for our liberties, I should quote the Old Congress--limited in number, but remarkable for the honesty and fidelity with which they performed what a more numerous body could not have accomplished. And, if I wished to cite an instance of the evils to be dreaded from a numerous assembly, I should quote the National Convention of France, where representatives, assembling in great number, exhibited such a spectacle of disorder as I hope we shall never, by a multitude of counsellors, run the risk of imitating.

Mr. PITKIN said that he had not expected that a bill of so much importance would have progressed so far, and gone through the Committee of the Whole in so rapid a manner as this had. What, he asked of the House, was settled by the passage of this bill? Nothing was, or could be settled by the present Congress, unless the returns were made from the different States of the number of inhabitants in each State, before the bill became a law; for Congress alone could designate and specify the number of Representatives which each State should send. The laws heretofore passed, designating the number of Representatives, had, at the same time, declared the ratio, and specified the number of Representatives of each State. Congress alone were competent to decide on the legality of the returns, and on their act alone could the State Legislatures proceed. Mr. P. presumed no member would say that it should be left to the Executive, or any Department of the Government, to say how many Representatives each State should send to Congress. The present Congress might fix the ratio as they pleased, but it would not be obligatory on the next Congress, who could, and undoubtedly would, modify or reverse it as they should think proper. This bill was, therefore, premature, and, in fact, would not settle the principle which it proposed to decide. He was, therefore, on this ground, opposed to the passage of this bill; and he believed the inconvenience of deciding it now would be greater than if the business were to rest until after the returns were made.

Mr. QUINCY said that the agitation of this question at the present moment had taken him as much by surprise as it had the gentleman from Connecticut. He had no idea that a question so pregnant with interest would be hurried through the House in this way. His object in rising was to obtain a postponement of the question till some time in the next week, for the consideration of a point, which to his mind was important. He objected to the bill on the principle that it would be a violation of the constitution to pass it. It went to establish a ratio which, in its effect, must be abortive. The constitution says:

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative."

The constitution then had specifically made it the duty of the House to apportion the representation of each State according to its respective numbers. Was it not, he asked, infinitely absurd and a direct violation of the constitution, to apportion the representation before these numbers were known? When the constitution had made it a duty to do a thing according to a standard prescribed, would they do that thing before that standard could be in possession of the House? Suppose that in 1791, before the numbers of the States were known, Congress had undertaken to fix the ratio of representation--would not the Hall have rung with the exclamations that it was a violation of the constitution? And how would this bill, Mr. Q. asked, less violate the constitution than such an act would have done? For, as to the numbers to be ascertained by the present census, Congress were as little competent to decide as they were before any census was taken. This was the ground on which he objected to the bill as unconstitutional, and which he wished an opportunity thoroughly to examine. He therefore moved that the bill lie on the table.

Mr. FISK said it had been deemed desirable to fix the ratio before the numbers of each State were ascertained, so as to avoid the difficulty which would arise from the fractions, and to afford an accommodation to the State Legislatures, which would be in session before the next meeting of Congress. It would indeed be necessary to pass a law declaring the number of Representatives to be sent by each State; but that would be a mere matter of form, if the ratio were previously ascertained by law.

Mr. F. treated the idea of this bill's being unconstitutional, as altogether unwarranted by fact; for it did not fix the apportionment, but merely the ratio, according to which the Representatives should be apportioned among the States when their respective numbers were known.

Mr. WRIGHT was in favor of postponing, and decidedly opposed to the bill. He was against it, because it proposed to bestow on others a power residing in Congress. If this law were to pass, could the Secretary of State be authorized to declare the number of Representatives to which each State was entitled? Could Congress transfer to him legislative power, and authorize him to declare of how many members this body should consist? He presumed not. The power was vested in Congress, and not in the Secretary of State. But gentlemen were desirous now to fix the number of souls which should entitle to a Representative--and why? That the State Legislatures, understanding the number of Representatives to which they are entitled from knowing the census, may proceed to district their States, in anticipation of the law to be passed by Congress. But their acts would not be conclusive, because Congress might change the ratio, and they would have to undo all they had done. Mr. W. hoped that this business would be postponed, until, as heretofore, Congress would be possessed of all the information of which the nature of the case would admit. When the census was received from the President of the United States they would be much better able to act than now. In this case, Mr. W. said he held himself imperiously bound to follow the steps of his predecessors. He held it a correct maxim in general, that the practice of to-day should be the precedent for to-morrow. Why need they decide this business immediately? There was yet some months in the session, and time enough to reflect on the subject. Why legislate by halves? If this law were passed, Mr. W. asked, was it perfect? Did it declare to how many Representatives each State should be entitled? He said he could refer to cases in which errors had occurred in the census; and it was in the power of the House alone to correct any errors which might have escaped the Secretary of State. In Maryland a mistake had occurred in the last enumeration, of thirty or forty thousand souls. He believed that a great portion of the district comprising Cecil and Hartford counties had been omitted; and he recollected perfectly well that the error was corrected; and, by turning his eye to the proceedings of that day, he could see other errors. He wished, when the House acted, that they should do it understandingly, and with all the evidence before them of which the case was susceptible. He hoped the bill would be postponed until the returns of the census were received in the usual mode.

Mr. W. ALSTON opposed the postponement. He was as loth to depart from old practices as the gentleman from Maryland, if those practices were found to be good. But when they proved inconvenient or useless, it was certainly right to depart from them. What, then, had experience taught them on this subject? Why, that if the ratio was not fixed before the census was known, great inconvenience would result to many States. Congress, at their last session, being apprised of the circumstance, had in their law directed that complete returns should be made to the Secretary of State by the first of March next. It was well known that, if they did not fix the ratio before the first of March, they would not be able to fix it after; when the ratio was fixed, however, the apportionment would not be the work of an hour. If it became necessary to deprive a State of a Representative, he asked whether it would not be more palatable that it should be done now than after the census was known? The State deprived of a Representative could not complain; the ratio would affect it in the same proportion, whether it gave or took a member. That argument, therefore, was entitled to no consideration. Mr. A. expressed his surprise that the small States appeared to be opposed to a large ratio; for, if it would be an advantage on any side, it would be decidedly in favor of the small States. He thought, indeed, that the Representatives of the large States, in voting for a large ratio, had shown great magnanimity and liberality.

Mr. GOLDSBOROUGH was in favor of postponement, and was sorry to see the bill attempted to be hurried through. Gentlemen had not maturely considered the subject, and, on reflection, would be convinced that their votes were, if not a direct, at least an indirect, violation of the constitution. This was premature legislation on what properly belonged to the next Congress, and which, act on it as they might, would unquestionably come before Congress at their next session. If it should be found that the ratio agreed on operated unfavorably on the numbers of any State or States, they would be anxious for a reconsideration of the subject. It would be immaterial whether the subject should be brought up by a bill de novo, or by a bill to repeal this, if it should indeed become a law; the ardor of discussion would be the same in either case. If this be admitted, the only argument in favor of the bill is done away. The constitution having directed that apportionment should be made accordingly to the whole census, Mr. G. said that he could not see how Congress could fix it before they knew what that census was. He did not know that every gentleman on the floor was ignorant of any of the returns; some might be already apprised of the returns of their own State. Each one made estimates no doubt, in his own mind, as to the probable result; and, for himself, Mr. G. said he had been endeavoring to make some sort of a calculation; and if the bill passed, and the ratio should prove unfavorable to the numbers of the State which he had the honor to represent, he should feel himself bound to move a repeal of the law; and they would have the whole discussion over again.

The question on the bill's laying on the table was carried--65 to 43.

And on motion, the House adjourned until Monday.

MONDAY, December 17.

Another member, to wit, from New York, JOHN NICHOLSON, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

TUESDAY, December 18.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, BARZILLAI GANNETT, appeared, and took his seat.

GEORGE POINDEXTER, the delegate from the Mississippi Territory, also appeared, and took his seat.

FRIDAY, December 21.

Two other members, to wit: from Virginia, JOHN CLOPTON, and WALTER JONES, appeared and took their seats; a new member, to wit, WILLIAM MCKINLEY, also from Virginia, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

MONDAY, December 24.

Three other members, to wit: WILLIAM HALE, from New Hampshire; BENJAMIN PICKMAN, jr., from Massachusetts; and THOMAS NEWBOLD, from New Jersey, appeared, and took their seats.

Claims for Military Services in the Old French War.

Mr. MORROW, from the Committee on the Public Lands, made a report on the several petitions of the officers and soldiers, and the heirs of officers and soldiers who served in the British army in America, in the war between Great Britain and France; which was read, and the resolution therein contained concurred in by the House.

The report is as follows:

The Committee on Public Lands, to whom was referred several petitions, claiming lands for military services, performed in the war of 1755, between Great Britain and France, report:

That, considering the subject-matter of the said petitions highly important, on account of the interest it has recently excited, and the speculation it has given rise to in various parts of the United States, the committee have carefully examined the State papers and public documents, of the period of the above war, to ascertain the original foundation of the supposed claim. In pursuing this investigation, the committee have not been able to discover that any engagement or contract whatever was made or entered into by the Government, or under the authority of Great Britain, with the officers and soldiers of the provincial troops, serving in the war aforesaid, for a grant of lands, either as an encouragement to their entering into the service, or as a compensation for services. All that the committee have been able to find on the subject is in a proclamation of the King of Great Britain, of the 7th of October, 1763, (after the closing of the war and disbanding of the troops,) and in the following words:

"And whereas we are desirous, upon all occasions, to testify our royal sense and approbation of the conduct and bravery of the officers and soldiers of our army, and to reward the same, we do hereby command and empower our Governors of the several provinces on the Continent of North America to grant, without fee or reward, to such reduced officers as have served in North America during the late war, and are actually residing there, and shall personally apply for the same, the following quantities of land, subject, at the expiration of ten years, to the same quit-rents as other lands are subject to, in the province within which they are granted, as also subject to the same conditions of cultivation and improvement, viz:

"To every person having the rank of a field officer, 5,000 acres.

"To every captain, 3,000 acres.

"To every subaltern or staff officer, 2,600 acres.

"To every non-commissioned officer, 200 acres.

"To every private man, 50 acres.

"We do likewise authorize and require the Governors and commanders-in-chief of all our said colonies, upon the Continent of North America, to grant the like quantities of land, and upon the same conditions, to such reduced officers of our navy of like rank, as served on board of our ships of war in North America, at the times of the reduction of Louisburg and Quebec, in the late war, and who shall personally apply to our respective Governors for such grants."

In this State paper, the committee can perceive no foundation whatever for the present claim upon the United States. Instead of a contract with the officers and soldiers for land, the proclamation contains a mere instruction to the provincial Governors--an instruction emanating from the munificence of the Sovereign, and for conferring a gratuity, not issued for the satisfaction of any previous claim or demand upon Government. That the grant intended by the above proclamation was rather a testimony of respect and approbation, than a donation of value, appears from the prescribed terms on which it was to be made, they being the same on which lands were granted to others in the provinces, with the exception, that the military grants were to be made free of office fees, and exempt from payment of quit-rents for ten years. Had application been made to the land offices of the provincial governments, as was the duty of all the claimants, there can be no doubt but that grants would have been readily made to the full extent of the bounty intended by the proclamation, subject, however, to the usual condition for settlement and improvement. Forty-seven years have now elapsed since the foregoing proclamation, during which period the above claims have laid dormant, and the committee do conceive, that, upon fair and just principles, those claims would have been considered derelict and abandoned had the Government, under which they arose, continued; but to admit them against the United States, placed as they now are, under a government founded on a revolution, which has intervened, is required by no principle of justice, and would, in the opinion of the committee, be an unauthorized disposition and sacrifice of the public property of the United States. On no principle of national law, or by any treaty or convention between the United States and Great Britain, are the United States bound to perform the engagements of the former government of Great Britain, especially for mere bounties; nor would the purposes for which the several States have ceded land, within their respective jurisdictions, to the United States, warrant the appropriation of those lands for the satisfaction of the claims in question, were the same better founded than by the committee they are conceived to be. The committee, therefore, beg leave to submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioners ought not to be granted.

MONDAY, December 31.

Another member, to wit, from Delaware, NICHOLAS VAN DYKE, appeared, and took his seat.

WEDNESDAY, January 2, 1811.

Two other new members, to wit: from New Hampshire, NATHANIEL A. HAVEN; and from Maryland, JOHN CAMPBELL, appeared, and took their seats.

Orleans Territory.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for admitting the Territory of Orleans as a State into the Union.

Mr. BIBB said it was very far from his intention to oppose the passage of the bill. On the contrary, he was favorably disposed to it; but a difficulty had occurred to him which he would state as a reason for delaying a decision on the bill for the present. The bill proposed including in the State all that part of the Territory which lay west of the Perdido, &c. The President, by his Proclamation, although he had required its occupation, he declared that the right should be subject to negotiation. Now, if it became a State, would not all right of negotiation on the subject be taken from the President?

Mr. BARRY said that the necessity of State government, the want of proper control by the General Government, and its inability to attend to the municipal concerns of the Territory, imperiously called upon Congress to erect it into a State. It was unimportant, as respected the ratio, that the bill should be delayed till that was ascertained. Although the precise population could not be ascertained, yet, from what had fallen from the gentlemen from Orleans and Mississippi Territories, it was probable that the Territory had already a right to become a State. Mr. B. said it was important that Congress should act on this subject, for a variety of reasons. It was a point of the Union particularly important to the country which he represented. New Orleans commanded the river through which the whole productions of the Western and of some part of the Southern country were carried to market. It became important in another respect, that the people in that country should have the power of self-government. He alluded to the necessity, in the present posture of affairs, that they should have the power of self-preservation to protect themselves in the enjoyment of their rights, and that the power resulting from State sovereignty ought therefore to be extended to them at this time. The objection which has been urged, respecting the question of title, was equally unimportant. Admitted in its full force, it would only require a modification of the bill, reserving to Congress the power of changing the boundary of the Territory; and this would be a desirable modification because of the undefined limits of the Territory. This objection did not meet the merits of the bill, but merely suggested a modification. It was important now to act on the subject, because Congress had the power to impose conditions on the Territory. If they waited until it had attained a population of 60,000, they could not say no to the demands of these people.

Mr. SHEFFEY said he was not prepared to act on the subject, because the materials on which to decide were not before the House. Whilst he was disposed to treat the inhabitants of the Orleans Territory as brothers, and not as vassals, he was not ready to transfer the inheritance purchased by the blood of our fathers to foreigners. While he looked upon these people as equals, and was disposed to do them justice, he thought all they could demand at his hands was to be placed on that equality to which they were entitled. It had been said that the population was this much or that much. How much?--Mr. S. asked. Sixty thousand? Forty thousand? Thirty thousand? Would any gentleman who regarded his honor tell the House that there were 30,000 inhabitants in the undisputed Territory? He believed not. And would gentlemen favor this French population at the expense of their own interests and rights? It was true indeed that Ohio became a State before she had 60,000; but the ratio of representation was then but 30,000. If he were to reason on this subject, Mr. S. said he would say, under the fostering hand of the General Government, let them become accustomed to our Government, before those were permitted to govern themselves who had so lately emerged from despotism. He was not, he said, directly hostile to the admission of this Territory into the Union; but he made these observations in answer to speculations ushered in to lead the House from its duty. They ought to have the necessary information.

Mr. MACON said he would treat these people as he would the people of every other Territory. They were a part of the nation, and so ought to be considered. There ought to be no question as to what stock they sprung from; the true question was, ought they to be a State? The true policy, Mr. M. thought, was, as they were to become a part of the United States, to make them one and indivisible as soon as possible. They had already served a sufficient apprenticeship to the United States, but not under a free Government, for the Territorial governments were not free. The advantage of exacting of them the condition of using the same language, was a great one. How could they be made one with the United States unless by the use of the same language? Mr. M. wished to treat this Territory as well as the others, and no better; he would not treat one as a daughter and the other as a step-daughter. He was as willing now to make Orleans a State as he had been to make Ohio a State. The great object is to make us one people; to make this nation one. As to the Mississippi Territory, it had not served a much longer apprenticeship than Orleans, having only been acquired by the treaty with Spain in 1795. The people of Orleans possessed certainly as strong an attachment to the nation as could be expected from the time they had belonged to it. When the Spaniards invaded the Territory, they stepped forward promptly to repel them; and when some citizens of the old States forgot the love every honest heart owes to his country, they showed their attachment to the Union by the readiness with which they lent their aid to repel them. To make them a State would make that attachment still greater, and it was therefore advisable to act on the subject.

The committee now rose, reported progress, and asked leave to sit again; but before leave was granted, the House adjourned.

FRIDAY, January 4.

Territory of Orleans.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for admitting the Territory of Orleans into the Union as an independent State, &c.

Mr. WHEATON.--Whenever a bill is offered for our sanction, in order that it may become a law, it is proper, before we give it such sanction, that we should inquire whether the subject of it is such as we have constitutional authority to legislate upon; and if so, whether, from a consideration of time and circumstances, it be expedient so to do.

It appears to me that the bill now before us is objectionable on both these grounds, and, if so, there is a double reason why it should not pass. A few moments will be sufficient for the remarks I have to make upon either; and, if they shall be deemed of no consequence, there will be this consolation, that they will have occupied but very little time.

The subject of this bill is the Orleans Territory, and the object of it, to form that Territory into a State, the people of which are to be subject to the same duties, and entitled to the same privileges, as the people of the United States in their federative capacity. It will be observed that our constitution, by its enacting clause, was ordained and established for the then United States of America. The United States being thus included, implies an exclusion of all others. It may, therefore, be fairly concluded that those that framed this constitution, and those that adopted it, never intended that its immediate operation should extend to any people that did not then, or that should not thereafter be included within the limits of the United States; that they did not intend to enter into a partnership of this sort without some knowledge of those that should compose it, lest the improper conduct of some might end in the ruin of all. The Territory of Orleans certainly was not within the limits of the United States when the constitution was established. It was known to be otherwise. The people there were foreigners to us, and subjects of another Government. That it could not have been intended that the constitution should embrace these people and this Territory, may be argued from the extreme danger of carrying the principle into operation. If we may extend our limits at all, without the consent of the people, further than what is expressed in the constitution, who can tell where will be our ultimate bounds, or what number of States we may have in the Union? Purchase and conquest are objects of ambition. The great Napoleon may have more land to sell, and Spain now possess what she cannot retain. May we not, in time, have the whole of South America, some of the West India islands, and, possibly, Great Britain? And if so, upon the same principle that we form the Territory of Orleans into a State, we may form these Territories into as many separate States as we please, and admit them into the Union with all the powers and privileges that any of our States now possess and enjoy. Then what will become of the Old United States, who first entered into the compact contained in the constitution, and for whose benefit alone that instrument was made and executed. Instead of these new States being annexed to us, we shall be annexed to them, lose our independence, and become altogether subject to their control. Besides, it may be recollected, that, when our independence and national existence was acknowledged by the other nations of the world, the Territory now proposed to be received into the Union made no part of the United States so acknowledged; if, therefore, this be done, a jealousy may be created in those other nations, and, possibly, they may have some reason to complain that, in addition to the immense increase of population within our ancient limits, we should extend our boundaries so far as to include other countries. This, however, by those who justify the Governments of other nations in the pursuit of their projects for universal domination, will be thought deserving of very little consideration. But, it may be well questioned how far the taking of positions that may lead to war comports with that pacific disposition which the people of the United States have been so anxious to maintain; and, whether the obligation they have placed themselves under, by adopting the constitution, to guaranty to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect each of them against invasion, can be made to extend to the Orleans Territory; or, whether the President can have any authority to send our militia there to repel any invasion or suppress any insurrection that may happen there, are inquiries worth some attention before we pass this act. And there will be found another difficulty in the way of carrying the object of it into full effect. If the people of that Territory are admitted into the Union as a State, on an equal footing with any of the now United States, they will have a right to send to our Legislature not only Representatives in proportion to their numbers, but, also, two Senators, and the constitution makes it a necessary qualification for a Senator that he should have been a citizen of the United States at least nine years, a period further back than it can be pretended that any of the people of that Territory ever belonged to the United States, unless they be emigrants, and have not, thereby, lost their citizenship. And a President of the United States they never can have from among their own people, unless he be yet to be born, for no person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution, can be eligible to the office of President. But, it has been said that Congress have already passed a law, wherein they have stipulated with those people, that they shall be formed into a State when they shall have gained a certain number of inhabitants. In answer to this, it is sufficient to say that, if it be incorrect to promise to do a wrong thing, it is more incorrect still to do it. If this bill be unconstitutional, so was that law.

But, in opposition to all this, it will, undoubtedly, be said that several new States have been formed by Congress since the adoption of the constitution, and that they are well authorized by that instrument. This is admitted. "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union." But, if we look into the article where this authority is to be found, we shall find it applicable to the territories then included within the limits of the United States, or to a division of some of the States then already formed; beyond which, it is believed, this authority has never been exercised. The Old Confederation did expressly authorize the admission of Canada into the Union, but the present constitution does not. If such an authority had been proposed to have been given to Congress by it, perhaps it had never been adopted.

If, however, it should be believed that this bill might pass into a law, in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the constitution, it is apprehended that the measure would be extremely impolitic and inexpedient at the present moment. We have not even the possession of a part of the country proposed to be embraced by this bill, and both title and possession have been disputed. It is true we have bought the whole country, and dearly paid for it, but still, if we have not a just title, we ought not to expect to hold it; and it is now admitted to be a subject of negotiation; and, even if our titles shall be found to be good, and we gain a peaceable possession, still, if we have a right to buy a thing, I know not why we may not sell it. But, as the expediency of this measure has been considered by other gentlemen, I forbear to add to the remarks I have already made.

Mr. MILLER said it would be observed that there were two applications to this House for admission into the Union as States; one from the Mississippi Territory, and the other from the Orleans Territory. The latter only, said he, is contemplated by the bill before you. Neither of these Territories have the number of inhabitants required by law to enable them to demand their admission into the Union as a matter of right. It may, therefore, be said with propriety to be an application for a favor, going directly to an amicable discussion, and which we may grant or refuse without running the risk of breaking any legal or moral obligation.

It has been objected against this bill that the population of the State proposed will not be American. Without intimating how far this consideration may have influence on my mind, under the circumstances in which that country has been lately placed, I cannot, however, but remark that it is natural for man to carry his feelings and prejudices about him. I was born in Virginia, sir, and I have not yet lost some of my Virginia feelings, notwithstanding an absence of fifteen years, and I cannot see why we should expect the people of Orleans to act and feel differently from other people, more particularly, when the French nation is towering so far above the other nations of the earth; they will have a secret pride in their glory, they will have some attachments, to what extent I cannot say; but, inasmuch as we know that if we send Paddy to Paris, that Paddy he will come back, the idea is certainly not unworthy of our consideration.

The bill on your table has another objection, of some weight with me, in relation to its policy. You propose to do them a favor by granting them an admission to the rank of other States before they can legally demand it, and, at the same time, you propose terms beyond which they cannot go. This, sir, resembles very much a polite invitation to walk in, but under an injunction to see that your feet are well cleaned, and your toes turned out. It is a niggardly sort of policy that I am sorry to see engrafted in the bill. If you design to be liberal, be so; do not destroy your liberality by an ungenerous sentiment.

Again, sir, there are objections to the bill, as presented, that renders it impossible for me to give it my sanction. It will be seen, sir, that the bill proposes to annex that portion of West Florida in dispute between this and the Spanish Government to the State to be formed out of the Territory of Orleans. The President has declared to the world that this portion of the country, in our hands, shall be subject to mutual arrangements, hereafter to be entered into between the two Governments. But, once annex it to a State and the power to negotiate ceases. What power have we to negotiate about the territory of any of the States? We have none.

Again, sir, I never will consent that the bay of Mobile shall be annexed to any State which includes New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi, unless, indeed, they are both included in the same State with the whole country north, up to the Tennessee line.

If you annex West Florida to the State to be composed of the Orleans Territory, they will then possess a narrow slip of the country, including nearly the whole of the seacoast of Orleans, (including the bay of Mobile,) with a most extensive up-country, composed of a great part of the Mississippi Territory, and, I may say, Tennessee, wholly dependent on them, perhaps, for leave to go out into the bay, and, certainly, for the improvement of its navigation. And this, sir, is rendered more probable, as we know men act mostly for their own interest. And, as New Orleans, from its present population, will govern the councils of that State, let me ask, sir, if it will not be their interest, as much as possible, to divert the 'trade and capital from the Mobile to the Mississippi? And what security have we that she will not do so? None; and from the nature of our Government can have none.

Upon the plan I propose, from the extent of the country proposed to be annexed, the people who inhabit it, in time, will have the preponderance, and their interest will dictate the proper course to be pursued in relation to the free passage of the Mobile.

We may, also, with some certainty, pronounce that the population of the Mississippi, if it is not now, will, in a few years, be the greatest slave population, in proportion to the whites, of any country in the United States. Is it, then, of no consequence to have those settlements so connected with others, composed of whites, as that they may, at all times, be able, within the limits of their jurisdiction, to suppress insurrections of that sort? Is not this a consideration that ought to be taken into account? I, therefore, move you, sir, to strike out the whole of the bill, from the words "a bill," for the purpose of inserting a section by way of amendment, the effect of which will be to consolidate both the Territories into a single State, which will include the whole of the country belonging to the United States, east of the Mississippi, and south of the State of Tennessee. This plan will avoid the objections made to the want of numbers, and will give, also, an American population to the State, if that should be desirable; and will, also, avoid the difficulty occasioned from the situation in which West Florida is at this time placed. To this plan I can see but one objection that ought to have any sort of influence, and that, sir, exists more in idea than reality. It is to the size of the proposed State. Divide and subdivide this country as you will, their interests, in a political point of view, will be the same. Their representation in this House will neither be increased nor diminished by a consolidation. In the Senate, the plan proposed is greatly to the advantage of the old States. In that House, they will have but two Senators instead of four or six, according to the number of States that may be made.

There is, also, no legal objection to this plan. The Treaty of 1803 with the French Republic, only provides for their admission into the Union, without regard to their territorial limits, and there is no law repugnant to the plan.

Mr. GHOLSON said that the observations of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. MACON) had rendered it unnecessary for him to make many of the remarks to the committee which he had intended. In no point of view, said Mr. G., in which this subject has been considered, can I perceive any reason for adopting the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. MILLER.) If that gentleman will only advert to the treaty of cession between France and the United States, and to the act of Congress passed pursuant to that treaty, he will readily discover that the amendment he proposes cannot be sanctioned without a manifest violation of public faith. By the third article of the treaty, it is stipulated that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." On the second of March, 1805, Congress proceeded by an act of legislation to fulfil this engagement with France; and accordingly, by the 7th section of that act, provided "that whenever it shall be ascertained by an actual census or enumeration of the inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans, taken by proper authority, that the number of free inhabitants included therein shall amount to sixty thousand, they shall thereupon be authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government, and be admitted into the Union upon the footing of the original States, in all respects whatever, conformably to the provisions of the 3d article of the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three, between the United States and the French Republic." Now, if to the Orleans Territory you add the Mississippi Territory, and of the two erect one State, you evidently will not comply either with your stipulations with the French Republic, or with your covenant to the Orleans Territory. For, by these you have agreed that Orleans shall become a State and not part of a State only; and there is a wide and substantial distinction between incorporating that Territory, together with other Territories into a single State, as but a fractional part thereof, and authorizing the people of that Territory "to form for themselves a constitution and State government, and to be admitted into the Union upon the footing of the original States." In the former case they may possibly have no influence whatever in appointments to the other branch of the Legislature, and all their interior regulations may also, by possibility, be dictated to them by an ascendant population in the remainder of the State. In the latter case they will, of course, have the entire direction in regard to their system of police and their State institutions, and will moreover have a right, not participated in by any other persons, of sending two Senators to Congress. In fact they will be a distinct State sovereignty. Surely, then, there is a great and obvious difference between what we have so often promised these people, and what is now proposed for them.

Mr. BIBB conceived that the House could not adopt such an amendment as that proposed, without the consent of Georgia; for without her consent they could not make an addition to or division of the Mississippi Territory. It was true, he said, that he had on a former day proposed to make an addition of territory to the Mississippi Territory, but it was only during such time as it should remain a Territory. To this there could be no objection, as there was no prohibition to it in the compact. It had been his intention, if the House had thought proper to sanction his motion, to have made a proposition to the State of Georgia to admit that territory to be incorporated with the Mississippi. The amendment now offered evidently proposed a violation of the compact with Georgia.

Mr. MACON said this bill had taken rather a curious course. The principle and detail had both been attacked; and yet no proposal had been made to try whether the House would legislate on the subject. He had proposed an amendment to do away some of the objections to the detail; but instead of being allowed to amend the bill, the House were met by a constitutional objection, from the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. WHEATON) to the power of Congress to make a State. If this objection was good, Mr. M. said, he admitted the bill ought not to pass; for, Mr. M. said, on this point he could not agree with the gentleman from Tennessee, that because a treaty had been made in relation to it, it was too late to object to the constitutionality. Mr. M. said no; it was never too late to return to the constitution. If the article of the constitution, however, did not mean that Congress might take States out of new Territories, what did it mean? There was no occasion for it in relation to the old Territories; for the ordinance of the Old Congress had secured to them the right; and these ordinances were as binding as the treaties which Congress had entered into. The change of the form of Government did not affect national obligations. The right to become States was one which Congress could not take from the old Territories. The right of creating States out of acquired Territories, was one which he had always contended for; and it had been stated by at least one of those who formed the constitution, that this article had reference to Canada. "New States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union." At the time this provision was made, Florida and Louisiana were not thought of. Canada was the Territory kept in view. Much, sir, said Mr. M., as the United States wanted the southern country, and great as is the convenience of possessing it, I never would have consented to have taken it to have kept them in Territorial government forever. I do not want provinces. I am extremely sorry, sir, that whenever this subject is agitated, we are met by the objection that these people are of French descent. I have before expressed my opinion on this subject, and it is needless to repeat it; but if gentlemen wish them to become our brethren in reality, make them our equals; act just towards them. Do unto them as you would they should do unto you, and make them your friends. I know an opinion is entertained that only those who are of the favored race can be free. I know, sir, that the English nation has been freer than any other; but the time has been that Holland, Sweden, and others, have been free--power, however, overcame right, and the people lost their liberties.

I cannot consider it any question for our consideration, who shall be their Senators and who their Representatives. They have had some time a delegate, and will find delegates in the Senate as well as the House of Representatives. It seems to me, sir, that the gentleman from Tennessee need not to have referred to the dispute between the Potomac and the Delaware, because the constitution has put an end to these sources of strife. It is true, sir, that the Orleans Territory is a slave country, and I would be glad if they could get clear of them; but that does not at all affect this question.

The present situation of Mobile and Orleans is the reason why I want some alteration in the bill. I would rather not have them under the same Government. I have endeavored to ascertain the present population of the Orleans Territory, so called. There is a difference of opinion among those well informed on the subject, from 45,000 to 55,000. He wished gentlemen would permit them to try the question on the principle of the bill, and ascertain whether the House would do any thing with it or not.

Mr. POINDEXTER observed that the proposition of the gentleman from Tennessee for incorporating the present Mississippi Territory with West Florida and the Island of Orleans, to the sea, with a view to form of the whole one State, did not meet his approbation. From the Tennessee line, which would be the northern boundary of the State, to the confluence of the Mississippi with the bay of Mexico, is a distance of from eight hundred to a thousand miles, in the nearest direction, and following the meanders of the river, not less in my opinion than twelve hundred miles. Taking the distance generally from the Mississippi to the Georgia line, I should judge it to be about five hundred miles, and from the northernmost point of the State of Georgia to the junction of the Chatahoochee with the sea, cannot be far short of a thousand miles. This vast tract of country, in my humble conception, is too extensive for the purpose of local State government. Indeed, sir, it could hardly be expected, over such an immense territory, interspersed with numerous tribes of Indians, that even the Executive functionaries of Government could be able to perform their duty in the execution of their laws.

That geographical limits, other than those which now divide the Orleans and Mississippi Territories, might be designated, to comport more with the future convenience and prosperity of the country, cannot be denied. I would suggest for the reflection of gentlemen who have to act on this subject, the expediency of making the great river Mississippi the high road between the Eastern and Western States, to be formed on its waters; that no one State should possess both banks of that river. In that event, to commence on the eastern shore at the mouth of the Yazoo, in latitude 32 30; thence in a direct line to the head-waters of the Chatahoochee, thence to the sea, and along the coast, in a southwestern direction, to Lake Barrataria, thence up the Chafalaga to its junction with the Mississippi, and thence up that river to the mouth of the Yazoo. This tract of country would include about three degrees of latitude; it would combine all the settlements on the Eastern side of the Mississippi, except the county of Madison, which could be disposed of as the wisdom of Congress might hereafter direct. There are various political considerations which operate in favor of the formation of such a State. The people of the Territory of Orleans are petitioning to become an independent State, and I for one hope the prayer of their petition will in substance be granted. It is said that the French population of the city of New Orleans are unfriendly to the American Government. That they have strong prejudices in favor of France. Although, sir, I do not attach so much importance to that circumstance as some gentlemen do, I am willing to admit that French emigrants in Louisiana feel an attachment to their native country. I do not blush to say that were I in France, or any other foreign country, I could never forget that I was born an American citizen. I could never relinquish my attachments to the land of freedom, in which I inhaled my first breath. Judging therefore, of the feelings of others, by my own, I cannot doubt that many influential French inhabitants of New Orleans entertain a predilection for the country which gave them birth. But, sir, within the limits which I have submitted to the consideration of the committee, there is an American population at least sufficient to neutralize every exotic prejudice which may exist in New Orleans. A people whose origin, whose feelings and principles are American, and who are prepared to rally around the standard of the constitution, in every scene of difficulty and of danger.

Mr. MILLER'S amendment was not agreed to.

MONDAY, January 14.

Orleans Territory.

The House resumed the consideration of the engrossed bill to enable the people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes.

The bill being on its final passage--

Mr. PITKIN said he had heretofore stated that he had some objections to the bill, which he had intended to have stated to the House when the bill was capable of amendment, but that he had not an opportunity so to do. I have stated, said Mr. P., that it was probable there would be some difficulty between Orleans, when it becomes a State, and the United States, respecting the extent of the State westward. I stated that the United States, in consequence of the purchase of Louisiana with the same extent that it had when Spain and France possessed it, had claimed the territory as far as the river called Rio Bravo; that the negotiations on this subject between the Governments of the United States and Spain were probably unknown to many members of the House, and that it required a pretty accurate knowledge of them, of the extent of the claim, and of the geography of the country, to understand precisely what I meant. I stated that there was an extent of country between a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches and Rio Bravo, of four or five hundred miles in width, which the United States had claimed as being their property. In the negotiations between the two countries, the United States offered to cede all the country between the Rio Bravo and the Colorado running east of it to Spain, on the condition that Spain would cede to the United States all the territory west of the Perdido. This proposition was rejected. Our Commissioners were instructed to assert our title as far as the Rio Bravo, or at least to the Bay of St. Bernard. It is so stated by the President of the United States in the introduction to the compilation of the land laws, in which he states that we unquestionably have a right to the country as far west as the sources of the rivers which fall into the Mississippi, to the sources of the Red River, Arkansas, and Missouri; that with respect to the territory immediately bounding on the Gulf of Mexico, we have claims to the "province of Texas," which it is well known is a very large province. By the bill before us, according to this construction, jurisdiction is extended over this very province; and it may be, and in fact will be, in the power of the State of Orleans to say that our limits extend so far, and therefore to extend their jurisdiction in like manner. In my apprehension, therefore, it is important, while we are making this Territory a State, where the boundaries are disputed, to retain in our own hands the power of settling them. It is known that, by the law which passed providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans, we had liberty to alter the boundary before we made them a State, but not after. Will it not be in the power of the new State to insist on their right to jurisdiction over the territory, at least as far west as the Colorado, and to prevent the United States from ceding any part of it? For instance, sir, the United States may wish, as we have taken Florida as far as the Perdido, subject to future negotiation, to make this arrangement: to cede to Spain a certain proportion west for East Florida. Now, sir, I ask when we have made this country a State if we can do this? I believe it will be said by every person that we cannot, after she becomes a State, alter the boundaries without her consent. I do apprehend, therefore, there will be difficulties on the subject hereafter, if the United States should attempt to settle the boundary in a manner disagreeable to the State; because, if they cannot extend their jurisdiction west of a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches, the territory will be in extent east and west but about one hundred miles, and north and south about one hundred and twenty, and this will make them comparatively a small State.

As the United States have settled a provisional line, to wit: a meridional line through Nacogdoches, it should not be in the power of the new State to extend its jurisdiction beyond that line. Provision might be made in this way: The western boundary might be made to conform to the provisional line; and a provision might then be made that there should be reserved to the United States the privilege of adding to it whatever land it should acquire westwardly. Such a provision would leave us at liberty to settle the limits without the interference of that State, and without, I apprehend, much difficulty. This was done in relation to the State of Ohio. Unless the right had been reserved, the consent of the State would have been necessary to a cession, or other alteration of its boundary. Such a course in this case will be perfectly safe for the United States, as well as for the new State. I wish we may so regulate the Territory as there may not in future be any collision between the State and the United States. The province of Texas is in the viceroyalty of New Spain. We know that the Viceroy sent his troops to oppose the passage of our troops, and a provisional line was established. New Spain is very powerful, and I should be very sorry that the new State should have power to embroil the United States with it. I would ask the chairman of the committee who reported this bill, what were his views respecting the western boundary, and how far it was his idea that the new State should extend, and whether it would not comport with his ideas that the change which I have suggested should be made? I could have wished that the bill was in such a state of its progress that I could have moved an amendment; but, as it is, unless I am satisfied that we shall not be involved in difficulty by the consequences I have stated, I shall be unwilling to pass the bill, and must vote against it.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I address you, sir, with an anxiety and distress of mind with me wholly unprecedented. The friends of this bill seem to consider it as the exercise of a common power; as an ordinary affair; a mere municipal regulation which they expect to see pass without other questions than those concerning details. But, sir, the principle of this bill materially affects the liberties and rights of the whole people of the United States. To me, it appears that it would justify a revolution in this country; and that, in no great length of time, may produce it. When I see the zeal and perseverance with which this bill has been urged along its Parliamentary path, when I know the local interests and associated projects, which combine to promote its success, all opposition to it seems manifestly unavailing. I am almost tempted to leave, without a struggle, my country to its fate. But, sir, while there is life, there is hope. So long as the fatal shaft has not yet sped, if Heaven so will it, the bow may be broken, and the vigor of the mischief-meditating arm withered. If there be a man in this house, or nation, who cherishes the constitution under which we are assembled, as the chief stay of his hope, as the light which is destined to gladden his own day, and to soften even the gloom of the grave, by the prospect it sheds over his children, I fall not behind him in such sentiments. I will yield to no man in attachment to this constitution, in veneration for the sages who laid its foundations, in devotion to those principles which form its cement and constitute its proportions. What, then, must be my feelings; what ought to be the feelings of a man cherishing such sentiments, when he sees an act contemplated which lays ruin at the root of all these hopes? When he sees a principle of action about to be usurped, before the operation of which the bands of this constitution are no more than flax before the fire, or stubble before the whirlwind? When this bill passes, such an act is done, and such a principle usurped.

Mr. Speaker, there is a great rule of human conduct, which he who honestly observes cannot err widely from the path of his sought duty. It is, to be very scrupulous concerning the principles you select as the test of your rights and obligations; to be very faithful in noticing the result of their application; and to be very fearless in tracing and exposing their immediate effects and distant consequences. Under the sanction of this rule of conduct, I am compelled to declare it as my deliberate opinion, that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved; that the States which compose it are free from their moral obligations, and that, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation--amicably if they can, violently if they must.

Mr. QUINCY was here called to order by Mr. POINDEXTER.

Mr. QUINCY repeated, and justified the remark he had made, which, to save all misapprehension, he committed to writing, in the following words: "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must."

After some little confusion,

Mr. POINDEXTER required the decision of the Speaker whether it was consistent with the propriety of debate, to use such an expression. He said it was radically wrong for any member to use arguments going to dissolve the Government, and tumble this body itself to dust and ashes. It would be found, from the gentleman's statement of his language, that he had declared the right of any portion of the people to separate----

Mr. QUINCY wished the Speaker to decide, for if the gentleman was permitted to debate the question, he should lose one-half of his speech.

The SPEAKER decided that great latitude in debate was generally allowed; and that, by way of argument against a bill, the first part of the gentleman's observations was admissible; but the latter member of the sentence, viz.: "That it would be the duty of some States to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must," was contrary to the order of debate.

Mr. QUINCY appealed from his decision, and required the yeas and nays on the appeal.

The question was stated thus: "Is the decision of the SPEAKER correct?" And decided--53 yeas; 56 nays.

So the decision of the speaker was reversed; Mr. QUINCY'S observations were declared to be in order; and he proceeded.

I rejoice, Mr. Speaker, at the result of this appeal. Not from any personal consideration, but from the respect paid to the essential rights of the people, in one of their representatives. When I spoke of a separation of the States as resulting from the violation of the constitution, contemplated in this bill, I spoke of it as of a necessity, deeply to be deprecated; but as resulting from causes so certain and obvious, as to be absolutely inevitable when the effect of the principle is practically experienced. It is to preserve, to guard the constitution of my country, that I denounce this attempt. I would rouse the attention of gentlemen from the apathy with which they seem beset. These observations are not made in a corner; there is no low intrigue; no secret machinations. I am on the people's own ground--to them I appeal, concerning their own rights, their own liberties, their own intent in adopting this constitution. The voice I have uttered, at which gentlemen startle with such agitation, is no unfriendly voice. I intended it as a voice of warning. By this people, and by the event, if this bill passes, I am willing to be judged, whether it be not a voice of wisdom.

The bill, which is now proposed to be passed, has this assumed principle for its basis--that the three branches of this National Government, without recurrence to conventions of the people, in the States, or to the Legislatures of the States, are authorized to admit new partners to a share of the political power, in countries out of the original limits of the United States. Now, this assumed principle I maintain to be altogether without any sanction in the constitution. I declare it to be a manifest and atrocious usurpation of power; of a nature, dissolving, according to undeniable principles of moral law, the obligations of our national compact; and leading to all the awful consequences which flow from such a state of things.

Concerning this assumed principle, which is the basis of this bill, this is the general position on which I rest my argument--that if the authority, now proposed to be exercised, be delegated to the three branches of the Government, by virtue of the constitution, it results either from its general nature, or from its particular provisions. I shall consider distinctly both these sources, in relation to this pretended power.

Touching the general nature of the instrument called the Constitution of the United States, there is no obscurity--it has no fabled descent, like the palladium of ancient Troy, from the heavens. Its origin is not confused by the mists of time, or hidden by the darkness of past, unexplored ages; it is the fabric of our day. Some now living, had a share in its construction--all of us stood by, and saw the rising of the edifice. There can be no doubt about its nature. It is a political compact. By whom? And about what? The preamble to the instrument will answer these questions:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution, for the United States of America."

It is, "we, the people of the United States, for ourselves and our posterity;" not for the people of Louisiana; nor for the people of New Orleans, or of Canada. None of these enter into the scope of the instrument; it embraces only "the United States of America." Who those are, it may seem strange, in this place, to inquire. But truly, sir, our imaginations have, of late, been so accustomed to wander after new settlements to the very end of the earth, that it will not be time ill-spent to inquire what this phrase means, and what it includes. These are not terms adopted at hazard; they have reference to a state of things existing anterior to the constitution. When the people of the present United States began to contemplate a severance from their parent State, it was a long time before they fixed definitely the name by which they would be designated. In 1774, they called themselves "the Colonies and Provinces of North America." In 1775, "the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America." In the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of America." And finally, in the Articles of Confederation, the style of the confederacy is declared to be "the United States of America." It was with reference to the old articles of confederation, and to preserve the identity and established individuality of their character, that the preamble to this constitution, not content, simply, with declaring that it is "we, the people of the United States," who enter into this compact, adds that it is for "the United States of America." Concerning the territory contemplated by the people of the United States, in these general terms, there can be no dispute; it is settled by the treaty of peace, and included within the Atlantic Ocean, and St. Croix, the lakes, and more precisely, so far as relates to the frontier, having relation to the present argument, within "a line to be drawn through the middle of the river Mississippi, until it intersect the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to the river Apalachicola, thence along the middle of this river to its junction with the Flint River, thence straight to the head of the St. Mary's River, and thence down the St. Mary's to the Atlantic Ocean."

I have been thus particular to draw the minds of gentlemen, distinctly, to the meaning of the terms used in the preamble; to the extent which "the United States" then included; and to the fact that neither New Orleans nor Louisiana were within the comprehension of the terms of this instrument. It is sufficient for the present branch of my argument to say, that there is nothing in the general nature of this compact from which the power contemplated to be exercised in this bill results. On the contrary, as the introduction of a new associate in political power implies, necessarily, a new division of power, and consequent diminution of the relative proportion of the former proprietors of it; there can, certainly, be nothing more obvious, than that from the general nature of the instrument no power can result to diminish and give away to strangers any proportion of the rights of the original partners. If such a power exists, it must be found, then, in the particular provisions in the constitution. The question now arising is, in which of these provisions is given the power to admit new States, to be created in territories, beyond the limits of the old United States. If it exists anywhere, it is either in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, or in the treaty-making power. If it result from neither of these, it is not pretended to be found anywhere else.

That part of the third section of the fourth article, on which the advocates of this bill rely, is the following: "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." I know, Mr. Speaker, that the first clause of this paragraph has been read, with all the superciliousness of a grammarian's triumph. "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union." Accompanied with this most consequential inquiry: "Is not this a new State to be admitted? And is not here an express authority?" I have no doubt this is a full and satisfactory argument to every one, who is content with the mere colors and superficies of things. And if we were now at the bar of some stall-fed justice, the inquiry would insure victory to the maker of it, to the manifest delight of the constables and suitors of his court. But, sir, we are now before the tribunal of the whole American people; reasoning concerning their liberties, their rights, their constitution. These are not to be made the victims of the inevitable obscurity of general terms; nor the sport of verbal criticism. The question is concerning the intent of the American people, the proprietors of the old United States, when they agreed to this article. Dictionaries and spelling-books are, here, of no authority. Neither Johnson, nor Walker, nor Webster nor Dilworth, has any voice in this matter. Sir, the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this constitution, to every State in the Union. Have the three branches of this Government a right, at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence, respectively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing, at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United States? The question has not relation merely to New Orleans. The great objection is to the principle of the bill. If this bill be admitted, the whole space of Louisiana, greater, it is said, than the entire extent of the old United States, will be a mighty theatre, in which this Government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled power. And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be exercised. Nor will it stop, until the very name and nature of the old partners be overwhelmed by new comers into the Confederacy. Sir, the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the present members of this Union. The real intent of this article is, therefore, an inquiry of most serious import; and is to be settled only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of this people and their constitution. These, I maintain, support this position: that the terms "new States," in this article, do intend new political sovereignties, to be formed within the original limits of the United States; and do not intend new political sovereignties with territorial annexations, to be erected without the original limits of the United States. I undertake to support both branches of this position to the satisfaction of the people of these United States. As to any expectation of conviction on this floor, I know the nature of the ground and how hopeless any arguments are, which thwart a concerted course of measures.

I recur, in the first place, to the evidence of history. This furnishes the following leading fact: that before, and at the time of the adoption of this constitution, the creation of new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States was contemplated. Among the records of the old Congress will be found a resolution, passed as long ago as the 10th day of October, 1780, contemplating the cession of unappropriated lands to the United States, accompanied by a provision that "they shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct Republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States." Afterward, on the 7th of July, 1786, the subject of "laying out and forming into States" the country lying northwest of the river Ohio, came under the consideration of the same body; and another resolution was passed recommending to the Legislature of Virginia to revise their act of cession, so as to permit a more eligible division of that portion of territory derived from her; "which States," it proceeds to declare, "shall hereafter become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the original States, in conformity with the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780." All the Territories to which these resolutions had reference, were undeniably within the ancient limits of the United States.

Here, then, is a leading fact, that the article in the constitution had a condition of things, notorious at the time when it was adopted, upon which it was to act, and to meet the exigency resulting from which, such an article was requisite. That is to say: new States, within the limits of the United States, were contemplated at the time when the foundations of the constitution were laid. But we have another authority upon this point, which is, in truth, a cotemporaneous exposition of this article of the constitution. I allude to the resolution, passed on the 3d of July, 1788, in the words following:

[Here the resolution was read.]

In this resolution of the old Congress, it is expressly declared, that the Constitution of the United States having been adopted by nine States, an act of the old Congress could have no effect to make Kentucky a separate member of the Union, and that, although they thought it expedient that it should be so admitted, yet that this could only be done under the provisions made in the new constitution. It is impossible to have a more direct contemporaneous evidence that the case contemplated in this article was that of the Territories within the limits of the United States; yet the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. MACON,) for whose integrity and independence I have very great respect, told us the other day, that "if this article had not territories within the limits of the old United States to act upon, it would be wholly without meaning. Because the ordinance of the old Congress had secured the right to the States within the old United States, and a provision for that object, in the new constitution, was wholly unnecessary." Now, I will appeal to the gentleman's own candor, if the very reverse of the conclusion he draws is not the true one, after he has considered the following fact: That, by this ordinance of the old Congress, it was declared, that the boundaries of the contemplated States, and the terms of their admission, should be, in certain particulars, specified in the ordinance, subject to the control of Congress. Now, as by the new constitution the old Congress was about to be annihilated, it was absolutely necessary for the very fulfilment of this ordinance, that the new constitution should have this power for the admission of new States within the ancient limits, so that the ordinance of the old Congress, far from showing the inutility of such a provision for the Territories within the ancient limits, expressly proves the reverse, and is an evidence of its necessity to effect the object of the ordinance itself.

I think there can be no more satisfactory evidence adduced or required of the first part of the position, that the terms "new States" did intend new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States. For it is here shown, that the creation of such States, within the territorial limits fixed by the treaty of 1783, had been contemplated; that the old Congress itself expressly asserts that the new constitution gave the power for that object; that the nature of the old ordinance required such a power, for the purpose of carrying its provisions into effect, and that it has been from the time of the adoption of the federal constitution, unto this hour, applied exclusively to the admission of States, within the limits of the old United States, and was never attempted to be extended to any other object.

Now, having shown a purpose, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, sufficient to occupy the whole scope of the terms of the article, ought not the evidence be very strong to satisfy the mind, that the terms really intended something else, besides this obvious purpose; that it may be fairly extended to the entire circle of the globe, wherever title can be obtained by purchase, or conquest, and the new partners in the political power may be admitted at the mere discretion of this Legislature, any where that it wills. A principle thus monstrous is asserted in this bill.

But I think it may be made satisfactorily to appear not only that the terms "new States" in this article did mean political sovereignties to be formed within the original limits of the United States, as has just been shown, but, also, negatively, that it did not intend new political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created without those original limits. This appears first from the very tenor of the article. All its limitations have respect to the creation of States within the original limits. Two States shall not be joined; no new State shall be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of Congress. Now, had foreign territories been contemplated, had the new habits, customs, manners, and language of other nations been in the idea of the framers of this constitution, would not some limitation have been devised, to guard against the abuse of a power, in its nature so enormous, and so obviously, when it occurred, calculated to excite just jealousy among the States, whose relative weight would be so essentially affected, by such an infusion at once of a mass of foreigners into their Councils, and into all the rights of the country? The want of all limitation of such power would be a strong evidence, were others wanting, that the powers, now about to be exercised, never entered into the imagination of those thoughtful and prescient men, who constructed the fabric. But there is another most powerful argument against the extension of this article to embrace the right to create States without the original limits of the United States, deducible from the utter silence of all debates at the period of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, touching the power here proposed to be usurped. If ever there was a time in which the ingenuity of the greatest men of an age was taxed to find arguments in favor of and against any political measure, it was at the time of the adoption of this constitution. All the faculties of the human mind were, on the one side and the other, put upon their utmost stretch, to find the real and imaginary blessings or evils, likely to result from the proposed measure. Now I call upon the advocates of this bill to point out, in all the debates of that period in any one publication, in any one newspaper of those times, a single intimation, by friend or foe to the constitution, approving or censuring it for containing the power here proposed to be usurped, or a single suggestion that it might be extended to such an object as is now proposed. I do not say that no such suggestion was ever made. But this I will say that I do not believe there is such a one any where to be found. Certain I am, I have never been able to meet the shadow of such a suggestion, and I have made no inconsiderable research upon the point. Such may exist--but until it be produced, we have a right to reason as though it had no existence. No, sir. The people of this country at that day had no idea of the territorial avidity of their successors. It was, on the contrary, an argument, urged against the success of the project, that the territory was too extensive for a republican form of government. But, now there is no limits to our ambitious hopes. We are about to cross the Mississippi. The Missouri and Red River are but roads, on which our imagination travels to new lands and new States to be raised and admitted (under the power, now first usurped) into this Union, among undiscovered lands in the west. But it has been suggested that the Convention had Canada in view, in this article, and the gentleman from North Carolina told this House, that a member of the Convention, as I understood him, either now, or lately a member of the Senate, informed him that the article had that reference. Sir, I have no doubt the gentleman from North Carolina has had a communication such as he intimates. But, for myself, I have no sort of faith in these convenient recollections, suited to serve a turn, to furnish an apology for a party, or give color to a project. I do not deny, on the contrary I believe it very probable, that among the coursings of some discursive and craving fancy, such thoughts might be started; but that is not the question. Was this an avowed object in the Convention when it formed this article? Did it enter into the conception of the people when its principles were discussed? Sir, it did not, it could not. The very intention would have been a disgrace both to this people and the Convention. What, sir! Shall it be intimated; shall it for a moment be admitted, that the noblest and purest band of patriots this or any other country ever could boast, were engaged in machinating means for the dismemberment of the territories of a power to which they had pledged friendship, and the observance of all the obligations which grow out of a strict and perfect amity? The honor of our country forbids and disdains such a suggestion.

But there is an argument stronger, even, than all those which have been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed to be exercised. Is it possible that such a power, if it had been intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon the effect of general expressions; and such too, as were obviously applicable to another subject; to a particular exigency contemplated at the time? Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp? Nothing less than a power, changing all the proportion of the weight and influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union. A stranger is to be introduced to an equal share, without their consent. Upon a principle, pretended to be deduced from the constitution--this Government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign partners in power, at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or ambitious views may suggest. It is a power that, from its nature, never could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the proportions of power guarantied by the constitution to the States, upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the moral force of this political contract. Would this people, so wisely vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States at its pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope of the constitution or the conception of the people, at the time of passing it?

This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty, as it is who shall be sovereign. Whether the proprietors of the good old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or whether they, and their constitution, and their political rights, shall be trampled under foot by foreigners introduced through a breach of the constitution. The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State, constituting this Union, depends upon the number of the States which have a voice under the compact. This number the constitution permits us to multiply at pleasure, within the limits of the original United States; observing only the expressed limitations in the constitution. But when in order to increase your power of augmenting this number you pass the old limits, you are guilty of a violation of the constitution in a fundamental point; and in one, also, which is totally inconsistent with the intent of the contract, and the safety of the States which established the association. What is the practical difference to the old partners, whether they hold their liberties at the will of a master, or whether, by admitting exterior States on an equal footing with the original States, arbiters are constituted, who by availing themselves of the contrariety of interests and views which in such a confederacy necessarily will arise, hold the balance among the parties which exist and govern us, by throwing themselves into the scale most conformable to their purposes? In both cases there is an effective despotism. But the last is the more galling, as we carry the chain in the name and gait of freemen.

I have thus shown, and whether fairly, I am willing to be judged by the sound discretion of the American people, that the power, proposed to be usurped, in this bill, results neither from the general nature, nor the particular provisions, of the Federal Constitution; and that it is a palpable violation of it in a fundamental point; whence flow all the consequences I have intimated.

The present President of the United States, when a member of the Virginia Convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as one, "that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here an essential right to be alienated? The right to that proportion of political power which the constitution has secured to every State, modified only by such internal increase of States as the existing limits of the Territories at the time of the adoption of the constitution permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old States. It was agreed, at that time, that by this power old States within the ancient limits could not be sold from us. And I maintain that, by it, new States without the ancient limits cannot be saddled upon us. It was agreed, at that time, that the treaty-making power "could not cut off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions devised by the constitution are in both cases marred, and the fate and felicity of the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended, by the most enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treaty-making power, that it exceeded that of the King of Great Britain. Yet, I ask, suppose that monarch should make a treaty, stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan should have a right of representation on the floor of Parliament, would such a treaty be binding? No, sir; not, as I believe, if a House of Commons and of Lords could be found venal enough to agree to it. But although in that country the three branches of its legislature are called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind; the limits of our power are distinctly marked; and when the three branches of this Government usurp upon this constitution in particulars vital to the liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.

I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant--I had almost said indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain, however, that when the dissension of this day is passed away, when party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and deceptive attachments and antipathies, that the ground here defended will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and that the principles here advanced will be appreciated.

I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates that it shall be "admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation of the constitution. There are ways in which this may constitutionally be effected--by an amendment of the constitution, or by reference to conventions of the people in the States. And I do suppose, that, in relation to the objects of the present bill, (with the people of New Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important accommodation to the Western States, there would be no violent objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up into independent States, to counterbalance and to paralyze whatever there is of influence in other quarters of the Union. Such a power, I am well aware that the people of the States would never grant you. And therefore, if you get it, the only way is by the mode adopted in this bill--by usurpation.

The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the Legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire belief of the fact, that our present Minister in Russia, then a member of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration of the Senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the principles on which they could be admitted into the Union. And it does appear that he made two several motions in that body, having for their object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in the constitution, to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that convention.

I will add only a few words in relation to the moral and political consequences of usurping this power. I have said, that it would be a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils! Again: it is settled as a principle of morality, among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged, beyond his intent at the time of the contract. Now, who believes, who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans and Louisiana, a portion of their political power, and to invest all the people those extensive regions might hereafter contain with an authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture to affirm that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now, by construction, give it; or can it be concealed that, beyond its fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let them abandon a measure which sooner or later will produce them. How long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell; but it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from the Red river and Missouri pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils, into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? I have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee danger, and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into this House under the plausible appearance of giving content to that important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By the course of nature, and conformable to the acknowledged principles of the constitution, the sceptre of power in this country is passing towards the Northwest. Sir, there is to this no objection. The right belongs to that quarter of the country; enjoy it; it is yours. Use the powers granted as you please; but take care, in your haste after effectual dominion, not to overload the scales by heaping it with these new acquisitions. Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your speed after uncontrolled sway, trample not down this constitution. Already the old States sink in the estimation of members, when brought into comparison with these new countries. We have been told that "New Orleans was the most important point in the Union." A place out of the Union the most important place within it! We have been asked, "What are some of the small States when compared with the Mississippi Territory?" The gentleman from that Territory (Mr. POINDEXTER) spoke the other day of the Mississippi as "of a high road between" ----. Good heavens, between what, Mr. Speaker? Why, "the Eastern and Western States." So that all the Northwestern Territories, all the countries once the extreme western boundary of our Union, are hereafter to be denominated Eastern States.

[Mr. POINDEXTER explained. He said that he had not said that the Mississippi was to be the boundary between the Eastern and Western States. He had merely thrown out a hint, that, in erecting new States, it might be a good high-road between the States on its waters. His idea had not extended beyond the new States, on the waters of the Mississippi.]

I make no great point of this matter. The gentleman will find, in the National Intelligencer, the terms to which I refer. There will be seen, I presume, what he has said, and what he has not said. The argument is not affected by the explanation. New States are intended to be formed beyond the Mississippi. There is no limit to men's imaginations, on this subject, short of California and Columbia river. When I said that the bill would justify a revolution, and would produce it, I spoke of its principle and its practical consequences. To this principle and those consequences, I would call the attention of this House and nation. If it be about to introduce a condition of things absolutely insupportable, it becomes wise and honest men to anticipate the evil, and to warn and prepare the people against the event. I have no hesitation on the subject. The extension of this principle to the States, contemplated beyond the Mississippi, cannot, will not, and ought not to be borne. And the sooner the people contemplate the unavoidable result, the better; the more likely that convulsions may be prevented; the more hope that the evils may be palliated or removed.

Mr. Speaker: What is this liberty of which so much is said? Is it to walk about this earth, to breathe this air, and to partake the common blessings of God's providence? The beasts of the field and the birds of the air unite with us in such privileges as these. But man boasts a purer and more ethereal temperature. His mind grasps in its view the past and the future, as well as the present. We live not for ourselves alone. That which we call liberty, is that principle on which the essential security of our political condition depends. It results from the limitations of our political system, prescribed in the constitution. These limitations, so long as they are faithfully observed, maintain order, peace, and safety. When they are violated in essential particulars, all the concurrent spheres of authority rush against each other, and disorder, derangement, and convulsion are, sooner or later, the necessary consequences.

With respect to this love of our Union, concerning which so much sensibility is expressed, I have no fear about analyzing its nature. There is in it nothing of mystery. It depends upon the qualities of that Union, and it results from its effects upon our and our country's happiness. It is valued for "that sober certainty of waking bliss" which it enables us to realize. It grows out of the affections, and has not, and cannot be made to have, any thing universal in its nature. Sir, I confess it, the first public love of my heart is the commonwealth of Massachusetts. There is my fireside; there are the tombs of my ancestors--

"Low lies that land, yet blest with fruitful stores, Strong are her sons, though rocky are her shores; And none, ah! none, so lovely to my sight, Of all the lands which heaven o'erspreads with light."

The love of this Union grows out of this attachment to my native soil, and is rooted in it. I cherish it, because it affords the best external hope of her peace, her prosperity, her independence. I oppose this bill from no animosity to the people of New Orleans, but from the deep conviction that it contains a principle incompatible with the liberties and safety of my country. I have no concealment of my opinion. The bill, if it passes, is a death-blow to the constitution. It may, afterwards, linger; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant period, be consummated.

TUESDAY, January 15.

Orleans Territory.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill authorizing the people of Orleans Territory to elect a convention to form a constitution preparatory to its admission into the Union as a free and independent State--Mr. QUINCY'S motion for indefinite postponement still under consideration.

Mr. WRIGHT.--Sir, this bill is not, in my judgment, a violation of the constitution, nor have I a fear that it is fraught with those direful consequences with which the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY) threatens us. It will neither justify a dissolution of the Union, nor lead any citizen attached to it, even amicably, much less forcibly, to the contemplation of it, notwithstanding the predictions of that gentleman. That we are authorized to erect new States, I will prove both by theory and practice, and for that purpose I will first invite your attention to the articles of Confederation. By one section it is expressly declared that Canada may be permitted to enjoy all the benefits of the Confederation on the same terms with the other States of the Union. The thirteen States under this Confederation conducted themselves safely through the war; but finding, in 1787, that their requisitions had not been duly respected, and that New York had rejected some necessary commercial regulations, whereby their fiscal affairs were deranged, Congress, by a resolution, resolved that a convention of States should be held for the express purpose of amending the articles of Confederation. Under this resolution the Convention met, and proceeded to form the present constitution. Thus it will appear that they were to form the new constitution not ex pari materia, but out of the very materials of the Confederation.

As a conclusive evidence, you will find a number of the articles in each instrument literally or substantially the same, and thereby be justified in giving a construction of the letter of the constitution, so as to respect the spirit of the Confederation. By the third section of 4th article of the constitution, "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union;" and by the next member of the same section, "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States"--hence I can have no doubt that Congress have the power to admit new States into the Union, that power being expressly given. It is however contended, that that power is limited to the admission only of those States that may be established within the limits of the United States, as demarcated by the Treaty of Peace. And the preamble to the constitution is relied on to establish that doctrine. "We, the people of the United States, &c., do establish this constitution for the United States of America." If this preamble is so imperious as to limit the positive provisions of the constitution, it will certainly limit itself to the States that formed the constitution--the negative of which has been determined. To prove which, here let me call your attention to the fact, that Vermont was not a member of the Confederation, nor was she a member of the convention that formed the constitution; she therefore was not one of the United States--was foreign as to them, and as distinctly governed as any other foreign power; she in 1791 was admitted into the Union, and the laws of the United States extended to her. She was not one of the old States, and was correctly admitted under the power to admit new States. Vermont was so repulsive to a confederacy with the United States, as not to be mentioned in the articles of Confederation. Can it be for a moment doubted that Canada, expressly mentioned, might be now received as a new State, by becoming independent, or by purchase, when Vermont has been admitted, who was not mentioned in the Confederation? Can there be an opinion that the framers of the constitution intended Canada should be excluded from the benefits of the constitution, when before invited into it? When, by the express letter of the instrument, "new States may be admitted," and when Vermont, not mentioned in the Confederation, has been admitted? Such a conclusion can never be the rational result of such premises. But it is objected, that, as this Territory was obtained by treaty, and after the formation of the constitution, it cannot be admitted into the Union as a State.

I have shown that new States may be admitted, that Vermont has been admitted, and that Canada was expressly entitled under the Confederation, and by the terms of the constitution may be admitted as a new State. "Congress may admit new States into the Union, and make all needful rules and regulations with respect to the territory or other property of the United States." This is certainly a territory, the property of the United States, and Congress as certainly may, if needful, that is, expedient, admit it into the Union. We are told, I presume to retard this measure, that the limits are in dispute, and that, if made a State, they cannot afterwards be settled by the United States. That this is not the case, I will prove by theory and by practice. By the treaty-making power vested in the President and the Senate, they may treat on all subjects within the treaty-making power, with foreign nations; and where the limits of any foreign power adjoining the territory of the United States are not ascertained to their mutual satisfaction, they certainly may settle them by a treaty of limits. This is the practice and usage of all nations, and the United States by a treaty of limits with Great Britain, did settle the beginning of their northeastern limits, at the river St. Croix, whereby they gave up seven miles to Great Britain, which was taken from a State--hence I presume no difficulty can arise on the subject.

The question was then taken on the motion for indefinite postponement, and lost: yeas 28, nays 78.

The main question was then taken that the said bill do pass, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 77, nays 36.

WEDNESDAY, January 16.

Bank of the United States.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.

Mr. BURWELL moved to strike out the first section.

I have made this motion, sir, said Mr. B., because it allows the greatest latitude of discussion upon the important points which are preliminary to the examination of the details. It tries the principle of the bill, and may save much tedious and useless labor. Should a majority decide in favor of the Bank of the United States, as an honest man I will aid in forming a system best adapted to the state of the country, and most subservient to the purposes of such an institution. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MOSELY) has done justice to my conduct, and the fairness with which the subject has been treated. I have been anxious to present the question fairly, not from any doubt or indecision as to the course I should pursue, but from its magnitude, and the sensibility it has excited. It will be recollected by the committee, when the gentleman from Pennsylvania presented the memorial upon which the Secretary of the Treasury founded his report, on that, as on all subsequent occasions, my opposition was manifested; and I will add that the particular attention which my duty has compelled me to bestow on the bank, has confirmed more strongly former impressions.

The remarks I shall make are intended to show that Congress possesses no power to incorporate a bank; to show its effect on the government, and to satisfy the committee that the exercise of the power, even if possessed, is inexpedient. While, sir, I feel the most ardent desire to consult the convenience of the government and promote the prosperity of the community in general, I have not lost sight of the limits within which I am restrained by the Constitution of the United States and considerations of sound policy. It is my most deliberate conviction that the constitution of the country gives no authority to Congress to incorporate a bank and endow the stockholders with chartered immunities; and even if its dissolution should produce ruin to the merchants, and, what is of equal importance, embarrassment to the government, they would not be paramount to the sacred obligation of supporting the constitution; though I am persuaded the dreadful evils which have been predicted from the annihilation of the bank will soon vanish, and that no material shock will be produced by that cause. The construction which the constitution has received by the various persons who have at different times administered it, has been rigid or liberal according to the confidence in the General or State Governments. The unqualified extent given to its general powers, and the inclusion of incidental powers, as flowing from and belonging to particular enumerated grants, have constituted the essential points of difference among those who have divided upon the principles of the constitution. This has been the case not only in the exercise of authority where the right was questionable, but in cases where the right was undeniable, tending by its operation to increase the weight of the General Government. In giving to the constitution that construction which sound policy requires, and a just regard to the harmony of the States and the perpetuation of their Union dictates, I cannot find any part of it authorizing the exercise of a power which, from its nature, is obnoxious, its tendency alarming, and its influence in the hands of those who manage its concerns irresistible. The power to establish a bank cannot be deduced from the general phrases "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," because they merely announce the object for which the General Government was instituted. The only means by which this object is to be attained are specifically enumerated in the constitution, and if they are not ample, it is a defect which Congress are not competent to supply. I think this inference the stronger, inasmuch as those means were granted to us by those who had acted under the confederation and experienced its defects, and knew precisely to what extent power was requisite to provide for the common defence and general welfare. In relation to this particular subject, the proceedings of the convention itself furnish the plainest evidence, by rejecting the proposition to vest in Congress the right to grant incorporations. I readily admit the motive of deliberative bodies cannot always be known. Various considerations might have operated. They might have supposed the power already vested. But, it is incumbent on those who can place faith in an interpretation so repugnant to the cautious and guarded phraseology of the instrument, to demonstrate it. If the right to incorporate exists, it is a general grant of power, equally applicable to all the objects of incorporation, and cannot be assumed as a means to carry into effect any particular grant of authority. To my mind, it is much more natural to suppose a power to create monopolies had been surrendered, to quiet the fears of those who saw in the constitution the germ which would sooner or later palsy the vitals of the State authority. If the general phrases are not explained in the manner just mentioned, and powers so extensive and important are derived from them, it would be ridiculous to consider the jurisdiction of Congress restricted; they would confer equal authority to establish monopolies in all the various branches of individual industry and commercial enterprise. Sir, I will conclude this part of the subject by reminding you how essential it is, when we are giving an interpretation to the constitution, to which the States are parties, to assume only what clearly belongs to us. Moderation will inspire confidence, selfishness will excite disgust and suspicion.

The parts of the constitution which bear any analogy to this subject, are

1st. Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare, &c.

2d. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

3d. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes. And

4th. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the General Government, into effect.

It will not be denied that, if the establishment of a bank comes within the meaning of the power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts of the United States, and to regulate commerce, or is necessary and proper to carry the foregoing powers into effect, it would be a fair subject for legislation by Congress. But can any one pretend that a bank would be a mode contemplated by the constitution to lay and collect taxes on the people for the purpose of raising revenue? Would it comport with that wise principle of uniformity, and those guarded restrictions against unequal burdens on the people, which constitute the most valuable safeguard to the citizen? To understand these terms we must give them a meaning which has been affixed by their usual import. When we speak of the power to lay taxes, we understand by it a demand of money from the community, regulated by fixed and equitable principles, indiscriminate as to persons, and the species of property taxed. To suppose that every law which imposed burdens or brought money into the Treasury was constitutional, would destroy our equal system of government, and substitute a capricious despotism. It would revive the exploded doctrine of free gifts, benevolences, and that shameful train of extortions practised by the old governments of Europe. Does it fall within the power to pay the debts of the United States? This clause relates entirely to the application of the funds after they have been accumulated; it is in conformity with that article which pledges the public faith for debts which had been contracted, as well as those which might be created in pursuance of the authority to borrow money upon the faith of the United States. If the power to incorporate a bank grew out of the obligation to pay the debts of the United States, its charter should be so worded as to cease whenever they were extinguished; and it would be no longer for Congress to fix a definite period for its expiration. If the right of incorporation was ever meant to be given, it would most naturally follow from the regulation of commerce; yet, no one has contended Congress could create insurance companies within the States. Those who contend the bank is constitutional, consider it as necessary and proper in collecting the revenue. That it may be an useful instrument, I do not deny. It forms depositories convenient to the government; but, you should recollect, depositories equally safe and convenient can be procured without being purchased at the expense of exorbitant and invidious privileges to a particular class in the community. I apprehend the constitution means something extremely different when it empowers the General Government to collect taxes; it relates exclusively to the authority thus given to Congress of employing compulsory process in coercing the payment of taxes; it enables Congress to create, within the jurisdiction of the States, officers of the revenue, and, through them, to exercise over the property of the citizens a concurrent jurisdiction, from which they otherwise would be precluded, and from which they had been precluded before the adoption of the constitution; it enables them to impose penalties and forfeitures, and to inflict punishment for resistance to their authority. But, sir, admit for a moment the bank may be formed to collect the revenue, ought it not to be exclusively used for that object? Whence the power to make it an instrument of commerce? Why invest it with a capital immense in amount, and sovereign in its control over the external and internal commerce of the country? Sir, I must again call your attention to the limited nature of our Government; we must administer it as we find it, and not as we think it ought to be. Under this view of the subject, so long as I understand the right to "lay taxes" to consist in drawing supplies from the people for public purposes, and not to tax one portion of the community for the benefit of another, and "to collect them," the right to enforce payment, I cannot construe them to authorize the establishment of a bank. Sir, a bank has been improperly considered a means of executing some power exclusively given to Congress. The nature of incorporations is so clearly a distinct class of political power, that, before they can be converted into means incidental to an object without the jurisdiction of the General Government, they must be shown to be absolutely necessary. Permit me to ask, how has it been ascertained that a bank is necessary to the operations of the Government? Has the experiment been tried? Upon a question involving a breach of the constitution, it would be safer to be guided by experience than conjecture.

Sir, I am well aware that I can add nothing new upon the constitutional points. The subject was more thoroughly examined in 1791, and more ably elucidated than any other since the adoption of the Government. The celebrated speech of Mr. MADISON, to which I ascribe my conviction, has been recently presented to us in the newspapers, and gentlemen must be familiar with it. I cannot give additional weight to the arguments, but I thought it proper to call the attention of the committee to that part of the subject by the remarks I have made.

I said, sir, it must be shown that the bank is necessary to the operations of the Government--without its aid our fiscal concerns cannot be managed. So far from subscribing to the necessity of the bank, I believe the revenue would be equally safe in the State banks, and could be distributed with inconsiderable difficulty. The revenue received in most of the States is nearly equal to the expenditure within them, and when a deficiency occurred in any one, it could be supplied by arrangements with the different banks, by transportation, or inland bills of exchange, in the manner that the public engagements are fulfilled abroad. I will venture to assert the Secretary of the Treasury will find no difficulty in contracting with individuals and corporate institutions, upon the most ample security, to transfer the public revenue upon terms equally advantageous to the United States. Among the several States commercial intercourse is great, and daily increasing; the constant traffic which the different portions of the country maintain with one another, will give facility to the operations of the Government, and obviate the obstacles which are anticipated; the very commerce which enables the Treasury to remit with ease immense sums to every part of Europe is the result of this interchange among the States, and insures equal facility at home. Where, then, is the necessity for this bank? The accommodation of the bank to the Government in times of emergency, and the use of its resources to support public credit, have been urged as motives for its establishment; how far such considerations weaken constitutional objections, it is needless to state. If, sir, the bank becomes a source of supply to the Government to an adequate extent, it ceases to be one to the merchants. It therefore cannot answer in both capacities. The same necessity which throws the Government upon the charity of the banks renders it incapable of discharging the obligation, and while the funds of the institution are locked up in the Government, its commercial functions must cease. The relief which sudden and temporary embarrassments require, can, at all times, be administered by the State banks, and, therefore, supersedes the necessity of aid from this bank. Whenever, by disasters, the ordinary sources of supply are exhausted, or the unavoidable objects of expenditure exceed the revenue, a more copious and permanent aliment will be found in the wealth and capital of the citizens than by loans from banks. Instead of diverting the active and productive capital from useful channels, the sluggish and inert mass will be drawn forth in its aid, to support public credit and cherish private enterprise. But, sir, is it prudent to rely upon an institution that may refuse you assistance? What will be the influence of such an institution on the Government, and the country at large? It cannot escape your recollection that the establishment of the Bank of the United States was the origin of a system which assumed as its basis the enlargement of the national jurisdiction. Whether the principles of expediency to which it owes its birth be regarded, or the overweening influence it established over the moneyed institutions and merchants of the States, the charge, to say the least, is plausible. The close and intimate connection between the Government and bank--the dependence of the former for loans, and the latter for public deposits, have given the Executive branch its full share of influence and odium--shows incontestably it was created to augment the power of the General Government, and the Executive in particular. Yes, sir, it was the commencement of those political animosities which have poisoned the sources of social intercourse; it was the origin of that doctrine of constructive power which abrogates the constitution and nullifies the restrictions imposed upon Congress. So long as it exists, the body politic will experience the agitations and convulsive throes of well-grounded jealousy in the States.

Sir, in the administration of this Government two things alone are necessary to insure its durability. You must first avoid every measure which will produce uneasiness among the States, or, second, that will extend the jurisdiction of the United States Government to subjects purely local. I do not mean that the rightful authority of Congress is to be abandoned for fear of giving offence, but, whenever called on to take a step which will produce uneasiness, you should be perfectly satisfied the letter and spirit of the constitution bear you out. Do not gentlemen perceive the tendency of this measure to involve us with the States upon delicate points? Has not the United States' Bank produced serious alarm? Will not the alarm be increased by its continuance at this time? Yes, sir, some of the States have already taxed this institution, others have waited under the expectation we shall render a collision unnecessary. Suppose the charter renewed, and the stockholders should be taxed in such a manner as to destroy, virtually, the privileges you have guarantied to them. Are you to leave them unprotected, or will you draw the sword in their behalf? While you have time, avoid a situation not less perilous than the most serious foreign war. Since the establishment of the bank, the States have created banks--their people have accumulated capital, and they will not tamely witness the perpetuation of an institution whose strength can at any moment overthrow whatever State bank they may mark for destruction. However paradoxical it may appear, I consider the General Government strengthened by narrowing its jurisdiction; it will produce disunion whenever they interfere with local concerns. The habits, local interest, and passions of this country vary, and no one is a competent judge of what will suit the feelings of the State out of which he lives. But, sir, there are general principles in which our feelings and interests are identified; there are subjects upon which we may safely act, and trust to the co-operation of every man and State in the Union. Does the bank affect the people locally? The answer is obvious: it not only undertakes to fix the amount of capital, but interferes with the rights of property most essentially--it may change the fundamental principles of State law as to the liability of property for debts, and the mode of recovering them. Let me caution you against the renewal of the charter; it is pregnant with the most baneful consequences to the tranquillity of the country. Is it not better to sacrifice this golden calf upon the altar of concord, restore confidence and harmony among individuals as well as States, and to reunite the lovers of the constitution?

In the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the convenience of obtaining loans from the bank is mentioned as an inducement to establish a National Bank. To me the abuse of this convenience is more dreaded than any other evil which will follow from the measure. Where have you seen a National Bank, connected with the Government, which has not ultimately ruined the circulating medium of the nation? It is a notorious fact that money has depreciated seriously, from the unlimited circulation of paper, and if the Government should be compelled, by necessity, to use the funds of the bank, they must permit the increased circulation of its paper, although its money capital remains stationary. In this situation the Government must tolerate an operation which will increase the evil of which we complain. The example of England is a salutary monition to us, and we ought to profit from it. In that country there was a time when the stability of the bank was a national phrase, "As good as the Bank of England." How is it now? The funds of the bank have been borrowed by the Government--its paper circulation increased, and Parliament has been compelled to make it a tender for the payment of all contracts. Who, sir, can estimate the complicated mischiefs of a depreciated paper currency, without specie for its redemption? Should we be involved in war, or our property seized abroad, nothing can present universal bankruptcy--one wide-spread ruin will pervade the continent. At this time the country is inundated with paper bottomed upon the whole floating and real property of the community: should an alarm exist, can these funds be converted into money to redeem its credit? Certainly not. Will it not be prudent to diminish the extent of this evil by putting down this bank which is the fountain from which the whole system flows? It is of little importance, as it regards the internal trade of a country, what constitutes the representation of property. Paper, iron, or any thing else, which passes current, will answer every purpose of barter and trade; but, in its commerce abroad, it is indispensable that the circulating medium should be equally valuable and readily acknowledged among all commercial nations; otherwise, all the operations of commerce, carried on with money, will be abandoned or prosecuted under disadvantages equal to the difference in the value of the currency at home and abroad. In countries actively engaged in business, this branch of trade is not only great in amount, but by far the most profitable. How unwise, therefore, not only to substitute for the precious metals paper currency, whose value is confined to the United States, but to augment the quantity until it depreciates even among ourselves.

THURSDAY, January 17.

Bank of the United States.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States--the motion for striking out the first section still under consideration.

Mr. FISK.--Mr. Chairman: I regret that we are called upon to vote for or against striking out the first section of this bill, at this time. I could have wished that, upon a bill of so much interest and importance, we could have proceeded to have filled the blanks, and made such amendments as would have obviated many objections which may be urged against it in its present form. I am not prepared to give my vote in favor of a renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States, either upon the terms upon which it was originally granted, or in the manner contemplated by this bill; yet, upon conditions less objectionable, I should feel myself bound to vote in favor of a renewal. But the question presented upon this motion, is not upon what terms this charter shall be renewed, but whether it shall be renewed upon any terms, subject to any conditions Congress may impose.

In this view, I consider it the most important subject upon which this Congress will be required to act. It is determining a question which is connected with our finances, with the circulating medium of the country, and with our agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests; and, as such, it cannot but be interesting to every class of our citizens.

The interests and prosperity of the United States are not only intimately, but inseparably, connected with trade. The market of the farmer depends greatly upon the merchant and the shipper. And the price and demand of every article of produce are in a great degree regulated by the difficulties or facilities of payment. Let the difficulty of paying be increased, and the price of produce immediately falls; for the demand for exportation becomes very limited, the markets are overstocked, and prices reduced. Any sudden check to our commerce, whether produced by our own municipal regulations, or the outrages of foreign powers, checks the market and the price of produce; so that not only the merchants, but the farmers feel its effects. I scarcely need recur to the history of the times when trade was principally suspended in this country, to show how severely the suspension operated upon every class of our citizens, and in every part of the country. This period in our political annals will be long remembered. So great was the distress in some States, and agricultural States, too, that their Legislatures deemed it necessary, for the protection of the debtor from the power of his creditor, to stay the administration of justice, and prohibit by statute the issuing of an execution for the collection of any debt.

This proves the connection which subsists between the two great agricultural and commercial interests of this country. Agriculture, commerce, and manufactures constitute the source of our wealth, revenue, and prosperity. To foster and cherish the principles upon which rest our existing hopes and future prospects, can never be a question of doubtful policy with a wise and patriotic legislature.

We have seen that commerce is essential to our interests; but commerce will not flourish without credit. It never has prospered independent of credit. As credit is essential to trade, so is punctuality to support credit. Look at the business of any commercial people, and see how much of it is done upon credit; and see the integrity and fidelity with which punctuality is maintained in order to support their credit.

For several centuries past, banks have been the successful medium through which credit has not only been preserved, but great wealth acquired. This assertion is warranted by the history of these institutions, and of the countries where they have been patronized. The first bank established in Europe, was at Genoa, in 1407--four hundred and four years ago; this was soon followed by one at Venice.

The Bank of Amsterdam was established in 1609, and shortly after those of Hamburg and Rotterdam; and the Bank of England in 1694; the Royal Bank at Paris in 1718; the Bank of North America in 1784--a memorable period in our history--and the Bank of the United States in 1791.

All these different institutions show, that enlightened legislators have entertained but one opinion upon this subject both in Europe and America for the last four hundred years. They have seen and acknowledged their utility. Banks have long since been considered not only essentially useful in the transaction of commercial concerns, but as highly necessary to aid the fiscal operations of Government. And a more unanswerable argument cannot be urged in favor of their general utility than their uniform success; to this may be added the prosperity of the people and the countries where banks have been supported. Their immediate advantages are, a convenient circulating medium; the safe depository they afford for cash and funds. And they serve to keep the standard of money steady and correct; to insure punctuality; to preserve credit; to inspire confidence, and to promote a spirit of industry and enterprise. They are not, as many have supposed, in their nature hostile to Government and dangerous to liberty. They rather form a barrier to tyranny and oppression. Their principal business is to lend money at the common rate of interest, and thus prevent usury. The owners of banks are generally rich men, who have not only their personal liberty, but a large property to risk, by sedition, treason, and rebellion. It is their interest to resist oppression. We need scarcely point to the Continent of Europe for proof of the fact, when we assert, that trade and banks cannot flourish where despotism prevails. Despotic power generally ruins trade and banks, but no instance occurs in history where banks, not under the control of Government, have ruined a State. A bank owned by Government, and under its command, would be an engine dangerous to the people. But when owned by individuals, neither the people nor the Government have any thing to fear from it. It is then dependent on both for its business, prosperity, and usefulness.

With the evidence which both history and experience offer to our reflection, we cannot doubt the utility of banks, nor deny but that they have been beneficial to us. And we are justified in the conclusion, that, under proper regulations, they may subserve the best interests of the people of the United States. They are now in successful operation in almost every State in the Union, and that they have been useful, the present prosperous state of the country abundantly proves. We enjoy as perfect security for life, liberty, and property, as any people under any Government ever did. These are the great objects of a good Government. And we may triumphantly ask, where is the nation or people that enjoy these with more freedom and safety than the American people? A parallel for our liberty and prosperity, for the last twenty years, is not to be found in the history of man. Our wealth, population, and resources, have increased beyond what any one would have calculated or imagined, and beyond what strangers and foreigners now believe. Industry, wealth, and contentment, pervade every quarter of our country, and poverty and oppression are unknown to our citizens.

In 1791, the year this bank was incorporated, our exports amounted to about eighteen millions of dollars; and in 1804, they had increased to about seventy-six millions, gaining in thirteen years fifty-eight millions; and our tonnage in about the same proportion.

Much of this prosperity is to be attributed to the active capital which has excited industry, and a spirit of enterprise among us, and the activity of this capital has been in a great degree created and promoted by the Bank of the United States. Its operations have been extensive in all our trading towns. It has aided in loans and discounts, and assisted in the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of our revenues. It has been the depository of our Treasury, and is now become incorporated with the administration of the fiscal department of our Government. The connection which it has formed with almost every branch of business in the country, is not slight and trifling, and so easily to be severed as some seem to believe. Its operations are deeply interwoven with the dealings and concerns of all the men of business in the United States.

With a capital of ten millions, it has furnished accommodations of fifteen millions a year. This has been employed principally in trade; in making prompt and cash payments to our farmers for their produce. This, again, has furnished to our citizens a ready and profitable market for every article of produce. These high profits of a good market have gone into the hands of the farmer, to cultivate, improve, and enrich the country. And travel through any State in the Union, and their effects may be readily seen, affording a prospect, consoling and elevating to the philanthropist and the patriot. The land is highly cultivated, good buildings, turnpike roads, bridges, and other expensive improvement, indicate the wealth of our citizens, and the prosperity of the country. Money has been freely circulated, trade has been active, produce high, and our country has been improved by these unexampled advantages to a degree far beyond what the most sanguine calculations, twenty years ago, could have anticipated. And yet, sir, we are gravely told that this bank has nearly ruined the country; that it is threatening our best interests with destruction. As well might gentlemen tell us that total darkness prevails at noon-day, or that the sun, in his meridian splendor, affords neither light nor heat to any part of this globe.

The principal portion of the trade and business of the United States has been conducted by a paper medium; metallic has scarcely been seen. The amount of this circulating medium is, say fifty millions. Now what is proposed by denying a renewal of the United States' Bank charter? That this bank shall close its concerns, and of course stop all its accommodations. This must necessarily check and change at least one-third of the circulating medium of the country. It will undeniably require $24,000,000 to be directed to one operation, and for a time to one point--for the capital is $10,000,000; this is to be collected to divide among the stockholders. There are $19,000,000 due to the bank; this must be collected. This will occasion a demand for this amount from other sources; it must be paid. And the $5,000,000 in the bank makes the sum of $24,000,000, which must be suddenly called in. The effect this will have upon the various interests in the country can neither be described nor conceived. It must inevitably give a general and heavy shock to all paper credit; this credit, so much and profitably in operation, must receive a severe, if not a mortal wound. And what substitute have we for this when it shall be destroyed? Silver and gold coin cannot be relied on. There is not from the best estimate an amount to exceed $10,000,000 specie in all our cities and trading towns, and this will be collected by this bank. The price of all stocks, and every kind of produce and species of property must suffer a great depression, for a scarcity of money enhances its value, and consequently depresses the value of every other species of property. That this sudden, if not total change in our system, must occasion great embarrassment, produce failures, disappointments, and distress, among our citizens, is certain.

Put down this bank, and how then are your revenues to be collected? Through the medium of the State banks? You do what no prudent man, in his individual concerns, would think of doing. You discard a faithful, honest, responsible agent, whose integrity and fidelity you have known for twenty years, and you place your estate in the hands and at the disposal of twenty or thirty entire strangers, of whose character and responsibility you know nothing, nor have the means of acquiring any knowledge, and over whose conduct you have no control. Should an individual act thus with his property, he would be deemed to have lost all regard for it, if not considered a madman. In resorting to the State banks, we are offering the amount of our revenue as a bounty for intrigues, cabals, and factions, through the country. In almost every State there are a number of banks, and each will endeavor to get the revenue collected in that State, to keep and trade with. It must be given to one, or divided among them all. If one is selected as the favorite, all the rest become jealous, dissatisfied, and exert their capital and influence against the favorite bank and its patron, the Government. This will awaken a spirit of faction in every State, yet unknown in this country. If all are to be gratified in their request for the deposits, the Government must open separate accounts with all the different banks in the country, to the amount of fifty or sixty; and new companies will be formed, and new applicants request to divide the business, and share the profits. Indeed, there will be no end to the scenes of speculation and intrigue, which will soon appear, if this course is adopted by the Government.

Mr. SEYBERT.--It may be said that this subject has been exhausted by the discussions of the ablest politicians of the country. I will premise, the remarks which I shall offer are intended solely to justify the vote which it is my intention to give on this momentous occasion.

The question pending the United States' Bank has excited a peculiar interest throughout this nation, more especially in our seaports. The dissolution of this institution, which from its limitation, will expire on the fourth of March next, has been portrayed in colors of the darkest shades, and the distresses which many maintain will be consequent to that event, call seriously for a fair and deliberate investigation. I hope, sir, I shall be pardoned for imposing on the patience of the House, when it is recollected that the community which I represent have employed four-tenths of the capital stock of the United States' Bank. If evil consequences are to attend the dissolution of this establishment, or if beneficial results proceed from its continuance, in either case I must feel myself essentially interested; it is therefore my wish to be distinctly understood upon the important principles which have connection with the great question now before us.

At the last session of Congress, I presented the memorial of the President, Directors, and Stockholders of the Bank of the United States; at that time I entertained no positive opinion on the subject; the discussions which took place in the committee to whom the memorial was referred, necessarily, as a duty on my part, excited that attention which the importance of the question imperiously demanded. Under circumstances of doubt, I voted in favor of reporting a resolution in support of the bank, for the purpose of giving to the establishment every chance which reason could urge; at the same time reserving to myself the right to pronounce a final decision, according as policy and expediency, but more especially as principle should dictate. I will admit, sir, that this is not the time or place to institute the general inquiry, whether banks are or are not beneficial to a nation? Because, whether the charter of the United States' Bank be renewed or not, the several States, who have the unquestioned authority to incorporate bank establishments, have already created many, which it is not in our power to control. I do not hesitate to declare, though many persons in the United States are decidedly opposed to a banking system, under every possible circumstance, I am not of this class. Experience has proved, in a manner very satisfactory to my mind, the advantages which are derived from the banks when they are impartially directed, and when the accommodation afforded by them is prudently employed; the great difficulty seems to be to confine the system within its proper limits. I understand the proposition as applicable to the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial interests of the United States.

For my proofs of this proposition, I will not rely upon the famous Bank of St. George, at Genoa, whose authority, by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. FISK,) has been considered of much weight. I will recall to the mind of my friend the remark of an intelligent traveller, who, when he visited this bank of antiquity, exclaimed: Here lies concealed the enigma, whether the bank possesses millions of millions, or whether it is indebted millions of millions! He concludes, Upon this important secret rests the safety of the State. Unhappy State, say I, whose safety depends upon a secret concealed within the vaults of a bank. Perhaps to a development of this secret may we attribute the present servile condition of the people of the once far-famed and powerful Republic of Genoa.

Sir, I am decidedly opposed to a prominent, and what to me appears to be a very dangerous feature in the bill now under consideration. I allude to the eighth section, which admits of an increase of the present capital stock of the bank. Adopt this provision, you will thereby create an Herculean power, which will have at its mercy all the minor institutions of the States; thus constituted, it can oppress and destroy them, as whim or interest may dictate. The steps which have been taken preparatory to a dissolution of the present bank, it is said, occasion much embarrassment, and threaten with ruin many of our citizens; if the present capital of ten millions can thus affect society, who will pretend to accumulate present evils, or risk entailing misery on posterity, solely for the purpose of a temporary gain to the Government? In this question Pennsylvania is deeply concerned; she has several millions of dollars invested in her banks; this to her is a valuable source of revenue; upon this may she predicate much of her future prosperity; hence will she derive the funds requisite for future internal improvements; but if you fill up the blanks in this section with a considerable sum, all these prospects will be blasted forever; you will thereby destroy the tree from whose ramifications were to emanate the blessings of peace and the sinews of war. Those of her representatives who may deem it politic and constitutional to vote for a continuance of the charter of the United States' Bank, ought surely to oppose any increase of the present capital; we have been told that that which now exists has been found sufficient for all purposes, at a time when our commerce was much more extensive than we have reason to suppose will soon again be the case.

The history of the banks in our country informs us, that the one usually termed the Bank of North America was the first establishment of the kind which received the sanction of the Government. This institution was incorporated by an act of Congress, in the month of May, 1781, under the authority of the "Articles of Confederation." The present Bank of the United States was incorporated by an act of Congress, on the 25th of February, 1791, during the operation of the present Constitution of the United States.

Without an attempt to examine every hypothesis, which has been or which might be proposed, respecting the constitutionality of the principle, I will content myself with the statement of the case, such as it appears to my mind. The first public act which I performed as a member of the Congress of the United States, was, to swear solemnly that I would support the Constitution of the United States. It therefore is my duty to examine and consider its precepts, according to the best of my ability.

The "Articles of Confederation" and the present Constitution of the United States do not differ as regards any power delegated by the States to Congress, touching charters of incorporation. I can never persuade myself that the constitution was intended other than to have a definite meaning; or that it was ever contemplated to speak an equivocal language; ambiguity arises solely from the misconceptions of its interpreters; it is very plain and of easy comprehension, especially as it relates to the present question, since it is totally silent on the right to create corporations--its wisdom is further illustrated by the special provision for the only exclusive privilege which is consistent with a free and equal government, and that is in favor of genius.

The powers delegated by the States are special and defined, and, it is expressly declared by the constitution, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." This language needs no interpretation. I cannot for a moment permit myself to suppose, that the patriots who were tested during the long-continued uncertainty of the most important events of our Revolutionary period, and to whom was ultimately assigned the right and power to construct the instrument which is to guide us in the political labyrinth--that they intended this their great work should alone be explicable by that refined reasoning to which common sense is a stranger, I never can admit. Surely that which they framed for the good and security of every individual in the nation, must be expressed in a manner to be understood by ordinary men, and those whom it was intended to direct. Sir, if simplicity was not originally contemplated by the framers of the constitution, why the imposition on the people in publishing it to the world? Was it not a prodigal waste of labor and materials, to furnish every citizen of our country with a copy of that which can only be understood by professional men, or such as are eminently skilled in scholastic research? It had better remain a secret, concealed amongst the musty rolls in the archives of State, than be a puzzle for mankind. As long as this instrument is preserved pure and untarnished, it will receive a becoming respect from your fellow-citizens--it will be regarded as "the stupendous fabric of human invention." Remember, the present argument, in several important points of view, affects posterity in common with ourselves. You had better commit the unintelligible jargon to the flames, than by the agency of construction, neutralize wisdom by folly. Sir, if we have a constitution which the people cannot understand, I then say, cut the original into slips, and provide the means for a better; or, if that is not to be done, and we are to be ruled by the iron hand of power, in that case, as one of the American people, I will pray you to be graciously pleased to grant a plain bill of rights for our better government.

If we look back, and attentively view the occurrences which took place, when the law incorporating the present bank of the United States was enacted, we shall find our reasoning supported and confirmed by many important circumstances; we shall then perceive, that the act of incorporation was opposed on constitutional ground, by men who were and continue to be esteemed for their talents, political skill, judicial knowledge, probity and patriotism; and it has been admitted, that the arguments formerly urged are unanswerable. That the power to create corporations was never intended to be ceded on the part of the United States, is proved beyond all manner of contradiction; for we are told by the highest authority, by one who was a member of the General Convention, that it had been proposed to cede to Congress the power to create corporations, and that the proposition was rejected, after a deliberate discussion. In my opinion this decision is in proof of the sagacity and wisdom of those who made it; it was highly justifiable to retain this power to be exercised by the States; because, corporations are generally founded on circumstances, which are entirely local--as such, they can be better understood by the Legislatures of the respective States, than by that of the General Government.

The experience of every session proves that the decisions of Congress vary with the men who at different times compose that body; therefore, the act of February, 1791, can have no force in settling the principle contended for.

I have heard it urged, that the States have recognized the constitutionality of the United States' Bank, by their laws. I know of no law in any of the States, which declares this charter constitutional. Were it even proved, that several of the States had published this declaration, with me it would signify nothing, unless the sanction of two thirds of the States was thus had. On a former occasion, several of the States were induced, from peculiar circumstances, to relinquish for a time their right in favor of a particular case--I allude to the first establishment of the Bank of North America. If this had been intended to decide this very important question, without any reservation of their power in other cases, they would have expressed it in the most positive and unequivocal manner.

Sir, it may be asked, how did the Congress, whilst acting under the "Articles of Confederation," incorporate the Bank of North America, though their powers were no more extensive than those of the present Congress? We shall not lose by this investigation--they declared that "the exigencies of the United States rendered it indispensably necessary that such an act be immediately passed," and, at that period, the Board of War confessed they had not money sufficient to pay the expense of forwarding an express to the Commander-in-chief of the Army! Notwithstanding such urgent necessities on the part of the General Government, they were too conscious of the rights of the States to attempt a usurpation of authority, or to pretend to force this act without their sanction; accordingly, we find the resolution by which this bank was established followed by another, which recommended to the Legislature of each of the States the necessity to pass such laws as they judged requisite for giving the ordinance, by which the subscribers to the Bank of North America were incorporated, its full operation; every provision in the charter of this bank, to have full effect, was recommended to the Legislatures of the several States for their approbation. (See Journals of Congress for 1781, vol. 7th, pp. 257 and 258.)

It is a well-known and an important fact, that the subscribers to the Bank of North America did not rest satisfied of the authority of Congress to incorporate them; subsequently to the original act of incorporation, they accepted from the Legislature of Pennsylvania a charter by which their privileges were very much abridged.

Some maintain, the States having made it penal to pass counterfeits of the notes of the United States' Bank, is in proof of their recognizing the constitutionality of the institution. No one will pretend that these laws were intended other than to guard the people against fraud. These statutes were enacted without any connection with or reference to the principle upon which the original act was founded. It is but too well known, notwithstanding these salutary provisions, that counterfeit bank notes of every denomination are in daily circulation. I will ask, what would be the case if such laws had not been passed by the States? Sir, if it requires all our care to prevent an inundation from such bank paper as is acknowledged to be genuine, for Heaven's sake do not risk the security of the people, by an indirect sanction of such as is known to be spurious!

FRIDAY, January 18.

A motion was made by Mr. FISK, that the House do now adjourn; and the question being taken thereon, it was determined in the negative--yeas 6, nays 59.

Bank of the United States.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.

Mr. BURWELL'S motion for striking out the first section being still under consideration.

Mr. P. B. PORTER.--Mr. Chairman: As this bank has excited so extraordinary an interest in every part of the United States, and particularly in the State which I have the honor to represent; as I am apprehensive, from what took place yesterday, that I shall be found, on this question, in opposition to a majority of my colleagues; and, (what will always be an imperative motive with me,) as I think this bill aims a deadly blow at some of the best principles of the constitution, I feel it my duty to state to the House the grounds on which I shall be constrained to vote for striking out the section now under consideration.

I acknowledge that I had not, until lately, paid any particular attention to the question of the constitutionality of this institution. I stand, therefore, in this respect, on safer ground than the respectable member from North Carolina (Mr. MACON,) for I have no reason to suspect myself of any long-rooted prejudices on the question. The Bank of the United States was established at a time when I was not in the habit of troubling myself with such questions. I had been accustomed to think of it as an institution, the constitutionality of which was conceded by common consent. But, sir, when the question was again stirred, I felt it my duty to give it a thorough investigation before I should sanction it by my vote. I have given it, if not a thorough, at least a candid and impartial examination; and the result has been, a full conviction that we have no right to incorporate a bank upon the principles of the bill on the table, or rather, upon the principles of the original charter, which this bill proposes to renew. The ground of my objection is, that it assumes the exercise of legislative powers which belong exclusively to the State Governments.

I shall not touch the question of the expediency of this bank, much less the expediency of banking generally. If I were competent, which I confess I am not, to the task, I should think it a very unprofitable one, to follow the gentleman through all the mazes of the banking system--a system, sir, about the various and important operations and effects of which on civil society, aside from a few obvious truths which it furnishes, I have found that those gentlemen who have professed to understand them best, have differed most. As I propose to confine myself to the constitutional question solely, I hope I shall be allowed to take a little broader range on this point, than has been taken by the gentlemen who have preceded me.

I am aware how ungracious constitutional objections to the powers of this House are with those, and there are many such, who believe that the powers of the Federal Government are, at best, too contracted; and who would be glad to see all the State rights merged and sunk into a consolidated government. Whatever may be my speculative opinions on this subject, I can never be influenced, by motives of expediency, to swerve from my allegiance to the constitution. This sentiment is indelibly fixed on my mind, and I trust it is a common one to the members of this committee. That, in adhering strictly to the obligation we have taken to support the Constitution of the United States, we not only perform a sacred duty to ourselves, but we render a better service to the real and permanent interests of our country than we could possibly render by a departure from that obligation; even though that departure were to avert so serious a calamity as a general bankruptcy--a calamity which, in order to alarm the timid, has been held out as the inevitable consequence of a refusal to renew this charter.

I should be surprised at the general acquiescence which seems to have been yielded to the constitutionality of this institution, did I not believe that others had been as superficial in their examination of the subject as I had myself. When objections are made to the constitutionality of the law, the people, in the cursory views which they are accustomed to take of such objects, are apt to adopt, as the tests of its constitutionality, the powers of the State and Federal Governments collectively; and if they find nothing in the law offensive to the principles of civil liberty, nothing uncongenial with the spirit of a Republican Government, they rest satisfied, and do not trouble themselves with nice distinctions between the powers peculiar to the one or the other of these Governments. Such reasoning would, however, ill become the sagacity of this House.

One of the most serious dangers with which our Government is threatened, and it is a danger growing out of the very nature and structure of the Government itself, consists in its tendency to produce collisions between State and Federal authorities. The Federal Government, as was observed by my learned colleague, (Mr. MITCHILL,) is imperium in imperio, a government within a government; and the misfortune is, that there exists no friendly third power to decide the controversies which may arise between these two great, independent, and, in many respects, rival authorities. The public peace must be kept, if kept at all, by the conciliatory dispositions of the parties themselves. As then we have a common interest in the preservation of both these Governments--as we are as well the subjects of the imperio as of the imperium, we ought to act with great circumspection and delicacy in the assumption of powers which do not clearly belong to us. It is better to forego the exercise of powers to which we are entitled, if the exercise of them is not very important, rather than hazard the assumption of doubtful ones, the fatal consequences of which my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. BURWELL) has so justly deprecated.

The great line of demarcation between the powers of the State and Federal Governments is well understood. The powers of the State Governments extend to the regulation of all their internal concerns: those of the Federal Government to the management of all our external relations--external as regards the individual States, as well as the States in their collective capacity. The general ideas upon which our Republic is founded, are these: That small territories are better adapted to the successful administration of justice than large ones. In a Republic, where the people are the sovereigns and source of power, it is important that, in order to enable them to execute this power discreetly, they should possess correct information in relation to the character and conduct of their rulers, and in relation also to the character of the measures which they pursue, or ought to pursue; and this information is better attained in a small than in a large territory. The individual States have therefore reserved to themselves the exclusive right of regulating all their internal, and, as I may say, municipal concerns, in relation both to person and property. But a single State may be inadequate to its own protection against foreign violence; it may also be unable to enforce the observance of proper rules and regulations for carrying on its foreign trade and intercourse. The Confederacy of the States is therefore formed for the purpose of attaining these two objects, namely, the regulation and protection of the trade and intercourse of the States with each other and foreign nations, and their security against foreign invasion. It has some other objects in view of minor consequence, and immediately connected with these principal ones. The Constitution of the United States is the basis of this confederacy; and it is only necessary to read the constitution to perceive that it is nothing more than a delegation of specific powers for these specific purposes, and that the general sovereignty of the States over their respective territories is expressly retained by the States.

But, sir, independent of these specific powers and duties of the Federal Government, it has another and distinct set of powers and duties to perform and execute. The national domain, as it has been called, embracing the lands acquired by the Revolutionary conflict; the lands since purchased of foreign nations; and the lands ceded by the several States to the General Government, belong to the United States in their federate capacity; and no individual State, as such, has any claim to or jurisdiction over them. As to these lands the powers of the United States are sovereign, independent, and complete: and the Congress of the United States is the only legitimate authority for the exercise of this sovereignty. The powers of Congress, then, in relation to these territories, include the powers of both the Federal and State governments, in relation to the States. I have adverted to this branch of the powers of the Federal Government as a means of dispelling the obscurity which has been thrown over the constitutional question, to which I shall soon come, by confounding the powers of Congress over the States, with their powers over the territories. Arguments, to which I shall have occasion to advert in the course of my observations, have been used to justify the exercise of particular powers within the limits of the States, from our acknowledged right to and practical exercise of similar powers within the Territories.

In discussing constitutional questions, then, we lay down these axioms:--That in relation to the territories, the powers of Congress are supreme and exclusive; that in relation to the States, they are specifically defined and limited by the constitution--and that we have no right to exercise, within the limits of a State, any power as resulting from the general rights of sovereignty; because that sovereignty belongs to the States and to the people, and not to the Federal Government. To show that these two last positions are correct, I will read the tenth article in the amendment of the constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people."

As, then, the incorporation of this bank involves the exercise of legislative powers within the jurisdiction of the States, in relation to the rights of property between the citizens of those States; and as no power to incorporate a bank, eo nomine, is to be found in the constitution, it would seem sufficient for us to rest the argument here, by a mere denial of the power, and to call on the advocates of the bank to show its constitutionality. An attempt to prove this constitutionality has been made--not, however, sir, by arguments advanced by gentlemen on the other side of the House in their places, (for they have, so far, observed, and I understand that they will continue to observe, a profound silence on this question,) but by arguments which have been gratuitously introduced, by the agent of the bank. I allude to the pamphlet which has within a few days past been printed and distributed among the members, containing the celebrated argument of General Hamilton, "on the constitutionality of a National Bank." As that pamphlet is de facto, if not de jure, before the committee, I will, if the committee will indulge me, attempt to examine some of the principal arguments contained in it, and I will also notice some additional ones, advanced yesterday by my honorable friend and colleague on my left, (Mr. FISK.) In the course of the observations which I have to submit, I shall, without doubt, repeat arguments and remarks made by the gentlemen who have preceded me, and others which are familiar to the members of the committee. My excuse must rest in the difficulty of taking a connected view of the subject, without such repetitions. If I shall be so fortunate as to throw a single new ray of light on this important question, I shall feel amply remunerated for my trouble, and I shall think the time of the committee not altogether misspent.

The first argument in this pamphlet is founded on the sovereignty of the powers of Congress. The Federal Government is said to be sovereign as to all the objects for which that Government was instituted. A sovereign power includes, by force of the term, a right to all the means applicable to the attainment of the end for which that power is given; and therefore Congress may, in virtue of their sovereign power, create incorporations for attaining the ends or objects of those powers.

This argument is founded on what the logicians call petitio principii, or begging the question. The proposition, that the Government is sovereign, is assumed, to prove that it possesses the attributes of sovereignty: or, in other words, the fact of sovereignty is assumed, to prove that sovereignty. If the position that the powers of this Government are sovereign as to all the objects of them, be proved, I will concede the consequence, to wit: that we have a right to establish corporations to attain these objects--but I deny the fact of sovereignty. The acts of Congress, it is said, are declared by the constitution to be the supreme law of the land: and the power which can make the supreme law of the land, is necessarily a sovereign power. But I deny that this is a correct definition, or exposition of sovereignty. It is not the high nature of an act, nor the authority of the act, that stamps the character of sovereignty on him who performs it. The sheriff of a county who puts a man to death, under the sentence of the law, executes an act of as high import and authority as human power can execute; and yet the sheriff of a county is not therefore a sovereign. His authority is a mere delegated authority--his act is a mere ministerial, mechanical act. The idea of sovereignty imports the exercise of discretion--of judgment--of will. It is of the very essence of sovereign power, that you may execute that power, or not execute it--that you may execute it when you will, and how you will. A sovereign power, as to any object, includes a right to any means, and all the means applicable to the attainment of the object. But, sir, do Congress possess sovereign powers, or, what is the same thing, discretionary means, as to the attainment of the objects of this Government? No, sir. The constitution is not a general authority to Congress to attain the objects for which the Government was established; but it is an enumeration of the particular powers, or means, by which, and by which only, certain objects are to be accomplished. If the powers of Congress were sovereign, they would of necessity comprehend all the means applicable to the attainment of their objects; but inasmuch as they are specific and circumscribed, that very circumstance proves that they are not sovereign. The people of the United States are the true sovereigns of this country. From them all power emanates, and on their will all the authority of this Government depends. The powers of the Federal Government are mere delegated chartered authorities; and in the exercise of them we are tied down to the letter of the constitution. We have, to be sure, a certain latitude of discretion allowed us, within the letter and pale of the constitution; and so far we may be said to possess a sort of limited qualified sovereignty. But the constitution is the standard by which to measure the quantum and extent of our sovereignty. And our sovereignty, which is the result of the powers given in the constitution, is not the standard by which to measure the constitution. The constitution is the true bed of Procrustes--and our sovereignty, however unwillingly we may yield it, must be the victim.

Another argument, which is rather an argument to the favor than to the right of this bank, is, that it is an innocent institution; that, although its erection involves the exercise of legislative powers within the States, it does not abridge or affect the rights of the citizens, as secured to them by the laws of those States. A corporation, it is said, is a fiction of the law, a mere political transformation of a number of individuals from their natural into an artificial character, for the purpose of enabling them to do business to better advantage, and on a more extended scale; but, that when this political association, this legal entity, is once formed, it becomes subject to the laws of the State in which it happens to be placed.

I know, sir, that there is nothing formidable in the abstract idea of a corporation. It is a mere phantom of the imagination, invisible, intangible, and, of course, innocent. But, sir, when the legal effects of this incorporation are to invest the individuals whom it associates with privileges and immunities to which they were not before entitled; when this legal fiction is interposed to shield certain individuals from the liabilities to which they would be subject as ordinary citizens, it then becomes a matter of important and serious consequence. What are some of the legal effects of this incorporation?

One of its most obvious and distinguished characteristics is, that it exempts the private property and persons of the stockholders from all liability for the payment of the debts of the company. By the laws of every State in the Union, every man is, I believe, liable for the payment of his debts, to the full amount of his private fortune; and, in case that fortune prove insufficient, his personal liberty is at the disposal of his creditor; at least to a certain extent. Is not, then, the exemption from these liabilities an important immunity? Is it not an exclusive privilege secured to the stockholders of this bank? Assuredly it is. I know it has been said that a number of individuals may, by a private association, secure to themselves all the advantages of an incorporated company; that, by forming a common fund or stock upon which to do business, and issuing notes chargeable upon that fund, they may exonerate their persons and private property from all liability for the payment of the debts contracted in that business. I am no lawyer, sir; but if the law be what it is said to be, and what I believe it to be, summa ratio, then I pronounce this doctrine not to be law; for nothing can be more preposterous in principle than to say, that a man may, by his own act, avoid the force of an obligation which the law has made universal and unqualified. If a man owes a debt, acknowledges he owes it, and has received a consideration for it, the law has prescribed the nature and extent of his liability to pay it; and it is not for him to say that it shall only be paid out of a certain fund, or particular part of his property, and no other. When men contract a debt jointly, the legal obligation to pay it extends as well to the persons and separate property of the individual partners, as to their joint property.

Another feature of this incorporation is, that it authorizes the stockholders to take usurious interest for their money. By the provisions of the law, the bank may issue notes and make discounts to double the amount of their capital stock; and, in addition to that, to the amount of any moneys which may happen to be deposited in their vaults for safe-keeping; and this, too, independent of the debts created by these deposits. The bank, then, may, and in fact, in many instances, does draw an interest on three or four times its capital. Every State in the Union has laws regulating the rate of interest, and in most of the States this rate is fixed at six per cent. a year. By these laws it is made penal for a man to receive more than six per cent. interest for the use of any sum of money which, by a loan, he puts at hazard, and the use of which he deprives himself of. Now, sir, this bank is permitted, contrary to those laws, to draw an interest on twenty or thirty millions of dollars, when, in truth, the whole extent of its responsibility, the whole sum which it puts at hazard, and the use of which it foregoes, is only its original stock of ten millions. In answer to this, it will be said that an individual may, by issuing notes to an amount greater than his property, legally receive an interest on a capital which he does not possess. But it must be recollected, in case of the individual, that, although he may not at the particular time possess a property adequate to the payment of his debts, yet that all the property which he may subsequently acquire, will be liable for the payment of those debts; and what is more, sir, his personal liberty is always put in jeopardy. In this point of view, the liability and the hazard of the individual may fairly be said to be co-extensive with the whole amount of the capital on which he draws an interest; and which is often the case with the bank.

This bank incorporation possesses other qualities at war with the laws of the several States; one of which is, that it authorizes stockholders, who may be foreigners, to hold real estate. But, sir, I will not detain the committee any longer on this part of the argument, for this institution cannot be said to be innocent, as regards the rights of the States, when its effects on the rights of property are to exonerate the stockholders from some of the most important responsibilities which the laws of the several States have provided for the payment of debts; and when it authorizes the taking of usurious interest. I lay it down, then, as a position which cannot be controverted, that the granting of this charter is not only an interference with the municipal regulations of the several States in relation to the rights of property; but that it is an infraction of the rights of individuals as secured by those regulations.

But it is contended, that a right to incorporate a Bank of the United States is delegated to Congress by the constitution: and five or six different provisions of the constitution are referred to as giving this right. It is said that it is implied in the power to lay and collect taxes, in the power to borrow money, in the power to regulate trade and intercourse between the several States, in the power to provide for the general welfare, and in the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territorial and other property of the United States. The very circumstance of referring this right to many different heads of authority is, in itself, conclusive evidence that it has no very direct relation to any of them. For it can scarcely be imagined, that the single act of incorporating a bank can be at the same time any thing like a direct execution of so many and such distinct and independent powers. But I will examine these provisions separately.

Before I proceed, however, I will premise that all the arguments in support of the right to incorporate a bank, as deducible from the provisions of the constitution itself, are built up by the aid of the clause of the constitution, which has been sometimes called "the sweeping clause." I allude to the clause which declares that Congress shall have the right to pass all laws necessary and proper for the carrying into execution the delegated powers. All the powers in the constitution are given for certain ends or objects. But each power is not a general authority to attain a particular object, and comprehending, of course, all the means or powers applicable to its accomplishment; but, in most cases, it is a specific means for effecting some particular end, and all other means or powers (for means and powers are the same thing) conducive to the same end, are expressly excluded by the restrictive clauses of the constitution.

The mode of reasoning adopted by General Hamilton, and the other advocates of implied powers, is this: They first search for the end or object for which a particular power is given; and this object will be an immediate or ultimate one, as may best suit the purpose of the argument. Having ascertained the end or object, they abandon the power; or, rather, they confound the power and the object of it together, and make the attainment of the object, and the execution of the power given to accomplish it, convertible terms. Whatever, they say, attains the object for which any power is given, is an execution of that power. But the constitution gives to Congress a right to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the delegated powers; and, therefore, as the execution of a power and the attainment of its object are synonymous terms, the constitution gives to Congress a right to make all laws necessary and proper for attaining the ends or objects for which the various powers in the constitution are given.

I beg leave to read a passage from this pamphlet: "The relation between the measure and the end, between the nature of the means employed towards the execution of a power and the object, must be the criterion of constitutionality." Here then is the axiom--now for the application of it. The constitution gives to Congress the power to levy taxes, and also the power to borrow money. But the establishment of a bank is neither levying taxes nor borrowing money; nor is the law incorporating the bank a law to levy taxes, or a law to borrow money. But the immediate end or object for which these two powers were given, was, to enable the Government to raise a revenue; and a bank may promote this object. Then, sir, by a dexterous application of the argument which I have stated, the fallacy of which consists in the sudden and unobserved transitions which are made from the power to the object, and from the object back again to the power, they prove that the establishment of a bank is in execution of the powers to lay taxes and to borrow money. I will now, sir, proceed to examine the particular provisions of the constitution which have been relied on, and to place the subject in some different aspects.

In the first place, then, it is contended that the right to incorporate a Bank of the United States is included in the power to lay and collect taxes. And what is the argument by which this position is maintained? Why, sir, it is said that the law, by creating bank paper and making that paper receivable in payment for taxes, increases the circulating medium in which taxes are paid, and of course must facilitate the payment of them. That whatever facilitates the payment of taxes facilitates also the collection of them; and whatever aids or facilitates the collection of taxes, is a means for their collection. And, therefore, the incorporation of a bank is in execution of the power to lay and collect taxes.

No man, sir, ought to complain of the weakness of a Government, whose powers may be reasoned up by logic like this. Amidst the infinite variety of relations and connections, and dependencies and analogies by which all human transactions are allied to each other, he must be a weak politician who cannot, by hooking together a chain of implication like this, justify any and every measure of political policy or economy, as a means of executing some of the powers with which this Government is intrusted. Take this latitude of implication or construction, and you want no other power but the power to lay and collect taxes. It may be tortured into a justification of every measure which ambition itself could desire. No tyrant ever made a law without assigning the public good as the motive of it. No man on this floor, however wicked his designs, would venture to propose a measure (indeed few could be proposed) in favor of which he could not adduce some plausible argument, to show that it would tend to promote the general prosperity of the country. And in showing this he would show its constitutionality; for it is demonstrable that whatever would promote the general prosperity of the country, would, and for that very reason, facilitate, in some greater or less degree, the payment of taxes; and might therefore be justified as a means for the collection of taxes.

But, sir, the constitution, as I have said before, and I must repeat it again, for this is the radical source of all the error on this subject--the Constitution of the United States is not, as such reasoning supposes it to be, a mere general designation of the ends or objects for which the Federal Government was established, and leaving to Congress a discretion as to the means or powers by which those ends shall be brought about. But the constitution is a specification of the powers or means themselves by which certain objects are to be accomplished. The powers of the constitution, carried into execution according to the strict terms and import of them, are the appropriate means, and the only means within the reach of this Government, for the attainment of its ends. It is true, as the constitution declares, and it would be equally true if the constitution did not declare it, that Congress have a right to pass all laws necessary and proper for executing the delegated powers; but this gives no latitude or discretion in the selection of means or powers. A power given to Congress in its legislative capacity, without the right to pass laws to execute it, would be nugatory; would be no power at all. It would be a solecism in language to call it a power. A power to lay and collect taxes, carries with it a right to make laws for that purpose; but they must be laws to lay and collect taxes, and not laws to incorporate banks. If you undertake to justify a law under a particular power, you must show the incidentality and applicability of the law to the power itself, and not merely its relation to any supposed end which is to be accomplished by its exercise. You must show that the plain, direct, ostensible, primary object and tendency of your law is to execute the power, and not that it will tend to facilitate the execution of it. It is not less absurd than it is dangerous, first to assume some great, distinct and independent power, unknown to the constitution, and violating the rights of the States; and, then, to attempt to justify it by a reference to some remote, indirect, collateral tendency, which the exercise of it may have towards facilitating the execution of some known and acknowledged power. This word facilitate has become a very fashionable word in the construction of powers; but, sir, it is a dangerous one; it means more than we are aware of. To do a thing and to facilitate the doing of it, are distinct operations; they are distinct means; they are distinct powers. The constitution has expressly given to Congress the power to do certain things; and it has as explicitly withheld from them the power to do every other thing. The power to lay and collect taxes is one thing; and the power to establish banks, involving in its exercise the regulation of the internal domestic economy of the States, is another and totally distinct thing; and the one is, therefore, not included in the other.

Again, sir, it is contended that the right to incorporate a bank is implied in the power to regulate trade and intercourse between the several States. It is said to be so, inasmuch as it creates a paper currency, which furnishes a convenient and common circulating medium of trade between the several States. Money, sir, has nothing more to do with trade, than that it furnishes a medium or representative of the value of the articles employed in trade. The only office of bank bills is to represent money. Now, if it be a regulation of trade, to create the representative articles or subjects of trade a fortiori, will it be a regulation of trade to create the articles or subjects themselves. By this reasoning then you may justify the right of Congress to establish manufacturing and agricultural companies within the several States; because the direct object and effect of these would be, to increase manufactures and agricultural products, which are the known and common subjects of trade. You might, with more propriety say, that under the power to regulate trade between the States, we have a right to incorporate canal companies; because canals would tend directly to open, facilitate and encourage trade and intercourse between the several States; and, in my humble opinion, sir, canals would furnish a much more salutary, direct and efficacious means, for enabling the great body of the people to pay their taxes, than is furnished by banks. But, sir, these various powers have never been claimed by the Federal Government; and, much as I am known to favor that particular species of internal improvement, I would never vote to incorporate a company for the purpose of opening a canal through any State, without first obtaining the consent of that State whose territorial rights would be affected by it. There can be no question but canal companies, and agricultural companies, and manufacturing companies, and banking companies, may all tend, more or less, to facilitate the operations of trade; but they have nothing to do with the political regulations of trade; and such only come within the scope of the powers of Congress.

But, it is again said, that the right to grant this charter is included in the power to borrow money. The right is attempted to be deduced by a train of reasoning similar to that employed in relation to the provisions which I have already noticed--by forming a string of implications, by which you prove that a power to act in certain cases, and in relation to certain subjects, implies the power to create those cases and subjects to act upon. The Government, it is said, may want and must have money, in any great national crisis. A National Bank with an extensive capital will furnish ample means for loans, will facilitate the exercise of the power to borrow; and, therefore, the right to establish such a bank is implied in the power to borrow. No one, but a logician, sir, would imagine that a power to lend and a power to borrow had any relation to each other, much less could he conjecture that a power to borrow, and a power to create the ability to lend, mean the same thing. A plain unsophisticated man, on reading the constitution, would say, that the power to borrow necessarily, and by force of the term, pre-supposed the existence of the ability and disposition to lend; and that it could not be exercised unless such ability and disposition should actually exist. But the favorite doctrine is, that all powers are given for particular ends, and include all the means applicable to their attainment. Here the end is to borrow money; to borrow honestly if we can, but--to borrow. The ability to lend is a necessary means or ingredient toward perfecting the execution of the power to borrow. But, sir, let me ask, whether the disposition to lend be not as necessary a means towards accomplishing a loan as the ability? It unquestionably is. And, of course, by the doctrine that the end justifies the means, you may coerce the will to lend--and this too equally, in cases where the ability is created by Congress, and where it is derived from any other quarter. A loan obtained by bringing into fair operation all the implications of this power would be borrowing in an off-handed style. Such a loan, if effected by Bonaparte, we should call robbery; but in this mild Republic, it would be nothing more than the fair exercise of an implied constitutional power.

I have pursued this argument thus far, merely for the purpose of showing the absurdities into which this doctrine of implication will lead us. But suppose, sir, that the argument of the gentleman on the other side of the question be correct, to wit: that the power to borrow implies a right to furnish the ability to lend. What, I would ask, is the probable fact, as to the facilities which this bank will afford the Government in borrowing?

It will be conceded that we shall have no occasion for borrowing, except in case of war; and if we have a war, the probability is, that that war will be with Great Britain--I say this, not as a party man, sir, but because the interests of that nation, from her situation, and her rival pursuits, will be much more likely to come in collision with ours, than those of any other power. Now it is a fact, in evidence before the committee, that more than one-half of the stock of this bank belongs to British subjects: and although, as foreigners, they can have no direct agency in the affairs of the bank, yet we well know that through the instrumentality of their friends and agents, of whom there are unfortunately too many in this country, they may completely control its operations. Now I would ask, whether it is probable, that the British subjects would be willing to lend us money to carry on war against their sovereign? Would they not, on the contrary, exert the influence which they are said to possess over the moneyed interest of this country, for the purpose of depressing the credit of the country; for the purpose of crippling the operations of the State banks; and for the purpose of drying up the sources from which the Government might otherwise calculate to derive supplies? But, sir, this has little to do with the question of constitutionality, to which I will again return.

Another ground upon which the constitutionality of this institution has been attempted to be supported, is, that it is necessary to the regular and successful administration of the finances. There is no question, but the bank and its branches afford convenient places for the deposit and safe keeping of the public revenue. It is not to be controverted that they also furnish a safe, convenient, expeditious and cheap means for the transmission of moneys from one part of the United States to another, as they may be wanted by the Government; and if these facilities were not to be attained in any other way, I should say it would afford an argument in favor of a bank. Not a bank infringing and violating the rights of the States; but, a bank upon principles consistent with those rights.

But, sir, is there not, in every State in which there is a branch of the United States' Bank, also one or more State banks, of equal respectability, and of equal security--at least to the extent of any sum for which they are willing to undertake? These State banks may be used as depositaries for the public moneys, and they will be equally safe and convenient. And if you will give to these State banks the advantages of these deposits, as you have hitherto given them to the United States' Bank, they will furnish means for the transmission of moneys from place to place, equally safe, convenient, cheap and expeditious. This object will be attained by connections which will be formed between the banks of the different States. Such connections have already in many instances been formed. But they have not been carried to the extent they otherwise would have been, on account of the United States' Bank and its branches; between which there is so intimate and so necessary a connection.

But, in answer to this, it is said that if the Bank of the United States would be constitutional without the existence of the State banks, it is equally so with. That a power which is once constitutional is equally so at all times, and under all circumstances. That a right which must depend for its existence on the will of the State Legislatures, over whom we have no control, is incomplete, and indeed, as to us, is no right all. This argument is founded on the supposition that the Federal Government is a complete Government, containing in itself all the principles and powers necessary for its own operations, which supposition is wholly false. The Federal Government does not profess to be complete in itself. It is expressly predicated on the existence of the State Governments; and most of the facilities for its exercise are derived from the State governments. It cannot perform even its own peculiar powers and functions, without the aid and co-operation of the State authorities. How, let me ask you, sir, is your Government constituted? Your Senate is appointed directly by the State Legislatures. Your President and House of Representatives, indirectly, by the same authority. Suppose they should neglect or refuse to make these appointments, can you compel them to do it? No, sir. Can you punish them for not doing it? Not in the least. They may appoint or not, as they think proper; and if they should neglect or refuse to do it, your boasted complete Government would die a natural death, by its own imbecility. It is not fair, then, to say that a power is constitutional, because the Government would be incomplete without it. It is not fair to say, that what would be constitutional without the existence of the State Governments and their appendages, is equally so with. This would prove that you have a right to appoint your own President, Senate and House of Representatives. It would go to usurp all the powers of the State Governments; for the Government could not be said to be complete without possessing the powers of both Governments combined. Indeed, this Federal Government cannot be said to be complete as to a single power, without all the auxiliary powers of the State Governments; for there is not a single act which it can perform without their assistance, directly or indirectly. The very bank law now under consideration is an illustration of this--for how are the provisions of this law to be enforced; how are the debts which it authorizes to be contracted to be collected, but through the medium of the State courts? The doctrine of perfect rights, then, if it prove any thing, proves too much. If it proves that, in order to manage your revenues, you may establish banks within the States; it equally proves, that, in order to carry the provisions of your bank laws into execution, you may establish courts and offices within the States for that purpose. I think then, sir, I may fairly conclude, that so long as the State Governments furnish you with all the facilities which you can reasonably require for conducting your revenues by means of their State banks; so long it will be unnecessary--so long it will be improper--and, therefore, so long it will be unconstitutional to invade the jurisdiction of the States, to establish national banks.

But, sir, I will conclude by again cautioning my Republican friends, and my worthy colleague in particular, to beware how they familiarize themselves with this doctrine of constructive power. It is a creed at war with the vital principles of political liberty. The pride and the boast of the American Governments is, that they are the governments of the laws and not of men--that they are the regular and necessary operations and results of principles and powers, established in the moments of cool and deliberate reflection, by the combined wisdom of the nation; and that they are not the effects of the momentary passion, pride, interest, whim, or caprice of a few individuals collected on this floor.

Little did the framers of this constitution, when they were so nicely adjusting and balancing its various provisions--when they were so carefully erecting guards and barriers against the encroachments of power and ambition--little, I say, sir, did they imagine, that there lay concealed under the provisions of this constitution, a secret and sleeping power, which could, in a moment, prostrate all their labors with the dust. Still less, sir, did the people when they adopted this constitution, with even more caution and scruple than that with which it was formed, conjecture that they were signing the death-warrant of all their State rights. But, once adopt the doctrine that you may travel out of the letter of this constitution, and assume powers, merely on the ground that they will tend to facilitate the execution of powers which are here given; and you compass, at a single sweep, all the rights of the States; and form the basis of a consolidated Government.

Let the principle of constructive or implied powers be once established, in the extent to which it must be carried in order to pass this bill, and you will have planted in the bosom of this constitution a viper which, one day or another, will sting the liberties of this country to the heart.

When Mr. PORTER had concluded his speech, the question was taken on striking out the first section, and carried--59 to 46.

The committee rose, and reported to the House, who adjourned without taking a question on the report.

SATURDAY, January 19.

Another member, to wit, from New York, BARENT GARDENIER, appeared, and took his seat.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. SAWYER called for the order of the day on the unfinished business of yesterday--the bill continuing the charter of the Bank of the United States.

[The first section had been struck out in Committee of the Whole, and the bill reported to the House, and the question now was upon concurrence with that vote in committee. On that question the debate was renewed in the House, and, of necessity, the same ground gone over which had been trod in committee, and still more extensively. Finally the vote was taken, and the concurrence carried by one vote! so close was the contest in both Houses--in the Senate the question decided by the casting vote of the Vice-President--in the House, by one vote. The following were the yeas and nays:]

YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, William T. Barry, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, Matthew Clay, James Cochran, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, Meshack Franklin, Barzillai Gannet, Gideon Gardner, Thomas Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, James Holland, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, William Kennedy, John Love, Aaron Lyle, Nathaniel Macon, Alexander McKim, William McKinley, Samuel L. Mitchill, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas Newton, John Porter, Peter B. Porter, John Rea of Penn., John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, Samuel Ringgold, John Roane, Ebenezer Sage, Lemuel Sawyer, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, John Smilie, George Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Archibald Van Horne, Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehill, Robert Witherspoon, Richard Wynn, and Robert Wright.

NAYS.--Joseph Allen, Willis Alston, jun., Abijah Bigelow, Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, John Campbell, John C. Chamberlain, Wm. Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, John Davenport, junior, William Ely, James Emott, William Findlay, Jonathan Fisk, Barent Gardenier, David S. Garland, Charles Goldsborough, Thomas R. Gold, William Hale, Nathaniel A. Haven, Daniel Heister, William Helms, Jonathan H. Hubbard, Jacob Hufty, Ebenezer Huntington, Richard Jackson, jun., Robert Jenkins, Philip B. Key, Herman Knickerbacker, Joseph Lewis, jun., Robert Le Roy Livingston, Vincent Matthews Archibald McBryde, Samuel McKee, Pleasant M. Miller, William Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Thomas Newbold, John Nicholson, Joseph Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, junior, Timothy Pitkin, jr., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, Thomas Sammons, John A. Scudder, Samuel Shaw, Daniel Sheffey, Dennis Smelt, John Smith, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, James Stephenson, Lewis B. Sturges, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, John Thompson, Nicholas Van Dyke, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, and James Wilson.[11]

And then the House adjourned until to-morrow morning eleven o'clock.

SATURDAY, January 26.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, EDWARD ST. LOE LIVERMORE, appeared, and took his seat.

TUESDAY, January 29.

_Removal of Federal Judges on address of Congress._

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.

Mr. WRIGHT.--Believing, as I do, that the Constitution of the United States is not perfect, and as provision is made in the body of the instrument for amending its imperfections in the manner therein prescribed, I feel it an imperious duty to propose an amendment to it. Here let me remark, that its adoption was opposed by the patriots of America, at the time of its ratification, because of omissions important to liberty. It had not guarded against an establishment of religion; it had not secured the right of the people to keep and bear arms; it had not guarded against soldiers being quartered in our houses in time of peace, without our consent, it had not guarded against warrants being issued without oath; it had not guarded against a man's being put to answer without previous indictment; it had not secured the criminal in the trial by jury; it had not secured the trial by jury in cases of common law, and these omissions as due guards to the liberty of the citizens stand recorded in these amendments almost coeval with the instrument. The terms Federal and anti-Federal had their origin in the zeal of the respective parties at that time; the one insisting on its adoption with all these imperfections on its head, while the other insisted on these amendments; and it has always appeared to me, that on the adoption of the amendments that those who were called anti-Federals were really the Federals, the constitution being perfected by the adoption of these amendments. The foregoing amendments test its original imperfection, and I trust will lead this House to a temperate examination of the amendment I now propose to submit.

The amendment, sir, is to place the judiciary of the United States on the same foundation that the British judiciary are placed by their laws; by enabling the President, on the joint address of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, to remove a judge.

In England the judges held their commissions during the pleasure of the Crown, till the time of Charles the First, when the Parliament imposed upon the King the necessity of granting them during good behavior; till then the Crown, as the fountain of justice, held the uncontrolled direction of the commissions of the judges. At the same time, sir, the High Commission Court and Star Chamber were abolished. In the thirteenth year of William the Third, the judges, by statute, were to hold their commissions during good behavior, and by the same statute they may be removed by the joint address of both Houses of Parliament; and here let me remark, that under that tenure and responsibility, the British judiciary have attained a celebrity in history for their judicial integrity and correctness highly honorable to them, and which this amendment, I fondly hope, in time, may correctly attach to the judiciary of the United States. There are a variety of cases where the exercise of this power may be necessary for the safety of the people, which ought to be the supreme law. This power, I trust, will never be abused by the American Congress. I do not recollect a case under the British Government, where for fifty years it has been exercised, and I trust we shall not ascribe to ourselves an indisposition to the correct discharge of those functions which have been correctly exercised or rather not exercised at all for fifty years by the British Government. If in England, where the Crown is hereditary, the Lords hereditary and for life, and the Commons for seven years, this tenure and responsibility has been found necessary, I trust in this Government, where the President is for four years, the Senate for six, and the House of Representatives for two years, this judicial tenure and responsibility will be thought expedient, and that this amendment will be adopted by Congress, particularly as it is but a preliminary decision--as it must be submitted to the States, and cannot go into operation but by the consent of three-fourths of the United States. I have therefore thought fit to submit this resolution, and hope the reasons assigned will induce you to believe that I think it of such importance to the nation as to entitle it to your attention.

Mr. W. then submitted the following resolutions:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following section be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid and binding as a part of the Constitution of the United States:

Resolved, That the judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, may be removed from office on the joint address of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

The House refused to consider the motion--45 to 38.

WEDNESDAY, January 30.

Jared Shattuck's Claim.

The House resolved itself into a committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims on the petition of Jared Shattuck--59 to 29.

The report is favorable to the claimant--a bill for the relief of this person having in two former sessions passed this House, but not been acceded to in the Senate.

Mr. MONTGOMERY, in a speech of some length, opposed the claim, and moved that the committee rise, with a view to printing the papers relating to the claim, which he conceived was not fully understood.

This motion was debated, and lost--56 to 43.

The report was also debated, and agreed to--57 to 39.

The committee then rose and reported their agreement to the report.

THURSDAY, January 31.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, ORCHARD COOK, appeared, and took his seat.

Mississippi Territory.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the report of the select committee in favor of admitting the Mississippi Territory into the Union on an equal footing with the original States.

A desultory debate of two or three hours took place on the resolution.

Messrs. POINDEXTER, JOHNSON, GHOLSON, MCKIM, SHEFFEY, HOLLAND, and WRIGHT, spoke in favor of the resolution, and Messrs. BACON, PITKIN, QUINCY, BIGELOW, and BLAISDELL, against it. The arguments in favor of its passage were, among others, that the territory could, when possessing a population of 60,000, claim admission as a right; that it now contained probably 45,000, and would, more than probably, before a Representative could be elected under the new constitution, contain full 60,000 souls; that, after admitting Orleans to the rank of a State, with a minor population, at the present session, it would be the height of injustice to refuse the same privilege to Mississippi, which had been so much longer a part of the united territory, and against the admission of which into the Union none of the constitutional objections had weight which had been urged against the admission of Orleans. The opponents of the resolution argued that some respect was due to the feelings, however grounded, of the eastern States, in relation to the creation of new States on the western waters; that the admission of one State during a session was sufficient; if two were admitted into the Union, in the course of three months, the people of the eastern States would be justly alarmed at the diminution of their relative weight in the scale of the Union; that, since it was acknowledged the new State could not be represented before the thirteenth Congress, there could be no occasion for pressing this subject so urgently at this time. Why not, it was asked, wait for the actual census of the territory? The very solicitude which was manifested to get this subject through Congress, it was said, showed there was something wrong, and was a strong argument against the adoption of the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to in Committee of the Whole--ayes 62.

The committee rose, and reported their agreement to the resolution.

The question was then taken to concur with the Committee of the Whole in their agreement to the said resolution, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 68, nays 47.

FRIDAY, February 1.

Commercial Intercourse.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the following bill reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations:

A bill supplementary to the act, entitled "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes."

Be it enacted, &c., That no vessel owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which shall have departed from a British port prior to the second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and eleven, and no merchandise owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, imported in such vessel, shall be liable to seizure or forfeiture, on account of any infraction or presumed infraction of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement.

Mr. EMOTT moved to amend the same by striking out the words in italic, and to insert in their place, "or merchandise." The bill, as amended, would read as follows:

"That no vessel or merchandise shall be liable to seizure or forfeiture on account of any infraction, or presumed infraction, of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement."

Mr. EMOTT.--Mr. Chairman: As the bill which is now on your table is calculated to relieve our merchants in part from the restrictive system which has again been attempted to be put in operation, I so far approve of it; but as it does not appear to me to go far enough, I rise for the purpose of moving an amendment, which, if adopted, will once more give us a clear deck; and while I am up, the committee will permit me, as concisely as the nature of the subject will admit, to assign the reasons which induce me to propose the amendment.

By the law of the first of May last, the President was authorized, in case either of the great belligerents, before the third of March, revoked her anti-neutral edicts, to proclaim the same, and if the other did not in three months also revoke, a non-intercourse with her was to follow. On the second day of November, the President had proclaimed, as a fact, that France had made the necessary revocation; and it follows, if he was correct as to the fact, that on the second day of this month, the non-intercourse went into operation against Great Britain.

As many formerly, and more latterly, have doubted as to the fact thus proclaimed, it becomes, sir, a duty which we owe to ourselves and to the people, to inquire into its existence; for if it be true that no such repeal, as was contemplated by the law, has taken place; if, indeed, the President has been deceived, or was mistaken, we cannot too soon make it known, and relieve the country from the vexation and embarrassment which must result from the present state of things.

If, sir, additional motives were necessary, we may find them in the bills which have this morning been introduced into the House by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, at the instance of the Secretary of the Treasury, one of which goes to lay large additional duties, and the other to authorize a loan. The reasons assigned by the Secretary for this new and heavy tax on our citizens are, that as the greater part of our duties on imports are collected on goods coming from Great Britain and her colonies, and as those duties will cease with the revival of the non-importation, it becomes necessary, in order to prevent a defalcation in the revenue, to tax the production of other countries much beyond the present rate. On this presumed defalcation, too, in some degree depends the proposition for a loan, or, if a loan be necessary, the amount of it. In this point of view, it becomes highly important to ascertain whether the non-intercourse has gone into operation; for if it has not, I trust we shall not proceed to give form and shape to the recommendation of the Secretary, that we shall not burden the country with new taxes, or subject it to large loans.

In the commencement of this inquiry, Mr. Chairman, we naturally ask ourselves, what edicts are to be revoked, and how are they to be revoked? It is not material to extend this inquiry to Great Britain, as we know of no revocation on her part, and, under all circumstances, we have not, I fear, much reason to believe that there will be such revocation. But it may be well to notice here something which has the appearance of inconsistency, on the part of our Executive, towards that Government.

The non-intercourse law of March, 1809, contains a provision, that, "in case either France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," the President shall declare the same by proclamation, and the non-intercourse was then to cease as to the nation revoking. It was under this law, and in consequence of the power so given to the President, that the celebrated, though ill-fated arrangement, was made between the Executive and the British Minister, Mr. Erskine. Now, sir, by referring to this arrangement, you will find, that on April 18, Mr. Erskine proposed to Secretary Smith the revocation of the orders in council of January and November, 1807, as a compliance on the part of Great Britain with the terms of the act of March; and our Secretary, on the same day, declaring that the withdrawing of such orders would be deemed satisfactory by the President, the arrangement was completed on the 19th, and a proclamation accordingly issued on the ground, and assuming the fact, that the British edicts had ceased to violate our neutral commerce, and again opening the intercourse between the two countries after the 10th of June.

This arrangement, and the short and hasty correspondence connected with it, you will recollect, sir, were presented to Congress with the Message, at the opening of the summer session of 1809, and we then passed a law, the object of which was to ratify and to carry into effect the arrangement. Here, then, we have an explicit opinion from both the Executive and the Legislature, that the only British orders which came within the spirit and intent of the law of March, were those of January and November 1807, and that, when those orders were revoked, the edicts of Great Britain ceased to violate the commerce of the United States.

I pray you now, Mr. Chairman, to turn with me to the law of May last; you will there find the precise phraseology of the act of March: "In case either Great Britain or France shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," the President is to make known the fact by proclamation. The authority given to the President is in both cases the same, and it was to have been presumed that it would have been exercised on the same terms. But, sir, it will be found, on referring to the papers, that, under the act of May, the Executive made a further requisition. The revocation of the orders in council of January and November was not to satisfy us, but the blockade of the year preceding was to be also annulled.

In the letter from Secretary Smith to our Minister at London, of the 5th of July, 1810, and which enclosed a copy of the law of May, it is said, "that in explaining the extent of the repeal which is required on the British side, Mr. Pinkney will let it be distinctly understood, that it must necessarily include an annulment of the blockade of 1806;" and our minister accordingly, in his letter to Lord Wellesley, of the 21st of September, tells him it is his duty to state "that an annulment of the blockade of May, 1806, is considered by the President to be as indispensable, in the view of the act, as the revocation of the British orders in council." Nay, so far has the President gone in this particular as to give the French Government a pledge that this will be required on the part of Great Britain. In the letter from Secretary Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of July, 1810, the latter is authorized, if it should be found necessary, to "let it be understood that a repeal of the illegal blockades of a date prior to the Berlin decree, namely, that of May, 1806, will be included in the condition required of Great Britain."

It is not my intention at this time, to enter into a discussion on the subject of blockades, nor am I to be understood as giving countenance to the system of paper blockades, whether that system proceeds from or is attempted to be enforced by England or by France; but, sir, I have gone into this examination to show that the President has acted differently under two laws which ought to have the same practical construction, because the terms used in them were alike; that under the law of May, 1810, he added a condition to a settlement with Great Britain, which he did not require under the law of March, 1809; and why this difference?

Will it be said, that when the arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine the President had no knowledge of the blockading orders of May, 1806? Not so, sir. By recurring to a report made by Mr. Madison, as Secretary of State, in December, 1808, of belligerent decrees and orders affecting neutral commerce, you will find this very blockade; and certainly what he knew as Secretary in December, he must have known as President in the April following. Shall I be told the President had discovered that the blockade had been "avowed to be comprehended in, and identified with, the orders in council?" I fear this will not be a satisfactory answer. For, in this case, if the orders in council are rescinded, the connection between them and the blockade will then stand as it was supposed by the Executive to stand when the arrangement was entered into.

Persons, Mr. Chairman, more prone to jealousy than myself, and who are disposed to find fault with the late Executive projects, may perhaps point to that passage in the letter from Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinkney, of the 22d of May, 1810, in which it is said, that the President has read, with surprise and regret, the reply of Lord Wellesley to the note requiring explanations with respect to the blockade of France, which "evinces an inflexible determination to persevere in the system of blockade," as affording a reason for this added condition: they may say that it was thrust in when our Administration were satisfied that it would not be acceded to by the British, and for the purpose of preventing an accommodation with, and keeping up the irritation against, that nation. But while, for myself, I disclaim this inference, I must confess that I am at a loss to assign a sufficient motive for the difference in the two cases.

As to France, sir, what were the edicts to be revoked, and how revoked? I shall have occasion, before I sit down, to notice the Berlin and Milan decrees. But were there not other decrees?

We have before us the Rambouillet decree, with a date of the 23d of March, 1810, which declares that "all vessels navigating under the flag of the United States, or possessed in whole or in part by a citizen or subject of that power, which, counting from the 20th of May, 1809, have entered, or shall enter into the ports of our Empire, of our colonies, or of the countries occupied by our arms, shall be seized, and the product of the sales shall be deposited in the surplus fund." Thus embracing almost the whole of continental Europe; for, with the exception of the Russian ports on the Baltic, and two or three places in the European peninsula, every port frequented by the Americans belonged either to the Empire of France, to the colonies of that Empire, or to countries occupied by the forces of the Empire. The seizures under this decree were consequently great and distressing to our merchants.

This decree purports to be an act of reprisal on this country, and for what cause? Not for any act of hostility by us; not for any seizures or confiscations of French vessels or French property under the authority, or within the limits of this Government. No, sir, a pretence of this kind appeared too absurd to be inserted even in a French decree. It is true that General Armstrong, in his letter to Secretary Smith, of the 10th of September, 1810, communicates a verbal explanation which accompanied the last letter of the French Minister: "If you confiscate French property under the law of non-intercourse, they will confiscate your property under their decree of Rambouillet." Ay, sir, and they have given a practical explanation that they would confiscate our property under the decree, although we did not confiscate their property under the non-intercourse law. Look at the decree itself, and you will find the motive, or rather the pretext for this act of reprisal. It is grounded on the passing of the act of the 1st of March, 1809, and it is grounded on that alone.

Thus, because we deemed it advisable to pass a law which we supposed was a mere municipal regulation, inasmuch as it related to our own citizens, or our own territories; a law, which, according to its letter, applied equally to both belligerents, and which was not to commence its operation until the 20th of May, contained in itself a notice sufficient to prevent any injury to French subjects; for this cause, and for this alone, the Emperor adopts, as an act of reprisal, a decree which subjects to seizure and confiscation, not only American property which should reach the continent after notice of the decree, or even after its date, but property which arrived there at any time for the preceding twelve months. I will not stop to inquire what would and what ought to have been the feelings of the Administration and of the country, if such an outrage had been committed by England for such a cause. But, sir, if the French Government is allowed to have in the act of March an excuse for reprisal, we had better discontinue making laws altogether; for it is difficult to find in our statute book a law less hostile to France, or more within the right of an independent Government to enact.

To see the true character of this decree, we must approach it a little nearer; and with the letters of the Duke of Cadore in my hand--those letters, sir, which have occasioned our present embarrassments--I am strangely deceived if this proceeding of the French Government does not appear to partake of the nature of an offence which, as respects individuals, is called swindling. It is a taking of property under false pretences.

Allow me now, Mr. Chairman, to present you with another view of this decree. The Duke of Cadore, in his letter of the 5th of August, 1810, says: "Now Congress retrace their steps; they revoke the act of the 1st of March; the ports of America are opened to French commerce, and France is no longer interdicted to the Americans." And in his letter of the 7th of September, he uses these expressions: "His Majesty has always wished to favor the commerce of the United States. It was not without reluctance that he used reprisals towards the Americans, while he saw that Congress had ordered the confiscation of all French vessels which might arrive in the United States."

"As soon as His Majesty was informed of this hostile act, he felt that the honor of France, involved in this point, could not be cleansed but by a declaration of war." Now "the American vessels which shall arrive in France, will not be subject to confiscation, because the act of Congress, which had served as a motive to our reprisals, is repealed." From this exposition of the views of the French Government, handed to us by the Minister of Exterior Relations, we perceive that he places the Rambouillet decree entirely to the account of the non-intercourse law of March; and from the course of reasoning used by him, it seems to be admitted that the decree, and the seizures under it, could not be justified, but while the obnoxious law was in force.

But we here again meet with another of the mistakes of this most just Government, which is so jealous of its honor and so friendly to our commerce. The fact happens to be that the law never was repealed. By its own limitation it expired with the then session of Congress, and, of course, went out of existence on the 28th of June, 1809. Thus this poor law, which is now brought up in judgment against us, had quietly descended to the tomb of the Capulets almost a year before the Emperor and King thought it consistent with his interest, or for the honor of his empire, to commence his measures of retaliation. The limitation clause could not have escaped the attention of His Majesty when he read the law; and, I trust, we yet have pride enough to believe that he knows there is an American Congress, and notices the periods of our meeting and departure, if he is careless about our proceedings. When, therefore, Napoleon issued the plundering decree of Rambouillet, he knew that the law on which he placed his justification had long since expired. But he knew a further fact, that the law never did affect French vessels. The British navy kept them at home, and we excluded English vessels only. Such was the practical and the only practical operation of our law.

I am aware that the apologists of the Emperor will point to the act of the 1st of June, 1809, as reviving or continuing certain sections of the law of March. Let me not be misunderstood, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to insinuate that the Emperor has apologists in this House, in this ark of independence and liberty of a great people; but, in whatever place this suggestion shall be offered, it may be answered that the French Government have not noticed the last law in their decree, or in any of their official papers. And it may be further remarked that the law of June, like that of March, was limited to the end of the next session of Congress, and, of course, ceased its operation on the 1st of May, 1810. As the decree issued on the 14th of May, and the seizures under it were after that time, it would seem, to a man of common understanding, who believes the transactions between nations are, or ought to be, regulated by the rules of honest, plain dealing, that the Emperor, when he had knowledge of the fact, would have loosened his hold on our property. And yet we find that, when we approach him on this subject, he laughs us to scorn.

The object which I had in view, in this examination of the Rambouillet decree, was, to mark its true character, to show that this decree emphatically outraged our neutral rights, and that, if it was submitted to by this country, our code of national rights will be found hereafter in the same books with those of the kingdoms which belong to the Confederation of the Rhine. Our merchants are induced to adventure to France by a prospect of large profits, and by promises of great security if their vessels have not been "denationalized." They take there many a valuable cargo, until the amount of property becomes an object of imperial attention, and then it is seized upon by an irresistible and unrelenting hand, without notice, and upon pretexts void of any foundation. Can a decree, or order, or edict, be pointed out in the long history of our wrongs and our sufferings, which is more strongly marked with injustice, or which more strongly "violates our neutral commerce?"

I will not detain the committee by entering into a particular examination of the French decrees, which, in the commencement of the last year, authorized the seizure of such a number of American vessels at St. Sebastians, at Naples, and in the North of Europe. It would lead me too far into the views and conduct of the French Government towards this country, for the purposes of this discussion. But, sir, in this volume of documents, I see, with emotions which I am sure are in unison with those of the American people, the famous note, signed "Champagny, Duke de Cadore," of the 4th of February last, written to justify those seizures, and, as he says, "that the President may the better know the friendly intentions of France towards the United States, and her favorable dispositions to American commerce;" in which we are told that we are "without just political views, without honor, and without energy." And are we so sunk in the estimation of the mighty conqueror, that he thinks it necessary and proper to use this as his official language towards us? Surely, sir, he mistakes the character and the spirit of this people if he believes they are to be broken down, or brought into his views, by insults or threats. As our Government had, a few months before, discharged and disgraced a British Minister for a supposed insult by an insinuation, it was to have been expected that, on this occasion, equal spirit would be shown. But to such as formed corresponding expectations, what will be their feelings when they find that the only Executive notice of the note is found in the letter of Mr. Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of June last, in which the Secretary says, that, "as the John Adams is daily expected, and as your farther communications by her will better enable me to adapt to the actual state of our affairs with the French Government, the observations proper to be made in relation to the seizure of our property, and to the letter of the Duke of Cadore, of the 14th of February; it is, by the President, deemed expedient not to make, at this time, any such animadversions."

Let us now see, Mr. Chairman, whether these decrees have been "so revoked or modified as that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States."

These decrees have two distinct operations, the seizure of our property, and the subsequent sale of that property; and, without attempting to prove a proposition which appears self-evident, I shall take it for granted that, if it was an infringement of our rights to seize the property, it is equally an infringement of our rights to proceed to the confiscation and sale of such property. Nay, sir, if we allow to the French Government the plea of retaliation, the infringement of our rights will commence with the confiscation and sale of our vessels after the cause of retaliation has been removed by us, and known so to be by the Emperor. A revocation or modification of these decrees, so that they should cease to violate our fair commerce, therefore, would look as well to an indemnity for the past as a security for the future; it necessarily includes a restoration of the property already taken, as well as an engagement against future captures. This appears to have been, at one time, the opinion of our Administration; for you will find, by recurring to the letter from Secretary Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of June, 1810, which enclosed a copy of the law of May, the determination of our Executive is thus made known: "If, however, the arrangement contemplated by the law should be acceptable to the French Government, you will understand it to be the purpose of the President not to proceed in giving it effect, in case the late seizure of the property of the citizens of the United States has been followed by an absolute confiscation, and restoration be finally refused." And in the letter from Mr. Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of July, this determination is expressed with added strength: "As has been heretofore stated to you, a satisfactory provision for restoring the property lately surprised and seized by the order, or at the instance of the French Government, must be combined with a repeal of the French edicts, with a view to a non-intercourse with Great Britain; such a provision being an indispensable evidence of the just purpose of France towards the United States."

Without asking for the evidence which the President had as to the repeal or modification of these decrees, I now put it to the committee whether every member of it is not perfectly convinced that if any modification, or suspension, or repeal, has taken place, it goes no farther than to restrain future seizures, leaving the property already seized to take the course of confiscation and sale? Do we not know, that, in the months of October and November, our vessels and merchandise have been brought under the hammer in pursuance of those decrees; and have we not lately seen, in our public journals, a list of some eighteen or twenty ships advertised by the French Government for sale at Bayonne, on the 5th of December? Nay, sir, the Executive was informed, before he issued his proclamation, by the letter from the Duke of Cadore to General Armstrong, of the 12th of September, 1810, that, "as to the merchandise confiscated, it having been confiscated as a measure of reprisal, the principles of reprisal must be the law in that affair." Words cannot be found which would more satisfactorily "evince an inflexible determination" to retain the property. As the principles of reprisal are to be the law, it follows that a restoration of the property depends on the discretion of the Emperor, and is not to be claimed by us as a matter of right, but of favor. And what have we to propose, according to the principles of reprisal, to obtain the restoration? Is it, that we have suffered the non-intercourse law to expire? Why, sir, this had taken place long before the letter of the Duke of Cadore. Is it a restoration of French property seized under the law of non-intercourse? This cannot take place; because, in truth, there was no such seizure.

We will now examine whether there has been such a revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees as warranted the proclamation. And here let me remark that, when the President acted under this law, he was not exercising the treaty-making power. He was the mere agent of the Legislature, and as such agent, he was confined and limited by his letter of attorney, the law. He had not, therefore, as has been asserted, a discretion, nor had he any thing to do with considerations of comity or courtesy. He was to ascertain when there was an actual and practical revocation, and then make known the fact; the consequences were left with the legislature. Indeed, sir, this power to give publicity to a fact might have been committed to one of the Secretaries, or to a clerk in the offices, and if it had, we should have smiled at the suggestion that its exercise depended on considerations of courtesy.

Mr. Chairman, when the proclamation first appeared, my impression was, and such, too, I understood to be the general impression, that the President had some document unknown to the American people. The letter of the Duke of Cadore, of the 5th of August, was already before the public, but it was not credited that on this letter the proclamation had been issued. Since we have received the Message the subject is at rest. It is now known and acknowledged that the President had not, and to this moment has not, any other evidence of a revocation. Now, sir, in this letter, I see neither the form nor the substance of a revocation.

What is the understanding of the French courts and officers, on this subject. I have already presented you with that part of the letter of the Duke of Cadore, of the 5th of August, in which he says, that since Congress have retraced their steps, by revoking the act of the first of March, "France is no longer interdicted to the Americans." Now, if this letter is in the form of a decree, it revokes or modifies the Rambouillet decree equally with those of Berlin and Milan, inasmuch, as long as the former continued in force, France was interdicted to the Americans. And yet we find, in a letter of the Duke of Cadore, of the 7th day of September, our Minister inquiring, "Has the decree of His Majesty of the 22d day of March last been recalled?" And General Armstrong, in his letter to Mr. Smith of the 10th of September, remarks, that this inquiry "may appear to have been useless, after the declaration, that American ships which will hereafter arrive in the ports of France shall not be subject to confiscation; but understanding from the Council of Prizes, that until some act be taken which had the effect of recalling, by name, the decree of the 23d of March, they must consider it both as existing and operative, and of course binding upon them," and he had presented the subject again.

Here, then, we have the opinion of the French court, most known and most important to us, the Court of Prizes, that the letter of the Duke of Cadore is not in the form of a decree, and has not the force and effect of a decree. In addition to this, we have the act of seizure of the brig New Orleans Packet, by the director of the customs at Bordeaux, in December last, under the Berlin and Milan decrees. As the letter of the Duke of Cadore had been published in France prior to this period, no one will believe that if it was in form of an edict of the Empire, the seizure would have been made.

But if the contents of this letter had been embodied in a formal act, would it have amounted to such a revocation or modification of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as that they ceased to violate our neutral commerce?

I remark first, that the revocation, if it be one, was a future and not a present revocation. "The decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and, after the first of November, they will cease to have effect." Now, sir, although there is an affected obscurity in this sentence, the intent is most obvious. As long as a law continues in operation, so long it must be unrepealed, and as these decrees were to have effect until the 1st of November, it follows, that on no construction can they be considered as revoked until that period. Indeed, on this point the Duke of Cadore is quite explicit in his letter to General Armstrong of the 7th of September, in which he tells him, that American vessels arriving in France before the first of November, although not liable to confiscation, "will be subjected to all the effects of the Berlin and Milan decrees."

But, again: the revocation, if any, was not only future, but it was also conditional; "it being understood, that in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their Orders in Council and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish, or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English." A condition--a qualification--a restriction. Is it not obvious, from the very terms of the letter, that it contains a condition that the repeal is a qualified one? The words "it being understood," are not only expressive of this, but they are singularly appropriate. If, however, we were inclined to doubt, we must be satisfied by the letter of the Duke of Cadore to General Armstrong, of September 7th, in which it is said, that the Emperor "repeals his decrees of Berlin and Milan, under the conditions pointed out in my letter to you of the 5th of August."

Our Ministers, General Armstrong and Mr. Pinkney, appear to have puzzled themselves much about this condition, to discover whether it was a condition precedent, or a condition subsequent. To me, sir, the idea of a condition subsequent to a repeal, is rather novel; but it may nevertheless be just. In common understanding, it is believed, that when a law is repealed it is extinct, and if it be so, then its appendage, the condition, would seem to be at an end of course. But in the view which I am about to take of this subject, it is not necessary to settle this point, as it must be conceded, that whether we call the condition a condition precedent, or a condition subsequent, the same consequence will follow: if the condition is not complied with, the decrees must be in force still. Now, sir, it appears to me that the conditions, attached to this pretended or proposed repeal, are of a nature which have not, and will not be complied with.

First, sir, as to the conditions on the part of England: "The English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish." With respect to the Orders in Council, I have nothing to say either as to their justice or their policy. Heaven knows they have been to us, from the moment of their inception, sore evils; the causes of great vexation, embarrassment, and losses; and I hope the period is not far distant when we shall be no longer disturbed by them. But, sir, I wish to call your particular attention to the other branch of the condition, that relating to blockades. We have been so long in the practice, and justly in the practice, of complaining of paper blockades, that at the first blush we are induced to believe the condition relates to them, and to them alone. Are these the blockades which are intended? Let the Emperor and King answer for himself. In the official note from Count Champagny to General Armstrong, of the 22d of August, 1809, we have this declaration: "A place is not truly blockaded until it is invested by land and by sea; it is blockaded to prevent it from receiving the succors which might retard its surrender. It is only then that the right of preventing neutral vessels from entering it exists." But we have it under the hand and seal of the Emperor himself, what he means by the "new principles of blockade." In the Berlin decree there is an enumeration of real or pretended interpolations, on the part of Great Britain, in the law of nations; among which we discover these: "that England does not admit the right of nations as universally acknowledged by all civilized people; that she extends to ports not fortified, to harbors and mouths of rivers, the right of blockade, which, according to reason and the usage of civilized nations, is applicable only to strong or fortified ports." And it is declared that "the decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the Empire, until England has acknowledged that the rights of war are the same on land as at sea--and until the right of blockade be restrained to fortified places actually invested by competent forces."

There can be no misunderstanding on this subject. The Emperor offers to give up his Berlin and Milan decrees, if the British will renounce their new system of blockade; and in these very decrees he explains what he means by this new system; that, besides paper blockades, it is the attempt to blockade the mouths of rivers and harbors, and ports not fortified. Now, sir, I will admit, if we could prevail on Great Britain and France thus to limit the right of blockade, it would add much to our security at home; for as we have no fortified places, although we may have places with fortifications, it would follow that we should never be subject to a blockade. But is it true that according to the usages of nations this is a novel system, or one now, for the first time, put in use by the British? Or is it believed, that a nation like England, whose effective force for offence and defence is a maritime force, can or ought to subscribe to a system of blockade which confines its exercise and right to "fortified places actually invested?" What would be the effect of such a system in the present war? France has surely not to apprehend an invasion from England; and if any of the commercial places on her extensive coasts are fortified, the fortifications may be dismantled or destroyed with great safety. As soon as this is done they become "harbors and ports not fortified," and have no longer to apprehend any inconvenience from the pressure of a naval force. Is it not obvious that England will not comply with her part of the condition, and that the Emperor never expected that she would?

As to the conditions on the part of this country--"The United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected." What rights, Mr. Chairman? The right of not being vexed or endangered by paper blockades? Yes, sir, and more; the right of not being interrupted in a commercial intercourse with cities situated on rivers, as Antwerp for instance; or to carry on a free trade with all the continental ports and harbors not fortified, although the whole British navy may be cruising at the mouth of the river, or in sight of the port. But we have a further declaration of neutral rights which the French Emperor says he will allow when France has a marine proportioned to the extent of her coasts and her population, and which, so long as the British shall continue to be masters of the sea, he insists we shall claim and exercise. Thus, in the note from Count Champagny to General Armstrong, of the 22d of August, 1809, "France admits the principle that the flag covers the merchandise. A merchant vessel, sailing with all the necessary papers from its Government, is a floating colony. To do violence to such a vessel by visits, by searches, and by other acts of an arbitrary authority, is to violate the territory of a colony. This is to infringe on the independence of its Government." In other words, the flag is to protect the property, and search is not to be permitted. I pray you, sir, to bear in mind, that since the formation of this Government, and under every Administration, the right of blockading, by an actual present and efficient force, ports and places not fortified; the right of search, and the principle, that enemy property is not protected by the character of the vessel, has been recognized or conceded.

But how are we to cause these rights to be respected? By putting in force the non-importation law? Suppose the British should not believe themselves excessively injured by this measure; that, in fact, it operated to their advantage, and we are suffered to bring on premature decay and old age, by this political quackery. Would this satisfy the Emperor? No, sir. He would soon tell us that we had not caused our rights to be respected. It is idle to believe that he will deem the non-importation a compliance with his condition; nor, to me, does his language convey this idea. We are to oppose, or declare ourselves against the British, and in the spirit of our law and of his declaration, we are to cause our rights to be respected, not by self-destroying measures, but by actual force and open hostility, if the English nation will not, without it, subscribe to the terms which have been presented to it. Recollect the history of our embargo and former non-intercourse, the propositions made under them by our Government to the French Government, and how these propositions were received, and you will be satisfied of the nature and extent of the present condition.

And now, let me ask, whether we are prepared for these conditions? Whether we believe in all the rights which the French Emperor condescends to claim for us from the British, although he will not admit them himself? And whether we are prepared to go to war for them? To me the conditions, both on the part of this country and Great Britain, appear inadmissible. At all events, I think that the President, before he acted on a proposition so loose and general, which admits of so much doubt, and can, by fair construction, be carried to such extravagant lengths, ought to have asked and received explanations and particulars.

But it may be said that the letter of the Duke of Cadore, if not itself a decree, is evidence that there is a rescinding decree. To my mind, Mr. Chairman, it has internal marks to the contrary; but, without troubling the committee with any further comments on the letter, I observe, that viewing it as a mere matter of evidence, it may be fortified or explained by other evidence. I have already read to you parts of the letters from Secretary Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of June and the 5th of July, which declare the determination of the President not to carry the non-intercourse law into effect against England, unless France not only revoked her decrees, but restored our sequestered property. We are to presume that our Minister made known this determination to the French Court, as it was his duty so to do. Now, with this declaration before him, is it to be credited that the Emperor would revoke his decrees, when he was given to understand that the revocation would lead to no result on our part, inasmuch as he did not release our property? Is it not obvious, from this circumstance alone, that the letter is a mere proposition in answer to the one made by our Government, expressive of the views, and stating the terms on which the Emperor would revoke?

Again, sir, we have the letter of Mr. Russell to Secretary Smith, of the 11th of December, 1810, informing our Government that the brig New Orleans Packet had been seized at Bordeaux a few days before, under the Berlin and Milan decrees, by the director of the customs. And we have had communicated to us, by the President, the note from Mr. Russell to the Duke of Cadore, of the 10th of December, stating this seizure to have been made under the decrees, and giving an additional fact, that the case of this vessel was the first which had occurred after the first of November, to which the decrees could be applied. As this seizure was made under the decrees, it shows the impression in France to be, that they still are existing and in force; and the evidence is the stronger, as coming from the custom-house of one of the principal trading towns, where surely the revocation must have been officially known, if it had taken place. I am aware it is said that Mr. Russell must have been misinformed as to the cause of the seizure, or that the custom-house officer mistook his duty. But as to both of these suggestions, I will only remind you of the silence of the French Government. The remonstrance of Mr. Russell was handed to the French Minister on the 10th of December, and the vessel which bore the despatches, brought Paris accounts to the 27th of December, and did not leave France until the 1st of January. If Mr. Russell had any explanation or answer from the French Government it would have been communicated to us; but he had none. The silence of the French Minister is equal to an express affirmance of the act of the custom-house officer, and is an admission that the decrees have not been revoked.

SATURDAY, Feb. 9.

Commercial Intercourse.

On motion of Mr. EPPES all the orders of the day were laid on the table, and the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill supplementary to the act concerning commercial intercourse, &c.

Mr. EMOTT'S motion being under consideration, to amend the bill so as to repeal the law of May last, &c., Mr. RHEA made a motion superseding that, viz: to strike out the whole of the bill.

Mr. EPPES said, that when, on a former day, this bill, designed only for the relief of our own citizens, was under discussion, subjects not at all connected with its merits were brought into view. A gentleman from New York (Mr. EMOTT) presented to the House on that occasion his view of our foreign relations, and exercised all his ingenuity to show, as it is but too often the practice here, that the Government of the United States is exclusively wrong, and the Government of Great Britain exclusively right. It seems that in this enlightened age new duties are assigned to a Representative. Under the pressure of every injury which foreign influence can inflict, a Representative is considered as discharging his duty, if, with a fine-spun web, he can present, under a suspicious aspect, either the motives or the acts of the Executive branch of his Government. No nation, ancient or modern, unless in the last stage of corruption, can be produced where, as in the United States, periods of difficulty have been seized by the Representatives, and the weight of their talents exclusively employed for increasing the public embarrassments. The speech of the gentleman from New York, however well he may have covered it under mildness of manner and a fine-spun argument, is designed to convey to the people an idea, that the Executive has manifested partiality towards France in the late arrangement. The gentleman tells us, that while the Minister of one foreign nation was denounced here for an implied insult, the letter of the Duc de Cadore to Mr. Armstrong is passed over almost in silence; that the Secretary of State, in a letter to General Armstrong, tells him that the President thinks it unnecessary to make any remarks on it. The gentleman ought to have gone further, and stated the whole fact: that the letter of General Armstrong in answer to the Duc de Cadore was approved by the President; that, by the approval, he adopts as his own the language and sentiments of that letter. The letter of General Armstrong, by the approval of the President, has become the act of his Government. For the sentiments contained in that letter the American Government is responsible, and not General Armstrong. The firm, manly, and eloquent reply of General Armstrong to the Duc de Cadore stands precisely on the same footing as if it had been originally written under the directions of the Government. General Armstrong did not wait for instructions. He repelled, in a style comporting with the dignity of his station, the charges of the Duc de Cadore. The President, through the Secretary of State, approves his letter, adopts it as his own, and says he has nothing to add. Well, indeed, sir, might he say so, because the Minister had already said, in a style as pleasing to his country as to his Government, all that the occasion demanded. But, sir, the gentleman from New York cannot agree with his colleague in considering the President of the United States correct in issuing his proclamation. Why, sir, does the gentleman disapprove of the President's proclamation? Because, says the gentleman, the letter of the Duc de Cadore, of August, was not a repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees. It is a mere promise that on a certain day they shall be withdrawn. When, sir, the President received the declaration of Mr. Erskine, the British Minister, that, on a particular day, the Orders in Council would be withdrawn, and issued a proclamation founded solely on that declaration, his conduct was warmly approved by men of all parties. The gentleman from New York joined in the burst of applause heaped on that Executive act. Was the letter of Mr. Erskine a repeal of the British orders? Unfortunately, we know practically it was not. Was it such a repeal as the gentleman contends ought to have taken place of the Berlin and Milan decrees, viz: under the sign manual of the Emperor? No, sir, it was just such a letter as that of the Duc de Cadore. In both cases the word of the Minister was taken as a pledge, and, on examining the two letters, so far as they may be considered a pledge, the words are nearly the same. I approved of the arrangement with Mr. Erskine; so did the gentleman from New York. I cannot see any difference in the ground taken by the Executive, except that one arrangement was with Great Britain, and the other with France. The one affected the interests of Great Britain; the other affects the interests of France. The gentleman from New York, more nice in distinctions than myself, may, perhaps, satisfy himself and the people that these two cases are marked by lines so strong as to render the conduct of the Executive in the one case an object of applause and approbation for himself and his friends, and in the other of suspicion and censure. It is not, however, my intention to pursue the gentleman through his argument. There is one part of it which I consider it a duty to pass in review, inasmuch as it is calculated to give to the public an erroneous view of the grounds taken by the Executive in the recent negotiation with Great Britain. The gentleman says, the President has not only required of Great Britain to withdraw her orders, but her blockades also. This, he says, she cannot and never will yield. This declaration is made, too, in the presence of the agent of Great Britain, who must have heard with delight the American Executive held up to suspicion, and an American Representative declare, on the floor of Congress, that demands were made on Great Britain, not sanctioned by the law of the last session. In order, sir, to support this declaration, the gentleman gives a view of the demands of the Executive on Great Britain totally incorrect and contradicted by every part of the correspondence before us. The gentleman tells you, that we have demanded of Great Britain not a withdrawal of the Orders in Council only, as contemplated by the law of last session, but of her "novel blockades." To establish the demands of the Executive, he turns, not to the correspondence, but to the Berlin or Milan decrees, and takes for our demand on Great Britain the definition of blockade given by the French Emperor. The gentleman is entirely mistaken as to the demand made of Great Britain by the Executive. The revocation of but one blockade, viz: that of May, 1806, is included in the demand of the Executive. The features of this blockade render it different from all other blockades. It is, in fact, from its character, more like the Order in Council, a permanent regulation in commerce, than a blockade. I will, however, first show from the correspondence, that the President did not, under the act of the last session, require the revocation by Great Britain of any blockade except that of May, 1806; and then, that from the peculiar features of that blockade, it must have been included in the demand made under the act of the last session. In the Message of the President, at the commencement of the session, pages 4th and 5th, we find the demand stated in the following terms:

"Under the modification of the original orders of November, 1807, into the orders of April, 1809, there is, indeed, scarcely a nominal distinction between the orders and the blockades. One of these illegitimate blockades, bearing date in May, 1806, having been expressly avowed to be still unrescinded, and to be, in effect, comprehended in the Orders in Council, was too distinctly brought within the purview of the act of Congress, not to be comprehended in the explanation of the requisites to a compliance with it. The British Government was accordingly apprised by our Minister near it, that such was the light in which the subject was to be regarded."

This is the language of the President. In pages 38 and 39 of the correspondence, we find the declaration of Mr. Smith, our Secretary of State, to General Armstrong, in the following words:

"If the non-intercourse law, in any of its modifications, was objectionable to the Emperor of the French, that law no longer exists.

"If he be ready, as has been declared in the letter of the Duke of Cadore, of February 14, to do justice to the United States, in the case of a pledge on their part not to submit to the British edicts, the opportunity for making good the declaration is now afforded. Instead of submission, the President is ready, by renewing the non-intercourse against Great Britain, to oppose to her Orders in Council a measure which is of a character that ought to satisfy any reasonable expectation. If it should be necessary for you to meet the question, whether the non-intercourse will be renewed against Great Britain, in case she should not comprehend, in the repeal of her edicts, her blockades which are not consistent with the law of nations, you may, should it be found necessary, let it be understood, that a repeal of the illegal blockades of a date prior to the Berlin decree, namely, that of May, 1806, will be included in the condition required of Great Britain; that particular blockade having been avowed to be comprehended in, and, of course, identified with the Orders in Council. With respect to blockades, of a subsequent date or not, against France, you will press the reasonableness of leaving them, together with future blockades not warranted by public law, to be proceeded against by the United States in the manner they may choose to adopt."

In pages 45 and 46, we have the declaration of General Armstrong and the Duke de Cadore. Mr. E. then read the following:

From General Armstrong to Mr. Pinkney.

PARIS, January 25, 1810.

"SIR: A letter from Mr. Secretary Smith, of the first of December last, made it my duty to inquire of His Excellency the Duke of Cadore, what were the conditions on which his Majesty the Emperor would annul his decree, commonly called the Berlin decree; and whether, if Great Britain revoked her blockades, of a date anterior to that decree, his Majesty would consent to revoke the said decree? To these questions I have this day received the following answer, which I hasten to convey to you by a special messenger:

ANSWER.--"The only conditions required for the revocation, by his Majesty the Emperor, of the decree of Berlin, will be a previous revocation, by the British Government, of her blockades of France, or a part of France, (such as that from the Elbe to Brest, &c.,) of a date anterior to that of the aforesaid decree."

In page 47, we have the statement of Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the fifteenth ultimo, wherein you request to be informed whether any, and if any, what blockades of France, instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the first day of January, 1807, are understood by his Majesty's government to be in force? I have now the honor to acquaint you, that the coast, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to Brest, both inclusive, were notified to be under the restrictions of blockade, with certain modifications, on the 16th of May, 1806; and that these restrictions were afterwards comprehended in the Order of Council of the 7th of January, 1807, which order is still in force."

In page 71 of the correspondence, Lord Wellesley declares, in a letter to Mr. Pinkney:

"The blockade, notified by Great Britain in May, 1806, has never been formally withdrawn. It cannot, therefore, be accurately stated, that the restrictions which it established rest altogether on the Order of Council of the 7th of January, 1807; they are comprehended under the more extensive restrictions of that order. No other blockade of the ports of France was instituted by Great Britain, between the 16th of May, 1806, and the 7th of January, 1807, excepting the blockade of Venice, instituted on the 27th of July, 1806, which is still in force."

From this, sir, it appears that if we are to credit the President, the Secretary of State, General Armstrong, the Duc de Cadore, and the British Minister, Lord Wellesley, the demand was confined to the blockade of 1806. Was this blockade such a violation of the neutral rights of the United States as to come decidedly within the act of the last session? Let us examine its features. This blockade is a compound one, presenting three distinct characters:

1. It obstructs a trade from one port to another of the same enemy--France for example. This trade has been denied latterly though not formerly, by Great Britain, to be free to neutrals. The United States assert the neutral right to it.

2. It obstructs a trade from the port of one enemy to the port of another--from a French to a Dutch port, for example. This is a principle not before asserted by Great Britain. The present Cabinet of Great Britain contended against its conformity to the law of nations, in opposition to their predecessors, who attempted to justify the orders of January, 1807, on that principle.

3. It obstructs the direct trade of neutrals from their own country to any part of the coast from the Elbe to Brest--a coast not less than a thousand miles. For this part of the blockade there can be no defence which is not applicable to the Orders in Council. This blockade has been continued for four or five years. No force, either adequate or inadequate, has been stationed for carrying it into effect. No new notification has been given. It is, in fact, like the Orders in Council, a permanent regulation of commerce, and has nothing of the character of a blockade, except the mere name. This blockade consists in great part of the same prohibition with the orders of January, 1807, in which it is said to be comprehended; that is, against a trade along the belligerent coast. If the orders be unlawful, therefore, the blockade must be so; and if the orders be repealed as a violation of neutral trade, in compliance with the act of Congress, the obligation to repeal the blockade, as a like violation, cannot be contested. This blockade of May, 1806, is in violation of the principles laid down by all authors on the subject of blockade. It is in violation of the principles laid down in all the treaties which attempted to define a blockade. It is in violation of the principles contended for by every Administration under the American Government, from the period of WASHINGTON to the present time. The correspondence under General WASHINGTON'S Administration, between the Secretary of State and Mr. Hammond, may be referred to for the principles asserted under that Administration. In the correspondence before us we have the principles as laid down by General Marshall and Mr. King. To these I will refer.

Mr. E. then read the following extracts of letters from Mr. King and Mr. Marshall:

From Mr. King.

"Seven or eight of our vessels, laden with valuable cargoes, have been lately captured, and are still detained for adjudication; these vessels were met in their voyages to and from the Dutch ports, declared to be blockaded. Several notes have passed between Lord Grenville and me upon this subject, with the view, on my part, of establishing a more limited and reasonable interpretation of the law of blockade, than is attempted to be enforced by the English Government. Nearly one hundred Danish, Russian, and other neutral ships have, within a few months, been, in like manner, intercepted, going to and returning from the United Provinces. Many of them, as well as some of ours, arrived in the Texel in the course of the last winter; the severity of which obliged the English fleet to return to their ports, leaving a few frigates only to make short cruises off the Texel, as the season would allow.

"My object has been to prove that, in this situation of the investing fleet, there can be no effective blockade, which, in my opinion, cannot be said to exist without a competent force, stationed and present at or near the entrance of the blockaded port."

_Extract of a letter from Mr. King to Lord Grenville, dated_

LONDON, May 23, 1799.

"It seems scarcely necessary to observe, that the presence of a competent force is essential to constitute a blockade; and although it is usual for the belligerent to give notice to neutral nations when he institutes a blockade, it is not customary to give any notice of its discontinuance; and that consequently the presence of the blockading force is the natural criterion by which the neutral is enabled to ascertain the existence of the blockade, in like manner as the actual investment of a besieged place is the only evidence by which we decide whether the siege is continued or raised. A siege may be commenced, raised, recommenced and raised again, but its existence at any precise time must always depend upon the fact of the presence of an investing army. This interpretation of the law of blockade is of peculiar importance to nations situated at a great distance from each other, and between whom a considerable length of time is necessary to send and receive information."

_Extract of a letter from Mr. Marshall, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, dated_

SEPTEMBER 20, 1800.

"The right to confiscate vessels bound to a blockaded port, has been unreasonably extended to cases not coming within the rule, as heretofore adopted.

"On this principle, it might well be questioned, whether this rule can be applied to a place not completely invested by land as well as by sea. If we examine the reasoning on which it is founded, the right to intercept and confiscate supplies, designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns, invested by sea only, is an unjustifiable encroachment on the right of neutrals. But it is not of this departure from principle--a departure which has received some sanction from practice--that we mean to complain. It is, that ports, not effectually blockaded by a force capable of completely investing them, have yet been declared in a state of blockade, and vessels attempting to enter therein have been seized, and, on that account, confiscated."

I have shown, from the correspondence, that the blockade of May, 1806, was the only one included in the demand of the Executive. I have shown that it is not only a violation of our neutral rights, but of the principles contended for by men of all political parties under every administration of this country; and I cannot but express my regret that the gentleman from New York should consider that, under the law of the last session, this blockade ought not to have been included in the demand of the Executive on Great Britain; that he should declare in the hearing of the British agent that demands had been made by the Executive of the United States which it would be extremely convenient for us if Great Britain would allow, but which she never could yield. The gentleman from New York has entered into an argument to show that the Berlin and Milan decrees are not repealed. We have just heard of the arrival of a French Minister; he has left France at a time to bring us certain information on this question. I have no wish to enter on this interesting question, with a bandage round my eyes. Whether France has complied with her engagements; whether France has failed in her engagements, cannot be a subject of ingenious speculation many days longer. Whatever may be the information received, I shall endeavor to adhere to what I deem the real interests of my country, and, so far as I am able, to maintain its rights against the unprincipled aggressions of every foreign nation.

I will now make a few observations on the bill before the House. It contains but a single section, and exempts from forfeiture goods owned wholly by citizens of the United States, which shall have departed from a British port prior to the second day of February, 1811. When the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the subject of modifications of the non-intercourse system was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, it appeared to be the unanimous sentiment of the committee, that goods which had left a British port, before the President's proclamation reached the port, ought to be exempt from the penalty of the non-intercourse law, although they might not arrive until after the 2d day of February. It was considered not inconsistent with an honest compliance with our engagements with France, and seemed to be required by that general principle of policy which is adhered to in all free countries, of allowing sufficient notice to its citizens of the commencement of penalties and forfeitures. The bill for enforcing the non-intercourse system was reported with that limited provision. After the bill was printed various statements were received by the committee, all tending to show that the orders of our merchants were sent out in September and October; that, from the change in the actual state of commercial capital in this country, goods were at present purchased with cash, and not only became the property of our citizens under the orders of merchants sent before the President's proclamation issued, but were at the risk of the purchasers; that these goods were actually paid for before the President's proclamation issued; that they could not be brought in before the second day of February. The committee having previously decided that time ought to be allowed for the President's proclamation to reach a British port, and taking into view the great injury our own citizens would sustain from a rigorous construction of the law, determined to extend the time to the ultimate period at which a citizen could put his property on board without infringing the laws of his country. It is not supposed that the construction put upon the law is strictly within its letter--it is, however, perfectly within its object. It was designed to operate on the nation refusing to modify or withdraw its edicts. To give it a construction which would either confiscate property bona fide American, or lock it up in British ports, would be to destroy our own resources, and produce no effect on Great Britain. Under the sixth section of the law, it is not made unlawful to put on board British manufactures with the intent to import them, until the expiration of the three months after the proclamation; its being unlawful after that period depended on Great Britain's following the example of France and revoking her edicts; according, therefore, as the citizen was more or less sanguine, his interest might be more or less involved by supposing that Great Britain would withdraw. Orders sent previous to the issuing of the President's proclamation violated no existing law. Those sent afterwards cannot be considered as given in violation of law, inasmuch as the commencement of the law depended on a contingency, viz: the modification or withdrawal of the British orders. There is another circumstance which operated on the committee: The law of the last session was not considered by the committee as a plain rule of action which every citizen could clearly comprehend, and so arrange his affairs as to avoid its penalties. The fourth section of the act of last session revives certain sections of another act, on the happening of a certain event, three months after that event shall have been proclaimed by the President. This reviving section does not declare that on and after three months from the date of the President's proclamation there shall be non-intercourse, but that particular sections of a former non-intercourse law shall be revived. Each of the revived sections contain the words "20th of May next," and it has been made a question whether these words are revived as part of the sections. It is not supposed by me that such is a proper construction of the law. It is only stated for the purpose of showing that the law was not in that clear, decided form in which penal statutes ought to be enacted. In the construction given to the law, more regard was paid to its objects and principles than to its strict letter. And if, for the purpose of affording relief in cases peculiarly hard and operating on our own citizens exclusively, we have placed on the law a construction not warranted by its letter, I hope we shall be justified by the purity of the motives under which we have acted.

Mr. EMOTT explained.

Mr. STURGES said be was happy that he felt himself so situated that he could avoid that course of discussion upon the present occasion, so much reprobated by the honorable gentleman (Mr. EPPES) from Virginia. He said he should not undertake to enter into a discussion of our foreign relations, nor say much upon our restrictive system; that his friend from New York (Mr. EMOTT) had already done that fully and ably.

He said he was at present inclined to support the amendment proposed by the honorable gentleman, (Mr. RHEA, of Tennessee,) and if the words should be stricken out as proposed by that gentleman, (as one good turn deserved another,) he hoped he would be disposed to support a proposition, which he (Mr. S.) would then submit to the committee. If the committee should agree to strike out, Mr. S. would then propose to insert in lieu thereof, after the words "be it enacted" the following words, (which he read to the committee,) viz: "That an act entitled an act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes, passed May 1, 1810, be and the same is hereby repealed."

Mr. S. said he was inclined to favor the amendment of the gentleman from Tennessee on another ground. He was not willing to imply by any vote of his a recognition of the efficacy of the non-intercourse law, so called, which could not, in his opinion, upon any principle, have any operative force, until the 20th of May next. He flattered himself, if gentlemen would be so good as to attend to him, that he should be able to demonstrate to their satisfaction the truth of this position; and that the chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, exercising his usual candor, would himself be satisfied. The law, passed March 1, 1809, contained a number of sections which went to prevent importations from Great Britain and France, and their dependencies. This law (containing a clause limiting its duration) was to expire at the end of the next session of Congress. The then next session of Congress ended the last of June, 1809. The law of March, 1809, therefore, then expired. The law of May 1st, 1810, enacted that certain sections of that of March, 1809, should be revived upon certain contingencies. Those sections, thus revived, are the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 18th. Mr. S. then recurred to those sections, and read the third, which is as follows:

[The section was here read.]

Mr. S. said it was unnecessary to read the other sections to which he had referred, as the phraseology, as to the time when they were to take effect, was the same as in the section which he had read. He said it would not answer the purpose of gentlemen who held a different opinion from him, to argue in such a case as the present, from the intention of the Legislature. He said it was a principle, in construing penal statutes, to construe them strictly. But he said it was not necessary for him, in support of his position, to resort to this rule of construction. The words of these sections are explicit, and the meaning plain. They are revived in the law of May, 1810. They must be considered as revived in todidem verbis--as the whole of the sections are revived generally, it is not competent to say that one part of the section is revived, and not the other part. If they had been transcribed verbatim, and incorporated in the law of May, 1810, there could have been no question; and there can be no difference as to this point between that case, and reviving them without excepting any part. Mr. S. therefore concluded, that as the expressions in the sections referred to were, that they were to take effect the 20th of May next; and the law reviving them passed the 1st of May, 1810; that they cannot have any efficacy until the 20th of May, 1811. And he said the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. EPPES,) in attending to this point, had implied his doubts upon it by saying, that as there might be doubts among lawyers, though among unlearned men there could be none, the Committee of Foreign Relations, in reporting the bill now under consideration, were disposed to give a liberal construction to the meaning of the Legislature. But, said Mr. S., this cannot help the matter. No new law, in the nature of an explanatory law, can give efficacy to the former one, if that law would otherwise have no force. If, then, he was correct in his ideas upon the subject, and he thought every lawyer in the House must be of his opinion, Mr. S. asked, what is the consequence? He said that, from the 2d of February, any seizures which have been or shall be made by your custom-house officers, cannot be considered as legal. Your Federal courts cannot condemn property so seized; and in case they are made, your State courts will sustain actions of trover and trespass in favor of the owners thereof against such officers.

Mr. WRIGHT.--Mr. Chairman: The gentleman from New York (Mr. EMOTT) labored yesterday for three hours on his proposed amendment to the bill under consideration, and exercised all his ingenuity to seduce us into a violation of the faith of the nation, pledged in the act entitled "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes." By this act the nation pledged itself to Great Britain and to France, "that if either of them should so revoke or modify their edicts that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, that the President should, by proclamation, declare the same; and that, three months after the date of said proclamation, no goods, wares, or merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the other nation, her colonies or dependencies, should be imported into the United States." The Government, strictly preserving her neutral character, at the same moment presented to both nations the same proposition, and by the solemnity of that act, in the face of the world, pledged the faith of the nation to the faithful performance of the condition above stated, on their part to be performed, in the event of either Great Britain or France so revoking or modifying their edicts that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States.

France, on the 5th of August, 1810, did so revoke her edicts that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, after the second day of November; and, although the fact has been established by the letter of the Duke of Cadore, of the 5th of August, to General Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, and by him communicated to the President of the United States; and, although the President did, by his proclamation, bearing date the second of November, in obedience to the said act of Congress, declare "that the edicts of France violating the neutral commerce of the United States had been so revoked or modified, that, from and after the second day of November, they would cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States;" whereby, after the expiration of three months from the date of said proclamation, by virtue of the act aforesaid, "no goods, wares, or merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain, her colonies or dependencies, should be imported into the United States, unless she, before the expiration of that time, revoked her edicts." Yet, sir, this gentleman, to the bill on the table contemplating a faithful execution of the non-intercourse law against Great Britain, has proposed an amendment that "no vessel or merchandise shall be liable to seizure or forfeiture, on account of any infraction, or presumed infraction, of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement;" thereby substantially to repeal the non-intercourse act, although France has revoked her decrees, and Britain has refused to revoke her Orders in Council, and by the last information from our Minister in London, every spark of hope of their being revoked had been extinguished.

That gentleman, a representative of the American people, has proposed this direct breach of public faith, and as a pretext to the unprincipled act, has had the temerity to declare "that the President had no authority to issue his proclamation; that the assurances of France to our Government were deceptive; that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not revoked; and that the non-intercourse act is not in force;" and thus has arraigned the President for issuing his proclamation.

By the constitution, the Departments of the Government are distinctly marked, and the President authorized, as the legitimate organ, to discharge every function of the Executive. Besides, the non-intercourse act has expressly authorized and directed him, by proclamation, to declare the fact of the revocation or modification of the edicts which the belligerents were by that act invited to revoke.

As well might that gentleman question the legitimacy of a treaty after it had been ratified and declared by proclamation, or an act of Congress after it had passed the usual forms and been duly published. Sir, this act of the President, as to every fact stated, implies absolute verity, and, like any other record, can be tried only by itself.

Had the gentleman contented himself with the discharge of his legislative duties, and indulged the President in the exercise of his Executive functions, we should have been relieved from a long speech, calculated only to inculpate the President and expose the gentleman's devotion to Great Britain. How, I ask, could the President act a different part, from the evidence in the case? The Duke of Cadore, the French Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris, in writing, informed General Armstrong, the American Minister at that Court, on the fifth of August, "that he was authorized to declare to him, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the first of November, they will cease to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish, or, that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English." General Armstrong immediately communicated it to the President, who, being thus in possession of the information, was not only authorized, but bound to issue this proclamation.

I would ask, if this diplomatic evidence, the established mode of communication between nations, is not to be received and respected, if national confidence is not destroyed, and an end put to all diplomatic intercourse? Was not the President, in good faith, bound to believe the fact, and, believing it, bound to act as he did?

Sir, if Great Britain had made the like communication through Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney, and he to the President, who had, thereupon, issued his proclamation, what would have been the conduct and language of this gentleman and those who think with him in political opinion? They would, I have no doubt, been prepared to eulogize the President, and publicly approve the act. In this assertion I am not left to conjecture, but will prove it by the most unequivocal evidence, if the gentlemen are consistent with themselves. You will recollect that, by the act of the first of March, eighteen hundred and nine, interdicting the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their colonies and dependencies, after a certain period, unless they should so revoke or modify their edicts that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the President in the case of either power, so revoking or modifying their edicts, was authorized by proclamation to declare the same, whereby the interdictions were, as to the power so revoking, to be suspended, and in force only against the other; and I hope you never will forget the deep game that was played by Great Britain on that occasion, and the diplomatic trick that was practised on our Administration by Mr. Erskine's memorable treaty. The President then placed full faith in the act of the British Plenipotentiary, and, on the signing of that treaty which revoked the Orders in Council, immediately issued his proclamation, and thereby dissolved the commercial injunction, whereby Great Britain was supplied with the necessaries of her existence. Then the President acted promptly, as in the case of France; then he acted on the information of the British Minister as he did in the case of France on the information of the French Minister. Then the treaty revoking the Orders in Council was rejected by the British Government; but now, in the case of France, the revocation of her decrees is confirmed and carried into full effect. But the proclamation in the case of France is denounced by the gentleman from New York as neither formal, substantial, nor by authority, although by comparing it with the proclamation in the case of Great Britain, which I hold in my hand, it will be found formally and substantially a copy of it, varied only as to the Government to whose proceedings it relates. When I assure you that the President's proclamation in the case of Great Britain met with the approbation of the gentleman from New York and his political friends, you will feel surprised at their partiality; but, when you examine the resolution of the House of Representatives approbating the conduct of the President in that case, you will feel no doubt of the fact.

Sir, this gentleman has told us that the non-intercourse act is not in force, and that the American people will not submit to its execution, notwithstanding the revocation of the French decrees, the continuation of the British Orders in Council, and the President's proclamation. Whence does this gentleman derive the power of declaring an act of Congress not in force, declared by the President's proclamation to be in force? Or in what section of the Union does the gentleman presume to say the American people will not submit to the law? That that gentleman's speech was intended to sow sedition among the people, and to encourage insubordination to this law, is too obvious.

Sir, the decrees of France, now they are revoked, seem to be more obnoxious to that gentleman than the British Orders in Council, now in full force. He denounces the Emperor for the Rambouillet decree, issued the twenty-third of March, eighteen hundred and ten; which subjected the ships of America to condemnation entering the ports of France, which the Emperor declares was an act of retaliation; because Congress had by their act of March, eighteen hundred and nine, subjected the vessels of France to condemnation entering the ports of the United States, yet that gentleman, when speaking of the British blockading order of eighteen hundred and six, issued without even a pretext, which by proclamation without investment subjected our ships to condemnation entering the ports of France, says, "with respect to their Orders in Council I have nothing to say as to their justice or their policy." He is prepared to condemn France for her act of retaliation, but he is not prepared even to speak of Great Britain's new paper blockading system, much less to declare it unjust or impolitic; although Sir William Scott, in 1 Robinson's Rep. page 96, expressly declares, "that no vessel was liable to condemnation for entering a port alleged to be blockaded, unless it was invested by such a naval force as to make the entry therein hazardous."

Sir, I am no apologist for France--nor do I know how any American, particularly a member of Congress, can be the apologist for either, after France and England have both expressly admitted, that their Orders in Council and decrees were direct violations of the law of nations, and adopted from necessity, as a measure of retaliation against each other, and have each charged the other with the first aggressions on our neutral rights. On examining that subject, I find that England, by her Orders in Council of May, eighteen hundred and six, by proclamation had placed France in a state of blockade; that France in eighteen hundred and seven had placed the British isles in a like manner in a state of blockade; that England, by her Orders in Council of the eleventh of November, eighteen hundred and seven, laid a toll on neutral vessels, and made them pass through her ports; France, by her decree of the seventeenth of December, eighteen hundred and seven, declared the vessels submitting to that order denationalized, and lawful prize; so that by their new principle of blockade, and their unprincipled retaliations, the commerce of the United States was cut up by the roots. The American Government, anxious to preserve the remnant of the property of the American merchants, that had escaped the rapacity of the tyrant of the ocean, on the twenty-second of December, eighteen hundred and seven, passes the embargo law, which the seditious clamors of certain arch traitors in the Eastern States, the violation of the law by treason and cupidity, induced Congress on the first of March, eighteen hundred and nine, to repeal, and to pass the present non-intercourse law, continued, under which France has revoked her decrees of Berlin and Milan, and now expects us to fulfil the conditions which we voluntarily imposed on ourselves, in the event of either revoking their decrees.

Sir, while Great Britain finds such able advocates on this floor, she will find no necessity to redress our wrongs, but will wait the issue of our proceedings in Congress, to see if our remedial laws are not repealed, or our citizens excited to oppose their execution. But we ought not to be surprised at this, when we take a retrospective view of their conduct, their united and uniform opposition to the Administration for many years. They have reprobated every measure--Mr. Erskine's British treaty only excepted--and, as soon as that was rejected by the British Government, as being made contrary to instructions, our Administration was charged with making it, knowing that Mr. Erskine had no authority, and with seducing him to make it contrary to instructions. Afterwards, when Mr. F. J. Jackson, of Copenhagen memory, was sent over as a Minister, while his hands were yet stained with the innocent blood of the inhabitants of Copenhagen, and insulted the administration with the charge of making the treaty with Mr. Erskine, knowing that he had no authority to make it, and after the peremptory asseveration "that Government had no such knowledge, that with such knowledge no such arrangement would have been made," and "that no such insinuation could be admitted," he replied, "that he made no insinuation, without being able to substantiate a fact, and in that I must continue;" thereby persevering in the charge of falsehood in the Administration for which he was dismissed. Again our Government was expressly charged with knowing that Mr. Erskine had no authority, and with dismissing Mr. Jackson without any just cause; that his charge was true, and that in this the Government acted under the influence of France. In order to make such an impression on the public mind, Mr. Jackson is treated with uncommon attention. When he arrives at Baltimore he is surrounded by tories, royalists, Burrites, and British agents, and treated with great politeness--when he arrives in Philadelphia, he is overwhelmed by the civilities of refugees, tories, Burrites, and United States' Bank directors--when he arrives at New York, he is received with open arms by a set of beings of the same description, who invite him to a public dinner, and to test their attachment to the British Government treat him to "God save the King"--when he reaches Boston, there is great parade indeed; he is welcomed to the city by tories, traitors, disorganizers, and embargo-breakers, and Fanueil Hall, once the Council Chamber of the patriots of the Revolution, is prostituted to the disgraceful purpose of a public dinner to this disgraced Minister, and there we see a distinguished Senator of the United States testing his loyalty by the toast of "Britain's fast anchored isle, the world's last hope." After this hasty review of the past, we ought not to be surprised at any measures that may be taken against the Administration, when Great Britain is in the question.

SATURDAY, February 23.

Commercial Intercourse.

Mr. MILNOR said: Mr. Chairman, when I take a view of the course which has been pursued in relation to this subject, during the present session, I confess I feel greatly surprised that we should be called upon to adopt the present measure. It will be recollected, sir, that, at a very early period, the honorable chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill supplemental to the act of the 1st of May last. Although the gentleman did make one or two feeble attempts to call it up for consideration, yet it was manifest that there was a general indisposition to act upon it at that time. This, in the opinion of myself and many others, arose from a doubt in the good faith of the Emperor of the French. It was true that he had, through the Duke of Cadore, declared that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked on the 5th of August and that they should cease to have effect after the first of November; and it was also true that the President of the United States had, by his proclamation of the 2d of November, declared, not simply that this promise had been given, but that the decrees were revoked, and had ceased to operate. Notwithstanding this declaration of the President, the previous conduct of the French Emperor inspired an almost universal doubt of his good faith, and the curious character of the declaration made by Cadore, was calculated to increase it. The decrees of Berlin and Milan were revoked; that is, dead on the 5th of August, and ceased to have effect; that is, to live on the first of November; thus this creature had the wonderful faculty of being dead and alive at the same time; of ceasing to have effect, and acting with full vigor at the same instant. While all was doubt and hesitation, despatches were received from Mr. Russell, our Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, which made it apparent that the decrees which were to cease to have effect on the first of November, were, in the month of December, still in existence, and in full and practical operation. It is now evident that the President was duped by the French Emperor, and led to issue a proclamation on the faith of his promise, declaring a fact which did not exist. So convinced were the House that this was the true state of the case, that the honorable chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations himself moved to recommit the bill he had previously introduced, and it was done. What, then, I would ask, sir, has since occurred to alter the face of affairs, to induce this new attempt to fasten on the restrictive system against our intercourse with Great Britain? Is there any thing in the last communication from the President, calculated to produce such an effect? On the contrary, it furnishes the most conclusive evidence of the treachery of Bonaparte, and ought to serve as a beacon to warn us against trusting him further. It is true that there is a letter from Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley, dated December 10th, in which the former labors to prove, that Cadore's note to Armstrong is an absolute repeal of the French decrees, without any conditions precedent, and that therefore the British Government ought to be satisfied of its validity, and take immediate measures for revoking their orders and blockades, agreeably to their promise. But, it unfortunately happened that, on the same day on which our Minister at London was performing his duty, in transmitting his able but theoretical argument to the British Ministry, our Minister at Paris was also performing his duty in remonstrating against the practical operation of those very decrees, which were to have ceased to have effect on the first of November. [Here Mr. M. read the letter of Mr. Russell to the Duke of Cadore, dated December 10th, remonstrating against the seizure of the brig New Orleans Packet, it being the only case, as declared by Mr. Russell, to which the decrees could be applied subsequent to the first of November.]

I recollect, sir, when Mr. Russell's correspondence was communicated to this House, an apology was set up for the French Emperor. It was alleged that the President's proclamation had not arrived in France at the time of the seizure of the New Orleans Packet, and that Bonaparte, having received no evidence of the intention of the American Government to fulfil their engagement, had used the precautionary measure of seizing the vessel, until he should receive some evidence of our good faith; and we were exultingly told that the President's proclamation would put all to rights, by satisfying his doubting Majesty of our sincerity, and would induce him to release all property seized subsequent to the first of November, and once more to put an end to those nine-lived decrees. How has this prediction been verified? The President's proclamation was communicated to the French Government on the 12th of December, two days after Mr. Russell's remonstrance; and yet, for any thing we know, that remonstrance remains unanswered, and the New Orleans Packet remains under seizure to this very day. It is true that, after waiting thirteen days, His Majesty condescended to direct the partial suspension of the decrees, thereby giving the most positive proof not only of their existence, but of their active operation. On the 25th of December, the Dukes of Massa and of Gaete, by the direction of their master, severally wrote a letter to the officers connected with their respective departments, directing them to suspend the operation of those very decrees, so far as respected the condemnation of vessels and cargoes seized after the first of November; not only those then in custody, but such as should thereafter be seized. I will read a part of those letters for the purpose of refreshing the memories of gentlemen on the subject. The Duke of Massa writes to the President of the Council of Prizes as follows: "In consequence of this engagement entered into by the Government of the United States, to cause their rights to be respected, His Majesty orders that all the causes that may be pending in the Council of Prizes, of captures of American vessels, made after the first of November, and those that may in future be brought before it, shall not be judged according to the principles of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, but that they shall remain suspended; the vessels captured or seized to remain only in a state of sequestration, and the rights of the proprietors being reserved for them until the 2d February next, the period at which, the United States having fulfilled the engagement to cause their rights to be respected, the said captures shall be declared null by the Council--and the American vessels restored, together with their cargoes, to the proprietors." The letter of the Duke of Gaete is of a similar import. I will read a single paragraph, which is as follows: "His Majesty having seen in these two pieces" (the President's proclamation and Gallatin's circular to the collectors) "the enunciation of the measures which the Americans purpose taking on the second of February next, to cause their rights to be respected, has ordered me to inform you that the Berlin and Milan decrees must not be applied to any American vessels that have entered our ports since the first of November, or may enter in future; and that those which have been sequestered, as being in contravention of these decrees, must be the object of a special report."

Here, sir, we find these two officers, by direction of their master, explicitly recognizing the existence of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and suspending their operation not as to sequestration, but only as to condemnation. Not only those which had arrived after the first of November, but those which should thereafter arrive, were to be held in a state of sequestration, and to be subject to a special report. With this plain statement before their eyes, will gentlemen assert, can they possibly believe, that the decrees were revoked and ceased to have effect on the first of November? They surely cannot. If, then, the declaration of the fifth of August is proved to be false, and the assurance that the decrees should cease to have effect after the first of November was mere delusion, what becomes of the act of the first of May, and of the President's proclamation? Sir, they are mere dead letters, having no binding force or operation. The practical operation of the act of the first of May was to depend upon the performance of certain conditions on the part of one or the other of the belligerents, and the President's proclamation was intended as a mere notification of such performance. Admitting, then, that a faithful performance of the pledge of the fifth of August, on the part of France, would have had a binding force on us to carry our part of the agreement into effect, can any man under the existing circumstances believe we are so bound? Can a violation of a solemn pledge confer an obligation which was only intended to be created on the complete fulfilment of that pledge? Surely not. Sir, the law of the first of May, professed, on the face of it, to be impartial towards the two nations who have violated our rights. It promised that, if either would so revoke or modify her edicts as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, in that case certain restrictive measures should be revived against the other. Have either complied? France did, indeed, make a declaration that her edicts were revoked, and should cease to have effect on a certain day. That day has long since passed, and, for any thing we know, those edicts are in full operation. Nay, we have positive proof of their active existence, nearly two months after they were to have ceased; for, on the 25th of December, their operation as to the condemnation of American property was suspended, while their power to sequester was absolutely recognized and continued. With such glaring, such positive proof before our eyes, of the perfidy of France, we are about to act as though we believed she had performed her promise with the utmost good faith. Nay, more, sir; if she had, indeed, complied with her engagement, she could require nothing more of us than the act of the 1st of May last; that was the full amount of our engagement, the utmost limit of our bond. Upon, and in consequence of that, was the Emperor's promise founded. Yet we are not satisfied with that; persisting, in the face of the most positive and conclusive testimony to the contrary, to affect to believe that he has performed his promise, we are going beyond our contract; and, lest some doubts should arise of the Emperor's want of faith, lest our courts should decide, as they must decide, that the decrees being still in force, the act of the first of May is a mere dead letter, we are about to volunteer our services, and, by the section of the bill now under consideration, to revive those sections of the old non-intercourse law which were intended in a certain event to have been revived by the act of the first of May; to revive them against Great Britain, and that without exacting any conditions on the part of France. And must this sacrifice be made in order to bolster up the President's proclamation so prematurely issued? Must the best interests of the nation be put to hazard to save him the mortification of acknowledging his error and retracing his steps? Here, I fear, lies the true motive for our present procedure.

This restrictive system is now to be revived against England, the French decrees being in full force and operation against us at the same time. Is this an honest neutrality? Is it equal and exact justice to those two nations? Is it not rewarding the perfidy of the one at the expense of the other, and at the expense of ourselves? Let us be cautious how we proceed in this course. If France choose, in consequence of our non-intercourse law of 1809, which was equal in its operation as to both nations, to take it so much in dudgeon as to confiscate the whole of the American property within her power, even that which had sought the rights of hospitality in her ports, how much more may Great Britain feel herself justified in retaliating on this most partial and unjust measure which we are about to adopt against her, by confiscating the millions of our property now within her power. And if we have been silent under the former, and have apparently acquiesced in it, what shall we, what can we, say, in case the latter event should take place? But, sir, the apologists of France tell us that His Majesty, the Emperor, has pledged his royal word that the decrees shall cease to operate as it respects us; and that, though he has thought proper to postpone the measure from the first of November to the second of February, he has only done so in order to ascertain whether we mean to go on to fulfil our engagements with good faith; that he is only holding our property seized since the first of November as security for our performance; and that, when he finds we are determined to resist the illegal orders and blockades of Great Britain, he will give up the property of our citizens. How insulting, this, to American feelings, to be told that a total violation of faith on the part of this man is excusable, because he chooses to suspect our faith. But, sir, do these people really believe the property of our citizens will be given up after the second of February, and in consequence of the measure we are now about to adopt? When did that voracious monster ever disgorge the plunder he had once received into his insatiable maw? Of the millions upon millions of which he has, at different times, and under various pretexts, plundered our unsuspecting citizens, where is the instance of a single dollar returning to its rightful owner? No, sir, let it once get within his iron grasp, and it is lost forever. The present measure is evidently intended as a propitiatory sacrifice to conciliate Napoleon--to induce him to become our friend, and to cease to rob and plunder our defenceless citizens. Is it calculated to produce this effect? Short-sighted as we confessedly are, sir, I should suppose we can scarcely be such silly politicians as to expect such an effect from such a measure. A brief view of the course which has been pursued, and is pursuing, by the Emperor of France, must produce a conviction in every unprejudiced mind, that he is not to be diverted from his purpose by a toy like this. Sir, it must be evident to every mind that his ambition soars to universal conquest. To this point all his measures tend--every other consideration is made to yield. For the accomplishment of this object, almost every nation on the Continent of Europe has been insulted, plundered, and subdued. To this end the external commerce of the continent has been annihilated, the agricultural and manufacturing interests have been depressed, and millions of his own subjects, and those of nations under his influence, impoverished and ruined. But there is one impediment to his gigantic project. Britain, proud, haughty Britain, stands in the way, and puts a stop to his career. Isolated, as she happily is, and the proud mistress of the ocean, she presents an impenetrable barrier to his ambitious views. But Britain must be humbled, she must be subdued. Her power on the ocean must be destroyed; and, to effect this, she must be attacked through her commerce and manufactures. For this purpose, what he is pleased to call his great continental system has been devised and rigorously enforced. Finding that all his restrictions and confiscations, aided by all his civil and military power, could not prevent the introduction of British merchandise upon the continent, he has resorted to a plan which promises to be more effectual. Regardless of the rights and interests of his subjects, he does not inquire whose the property may be; if it is of British origin it is committed to the flames. Such is his plan; such are the efforts and sacrifices he is making to insure its accomplishment. And yet, Mr. Chairman, it would seem as if we had the consummate folly to believe that we can appease this merciless tyrant by so weak, so silly, so futile a measure as this one now under consideration. We seem to have the madness to believe that this man, after the immense sacrifices he has made for the attainment of his object, would yield that object in our favor, and in order to be upon friendly terms with us would forego all other considerations. And from what premises is such a conclusion drawn? Is it from his past treatment of us? Let us, Mr. Chairman, take a brief review of his past conduct towards us, in order to see what we may expect in future. It is some years since he ordered our ships and cargoes to be burned upon the ocean, and many were burnt. He has, at various terms, and under different pretexts, seized and confiscated the property of our citizens on the ocean, and in his ports, and in the ports of his vassals. No longer ago than last spring, he told us that we were without just political views, without honor, without energy; and that, after refusing to fight for honor, we might find it necessary to fight for interest. This insulting declaration, which was dated on the 14th of February, was followed on the 23d of March by the Rambouillet decree, which confiscated all American vessels and cargoes which had arrived from the 20th of May, 1809, or should thereafter arrive in any port of France, her allies, or those occupied by her arms. Thus was from twenty to thirty millions of the property of our unsuspecting and confiding citizens, who had sought the rights of hospitality in his ports, sacrificed without a pretext, or with a pretext which added to the injury. Finding, after this gross violation of every principle which ought to govern honest and honorable nations, that our merchants, taught by sad experience that there was no safety within the range of his power, would venture there no more, he found it necessary to throw out another lure to entice the unwary within his reach. His tone is now suddenly changed. Instead of the haughty and insulting tyrant, he assumes the shape of a fond and doating lover. "His Majesty loves the Americans. Their prosperity and their commerce are within the scope of his policy. He is pleased in aggrandizing the United States." Yes, truly, His Majesty loves the Americans! If not for our persons, yet for our property, he has given the most ample and convincing proofs of his love. These sugared words, displaying so much of the milk of human kindness, seem to have perfectly reconciled us to his loving Majesty, and to have quite obliterated the remembrance of his harsh and unkind language so lately used towards us. And not only so, but it seems to have fully compensated us for all his robberies; and we forbear to touch that string, lest he might be somewhat ruffled, and once more induced to vent his anger on us. But lest his bare professions of love should not have the desired effect of inducing the Americans once more to place their property within his power, he directed his Minister to declare that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and should cease to have effect after the first of November. Our Administration, confiding in his assurances, in the face of all his previous conduct, published the proclamation of the second of November, and thereby assisted in deceiving our too credulous citizens. But few, however, ventured to place trust in him; and those who did, have met with a fate which every man of reflection ought to have anticipated. If, sir, such has been the course of that man's conduct towards us, (and that it has, I appeal to all the documents which have been laid before us,) I would ask why are we called upon to pass the section now under consideration? To me, it is matter of mystery and astonishment.

MONDAY, February 25.

Commercial Intercourse.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of Saturday last, to wit, the bill supplementary to the act entitled "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes," and the amendments reported thereto by the Committee of the whole House. The said amendments were read at the clerk's table.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker: The amendments contained in the sections under consideration, contemplate the continuance and enforcement of the non-intercourse law. This proposition presents a great, an elevated and essential topic of discussion, due to the occasion, and claimed by this people, which comprehends within the sphere and analogies of just argument, the chief of those questions, the decision of which, at this day, involves the peace, the happiness, and honor of this nation. Whatever has a tendency to show, that if the system of non-intercourse exist, it ought not to be continued; or, that if it do not exist, it ought not to be revived; whatever has a tendency to prove, that we are under no obligation to persist in it, nor under any obligation to abandon it, is now within the fair range of debate.

After long delay, and much coy demeanor, the Administration of this country have condescended to develop their policy. Though they have not spoken to our mortal ears, with their fleshly tongues, yet they have whispered their purposes through the constituted organs of this House. And these are the features of the policy which they recommend: it is proposed to grant particular and individual relief from anticipated oppressions of the commercial restrictive system. It is proposed to perpetuate that system, indefinitely, and leave our citizens, still longer, subject to its embarrassments, its uncertainty and its terrors. The chairman of our Committee of Foreign Relations, (Mr. EPPES,) at the time he introduced these amendments to the House, exhibited the true character of this policy, when he told us that it was "modelled upon the principle not to turn over to the Judiciary the decision of the existence of the non-intercourse law, but to make it the subject of legislative declaration." In other words, it is found that the majority of this House have too much policy to deny, and too much principle to assert, that the fact, on which, and on which alone, the President of the United States was authorized to issue his proclamation of the second of November last, has occurred. A scheme has, therefore, been devised, by which, without any embarrassment on this intricate point, the continuance and enforcement of non-intercourse may be insured, and toils, acceptable to France, woven by the hands of our own Administration, spread over almost the only remaining avenue of our commercial hope.

The proposition, contained in these amendments, has relation to the most momentous and most elevated of our legislative obligations. We are not, now, about to discuss the policy by which a princely pirate may be persuaded to relinquish his plunder; nor yet the expectation entertained of relaxation, in her belligerent system, of a haughty, and perhaps jealous rival; nor yet the faith which we owe to a treacherous tyrant; nor yet the fond, but frail hopes of favors from a British regency, melting into our arms, in the honeymoon of power. The obligations which claim our observance are of a nature much more tender and imperious; the obligations which, as Representatives, we owe to our constituents; the allegiance by which we are bound to the American people; the obedience which is due to that solemn faith, by which we are pledged to protect their peace, their prosperity, and their honor. All these high considerations are materially connected with this policy.

It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to dilate on the general nature and effects of this commercial restrictive system. It is no longer a matter of speculation. We have no need to resort for illustration of its nature to the twilight lustre of history, nor yet to the vibrating brightness of human intellect. We have experience of its effects. They are above, around, and beneath us. They paralyze the enterprise of your cities. They sicken the industry of your fields. They deprive the laborer and the mechanic of his employment. They subtract from the husbandman and planter the just reward for that product which he has moistened with the sweat of his brow. They crush individuals, in the ruins of their most flattering hopes, and shake the deep-rooted fabric of general prosperity.

It will, however, be necessary to say a word on the general nature of this system. Not so much for the purpose of elucidating, as to clear the way, and give distinctness to the course of my argument. It will also be useful to deprive the advocates of this system of those colors and popular lures, to which they resort, on a subject in no way connected with the objects with which they associate it.

My argument proceeds upon the assumption of the irrelevancy of four topics, usually adduced in support of the system contained in the law of May, 1810, and of March, 1809; commonly called the non-intercourse system. I take for granted that it is not advantageous; in other words, that it is injurious; that it is not fiscal in its nature; nor protective of manufactures; nor competent to coerce either belligerent. That it is injurious is certain, not only because it is deprecated by that part of the community which it directly affects, but because no man advocates it as a permanent system, and every one declares his desire to be rid of it. Fiscal it cannot be, because it prohibits commerce, and consequently revenue; and by the high price and great demand for foreign articles, which it produces, encourages smuggling. Protective of manufactures it cannot be, because it is indiscriminate in its provisions and uncertain in its duration; and this uncertainty depends, not on our legislative discretion, but on the caprice of foreign powers; our enemies, or rivals. No commercial system, which is indiscriminate in its restrictions, can be generally protective to manufactures. It may give a forced vivacity to a few particular manufactures. But in all countries, some, and in this almost all manufactures, depend, either for instruments or subjects, on foreign supply. But, if this were not the case, a system, whose continuance depended upon the will or the ever variant policy of foreign nations, can never offer such an inducement to the capitalist, as will encourage him to make extensive investments, in establishments resting on such precarious foundations. As to the incompetency of this system to coerce either belligerent, I take that for granted, because no man, as far as I recollect, ever pretended it; at least no man ever did show, by any analysis, or detailed examination of its relative effects on us, and either belligerent, that it would necessarily coerce either out of that policy which it was proposed to counteract. Embargo had its friends. There were those who had a confidence in its success. But who was ever the friend of non-intercourse? Who ever pretended to believe in its efficacy? The embargo had a known origin, and the features of its character were distinct. But "where, and what was this execrable shape--if shape it may be called, which shape has none?" We all know that the non-intercourse was not the product of any prospective intelligence. It was the result of the casual concurrence of chaotic opinions. It was agreed upon, because the majority could agree upon nothing else. They who introduced it, abjured it. They who advocated it, did not wish, and scarcely knew its use. And now that it is said to be extended over us, no man, in this nation, who values his reputation, will take his Bible oath that it is in effectual and legal operation. There is an old riddle on a coffin, which I presume we all learned when we were boys, that is as perfect a representation of the origin, progress, and present state of this thing, called non-intercourse, as is possible to be conceived.

"There was a man bespoke a thing, Which when the maker home did bring, That same maker did refuse it; The man that spoke for it did not use it, And he who had it did not know Whether he had it;--yea, or no."

True it is, that if this non-intercourse shall ever be, in reality, extended over us, the similitude will fail, in a material point. The poor tenant of the coffin is ignorant of his state. But the poor people of the United States will be, literally, buried alive in non-intercourse; and realize the grave closing on themselves and their hopes with a full and cruel consciousness of all the horrors of their condition.

For these reasons, I put all such common-place topics out of the field of debate. This, then, is the state of my argument; that as this non-intercourse system is not fiscal, nor protective of manufactures, nor competent to coerce, and is injurious, it ought to be abandoned, unless we are bound to persist in it, by imperious obligations. My object will be to show that no such obligations exist; that the present is a favorable opportunity, not to be suffered to escape, totally to relinquish it; that it is time to manage our own commercial concerns, according to our own interest; and no longer put them into the keeping of those who hate or those who envy their prosperity; that we are the constituted shepherds, and ought no more to transfer our custody to the wolves.

It is agreed, on all sides, that it is desirable to abandon this commercial restrictive system. But the advocates of the measure now proposed, say that we cannot abandon it, because our faith is plighted. Yes, sir, our faith is plighted; and that, too, to that scrupulous gentleman, Napoleon; a gentleman so distinguished for his own regard of faith; for his kindness and mercies towards us; for angelic whiteness of moral character; for overweening affection for the American people and their prosperity. Truly, sir, it is not to be questioned, but that our faith should be a perfect work towards this paragon of purity. On account of our faith, plighted to him, it is proposed to continue this non-intercourse.

But, Mr. Speaker, we may be allowed, I presume, to inquire whether any such faith be plighted. I trust we are yet freemen. We are not yet so far sunk in servility, that we are forbidden to examine into the grounds of our national obligations. Under a belief that this is permitted, I shall enter upon the task, and inquire whence they arise and what is their nature.

Whence they arise is agreed. Our obligations result, if any exist, under the act of May the first, 1810, called "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes." It remains, therefore, to inquire into the character of this act, and the obligations arising under its provisions.

Before, however, I proceed, I would premise, that whether I shall obtain, I am doubtful, but I am sure that the nature of my argument deserves, the favor and prepossession for its success, of every member in the House. My object is to show, that the obligation which we owe to the people of the United States, is a free and unrestricted commerce. The object of those who advocate these measures is to show that the obligation we owe to Napoleon Bonaparte, is a commerce restricted and enslaved. Now, as much as our allegiance is due more to the people of the United States than it is to Napoleon Bonaparte, just so much ought my argument to be received by the American Congress, with more favor and prepossession than the argument of those who advocate these measures. It is my intention to make my course of reasoning as precise and distinct as possible. Because I invite scrutiny, I contend for my country according to my conscientious conceptions of its best interests. If there be fallacy, detect it. My invitation is given to generous disputants. As to your stump orators, who utter low invective and mistake it for wit, and gross personality, and pass it off for argument, I descend not to their level; nor recognize their power to injure; nor even to offend.

Whatever obligations are incumbent upon this nation, in consequence of the act of the first of May, 1810, they result from the following section: "And be it further enacted, That in case either Great Britain or France shall, before the third day of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not, within three months thereafter, so revoke or modify her edicts, in like manner, then the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eighteenth sections of the act, entitled 'An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes,' shall, from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the proclamation aforesaid, be revived and have full force and effect, so far as relates to the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of the nation thus refusing or neglecting to revoke or modify her edicts in manner aforesaid. And the restrictions imposed by this act shall, from the date of such proclamation, cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation revoking or modifying her decrees, in the manner aforesaid."

Divested of technical expression, this is the abstract form of this section. It provides that a new commercial condition shall result, on the occurrence of a specified fact; which fact the President shall declare. On this state of the subject I observe that nothing in the act indicates whether the object of the United States, in providing for this eventual commercial condition, was its own benefit, convenience, or pleasure; or whether it was in the nature of a proffer to foreign nations. It will, however, be agreed on all sides, that the object was either the one or the other. If the object were our own benefit, convenience, or pleasure, it will not be pretended that we are under any obligation to continue the system. For that which was adopted, solely for either of these ends, may, whenever our views concerning them vary, be abandoned; it being the concern of no other. But it is said that the act was, in truth, a proffer to the two belligerents, of commerce to the obsequious nation, prohibition of commerce to the contumacious nation. If this were the case, I shall agree, for the sake of argument, that it ought to be fulfilled to the full extent of the terms. But inasmuch as there is, in the terms of the act, no indication of such a proffer, it follows that its nature must arise from the circumstances of the case; and that the whole of the obligation, whatever it is, grows out of an honorable understanding, and nothing else. As such, I admit, it should be honorably fulfilled. The nature of this proffer is that of a proposition upon terms. Now what I say is, and it is the foundation of my argument, that whoever claims an honorable compliance with such a proposition, must be able to show, on his part, an honorable acceptance and fulfilment of the terms. The terms our act proposed were--an act to be done; an effect to be produced. The act to be done was, the revocation or modification of the edicts. The effect to be produced was that this revocation or modification should be such as that these edicts should "cease to violate our neutral commerce." Now the questions which result are, has the act been done? If done, has it been so done as to amount to an honorable fulfilment or acceptance of our terms? The examination of these two points will explain the real situation of these United States, and the actual state of their obligations.

In considering the question whether the fact of revocation, or modification, has occurred, it is unfortunate that it does involve, at least in popular estimation, the propriety of the proclamation, issued on the second of November last, by the President of the United States. I regret, as much as any one, that such is the state of things, that the question, whether a foreign despot has done a particular act, seems necessarily to be connected with the question concerning the prudence and perspicacity with which our own Chief Magistrate has done another act. I say in popular estimation these subjects seem so connected. I do not think that, in the estimation of wise and reflecting men, they are necessarily thus connected. For the fact might not have occurred precisely in the form contemplated by the act of May, 1810, and yet the President of the United States, in issuing his proclamation, might be either justifiable or excusable. It might be justifiable. A power intrusted to a politician to be used on the occurrence of a particular event, for the purpose of obtaining a particular end, he may sometimes be justifiable in using, in a case which may not be precisely that originally contemplated. It may be effectually, though not formally, the same. It may be equally efficient in attaining the end. In such a case a politician never will, and perhaps ought not to hesitate at taking the responsibility, which arises from doing the act in a case not coming within the verbal scope of his authority. Thus, in the present instance. The President of the United States might have deemed the terms, in the letter of the Duke of Cadore, such as gave a reasonable expectation of acceptance on the part of Great Britain. He has taken the responsibility. He has been deceived. Neither Great Britain accepts the terms, nor France performs her engagements. The proclamation might thus have been wise, though unfortunate in its result. And as to excuse, will it be said that there is nothing of the sort in this case? Why, sir, our Administration saw the Great Napoleon, according to his own confession, over head and ears in love with the American people. At such a sight as this, was it to be expected of flesh and blood that they should hesitate to plunge into a sea of bliss, and indulge in joy with such an amorous Cyprian?

But, whether the fact has occurred, on which alone this proclamation could have legally issued, is a material inquiry and cannot be evaded, let it reach where or whom it will. For with this is connected the essential condition of this country; on this depends the multiplied rights of our fellow-citizens, whose property has been or may be seized or confiscated under this law: and hence result our obligations, if any, as is pretended, exist. It is important here to observe, that, according to the terms of the act of May 1, 1810, the law of March 1, 1809, revives on the occurrence of the fact required, and not on the proclamation issued. If the fact had not occurred, the proclamation is a dead letter, and no subsequent performance of the required fact, by either belligerent, can retroact so as to give validity to the previous proclamation. The course required by the act of the 1st of May, 1810, unquestionably is, that the fact required to be done should be precedent, in point of time, to the right accruing to issue the proclamation; and of consequence that, by no construction, can any subsequent performance of the fact required operate backward to support a proclamation issued previous to the occurrence of that fact? Whenever this fact is really done, a new proclamation is required to comply with the provisions of the act, and to give efficacy to them.

I am the more particular in referring to this necessary construction, resulting from the terms of the act of the first of May last, because it is very obvious that a different opinion did until very lately, and probably does now, prevail on this floor. We all recollect what a state of depression the conduct of Bonaparte in seizing our vessels, subsequent to the first of November, produced, as soon as it was known in this House, and what a sudden joy was lighted up in it, when the news of the arrival of a French Minister was communicated. Great hopes were entertained and expressed, that he would bring some formal revocation of his edicts, or disavowal of the seizures which might retroact and support the proclamation. It was confidently expected that some explanation, at least of these outrages, would be contained in his portmanteau; that under his powder-puff, or in his snuff box, some dust would be found to throw into the eyes of the American people, which might so far blind the sense, as to induce them to acquiesce in the enforcement of the non-intercourse, without any very scrupulous scrutiny into the performance of the conditions by Bonaparte. But, alas! sir, the Minister is as parsimonious as his master is voracious. He has not condescended to extend one particle, not one pinch of comfort to the Administration. From anything in the Messages of our President, it would not be so much as known that such a blessed vision, as was this new Envoy, had saluted his eyes. His communications preserve an ominous silence on the topic. Administration, after all their hopes, have been compelled to resort to the old specific, and have caused to be tipped upon our tables a cart-load of sand, grit, and sawdust, from our metaphysical mechanic, who seesaws at St. James', as they pull the wire here in Washington. Yes, sir, a letter written on the tenth day of December last, by our Minister in London, is seriously introduced to prove, by abstract reasoning, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had ceased to exist on the first of the preceding November, of whose existence, as late as the 25th of last December, we have, as far as the nature of things permit, ocular, auricular, and tangible demonstration. And the people of this country are invited to believe the logic of Mr. Pinkney in the face of the fact of a continued seizure of all the vessels which came within the grasp of the French custom-house, from the first of November, down to the date of our last accounts; and, in defiance of the declaration of our Chargé d'Affaires, made on the 10th of December, that "it will not be pretended that the decrees have in fact been revoked," and in utter discredit of the allegation of the Duke of Massa, made on the 25th of the same month, which, in effect, declares the Berlin and Milan decrees exist, by declaring "that they shall remain suspended." After such evidence as this, the question whether a revocation or modification of the edicts of France has so occurred "as that they cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," does no longer depend upon the subtleties of syllogistic skill, nor is to be disproved by any power of logical illation. It is an affair of sense and feeling. And our citizens, whose property has been, since the first of November, uniformly seized, and of which they are avowedly to be deprived three months, and which is then only to be returned to them on the condition of good behavior, may as soon be made to believe, by the teaching of philosophy, that their rights are not violated, as a wretch, writhing under the lash of the executioner, might be made by a course of reasoning to believe, that the natural state of his flesh was not violated, and that his shoulders, out of which blood was flowing at every stroke, were in the quiet enjoyment of cuticular ease.

Whether the revocation expressed in the letter of the Duke of Cadore, was absolute or conditional, or whether the conditions were precedent or subsequent, in the present state of our evidence, it seems scarcely important to inquire. Yet the construction of that celebrated passage, in his letter of the 5th of August, has been, as I have ever seen, given so much in the manner of lawyers, and so little in that of statesmen, that it deserves a short elucidation; how much the words "it being understood that," in their particular position are worth; and whether they have the effect of a condition precedent, or of a condition subsequent. A statesman will look at the terms contained in that letter in a different aspect, not for the purpose of ascertaining how much a court of law might be able to make of them, as to discern in what position of language the writer intended to intrench himself, and to penetrate his real policy, notwithstanding the veil in which he chose to envelope it. He will consider the letter in connection with the general course of French policy, and the particular circumstances which produced it. By these lights, it is scarcely possible to mistake the character and true construction of these expressions. Upon recurring to the Berlin and Milan decrees, it will be found that they contain a solemn pledge, that "they shall continue to be rigorously in force, as long as that (the English) Government does not return to the principle of the law of nations." Their determination to support this pledge, the French Government has uniformly and undeviatingly declared. They have told us constantly that they require a previous revocation on the part of Great Britain, as the condition of their rescinding those edicts. The question who should first revoke their edicts had come to be, notoriously, a sort of point of honor between the two belligerents. Perfectly acquainted with this state of things, we have been perpetually negotiating between the one and the other, and contending with each that it was his duty previously to revoke. At length the French Government, either tired with our solicitations, or more probably, seeing their own advantage in our anxiety to get rid of these decrees, which yet, as an essential part of its continental system of total commercial exclusion it never intended to abandon, devised this scheme of policy, which has been the source of so much contest, and has puzzled all the metaphysicians in England and the United States. Cadore is directed to say to Mr. Armstrong: "In this new state of things I am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the first of November they will cease to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English." In this curious gallimaufry of time present and time future, of doing and refraining to do, of declaration and understanding, of English duties and American duties, it is easy to trace the design, and see its adaptation to the past and present policy of the French Emperor. The time present was used, because the act of the United States required that previously to the proclamation the edicts "shall be" revoked. And this is the mighty mystery of time present being used, in expressing an act intended to be done in time future. For if, as the order of time, and the state of intention indicated, time future had been used, and the letter of Cadore had said the decrees shall be revoked on the first of November next, then the proclamation could not be issued, because the President would be obliged to wait to have evidence that the act had been effectually done. Now as the French Emperor never intended that it should be effectuated, and yet meant to have all the advantage of an effectual deed without performing it, this notable scheme was invented. And, by French finesse, and American acquiescence, a thing is considered as effectually done, if the declaration that it is done be made in language of time present, notwithstanding the time of performance is in the same breath declared to be in time future. Having thus secured the concurrence of the American administration, the next part of the scheme was so to arrange the expression that either the British Government should not accede, or if it did accede, that it should secure to France the point of honor--a previous revocation by the British; and if they did not accede, that there should be a color for seizures and sequestrations, and thus still further to bind the Americans over to their good behavior. All this is attained by this well-devised expression "it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke."

Now, Great Britain either would accede to the terms, or she would not. If she did, and did it as the terms required, in consequence of this declaration, then it must be done previous to the first of November, and then the point of honor was saved to France; so that thus France, by a revocation verbally present, effectually future, would attain an effectual previous revocation from the English. But if, as France expected Great Britain would not trust in such paper security, and therefore not revoke, previously to the first of November, then an apology might be found for France, to justify her in refusing to effectuate that present, future, and absolute, conditional revocation. And if ever the Duke of Cadore shall condescend, which it is probable he never will, to reason with our Government on the subject, he may tell them that they knew that the French Emperor had issued those decrees, upon the pledge that they were to continue until the British abandoned their maritime principles; that he told us, over, and over, and over again, that previous revocation by the British was absolutely required; that for the purpose of putting to trial the sincerity of the British, he had indeed declared that the French decrees "are revoked," on the first day of November ensuing; but then it was on the expressed condition that in consequence of that declaration, not of the revocation, but of that declaration, the British were to revoke, and, if they did not, the "understanding" was not realized; and his rights of enforcing his system remained to him. And I confess I do not well see what answer can be made to such an argument. Let us examine the case in common life. You, Mr. Speaker, have two separate tracts of land, each lying behind the farms of A and B, so that you cannot get to one of the tracts, without going over the farm of A, nor to the other tract without going over the farm of B. For some cause or other, both A and B have a mutual interest that you should enjoy the right of passage to your tract, over the farm of each respectively. A and B get into quarrels and wish to involve you in the dispute. You keep aloof, but are perpetually negotiating with each for your old right of passage-way, and telling each that it is owing to him that the other prohibits your enjoyment of it. At last A says "Come. We will put this B to trial. I on this fifth day of August, declare my prohibitions of passage-way are revoked, and, after the first day of November, my prohibitions shall cease to have effect; but, it is understood that B, in consequence of this declaration, shall also revoke his prohibition of passage-way." If B refuses, does A, under the circumstances of such a declaration, violate any obligation, should he refuse to permit the passage? Might not A urge with great color and force of argument, that this arrangement was the effect of your solicitation and assurance that B would be tempted by such a proffer, and that the revocation of B was required, by the terms, to be the consequence of A's declaration, for the very purpose of indicating that it must be anterior to the fact of A's effectual revocation? But let this be as it will; suppose that you, on the first of November, in consequence of A's assurance, had sent your servants and teams to bring home your products, and A should seize your oxen, and teams and products, and drive your servants, after having stripped them, from his farm, and should tell you, that he should keep this, and all other property of yours, on which he can lay his hands, for three months, and then he should restore it to you, or not, as he saw fit, according to his opinion of your good behavior. I ask, if, in any sense, you could truly say that on the first day of November the prohibitions or edicts of A were so revoked, that they ceased to violate your liberty of passage? Sir, when viewed in relation to common life, the idea is so absurd, that it would be absolutely abusive to ask the question. I refer the decision of so simple a case to the sound sense of the American people, and not to that of "scurvy politicians, who seem to see the things they do not." In a condensed form my argument is this. From a revocation merely verbal, no obligations result. By the terms of our act the revocation must be effectual, "so as the edict shall cease to violate our rights." Now the simple question is, whether a uniform seizure, since the first of November, under those edicts (for none other are pretended) of all their property, and holding it for three months, to see how they will behave, be or be not a violation of the rights of the American people? In relation to the revival by a formal declaration of the non-intercourse system, as is proposed in one of these sections, I offer this argument: Either the fact, on which the President's proclamation could alone have been issued, has occurred or it has not. If it has occurred, then the law of March, 1809, is revived, and this provision, by a declarative law, is unnecessary. If it have not occurred, then there is no obligation to revive it, for alone on the occurrence of the specified fact does our obligation depend. In such case the revival by declaration is a mere gratuity to Napoleon. This is in fact the true character of the law. As to the provisions for relief of our merchants against anticipated seizure, I hold them scarcely deserving consideration. Heaven be praised we have independent tribunals and intelligent juries. Our judges are not corrupt and our yeomanry will not be swayed in their decisions, by the hope of presidential favors, nor be guided by party influence. The harpies of your custom-house dare as soon eat off their own claws, as thrust them, in the present state of the law of March, 1809, into the fatness of their fellow-citizens. The timorous and light-shunning herd of spies and informers have too much instinct to pounce on such a prey.

But, in order to cause any obligation to result under the law of May 1, 1810, it is necessary, not only that the fact required be done, and the effect required produced; but also the terms of that act must be accepted. The proffer we made, if such be the character of that act, was only to revive the non-intercourse law against the contumacious belligerent, after three months had expired from the date of the proclamation. Now it is remarkable, that, so far from accepting the terms of the proposition contained in our act, as the extent of our obligations, Bonaparte expressly tells us that they mean something else; and something, too, that no man in this House will dare to aver they really intend. It is also remarkable that the terms of this celebrated letter from the Duke of Cadore, of the fifth of August, which have been represented as a relaxation in the rigor of the French Emperor's policy, are, in fact, something worse than the original terms of the Milan decree, and that, instead of having obtained a boon from a friend in this boasted letter, our Administration have only caught a gripe from a Tartar. By the terms of the Milan decree, it was to "cease with respect to all nations who compelled the English to respect their flag." By the terms of the letter of Cadore, it was to cease on condition that the United States "cause their rights to be respected." Now, as much as an obligation, of an indefinite extent, is worse than a definite obligation, just so much worse are the terms of the letter of Cadore, than the original terms of the Milan decree. Mr. Speaker, let us not be deceived concerning the policy of the French Emperor. It is stern, unrelenting, and unrelaxing. So far from any deviation from his original system being indicated in this letter of the Duke of Cadore, a strict adherence to it is formally and carefully expressed. Ever since the commencement of "his continental system," as it is called, the policy of Napoleon has uniformly been to oblige the United States to effectual co-operation in that system. As early as the 7th of October, 1807, his minister, Champagny, wrote to General Armstrong, that the interests of all maritime powers were common, to unite in support of their rights against England. After this followed the embargo, which co-operated effectually at the very critical moment, in his great plan of continental commercial restriction. On the 24th of the ensuing November, he resorts to the same language--"in violating the rights of all nations England has united them all by a common interest, and it is for them to have recourse to force against her." He then proceeds to invite the United States to take "with the whole continent the part of guaranteeing itself from her injustice, and in forcing her to a peace."

On the 15th of January, 1808, he is somewhat more pointed and positive, as to our efficient concurrence in his plan of policy. For his Minister, Champagny, then tells us, that "His Majesty has no doubt of a declaration of war against England by the United States," and he then proceeds to take the trouble of declaring war out of our hands, and volunteers his services, gratuitously, to declare it, in our name and behalf. "War exists then, in fact, between England and the United States; and His Majesty considers it as declared from the day on which England published her decrees." And in order to make assurance doubly sure, he sequesters our vessels in his ports, "until a decision may be had on the dispositions to be expressed by the United States," on his proposition of considering themselves "associated in the cause of all the powers," against England. Now in all this there is no deception, and can be no mistake, as to the purpose of his policy. He tells us, as plain as language can speak, that "by causing our rights to be respected," he means war, on his side, against Great Britain. That "our interests are common"--that he considers us already "associates in the war," and that he sequesters our property by way of security for our dispositions. This is his old policy. I pray some gentlemen on the other side of the House to point out in what it differs from the new. The letter of Cadore on the fifth of August tells us, it is expected that we "cause our rights to be respected, in conformity to our act," and the same letter also tells us what he understands to be the meaning of our act. "In short, Congress engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent powers which shall refuse to acknowledge the rights of neutrals." In other words, "by causing our rights to be respected," he means war on his side against Great Britain. In perfect conformity with this uniform, undeviating policy, his Minister, Turreau, tells our Government, in his letter of the 28th of November last, that "the modifications to be given to the present absolute exclusion of our products will not depend upon the chance of events, but will be the result of measures, firm and pursued with perseverance, which the two Governments will continue to adopt to withdraw from the monopoly and from the vexations of the common enemy a commerce loyal and necessary to France as well as the United States." And to the end, that no one feature of his policy should be changed, or even appear to be relaxed, his Excellency the Duke of Massa, and his Excellency the Duke of Gaete, in their respective letters of the 25th of December, declare, that the property taken, shall be "only sequestered until the United States have fulfilled their engagements to cause their rights to be respected." Now, Mr. Speaker, is there a man in this House bold enough to maintain, or with capacity enough to point out, any material variation between the policy of France to this country, subsequent to the Cadore letter, of the 5th of August, and its policy anterior to that period? The character of the policy is one and indivisible. Bonaparte had not yielded one inch to our Administration. Now, as he neither performed the act required by the law of May, 1810; nor produced the effect; nor accepted the terms it proposed; whence arise our obligations? How is our faith plighted? In what way are we bound again to launch our country into this dark sea of restriction; surrounded on all sides with perils and penalties?

The true nature of this Cadore policy is alone to be discovered in the character of his master. Napoleon is a universal genius. "He can exchange shapes with Proteus to advantage." He hesitates at no means and commands every skill. He toys with the weak--he tampers with the mean--he browbeats the haughty--with the cunning he is a serpent. For the courageous he has teeth and talons. For the cowering he has hoofs. He found our Administration a pen and ink gentry--parchment politicians; and he has laid, for these ephemeral essences, a paper fly-trap, dipped in French honey. Hercules, finding that he could not reach our Administration with his club, and that they were out of their wits at the sight of his lion's skin, has condescended to meet them in petticoats, and conquer them, spinning at their own distaff.

As to those who, after the evidence now in our hands, deny that the decrees exist, I can no more reason with them than with those who should deny the sun to be in the firmament, at noon-day. The decrees revoked! The formal statute act of a despot revoked by the breath of his servile Minister; uttered on conditions not performed by Great Britain, and claiming terms not intended to be performed by us! The fatness of our commerce secure, when every wind of heaven is burdened with the sighs of our suffering seamen, and the coast of the whole continent heaped with the plunder of our merchants! The den of the tiger safe! Yet the tracks of those who enter it are innumerable, and not a trace is to be seen of a returning footstep! The den of the tiger safe! While the cry of the mangled victims are heard through the adamantine walls of his cave; cries, which despair and anguish utter, and which despotism itself cannot stifle!

No, Mr. Speaker. Let us speak the truth. The act now proposed is required by no obligation. It is wholly gratuitous. Call it then by its proper name. The first fruit of French alliance. A token, a transatlantic submission. Any thing except an act of an American Congress, the Representatives of freemen.

The present is the most favorable moment for the abandonment of these restrictions, unless a settled co-operation with the French continental system be determined. We have tendered the provisions of this act to both belligerents. Both have accepted--both, as principals, or by their agents, have deceived us.

We talk of the edicts of George the Third and Napoleon. Yet those of the President of the United States, under your law, are far more detestable to your merchants. Their edicts plundered the rich. His make those who are poor still poorer. Their decrees attack the extremities. His proclamation fixes upon the vitals, and checks the action of the seat of commercial life.

I know that great hopes are entertained of relief from the proposed law, by the prospect of a British regency. Between a mad monarch and a simpering successor, it is expected the whole system of that nation will be abandoned. Let gentlemen beware, and not calculate too certainly on the fulfilment, by men in power, of professions made out of it. The majority need not go out of our own country, nor beyond their own practice, to be convinced how easily, in such cases, proud promises may eventuate in meagre performance.

The whole bearing of my argument is to this point. It is time to take our own rights into our own keeping. It is time, if we will not protect, to refrain from hampering, by our own acts, the commerce of our country. Put your merchants no longer under the guardianship and caprice of foreign powers. Punish not, at the instigation of foreigners, your own citizens for following their righteous calling. We owe nothing to France. We owe nothing to Great Britain. We owe every thing to the American people. Let us show ourselves really independent; and look to a grateful, a powerful, and then united people, for support against every aggressor.

Mr. MUMFORD.--The gentleman (Mr. QUINCY) from Massachusetts has given us a long talk, that amused the House very much with tropes and figures, and I hope has convinced himself that he is right. I am no advocate of either belligerent, I have not much confidence in the declarations of foreign Governments. I did, however, put some confidence in the Erskine arrangement, but I was deceived; it met my approbation, because I was among those who were determined to settle our disputes with Great Britain in our own way, as an independent nation. And I will now ask the gentleman from Massachusetts whether, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or any other higher authority in Great Britain, should write a letter to Sir William Scott, and a circular letter to the Collector of Liverpool, informing them that the Orders in Council did not apply to American vessels from and after the 1st November, he would not deem those letters to be evidence of the fact? If so, why not give the same credence to the letters of the Duke of Massa and the Duc de Gaete? I wish to preserve the faith of the nation. We have been plundered by both belligerents, and have as little confidence in the one as in the other; but without some reliance on the word of constituted authorities there is an end to all negotiations. The gentleman says that we are about to shut up "the only avenue to our commercial hope." These are his own words. Let us now examine this avenue to our commercial hope. I will in the first place ask the indulgence of the House while I read and state some facts from a letter I have just received from Liverpool, dated January 8, of the present year, from one of the most respectable houses there, which states that the importation of cotton from the United States was 320,000 bales in 1810; that there were then 145,000 bales on hand; tobacco imported in the same period, 14,700 hogsheads; and notwithstanding the consumption, the quantity imported kept the market supplied constantly with about the same number of hogsheads throughout the year 1810. Potashes imported 28,946 barrels, on hand 13,000 barrels: rice 39,000 imported, and there remain on hand very large supplies. Those are the principal articles of the produce of our soil unsold on 8th January, 1811, in the port of Liverpool alone, besides the quantities in the other ports of Great Britain; and the same letter observes: "This supply checks any attempt at speculation, and without an export vent is procured, the stock on hand must remain unsalable; if the belligerents return to a sense of justice, the continental markets being in that case reopened, will require large supplies, and cause our market to rise." The prices of upland cotton are stated at 12d. sterling per lb.; tobacco, very prime, 4d. to 7d., middling quality, great quantity on hand, fit only for continental market, at 1½ a 4d.; pot-ashes £43 to £44 per ton--rice 19 to 23 per cwt. Sir, there is no American merchant who can pursue that commerce, attended with the enormous charges and duties imposed on those articles without inevitable ruin; and I call to the recollection of gentlemen the numerous failures in consequence of bills of exchange returned under protest, which had been predicated on shipments to British ports; and yet the gentleman from Massachusetts tells us this is "the only avenue to our commercial hope." Send your vessels to the Brazils, you meet them there intriguing against your commerce; to Buenos Ayres, you find them there; to Cayenne, there also; to Terra Firma, you there find them in conjunction with Miranda intriguing and counteracting your commerce; to Barbadoes, Surinam, Demerara, Trinidad, Martinique, Guadaloupe, Jamaica, &c., and you are met with enormous port charges, and duties amounting to prohibition on the staple articles of the New England States; codfish, beef, pork, butter, lard, cheese, hams, &c. It is true we are admitted every now and then, at the mere will and caprice of a governor, to import into those colonies flour at a duty of one dollar per barrel; rice and lumber in proportion; on condition that you shall not take away any article but rum and molasses, and this is the only avenue to our commercial hope. They are like the locusts of Egypt in relation to our commerce. What has become of your 1,350,000 tons of shipping, valued at fifty dollars per ton, amounting to $67,500,000, one-third of which belongs to Massachusetts? Is the gentleman willing to surrender the carrying trade to Great Britain? Let him turn his attention to the ports of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, and New Orleans, and he will find that British ships are now taking the bread out of the mouths of his own constituents. They are enabled to take freight on so much lower terms than American vessels can afford to do it in consequence of the very great difference of duties in Great Britain, between importations in America or in a British ship, that we cannot compete with them unless you will countervail them, and take a decisive stand in defence of your commerce to continental Europe, and carry your produce direct to the consumers, and be no longer subjected to be fleeced by the monopolizers and retailers of the old world. They are not content to have the whole products of your soil deposited on their Island, on which they receive an enormous import, and raise an extra war tax, besides; but they will claim very soon the exclusive right to carry it when and where they please in their own ships. We are thus reduced to a worse situation than in a state of colonization; we have now all the disadvantages of being plundered by their navy, and none of the advantages of receiving its protection, although they have the impudence to charge us four per cent. convoy duty on their gewgaws and manufactures, which convoy they do not give us. Can this be a desirable state of things? And if persevered in, I am convinced the commerce of the United States will descend into the same tomb with the gentleman's story of the coffin.

There are three classes of your citizens to be provided for, as contemplated in the provisions of this bill--first, sequestrations in France, Spain, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia. Second, those who have sailed to France under the faith of the Duke of Cadore's letter of the 5th of August. Third, importers of British manufactures. But it would seem by the arguments I have heard advanced in this House that there were only the latter class to be provided for, and, as I presume British precedent and authority will be admitted by the gentleman from Massachusetts to be good evidence, I will inform him and the House, what was the concurrent testimony of the English merchants before the bar of the House of Commons on the subject of exports and imports of the United States. They stated on oath that the exports to the United States were about twelve millions sterling, and that the imports were about four millions on an average for the years 1802, 1803, 1804, when there were no decrees against American commerce, and consequently it took its own natural channel and supplied each market according to its natural consumption. The difference between export and import being about eight millions sterling against us. Those English merchants state that it was made up and received from our trade with continental Europe; this has not been disproved by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, nor by his friend Stevens, of War in Disguise--it is a fact; they cannot deny it. And shall we be told about the profitable commerce with Great Britain? After a statement of these facts, shall we go on to gorge their warehouses with twelve millions sterling of produce, when their own internal consumption does not exceed four millions sterling? I hope not; and I do trust that the time is not far distant when we shall assert and defend our just rights.

Mr. BLAISDELL.--Mr. Speaker: nothing would induce me to address you at this late hour, while there is so great a commotion in, and so many tokens of impatience manifested by, the House, but a sense of duty, and a desire to lend my feeble aid in arresting the progress of a measure which, in my opinion, involves a question of no less importance than whether we are prepared, after having been insulted, robbed, and deceived, by the French Emperor, to follow the fatal example of the petty, servile States of Europe, and throw this people into the embraces of that monster, at whose perfidy and corruption Lucifer blushes and Hell itself stands astonished. If I understand the amendment of the honorable gentleman from Virginia, its principal object is to renew the non-intercourse of 1809, so far as it respects Great Britain, which was previously attempted to be revived by the proclamation of the President of the second of November last. I should have supposed that, rather than have made so glaring a confession that that State paper misstated fact, the gentleman would have been dissuaded from his darling object, the non-intercourse. But it seems that when it comes in competition with the views of Napoleon, the veracity of the President must be sacrificed. But, sir, convinced as I am, that our paper war, which has been applied to all purposes, even to calling out the army, raising the militia, pressing the horses, &c., and sending them on an expedition the distance of five hundred miles, with express orders not to fight, has damned the character of this Government, broken down the spirit of the nation, embarrassed our citizens, and emptied the late overflowing Treasury, so as to render the resort to borrowing necessary; I cannot but hope that the amendment on your table will be rejected to give place to an amendment offered some days ago by an honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,) when this bill was under discussion in Committee of the Whole.

Sir, if I understand that amendment, it went to suspend the whole restrictive system, except the third section of the law of May last, which saves fines and forfeitures incurred under our various restrictions. This amendment, to be sure, changes the position recommended by the Executive, but not much more than the bill, with the addition of the amendment now under consideration. Although it becomes this House to pay due deference to Executive recommendations; yet, if there are good reasons for a departure from such recommendations, it equally becomes the members of this House, out of a regard to the correctness of their own proceedings, to make such a departure correspond with the reasons which produced it. The position recommended by the Executive made its first appearance in a short paragraph in the President's Message, recommending such a modification of the law of May last, as would remove all doubts as to its exposition and execution; for the details of such modification we are referred to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. In this report we find a project recommended to enforce the non-importation against English merchandise of every kind and from every country. In the first place, by making the proclamation of the President, declaring that the French edicts had ceased to violate our neutral commerce on the first day of November last, the only evidence of that fact; and in the second place, by authorizing the officers of the army and navy to enter ships, dwelling-houses, stores, or any other place, to search for and seize merchandise suspected of being imported contrary to law, and making a donation of the boon so seized to the wretch who should be hardy enough, in defiance of all moral obligation, thus to rob his neighbor; and in the third place, by declaring all merchandise so seized in the Northern section of the Union, adjoining the British provinces, to be forfeited, unless by a palpable inversion of the rule of evidence in all other cases, and even in this case, adopted in all other sections of the Union, he is able to prove that the merchandise was legally imported and the duties paid--with many other provisions, all of which have been laid before this House, in the first bill on the subject reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations, the details of which are too well recollected to need pointing out, or to be suffered to meet a public investigation at this time.

But, sir, with all due deference to the high ministerial officer who recommended the project, and likewise to the honorable committee who reported the bill, I may be allowed to pay it the compliment of saying that, in my opinion, previous to the reign of that tyrant, who, by a military force, aided by projects of this kind, has destroyed the sanctuary of justice, and has spread pillage, debauchery, robbery, and death, throughout the greater part of Europe; such a bill as that would have been scouted from this Hall as the production of a madman. But on receiving the Message of the President, covering the letters of Mr. Russell, the American Chargé des Affaires at Paris, stating that American vessels, loaded with bona fide property of American citizens, had been seized and sequestered in the ports of France, under the Berlin and Milan decrees, as late as the 9th of December, doubts seemed to arise in this House, whether the decrees had ceased to operate on the first of November, as the President had declared. And the bill was sent back to the committee, for the purpose, as I understood, of bringing in a bill to suspend the operation of the law of May last, until we should hear from France, whether the Emperor had disavowed those seizures, and whether the decrees had actually ceased to operate on the first of November. And I did understand the honorable chairman of the committee, and several other gentlemen on the other side of the House, to say on that occasion, that if, after we had new arrivals from France, that did not prove to be the case, they should be as ready as any gentleman to repeal the whole code of restrictive laws until the Emperor should learn to respect our rights. What evidence have we had since to give us a more favorable prospect, as it respects the revocation of the decrees? Not a syllable. But, on the other hand, we have conclusive evidence that they were not so revoked that their operation ceased on that day.

If it be asked where this evidence appears, the answer is ready. In the first place, by the letter of the Grand Judge, the Duke of Massa, to the President of the Council of Prizes, as also by the letter of the Minister of Finance to the Director General of the Customs, both dated the 25th of December, fifteen days after the manly remonstrance of Mr. Russell, in the case of the Orleans Packet; in which remonstrance he states the outrageous conduct of the custom-house officers, and requests a prompt and speedy disavowal of the seizures, and that the property be again placed in the hands of the owners. But, sir, is there any thing in these two letters which looks like a disavowal of the seizure in express violation of the promise of the Duke of Cadore? No, sir, although these letters were written fifteen days after the remonstrance of Mr. Russell. Instead of this they both agree that the decrees did not cease to operate on the first of November, but that the property taken with the Orleans Packet, and all the property which should be seized between the first of November and the second of February, must remain in depot to wait the pleasure of the Emperor, on our causing our rights to be respected by England.

But how, Mr. Speaker, are we to cause our rights to be respected? Is it by merely reviving the law of May last, as is the object of this amendment? Certainly this is not their meaning; for both these letters have reference to that law, as well as the proclamation of the President giving it effect, and to the circular of the Secretary of the Treasury, addressed to the collectors of the several ports, enjoining a strict execution of that law. No, sir, this is not what is to be done, which will satisfy the Emperor. He who flatters himself that this will be sufficient, shuts his eyes against official evidence to the contrary; as well in the above-recited letters, written with a perfect knowledge of the performance on our part, and the promise of a performance on the part of France on the first day of November, as in the letter of the French Minister in the United States on the 12th of December, in which we are told that the French restrictions on our commerce are not to cease, but only on the result of firm and energetic measures to be adopted and persevered in by the two Governments against the common enemy.

But shall I be told that the letters of the Grand Judge and Minister of Finance promised that the property taken from our citizens since 1st of November should be restored, if we cause the law to be carried into effect after the 2d day of February, and therefore we were to believe it and ought to wait until we hear whether that has been the case? For the honor of my Government, I hope not. Is it really come to this, that we are brought to acknowledge that the Duke of Cadore was correct when he told General Armstrong that His Majesty could place no reliance on the American Government? No, sir, if this be true, for heaven's sake let us not express it. But what is this amendment which re-enacts the law of May last, and such pitiful reasoning as I have heard on this occasion, but placing our seal to that infamous insinuation? The President, on the mere promise of the Minister of the Emperor, that the Berlin and Milan decrees should cease to operate on the first day of November, placed full faith and reliance on that promise, and issued his proclamation on the 2d, presuming the promise had been fulfilled--and, shall we say that the Emperor is justifiable in disbelieving the law of May last, solemnly enacted by the three branches of the Government and the President's proclamation, together with the Circular of the Secretary of the Treasury, enjoining the law to be carried into effect?

I hope not; for if we are become so pitifully servile as this, well might Cadore, in his letter of February 14th, 1810, tell General Armstrong that the Americans were without just political views, without honor, and even independence. And if we, by adopting this amendment, condescend to justify the Emperor, in his insult upon the plighted faith of our Government, in my opinion we shall furnish the American people and the world with just ground to say Amen to the declaration of Cadore in that respect. Will any gentleman still say, that the decrees ceased to operate on the first of November, since we have had official information from the French Government itself, that our vessels are to be seized under these decrees, until the second of February? I trust not. Those gentlemen who support this amendment, ought to recollect that the sections which go to re-enact the law of May last, contain a confession that that law is not now in operation; for if the decrees did actually cease to operate on the first of November, no one doubts but the law is now in full force, without the provisions of this bill. When the honorable chairman of the committee first offered his amendment, a misunderstanding seemed to take place between him and two gentlemen on the opposite side of the House, viz. the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. WRIGHT,) and the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. RHEA,) which undoubtedly happened in this way. While the honorable chairman well knew that the decrees did not cease on the first of November; therefore to keep alive the spirit of the law of May, which gave England three months after they did cease, it became necessary to lengthen the time for her to revoke; and the other two gentlemen, as it would seem, really supposed, that because Mr. Pinkney had said that Cadore's letter was precision itself, these decrees really did cease to operate agreeable to that promise; although we have the official information from Mr. Russell on our tables, that the Orleans Packet was the first case that had happened after the first of November, to which the Berlin and Milan decrees could have been applied, and that they were applied in that case, and that several late arrivals, which left France from twenty to twenty-five days afterwards, bring no information from him that a change had taken place, and had that been the case, he would certainly have communicated information to the Government before the rising of Congress. On the contrary, these arrivals confirm what he had stated, and say, that every vessel arriving in France shares the same fate. Mr. Speaker, until I heard those two gentlemen, I did suppose that no man of common sense could have believed a position, in such direct opposition to evidence. And from the opinion which I have of the discernment of the gentleman from Tennessee, I think I must have misunderstood him, while perhaps it may be improper to include the other gentleman in the supposition.

Sir, I seldom trouble the House with any observations of mine, nor is it my intention, at this time, to examine and expose all the winding and management which has been practised, to bring about such a state of things as to render plausible this measure at this time. I shall, however, examine the non-intercourse system from the date of the law of March, 1809, and inquire what was its professed object? What use has been made of it? And how has it been regarded by the belligerents? And also notice some of its effects upon our own citizens as well as upon the Treasury. What must be the inevitable consequence if this measure is suffered to go into effect? I take it to amount to an entire non-importation of any of the articles, products, or manufactures of more than three-fourths of the civilized world, to which our merchants would, at this time, run the risk of attempting voyages; for, from the Continent of Europe no one returns unless at the expense of this Government. The dominions of Great Britain, including the East and West Indies, as well as her European dominions, and those on the American Continent, are immense. The products of these various countries formed a principal part of those importations of the last year, which, while the non-intercourse slept, gave new life and vigor to every branch of business. Our seaports, which the year before presented the gloomy appearance of cities besieged by a hostile foe, again resumed the appearance of enterprise, industry and wealth. Thousands, who in 1809 were either a burden to their friends, in the poor-house, or begging their bread in the streets, were in 1810 enjoying the fruits of their industry in a comfortable supply of the necessaries of life, while the farmer and planter sowed his seed and cultivated his field, with the comfortable prospect that his crop would not decay on his hand for want of a market. Now, sir, although exportation is not interdicted by this bill, yet I apprehend the result will be much the same. It can hardly be expected that Great Britain, who gentlemen on the other side of the House are fond of considering as the cause of all our commercial distress, will condescend to pay us specie for our produce, while our ports are closed, not only against her shipping of all kinds, but against every article of her products and manufactures, as well as those of her colonies and dependencies, while they are open to those of her enemy. Again, what was the effect of the non-intercourse in 1809 upon our Treasury? In addition to the bankruptcy and wretchedness spread over the face of the whole country, we are informed by the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, laid on our tables, that the net revenue arising from duties on merchandise and tonnage, accruing during that year, amounted to only $6,527,000, while we are informed in the same report, that this source of revenue in the three first quarters of the year 1810, while commerce was free, amounted to a sum exceeding $7,250,000, and the Secretary adds, that he believed the whole revenue arising from duties on merchandise and tonnage for that year would amount to more than $12,000; making an increase in this year, when commerce was unshackled, of $5,473,000, notwithstanding all the robberies of Napoleon, which probably amounted to more than forty millions, a free importation of the avails of which would have greatly increased the revenue of that year. From this view of the subject, we find a deficit in the revenue of 1809, caused by this measure, of $5,473,000, and, in anticipation of the effects of the law now about to be enacted, the Secretary of the Treasury has, in the same report, recommended an immediate additional duty to be laid upon importations, which, together with the high duties already established by law, he thinks will not amount to more than $8,000,000; making an anticipated deficiency in the next year's revenue, occasioned by this measure, of $4,000,000, compared with that of 1810. But if we compare the revenue arising from duties on merchandise and tonnage during the year 1809, while commerce was restricted by the non-intercourse, with what it was in 1807, while it was unshackled, we shall find a deficiency of about $11,000,000.

From this view of the subject, which is taken from authentic documents, which I invite gentlemen to controvert if they have it in their power, it is demonstrated that if we suffered this system to go into operation, we are not only to again reduce our citizens to a state of bankruptcy in their private fortunes, while loaded with additional taxes, but, notwithstanding the aid of these additional taxes, our Treasury is, if possible, to be reduced to a more complete state of bankruptcy than at present. I put it to gentlemen, who are in the confidence of the Cabinet, to say, why we are called upon again to plunge this nation into such a state of poverty and wretchedness? Is it necessary as a measure of self-defence, as the only mode of resistance which will bring England to terms? For myself I should suppose that our late experiment in this species of warfare, at which France took so much offence, as to take occasion to seize and confiscate the property of American citizens, to the amount of $40,000,000, which rendered necessary an appropriation of $80,000 during the present session, in order to enable those of our citizens, who had been thus robbed and plundered, to revisit their native shores, afforded a spectacle too humiliating to suffer us to make another attempt so soon, and before we have so far recovered from the effects of our late experiment as to be able to defray the ordinary expenses of government without having recourse to annual loans for the purpose. Are we bound to adopt this measure on account of the faith of Government being pledged to France by the law of May last?

Here give me leave to inquire what has been the further effect of this law. It seems England, although she saw that if it had any operation at all, it operated only against her, was willing to consider it as a municipal regulation of our own, and treated it as such, while Bonaparte at first, and for ten months, passed it over as inoffensive to him, until our vessels, which had been shut up in our ports by its elder sister, the embargo, having got released from that strong measure, flocked into the ports of France, Spain, Holland, and Naples, all under the immediate and entire control of France, when, on the 23d March, an order was issued by his gracious and loving Majesty to seize and confiscate the property of our citizens in all those countries; which property is, by the best calculation, estimated at more than forty millions. And you will perceive, Mr. Speaker, that the Duke of Cadore saw, that, by suffering the law to pass unnoticed, till our property released from the embargo had filled nearly every port in Europe under French control, and then issuing an order which was to have a retrospective operation of ten months, was such a gross outrage upon every principle of honor and justice, as well as the usages of public law, that he, in a letter to General Armstrong, of the 5th August, 1810, attempts to excuse the piratical transaction, by saying that the Emperor knew nothing of the law of March, until very lately. But, I pray gentlemen to take notice that General Armstrong, in his letter to Cadore of the 10th of March, (five months before the one just recited from Cadore,) asserts that this law was communicated to him in the month of June or July preceding--one whole year before the declaration made by Cadore.

But to pursue this subject: on the first day of May, 1810, while this robbery, I ought to presume, was unknown to the Executive--certainly to the people--this non-intercourse law was repealed; but the majority, for wise purposes, I presume, did, in the same law that repealed the non-intercourse, give the President power, in case England or France should, before the 1st day of March, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation; in which case, the non-intercourse should be revived against the nation neglecting to revoke or modify her edicts, in like manner, for the space of three months after the date of such proclamation. And you will recollect, sir, that this law was also opposed by the minority, not so much, perhaps, because they suspected either the integrity or impartiality of the President, as because they thought it unconstitutional to commit a power to the Executive which was, in its nature and effect, an act of legislation, viz: to revive a law at his discretion which was to affect the great interest of the nation, and might result in war. I say, at his discretion; and I ask gentlemen to take notice that the law reads, "so revoke or modify." This law was also sent by the President to our Ministers at London and Paris, as he states in his Message. But, what was it sent there for? Only to be used as an inducement to those nations to revoke their unjust edicts, which was the avowed object of the provision when it passed. And, if sent there for that purpose, it would seem, that to have acted a neutral part, it ought to have been used alike at the palaces of St. Cloud and St. James. But, Mr. Speaker, what was the fact? Here we may learn the management of which I spoke when I first addressed you. This law, which you will perceive was in the nature of a generous overture made to the belligerent who first revoked his edicts, changed its character when offered to the other belligerent, who should neglect to revoke the obnoxious edicts until after his enemy had done so; and, instead of being a generous offer, contained a threat, that if she did not revoke, we should shut our ports against her products, while they should be open to those of her enemy. And this is the light in which it was viewed by our Government, as will be seen in Mr. Smith's letter to General Armstrong, of the 5th day of June, 1810, (printed documents, p. 35,) in these words: "It might be added, that the form in which the law now presents the overture, is as well calculated as the overture itself to gain a favorable attention, inasmuch as it may be regarded by the belligerent first accepting of it as a promise to itself and a threat only to its adversary." For this view of the subject, gentlemen will perceive that it is much more agreeable to close any matter in dispute upon a generous offer for so doing, than it would be to do so while threatened by their opponent that if it is not done they must suffer the consequence of their own folly and his vengeance. Now, in looking through the documents, I mistake if gentlemen have not discovered some management in this business, so that while the law was presented to France as an offer made to herself, it should be presented to England in no other character than that of a threat. It seems that the first correspondence with our Minister which we are suffered to see, is a letter from Mr. Smith to Mr. Pinkney, of the 22d May; although it appears from that letter that the Secretary of State had sent a copy of the law in a previous letter of the 4th of that month to Mr. Pinkney, as also another copy in the letter of the 22d; but we hear nothing of instructions in either to use this new overture, which the law presents, to the best advantage at the Court of St. James, while it retained its character of an offer made to that Government. Indeed, it would seem most natural to suppose that the instructions given in this business were contained in the letter of the 4th, which was the first enclosing a copy of the law. But, at this we are not suffered to look, nor at the one sent to General Armstrong, of the same date, which was also the first to him enclosing a copy of the law.

But, Mr. Speaker, as we are not suffered to see the first correspondence on this important business, which we are called upon by the Executive to carry into effect by a new act of legislation, it becomes doubly our duty to examine well this letter of the twenty-second, and see what that treats of, and whether it compares with the first we are suffered to see, sent to General Armstrong on this subject. In this letter to Mr. Pinkney of the twenty-second, the Secretary commences, as he says, with much surprise, that Great Britain had not revoked her blockades, and that she had not sent a man of rank to replace Mr. Jackson; and, after having dwelt at great length on the latter of these subjects, he mentions that he had sent a copy of the law, as also another, in his letter of the fourth of that month, and tells Mr. Pinkney to let the British Government know that the provisions of the law would be carried into effect, but not a syllable of proffering it as an offer made to that Government and a threat to France. But, instead of this, the Secretary selects two subjects, which he must have known would be difficult to close, and tells Mr. Pinkney that if another Minister was not sent to replace Mr. Jackson, to let the British Government know that he would return to the United States. And as though this was not sufficient to prevent the British Government from closing with the conditions of the new overture, the attack on the Chesapeake must be settled in a manner agreeable to the propositions made to Mr. Rose and Mr. Erskine, which he might well know would not be done, as the British Government had told him it could not be closed in that way. On the first of July, Mr. Pinkney acknowledges Mr. Smith's letter of the twenty-second of May, and very properly goes on to execute the instructions it contained as to the British Government sending a man of rank to replace Mr. Jackson, &c. And, in my opinion, very properly notices the scrap of instructions it contained, respecting the law of May last, by merely mentioning, that while he is engaged with Lord Wellesley on these other subjects, he thinks he shall draw his attention to the non-intercourse law, but I find no account of his ever presenting the law to that Government.

Now, Mr. Speaker, while we see in this letter of the twenty-second the substance of all we are permitted to see of the use to be made by Mr. Pinkney of this law, as an inducement to the British Government to revoke the Orders in Council, let us examine what was the course pursued towards the French Government to induce it to take advantage of the law, while it retained the character of a favorable overture, so that the British Government should have to meet it as a threat, or as a rod held over them to procure the revocation of their edicts. In order to do this, I shall examine the first letter which is suffered to come to public view, from Secretary Smith to General Armstrong, after the date of the law of May first. This bears the date of June fifth, documents, page 34. In this, we find that he had sent two before, each one enclosing a copy of the law, and no doubt both containing instructions what use to make of it. For we find, even in this third letter, that Mr. Smith tells General Armstrong, (to use his own words,) "If there be sincerity in the language held at different times by the French Government, and especially in the late overture to proceed to amicable and just arrangements in the case of our refusal to submit to the British Orders in Council, (not blockades,) no pretext can be found for longer declining to put an end to the decrees of which the United States have so justly complained." And here, I entreat gentlemen to notice that this is the first ground stated by our Government to that of France, as being that which would be insisted upon from England--a compliance on her part required to entitle her to the provisions of this law, viz., her relinquishing the Orders in Council. We may here notice, that Mr. Smith adds, as a further inducement to France to take advantage of the law, while it retained the character of a favorable overture, "that by putting in force the non-intercourse against England, agreeable to the terms of this statute, that the very species of resistance would be made which France has been constantly representing as the most efficacious." But, Mr. Smith goes still farther in his instructions, and tells General Armstrong, "that it may be added, that in the form in which the law now presents the overture, it is as well calculated as the overture itself to gain a favorable attention, inasmuch as it may be regarded by the belligerent first accepting it as a promise to itself, and a threat only to its adversary." In this letter, we find that the Secretary states a first ground, which was necessary in the first instance to entitle the French Government to the provisions of this law. What was this ground? Why, he tells General Armstrong to let the French Government understand that the President would not proceed to give the law effect, if the restoration of the property of our citizens be finally refused; and closes his letter by directing him to let that Government know that the only ground, short of a preliminary restoration of the property, on which the contemplated arrangement could take place, would be an understanding that the confiscation was reversible, and that it would become immediately the subject of discussion, with a reasonable prospect of justice to our injured citizens. Was this the ground on which the subject was placed? It seems so, from this official letter of the Secretary. Yes, sir, it was; and with due deference, I may be allowed to say, the only honorable and just ground; and if the American Government had possessed independence enough to have still occupied this ground, we would not have had the mortification to discuss the bill on the table at this time. But, instead of this, although Mr. Smith had just received Cadore's insulting letter, in which he more than insinuates that, as a Government and nation, we are destitute of just political views, without honor, energy, or even independence, and closes by letting our Government know of the seizure and sale of the property of our citizens in all the ports of Europe under French control; what was the conduct of the American Government on this occasion? I entreat gentlemen to take notice, that, with this horrid picture of insult and robbery fresh in their recollection, the same conciliatory disposition, guided by the principles of neutrality, which dismissed a British Minister for an implied insult, induced Mr. Smith to inform General Armstrong that the President thought it best not to make any animadversions on that subject at that time. (Printed documents, page 34.) The next letter on this subject worthy of notice, is one of the 5th of July, in which Mr. Smith acknowledges the receipt of information, that the property which he had said in his last must be restored, in order to entitle France to the American commerce while it was denied to England, was sold, and the proceeds deposited in the caisse prive--privy purse of the Emperor. Here, indeed, Mr. Smith seems to have almost forgot himself, and to conceive he was giving instructions how to proceed with a British Minister, and tells General Armstrong to demand every reparation of which the subject was susceptible. But, Mr. Speaker, is it not worthy of notice that he closes even this spirited letter, with such a history of piracy and insult then on his desk before him, by quitting the ground he had taken in his letter of the fifth of June, and, instead of a proposed renewal of the non-intercourse against England, if she should neglect to withdraw her Orders in Council, which was the only ground taken by the President with Mr. Erskine, and also the only thing contemplated when the law of May last was passed, as also the only ground taken by himself only one month before, (having, it is presumed, heard from France in the interval,) he condescends to tell the General, that if France should demand it, he might give her to understand that it was the President's intention to renew the non-intercourse against England, if she did not also rescind her blockades. It is here again to be noticed, that he again repeats, what he had before told General Armstrong, that a restoration of the property was indispensable, in order to a renewal of the non-intercourse against England.

But again: will, I had like to have said, the servile manner, in which a rescinding the blockade is coupled as a condition with the withdrawing the Orders in Council, escape notice? Immediately on instructing General Armstrong to state to the French Government that a repeal of the blockade of eighteen hundred and six would be insisted on, the Secretary adds: "You will press the reasonableness of permitting the United States to proceed in such way as they may think proper, in relation to any subsequent blockades, or any other blockades not against France," which to me reads in this way, i. e., as we have, at the request of the French Government, receded from our first ground, and included blockades also, you are instructed humbly to request Bonaparte to permit us to do our own business in our own way in future. My God! After all this, to see the Government of my country soliciting, at the feet of the Emperor of France, for permission to manage their own affairs in their own way! What American can read this correspondence without laying his hand upon his heart and exclaiming, O my Government, my Government, now is the gold become dim, and the most fine gold changed! The next thing we meet with, is Mr. Smith's letter of the 2d of November, to General Armstrong, enclosing the President's proclamation, declaring the edicts of France so revoked, as that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, and of course the non-intercourse to be revived against England after the 2d of February, if she did not in the mean time revoke her orders, which, after the ground taken, and so often repeated, with respect to the restoration of the property, must astonish every American. But we have still this as a consolation, that Mr. Smith, notwithstanding he had been told by the Duke of Cadore that it was impossible any compromise could take place on that subject, says in the letter enclosing the proclamation that the President presumes that the requisitions contained in his letter of the 5th of July, as to the restoration of the property, will have been satisfied. In the name of God, Mr. Speaker, what grounds had he for this presumption? In addition to this, in his letter of the 5th of November, Mr. Smith instructs General Armstrong to let the Emperor know that the third section of the law of March, 1809, at which he took so much offence, was not intended to operate against his subjects, but against our own citizens. And although this may be, and probably is, true, yet a confession of this kind, after so recent and aggravated insult and violence, must I think be sickening to the American people, and Napoleon himself will be at a loss to know why it was made unless to testify our loyalty. But our loyalty to the contrary notwithstanding, the Duke of Cadore in his letter to General Armstrong of the 12th of September, in answer to one from him of the 7th of that month, tells the General, that the Emperor sees with pleasure that the Americans are far from acknowledging the tyrannical principles of English legislation, yet informs him that as to the merchandise confiscated, it having been confiscated as a measure of reprisal, the principles of reprisal must be the law in that affair.

Now, Mr. Speaker, after seeing how the law of May, 1810, has been used with the French Government, and for aught we know, not used at all with that of England, until it had assumed the character of a threat, together with the various changes of position taken by our Government in this business, I think it demonstrates a management, which, if duly examined, will not leave much doubt whether it be indispensably necessary to suffer this law to go into operation, either as a measure of resistance against England, or of good faith towards France. For instance, at one time England must repeal her Orders in Council to entitle her to the benefit of the law; at another, viz: after hearing from France, the condition must include a repeal of the blockades also, and on the part of France, she must rescind her decrees and restore the property, then a promise is to be accepted as it respects the property, and, to top the climax, the proclamation issues on the presumption of an agreement having taken place, on the part of France, that the property shall be restored. But after all this we are told by Cadore, on the 12th of September, to be contented, for as to the property in question it will not be restored.

But, Mr. Speaker, it seems that the President, in compliance with a resolution of the House of the 21st of December, has furnished documents which put the question beyond a doubt, that the proclamation was issued, declaring that the French decrees were repealed, so that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, when, to say the least, he had no official information of the fact, or, if he had, he has taken care to keep it to himself. Mr. Smith, in his letter to Turreau, of the 18th of December, is compelled to say in effect, that the French restrictions on our commerce are not rescinded, or, to use his own words: "If, then, for the revoked decrees, municipal laws producing the same commercial effect have been substituted, the mode only, and not the measure, has undergone an alteration." In this situation, I should like to be informed why we are called upon by the Executive so to modify our laws as to carry the non-importation against England and her dependencies forcibly into effect, and thus destroy the small remains of our commerce, the effects of which we have so recently felt at the Treasury, since the repeal of the non-intercourse law of May last, as I have already shown from the Secretary's report. This information I have not as yet been able to obtain, although I have sought for it, unless I resort to the last paragraph in General Turreau's letter of December 12, to Mr. Secretary Smith, in answer to one from the Secretary, remonstrating against the exclusion of cotton and tobacco from the ports of France. In reply to which he says, among other things, that he thinks some modification will take place in this respect, but tells him that this will depend upon the firm and persevering measures to be pursued by the two Governments against the common enemy. In this intimation of his Imperial Majesty through his Minister, which, by-the-by, is not the first of the kind, will I fancy be found the only necessity of suffering this measure to go into operation. And are gentlemen prepared to obey? I trust not. No, sir, I will not for a moment entertain so degrading an idea. But firmly believing the contrary, I still hope the amendment will be rejected, and with it the whole restrictive system, until France shall learn to respect our rights.

Mr. Speaker, if I am to be called an enemy to my country for opposing this measure, under present circumstances, to my country I will appeal; being entirely willing that the honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WRIGHT) and his friends should share the whole of the honor of advocating the right of the Emperor to take and withhold the property of our citizens. Sir, it creates no astonishment to hear that gentleman contend that we are bound by the law of May to carry the non-intercourse into effect against Great Britain, but, to hear a gentleman possessed of the discernment of the honorable chairman of the committee who reported this bill, make this declaration, is truly astonishing, when the reverse is the fact. I trust I have already shown that in every communication from our Executive to the French Government on the subject, that Government has been told that if, in connection with the revocation of the decrees, the sequestered property was not given up, the non-intercourse would not be renewed against England. These several letters were communicated to this House, and published nearly three months since, and are, at this moment, in the hands of the British Government, and, by this tenure, that Government has a right to rest assured that the non-intercourse will not be renewed against them. Indeed, to believe the contrary, would be an insult to the plighted faith of the Executive.

Mr. BIGELOW.--Mr. Speaker, I regret extremely that, at this late period of the session, and at this late hour of the night, the high sense of the duty which I feel that I owe to my constituents and to my country, should compel me to submit to the consideration of the House a few remarks upon this all-important subject. They will be of a general nature, candid, and as much as possible confined to the subject of debate.

Sir, on this occasion, I feel no disposition to censure the conduct of the President. Permit me, however, before I proceed to the subject, to notice a very singular remark of the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Ross.) That gentleman observed, "that when this bill was laid on your table, he was determined to vote against it; that he considered it wrong in principle, and injurious in its consequences; and that he should now vote against it, had not several gentlemen, particularly the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. QUINCY,) been so severe in their censures upon the conduct of the Administration. He felt it his duty to support the Administration, and should, therefore, vote for the bill, although he disliked it."

Sir, I apprehend the President will not feel under very great obligations to that gentleman for this kind of support. For myself, I am free to declare, that stronger reasons than those must operate upon my mind, before I can give my sanction to a measure professedly impolitic and unjust.

This bill, Mr. Speaker, is advocated on the ground that, by the law of May, 1810, we are under obligations to France to prohibit commercial intercourse with Great Britain. If, sir, I rightly recollect, for I have not the law before me, the substance of the provision, as it respected France, was, that if she so revoked or modified her edicts and decrees, as that they should cease to violate our neutral commerce, and Great Britain refused, for three months, to pursue a similar course, then was this system of non-intercourse to commence, as it respects Great Britain.

Mr. Speaker, I deny that the faith of the nation is pledged by the law of May, 1810. It is neither a contract nor a treaty. To constitute a contract, two parties are necessary, at least. All writers upon the subject have so considered it; and, sir, if one party can make a contract with another, without the knowledge, consent, or approbation of the other, it is a new discovery, with which, as yet, I am unacquainted. Such, sir, is the nature of the contract referred to. The Congress was the only party concerned in making it. France knew nothing of it; it was made wholly without her consent or approbation. How, then, is the national faith plighted to France by that law? Sir, I know of but one way in which the faith of this nation can be pledged to another, and that is, by a treaty approved and ratified by the constituted authorities; and surely, sir, no gentleman will contend that this law amounted to a treaty. If, then, it was neither a contract nor a treaty, the faith of the nation is not pledged. The most you can make of it is, as was observed on a former occasion by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) "that it is a rule of conduct for ourselves." But, sir, I am willing to admit, in case France had fairly and honestly complied with the conditions of the law, so often referred to, that good faith on our part might have required that we should pass the present bill. What was the condition to be performed on the part of France? Sir, she was to revoke and modify her decrees, so that they should cease to violate our neutral commerce. This has not been done. The Berlin and Milan decrees are not even nominally revoked. Look at the letters of Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at Paris, of the tenth of December last. Look at the letters of the Dukes of Massa and Gaete, of the twenty-fifth of the same month. Look at her conduct subsequent to the first of November, the time when you were informed that those decrees would cease to operate. Has she not seized every vessel which has arrived at her ports since that period? Upon this point I will not waste the time of the House by attempting to show that those decrees are still in force, a fact which has been already so fully and amply proved by the candid and able arguments of the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT.)

But, sir, I will go further, and, for the sake of argument, admit, not only that the law of May, 1810, has all the binding force upon this nation of a treaty made by the regular constitutional authorities, but that the Berlin and Milan decrees were, on the fifth day of August last, actually revoked; and, after the first day November, ceased to violate our neutral commerce. There is still another important point to be considered, and I hope gentlemen will attend to it with candor.

Sir, it is a principle well established by the law of nations, as well as by the laws of nature and reason, that when one nation, in consequence of revoking certain acts injurious to another nation, claims from the other nation the performance of a promise made on condition that those acts should be revoked, it is necessary that the nation thus claiming the fulfilment of the promise, should first, not only revoke those injurious acts, but it should also be done fairly and honestly, without subterfuge or reserve, and without, at the same time, adopting other measures equally injurious, and producing the same effects. Now, sir, admit that the declaration of the Duc de Cadore, in his letter of the 5th of August, 1810, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and, after the first of November, would cease to violate our neutral commerce, was an actual revocation of those decrees; still, sir, if this was merely to amuse and deceive us, if another act equally injurious was at the same time substituted, will it be contended that France has, nevertheless, fairly complied with the conditions of your law? Sir, it is a very singular fact that, on this very fifth day of August, another decree was issued by the French Emperor, which was equally injurious, and amounted, in fact, to a prohibition of our commerce, as much as the Berlin and Milan decrees. I allude to the duties established by the Emperor on articles of American produce, which were so enormously high, that the owner would prefer an abandonment of his cargo to a payment of the duties. Even this was insufficient; for, by a subsequent decree, various articles were prohibited, and those which were allowed, must only be exported in vessels which should sail from Charleston or New York.

Is this, sir, that fair, that honest repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; is this that bona fide performance of the condition; that ceasing to violate our neutral commerce, which lays us under such solemn obligations to France? Am I not, then, Mr. Speaker, authorized to say, that the condition of the law of May, 1810, has not been complied with? I trust, sir, as to this point, that the letter of the Secretary of State to Mr. Turreau, of the 18th of December last, will be considered as conclusive. In this letter, the Secretary, speaking of the enormous duties which have been mentioned, observes: "If, then, for the revoked decrees, municipal laws, producing the same commercial effect, have been substituted; the mode only, and not the measure, have undergone an alteration."

To my mind, sir, this insidious, this perfidious conduct, on the part of Napoleon, is infinitely more base, and merits the indignation of the American people infinitely more than would an open refusal to revoke the obnoxious decrees. It is an attempt, if I may be allowed the expression, to gull and deceive us, by an artful, intriguing policy, which ought to excite our jealousy, and rouse our highest resentments. I trust, sir, I have fairly shown that our faith is not plighted, that we are under no obligations to Napoleon. If in this I am correct, then the passage of the present bill is a mere question of policy and interest.

It would be a mere waste of time to attempt, by a reference to the past evils which have resulted from this restrictive system, to show the impolicy of its continuance. The bad effects already produced are but too well known. This, sir, is the favorable moment to erase it from your statute books; the policy and interest of the nation require it.

Let us examine, for a moment, the consequences of its continuance.

Do you believe, sir, that your merchants, a great portion of whose property has been seized by foreign nations, when the remnant of their vessels, which have escaped, shall, upon entering your own ports, be seized by your own custom-house officers, that they will be satisfied to lose the remainder of their property, in pursuance of your own laws? They will think it hard enough, that millions of their property have been seized by France, by Denmark, and by Sweden, without having the remainder seized on their return, and confiscated by their own Government. Surely, sir, they will require strong evidence of the fact that your faith is plighted to France, before they will be satisfied with the measure you are about to adopt.

Mr. Speaker, I am not the Representative of merchants; I feel no peculiar interest in their favor, but I consider them a useful class of citizens; their interests are closely connected with the interests of your farmers; and, in this point of view, they are at least entitled to notice. Hitherto, your merchants have been noted for their fairness, and for the respect they have paid to your revenue laws. But, sir, after having their property plundered by France, by Denmark, and Sweden, will they not, when they learn that from a scrupulous regard to your faith plighted to France, a faith, however, which has no existence, you seize, with a few exceptions, all which return; will they not, I repeat it, endeavor to land their cargoes so as to escape the vigilance of your officers? Have you no apprehension that, when they have once learnt the art of smuggling to save their property from seizure and confiscation, they will afterwards practise it, to avoid the payment of duties? I fear that this system will have a tendency to corrupt the morals of your merchants, and from them it will extend throughout the country.

WEDNESDAY, February 27.

The House formed a quorum at half-past ten o'clock.

Mr. GOLD.--Mr. Speaker, at a period when the civilized world is convulsed by continued war, to its centre; when the European continent is exhibiting the marks of ruthless conquest, and is threatened with all that barbarism, with which Attila, with his invading hordes, overwhelmed the Roman world, it becomes the Councils of this nation to move with cautious steps on the theatre of our foreign relations; to move, sir, with a fixed eye on the great law of neutrality, and yield an implicit obedience to its high injunctions.

It eminently becomes, sir, the Government of this country, in all our concerns with the belligerents of Europe, to carry an even hand, to manifest to both a fair, impartial, and equal conduct. Without such a course, the consequences to our peace and prosperity, from the jealousy and violence of warring nations, are inevitable, and, with it, we can hardly promise ourselves exemption from aggressions and spoliation; such and so destructive is the spirit of the times. Need I, sir, to excite caution in legislation, refer the House to the consequences of the non-intercourse act of the 1st of March, 1809; for, however free from all exception from the belligerents was that act, yet France, in the wantonness of power, made it the pretext for the exercise of the rigorous right of reprisal by an additional decree, which, with the preceding, have, like the besom of destruction, swept our property from the ocean.

It was on that act, that the Rambouillet decree of the 23d of March last, was founded for its sole justification; and so do the very terms of the decree, shameful and disgraceful as it is, import.

In reviewing the proceedings of our Government under the act of the 1st of May last, (the act upon which the President's proclamation for a non-importation with Great Britain is founded,) permit me, sir, to ask if the spirit of a fair and impartial neutrality, so eminently necessary in the critical situation of the United States, has guided our proceedings with the respective belligerents? By this act, if either of the belligerents rescinded its edicts, violating our neutral rights, the non-intercourse act was to be put in force against the other refusing to rescind, and the President, by proclamation, was to declare such fact of rescinding. Under this provision, sir, the President substituted a prospective engagement for a fact done; a promise for a performance; the future for the past, and hence, sir, have resulted our present difficulties; that crisis which bears so hard upon the American people. It is not, sir, my object to impeach the motives of the President in this ill-fated proceeding; I am to presume a love of country guided him; but it is impossible not to see in the measure a course indulgent to France, a construction upon the letter of the Duke de Cadore, of the 5th of August last, (touching the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan,) the most favorable and advantageous to that country, and offensive to Great Britain. For, sir, notwithstanding the above proclamation, the noon-day sun is not plainer than that those decrees are not revoked; nor indeed, sir, will they, in my opinion, ever be revoked under the above act. The utmost extent of our hopes, from the last despatches transmitting the official communication of the twenty-fifth of December last, from the Grand Judge Massa, and the Minister of Finance, Gaete, is, that our vessels (with their cargoes) seized in the ports of France since the first of November, in violation of the stipulation of the above letter of the 5th of August, and of all that is holden sacred among nations, may be at some future day, under some new and embarrassing conditions, flowing from the policy of Napoleon, restored to our suffering citizens. By the last paragraph of the above letter of the Minister of the Finances, it would seem that the Emperor and King has shut his eyes upon past engagements, and referred all that concerns us to the second day of February, when new toils are to be spread, as is to be presumed, for the unsuspecting, credulous, and confiding American merchant and navigator. Against the mass of evidence, that the French decrees are not revoked--evidence which is increased by the melancholy advices of every east wind--the honorable member (Mr. RHEA) from Tennessee, refers us to the President's proclamation, as a foundation for our faith in the repeal of the decrees to rest on; this is evidence indeed of things not seen. As well might the trembling mariner look to his almanac for the state of the weather at the moment the pitiless tempest is beating upon him, and his vessel is sinking under the shock of the elements. Whatever ground of hope or belief in the good faith of France existed at the time of issuing the proclamation, subsequent events have removed those grounds from under our feet, and blasted all our hopes; the wily policy of the French Court stands confessed; the Emperor loves but to chasten; he seduces but to destroy.

While the indulgent course, the favorable interpretation of the letter of Cadore of the 5th of August above mentioned, was adopted by the Cabinet towards France; was a similar temper and disposition manifested in relation to Great Britain?

I fear, sir, this part of the case will not well bear scrutiny. That the Orders in Council, and not the doctrine of blockade, were the objects of the act of the 1st of May, in relation to Great Britain, not only the debates of the period, but the recollection of every member of this House, will bear me out in asserting. That mere cruising blockades, and every other blockade not supported by an actual investing force, is unwarranted by the laws of nations, is my clear conviction; it is the result of examination and reflection on the subject; but unfounded in public law as is the doctrine set up by Great Britain, its abandonment or modification can only be expected from treaty, and not by an isolated declaration at the threshold, under the threat of a specific alternative. The Orders in Council being removed, the blockade of May, 1806, would have been little more than nominal; why then was it insisted on as indispensable, under the above act? Through a strange fatality, something, inconsiderable in itself, is always found in our demands upon Great Britain, to bar a settlement.

But, Mr. Speaker, what is calculated much more to put in jeopardy the neutral character of our Government is the bill on the table. While all is uncertainty and embarrassment with France; while her decrees remain merely suspended and not revoked; while your merchants, trusting to the plighted faith of the Emperor, have been drawn into the French ports and there betrayed and sacrificed; while commerce is bleeding at every pore under the merciless gripe of Napoleon, we are called on to go farther to conciliate France, than she was entitled to, had she faithfully revoked her decrees. Upon revoking his decrees, the Emperor was entitled to have the act of the 1st of May carried into effect against Great Britain, and he was entitled to no more. Such, sir, is the precise condition imposed on the United States by the letter of the Duke de Cadore, of the 5th of August, and this is the whole extent of the requirement. Upon what ground, then, sir, is it that we are called on to pass this additional non-importation act against Great Britain? If France has revoked her decrees, is not a non-importation with Great Britain inevitable, and does it not exist? But I will put the key to the door; let us not dissemble; France has not revoked, and for that cause and that alone, has the question arisen, whether there be at this time a legal non-importation with Great Britain. If, sir, there be any other difficulty, in the way of a non-importation with Great Britain; if there does exist any other possible obstacle, let the advocates of the bill name that obstacle. I make the appeal to gentlemen, I demand of the chairman of the committee who reported this bill, why and wherefore it is presented? France has failed to revoke her decrees, and as such revocation was, under the act of the first of May, a prerequisite to non-importation with Great Britain, such non-importation must fall, unless this additional act in favor of France is passed. This, sir, is the whole length and breadth of the case; and on no other ground can this disastrous measure be placed. If France revoked her decrees, she was entitled to a non-importation against Great Britain, and if she failed to revoke, what? The bill gives the answer--she is equally entitled; so that, do what France may do, the end must be a non-importation with England. Such, sir, is the logic of your bill; such the impartiality towards the belligerents; such and so barefaced the subversion of the great principle of the act of May last.

The principle of the act of May was just and equal; our offers to Great Britain and France were the same, and the result, in case of refusal, alike to both. France met the offer by the famous letter of Cadore, of the 5th of August; in which, with more than conjurer's skill, this disciple of the Jesuits brought together and united both present and future; he revoked and did not revoke; he gave up the decrees and yet retained their operation or effects; he made the revocation both absolute and conditional; absolute for obtaining the President's proclamation, conditional for the purpose of eluding performance; absolute for drawing our property within his clutches, conditional for retaining it, to fill his coffers and fatten his minions; in fine, sir, the letter was one thing, or another thing, or nothing at all, as artifice might suggest or future events render necessary.

But, sir, the most copious source of error that I have witnessed during the various debates upon the proceedings under the act of the 1st of May, is found in the extent of the Berlin and Milan decrees. The gentlemen who have commenced their career of conciliation with France, treated those decrees as operating only on the narrow ground of direct commerce between the United States and Great Britain and on our vessels to other ports which have submitted to British search; hence the effort to justify the late seizures of our vessels in France, upon grounds consistent with the repeal of those decrees, as being laden with British colonial produce, &c. But, sir, this cannot avail or give the least color to the pretence of a repeal.

The Berlin decree (that decree which emanated from the French Emperor at the capital of prostrate Prussia, where he sat like Marius over the ruins of Carthage) contains ten distinct articles; the 6th and 7th prohibit all trade in British merchandise, and, the more effectually to close all the avenues to the continent, exclude from the continental ports all vessels coming from Great Britain or her colonies, or that shall have visited the colonies after the date of the decree. The Duke de Cadore, by the above letter of the 5th of August, pledged the Emperor, his master, for the entire repeal of this decree without any reservation. Had this pledge been faithfully redeemed; had such repeal been had with good faith, it would have subverted the whole continental system and removed all difficulty both between the United States and France, and between us and Great Britain, as it must have produced the actual result required by Great Britain, in restoring the commerce of the world to that state it was in at the promulgation of the decrees. Although the above decrees partake of municipal as well as external regulation, yet the French Emperor, foreseeing that Great Britain would not relinquish the ground taken while the continental system, so hostile to her commercial interests, was continued, and yielding for a moment, as is supposed, to the groans of subjugated States, stipulated by the above letter for a relinquishment of his system by an entire repeal of those decrees. Let me repeat, sir, had France proved faithful to her engagements, the United States would at this moment have had a prosperous commerce with Europe, and the present state of things is fairly imputable to the Emperor, with whom that bill on your table invites us to proclaim "all is well." I look about me, sir, with emotions of concern and anxiety to find a ground on which to justify the course adopted by this bill towards the belligerents. The peace, the reputation, and honor of my country are concerned. While the great principles of justice and fair neutrality shall be our landmarks and guide, come what may, fall when we may, we shall stand justified to the world, and what is of more consequence, we shall have the support of our own consciences; the sweet and consoling reflection, that we stand clear of fault and deserve a better fate. This bill will not give the United States this high and enviable condition.

Mr. PEARSON.--It is but seldom, Mr. Speaker, I address you, especially on subjects of the nature and importance of that which is now under discussion. Perhaps on this account, I may not be the less entitled to your indulgence and the attention of this assembly.

Being opposed to the principles of this bill, and having no confidence in the reasons or pretences by which it is attempted to be justified, I shall not trouble you with an exposition of its particular details, however novel, arbitrary, and impolitic they may appear. The bill proposes substantially a revival of that system of commercial restrictions, under which the people of our country have so long and severely suffered. It substantially denies all intercourse with Great Britain and her colonies, by excluding from our ports British vessels of every description, and the products and manufactures of that nation of every kind, and to whomsoever they belong; while at the same time, every possible indulgence is granted to France--her vessels, armed and unarmed, her products and those of the nations which she has subjugated, find no restraint from us. Here let me remark, that to those two contending powers, whenever their interest, or the interests of either of them come in contact with the interests of my own country, I feel no preference, I make no discrimination; my first best wishes ever are at home. I now solemnly appeal to gentlemen, why shall we, at this moment, make this marked distinction? Why shall we take this hostile attitude against Great Britain, and open our arms to the embrace of France--when, by doing so, we must inevitably afflict our own people, and depart from that character of neutrality, which has been the alleged boast of the present and late Administration; and which alone has afforded those in power an apology with the people for those wild schemes of policy, with which their course has been but too plainly marked, and that accumulated distress which every man has seen, and every honest man has felt? Can it be because Bonaparte has said he loves the Americans? I, sir, know no other cause. I know it has been said on this floor, and said too by the honorable gentleman who reported this bill, and his honorable colleague, (Mr. GHOLSON,) that the Berlin and Milan decrees are revoked; and, in compliance with the law of the late session of Congress, the faith of this nation is pledged to Bonaparte, for the due execution of that law against Great Britain. To those opinions my understanding cannot assent--the obligation to Bonaparte I neither feel nor believe. That none such exist will not, in my opinion, be difficult to prove. For a fair understanding of this question, it becomes necessary to apply to the law of May, 1810. On that law and the proceedings which have been subsequently adopted by this Government and France, must the propriety of the present measures be justified or condemned. The act alluded to, in substance, declares: "That in case either Great Britain or France shall, before the 3d day of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts, that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not, within three months thereafter, so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner, the restrictive provisions of the law of 1809 are to be revived and have full force and effect against the nation so refusing or neglecting to revoke or modify," &c., and the restrictions imposed by the act, are from the date of such proclamation, to cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation revoking or modifying her decrees in the manner aforesaid.

The emphatic words of this law are, so revoke or modify, as that they cease to violate, &c. Here is a positive, unconditional, indispensable prerequisite, to be complied with before the President was authorized to exercise the power given to him; a specific fact was to exist, and he was empowered simply to make its existence known to the nation; no discretion was allowed; nothing left to doubtful construction--no conditional promissory note of a perfidious agent, of a more perfidious master, was contemplated by the law. The great question now is, does the fact on which the proclamation was alone to issue, and on which its legitimacy solely depends, exist, or does it not? The very doubt ought to decide the question--the burden of proof unquestionably ought to rest on those who call on us to pass this law; and in their own language, execute the contract, and violate not the faith so solemnly plighted to "Napoleon the Great"--unfortunately the evidence on which they rely disproves the fact, and we are enabled to do what can seldom be done, and ought never to be required--prove a negative.

The letter of the Duke de Cadore, of the 5th August, 1810, the proclamation of the 2d of November, and Mr. Pinkney's diplomatic special pleading in his letter to the Secretary of State, of the 10th of December, constitute the whole burden of proof upon which the advocates of this bill rest their defence, and the evidence of the fact on which alone it can be justified. I have stated the law, and what I conceive to be its obligations on the President and ourselves. It will now be proper to take a correct view of this famous letter of the Duc de Cadore of the 5th August, this honeyed charm, which has seduced us into a labyrinth, from whose gloomy cells and devious windings we are, I fear, not soon to be extricated. This letter, which contains but one sentence of plain truth, viz: "That the Emperor applauded the general embargo laid by the United States"--after asserting the most palpable falsehood, by denying that the Emperor had knowledge of our law of March, 1809, until very lately, and justifying the seizure and condemnation of all American property which had entered, not only the ports of France, but those of Spain, Naples and Holland, dating from the 20th of May, 1809; and declaring that reprisal was a right commanded by the dignity of France, a circumstance on which it was impossible to make a compromise--the letter proceeds: "Now Congress retrace their steps, they revoke the act of the first of March, the ports of America are open to French commerce, and France is no longer interdicted to the Americans. In short, Congress engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent powers which should refuse to acknowledge the rights of neutrals. In this new state of things, I am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the first of November they will cease to have effect; it being understood, that in consequence of this declaration, (remark, Mr. Speaker, this declaration, not this fact,) the English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish, or that the United States, conformable to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English"--then follows in sweet accents His Majesty's declaration of love for the Americans, his solicitude for our prosperity, and the glory of France.

This is the gilded pill, in which lurks a most deadly venom, and which if we swallow, I fear all the political quackery of the nation cannot save us. On this letter, gentlemen rely for the revocation of the French edicts, and the freedom of our commerce with France. Allowing the most favorable construction to this letter, and abstracting it from circumstances and facts both before and after its date, it will not bear gentlemen out in their conclusion; it does not satisfy your law, and did not warrant the state of things which has been and is about to be produced. Instead of an existing and determined fact, we have a promise, and that too clogged with conditions, which it was well known to the Emperor would not or could not be complied with to the extent required by him. The conditions which depended on Great Britain, he knew, never would be yielded, and that which depended on ourselves was nothing short of war with England or our own citizens, by oppressing them with a perpetual embargo. Instead of an authenticated act of revocation, bearing the authority of the most ordinary law or edict of the French Empire, we have nothing but a letter from the agent of the Government, and which the Emperor may disavow at pleasure--as was done in the case of the Minister of Marine, in his explanations to General Armstrong of the intended operation of the Berlin decree--instead of the restoration of the immense amount of American property, of which your citizens have been most cruelly and unjustly robbed by this fell monster of the age--and which the President declared, through the Secretary of State, in letters to General Armstrong of the 5th of June and July, must precede an arrangement with France, and was an indispensable evidence of the just purpose of France towards the United States; instead of having forty or fifty millions' worth of our property restored, we are vauntingly told, that the property was confiscated as a measure of reprisal, that the principles of reprisal must be the law in that affair, and that a compromise would be inconsistent with the dignity of France--the plain English of which is, we have the property and we will keep it. Mr. Speaker, are we to be thus amused? Common honor and common sense revolt at the idea.

An honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,) whom I am very much inclined to respect, in an ingenious argument which he made the other day, to prove that the French decrees were revoked, told you that the revocation of those decrees depended on the mere volition of the mind of the Emperor, not requiring authentication or form; and although they might be revived the next moment, or substituted by other regulations equally affecting our neutral rights, still they were revoked. Thus attributing an authority to Bonaparte, descriptive of the power of the God of nature--when he said, let there be light and there was light. And in reply to the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. QUINCY,) who contended that form was essential to the repeal of a decree, he remarked that the gentleman wanted form and not substance. From this course of reasoning, I conceive the gentleman has admitted, that this pretended revocation has neither form nor substance. An edict may be defined to be a law promulgated in such form as the institutions of the country require, or some act of sovereign authority, which has gone through the established forms of office, so as to become obligatory. The edicts of France have an appropriate form, their authority is attested by the Emperor and publicity is given, for the direction of those whose duty it is to carry them into effect. Sir, the decree of the most absolute monarch on earth is no decree till it is published. I contend that a revocation or modification of an edict requires the same or equal solemnities with its enactment; the fact must exist and be officially made known before it becomes obligatory--no declaration of an intention to revoke, can constitute an actual revocation. The act ought not only to be determined and public, but susceptible of authentication, and capable of being communicated to the nation and the world.

This opinion, if it needs authority, is supported by the instructions of the Secretary of State to our Ministers at Paris and London, of the 5th July. Mr. Pinkney is directed in these words--"If the British Government should accede to the overture contained in the act of Congress, by repealing or so modifying its edicts, as that they will cease to violate our neutral rights, you will transmit the repeal, properly authenticated, to General Armstrong, and if necessary, by a special messenger, and you will hasten to transmit it also to this Department--similar directions are given to General Armstrong."

Will it for a moment be contended, that the formal authentication required by the Administration, could mean a Jesuitical, insolent, equivocal, conditional letter, full of sound, and meaning nothing for our good? But, say gentlemen, the President received the evidence and issued his proclamation. This is true; but why has he done so, and how justified by the law under which alone he was authorized to act, is, to my mind, perfectly inexplicable; why, in the course of this arrangement with France, he has varied the ground which he first took--why dispensed with requisites at one time declared indispensable--why he advanced in exactions from Great Britain in proportion as he receded from demands on France, is left for himself and those who have more wisdom than myself, to determine. I trust, sir, I have a proper share of confidence in the Executive, and have no disposition to detract from his merit; but he is only man, and therefore subject to the frailties man is heir to. We have as yet no such maxim among us, as that the Executive is infallible--he can do no wrong. Whatever may be the disposition of other gentlemen, I am as yet too free, too much of a genuine Republican to subscribe to such a doctrine. I said, sir, that in the course of this arrangement with France, the Administration advanced in their demands on Great Britain and receded as to France.

I argue from the documents, which accompanied the President's Message at the opening of the present session of Congress. The first letter in the documents from the Secretary of State to Mr. Pinkney, of the 20th January, 1810, does not contain a word on the subject of blockades--on the contrary, the Orders in Council are alone required to be repealed, as preparatory to a treaty with Great Britain; and the British Government are assured of the cordial disposition "of the President to exercise any power with which he may be invested, to put an end to acts of Congress which would not be resorted to but for the Orders in Council, and at the same time of his determination to put them in force against France, in case her decrees should not also be repealed."

His letter of the 4th of May, which was the first after passing the act of the 1st of May last, that enclosed a copy of that act, is not published. On the 22d of May, another letter is sent enclosing a second copy of the act of Congress, in which there is not to be found any requisition of a repeal of the blockade which is now made a sine qua non to an arrangement with Great Britain. But on the 2d of July, after the arrival of the John Adams, which brought the correspondence between our Ministers at Paris and London, and the Agents of the British and French Governments, on the subject of the repeal of their several orders and decrees; and when it was known that the British Government would not abandon her system of blockade and adopt the principles contended for by France--in this letter, I say, is contained not only a demand of the repeal of the Orders in Council, but also of the blockading order of May, 1806. I have already shown, from the letters before me, of the 5th June and July, that the restoration of the property of our citizens, confiscated by the order of Bonaparte, was declared by the Executive as an indispensable prerequisite to an arrangement with the French Government. But the proclamation of the President has been issued without a cent of property being restored; nor is there the most distant prospect of our regaining a shilling from his iron grasp. Thus have the Administration changed the ground first taken, increased the demands on Great Britain, and abandoned what was deemed indispensable on the part of France.

So conscious was the President of the just expectation of the people of this country, that provision would be made for the restoration of their property, he informs Mr. Armstrong on the 2d of November, the day the proclamation was issued, that "in issuing the proclamation it has been presumed, that the requisition on the subject of the sequestered property will have been complied with." From what this presumption arose, I am at a loss to say--the letter of the Duc de Cadore to General Armstrong, of the 12th September, had been received here; we had been told there would be no compromise; the law of reprisal must govern. Sir, the law of reprisal, as recognized by the laws of nations, could never have authorized the seizure. Reprisals can only be resorted to in case of an act of hostility committed by one nation on the property or citizens of another, and after compensation for the injury has been demanded and refused; and even in that case, the property taken is to be held only in pledge, till satisfaction is made by the offending nation. The moment that confiscation takes place the principle of reprisal ceases and it becomes an act of war. We had done no injury to France; we had violated neither the rights of the persons or property of her subjects--no demand of indemnity was ever made; not a complaint whispered, till nearly twelve months after the passing of the law, (and after its expiration too,) which is made the pretext for this monstrous outrage. The law of reprisal had nothing to do with the affair, and the confiscation of our property excludes the idea of restoration. I confess I was astonished, and felt humbled as an American, when I heard the language of the President of the United States, in his Message to Congress at the opening of the present session on this subject. Instead of that high indignant tone, demanded by the honor and feelings of the nation, he, in the mildness of calm philosophy, says, "It was particularly anticipated that as a further evidence of just dispositions towards them, restoration would have been immediately made of the property" of our citizens, seized under a misapplication of the principles of reprisals, and a misconstruction of a law of the United States. This expectation has not been fulfilled. Thus the question as to the restoration seems to be abandoned; one kind, loving word from Napoleon the Great, (as he has been triumphantly called in this House,) this modern Alexander (without his virtues, with all his faults) disarms us of our rage, and we give millions for his embrace.

Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the committee (Mr. EPPES) who reported the bill, in reply to the very able speech of a gentleman from New York (Mr. EMOTT) who addressed you in the early stage of this discussion, appeared to me rather to question the purity of the source from which they came, than to have answered the arguments of that gentleman. This mode of reasoning may answer the purposes of gentlemen, but is surely unfavorable to fair investigation; it tends to abridge the freedom of debate, and prevent that firm, decisive, and candid exposition of those measures, which we conceive may vitally affect the happiness of the people. This is a privilege and a duty which I shall ever regard and ever perform. The same gentleman (Mr. EPPES) and several others, have reminded us of the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine; and offer it as a precedent for the justification of the President's proclamation and this bill, (which are substantially one and the same thing.) I had supposed that that unfortunate arrangement would have been kept out of sight by gentlemen on the other side of the House. It was to have been expected they would carefully avoid an attempt to make one bad precedent justify another; they must have forgotten how that arrangement militates against the proclamation, and the demand which is now so positively made of a revocation by Great Britain of her order of blockade of May, 1806. That arrangement, almost dictated by the Administration, and which was perfectly satisfactory to us all, did not contain one syllable, not the most distant information, relative to the repeal of that order, which now appears to excite so highly the indignation of gentlemen, and has been magnified into a cause of war. The order of blockade was at that time more recent, and if so injurious as now alleged, could not have escaped the attention of the Executive, and his vigilant Cabinet, when they were providing for the annulment of the Orders in Council of January and November, 1807. That arrangement was made without requiring a repeal of the blockade--now nothing can be done without a repeal, and thus we are to be blockaded both at home and abroad.

It may be further remarked, that by the law of February, 1808, the President was authorized to suspend the embargo as to France or Great Britain, on the same conditions pointed out by the act of May, 1810. In the exercise of that power, the President instructed Mr. Pinkney to propose to the British Government a repeal of the embargo as to that nation, and its continuation against France, if the Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, should be rescinded. At that time nothing was said, no demand was made, not even a proposition offered on the subject of the blockade in question. My attention, sir, has been somewhat drawn to this part of the subject by the importance which has been given to it in the document before me, and the arguments of gentlemen of this House, particularly the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. EPPES,) who said much on this subject the other day, in answer to arguments which the gentleman from New York (Mr. EMOTT) did not make. He reiterated last night that his arguments were unanswered and unanswerable. I do not profess, sir, to be perfectly acquainted with the practical extent of the order of blockade of May, 1806, nor do I know the precise quantum of injury we have sustained by it, nor am I to be understood as attempting its justification--I should be the last to concede any principle or any right to which my country has a claim. But, sir, I am compelled to believe, that an artificial importance is at this moment given to the subject, which it has not received at any other period since the adoption of that regulation by the British Government. I have already shown that, in the negotiation of 1808, and in the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, the question was not even made a matter of contestation; and, sir, from an examination of the Executive papers, from the date of the order of the blockade, down to the present session of Congress, I have not been able to discover a single paper remonstrating against the order, or insisting on its revocation, nor do I know of a single case of the condemnation of an American vessel under its operation. On the contrary, at the time of its adoption, (during the administration of Mr. Fox, who was believed to be as friendly disposed towards us, as any man who ever administered the affairs of the British Cabinet,) this measure was spoken of by our Minister at London (Mr. Monroe) as a relaxation favorable to neutral commerce. It may not be improper to refer to the order itself, as communicated by Mr. Fox to Mr. Monroe, on the 16th of May, 1806; after the preamble this note states "that the King, taking into consideration the new and extraordinary means resorted to by the enemy for the purpose of distressing the commerce of his subjects, has thought fit to direct that necessary measures should be taken for the blockade of the coast, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive; and the said coast, rivers, and ports, are, and must be considered, as blockaded. But His Majesty is pleased to declare, that such blockade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods not being the property of His Majesty's enemies, and not being contraband of war, from approaching the said coasts and entering into and sailing from the rivers and ports, (save and except the coast, rivers, and ports, from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous blockade, and which are to be considered as continued,) provided the said ships and vessels so approaching and entering (except as aforesaid,) shall not have been laden at any port belonging to, or in possession of, His Majesty's enemies, and that the said ships and vessels so sailing from the said rivers and ports, (except as aforesaid) shall not be destined to any port belonging to, or in possession of His Majesty's enemies, nor have previously broken the blockade." This order, then, only excludes from those ports vessels having enemies' property on board or articles contraband of war, in both of which cases they are liable to seizure by the law of nations, at least it has been long contended for on the part of Britain; it also prevents the direct carrying trade from one port to another of an enemy. If this latter extension is not recognized by the law of nations, it is generally the subject of treaty, and was provided for by our treaty with the British Government, and the late convention formed by Mr. Monroe with the British Government, but which was rejected principally because Great Britain required us not to submit to the Berlin decree--a requisition, sir, infinitely short of what we are now to comply with, at the dictation of France--by which colonial produce was required to be relanded in the United States before it would be admitted into the ports of the continent. By this order, bona fide neutral vessels, with neutral produce, sailing from our own country, never were affected.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. EPPES) has said this order of blockade has not a single feature of a regular blockade; in this, the gentleman is tolerably correct, and when he denounces, what in the fashionable cant of the day are called paper blockades, I join most heartily in the execration. It is true this order of May, 1806, has scarcely a feature of a regular blockade. It was not avowed at the time to be even a constructive blockade, nor was the right contended for of blockading without an actual investing force. It does not, like ordinary blockades, attempt a complete prohibition to all trade with those ports, but only to the particular objects and specified cases which I have mentioned. The previous measures of France are declared by Mr. Fox to be the cause of this order. What were those measures? They were no less, as regards ourselves, than a violation of the treaty which had been solemnly entered into between this country and France; by harassing our trade, seizing and confiscating our vessels in pursuing the commerce guaranteed to us by that treaty; she had usurped authority in almost every port and city from Elbe to Brest, and excluded the introduction of British products and merchandise, whether belonging to American citizens or British subjects.

Now, sir, let me state to you the language of our Minister (Mr. Monroe) at the time this order was issued. In his letter of the 17th of May, to the Secretary of State, speaking of the order, he says, "the note is couched in terms of restraint, and professes to extend the blockade further than it has heretofore done, nevertheless it takes it from many ports already blockaded, indeed all east of Ostend and west of the Seine, except in articles contraband of war and enemy's property, which are seizable without blockade; and in like form of exception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals within the same limits to be free, in the productions of enemy's colonies, in every but the direct route between the colony and parent country.

"It cannot be doubted but the note was drawn by the Government in reference to the question, and if intended by the Cabinet as a foundation on which Mr. Fox is authorized to form a treaty, and obtained by him for the purpose, it must be viewed in a very favorable light; it seems clearly to put an end to further seizures, on the principle which has heretofore been in contestation." This view of the subject, which surely is a fair one connected with the silence of the Administration for four years, must put an end to the clamor so often raised against this order, which has been the alleged cause of the Berlin decree, and charge against Great Britain, of having been the first aggressor on our neutral rights. Sir, we have indeed been insulted, injured, and abused by both nations, to an extent which would justify any measures in our power, but let us not palliate the crimes of one, and magnify those of the other; and, above all, let us not whip ourselves because they will not respect us; let us not become so Quixotic, as to act the part of a famous knight in the tales of chivalry, who tortured himself because his mistress would not be kind.

Mr. Speaker, as the arrangement with Mr. Erskine has been often mentioned, and much relied on by the advocates of this bill, it deserves some further notice. That arrangement was the first act of the present Executive, after he came into office; it was presumed to have been fairly and properly made--it was hailed as a political jubilee by all denominations of politicians--particularly those who had not contributed to the elevation of the present Chief Magistrate; we thought we perceived in that event the evidence of a disposition in the present Executive (which we could not discover in his predecessor) to relieve this country from that system of commercial restriction, that self-destroying policy, which had made us poor indeed; we also thought a determination was manifested not to decline any advantageous accommodation with Great Britain, whether France said yea or nay. It will be but too well remembered that we had been groaning for two years under the pressure of non-importation, embargo, and non-intercourse--your treasury was drained, your citizens unable to pay their debts, and your courts of justice actually shut up, at least so far in many States (and among the rest the State which I have the honor in part to represent) as to suspend the effect of executions; your cities and seaports were inactive or deserted; gloom and dismay marked the features of the nation, and hope had almost bid us farewell; we fancied in this arrangement the glimmerings of returning sunshine, peace, and prosperity: with honest and upright hearts, we were willing to applaud the hand that gave it, without questioning or suspecting the manner or motives with which it was given. The delusion soon vanished; and I have no hesitation to declare, had I then known what I now know, I should have not offered such unqualified applause.

Mr. Speaker, let us make a very strange and very false supposition, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were actually repealed, and did cease to have effect on the first of November. What have we gained? What advantage have we derived from it? And have we not been officially informed by the French Minister in this city (General Turreau) in his letter to the Secretary of State, of the 12th December, 1810, that our most valuable productions, particularly of the Southern States, are at this moment excluded from the ports of France? As to the important articles, cotton and tobacco, he says: "their importation into France is at this moment especially prohibited, but I have reasons to believe (and I pray you meanwhile to observe, sir, they do not rest on any facts) that some modifications will be given to this absolute exclusion. These modifications will not depend on the chance of events, but will be the result of other measures, firm and pursued with perseverance, which the two Governments will continue to adopt to withdraw from the monopoly and from the vexations of the common enemy a commerce loyal and necessary to France as well as the United States." In this letter we find the touchstone, the true clue to French favor--war with England. Connected with this letter from Turreau, is a decree of the 16th July, 1810, which, in point of principle and arrogance, is not surpassed by any act in the history of Bonaparte. By this decree thirty or forty American vessels may import into France, under license, cotton, fish, oil, dye-wood, salt-fish, codfish, and peltry; they must export wine, brandy, silks, linens, cloths, jewellery, household furniture, and other manufactured articles; they can only depart from Charleston and New York, under the obligation of bringing with them a gazette of the day of their departure, also a certificate of the origin of the merchandise, given by the French Consul, containing a sentence in cypher. The French merchants who shall cause their vessels to come, must prove that they are concerned in the fabrics of Paris, Rouen, and other towns. Here is an attempt to extend French influence by bribing a select class of our merchants; granting favors to favorites. It is an attempt to make commercial regulations in our own ports, and to violate our constitution, by giving a preference to the ports of Charleston and New York, over all the rest in the United States, which is specially denied by the constitution. In addition to all this, we have a list of duties established at the French custom-house on the 5th August (the very day on which twenty or thirty American vessels and cargoes were sold and the proceeds given over to Bonaparte--the very memorable 5th August, the birthday of the celebrated letter of the Duc de Cadore) subjecting long staple cotton to a tariff of eighty cents per pound, short staple sixty cents, and tobacco forty cents per pound. By another decree of the 12th September, 1810, potash is taxed at one dollar twenty-five cents, codfish two dollars, rice four dollars per hundred--thus are we loved, favored, and taxed.

There can be no importation of American productions into France but on terms utterly inadmissible. The act of May last, in the language of the Secretary of State, had for its object not merely the recognition of a "speculative," legitimate principle, but the enjoyment of a substantial benefit. The overture then presented obviously embraced the idea of commercial advantage, it included the reasonable belief, that an abrogation of the Berlin and Milan decrees would leave the ports of France as free for the introduction of the produce of the United States, as they were previously to the promulgation of the decrees. If, then, for the revoked decrees, municipal laws, producing the same effect have been substituted, the mode only and not the measure has undergone an alteration. If France, by her own acts, has blocked up her ports against the introduction of the products of the United States, what motive has the Government in a discussion with a third power, to insist on the privilege of going to France? Whence the inducement to urge the annulment of a blockade of France, when, if annulled, no American cargoes would obtain a market in any of her ports? In such a state of things, a blockade of the coast of France would be to the United States as unimportant as would the blockade of the Caspian Sea. This is the language of truth and common sense, language which I did not very much expect to hear from the Secretary at this time; because it exposes the proclamation of the President, and condemns the present bill. But truth, like murder, will out, and it ought to strike dumb the advocates of this bill, and open their eyes to a different policy. But, sir, going on to the supposition that the French decrees are actually repealed, and cease to have effect, pursuing the principle about to be established of taking words for deeds, and form for substance, what is to become of the promise of Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney, of the 31st of August, 1810, when he states that he is commanded by his Majesty to repeat the declaration made to this Government in February, 1808, of his Majesty's desire to see the commerce of the world restored to that freedom which is necessary for its prosperity, and his readiness to abandon the system which had been forced upon him, whenever the enemy should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary; and to assure us that whenever the repeal of the French decrees shall have actually taken effect, and the commerce of the neutral nations shall have been restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those decrees, he will feel the highest satisfaction in relinquishing a system which the conduct of the enemy compelled him to adopt. Here is a promise equally solemn, (and as there is at least as much virtue in the British Government as there is in that of France,) as much to be relied on as that of the Duc de Cadore; and as certainly as the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and would cease to have effect on the first of November, so certainly have we the same assurance that the orders of Great Britain would be rescinded. Shall we then believe the one and not the other? Shall we frown and look big at England, while, with timid and abject submission, we crouch at the feet of France, and quietly rivet the chains prepared for us? Mr. Speaker, the goddess of justice has been described as being blind, with sword in one hand, and the scale and balance in the other, but if she is invoked in this measure, she comes blind indeed, with a sword in one hand, but no balance in the other; in one hand is the emblem of war, in the other the badge of slavery.

If war with England must happen, let it be done openly and for ourselves; let us not commence the attack by practising on our own citizens; and let it not be said we have been caught in the snares of Bonaparte. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose this bill because it professes to give some relief to those merchants whose vessels sailed before the date of the proclamation, and which may have departed from a British port, prior to the 2d of February, 1811, but, sir, because I wish to rid the country of this whole consumptive system; and, if that cannot be done, I will not aid in propping up the President's proclamation, by taking from the judiciary of the country the power of deciding on its validity, which is one of the avowed objects of this bill. I had rather trust to the opinion of the judges for entire relief to our citizens, from the operation of the law of May, 1810, than grant the partial exemption contemplated by this bill. The honorable gentleman (Mr. EPPES) who reported this bill, declares that its great object is to prevent questions arising in the courts, on the construction of the law of May, 1810, and the effect of the President's proclamation. This, to my understanding, is legislating retrospectively; it is ex post facto; and, like the Rambouillet decree, is not only prospective, but retroactive. It takes from our citizens the right of appealing to the courts of justice, and makes the fiat of the Executive the supreme law--a doctrine subversive of the first principles of republicanism, and strange to be advocated by gentlemen who came into power under the name of republicans.

It is in vain, Mr. Speaker, to seek for the justification of this measure from any thing France has done, or from the indications which she has given of her fixed course of policy. Her great object is the destruction of the commerce of the world; and she wishes to make us tributary to that end, and, if possible, to embroil us in a war with England.

The disposition of Bonaparte towards us rests not alone on his acts of aggression, rapine, and plunder; the imprisonment of our citizens, the burning and sequestration of our property. He has heaped upon this devoted country all the epithets which malice could suggest or tyranny dictate; he has exhausted the cup of bitterness, and made us drink the dregs of humiliation; he has declared his decrees should suffer no change, and that the Americans should take the positive character of allies or enemies. As long ago as the 15th of January, 1808, he issued a declaration of war for us against Great Britain; an unconditional surrender of your rights is demanded, or an obedience to his dictates. And are we not in the act of yielding obedience? Sir, the nation which pretends to dictate laws to another offers chains. With more than Christian charity do we seem to forget and forgive the indignities offered to our national character; and the unkind, the severest cut of all to the present Administration, contained in the letter of the Duc de Cadore to General Armstrong, of the 17th of February, 1810, in which we are told that His Majesty could place no reliance on the proceedings of the United States. We are advised to tear to pieces the act of our independence; declared to be more abject than the slaves of Jamaica; that we are men without honor, energy, or just political views; that we will be obliged to fight for interest, after having refused to fight for honor. Our present rulers are there contrasted with the brave and generous heroes of our Revolution, and they are declared to be fit for the yoke which had been thrown off by their ancestors. This letter had scarcely reached our shores, the ink was scarcely dry, it was fresh in our memories, when the letter of the 5th of August was received; which, like a Lethean draught, threw the shade of oblivion over our insults and our wrongs; we sipped the poison as it fell, and I fear it is fast spreading through the body politic.

Mr. Speaker, I turn with disgust from those polluted pages before me--this history of our wrongs, this tyrant's love--would to God they could be blotted from our memories; or, if remembered, let it be with abhorrence and detestation.

I deprecate the course of policy, if policy it may be termed, which is now about to be forced upon us. I protest against it as a measure injurious to ourselves; weak, temporizing, and partial in its operation on foreign nations; unauthorized by the actual state of things; and calculated to hasten the period of our union with the destinies of France.

Sir, unless we turn from this wayward course, this highway to ruin, the time cannot be very distant when your deserted ports, your uninhabited cities, your oppressed people, and even your firesides and your altars, will only exhibit the sad signs of what they were. And I fear, sir, the period is fast approaching when it will not again be said, "that we are a people with whom the fierce spirit of liberty is stronger than among any other people on earth; whose institutions inspire them with lofty sentiments; who do not judge of an ill principle only by an actual grievance; but who anticipate the evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle; who snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze."

When Mr. P. had concluded, the House adjourned to six o'clock this evening.

Six o'clock, P. M.

The House was called to order, and resumed the unfinished business.

A motion was made by Mr. RANDOLPH to postpone the subject to Friday next, and lost--ayes 36, noes 36.

A motion was then made by Mr. R. to postpone it until to-morrow.

On this motion a debate, which from its nature caused irritation, took place, in which Messrs. RANDOLPH and EPPES were the principal speakers.

Much warmth was excited, and frequent calls to order made.

The question on postponement till to-morrow was decided by yeas and nays. For postponement, 44; against it, 74.

Mr. Pitkin spoke more than an hour against the bill generally, and in support of the particular proposition which he was about to make. He contended that the Emperor of France had not fulfilled his engagement to the United States, inasmuch as the decrees, if revoked, which he denied, had not been revoked on the day on which he had engaged to revoke them. He quoted the history of the connection of Spain with France as evidence of the perfidy of Bonaparte, from whom, he said, no compliance with his promises could be expected, &c. In supporting his amendment, Mr. P. contended for its beneficial effects to our merchants: and it would not, he said, be more a breach of our contract with France than the first section of the bill now before the House. The one was, in fact, as much a departure from the engagement with France as the other. The following was the amendment offered by Mr. PITKIN:

Provided, also, That nothing in this act, or the act to which this is a supplement, shall be construed to affect any vessels owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, or the cargoes of any such vessels which shall have cleared out from any port in the West Indies within ---- days after the 2d of February, 1811.

The yeas and nays on the motion were, 46 yeas; 58 nays.

Mr. MACON addressed the Chair on the merits of the bill at some length. He believed the President to have been justified in issuing his proclamation by the Duc de Cadore's letter; but as subsequent information had been received from France, the question appeared to him to resolve itself into this: Was the sequestration of our vessels from the 1st November to the 2d of February a violation of our neutral rights or not? Had the decrees been so modified, under present circumstances, as that they had ceased to violate our neutral commerce? He conceived not, and should therefore vote against the bill. He deprecated the course of debate, and the irritation which prevailed in the House, as tending to bring this body into disrepute, &c.

Mr. P. B. PORTER then said that, for the purpose of coming to a decision on the bill, and putting an end to a scene which was, to say the least of it, disreputable to the House, he moved for the previous question on engrossing the bill.

The previous question was taken and decided in the affirmative, and the bill ordered to a third reading--65 to 9.

The bill was then read a third time.

The previous question was required on its passage, and carried in the affirmative.

Mr. RANDOLPH twice successively moved an adjournment. Motions negatived; the first 65 to 10, the second 66 to 8.

The question on the passage of the bill was then decided in the affirmative--yeas 64, nays 12, as follows:

YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jun., William Anderson, David Bard, William T. Barry, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, Matthew Clay, James Cochran, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Meshack Franklin, Barzillai Gannett, Gideon Gardner, Thomas Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, James Holland, Jacob Hufty, Richard M. Johnson, Thomas Kenan, John Love, Aaron Lyle, Samuel McKee, William McKinley, Pleasant M. Miller, Samuel L. Mitchill, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thos. Newbold, Thos. Newton, John Porter, Peter B. Porter, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, Samuel Ringgold, Erastus Root, Ebenezer Sage, John A. Scudder, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, Geo. Smith, John Smith, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehill, and Robert Witherspoon.

NAYS.--Abijah Bigelow, Barent Gardenier, Richard Jackson, jr., William Kennedy, Nathaniel Macon, Elisha R. Potter, John Randolph, Richard Stanford, Jacob Swoope, Archibald Van Home, Laban Wheaton, and Ezekiel Whitman.

The House then adjourned to meet again at one o'clock.

The following is the bill as it passed this House:

A Bill supplementary to the act, entitled "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes."

Be it enacted, &c., That no vessel, owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which shall have departed from a British port, prior to the 2d day of February, 1811, and no merchandise owned wholly by a citizen or citizens of the United States, imported in such vessel, shall be liable to seizure or forfeiture on account of any infraction or presumed infraction of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That, in case Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the President of the United States shall declare the fact by proclamation; and such proclamation shall be admitted as evidence, and no other evidence shall be admitted of such revocation or modification in any suit or prosecution which may be instituted under the fourth section of the act to which this act is a supplement. And the restrictions imposed, or which may be imposed, by virtue of the said act, shall, from the date of such proclamation, cease and be discontinued.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That, until the proclamation aforesaid shall have been issued, the several provisions of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eighteenth sections of the act, entitled "An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes," shall have full force and be immediately carried into effect against Britain, her colonies, and dependencies: Provided, however, That any vessel or merchandise which may, in pursuance thereof, be seized, prior to the fact being ascertained, whether Great Britain shall, on or before the second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and eleven, have revoked or modified her edicts in the manner above mentioned, shall, nevertheless, be restored, on application of the parties, on their giving bond with approved sureties to the United States, in a sum equal to the value thereof, to abide the decision of the proper court of the United States thereon; and any such bond shall be considered as satisfied if Great Britain shall, on or before the second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and eleven, have revoked or modified her edicts in the manner above mentioned: Provided, also, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect any ships or vessels, or the cargoes of ships or vessels, wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which had cleared out for the Cape of Good Hope, or for any port beyond the same, prior to the tenth of November, one thousand eight hundred and ten.

SATURDAY, March 2.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. P. B. PORTER, from the committee to whom was referred, on the twenty-fifth ultimo, the memorial of the Stockholders of the Bank of the United States, made the following report, which was read:

"The committee to whom was referred the memorial of the Stockholders of the Bank of the United States, report:

"That they have carefully examined the various matters set forth in the said memorial, and attentively listened to the representations of the gentlemen who have appeared in behalf of the said petitioners. The object of the memorialists is to obtain extension of their corporate powers beyond the period limited for the expiration of their charter, so as to enable them to prosecute for their debts, and to arrange, liquidate, and close the various concerns of the company.

"The committee are of opinion that a law of Congress, granting the powers prayed for, would facilitate the final adjustment of the affairs of the bank, although they do not think such a law indispensable to that object. But believing, as your committee do, that, in granting the original charter to the stockholders, Congress transcended the legitimate powers of the constitution; the same objection now presents itself to the extension of any of their corporate capacities.

"If the committee had time to go into the investigation, and to present to the House the various reasons which have conduced to this opinion, it would be more than useless to divert its attention from the important concerns of the nation, at this late period of the session, to a subject which, but a few days since, was so fully and elaborately discussed.

"They therefore beg leave to introduce the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the prayer of the memorialists ought not to be granted."

The House agreed to meet to-morrow, (being Sunday.)

The House then adjourned to six o'clock this evening.

March 2--6 o'clock, p.m.

Adjournment.

On motion of Mr. SMILIE,

Resolved, That the thanks of this House be presented to JOSEPH B. VARNUM, in testimony of their approbation of his conduct in the discharge of the arduous and important duties assigned to him while in the Chair.

The SPEAKER then made his acknowledgments to the House in the following words:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

I acknowledge, with grateful sensibility, the aid you have afforded me in the discharge of the duties of Speaker. Your approbation of my conduct in the important office you have been pleased to assign me, affords me very great consolation; and permit me to assure you, gentlemen, that you have my most ardent wishes for your individual prosperity and happiness.

At this moment, Mr. GARLAND, from the committee appointed for the purpose, reported that they had waited on the President and informed him that they proposed to adjourn, and had received for answer that he had no further communication to make.

A message was received from the Senate, and reciprocated, that they were about to adjourn; a motion was then made to adjourn, and carried.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] Thus terminated the existence of the first Bank of the United States; but there was a fatal defect in terminating it in not providing a general currency in place of its notes, by reviving the gold currency and in not creating an independent treasury for keeping the public moneys. Those who terminated the existence of the second bank avoided these errors, and thereby avoided all the evils and embarrassments which followed the termination of the first one.

TWELFTH CONGRESS.--FIRST SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 4, 1811.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.[12]

MONDAY, November 4, 1811.

The first session of the Twelfth Congress commenced this day at the city of Washington, conformably to the proclamation of the President of the United States, of the 24th of July last, and the Senate assembled in their Chamber.

PRESENT:

GEORGE CLINTON, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

NICHOLAS GILMAN and CHARLES CUTTS, from New Hampshire.

CHAUNCEY GOODRICH and SAMUEL W. DANA, from Connecticut.

STEPHEN R. BRADLEY, from Vermont.

Spotted a typo or a problem in this chapter? Tell us