Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 3 of 8)

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) (part 3 of 8)

The insulting idea said to be conveyed is, that Mr. Smith had a knowledge, at the time of the arrangement, of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, and this because such a knowledge was one of the essential circumstances which could only lead to a disavowal. Now, it does happen that neither Mr. Erskine nor his Government enumerate this knowledge of our Government as one of those essential circumstances. On the contrary, they constantly omit it, when formally enumerating those circumstances. Mr. Canning places the disavowal, solely, on the footing of Mr. Erskine's having "acted not only not in conformity, but in direct contradiction to his instructions." Mr. Jackson, also, in his letter of the 23d, when formally enumerating the causes of the disavowal, says expressly, that the disavowal was "because the agreement was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." Now, is it not most extraordinary, that after such formal statements, not including the knowledge of our Government among the essential circumstances, that it is on this knowledge the British Government intend to rely for the justification of their disavowal? I simply ask this question, if the British did intend thus to rely on the previous knowledge of our Government, why do they always omit it in their formal enumerations? And if they do not intend thus to rely, in what possible way could it serve that Government thus darkly to insinuate it? But as if it were intended to leave this House wholly without excuse in passing this resolution, Mr. Jackson expressly asserts, in this very letter of the 23d of October, that the information of that fact was derived from him, the knowledge of which, this resolution asserts, he intended to intimate was known at the time of the arrangement with Erskine. For he specifically says: "I have had the honor of informing you that it (Mr. Erskine's instruction) was the only one by which the conditions on which he was to conclude were prescribed." Now, if Mr. Jackson had remotely intended to intimate that Mr. Smith had a previous knowledge of that fact, would he have asserted that he was indebted to him (Mr. Jackson) for the information? Conclusive as this argument is, there is yet another in reserve, which is a clincher. And that is, that this very knowledge which we propose solemnly to affirm Mr. Jackson intimated our Government possessed at the time of the arrangement, it is, from the nature of things, impossible they should have possessed. The idea asserted to be intended to be conveyed is, a knowledge in our Government that the arrangement was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine. Now, the fact that Mr. Erskine's powers were incompetent, it was impossible for our Government to know, except from the confession of Mr. Erskine. But Mr. Erskine before, at the time, and ever since, has uniformly asserted the reverse. So that, besides all the other absurdities growing out of this resolution, there is this additional, that it accuses Mr. Jackson of the senseless stupidity of insinuating as a fact, a knowledge in our Government, which from the undeniable state of things it is not possible they should have possessed. Mr. Speaker, can any argument be more conclusive? 1. The idea is not conveyed by the form of expression. 2. Mr. Jackson, though expressly enumerating the only causes which led to a disavowal, does not suggest this. 3. Mr. Jackson expressly asserts the knowledge that these were the only instructions derived from him; of course it could not have been known previous to the arrangement. 4. Had he been absurd enough to attempt to convey such an idea, the very nature of things shows that it could not exist. I confess I am ignorant by what reasoning the non-existence of an insinuation can be demonstrated, if it be not by this concurrence of arguments.

Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will be necessary to make a single observation or two, on the following passage in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 4th of November, for although our assertion has relation, in the part of the resolution under consideration, only to the letter of the 23d of October, yet this subsequent passage has been adduced as a sort of accessory after the fact. "You will find that, in my correspondence with you, I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation, where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered." This the subsequent part of the resolution under debate denominates, "the repetition of the same intimation." But if the argument I have offered be correct, there was no such "intimation" in the preceding letters, and of course no repetition of it here. For if he had, as I think I have proved, in his former letters uttered no such insinuation as is asserted, then all the allegations in this paragraph are wholly harmless and decorous, neither disrespectful nor improper. "But this," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MILNOR) "is conclusive to my mind, that Mr. Jackson did intend to insult, for if he had not would he have refrained from giving an explanation when it was asked?" That gentleman will recollect that the assertion of this House is as to the idea which Mr. Jackson has conveyed in the letter of the 23d, not as to the idea which he intended to convey. Suppose he intended it, and has not done it, our assertion is still false. But will that gentleman seriously conclude, contrary to so obvious a course of argument, that he has asserted, or even intended to assert, this particular idea, merely because he does not choose to explain it? Are there not a thousand reasons which might have induced Mr. Jackson not to explain, consistent with being perfectly innocent of the intention originally to convey it? Perhaps he thought that he had already been explicit enough. Perhaps he thought the explanation was asked in terms which did not entitle Mr. Smith to receive it. Perhaps he did not choose to give this satisfaction. Well that now is "very ungentlemanly," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MILNOR.) I agree, if he pleases, so it was. But does that justify this resolution? Because he is not a gentleman, shall we assert a falsehood?

I briefly recapitulate the leading points of my argument. When Mr. Jackson asserts "that the substance of the instructions was known to our Government," the expression cannot convey the obnoxious idea, because it is not pretended that, in those instructions, the existence of other powers was excluded. When he says, "you must have thought it unreasonable to complain of disavowal," the time of knowledge implied is confined by the structure of the sentence to the time of a disavowal known, and cannot be limited backwards to the time of arrangement made. It is also absurd to suppose that Mr. Jackson would intimate by implication the knowledge of our Government of Erskine's incompetency of powers at the time of arrangement, as an essential circumstance on which the King's right of disavowal was founded, and yet omit that circumstance in a formal enumeration; and lastly, it is still more absurd to suppose that he would undertake to insinuate a knowledge, which, from the nature of things, could not possibly exist.

I have thus, Mr. Speaker, submitted to a strict and minute scrutiny all the parts of this correspondence which have been adduced by any one in support of the fact asserted in this resolution. This course, however irksome, I thought it my duty to adopt, to the end that no exertion of mine might be wanting to prevent this House from passing a resolution, which, in my apprehension, is pregnant with national disgrace, and other innumerable evils.

FRIDAY, December 29.

Another member, to wit, from North Carolina, JAMES HOLLAND, appeared and took his seat.

COL. ISAAC A. COLES.

Breach of Privilege.

Mr. TAYLOR, from the committee appointed to inquire into the circumstances alluded to in the letter of I. A. Coles to the Speaker of the House, made the following report:

That, according to that order, they have taken into consideration the subject referred to them; that in making the proposed inquiry they have taken the depositions of the honorable James Turner, a Senator of the United States, and of Mr. Samuel Sprigg, which depositions they beg leave to report to the House.

From these depositions it was established, to the satisfactory belief of your committee, that Mr. I. A. Coles, without any immediate previous altercation or provocation, did assault and strike a member of this House, within the walls of the north wing of the Capitol; that this act was done on Monday, the 27th ult., about one o'clock P. M., and after this House had adjourned over to the following day.

That, from the assertions of Mr. Coles, and from the actual admission of the member assaulted, your committee were satisfied that the provocation or supposed provocation which occasioned the attack did not arise from any thing said or any act done by the member of this House, in the fulfilment of his duties as a Representative in the Congress of the United States.

Your committee are of opinion that this latter circumstance may be received in extenuation, but cannot be admitted in justification of the act done by Mr. Coles; and, from all the circumstances of the case, they are of opinion that said assault and violence offered to the member was a breach of the privileges of this House.

Your committee further report, that they have considered the letter of Mr. Coles to the Speaker of this House, together with another letter from Mr. Coles addressed to the Chairman of your Committee, (which they also beg leave to report to the House,) that these two letters, in the opinion of your committee, do contain acknowledgments and apologies on the occasion, which ought to be admitted as satisfactory to the House. They therefore recommend the following resolution:

Resolved, That any further proceeding in the above case is unnecessary.

To the Hon. John Taylor, Chairman, &c.

SIR: Understanding that the declaration which I had the honor this morning to make before the committee, will be more acceptable if put in the written form, I hasten to comply with what I believe to be their wish, in tendering through them, to the House of Representatives, the renewed assurance "that if I could have supposed that the circumstance alluded to in my letter to the Speaker, would have been construed into a breach of the privilege of the House, it would not have occurred at the time and in the place where it unfortunately happened."

With sentiments of great respect, I am your obedient humble servant,

I. A. COLES.

December 28, 1808.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Conduct of the British Minister.

The House resumed the consideration of this subject. At four o'clock Mr. LIVERMORE commenced a speech, but gave way for a motion to adjourn which was carried, 53 to 51.

SATURDAY, December 30.

A motion was made by Mr. DAWSON, that the report made yesterday, on the occurrence between I. A. COLES and a member of this House, and the documents accompanying the same, be printed for the use of the members: and the question being taken thereon, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 76, nays 25. The report and documents were referred to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next.

Conduct of the British Minister.

Mr. RHEA, of Tennessee--Mr. Speaker, it is not deemed necessary in the observations I will make on the resolution under consideration, to take into view any relations of the United States with Great Britain or France, because it does not clearly appear that any exist, except in this, that the United States are suffering loss and damage. If there be any relations with Great Britain, as they respect the United States, they are negative and suffering; as they respect Great Britain, positive and active. Be they what they may, they are not properly within the range of a discussion on this resolution, which merely respects the conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty near the United States. How the relations, if there be any, between the United States and France are connected with the subject of this resolution, will require the greatest civilian, the most wise master of public law, to discover; the consideration of these subjects, except so far as mentioning only circumstances which have existed, will be omitted. Neither does it appear very necessary to recur, in examining this question, in the view I intend to take of it, to writers or authorities, as they are called, on public law or laws of nations, because, if any time heretofore, there was a public law acknowledged and practised by all civilized nations, that law is, in these times, become obsolete and disused; and the great nations of the old world have severally adopted particular systems of law respecting other nations, adapted to their own several existing circumstances, and bottomed on principles different from those which heretofore were denominated principles of public law. When, therefore, in the course of these observations, said Mr. R., I may use the words "public law," my intention is to express thereby an idea of some system named public law, not the law of nature, which, gradually becoming obsolete, has been very little, if any, in use since the commencement of the American Revolution--a system which, notwithstanding it is often appealed to, if ever it did exist, is now only to be found in books, and not in practice. Neither is it intended in this case to draw into notice any diplomatic proceedings many years heretofore transacted, by way of argument, in support of what I may say on the subject of this resolution; inasmuch as the truth and merits of it do rest and depend on the Message of the President of the United States, and the documents accompanying the same, and the other documents relative thereto, which have been received from him since the commencement of this session of Congress, together with some other documents relative to the arrangement of April last, made between the American Government and the honorable David Montague Erskine, late Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty, near the United States.

This resolution is not an answer to a Message from the President of the United States; there are not in it any words of relation between it and a message evidencing an expression or intended direction of that nature; neither are there in it any words manifesting an intention to transmit it to him as an address; for these and other reasons, which, if necessary, might be mentioned, it does not appear that this joint resolution can, with any propriety, be named an answer or response to a Message from the President, or an address to him. It may, therefore, be reasonably expected, that any objection raised against it, on the opinion of its being an answer to a Message from the President, or an address to him, will not prevail.

This resolution is not a declaration of war; it is predicated on a specified conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, near the Government of the United States, and on the denial of the Executive Government of the United States to receive any further communications from him in consequence of that conduct. And it may be observed that, how ancient soever among nations the custom or usage of sending or receiving Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries, and public Ministers of that kind may be, the custom or usage, it is reasonable to believe, is bottomed only on the great principle of humanity, and does not impose a perfect obligation either to send such minister, or to receive him, or to continue him after being received; therefore, not to send an Ambassador, Plenipotentiary, or public Minister--not to receive such Minister--to recall such Minister--or to refuse to receive any further communications from such Minister, is not a just cause of war; and it follows that the acting or not acting, in either of the cases, is not a declaration of war. True it is, that the resolution states, that "the Congress of the United States do solemnly pledge themselves to the American people, and to the world, to stand by and support the Executive Government in its refusal to receive any further communications from the said Francis James Jackson, and to call into action the whole force of the nation, if it should become necessary, in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in this respect, to repel such insult, and to assert and maintain the rights, the honor, and the interests of the United States;" but, it is to be observed, that that pledge goes only to the doing of certain things which may become necessary in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in respect to that thing which is alluded to. But if any gentleman is disposed to continue to this resolution the name of an answer to a Message from the President, or address to him, or to call it a declaration of war, he certainly may give it any name he pleases; and I hope, said Mr. R., that I may also have the liberty to give it a name that appears appropriate to it.

[Here Mr. RHEA entered into a close examination of the correspondence between the British Minister and the American Secretary of State, to show, first, the insult to the American Government by charging it with falsehood; secondly, the falsity of that charge by showing that it was founded on false assumptions and continued:]

The whole civilized world is a spectator in the discussion of this resolution; and all the civilized nations in the world are and will be anxiously desirous to know, whether the United States of America, after having hitherto, with impunity, suffered all the aggressions of Great Britain, and after having suffered Great Britain, with impunity, to impress thousands of their seamen, and retain them on board of their armed ships and vessels, and compelling them to fight against nations with whom the United States are at peace; after having suffered Great Britain, with impunity, to murder their citizens, and after having suffered Great Britain with impunity to attack their sovereignty, in case of the Chesapeake frigate, will, after all these outrages and hostile acts, tamely, meekly, and patiently, submit and bow down to the lowest degree of debased degradation, and suffer Francis J. Jackson, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, with impunity, to abuse their Executive Government, and to impute to it with impunity the detestable charge of untruth.

TUESDAY, January 2, 1810.

Another member, to wit, from Pennsylvania, ROBERT JENKINS, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, January 3.

Trade to the Baltic.

Mr. BURWELL said that he had given to the subject of our foreign relations as much consideration as he was capable of doing, and digested some plan which appeared to him best adapted to the present situation of the country. It would be recollected, however, that they had seen in the papers that France either had blockaded or did contemplate the blockade of all the ports not embraced in the British orders; and they had seen in the papers a paragraph intimating that a project existed to close the northern ports against all vessels but those of France. He conceived it necessary to call for any information which by possibility might be in possession of the Executive on this subject, as such information, if to be obtained, might have some influence upon his mind as to the course proper to be pursued; and therefore moved the following resolution:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House any information he may possess relative to the blockade of the ports of the Baltic by France, and the exclusion of neutral vessels by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.

The motion was agreed to without opposition, and Mr. BURWELL and Mr. GARDNER appointed a committee to wait on the President accordingly.

Conduct of the British Minister.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, being the resolution from the Senate approving the conduct of the Executive in refusing to receive any further communication from Francis James Jackson, &c.

The resolution was ordered to be read a third time.

To-morrow was named as the day on which it should be read a third time, and negatived, ayes, 32.

The resolution was then ordered to be read a third time to-day.

Mr. NEWTON.--Mr. Speaker: It is with regret, sir, I feel myself constrained to offer some observations on the resolution from the Senate now on its passage.

I am not ignorant that I am trespassing on your patience, and that, at this late period of the discussion, I address you to no little disadvantage; but I derive, under such discouragement, great satisfaction in knowing that your politeness and indulgence are at all times the same.

I lament, sir, that the discussion has not been confined to the subject which the resolution presents for consideration, but as I had no control over the debate, I am compelled to pursue it through the meanders it has taken.

As silence on the observations which have been made, though on points foreign to the one in debate, may be ascribed to an acquiescence in their justness, I cannot refrain from apprising you that I hold myself bound to answer such as shall, in my judgment, demand an answer. This course will compel me to discuss points no ways related to the one before the House.

I shall endeavor to atone for taking this range by giving to each subject a separate consideration, and by observing a due regard to brevity. With this apology, I hasten in the first instance to the discussion of the competency of Mr. Erskine's powers to conclude the provisional agreement of the 19th of April last.

I put aside from this discussion the instructions of Mr. Erskine authorizing him to tender reparation for the attack on the Chesapeake, because his power so to act has not been distinctly questioned. The gentlemen who have preceded me on the same side of the question have sustained, I trust to your satisfaction, and that of the House, the competency of Mr. Erskine's powers to make and conclude the arrangement of the 19th of April last. Persuaded, as I am, that they have performed this task with great ability, I will not tire your patience by passing over the same ground, nor by citing the same authorities on which they relied to support their arguments.

I will permit myself only to take up the discussion of the points which terminated their remarks. I will content myself with furnishing some authorities not pressed into service, in support of the positions taken by them. That Mr. Erskine was a Minister Plenipotentiary, cannot be denied; in that character he was received, and in that he acted until he was recalled, is equally true. The propositions made by him in that character were received and acted upon as the propositions of his Government. The Executive of the United States had no control over his private instructions; no right to demand an exhibition of them; they were given for the government of the Minister's conduct. If he acted in contravention of his secret orders, over which his power was absolute, he became responsible to his sovereign for his non-observance of them; but his public acts must necessarily be binding and obligatory, originating, as they must be considered, in the general and avowed powers of the Minister, exercised in conformity to his private instructions. If his secret instructions limit his general commission, he is bound honestly to apprise the Government with which he is negotiating of the fact. He ought to say, to this boundary I can go; beyond it I cannot pass. To illustrate this doctrine, which I hold to be sound and correct, I will give as an instance the chaste conduct of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, who, previous to affixing their signatures to the treaty concluded by them with the British Commissioners, publicly apprised the Commissioners that they had no authority to bind the Government of the United States, as their instructions did not permit them to conclude a treaty which should not contain stipulations against impressments. The fate of that treaty is known. It was rejected. The British Government could not complain, because it was previously informed that the Ministers of the United States had no power to form such a treaty.

Mr. Erskine never entertained a doubt but that his powers were competent to the formation of the arrangement of April last. He unhesitatingly declared, in submitting his propositions for suspending as to the United States the operation of the Orders in Council, that he was commanded by his Majesty to submit them to the consideration of the Executive of the United States. I will prove this statement by his letter of April 18, 1809, and others, addressed to the Secretary of State. He says:

"The favorable change in the relations of His Majesty with the United States, which has been produced by the act usually termed the non-intercourse act, passed at the last session of Congress, was also anticipated by His Majesty, and has encouraged a further hope that a reconsideration of existing differences might lead to their satisfactory adjustment. On these grounds and expectations, I am instructed to communicate to the American Government His Majesty's determination of sending to the United States an Envoy Extraordinary, invested with full powers to conclude a treaty on all points of the relations between the two countries. In the mean time, with a view to the attainment of so desirable an object, His Majesty would be willing to withdraw his Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, so far as respects the United States, in the persuasion that the President would issue a proclamation for the renewal of the intercourse with Great Britain, and that whatever difference of opinion should arise in the interpretation of the terms of such an agreement, will be removed in the proposed negotiation."

In another letter, of April 19, he says:

"In consequence of the acceptance by the President, as stated in your letter of the 18th instant, of the proposals made by me on the part of His Majesty, in my letter of the same day, for the renewal of the intercourse between the respective countries, I am authorized to declare that His Majesty's Orders in Council of January and November, 1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the United States, on the 10th day of June next." (1809.)

The above extracts from Mr. Erskine's letters leave us in no suspense as to the opinion he had formed of his instructions. In this settled belief that he had conformed strictly to the instructions of his Court, we find him so late as June 15, 1809, when he notified to the Secretary of State the new Order in Council issued on the 26th of April last. In this letter he says:

"In consequence of official communications sent to me from His Majesty's Government, since the adoption of that measure, I am enabled to assure you that it has no connection whatever with the overtures (of the 19th of April, 1809) which I have been authorized to make to the Government of the United States, and that I am persuaded that the terms of the agreement so happily concluded by the recent negotiation, will be strictly fulfilled on the part of His Majesty. The internal evidence of the order itself would fully justify the foregoing construction, and, moreover, it will not have escaped your notice, that the repeal has not thereby been made of the orders of the 7th of January, 1807, which, according to the engagement I have entered into on the part of His Majesty, is to be abrogated with the other orders, in consequence of the adjustment of differences between the two countries, and the confidence entertained of a further conciliatory understanding."

Thus it appears that Mr. Erskine, from communications, subsequent to the 26th of April, from this Government, is decidedly of opinion that he acted within the pale of his instructions. His language is free from ambiguity. He says: "In consequence of official communications sent to me from His Majesty's Government, since the adoption of the order of the 26th of April, I am enabled to assure you it has no connection whatever with the terms of agreement concluded by the recent negotiation." Nothing can be clearer than that his opinion was made up on a full consideration of all the instructions received by him from his Government. This must be evident to the most superficial observer on reading the following extract from a letter of the 14th August, 1809, addressed by him to the Secretary of State. It is as follows:

"Under these circumstances, therefore, finding that I could not obtain the recognitions specified in Mr. Canning's despatch of the 23d of January, (which formed but one part of his instructions to me,) in the formal manner required, I considered that it would be in vain to lay before the Government of the United States the despatch in question, which I was at liberty to do in extenso, had I thought proper. But as I had such strong grounds for believing that the object of His Majesty's Government could be attained, though in a different manner, and the spirit, at least, of my several letters of instructions be fully complied with, I feel a thorough conviction on my mind that I should be acting in conformity with His Majesty's wishes, and, accordingly, conclude the late provisional agreement on His Majesty's behalf with the Government of the United States."

The British Government could not, from this view, disavow the act of its Minister without incurring, and that justly, the charge of bad faith. To give support and nerve to this inference, I will read a passage from an author of great celebrity, Burlamaqui. The author says: "If he who has a commission to treat has kept within the bounds of the power annexed to his office, though he acts contrary to his private instructions, the sovereign is to abide by what he has done; otherwise, we could never depend on engagements contracted by proxy." This authority is full, and in point; it covers the whole ground; it leaves no fissures through which crafty politicians can make an escape. On the reputation of the British Government it fixes a blot which nothing short of the power of time can efface.

Past transactions are worthy of remembrance, and sometimes of repetition. The chameleon may take the hue of surrounding objects, but his change of color does not new-model his figure, form, or character.

Let us, for a moment, bring to our recollection the occurrences which took place, and the orthodox opinions which were held, at the time when the honor and dignity of this nation were deeply wounded, (a wound not yet healed,) in the attack of the Chesapeake; when the blood of American citizens was wantonly shed, and when the British squadron, after the commission of an act so atrocious, in violation of the jurisdiction of the United States, anchored in Hampton Roads and interrupted the regular communication between Norfolk and other places. After having taken a review of facts, let us compare the opinions of that day with those subsequently delivered; and, by the standard of consistency, test them.

The President, soon after the commission of those outrages, issued his proclamation, interdicting the entrance of the waters of the United States to the public armed vessels of Great Britain. That act of the President was considered as just and proper, as flowing from moderation and wisdom. The propriety of it was defended on the declaration to the Executive by Mr. Erskine, that it was his firm belief that Admiral Berkeley had acted without orders. Keep in force the proclamation, was the language of that memorable day, until reparation, ample and satisfactory, should be made. Such was the state of the public mind. Mr. Rose arrived; his mission, instead of having the salutary tendency of removing the irritations excited, was eminently calculated to nurture and increase them. Insults were added to injuries. Before he would deign to make known to the President the nature and extent of the reparation he was authorized to offer, he demanded the revocation of the President's proclamation; in plain terms informing this nation that its Government should make concessions to His Majesty for using precautionary measures against the lawless acts of his officers, as a prerequisite to a tender of the reparation His Majesty had condescended through him to offer. This new mode of redress proving no ways satisfactory, Mr. Rose's mission terminated. No sooner was it known that the negotiation with Mr. Rose proved abortive, in consequence of the inadmissible demands made by him, as already stated by me, than the President was openly accused as being the cause of it, by adhering to a "mere punctilio."

Thus, sir, we see, that no Republican President can do right, when his actions are viewed through the medium of party spirit.

Mr. STANLEY said he did not flatter himself he could add any thing to the information which the House already possessed on this subject. Yet, as a measure was about to be adopted, which, without the possibility of yielding any advantage, would, in his opinion, fix a stain on the national character, and put at hazard the peace and prosperity of the country, he felt impelled by the imperious call of duty, to raise his feeble voice against it. Permit me here, said Mr. S., to express the surprise and regret with which I have heard observations from those who support the resolution, which, having no connection with the resolution itself, are calculated, if not intended, to excite the passions of the House or of the people; to furorize the public mind; to mislead our judgments in deciding the question, and to obtain a result rather from passion than reason. I allude to the repeated recital of British outrages, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and the attack on Constantinople. A calm discussion of the question itself, would probably lead to as correct a decision, and be not less honorable to the American Congress. The danger of foreign influence has been mentioned to us, by way of caution, I presume. A solicitude on this point can be but commendable, though I hope unnecessary. It may be the fate of this country to be cursed with men whose ill-directed ambition, and predominant selfish views, lead them to support the interest and the designs of foreign nations, though adverse to the interests and honor of their own. If such there be, let them be marked as objects of suspicion, scorn, and contempt.

It has also been the fate of other countries, and may be the misfortune of this, to possess in its bosom, and to cherish in its confidence, men, who from an equally base and corrupt self-love and ill-directed ambition, become supple courtiers, political sunflowers, cringing demagogues; who, worshipping the idol power, whether in the hands of a military commander, a protector, or a consul, tender an implicit obedience and united support to every measure which emanates from the Executive, the source of office and profit. Such men bring upon a country the curses of undue domestic influence. Not to know and not to fear the dangers both of foreign and domestic influence, is to close our eyes on the light of history, and to disregard the testimony of ages. The States of Greece, as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. EPPES) reminds us, fell from foreign influence; the unhappy Kingdom of Spain at this moment groans and bleeds from the same cause. And, sir, from domestic influence, Rome had her Cæsar, England her Cromwell, and France now drags the chains of Bonaparte. Should it ever become the settled doctrine in this country, that the opinions and the measures of the Executive are entitled to our prompt acquiescence and blind support; that, like the devoted soldier, a mere military machine, we are not to pause over a vote; that free discussion of the merits of the Executive shall authorize suspicion of the purity of the citizen; the time will be fast hastening when a throne shall be erected upon the ruins of the Constitution of the United States, and the name of America be added to the list of those Republics which have "risen like the rocket, and fallen like the stick." Whether either of these parties exist in this country, I need not at this time inquire; no circumstance could render such an inquiry in this place other than unpleasant. I have suggested the possibility of their existence, and their evils, with a view equally pure, I hope, with that of those who have before alluded to them, and to excite a caution which well merits the attention of the American people.

Associated in this House with gentlemen, all of whom, I am to presume, are actuated by the same love of country; who alike feel the obligations of honor, conscience, regard to the constitution and responsibility to our constituents--I cannot but believe they act on this occasion with motives as pure as my own. Yet, sir, feeling myself bound by these high sanctions to pursue the course pointed out by my own judgment, and the dictates of my own conscience, I am compelled to declare, that I disapprove the conduct of the administration in the affair with Mr. Jackson, and that I am decidedly opposed to the resolution before us.

From the view I have taken of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson, my mind is satisfied--

That the letters of Mr. Jackson do not contain the insult to our administration which is imputed to them by the resolution. That, if they did, the Congress of the United States are not required either by duty or policy to interfere in the business--and that if they will interfere, the resolution under consideration is improper. On each of these points I will submit a few observations.

In regard to the insult said to be contained in Mr. Jackson's letters, my remarks shall be brief, with no other reference to the letters already so often repeated, as to have become "dull as a tale twice told," than I may conceive necessary to be intelligible. The offensive idea "that the Executive Government of the United States had a knowledge that the arrangement lately made by Mr. Erskine in behalf of his Government with the Government of the United States, was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine for that purpose," is said in the resolution to be conveyed in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 23d of October, and to be repeated in that of the 4th of November. Yet, as if it was on all hands admitted that no such idea could be found in these letters, all who have most anxiously desired to find it, have endeavored to establish it by recurring to Mr. Jackson's letter of the 11th of October, and there point us to that part of the letter, where Mr. Jackson, in reply to Mr. Smith's declaration, that an explanation was expected of the grounds of the disavowal by His Britannic Majesty of the arrangement made between Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine, informs Mr. Smith, that he had seen with pleasure the forbearance of Mr. Smith, to complain of this disavowal, "inasmuch as you could not but have thought it unreasonable to complain of the disavowal of an act done under such circumstances as could only lead to the consequences that have actually followed." He adds, "It was not known when I left England whether Mr. Erskine had, according to the liberty allowed him, communicated to you in extenso his original instructions; it now appears that he did not. But in reverting to his official correspondence, and particularly to a despatch addressed on the 20th of April to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I find that he there states, that he submitted to your consideration the three conditions specified in those instructions, as the groundwork of an arrangement which, according to information received from this country, it was thought in England might be made, with a prospect of great mutual advantage. Mr. Erskine then reports, verbatim et seriatim, your observations upon each of the three conditions, and the reasons which induced you to think that others might be substituted in lieu of them. It may have been concluded between you that these latter were an equivalent for the original conditions; but the very act of substitution evidently shows that those original conditions were in fact very explicitly communicated to you, and by you of course laid before the President for his consideration. I need hardly add, that the difference between these conditions and those contained in the arrangement of the 18th and 19th of April, is sufficiently obvious to require no elucidation; nor need I draw the conclusion, which I consider as admitted by all absence of complaint on the part of the American Government, viz: that under such circumstances His Majesty had an undoubted right to disavow the act of his Minister."

As the offensive idea is alleged to be an allusion to the circumstances under which the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was concluded, which justified the King in disavowing it; intimated to be known to our administration at the date of this letter; it is necessary to search, from the evidence before us, what those circumstances were upon which the King justified his disavowal; these found, we shall be at no loss to fix Mr. Jackson's allusion, and then to inquire whether these circumstances thus alluded to, were in fact known to our administration. It appears from the documents before us, that the King's Order in Council of the 24th of May, 1809, announcing the provisional agreement concluded by Mr. Erskine and the disavowal of it, assigns as the sole ground of the disavowal, that the said agreement "was not such as was authorized by His Majesty's instructions." And Mr. Pinkney, on the 28th of May, informs Mr. Smith that the British Minister, Mr. Canning, had in their interview on the 25th of May declared "that the British Minister (Mr. Erskine) had acted in his late negotiation and engagements with you, not only without authority, but in direct opposition to the most precise instructions;" that these facts were communicated by Mr. Pinkney, and known to our administration before the arrival of Mr. Jackson, appears from the correspondence between Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine in July and August. Mr. Jackson also, in his letter of the 11th of October, says that his Government "with frankness, promptitude, and a most scrupulous regard to national honor, gave notice to the American Minister in London of the disavowal, of the motives of it, and of the precautions spontaneously taken by His Majesty to prevent any loss or injury accruing to the citizens of the United States from an agreement, however unauthorized, made in His Majesty's name." And in his letter to Mr. Smith, 23d of October, explicitly declares "His Majesty was pleased to disavow the agreement concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, because it was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." And to dispense with a recital of each particular in which the instructions were disregarded, Mr. Jackson adds, "These instructions I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were at the time in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred, than by a reference to the terms of your agreement."

We thus find the British Government on every occasion, and through every agent, assigning the violation of instructions, and the want of authority in Mr. Erskine to conclude the agreement, as the sole ground of the disavowal, and relying on that ground, and no other, to shield them from the charge of perfidy. With this evidence before us; with the admission of Mr. Jackson "that the instructions were not made known in extenso;" with the correspondence of Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine showing the knowledge of our administration of the instructions to Mr. Erskine and of the grounds of the disavowal of his arrangement prior to the arrival of Mr. Jackson in the United States, does it consist with candor and good sense; is it not a palpable violation of both, so to torture the language of Mr. Jackson in his letter of the 11th of October, in allusion to the circumstances which "could only lead to the disavowal," and to the knowledge of them by our administration, which prevented their complaints to him on his arrival, as to make them convey an idea that a distinct and different ground of disavowal existed than that which his Government and himself had before repeatedly assigned; to impute to him the insinuation that the restricted authority of Mr. Erskine was known at the time of the arrangement, when he had explicitly declared "that the instructions were not made known in extenso," and thus to fix upon him the absurdity of contradicting himself?

Such construction, and such an imputation, in my opinion, is at war with every sound rule of construction, and every honorable principle of just and fair dealing. It is worthy the observation of those gentlemen who so clearly see an insult in this letter of the 11th of October, that they have found what had escaped the jealous perspicacity of Mr. Smith, and the patient research of the draughter of the resolution; since Mr. Smith, in his reply of the 19th of October, gives no intimation of any thing offensive in this letter, and the resolution confines the insulting idea to the letter of the 23d of October. We come now to the letter of the 23d of October, in which, according to the resolution, is contained the "insolent and indecorous expressions, conveying the idea that the Executive Government of the United States had a knowledge that the arrangement lately made by Mr. Erskine with the Government of the United States was entered into without competent power on the part of Mr. Erskine." The offensive idea is said to be found in the following part of Mr. Jackson's letter: "I have no hesitation in informing you that his Majesty was pleased to disavow the agreement concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, because it was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it. These instructions, I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were at the time in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred than by a reference to the terms of your agreement." There is no equivocation in this language. He says the instructions were made known in substance--an expression which from its very terms excludes the idea of being made known in full extent; and that it is true, as Mr. J. here alleges, that the substance of Mr. Erskine's instructions were made known, appears from Mr. Smith's letter of the 19th of October. "Certain it is that your predecessor did present for my consideration the three conditions which now appear in the printed document; that he was disposed to urge them more than the nature of two of them (both palpably inadmissible, and one of them more than merely inadmissible) could permit, and that on finding his first proposals unsuccessful, the more reasonable terms comprised in the arrangement respecting the Order in Council were adopted." And Mr. Erskine himself declared to his Government, 20th of April, as stated by Mr. Jackson to Mr. Smith, 11th of October, and not questioned by him, "that he had submitted to the consideration of Mr. Smith the three conditions specified in his instructions, as the groundwork of an arrangement," and adds the reasons which induced Mr. Smith to think "that others might be substituted in lieu of them." These expressions of Mr. Jackson are unequivocal, free from obscurity, and cover no insinuation. They assert a single fact, the existence of which is established by the letters of Mr. Smith himself. To find in them a meaning "conveying the insolent and indecorous idea that our Government knew of Mr. Erskine's restricted authority," is to give to language a signification different from that heretofore received, and to exert a strength of imagination to which I have no pretensions. But in the letter of Mr. Jackson of November 4th, is said, by the resolution, to be found "the still more insolent and affronting "repetition of the same insinuation. In the conclusion of this letter Mr. J. complains, not intemperately, of the liberty Mr. Smith claimed of styling his remarks "irrelevant and improper," a freedom which I should regret to believe would be justified by our Secretary's ideas of decorum. Mr. Jackson concludes in the words which are said to contain this offensive repetition of the imaginary insult: "You will find in my correspondence with you, that I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact."

If Mr. Jackson had really uttered an unfounded insinuation, he here certainly repeats it, because he adheres to all he had before said, and retracts nothing. But if, as I believe, he had not made any insinuations, but had directly and obviously referred to facts which were either admitted or had been, substantially proved, and more especially as he has not anywhere made the insinuation charged, "that our Government were acquainted with Mr. Erskine's restricted authority," the conclusion seems to be irresistible, that he could not here repeat an insinuation which he had not previously made. This paragraph obviously means that he had abstained from such an insinuation because "he was unable to substantiate the fact." Nor can I conceive how this declaration could be offensive to Mr. Smith, unless received by him as presenting a contrast to his own deportment, in which case he owes his feelings to his own conscious sensibility.

Were it, however, otherwise, and if, instead of an insinuation so hidden that a Secretary of State only can discover it, Mr. Jackson had given a direct and unequivocal insult, the Congress of the United States are not required either by duty or policy to interfere. The constitution has wisely created different branches of the Government, committed to each its separate cares and duties, made each independent of the other, intending thereby to secure the separate deliberation and separate responsibility of each. To attain its blessings, these valuable objects of the constitution ought not to be defeated. To the President alone is given the power to receive Ministers and to treat with them, and as in the course of this duty he becomes personally interested in the deportment of foreign Ministers, if they demean themselves disrespectfully towards him, he is clothed with the power to break off intercourse with them at pleasure, and so far to suspend their ministerial functions. This power has been repeatedly exercised by our Presidents, as the constitution intended it should be, upon their own responsibility. And it is the highest policy of this Government, in order to obtain the advantages of the free judgment and decision of the President, so to conduct towards him that he should learn to act without fear of the censure of Congress on the one hand, and without any hope on the other, that their countenance shall shelter his measures from scrutiny. This policy, and the strict inviolability of the Executive power in all cases of treaty, were emphatically settled in the case of Jay's Treaty, in which the President, (whose independent example deserves more respect than it has met from his successors), standing upon his own responsibility refused to submit to the House of Representatives any papers relating to that negotiation, except the treaty itself. Yet if the plan proposed by these resolutions be adopted; if we by formal resolutions approve the conduct of the President in an affair so exclusively his own, as that of the rupture with Mr. Jackson, may we not on some future occasion, as observed by my honorable colleague, (Mr. MACON,) claim the right of censuring in matters equally within his sole and peculiar province? If, then, we are to interfere with Executive duties, not merely as sycophants, applauding his every act, but as freemen condemning what we do not approve, the inevitable consequence must be, a conflict between the Executive and Legislative Departments, in which the wounds of either can only be inflicted through the constitution; or (an issue equally fatal) the advantages intended to be derived from separate deliberation, distinct responsibility, and mutual jealousy and watchfulness of the separate departments disappear, in a miserable complaisance of acting by previous concert, and thus propping each other before the people.

The question was then taken on postponement as moved by Mr. GARDENIER, and negatived without a division.

And at length, at half past five o'clock, the main question on the final passage of the resolution was taken, and carried--yeas 72, nays 41, as follows:

YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jr., William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, Adam Boyd, John Brown, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Matthew Clay, Howell Cobb, James Cochran, James Cox, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Jonathan Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Barzillai Gannett, Gideon Gardner, Thomas Gholson, jr., Peterson Goodwyn, William Helms, James Holland, Benjamin Howard, Jacob Hufty, Robert Jenkins, Richard M. Johnson, Thomas Kenan, William Kennedy, John Love, Aaron Lyle, Robert Marion, Samuel McKee, Alexander McKim, William Milnor, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Thomas Newbold, Thomas Newton, John Nicholson, Peter B. Porter, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, John Roane, Erastus Root, John Ross, Ebenezer Sage, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, George Smith, Henry Southard, John Taylor, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, Charles Turner, jr., Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehill, and Robert Witherspoon.

NAYS.--Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, John C. Chamberlain, William Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jr., William Ely, James Emott, Barent Gardenier, Thomas R. Gold, William Hale, Nathaniel A. Haven, Jonathan H. Hubbard, Richard Jackson, jr., Herman Knickerbacker, Joseph Lewis, jr., Edward St. Loe Livermore, Robert Le Roy Livingston, Nathaniel Macon, Archibald McBryde, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jos. Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, jr., Timothy Pitkin, jr., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Lewis B. Sturges, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, Ezekiel Whitman, and James Wilson.

[On this vote were absent 27 members, viz: Messrs, CAMPBELL, CLOPTON, COOK,* CRIST, DENNING,* GOLDSBOROUGH, GRAY, HEISTER, J. G. JACKSON, JONES, Key, LYON,* MATTHEWS, MILLER, T. MOORE, MUMFORD,* NELSON, RANDOLPH,* SAWYER, SHAW, SHEFFEY, J. Smith, S. SMITH, Troup, VAN DYKE,* Van Horne, and WYNN*; of whom those marked (*) have not appeared in their seats during the present session, and those in italic are known to be absent from the city.]

The House then adjourned, at a quarter before six, after a session of nineteen hours, during the whole of which time the Speaker presided in the Chair with dignity and moderation, to Friday next.

FRIDAY, January 5.

Another member to wit, from Delaware, NICHOLAS VAN DYKE, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Claim of Elizabeth Hamilton.

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee of Claims, made a report on the petition of Elizabeth Hamilton, referred on the 5th ultimo; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The report is as follows:

That it is stated by the petitioner, that her late husband, Alexander Hamilton, served as Lieutenant Colonel in the Army of the United States during the Revolutionary war; that, in common with other officers he was entitled to five years' full pay as commutation for half-pay during life; that her husband, being in Congress at the time the resolution passed making this provision in favor of the officers of the Revolution, in a letter to the Secretary of War he relinquished his claim to commutation; and the petitioner prays for the amount of said commutation. It does not appear, from any evidence from the Secretary of War or of the Treasury, that the late Colonel Hamilton ever did relinquish his right to half-pay or commutation, nor can the committee believe that it would be proper or generous that such relinquishment should be relied on as a bar to a just claim upon the United States for meritorious services against the representatives of such claimant. It appears, from a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, that the late Colonel Hamilton received pay as an officer up to the end of February, 1782, and no later. And there is no evidence upon the Treasury books, or books of the War Office, whether at this or what period Colonel Hamilton resigned. The committee, however, have been furnished with a document, which induces the belief that Colonel Hamilton did not resign his commission until after the 28th day of October, 1783, which document is in these words: "In pursuance of an act of Congress of the 30th day of September, 1783, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton is to take rank as Colonel by Brevet, in the Armies of the United States of America. Signed at Princeton, October 28, 1783, by Elias Boudinot, President," &c.

The committee are of opinion, that the resolution of Congress, upon a liberal construction, did not require actual service, and that the officer should be in the receipt of his pay to entitle him to commutation; but that he should have a commission, and be at all times liable to be called on to perform the duties of his station. The committee are confirmed in this opinion, when they recollect the situation of the United States and the Army in the year 1783, and in fact, from the capture of Cornwallis and his Army at Little York, in the State of Virginia, in the year 1781. But this claim is, like all other claims of this description, barred by the statute of limitation. The following resolution is offered:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petition ought not to be granted.

MONDAY, January 15.

Two members, to wit: from New York, GURDON S. MUMFORD, and from Kentucky, MATTHEW LYON, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

TUESDAY, January 16.

Another member, to wit, from South Carolina, RICHARD WYNN, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, January 17.

A new member, to wit, DAVID S. GARLAND, returned to serve as a member of this House for the State of Virginia, in the place of Wilson Carey Nicholas, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

WEDNESDAY, January 31.

Officers of the Revolution.

Mr. NELSON, from the committee appointed on the twenty-fourth instant, made a report on the several petitions of the surviving officers of the late Revolutionary Army; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. The report is as follows:

That, by a resolution of Congress of the 15th of May, 1778, all military officers who then were, or should thereafter be, in the service of the United States, and who should continue in service during the war, and not hold any office of profit under the United States, or any of them, should, after the conclusion of the war, be entitled to receive, annually, for the term of seven years, if they should live so long, one-half of the then pay of such officers: provided that no general officer of the cavalry, artillery or infantry, should be entitled to receive more than the one-half part of the pay of a colonel of such corps, respectively; and, provided that the said resolution should not extend to any officer in the service of the United States, unless he should have taken an oath of Allegiance, and should actually reside within some one of the United States.

That, by a resolution of Congress of the 11th of August, 1779, it was resolved that the half-pay provided by the aforesaid resolution of the 15th of May, 1778, should be extended to continue for life.

That, by a resolution of Congress of the 21st of October, 1780, it was provided that the officers who should continue in the service to the end of the war should be entitled to half-pay during life, to commence from the time of their reduction.

That, by a resolution of Congress of the 17th day of January, 1781, all officers in the hospital department, and medical staff, thereinafter mentioned, who should continue in service until the end of the war, or be reduced before that time as supernumeraries, should be entitled to receive during life, in lieu of half-pay, the following allowances, viz: The director of the hospital, equal to the half-pay of a lieutenant-colonel; chief physician and surgeons of the army and hospital, and hospital physicians and surgeons, purveyor, apothecary, and regimental surgeons, each equal to the half-pay of a captain.

That, by a resolution of Congress of the 22d day of March, 1783, it was provided that such officers as were then in service, and should continue therein until the end of the war, should be entitled to receive the amount of five years' full pay in money, or securities on interest at six per centum per annum, as Congress should find most convenient, instead of the half-pay promised for life by the resolution of the 21st day of October, 1780; the said securities being such as should be given to the other creditors of the United States: provided it should be at the option of the lines of the respective States and not of officers individually in those lines, to accept or refuse the same; and provided, also, that their election should be signified to Congress, through the Commander-in-Chief, from the lines under his immediate command, within two months, and through the commanding officer of the Southern Army, from those under his command, within six months from the date of the resolution.

That the same commutation should extend to the corps not belonging to the lines of any particular State, and who were entitled to half-pay as aforesaid: the acceptance or refusal to be determined by the corps, and to be signified in the same manner, and within the same time, as above mentioned; that all officers belonging to the hospital department, who are entitled to half-pay by the resolution of the 17th of January, 1781, might collectively agree to accept or refuse the aforesaid commutation, signifying the same through the Commander-in-Chief, within six months; that such officers as had retired at different periods entitled to half-pay for life, might, collectively, in each State of which they are inhabitants, accept or refuse the same; their acceptance or refusal to be signified by agents authorized for that purpose, within six months; that with respect to such retiring officers, the commutation, if accepted by them, should be in lieu of whatever might be then due to them since the time of their retiring from service, as well as what might thereafter become due; and that as soon as their acceptance should be signified, the Superintendent of Finance should be, and he was thereby, authorized to take measures for the settlement of their accounts accordingly, and to issue to them certificates bearing interest at six per cent.; that all officers entitled to half-pay for life, not included in the preceding resolution, might, also, collectively, agree to accept or refuse the aforesaid commutation, signifying the same within six months from the passage of said resolution. The petitioners state, and the fact is of too general notoriety to be disputed, that although they confidently expected, at the time they were compelled from imperious necessity to accept the sum in gross in lieu of half-pay for life, that it would be paid to them in reality, and not by a fresh promise without any sufficient guarantee for its due performance, yet they were compelled to receive certificates, which, for want of any specific provision for the payment of them, or the interest accruing on them, were immediately depreciated to five for one, and, by degrees, to ten for one, in exchange for money. They therefore pray that half-pay for life, to commence from the time of the reduction of the Army, may be granted to them, according to the solemn stipulations entered into with them by Congress, by the resolutions before referred to; deducting therefrom the five years' full pay received by them in depreciated paper, by way of commutation.

It is well known to your committee, and to the whole nation, that the far greater part of the officers were compelled by hard necessity to dispose of their commutation certificates at prices infinitely below their nominal amount; that this did not proceed from want of patriotism, of which they had beforehand given proofs most unequivocal, or of want of confidence in their Government; but that, after having spent the vigor of their manhood in the service of their country, they returned to the walks of civil life, (many of them maimed, and scarcely able to halt along,) ignorant of what was passing or likely to pass in the councils of their country; the griping hand of poverty bore hard upon them; and, unacquainted as they necessarily were with civil affairs, they fell an easy prey to the wiles of the artful and insidious speculator, who was lying in wait to fatten upon their hard earnings. Under circumstances like these, it would have been strange indeed, if they had kept their certificates in their pockets. No, the thing was impracticable; go they must, for whatever they would bring, and be the consequences whatever they might.

Upon the whole, the committee are of opinion that the contract entered into by Congress with the officers of the late Revolutionary Army, for giving them half-pay for life, has not been substantially complied with by the Government. They, therefore, recommend the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioners is reasonable, and ought to be granted.

FRIDAY, February 9.

Robert Fulton and Torpedoes.

The following letter was laid before the House:

"KALORAMA, February 9, 1810.

"SIR: Having published a pamphlet explaining my experience on the practice and effects of torpedoes, I beg leave to present you, and each member of the House of Representatives, one copy. Should the House consider this subject of sufficient interest to merit further explanation, I shall be happy to give a lecture at such time and place as may be most convenient, in which I will exhibit the various modes of attack with torpedoes and harpoon guns, as prepared for action, with such models and demonstrations as will lead to a clear understanding of the subject.

"I have the honor to be, &c.,

"ROBERT FULTON.

"Hon. SPEAKER House of Reps."

Leave was given to present the pamphlets mentioned in the above letter, as requested.

Navigation of the Mobile.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit to the House a report of the Secretary of State, complying with their resolution of the 22d of January.

JAMES MADISON.

FEBRUARY 9, 1810.

DEPARTMENT STATE, Feb. 8, 1810.

The Secretary of State, to whom the President has been pleased to refer the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d of last month, has the honor to state that it appears from the records in this department, that in the years 1801 and 1802, the Executive had endeavored to obtain, for the citizens of the United States residing on the waters of Tombigbee and Alabama rivers, the free navigation of the Mobile river to its confluence with the ocean--first, by claiming this navigation as a natural right, sanctioned by the general principles of the law of nations applicable to rivers similarly situated; and, secondly, by endeavoring to purchase the country held by Spain on the Mobile.

These efforts were made before it was known that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France, and consequently before the purchase of that province by the United States. Since that purchase, the country held by Spain on the Mobile has been claimed as being included therein.

The Spanish Government, having objected to this claim in a manner which justified a belief that the question would not be soon decided, our Minister at Madrid was instructed again to claim the free navigation of the Mobile under the general principles of the law of nations, and to represent to His Catholic Majesty the propriety and necessity of giving orders to his officers not to interrupt the free communication with our Territories through the waters of the Mobile.

In addition to what has been done through this department, it appears that the Governor of the Orleans Territory, and other officers of the United States, have endeavored to induce the Spanish authorities on the Mobile to abstain from exacting duties on the passage of our merchandise or produce up or down that river. Notwithstanding, however, every thing which has been done, it is understood that these authorities have continued to exact (with some occasional relaxations) a duty of twelve per cent. "on all articles of the growth or manufacture of the United States, which are conveyed through said river to and from the city of New Orleans."

All which is respectfully submitted.

R. SMITH.

MONDAY, February 12.

Torpedoes.

Mr. DAWSON.--On hearing the Journal read, I find that on last Friday a letter was received by the Speaker from Mr. Fulton. What merit is due to his invention I will not pretend to say; but I know Mr. Fulton to be a man of science and successful experiment; of which he has given proofs, both in Europe and this country. It seems to me that some attention ought to be paid to his communication. I therefore move you that his letter be referred to a select committee.

Mr. Dawson's motion was agreed to, and a committee appointed, consisting of Messrs. DAWSON, TAYLOR and BACON.

WEDNESDAY, February 14.

Torpedoes.

Mr. DAWSON made the following report:

The committee to whom was referred a letter from Robert Fulton to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, dated on the 9th instant, beg leave to report, in part, that at their request Mr. Fulton attended the committee on this morning, and explained to them his views of the uses and effects of torpedoes, on which the committee forbear to give an opinion, and offer the following resolution:

Resolved, That, when the House shall adjourn on Friday next, it will adjourn to meet on Monday; and that Mr. Fulton have the use of this Hall on Saturday, for the purpose of exhibiting the torpedoes and delivering a lecture on their practice and utility.

Mr. RHEA moved to recommit the report to the committee who reported it, with a view to obtaining a report on the merits of it.--Motion negatived.

Mr. LIVERMORE called for a division of the resolution reported by the committee, so as to take a question separately on the words, "RESOLVED, That, when the House shall adjourn, it adjourn to meet on Monday."

The question on this part of the resolution was decided by yeas and nays--yeas 90, nays 29.

Mr. LIVERMORE moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject indefinitely.

A desultory debate took place on these various questions. It was said that the Hall of the House of Representatives was exclusively appropriated to Legislative purposes, and that, at this time, to appropriate it to the purpose of experimental lectures, would afford a precedent which would be injurious; that such a measure, if admissible at all, should not be taken unless the House were convinced of the practicability of the system proposed to be illustrated, because it would hold out the idea that the House of Representatives had sanctioned it. It was also said that this system could quite as conveniently be illustrated in one of the other apartments of the Capitol, without spreading on the Journals a formal record allowing Mr. Fulton the use of this House. In reply, it was said, that this was an invention which promised to be of great public utility, and it was but reasonable, as the inventor was known to be a scientific man, that he should have an opportunity of demonstrating its efficacy, when he has offered his services for that purpose. If it succeeded, it might be a saving of many millions to the United States; and if it failed, the House would, by paying attention to it, have shown their disposition to encourage science. The argument against the report of the committee, that this Hall was exclusively devoted to legislation, it was said, would operate with equal force against permitting Divine service to be performed there on Sundays.

Before any question was taken on the latter clause of the report of the committee, the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, February 15.

Torpedoes.

A motion was made by Mr. BURWELL, that the unfinished business of yesterday do lie on the table; and the question being taken thereon, it was determined in the negative.

The House then resumed the consideration of the said unfinished business, and the question recurring on the motion to postpone indefinitely the further consideration of the second member of the resolution, Mr. SPEAKER decided that the said motion to postpone indefinitely was, at the time the same was under consideration, out of order.

A motion was then made by Mr. ROSS, to amend the said resolution by striking out the words, delivering a lecture on, for the purpose of inserting the word explaining. And the question being taken thereon, it was resolved in the affirmative.

The question was then taken upon concurring in the second and last member of the said resolution, and determined in the negative--yeas 55, nays 61.

On motion of Mr. TROUP, the question was then stated on concurring in the first and second members of the said resolution; when Mr. SPEAKER decided that, a question being divided, one part affirmed and the other rejected, a question cannot be put upon the whole of the resolution as originally proposed. From which decision of the chair, an appeal was made to the House by Mr. TROUP, and being seconded, the question was taken, "Is the decision of the Chair correct?" and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 78, nays 21.

FRIDAY, February 16.

Mrs. Hamilton's Claim.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims on the petition of Elizabeth Hamilton, widow of Alexander Hamilton, praying for the compensation due to her deceased husband.

[This report is one of the class of those favorable to the prayers of the petitioners on grounds of equity, but declaring, because they are barred by the statute of limitations, that they, therefore, ought not to be granted.]

The resolution reported by the Committee of Claims is as follows:

"Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted."

The report was supported by Messrs. MONTGOMERY, VARNUM, HELMS, and BACON, on the ground that the late General Hamilton had no claim on the Government under the resolutions of the old Congress; because he was, on the 25th of November, 1782, a delegate in Congress, and, by the 6th article of the Confederation, incapable of holding, at the same time, a military commission. He was in that Congress, a member (if not the chairman) of the committee which reported the resolutions under which his heirs are now said to be entitled to compensation. Had no statute of limitations ever been passed, therefore, it was said that General Hamilton or his heirs had no claim on the Government; because in accepting a seat in Congress, he had virtually resigned his commission before the close of the war. The case might be a hard one; but there were hundreds of cases at least equally so, and cases too in which the sufferers had not, as General Hamilton had, subsequently enjoyed lucrative employments by the favor of his country. It was said that Congress ought to be just before they were generous. Before they granted a claim of this doubtful character, influenced by the character or standing of the individual, they should relieve the impoverished old soldiers who daily begged of them for a pittance of bread, whose claims were equally just and whose necessities were much more pressing.

Mr. BOYD spoke in favor of the report of the committee. Either the statute of limitations was just or it was unjust. If unjust, it ought to be repealed; if just, Congress ought to be careful how they made exceptions in favor of particular claims.

Messrs. JOHNSON, GHOLSON, DAWSON, SHEFFEY GOLD, KEY, PITKIN and GARDENIER, oppose the report of the committee. It was said that General Hamilton's having received a brevet commission at the close of the war was evidence of his having been considered in service until the end of the war; for unless he had, such a commission could not have been issued to him. But a short time before the peace, he was seen at the head of his regiment gallantly storming a redoubt at the siege of York, and contributed not a little to the capture of Cornwallis and his army. By accepting a seat in Congress he did not resign his commission, but held himself liable to be called into service at any time, if necessary. But if he had, from the best of motives, accepted a seat in Congress, and thereby resigned his commission, it was said that his heirs ought not, therefore, to be deprived of the compensation equitably due to him. Congress had extended the hand of relief to the daughters of Count de Grasse, who had no shadow of a legal claim; but their father had assisted by sea, as General Hamilton did on the land, at the capture of Cornwallis; they were in this country in distress, and Congress had relieved them. Should the same relief be denied to the representatives of a citizen who had served during the war, and whose legal claim, if barred at all, (except by the statute of limitations,) was only barred by his zeal in the service of his country, which prompted him to accept a seat in Congress? The statute of limitations, it was said, was never intended to bar Congress from discharging a just claim, but merely to prevent the accounting officers of the Treasury from allowing all the old, and perhaps fraudulent claims which might have been pressed upon them. Every gentleman who spoke, dwelt upon the obduracy of heart and injustice, as it was termed, which could refuse to the claim of the war-worn soldier, the compensation due to him for his assistance in achieving the liberties of his country.

Before the question was taken on the report, the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

And the House adjourned to Monday.

MONDAY, February 19.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. MONTGOMERY, from the committee appointed, on the twenty-ninth ultimo, on the memorial of the Stockholders of the Bank of the United States, made a report thereon; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow. The report is as follows:

That in proceeding to the consideration of the said petition, your committee instructed their chairman to address a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, requesting him to furnish such information or observations as he might think proper, in relation to the subject-matter thereof, as connected with the financial and commercial interests of the United States. In reply to which, the Secretary, by his letter to the chairman, referred your committee to his former report on the said subject, made to the Senate of the United States, in obedience to the order of that House.

Your committee have been attended by agents of the petitioners, who, in addition to the matters contained in the petition, have suggested to your committee that the object of the petitioners was to obtain the renewal of the charter in its present form; that, for this renewal, the bank is willing to make compensation, either by loans at a rate of interest, or by a sum of money to be agreed upon, or by an increase of the capital stock, by a number of shares to be taken and subscribed for by the United States, to an amount adequate to the compensation to be agreed upon for such renewal.

These agents also suggested that they were fully authorized and empowered to offer and conclude the terms specifically connected with these propositions.

Your committee, not feeling themselves authorized to enter into such terms, and judging that the extent of those propositions would better apply to the details of a bill, than to the adoption of a principle to be first settled by the House, have, therefore forborne to inquire into the extent of the propositions, and, without expressing an approbation or rejection of these offers, or giving an opinion as to the plan and reasoning of the Secretary of the Treasury, your committee in order that the opinion of the House on this great national question may be declared previous to entering into the details connected with the subject, recommend the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is proper to make provision for continuing the establishment of the Bank of the United States, with offices of discount and deposit, under the regulations necessary for the beneficial administration of the national finances, during such time, and on such conditions, as may be defined by law.

WEDNESDAY, Feb. 28.

Amey Dardin.

Mr. GHOLSON, from the committee appointed on the seventh of December last, on the petition of Amey Dardin, made a report thereon; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the whole House on Friday next.

The report is as follows:

That the petitioner claims compensation for a stud-horse, known by the name of Romulus, taken from her husband, David Dardin, in the year 1781, for the use of the army of the United States. It appears that the said horse was impressed from David Dardin for the public service by Lieutenant Rudder, a Continental officer, on the 26th of February, in the year aforesaid, and was then valued at the sum of £750 specie. The horse was taken to the army in North Carolina, then commanded by General Greene, who, upon hearing of the valuation, ordered the said horse to be valued again, which valuation was still higher than the first; whereupon General Greene ordered the horse to be returned to his former owner, who called upon three persons to ascertain the damages sustained by the use of his horse, and they estimated the damages at £100. The said Dardin then received the horse as his property, and continued to use him as such until the 18th July, 1781, when another Continental officer again took the horse and gave a receipt for him, wherein the sum of £750 is mentioned as having been before stated as the appraised value. This procedure attracted the attention of the Executive of Virginia, and in December, 1782, Benjamin Harrison, then Governor, made a representation to General Greene respecting this subject; but the horse being by this time in the State of Georgia, and applied to the public service, was continued therein, finally disposed of, and never thereafter returned to the said owner. It also appears that this claim of Dardin was referred to the Virginia Assembly in 1782 by the court of Mecklenburg county; and, in a former report it is stated, and believed to be true, that Dardin accordingly petitioned the Legislature of that State; but his claim being considered as coming more properly against the Union than against any particular State, he did not succeed. He, or the present petitioner, was then advised that redress might be obtained against the officers who took the horse, and a suit was instituted in the High Court of Chancery of Virginia for that purpose, which suit was depending therein until the month of June 1793, when it appears to have been abandoned and was dismissed. With the exception of the fact which the committee have extracted from a former report in this case, that this claim was once presented to and rejected by the Virginia Legislature, (which is deemed a circumstance of no particular importance,) all the foregoing statement is supported by written documents, which appear to be genuine and authentic.

On the merits of this claim, your committee consider it almost superfluous to comment. The facts are conclusive in its favor, and no obstacle to its discharge can be conceived, except the lapse of time on this subject. The committee beg leave to state, that on the 23d July, 1787, Congress passed a resolution providing that all persons having unliquidated claims against the United States shall exhibit a particular abstract thereof to the Comptroller of the Treasury of the United States within one year. This was the first limitation that was adopted in respect to any class of claims, except those for personal services, which had been barred by the resolution of 2d November, 1785. The committee are of opinion that this claim was not included in the resolution of 23d July, 1787, because that resolution mentions only unliquidated claims; and the present claim was always liquidated and certain. The certificate granted by the Continental officer states the appraisement of the horse, made pursuant to the usage of the army, at the specific sum of £750 specie.

The next limitation to claims against the United States, and which it is believed by the committee embraces the claim of the petitioner, is contained in the act of the 12th February, 1793, which took effect on the 1st of May, 1794. On the 28th of February, 1794, the petitioner, instead of presenting her claim to the Treasury, according to the requisition of the statute of the 12th of February, 1793, presented it to Congress, who took cognizance of it, and ordered it to lie on their table. Her petition, and the only documents on which she could have succeeded at the Treasury, were retained in the possession of the House of Representatives until, and for some time after, the statute of limitations began to operate. Your committee have no hesitation in hazarding the opinion that in a case like this, between A and B, before an intelligent and upright, and equitable judge, the claim would be most undoubtedly sanctioned, as not coming within the spirit, although it may fall within the strict letter of the act of limitation.

Placing, however, this question out of view, the committee are still of opinion that the claim of the petitioner ought to be allowed. They believe that when a claim, founded in a fair consideration, and supported by indisputable evidence, is presented for payment, a proper self-respect on the part of the Government, as well as justice to the claimant, requires its discharge. They therefore submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner ought to be granted.

FRIDAY, March 2.

Mrs. Hamilton's Claim.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the following resolution reported by the Committee of Claims on the petition of Elizabeth Hamilton:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted.

Messrs. NELSON and TAYLOR opposed, and Messrs. ROOT, BOYD, and MONTGOMERY, supported the report--each at considerable extent.

At length the question was taken in committee, and the report disagreed to, 60 to 52. The committee rose, and reported their disagreement.

The House concurred with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement--yeas 62, nays 52.

After some conversation as to the proper course now to be pursued,

Mr. GHOLSON moved that the Committee of Claims be instructed to report a bill, pursuant to the prayer of Elizabeth Hamilton.

The motion was agreed to by yeas and nays--61 to 46.

FRIDAY, March 9.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the relief of Charles Minifie," was read twice, and committed to the Committee of Claims.

Torpedoes.

The bill from the Senate, entitled "An act making appropriation for the purpose of trying the practical use of the torpedo, or submarine explosion," was read the first time.

A motion was made by Mr. LIVERMORE, that the bill be rejected; and the question being taken thereon, it was determined in the negative--yeas 27, nays 76.

The bill was then read the second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.

MONDAY, March 12.

Another member, to wit, from Virginia, JOHN RANDOLPH, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, March 14.

Claim for Indian Depredations.

Mr. WITHERSPOON, from the committee appointed on the fourteenth ultimo, on the petition of Alexander Scott, made a report thereon, which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole on Friday next. The report is as follows:

That in the month of February, 1794, William Scott, James Pettigrew, and John Pettigrew, of South Carolina, left that State, with a view of establishing themselves in the present Mississippi Territory, and took with them twenty-one negro slaves, with goods and chattels to the value of more than one thousand dollars; that they proceeded in safety on their journey as far as the Muscle Shoals, on the river Tennessee, where they were attacked, about the 9th of June, 1794, by a party of Cherokee Indians, who put to death all the white people of the family, and took possession of and carried away the negroes and other property. It appears, also, to your committee, that repeated endeavors have been made, at very great expense, to recover the aforesaid property, without any other success than the recovery of a negro child; and that the persons legally entitled to the said property are forever foreclosed from any remedy by which to recover the same, in consequence of the stipulations of the ninth article of a treaty made with the Cherokee Indians on the 2d day of October, 1798, which article is in the following words: "It is mutually agreed between the parties that the horses stolen, and not returned within ninety days, shall be paid for at the rate of sixty dollars each. If stolen by a white man, citizen of the United States, the Indian proprietor shall be paid in cash; and if stolen by an Indian from a citizen, to be deducted, as expressed in the fourth article of the Treaty of Philadelphia. This article shall have retrospect to the commencement of the first conferences at this place in the present year, and no further. And all animosities, aggressions, thefts, and plunderings, prior to that day, shall cease, and be no longer remembered or demanded on either side." By the above-recited article, the petitioners are wholly deprived of redress in the premises. If there existed any tribunal of justice before whom the case could be brought, the right of the petitioners to the said negro slaves and their increase would doubtless be established. But there is no court within the United States having cognizance of an action for the recovery of property held within the Indian boundary. Neither is it in the power of the petitioners to avail themselves of force or stratagem, whereby to regain possession of the aforesaid slaves and their increase, because they would be liable to punishment for a violation of the statute of the United States regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes. From these premises, it appeared to your committee that the petitioners have an undoubted right to the above-mentioned slaves and their increase, and that they have been deprived of all remedy for their recovery by the acts of the Government of the United States; that the voluntary renunciation of their rights by the Government gives to the petitioners a fair claim on the Government for indemnification. Your committee, therefore, under an impression that the aforesaid slaves would be delivered to the agent of the United States for Indian Affairs among the Cherokee Indians upon conditions more favorable to the United States than a full remuneration of their value to the petitioners, respectfully submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner is reasonable, and that the President of the United States be authorized and requested to treat, by such commissioner as he shall appoint, for the delivery to the rightful owners of the slaves and their increase taken from William Scott, James Pettigrew, and John Pettigrew, on or about the 9th of June, 1794, by a party of the Cherokee nation of Indians, at or near the Muscle Shoals, on the river Tennessee, upon such equitable conditions as to him shall appear just and reasonable.

FRIDAY, March 16.

Mrs. Hamilton's Claim.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for the relief of Elizabeth Hamilton.

Messrs. SMILIE, ROOT, W. ALSTON, BACON, MACON, CLAY, and BOYD, opposed the bill, and Messrs. JOHNSON, SHEFFEY, and NELSON, supported it.

The committee rose about four o'clock, and reported the bill.

Mr. MACON moved to amend the said bill by striking out the following words: "five years' full pay for the services of her said deceased husband as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Revolutionary war, which five years' full pay is the commutation of his half-pay for life;" for the purpose of inserting, "whatever may be due to her for his services as an officer during the Revolutionary war."

Mr. GHOLSON called for a division of the question.

And the motion to strike out was negatived, yeas 57, nays 54.

Mr. W. ALSTON moved to amend the bill by adding the following proviso:

"Provided, That it shall be made to appear, to the satisfaction of the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, that the said Alexander Hamilton ever was entitled to half pay or commutation."

The question on Mr. ALSTON'S amendment was decided in the negative--yeas 55, nays 56.

And on motion, the House then adjourned, about five o'clock.

SATURDAY, March 17.

Amey Dardin's Claim.

The bill for the relief of Amey Dardin was read a third time.

Mr. STANFORD moved to recommit the bill to obtain a more particular report on the claim than had been made. Motion negatived.

The passage of the bill was opposed by Messrs. MACON, BACON, PICKMAN, and STANFORD, and advocated by Messrs. GHOLSON, SMILIE, W. ALSTON, and SHEFFEY.

[It was opposed on three grounds--the main objection being that it opened the statute of limitations; 2, that the claim ought not to be allowed, because the horse, for which compensation was asked, might have been reclaimed if the deceased Mr. Dardin had chosen to have received it; 3, that interest ought not to be allowed on the sum at which the horse was valued.]

The bill was passed--yeas 82, nays 24.

Mrs. Hamilton's Claim.

The consideration of the bill for the relief of Mrs. Hamilton was called for.

Mr. WYNN moved to adjourn. For it, 23.

Mr. ROOT moved to postpone the further consideration of it till Friday next. Negatived, 57 to 43.

Mr. ROOT opposed the bill at length, and Mr. FISK replied.

The question "Shall the bill be engrossed for a third reading?" was then taken and carried, by yeas and nays.

On the question, when the bill should be read a third time, Mr. ROOT named Friday, and Mr. NELSON to-day.

For Friday 44--For Monday 50.

To-day was fixed as the day; and a motion was made by Mr. T. MOORE to adjourn. Lost, 63 to 50.

The bill was read a third time and passed, 63 to 53, the votes being precisely the same as those last taken, except that Mr. R. BROWN was absent on this vote.

MONDAY, March 26.

Torpedo Experiment.

The bill making an appropriation for the purpose of making an experiment on the practical use of the torpedo, or submarine explosion, was taken up.

Mr. DANA, said that the question now before the House did not relate to any degree of reputation which any individual might claim for any invention, nor to any interest he might have in any discovery he had made. The question was, whether this proposition now appeared before the House under such circumstances that they should step out of the ordinary course of encouragement, given by law to inventors, to provide the means of making an experiment at the public expense. This, Mr. D. said, was the simple inquiry to be made; and, however eminent or distinguished in the walks of science, or however irradiated by the splendor of genius, it belonged to no individual to demand of the Legislature that they should adopt any system previous to its utility being ascertained. No individual could arrogate it to himself; and, when any individual pressed himself upon the Legislature, it was a question whether this experiment was worthy to be made; whether the invention promised any possible good worthy of this experiment.

Mr. D. said he had no wish to detain the House, but he had really doubted, for himself, whether, with the views he entertained on this subject, it was compatible with the respect due to the House to withhold some of the sentiments which occurred to him in opposition to this bill. In every instance in which a sum of money had heretofore been appropriated to encourage inventions, it had been for some object admitted to be of value, for something intended to be of use, and which, prior to making the appropriation in relation to it, had been, in a degree, examined. This, however, was a thing which, on the face of it, appropriated a sum of money for the purpose of making experiments to ascertain the use of the invention. It was therefore, perhaps, the first appropriation of the kind ever proposed.

Mr. D. said he did not perceive that any experiment could be made, in time of peace, to ascertain this thing, so as to decide the question of the practical use of the torpedo; for, with respect to every question stated in the publication laid on the table, with respect to any principle which the inventor proposed to establish by any specific experiment, with respect to any question which related to natural agents or their physical effect, he thought it proper to admit the whole.

In the first place, Mr. D. said that he admitted that the explosive force of gunpowder, placed at the keel, might destroy any ship. Another thing he would admit, that a person might deposit powder in a metallic case, which should remain under water; that the case might be made water-tight, and that the clock-work contained in it might be put in motion. He would admit, also, that this machine might be balanced so that its gravity should be nearly equal to that of the water; that the action of the current or tide might bear such a magazine, so specifically apportioned, beneath the bottom of the vessel.

But, when all these things were admitted, Mr. DANA said that he did not perceive that any one point was gained as respected the object of the experiment, for it must be considered that all this experiment could only go to decide the action of natural physical powers, where the efforts of genius were not combined.

As respects the whole of the thing itself, as far as I understand it, I perceive nothing new in it. I do not conceive that, on this subject, there is any thing very novel in point of principle. There may be something in the modification of it; but, as respects the main principle, there is nothing new. The idea was started during the war of the American Revolution, and various experiments were made on it. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States, at that time, was not, as I have understood, impressed himself with much confidence in the experiment. But a gentleman of his family, and an officer of his army, who had more confidence in it, made the experiment; and, ultimately, the experiment was pretty much given up.

As he did not speak at random, Mr. D. asked leave to call the attention of the House to the principles of the invention of David Bushnell, of Connecticut. [Mr. D. here read, from the Philosophical Transactions, an account of a machine invented by Mr. Bushnell, in many respects similar to that invented by Mr. Fulton.]

The principal difference between these two inventions, Mr. D. said, appeared to be in the mode of conveying the machine to the keel of the ship. The plan of Mr. Fulton was, instead of conveying it by means of a diving-boat, to convey it by the action of the current to the place where it was to operate. To do this he proposed two modes. As respected the first, the action of the current on the torpedo placed obliquely, Mr. D. said he had no doubt. It was the principle on which the helmsman steers his ship, and the seaman manages his sails; the principle on which boats are made to pass ferries by the oblique action of the current. As respected the second mode, the use of the harpoon-gun, there was no novelty in that certainly. It had been used in Europe in the whale fishery, where they were not trained in this species of fishing so as to produce dexterity in throwing the harpoon. Premiums had been given, and attempts made to discharge a harpoon from a ring and rope attached to it, at the distance of ten fathoms, which was a greater distance than the most experienced and skilful could strike with effect.

The question which Mr. D. said he proposed, was, whether obstacles could not be interposed by naval men. As respected firing the harpoon-gun, he should suppose it a want of skill or attention in the experiment if it failed to take effect. That a harpoon might be fired into a vessel, that the torpedo would go under her, and that a vessel which could be bought for $5,000, might be blown up in this way, he had no doubt; but when all this is done, what does it ascertain? As respects making a torpedo, any person who is in the neighborhood of a good gun and locksmith, and has good powder, can construct one. Mr. D. said he did not see the necessity of spending this sum of money rather for amusement than for any thing else. He did not see the necessity of it, because he did not perceive any one thing to be learnt from an experiment. He was, therefore, against the bill.

Mr. LYON said that the gentleman from Connecticut had shown his own conviction of the utility of torpedoes, and it would be worth while to give five thousand dollars to establish the same conviction in others. If I had the twentieth part of the certainty on the subject which that gentleman has, said Mr. L., I should not vote for the experiment. I have no desire, in voting for any thing of this kind, to give up any other kind of defence. I know it is all-important in us to defend our ports and harbors. If it was not for our extensive seacoast, I should not be so extremely averse to going to war. I would leave no means untried to protect this seacoast. However little the hope might be, if there was the least thing to hang hope on, I would give $5,000 for the experiment. I have voted for the highest sum ever called for, for the defence of New York; but still, when I look to the steeples of the fine churches, and to the banks, &c., of that city, exposed as it is and must be, I am struck with horror. Notwithstanding all the exertions which have ever been made for them, they must still be insecure. If $5,000 would carry conviction as far on the rest of the House as with the gentleman from Connecticut, the money would be well laid out to enable us to go on with a further experiment of this plan.

The gentleman from Connecticut read a long history of the torpedo experiment made many years ago. I believe, sir, Mr. Fulton has but little merit in originating the thing. Let gentlemen recollect what an alarm this thing made, and how uneasy the British were during the Revolutionary war, till they thought they had got rid of these machines. I cannot forget the alarm which they excited, and will take the liberty to quote Hopkinson on the subject, who was a witness to the transaction:

"'T was early day, as poets say, Just when the sun was rising, A soldier stood on log of wood, And saw a sight surprising.

"As in amaze he stood to gaze, The truth can't be denied, sir, He spied a score of kegs, or more, Come floating down the tide, sir.

"A sailor, too, in jerkin blue, The strange appearance viewing, First damn'd his eyes, in great surprise, Then said--'some mischief's brewing.'

"These kegs now hold the rebels bold, Pack'd up like pickled herring, And they 're come down, t' attack the town In this new way of ferry'ng.

"The soldier flew--the sailor too, And, scar'd almost to death, sir, Wore out their shoes to spread the news, And ran till out of breath, sir.

"Now up and down, throughout the town, Most frantic scenes were acted; And some ran here, and some ran there, Like men almost distracted.

"Some fire cried, which some denied, But said the earth had quaked; And girls and boys, with hideous noise. Ran through the town half naked." &c. &c.

If a parcel of kegs, in those days, alarmed them so much, what will Fulton's torpedoes do now?

Mr. MCKIM said, that what had fallen from the gentleman from Connecticut had operated powerfully on his mind to satisfy him of the propriety of the appropriation. He says, observed Mr. MCK., that he has no doubt they will produce the desired effect. Now, sir, when I am informed, from so respectable a source, of their effect when properly placed under the ship, I am induced to vote for this appropriation. If one of these machines in a hundred should take effect, the object would be perfectly gained. If we could only blow up one or two in a squadron, we should not hereafter be disturbed by British squadrons in our waters. I have listened with great pleasure to the lecture of the gentleman on pneumatics, hydraulics, &c., for I know not where I could have derived so much information as from that gentleman, and I take the opportunity of returning my thanks to him.

Mr. FISK said he was against the bill, but from different reasons than other gentlemen were. I do believe, said he, that in some cases, the anchored torpedoes may be effectual; but I do not believe that any thing to result from this bill will be of service to the country. I do not entertain any doubt that a vessel may be blown up. The explosion will take place, the wreck will be left in the bed of the river, and it may cost $5,000 to raise it, or it may remain as an obstacle to the invasion of the capital. If Congress are at this time seriously to resort to the torpedo system of defence, let us do it in a more serious manner; let us make a respectable provision to purchase torpedo munition, and create a torpedo corps under certain regulations. We have got military and naval armaments; let us make a torpedo armament. At the same time, it was but justice to the inventor to say, that he considered the anchored torpedo as a very useful invention. Mr. F. moved to recommit the bill, to inquire into the propriety of appropriating such a sum of money as the Secretary of the Navy should deem adequate to the object, for the sum proposed certainly was not.

Mr. QUINCY said he agreed with the gentleman from New York in his opposition to the bill, because, if a fair experiment was intended, the appropriation was totally insufficient. This morning, in a conversation with the Secretary of the Navy, I understood that this sum will not enable a vessel to be placed in that situation which will give a fair experiment. If we pass this bill, it will be utterly useless to the purpose proposed. If the object be to have gentlemen who never saw such a thing gratified with an explosion, that object will be attained, but no other. Let us have an estimate from the Secretary of the Navy of the probable expense, or the whole sum appropriated may be lost, and the law will prove utterly disgraceful to those who passed it.

Mr. HOLLAND said he had understood from the torpedo inventor himself, that $5,000 would be amply sufficient.

Mr. DANA said he had no belief that any vessel could be purchased for five thousand dollars, on which a sufficient experiment could be made. He conceived that the experiment could only be made in hostile operations. We are told that these torpedoes would destroy the navy in the British channel. Do we doubt the inveteracy of the French hatred of the British navy when it has existed so many years? If this invention would command the British Channel--and millions are but dust in the balance for this object--to enable Bonaparte to strike at the British soil, why has not the invention been patronized by France? It has been rejected by France, and rejected by England after an expense of hundreds of thousands of dollars--and now are we to take it up? It is as a stationary resistance to be made to a naval force where there are fortresses also, that the torpedo may be made use of, if they can be used at all; where chains, or chevaux-de-frises are made use of, it may be made use of as auxiliary to other aids in terrifying the enemy. As to setting these machines afloat, firing harpoons into vessels, calculating the chance of boats getting away when a single shot may send them to the bottom, I have no opinion of it at all.

Mr. LYON said he would not vote for recommitment, not that he had not rather that ten thousand dollars were appropriated than five thousand; but the House had the Senate's opinion on that point before them. He agreed with gentlemen entirely, that there never could be a complete experiment until time of war. But that was no reason why we should not, before war came, be in a fair state to try the experiment in war.

Mr. FISK said he had not seen the experiment which had been made in New York, but he had conversed with hundreds who had. He had no doubt but the invention might be useful, but how was its utility to be ascertained, unless in the vessel to be attacked, there was a crew prepared to resist the approach of the boats, or prevent the operation of the torpedo? The nation would be no more convinced of their utility after an expenditure of five thousand dollars than they now are. It is because I have confidence in the effect of anchored torpedoes, that I am for recommitting the bill. By passing the bill as it is, we shall demonstrate nothing but the expenditure of money. I am for making an actual experiment on an enemy's vessel. To attack a well-manned frigate, is a very different thing from attacking an old hulk, perfectly at the disposal of the projectors. If we were to pass a bill constructing a torpedo corps, and offering a bounty on every ship blown up, it would be much better calculated to make an impression of our seriousness than this bill.

Mr. TALLMADGE said, that having been absent from the House at the time this bill was first introduced, he knew not what arguments had been offered in favor of it. He said he was always ready to encourage inventions, &c., but when a measure was presented which had no novelty in it, he could not be satisfied to give a silent vote on the bill for encouraging it.

My honorable colleague stated fairly the principles on which the submarine boat was constructed; and I believe, said Mr. T., that there is no gentleman in this House who doubts the power of gunpowder, placed under the bottom of a vessel, to destroy it. I have seen it tried during the war in a great variety of ways. I became perfectly satisfied that the principle was just; the only difficulty was to place the magazine in such a situation that it should have the greatest possible effect.

I well recollect that, in 1777, when Bushnell was called on to make an experiment on a British brig of thirty-two guns, lying in North river, a detachment of troops was directed to proceed down the river to enable him to make the experiment free from interruption. I had the honor to command the detachment, and continued there one month. The object of the troops under my immediate command was to keep off all hostile persons, whether of the enemy or persons unfriendly to the invention, that he might have every opportunity to make his experiment with success. His object was at ebb tide to get into the river a boat constructed for the purpose, and pass down the river, and, if possible, fix his magazine of powder to the bottom of the enemy's vessel. He tried it over and over again. Sometimes he would entirely miss the vessel; sometimes he would come so near that he would get intimidated and retire again; till, sir, I became so heartily sick of the business, and of that sort of duty, that I wished the boat and men were both at the bottom of the ocean. I state this to show the difficulty, danger, and what I myself conceive to be the impossibility of placing the magazine under the vessel. So much for this; and I take Mr. Fulton's machine to be bottomed precisely on the same principle, the difference only being in the mode of application.

I have no idea of laughing the subject out of the House; but how can gentlemen see the least probability of success in the invention? Suppose a frigate at anchor, and a few boats endeavoring to harpoon this vessel. Do gentlemen suppose that boats can approach without the most imminent danger? And, granting that the harpoon strikes, where is all the nautical skill of the men when they see this, if they do not prevent it from taking effect. Suppose a perfectly sure shot, and that the harpoon should be fastened in the bow, is it possible that the rope to which the torpedo is attached would not be cut, and the torpedo left to float below perfectly harmless? Do gentlemen consider harpooning a vessel to be like harpooning a whale, which has no men on board of it to take out the harpoon? I cannot bring myself to believe it possible that a crew on board a ship could see all around her, and yet permit a torpedo to be attached to her and place her in such a condition as to be liable to be totally destroyed with every person on board.

It does seem to me that this sort of philosophical experiment ought not to be gone into by this House. If it be necessary to employ anything it would be vastly preferable that we should not go through all this solemn farce of passing a law for the purpose of exhibiting a sort of playful experiment, and there is probably a day of our time to be devoted to it, when, in truth, no solid advantages can accrue from it. I am unwilling on another ground, because the thing itself would expose the Government to a sort of ridicule. If we pass this bill, and the experiment be made; if a brig be bought for this money and totally destroyed, there will still be as much proof wanting to demonstrate that this is an experiment on which we can rely, as there was before. I am against it on another ground: that if we trust to this kind of doubtful defence, we shall get into the habit of giving up the more substantial defence of the country. This is my solid reason for voting against this bill. No one ever yet found any way of getting along in solid defence but by solid preparation. I should rather come into honorable combat than fight with this underhand explosion, when especially there is so much doubt in it. If an experiment could be made, however, without all this solemn farce, I do not, know that I should have any objection to it.

The motion for recommitment was lost--50 to 45.

The question on the passage of the bill was then taken by yeas and nays, and decided in the affirmative--yeas 65, nays 53.

WEDNESDAY, March 28.

First Meridian.

Mr. PITKIN, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 25th of January last, the memorial of William Lambert, made the following report thereon:

That the memorialist states that, for the purpose of laying a foundation for the establishment of a first meridian for the United States of America, at the seat of Government, he has made calculations to determine the longitude of the Capitol, in the City of Washington, from Greenwich Observatory, in England; and that he submits the same, together with the data and elements on which his calculations are made, to the consideration and patronage of the National Legislature.

The committee have deemed the subject worthy the attention of Congress, and would, therefore, beg leave to observe, that the necessity of the establishment of a first meridian, or meridian which should pass through some particular place on the globe, from which geographers and navigators could compute or reckon longitude, is too obvious to need elucidation.

The ancient Greek geographers placed their first meridian to pass through one of the islands, which were by them called the Fortunate Islands, since called the Canaries. Those islands were situated as far west as any lands that had then been discovered, or were known by ancient navigators in that part of the world.

They reckoned their longitude east, from Heria or Junonia, one of these islands supposed to be the present Island of Teneriffe.

The Arabians, it is said, fixed their first meridian at the most westerly part of the continent of Africa. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Europe was emerging from the dark ages, and a spirit of enterprise and discovery had arisen in the South of Europe, and various plans were formed, and attempts made to find a new route to the East Indies, geographers and navigators continued to calculate longitude from Ferro, one of the same islands, though some of them extended their first meridian as far west as the Azores or Western islands.

In more modern times, however, most of the European nations, and particularly England and France, have established a first meridian to pass through the capital, or some place in their respective countries, and to which they have lately adapted their charts and astronomical tables.

It would perhaps have been fortunate for the science of geography and navigation, that all nations had agreed upon a first meridian, from which all geographers and navigators might have calculated longitude; but as this has not been done, and in all probability never will take place, the committee are of opinion that, situated as we are in this Western hemisphere, more than three thousand miles from any fixed or known meridian, it would be proper, in a national point of view, to establish a first meridian for ourselves; and that measures should be taken for the eventual establishment of such a meridian in the United States.

In examining the maps and charts of the United States, and the particular States, or their seacoasts, which have been published in this country, the committee find that the publishers have assumed different places in the United States, as first meridians.

This creates confusion, and renders it difficult, without considerable calculation, to ascertain the relative situation of places in this country. This difficulty is also increased, by the circumstance that, in Louisiana, our newly-acquired territory, longitude has heretofore been reckoned from Paris the capital of the French Empire.

The exact longitude of any place in the United States being ascertained from the meridian of the observatory at Greenwich, in England, a meridian with which we have been conversant, it would not be difficult to adapt all our maps, charts, and astronomical tables, to the meridian of such a place. And no place, perhaps, is more proper than the seat of Government.

It appears by the papers submitted to the consideration of the committee, that Mr. Lambert has calculated the longitude of the Capitol in the City of Washington, from the Royal observatory at Greenwich, by one of the most approved methods now in use for that purpose, viz: an occultation of a known fixed star by the moon.

His calculations are founded on an occultation of n pleiadum, (Alcyone,) one of the seven stars, on the night of the 20th of October, 1804. By these calculations it appears, that the longitude of the Capitol, in the city of Washington, as reduced according to the true figure of the earth, (being that of an oblate spheroid,) is 76° 53´ 6".920 degrees west. The committee would observe, that Mr. Lambert appears to be well acquainted with astronomical calculations; and that, so far as the committee have had time to examine them, they appear to be correct. In a question, however, of so much nicety, the correct decision of which depends so much on the accuracy of the observations made, and the goodness of the instruments used, and when the smallest error in the data will necessarily produce an erroneous result, full reliance ought not to be placed on calculations made from a single observation.

Indeed, in order to be certain of a correct result, it may be proper that more than one of the various methods of ascertaining longitude should be used; that calculations should be made from observations of the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites, of solar eclipses, of the angular distances between the sun and moon, or the moon and a fixed star, or other methods, as well as from observations on occultations of fixed stars.

The committee are, therefore, of opinion that, in order to lay a foundation for the establishment of a first meridian in this Western hemisphere, the President of the United States should be authorized to cause the longitude of the city of Washington, from the observatory at Greenwich, in England, to be ascertained with the greatest possible degree of accuracy; and that he also be authorized, for that purpose, to procure the necessary astronomical instruments.

They, therefore, beg leave to submit to the consideration of the House, the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is expedient to make provision, by law, authorizing the President of the United States to cause the longitude of the city of Washington from the observatory at Greenwich, in England, to be ascertained with the greatest degree of accuracy; and also authorizing him, for that purpose, to procure the necessary astronomical instruments.

In presenting the above report, Mr. PITKIN observed that the object of the committee was to have a first meridian established for the United States, from which computations of longitude might be generally made, that maps, charts, and nautical tables, might not, as heretofore, be calculated from the observatory at Greenwich, or from the varying points of Philadelphia, New York, Washington, or Charleston. Mr. P. dilated upon the advantages of such a measure. Congress would fix upon the place most proper for a first meridian; and, perhaps, as Washington was the seat of Government, it would be as proper a place as any. As the longitude must be taken very exactly, various instruments would be necessary for the purpose of making astronomical observations. As he was desirous that a bill should pass on the subject at this session, he did not move a reference of the report to a Committee of the Whole, but moved that it lie on the table, to give gentlemen time to consider it before he asked a decision on it.

The report was accordingly ordered to lie on the table.

FRIDAY, March 30.

Batture at New Orleans.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill providing the means to ascertain the title to the batture near New Orleans.

Mr. BIBB's motion yet under consideration, and a division of the question being called for,

The question on striking out the sections of the present bill (providing for a judicial decision) was taken, and carried--yeas 95, nays 22.

The question now recurred on Mr. BIBB'S amendment, to insert, in lieu of those stricken out, several new sections.

[Mr. BIBB'S amendment proposes that the right of the United States shall be vested in the Corporation of New Orleans, so as to enable them to defend any suit which may be instituted for the recovery of the batture, and that the batture shall be used and enjoyed as a public highway and landing place, &c.; as well by citizens of the United States as by the inhabitants of New Orleans.]

This motion was decided by yeas and nays and lost--yeas 36, nays 84.

SATURDAY March 31.

The Batture at New Orleans.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, on the bill providing the means to ascertain the title to the batture in front of the suburb St. Mary, in the city of New Orleans.

The question having recurred on the amendment of Mr. PITKIN, the said amendment was withdrawn by the mover.

The question was then taken on concurring with the Committee of the Whole in their first amendment to the said bill, and carried in the affirmative.

The question then recurred on concurring with the Committee of the Whole House in their second amendment to the said bill, amended in the House to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, at any time within one year, to make and execute such compromise with the parties, or any of them, who were removed from the said batture on the twenty-fifth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, by order of the President of the United States, and to procure a cession of their claims thereto, or to any part thereof, for the use of the public, or to any body politic or corporate, on such terms as may be agreed on with the said parties, and deemed advisable by the President, and to stipulate for a compensation, either in money or public lands, in the city of New Orleans, or its territories, as he may think proper."

Messrs. NELSON, SMILIE, HOLLAND, and BIBB, opposed the amendment; and Messrs. SHEFFEY, KEY, and LYON, supported it.

The question being taken, it was determined in the negative--yeas 62, nays 55.

MONDAY, April 9.

Apportionment of Representation.

Mr. FISK said he rose to offer a resolution, which he had for some time wished to present for the consideration of this House. It is to provide for fixing the apportionment of the Representatives of the several States according to the third census. The last ratio was one Representative for every thirty-three thousand souls; which, gave one hundred and forty-two members to this House--a number as large as may be considered necessary for the despatch of legislation, or to preserve the liberties of the people. It is estimated that the next census will give seven millions two hundred thousand souls, which, according to the present ratio of representation, would give to this House two hundred and eighteen members--a greater number than could be accommodated within these walls, and a greater body of men than could progress with the business of the House.

After the census shall be taken, the amount in each State ascertained, and the fractional numbers known, it will be much more difficult to fix the ratio than at this time. I therefore beg leave to submit the following resolution. And as it embraces a subject of great importance, I have no objection that it lay on the table a few days for the consideration of the members:

Resolved, That the apportionment of Representatives amongst the several States, according to the third enumeration of the people, ought to be in the ratio of one Representative for every forty-five thousand persons in each State, and that a committee be appointed to bring in a bill accordingly.

A motion was made that the resolution lie on the table.

A motion was also made to postpone it for a week.

Mr. PICKMAN moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolution indefinitely. He thought the question could be decided to much greater advantage in the two first months of the next session of Congress than in the two weeks remaining of the present session.

Mr. MACON was against indefinite postponement. Every one, on reflection, must be satisfied that it would be better to decide the ratio of apportionment now than after the result of the census was known. He thought the resolution had better have been in blank as to the ratio. The ratio might be settled either by fixing the number of Representatives of whom the House should consist after the next census, or by fixing the number of souls which should entitle a district to a Representative.

Mr. GOLD said, however desirable it might be at this time to fix the ratio, he doubted very much whether a decision would now settle the question. If a law were now to be passed, and there should be several large fractions on any given ratio, there would be a strong disposition to alter the ratio at the next session. He thought it would be expedient also to postpone the apportionment, because it might be affected by the proportion in which the population of the United States may have increased since the last census, which could not be ascertained till after the census.

Mr. QUINCY said he understood the object of the resolution to be to settle a principle before the facts were ascertained. Now it was his opinion that the House should know the facts first and settle the principle afterwards. Suppose the principle to be adopted--perhaps one or two States might be entitled to but one Representative, which, had the ratio been fixed at forty thousand, might have been entitled to two. This would appear to operate unjustly. The House must know the facts in order fairly to apportion representation. The apportionment ought to be made not merely in relation to population, but to the weight of the different States in the Union--and these considerations could not have their due weight till after the relative numbers were ascertained.

Mr. W. ALSTON was in favor of deciding on the subject at this session. He had no fear of difficulty resulting from fractions remaining unrepresented. It would be recollected that at the last apportionment, Delaware had a fraction of thirty-one thousand left, and Carolina twenty-nine thousand. The small States could not object to the course proposed; for if this question was postponed till after the census, and a particular ratio should appear to suit the returns of the three large States, they would support it and carry it too, notwithstanding the large fractions it might leave to smaller States. A disadvantage would therefore result to the small States from postponement rather than from a decision now.

Mr. FISK said there was one other reason why an apportionment should be made at this session, viz: that it would enable the State Legislatures at their ordinary winter sessions to divide the States into districts, and not subject them to the necessity of an extra session for the purpose.

Mr. LIVERMORE was against indefinite postponement, because he was inclined to the opinion that the subject ought to be acted on at this session, but wished the resolution to lie on the table a day or two. He said he was convinced, from his experience in the manner of doing business in this House, that it would take nearly the whole of the next session of Congress to make the apportionment, if it was postponed till after the census was taken. He had rather the resolution had been blank as to the ratio.

Mr. FISK modified his motion, so as to leave it blank as to the ratio.

Mr. BURWELL thought that the present was the proper time to fix the proportion; because, after the respective numbers of each State were received, it would be in the power of the larger States to fix the ratio as they pleased, and at present none of the State jealousies could be brought into action, which would, when the returns were actually made. To get over the difficulty said to exist in settling a principle before the facts were known, it was only necessary to say that so many members should compose the House. If the population was smaller than expected, there would still be the number deemed proper to constitute the House; and if it was larger there would be no great increase of members, to the detriment of public business. Mr. B. said he was fully impressed with the necessity of acting on the subject at the present session. If postponed till the result of the census was known, and the particular interest of each member of the House became implicated in the decision of it, there would be extreme difficulty in coming to a decision.

Mr. SMILIE said he could not conceive any objection to passing the resolution in its present shape. In this question there was an inconvenience on one side and evil on the other. It was an inconvenience that the House could not with precision ascertain the population of the United States; but, from the increase in times past, the increase for the last ten years might be estimated. The evil of postponement on the other hand was great. Mr. S. said he had been in Congress when the ratio of representation had been settled heretofore, and he had never seen a more difficult question--and it ended at last in a bargain between the members of the different States; and from these bargains no good could arise. He much preferred deciding on the subject at the present session.

Mr. RHEA of Tennessee was anxious that the subject should lie on the table a day or two, the more especially as there was such a disagreement of opinion as to the operation of the measure of fixing the ratio beforehand. Coming from a small State himself, he feared lest the principle should operate to the injury of the small States. He said he had been much surprised at the declaration of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that the question would be decided eventually (if postponed) by individual interest. If on such a question the House was to be governed by individual interests, what was the nation to expect from them? This suggestion was another reason in his mind for the resolution's lying on the table.

Mr. SMILIE had spoken of human nature as he found it, even in the gentleman from Tennessee as well as all others--a degree of self-concern always influenced individual conduct. Whoever had assisted at settling the representation of a State would conceive the difficulty of deciding these questions.

The motion for indefinite postponement was negatived, ayes 23. The motion to postpone to Monday shared the same fate, ayes 33. The motion to lie on the table was carried--53 to 41.

WEDNESDAY, April 11.

Colonel Washington.

Mr. RANDOLPH said that the House was already apprised of the death of Colonel William Washington, in whom our country had lost one of her most illustrious sons. It is very far from my intention, sir, said he, by any amplification of mine to lessen the impression of that merit which the bare mention of his name is calculated to make on the mind of every man who hears me. It is not the least unequivocal proof of that worth that it was not extinguished by the effulgence of his great kinsman's glory, with which it was daily brought into comparison. The reputation which can stand such an ordeal as this, is far beyond the praise or blame of an humble individual like me. If, to the proposition which I am about to offer, an objection should arise in the breast of any man who hears me on the score of the rank which that gentleman bore in the late American army, permit me to suggest that it is a testimony to valor and not to rank. It is not a mere respect to rank which I wish the House to pay. It is not in rank to add to the infamy of an Arnold, or to the glory of a WASHINGTON. I will, therefore, move the following resolution:

Resolved, That the members of this House do wear crape on the left arm during the remainder of the session, as a testimony of respect for the memory of William Washington, late a Lieutenant Colonel in the Revolutionary army.

Mr. SMILIE said he hoped there was no man who felt more respect or gratitude to those men who served their country during the Revolutionary war than he did, but this resolution appeared to be improper on several grounds. I agree, said Mr. S., with the gentleman from Virginia, that rank should have no effect on the opinions of the members of this House on such a subject as this. But, is it not singular that as to the many heroes who have served us during the Revolution, who have now gone to their long home, no notice has been taken of their merits by us, nor any step taken to confer upon them the honor now proposed to be conferred on this officer, whom I acknowledge to be meritorious? We have seen a Greene die, and certainly no man exceeded him in rank or merit, the General-in-chief excepted. We have seen a Wayne also die; and I do not recollect that such a tribute was proposed to any man who served us during the Revolution. Shall we, then, by passing this resolution, sanction an idea that Lieutenant-Colonel Washington was entitled to more respect than others? Would not the passage of this resolution be considered as an indirect censure on the other Revolutionary characters who have gone from us? When the other heroes fall that are still existing, we must, if we pass this resolution, pay the same respect to their merits, or suppose them to have been inferior. This would introduce into the Legislature invidious comparisons, and, instead of legislating, we shall be sitting as judges upon character. In every respect, I think the resolution objectionable.

The question was taken on the resolution without further debate, and passed in the negative--yeas 30.

THURSDAY, April 12.

The Convoy System.

Mr. EPPES said that, some time ago, a bill had been reported by him to the House, authorizing the President of the United States to employ the public armed vessels to convoy the lawful commerce of the United States. The motion to adjourn, which had been agreed to, would leave but a small portion of the time of the House for the discussion of the several subjects before them. As he was compelled by ill health to leave the city at an early day, having already obtained leave of absence, he was anxious to obtain a vote on this before he departed, and therefore asked to discharge the Committee of the Whole from the further consideration of the bill, in order to take the sense of the House whether it should go to a third reading or lie on the table for the present.

This motion was opposed by Messrs. MACON, TAYLOR, PICKMAN, RANDOLPH, LIVERMORE, and WILSON, on the ground of its being out of the usual course of proceedings; and it was objected to the more especially as this was a subject involving very important principles, and one which, of all others, ought to be discussed in Committee of the Whole.

Mr. EPPES expressed his willingness to take a silent vote on the subject, and thought a vote might be obtained on the bill without much debate.

Mr. JOHNSON expressed great anxiety to vote on the bill.

Mr. LIVERMORE intimated that he was strongly against the bill, and, if it took every hour in the session, he was determined to expose what he believed to be its injurious features.

On the question, Mr. EPPES' motion was negatived--yeas 50, nays 61, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jr., William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Adam Boyd, John Brown, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Howell Cobb, James Cox, William Crawford, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Meshack Franklin, David S. Garland, Thomas Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, James Holland, Benjamin Howard, Jacob Hufty, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Aaron Lyle, Samuel McKee, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Roger Nelson, John Porter, John Roane, Erastus Root, Ebenezer Sage, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, Dennis Smelt, George Smith, John Smith, Henry Southard, Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehall, Robert Witherspoon, and Richard Wynn.

NAYS.--William W. Bibb, Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, William Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, James Cochran, Richard Cutts, John Davenport, junior, William Ely, James Emott, Jonathan Fisk, Barzillai Gannett, Thos. R. Gold, William Hale, Daniel Heister, Jonathan H. Hubbard, Richard Jackson, jr., Robert Jenkins, William Kennedy, Herman Knickerbacker, Joseph Lewis, jun., Edward St. Loe Livermore, Matthew Lyon, Nathaniel Macon, Robt. Marion, Vincent Matthews, Archibald McBryde, Pleasant M. Miller, William Milnor, Thomas Moore, Jonathan O. Mosely, Joseph Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, jun., Timothy Pitkin, jun., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, Daniel Sheffey, John Smilie, Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, James Stephenson, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, John Taylor, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Jabez Upham, Nicholas Van Dyke, Archibald Van Horne, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, Ezekiel Whitman, and James Wilson.

FRIDAY, April 18.

Colonel Washington.

Mr. QUINCY rose to move a resolution. He said he very deeply regretted the situation in which this House had been placed in relation to the memory of that distinguished officer of the Revolution, General William Washington, in consequence of the resolution moved on the 11th instant. He thought that the impression exhibited on the journals was not such as either did justice to that individual or to the feelings of every member of the House. He hoped that to the resolution which he was about to offer, and which had for its object an explanation of the grounds on which he knew a majority of the House had voted, would not find an objection. It would take away the appearance that this House had not that deep sense of the merits and services of that officer which he knew they possessed. He then read the following resolution:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives are deeply sensible of the loss this nation has sustained in the death of General William Washington, late Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army of the Revolution, and that the rejection of the resolution offered on the 11th instant, in relation to that distinguished officer, having been produced wholly by considerations of a general nature, cannot be deemed to derogate from the high sense which this House, in common with their fellow-citizens, entertain of his civil and military virtues and services.

The House agreed to consider the resolution--58 to 13.

The resolution passed--ayes 63; about seventy-five members were present.

FRIDAY, April 20.

General Wilkinson.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following letter, which was read:

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1810.

SIR: After a tedious passage from New Orleans I arrived at Baltimore on the 16th instant, and reached this city the next day. My absence has been necessarily protracted by the selection of papers, from a mass of twenty years' accumulation, for the establishment of facts, to refute the multifarious and diversified calumnies by which I have been assailed.

I now present myself to the Representative body of the nation, the guardians of the public weal and the protectors of individual rights, to express my earnest desire that they may constitute some impartial tribunal, which may be governed with strictness by the principles of the constitution and the laws of evidence, to investigate the conduct of my whole life, civil and military, whereby justice may be done, and my unexampled persecution be terminated.

I aver my innocence of the foul offences which are imputed to me, and declare my ability to support it before any unprejudiced court. Through you, sir, I appeal to my country, and I claim that right which is not refused to the most profligate--the right of confronting my accusers. The Representatives of the people will not, I am persuaded, suffer a fellow-citizen who has been devoted to the public service more than twenty-five years, and has nothing left him but conscious fidelity and attachment to his native country, to sue in vain for justice.

The enclosed letter to the Secretary of War was written anterior to the receipt of my notification of recall from the command on the Mississippi, and will evince my readiness and my desire for a full investigation of my conduct.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Hon. J. B. VARNUM, Speaker, &c.

Naval Establishment.

Mr. RANDOLPH, from the committee to whom was referred the resolution respecting the reduction of the Naval Establishment, reported the following bill; which was twice read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole:

[Here follows the Bill.]

MONDAY, April 23.

Loan Bill.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill authorizing a loan for a sum of money not exceeding the amount of the principal of the public debt reimbursable during the year 1810.

[In the discussion which took place on this bill, there was no objection to the principle of it. Every gentleman who spoke assented to the propriety of placing at the disposal of the Government a sum of money fully adequate to meet the appropriations authorized by law for the present year.]

Mr. DANA wished to ascertain the precise amount of the principal of the debt reimbursable during the year 1810, with a view to inserting the sum in the body of the bill.

Some difference of opinion appeared to exist as to the exact amount of principal reimbursable. The sum annually applicable to the payment of the public debt is eight millions of dollars. The sum left, after paying the interest of it for the year, is annually applicable to the extinguishment of the principal. The exact amount of interest payable on the public debt during this year not being known, there was a difficulty in ascertaining the exact amount of principal reimbursable.

The sum of $4,800,000 was mentioned.

Mr. DANA moved to amend the bill so as to authorize a loan "not exceeding $4,800,000, being the amount of the principal reimbursable," &c. This motion was supported by the mover, and Messrs. GOLD, SHEFFEY, QUINCY, UPHAM, TALLMADGE, and PICKMAN, and opposed by Messrs. BACON, W. ALSTON, and MONTGOMERY.

The arguments in favor of the motion were, generally, that it was improper to attempt to disguise any thing by giving to it a specious name; that borrowing money should not be called paying the public debt; that all authority given to borrow money should be express and specific as to the sum. It was said in reply, that there could be no objection that the truth should appear on the face of a bill; that this sum not being wanted to defray the ordinary expenses of the Government, but to pay debts heretofore contracted, the phraseology was perfectly correct; that it was as specific in fact as if expressed in so many figures.

Mr. DANA varied his motion, after debate, on account of the uncertainty which appeared to exist as to the sum reimbursable, and of course as to the sum to be loaned. He moved to amend the bill so as to give authority to borrow a sum of money "not exceeding four millions of dollars."

This motion was supported and opposed by the same gentlemen who debated the former motion. In support of the motion it was said, that this sum was all that the Secretary of the Treasury had asked for, and was therefore as much as ought to be given. The advocates of the amendment also said that they were averse to legislating blindfold, to voting millions without knowing for what, or to surrendering up their judgments to Executive discretion, under an idea that the President would not borrow more than was necessary.

In reply it was said, that since the Secretary of the Treasury had made the estimate in question, other expenses had been incurred; that it was impossible to tell the precise amount which was wanted until Congress should adjourn, as it was impossible to tell on one day what appropriations they would make the next day; that, if not necessary, the authority to borrow would not be used; as in the case of the loan authorized at the last session of Congress, not a cent of which had been actually borrowed. That law had granted an authority nearly similar to this in nearly the same language.

Mr. DANA'S motion was negatived--52 to 29.

Mr. QUINCY observed that he felt but one difficulty on this subject. He could not agree to borrow an amount greater than the Secretary of the Treasury had said was necessary. He, therefore, moved to amend the bill by adding to it the following proviso:

"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to authorize any sum to be borrowed greater than four millions of dollars."

The motion was lost--ayes 28.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

TUESDAY, April 24.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House in Committee of the Whole on the bill to reduce the Naval Establishment of the United States.

The bill having been read--

Mr. MCKIM moved to amend that part of the bill which directs the sale of all the gunboats, by adding the following words: "belonging to the United States, unfit for service, and unworthy of repairs."

This motion was agreed to without debate, ayes 56.

Mr. KEY said he was friendly to the reduction of the Navy, but not to its annihilation. He therefore moved to strike out so much of the bill as provides that all the frigates but three shall be "sold," and to insert in lieu thereof, "laid up in ordinary."

Messrs. DANA and MUMFORD supported the motion.

Mr. RHEA of Tennessee made a motion, which superseded that made by Mr. KEY, to strike out the whole of the section, except so much as related to gunboats. He was wholly opposed to the reduction of the Navy at present.

Mr. SMILIE said he should vote for the motion with a view to inserting a substitute going to place the Navy now on the footing of the Peace Establishment of 1806.

Mr. DANA was in favor of Mr. RHEA'S motion, but expressed himself very pointedly in favor of a reform in the expenditures and conduct of the Naval Establishment generally.

Mr. BASSETT also was in favor of Mr. RHEA'S motion. He supported the policy of a small navy, and vindicated the establishment generally from charges of waste or extravagance, though he was friendly to reform wherever necessary. Mr. B. spoke nearly an hour.

Mr. COOK and Mr. RHEA of Tennessee also spoke in favor of the motion to strike out the whole of the first section.

Mr. MACON spoke against the motion, and against the policy of a navy as applicable to the situation of this country.

Mr. STANFORD followed Mr. MACON on the same side of the question, and particularly reprobated the extravagant expenditure of money incident to the naval system.

Mr. DANA spoke again on the subject of reform in the system.

Mr. MACON and Mr. STANFORD explained.

Mr. BOYD was against the reduction of the Navy under present appearances.

The motion to strike out the remainder of the section was carried, 61 to 25.

Mr. SMILIE moved to insert, in the place of that part which was stricken out, the following:

"And further, that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to keep in actual service as many of the frigates and other armed vessels as in his judgment the nature of the service may require, and to cause the residue to be laid up in ordinary in convenient ports: Provided, the whole number of officers and seamen shall not exceed that fixed by the act 'in addition to the act, supplementary to the act, providing for the Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes;' passed the 21st day of April, 1806."

Mr. S. read the law alluded to in this amendment, which would go to retain in service thirteen captains, nine masters commandant, seventy-two lieutenants, one hundred and fifty midshipmen, and nine hundred and twenty-five able-bodied seamen, ordinary seamen and boys.

Mr. MCKIM opposed the amendment, because he was altogether opposed to a reduction of the Navy in the present state of the world.

Mr. SMILIE replied. He said he had no apprehension of danger to his country from laying up a few frigates.

Mr. BASSETT stated that the whole number of seamen now in service, was but two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three. If the number was reduced, the expense of reducing and re-enlisting them within a short period, would exceed the expense of keeping them in service during the interval.

Mr. MONTGOMERY spoke in favor of the amendment, under the impression that there was no disposition in Congress to make use of the Navy. Although the number of seamen in service might not exceed two thousand seven hundred and twenty, as stated, yet the President now had power to authorize the employment of five thousand four hundred and ninety men. The adoption of the amendment, he said, would curtail the present annual expense, $778,000.

Mr. MUMFORD spoke against the amendment. He remarked that the counting-house calculation of pounds, shillings, and pence, heretofore imputed as a fault to the merchants, seemed to have been transferred to the planters of cotton and tobacco. He did not regard a little expense when put in competition with the national safety.

Mr. SMILIE'S amendment was negatived.

The section for disusing all the navy-yards except those at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, having been read--

Mr. KEY moved to insert "Washington" after New York, and, speaking in support of his motion, expatiated on the advantages possessed by a navy-yard at the seat of Government.

Mr. BASSETT concurred with Mr. KEY in opinion; but, as he presumed the section was only meant as an accompaniment to that part of the bill already stricken out, he moved to strike out the whole section.

Mr. DANA opposed the amendment. Six navy-yards were certainly not necessary for the service of the United States, and he particularly opposed the retention of the yard at Washington.

Mr. KEY spoke in reply to Mr. DANA, and in support of Mr. BASSETT'S motion. He defended the navy-yard at Washington against the imputations cast on it.

Messrs. TALLMADGE and DANA spoke against the amendment.

Mr. SMILIE spoke in favor of the amendment, and expressed his astonishment at the change which appeared to have taken place in the House since they had voted, 60 to 31, a few days ago, to reduce the Navy.

Mr. KEY expressed his surprise that a gentleman having as much parliamentary experience as the gentleman who preceded him, should be surprised at the change of votes. A majority had voted to reduce, having different objects of reduction in view; but, when a reduction in any one branch of expenditure was proposed, it appeared that a majority could not agree in it. Mr. K. spoke again in favor of the amendment.

The motion to strike out the section was lost, 52 to 40.

Mr. KEY renewed his motion to insert "Washington."

Mr. RANDOLPH opposed the motion on the ground of the unfitness of the situation of Washington, compared with others, for a navy-yard.

Mr. MACON supported the motion; because he was utterly opposed to a navy, he said he wished that a navy-yard should be kept here, as members of Congress would be much sooner disgusted by seeing the expenditures of the Navy system, than by hearing of them.

Mr. DANA, as a friend to a navy, said he wished the amendment not to prevail. The gentleman from North Carolina, an enemy to navies, wished to retain the yard at this place; he, Mr. D., a friend to them generally, wished to dispose of or disuse it. They therefore thought alike, though they should vote differently.

The motion to insert "Washington" was carried--54 to 42.

The section for reducing the marines was struck out, without debate--ayes 59.

The committee rose, and reported the bill as amended.

The SPEAKER resumed the Chair, and the House resolved now to consider the report of the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. MILNOR said the bill had been much amended in committee, and as the remnant left amounted to very little, and the discussion of that little would probably cost more than would be saved by passing it into a law, he moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject indefinitely.

WEDNESDAY, April 25.

Loan Bill.

The engrossed bill authorizing a loan for a sum of money, not exceeding the amount of the principal of the public debt, reimbursable during the year 1810, was read a third time.

All the gentlemen who spoke against the bill professed to be willing in a proper manner to authorize a loan of any sum of money necessary to meet the appropriations made; but they contended that the bill was objectionable because the sum was not stated in the face of the bill, because the bill bore a deceptive appearance of borrowing money to pay the public debt, when, in fact, it was to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government; because the bill authorized a loan of five millions five hundred and sixty thousand dollars, more by one million one hundred and sixty thousand dollars than the Secretary of the Treasury had declared to be necessary, and because no loan ought to be authorized until bills now before the House were decided on, which involved a reduction of the annual expenditure.

In reply to the objections to this bill, it was urged that the amount authorized (not required) to be borrowed was as definitely expressed as though in figures; that there could be no deception on the face of the bill, for, if no debt heretofore contracted was now to be paid off, there would not only be no occasion to borrow, but there would be an immense annual surplus in the Treasury; that, since the estimate of four millions had been reported to the House, various appropriations had been made, and it was impossible yet to say how much might be wanted, and no more would be borrowed than actually was wanted; that if the passage of the bill was delayed but a day or two, it would be very easy for gentlemen to prevent its passage at all.

The bill was passed--yeas 77, nays 35.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House then resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday.

Mr. MILNOR said when he had made the motion for the indefinite postponement of the bill, he had supposed that the sense of the House had been fully expressed on it; but as it appeared that the motion would occupy much time in debate, and as some gentlemen had thought proper to insinuate that the motion was made for the purpose of avoiding meeting a direct question on the bill, he now rose to withdraw the motion.

The question was then stated on the first amendment made in Committee of the Whole, viz: to strike out so much as requires the sale of all the gunboats.

Mr. MUMFORD hoped that the frigates would not be laid up in ordinary. He said he was no politician by profession; he had been called from mercantile pursuits against his inclination, but he had always understood that government was instituted for the protection of the citizen. He was chagrined when he saw the events unfolding in the Old World, and witnessed such a paralyzing system going on in his own country. He had hoped that some system would have been adopted for the protection of our commerce at sea. If gentlemen were determined to abandon the ocean altogether, he begged to know it in time before merchants were totally ruined, for it was impossible at present to carry on any commerce whatever. The part of the country which he represented (city of New York) felt it strongly; agriculture would feel it sooner or later. The enormous captures made of their property had reduced merchants to the alternative of staying at home, or having no commerce but with Great Britain. If gentlemen are disposed to surrender commerce to the discretion of the belligerents and retire from the ocean, it is time to know it. Mr. M. said he was no motive-monger; he never arraigned gentlemen for their motives. We have heard gentlemen say, "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute;" and a noble and popular sentiment it was. It seemed now to be reversed with them, and a plain translation of their speeches was, "millions for tribute; not a cent for defence." Various projects had been offered. Some gentlemen were for putting down the whole Army and Navy; others were for a sort of snail system, alarmed at the least apprehension of danger. Viewing the subject as he did, Mr. M. entreated that gentlemen would consent to protect commerce. The island of St. Domingo now possessed seventeen armed vessels. They were gaining strength daily, and what was the situation of our Southern borders? If our naval force was entirely withdrawn from the ocean, it was impossible for an army of militia to defend the mouth of the Chesapeake. He understood that two vessels were now building in Chesapeake Bay for St. Domingo. He knew that the Haytian agents had been in this country for the purpose of purchasing vessels. Under all these circumstances was it wise and prudent to discharge the Navy? He presumed the best course would be to put to sea what little navy we have to protect our own coasters, for they would be necessary without any view to commerce in the European seas. Under every view, instead of laying up those vessels in service, Mr. M. said he hoped that gentlemen would consent to fit out every vessel in the possession of the United States, and send them out to protect American commerce.

A motion having been made by Mr. SMILIE to amend the bill so as to place the Navy on the footing on which it stood in 1806--

Mr. DANA said he was not for pausing with merely replacing the former system; he was also for guarding against the waste of public property and treasure which had taken place in the Naval Establishment. He believed that for the number of fighting men afloat the United States had been put to a much greater expense than was necessary. He was not speaking, he said, of our having few brave men on the water, nor of the great sums given anywhere to those who give us their blood; but the system of the navy-yards, he believed, required a thorough reform. If he was to judge of the general economy on board the frigates and smaller vessels from the little he had seen of them, he must set it down for certain that waste did not exist on board the vessels after they were fitted for service, and manned, and officered. As far as he had an opportunity to observe, he had marked a strong sense of subordination, and the practice of command at the same time sustained with gentleman-like propriety, without any unnecessary torture or rigor. In all this business, Mr. D. said, where you employ warriors, whether by land or water, that department called the staff, the agents, purveyors of supplies, &c., is the branch of the service to which you most look for waste. On merely casting the eye along the decks of our vessels, the conduct of the officers, and the manner in which the men behaved, indicated a sort of conduct which appeared to him incompatible with waste, laxity of discipline, or want of attention to duty. Generally speaking, the civil branch of the service was the reverse of this. Mr. D. adverted to the mode of equipping vessels, and reprobated the scrambling, which he had understood often took place for equipments, as incompatible with methodical arrangement, and correct distribution of supplies. It was wasteful and inconsistent with regular accountability. It was not the course pursued in the navy-yards of other nations. The commander of a man of war in other countries was not permitted to go into a navy-yard; he could not there claim to have every thing new on board his vessel. When every man was suffered to manage as he would, there was no security for the economical conduct of an establishment; for the more anxious was each commander to have his own vessel exclusively well equipped, the more would the public suffer. He was, therefore, for adopting some system of rigorous retrenchment--what it should be he did not know. In the nature of the thing he was confident it could be done; without it there must be much waste. At present, therefore, he was against striking out the frigates from the Naval Establishment. A reform in the expense was the great desideratum, not the abolition of the Navy.

Mr. D. said he would submit to the House one consideration: the appearance which the passage of such a bill would present to the world after the resolutions passed at the commencement of the present session. For his own part, indeed, he had deemed it useless to make declarations of national independence, or to resolve against submission; but at the commencement of the session a resolution had been passed respecting what had taken place between Executive and the British Minister, and then Congress had pledged themselves to call forth the whole force of the nation to stand by and support the President. He had supposed this unnecessary, improper, and exceptionable in some respects. But at the same session, when the controversy was chiefly respecting maritime privileges, if they should not only reduce but sell the Navy, what would the world say, when they had seen the beginning and end of the session? Would it be possible that foreign powers could look up with any reverence to their acts? We shall, said he, be reduced to such a situation that even the apprehension of our hatred could not insure respect from foreign Governments, if we suffer our conduct to be so completely at war with our own acts. In order to possess some appearance of respectability in the estimation of others, the most expedient course would be to establish economy and provide for a less profuse distribution of the public moneys, but to retain the public armed vessels, that we may be in the condition for effectual service whenever it is deemed expedient. By this course we may save more of property as well as character than by an abolition of the Navy; and if we save both it is better than to save the one and lose the other.

In allusion to a remark of Mr. MUMFORD against the bill, Mr. D. said that in regard to what was formerly said respecting millions for defence and not a cent for tribute, that doctrine was a very good one, but it had no connection with crawling within ourselves in time of danger--with the terrapin policy--with drawing in head and claws so that no part of the body should be exposed; and those who were for that course, (because really they had not provided any shell,) could not very well appeal for their justification to the doctrine of "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute," and yet he believed that the gentleman from New York himself had voted for that system of terrapin defence. Although, said Mr. D., I was against that thing, yet there were men distinguished for talents and worth, and who are eminent in the councils of their country, who entertained sentiments widely different. This policy was borrowed from the colonial system; we did not assume the spirit of a nation, perhaps; we recollected what we had done before when we were colonies, and perhaps gentlemen thought the efforts of children might succeed when they had attained to manhood. It was a delusion. If gentlemen, however, now see through their error, their desire to correct it ought not to be condemned.

Mr. BASSETT was of opinion with Mr. D. that reform rather than reduction of the Naval Establishment ought to be their object. He was glad to find that when the Navy was brought into view, other ideas than those of mere commerce began to be associated with it. Heretofore it had only been advocated as a means for the protection of commerce. Mr. B. said he lived in a district which was sensibly alive to the benefits of a navy. The district which he represented had within it more water than land. It therefore became essential to the defence of his constituents that they should have a floating protection. It was impossible, in the nature of things, that they could be defended but by a floating defence. Surely there could be no gentleman in the House who was not sensible of the necessity of protection! It might be a favorite point in a monarchy to keep the country unprotected, and thus under the control of the Government, but the motto of Republics should be universal justice, equal rights, and common defence. He asked gentlemen to look at the magnitude of the object of defending our seacoasts, which could not be less than three thousand miles in extent, and, taking into consideration the sides of our navigable rivers, that extent would be doubled. If gentlemen would but for a moment consider the immense space which was exposed, they would see all the importance of securing an adequate defence. The House had been told, and certainly very truly, that there was a maritime force rising in our neighborhood. The House had been told, also, and told correctly, too, that at least two large vessels were building in their own waters for the use of that growing maritime power. At the very moment, said Mr. B., that we know that the blacks of St. Domingo are building vessels, shall we dispose of Our public armed vessels? Let me ask who will buy them when put into the market? Who but Christophe and Petion? It is reduced to a certainty that if we put them now to the hammer, they must go in that direction. I ask gentlemen seriously to weigh that consideration.

The situation of our Navy is at present sufficiently reduced. We have only five frigates in actual service. The Chesapeake, for want of repairs, is now in harbor. If gentlemen are anxious that she should be laid up in ordinary, I would accord in it; but I would prefer to leave this subject entirely to the discretion of the Executive. I know, sir, how apt a proposition of this sort is to be met by a suggestion of Presidential confidence; but when we come to consider our particular situation, that we are putting it into the power of the President, not to add to the burdens of the people, but to relieve them, that will be thought a sound argument to justify the course of leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the President. The wisdom of the last and of the present Congress has kept in service five frigates. We cannot remain in session at all times; and we are at this moment, extremely doubtful as to the aspect our affairs will assume as to foreign nations. I would ask gentlemen if former experience does not warn us that if we have an accommodation with one belligerent, it will but lead to a wider breach with the other? But if this occurrence does not take place, and every thing should turn out happily, my proposition would leave it in the power of the Executive to secure the public against loss. The expense is not drawn upon us by the Executive, but it is such as the wisdom of the National Legislature has thought proper to incur. Therefore I think it fair to consider the subject in this way. As we are about to separate, and as present appearances would not warrant our giving up any species of protection, we shall be justified in giving a discretionary power to the Executive to put down such part of the Naval Establishment as he may in future think it justifiable to part with.

I am not one of those who think the expense of the Navy a sufficient argument for disposing of it altogether. I have been asked what has the Navy done. I can answer for a large portion of my constituents, that it has kept them quiet in mind. Is it not important that the men who live on the seaboard should know that we have a force to repel attack? What sort of attack have we cause to expect? A serious invasion? Certainly not. The sort of attack which we ought to guard against is the predatory attack, made at small expense, to our great injury. If we do away the naval system entirely, our whole seacoast will be liable to be ravaged. A single frigate, a single privateer, a single pirate, might come into your waters and injure your citizens to a considerable amount. It has been mentioned, and I have seen an official intimation of it, that two or three vessels, in the shape of pirates, had stopped vessels at the mouth of the Mississippi. The force now embodied on the ocean is not more than adequate to the security of the nation against predatory warfare. I am willing, notwithstanding this, to leave it to the Executive discretion to lessen the burden.

I regret much that at this period of the session we cannot go into an examination of the expenditures the gentleman from Connecticut complains of. I think it proper to observe that for one I shall be willing to receive his assistance in detecting abuses. I believe the gentleman at present at the head of the Navy Department has every disposition to correct them. But at the same time that is not sufficient for us. I do not know of any unnecessary expenses, or I should bring them to public view; I do believe there is not that want of system which the gentleman seems to suppose. This much I know, that at all the navy-yards are proper officers for distributing stores. There all the rigging, ropes, &c., &c., are kept apart, and, as far as a landsman, a lubber like myself, can judge, appear in great order.

In relation to the smaller vessels it appears by the report of the Secretary of the Navy that they are in perfect repair. The expense of sailing them is the only expense. I cannot but again repeat, because I think it of the last importance, that the security which these small vessels gives us greatly outweighs all disadvantages of expense. If we can lessen the expense, let us do it, in the hope that at another session we shall be able to find out where the evil exists. It is generally said, when this subject is under consideration, that we cannot attempt to cope with Great Britain. Because we cannot, are we to succumb to others? To provide no protection against smaller powers? At this moment the master of an American merchant vessel is employed in the service of the Emperor of China, a country possessing the greatest population in the world, for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the Emperor against some small pirates. Is there a fact can speak more strongly to us, that, without some sort of naval defence, with such a seacoast as we have, (and let it be recollected, sir, that our seacoast is much greater in proportion to our population than the Chinese,) we shall be at the mercy of the worst of the human race?

It was asked what mighty good the Navy has done. Let me ask the gentleman who asked that question, what mighty good our Army has done by land? When we consider the point of expense, let us consider the evils of different sorts. Let me ask gentlemen if the evils depicted to exist in Peru, where gold abounds, do not equal any thing they can imagine to proceed from the want of money? We must forget the evils that force produces in the necessity which exists for having it. We cannot say, because some evil results from force, that we will not have it; for, if you have it not, others will. Our own experience should teach us the necessity of it. What was the effect of our eloquent addresses, when colonies, placed at the foot of the British throne? They (the British) sent a fleet and army to Boston. They did not tell you power was right; but they said it with their fleet and army. Reason will tell us the same now; it is impossible to meet force but by force. The effects of naval force are well remembered. It is well recollected that in the Revolution Cornwallis marched from Charleston to Virginia. When he got there, a French fleet was on the coast. The very moment the fleet advanced by water, Cornwallis surrendered. Here was evidence of the effect of naval force. And it is by its efficiency that we must balance the great objection of expense. I have heard it stated here how much more expense a sailor is than a soldier. If we look to the fact, and contrast the efficiency of the two, we shall find that the superior efficiency of the sailor greatly outweighs the additional expense. There is one fact, very strongly illustrative of this principle, drawn from British history. It is found, by the papers laid before Parliament, that the present naval establishment costs seventeen millions annually. The expense of the army is nearly the same. With seventeen millions of water force, the navy of Great Britain makes her mistress of the ocean; with seventeen millions, the land force of Great Britain is contemptible. As concerns ourselves, all the attack we can expect to receive is on the ocean or on the seacoast, and we can by this fact see demonstrably that we can procure more protection for a certain number of dollars expended on the water than we can from the same number of dollars expended on the land. History shows that Republics are always naval powers; and navies have preserved their existence. The history of England, instead of destroying this argument, is in favor of it; the celebrated exploits of the Dutch confirm it. England, though a monarchy, is the freest in Europe, and all nations have enjoyed the greatest naval celebrity when they have been most free. A navy has no great general at the head of it, wielding an immense body of armed men. The commanders of ships have a very different influence. The admiral himself cannot act on the land. History does not show an instance where an attack was made on the liberty of a nation from that quarter. I am therefore disposed to give my feeble aid to support an efficient force upon the water rather than upon the land; and I believe the present establishment is by no means beyond what ought to exist.

Mr. RANDOLPH said, that as his objections to the Navy went to the whole system, he would make his observations at large, in preference to reserving them in detached parts on the various details of the bill. My object, said Mr. R., is to endeavor to persuade the House that they ought not to concur in the report of the Committee of the whole House. I have ever believed that the people of the United States were destined to become, at some period or other, a great naval power. The unerring indications of that fact were presented to us in a tonnage and number of seamen exceeding those of any other nation in the world, one only excepted. When, therefore, I proposed to reduce the Naval Establishment of the United States, it was not for the pitiful object of putting down some five or seven gunboats and two or three unimportant navy-yards, or of making the mighty reduction contemplated in the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. In other words, it was for the purpose of making barely such a retrenchment in the naval expenditure as might enable Government, after such retrenchment was effected, to go on with the aid of loans and taxes. We had two views of the probable state of the nation presented to us during this session. The first was a view of war, in which case it was agreed on all hands that loans and taxes would be necessary; the next was a view of peace, in which case it was believed that loans and taxes were unnecessary, and was so pronounced from the highest authority in the country on financial concerns. But now it seems to have a view of reduced military and naval expenditure which does not obviate the necessity of loans and taxes. My object in the proposed reduction was not to enable the Government to get on with the aid of loans and taxes, but to make such a reduction as would have enabled the Government to dispense with a recurrence to them.

I have said, sir, that the United States were, in my opinion, destined to become a great naval power; and I have read unerring indications of it in the commercial prosperity of our country, out of which alone it can grow. But I believe, if any thing could retard or eventually destroy it--if any thing could strangle in the cradle the infant Hercules of the American Navy--it would be the very injudicious mode in which that power has been attempted to be prematurely brought into action, and kept in action, during the two last administrations. Again, a naval power necessarily grows out of tonnage and seamen. We have not only driven away our tonnage, but have exerted ourselves with no little zeal, even at this very session, to prevent its ever coming back. We have not been willing to consent that vessels polluted by the unpardonable sin of a breach of the embargo should return. True it is, that we have not made the same provision in relation to seamen: we have conceived the guilt rather to reside in the wood or iron, than in the men who conducted it. But, although we have no provision for the express purpose that they should not return, unfortunately they have not returned; and the proof of this fact is evinced by another, viz: that landsmen are at this moment employed on board our few ships of war, because seamen cannot be procured. Our tonnage and seamen, then--the sinews of naval power--are wounded by our own measures, to a considerable degree. Again: it has always been understood, according to my view of the subject, that one of the principal uses of a navy was to protect commerce; but our political rule for some time past has been that of inverse proportion, and we have discovered that commerce is the natural protector of a navy. The proof of this is found, if not in every act of this House, certainly in most of the speeches delivered on this floor. I need only allude to a speech made by a colleague of mine, (Mr. GHOLSON,) who usually sits on my right hand, a few days ago, in which he stated that the power to regulate commerce was specially given by the constitution to the United States--not as a means of raising revenue, equalizing duties throughout the United States, and making all in fact one family--but, that it was put into the hands of Congress as a scorpion-whip to bring the other nations of the world to our terms; that, by turning away the light of our countenance--the sunshine of our commercial bounty--they might wither and decay.

I had always thought too, sir, that the revenue which a Naval Establishment naturally calls for was to be founded on commercial greatness; in other words, that commerce was to give us revenue, and revenue was to support a navy, which in return was to protect commerce. But, it seems we have changed all this--we have perverted the whole course of procedure--and why? Sir, shall we keep up an expensive Naval Establishment, necessarily driving us into loans and taxes, for the protection of a commerce which the Government itself says we shall not carry on; and when members of this House tell us that the natural protection of commerce is the annihilation of it? The Navy has now become a sort of fifth wheel to the political coach, and I am unwilling to keep it up, at this expense, on these grounds.

If, sir, the construction which I have taken of the sense of the House and of the Government be not correct, whence comes it that we have such cases before us as that of Daniel Buck? Whence comes it that we hear of Treasury instructions, not issued in the first instance for the purpose of expounding a law touching the clearances of vessels, that uniformity may prevail in the different districts, but supplementary instructions, becoming in practice the actual law of the land? In other words, if my construction be not correct, whence comes it that every principle formerly called federal--every principle of Executive energy and power--has been strained of late to an extent heretofore unparalleled? Whence comes it, that in the archives of this Assembly, we find copies of licenses given by the Executive power of the nation--to do what? To permit one part of this confederacy to supply another part with bread! We have had Executive licenses, graciously permitting that a portion of our citizens should not starve while the rest were revelling in plenty, and suffering for want of a market! Let us suppose, that in the fragments of history of the ancient nations of the earth, of those periods which are most involved in obscurity, we should find an Imperial rescript to this effect, what would be the inevitable conclusion of the historian? That, if the Chief Magistrate of the Government could at pleasure starve one part of the people while another was rioting in plenty, that the individual who held this power was the greatest despot on earth, and the Government a purely unmixed despotism. But, sir, it would be improper to draw any such conclusion here, because we are the most enlightened people on earth--I believe we have placed that on record. It was nothing but the protection of the Navy of the United States, and a desire of avenging the attack on the Chesapeake--for, among all the causes of the embargo, we hear of none oftener than the attack on the Chesapeake;--it was nothing but a defence, not only of the commercial interests, but of the naval strength of the nation, which created this dictatorship in the person of the Chief Magistrate. It was not that we are naturally more prone to slavery than others, but it was for the preservation of our national defence, (if that be not positively opposed to national defence which costs four millions, and which, when Greek meets Greek, and the tug of war comes, must take refuge under such measures as those I have mentioned.) No, sir; my object in the bill which I presented to the House was a great one: it was to enable us to dispense with a loan to the acknowledged amount of $5,150,000--to enable us to dispense with taxation, to an amount which no man can calculate, (if, indeed, the system which passed this House was constructed to bring in revenue at all). It was not a little, paltry affair of reducing a couple of navy-yards; not to bury the dead, who have been already interred in the marshes of the Mississippi; not twice to slay the slain: it was for a great public object. Really, sir, the reduction of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) reminds me very forcibly of an incident which is said to have taken place at the discovery of the gunpowder plot. When commissioners were sent into the Parliament vaults, to examine into the situation of the gunpowder and combustibles collected together for the purpose of blowing up the King, the Parliament, and the whole constitution, they returned and reported that they had found fifty barrels of gunpowder; that they had removed five-and-twenty barrels, and humbly trusted that the remaining five-and-twenty would do no harm! This is precisely the reduction which the committee and the gentleman from Pennsylvania have agreed to make. It is a reduction which will not do any effectual service, and I therefore hope the House will not accord in it.

But, we are told that great and gigantic events in Europe are to be arrested. That which the British navy cannot do, I suppose, or that which the combined Continental forces opposed to her cannot effect, is to be decided here by three frigates; for that is precisely the extent to which, if I understand him, he is willing to go. It seems, we are also to suffer a total loss of the ships to be sold, they being unfit for every other purpose. Are they unfit for the East India trade? Was not the first vessel which ever doubled the Cape of Good Hope, under the flag of the United States, the old frigate Alliance? And would not these vessels, if sold, be purchased for that and for other purposes; more especially when we consider the immense loss of tonnage which the United States have sustained--I will not say how, but when--within the last two years? But this, if well founded, would be no objection with me to the reduction of the Navy. I am willing to put a clause in the bill to authorize the President to give the frigates away, if he cannot sell them. My objection to the expense is not merely to pounds, shillings, and pence--not merely to the counting-house calculation--but to expenses utterly incommensurate to the object to which those expenses profess to go, and to a system of organized public plunder. If we agree to make this reduction, however, according to the statement of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BASSETT,) foreigners will purchase from us ships of the best construction in the world, on the best terms. I believe, if the gentleman's knowledge on the state of our public ships was as accurate as perhaps it is on other subjects, he would hardly suspect foreigners of coming to our markets for the purpose of buying those ships to annoy our commerce. Who will become the purchasers--Great Britain? After having given her hundreds of thousands of tons of your shipping now sailing under the British flag, and manned her navy with your seamen driven from your employment, do you believe the Admiralty will send across the Atlantic to buy the hulks rotting at the navy-yard; or would it be a formidable accession to the British navy, especially when four of these vessels are absolutely unfit for any purpose whatever? I presume that even the Emperor of France, if it were an object with him to have these famous models of naval architecture at Antwerp, would hardly venture to purchase them, and run the risk of getting them across the ocean. I conceive you could hardly get insurance done on them at Philadelphia or Baltimore. The idea of keeping these vessels is absolutely idle, unless gentlemen are disposed to send their commerce on the ocean, and employ force in the protection of it.

Sir, I am extremely exhausted already--and I presume the House are fully as fatigued with me as I am with myself--but I will endeavor to go along with my loose remarks. The panegyric which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) has been pleased to bestow on the American naval officers, I have not the least indisposition to subscribe to, so far as my knowledge will permit me to go. As far as my information extends--as far as I have the pleasure, and I may add the honor, of being acquainted with those gentlemen--there is no class in society whom I think more highly deserving. And I did hope, when the gentleman went into this eulogium on the one hand, and inference at least of censure on that which he has been pleased to term "The Staff of the Navy"--but which I suppose I may as well call the civil branch, who have the control and management of the civil service; not the men who fight the battles, but who pocket the greatest part of the emolument--that he would have been more particular. Sir, I do know that comparisons are extremely unpleasant, and no consideration would induce me to go into them, especially after the observation of my friend before me, (Mr. MACON,) but the discharge of an imperious public duty. I can have no hopes of deriving any thing further than experience from the past Administrations. It is to make use of this experience that I call the attention of the House to the comparative expenses of the Navy under the several Administrations.

I find, from the Treasury statement in my hand, made on the 5th of this month, that the Navy under General Washington's administration, cost $1,100,000; that during the four years of Mr. Adams's administration, it cost $9,700,000, in round numbers; that, in the eight years of the succeeding Administration, it cost $12,700,000. I make these remarks, because the statement differs from that made by the worthy gentleman from Connecticut in this respect; that, when he made the expenditure under the last Administration to amount to fourteen millions, he did, in my opinion, improperly saddle that Administration with the expenditure of the year 1801, viz: $2,111,424, authorized and voted under Mr. Adams's administration. From the mere glance at this paper it will be seen, that from 1801 to 1802, the expenditure fell from the above sum of $2,000,000, to $900,000, marking distinctly the retrenchment at the period of Mr. Jefferson's accession. The first year properly chargeable to the last Administration is that succeeding the one in which they came into office, viz: 1802. I find, also, from a comparison of the statements in the same document, that the most extravagant year of the second Administration was the year 1800--the year after I first had the honor of a seat in this House--when the expenditure amounted to $3,448,716. The most extravagant year of the last Administration was the year succeeding its going out of office, the expenses of which were incurred and voted by it, viz: to the amount of $2,427,758.

Against the administration of Mr. Adams, I, in common with many others, did and do yet entertain a sentiment of hostility, and have repeatedly cried out against it for extravagance, and for profusion, and for waste--wanton waste--of the public resources. I find, however, upon consideration--whether from the nature of man, or from the nature of things, or from whatever other cause--that that Administration, grossly extravagant as I did then and still do believe it to have been, if tried by the criterion of the succeeding one, was a pattern of retrenchment and economy; and I ask the House to put the question to themselves, whether we are likely to see, at any future period, an Administration more economical than that of which we have just now taken leave? And this I say, without meaning to cast the slightest imputation on the present. The person now at the head of affairs, has, at least in one respect, conducted himself in his high office in a spirit dear to my heart--it is the spirit of a gentleman. The first session of Congress under the last Administration was a period of retrenchment. Throw the session of last summer out of the question, and this must be the session of reform under the present. Have we any reason to conclude, from what we have seen or heard, that we can look forward to any policy more economical than that of the Administration of which we have just taken leave? I wish it to be clearly understood, that in the year 1800, in which our expenses amounted to $3,448,060, we had three 44-gun frigates; six frigates, from 44 to 32; two of 32, of a large size; four of 32, smaller; eight from 32 to 20; three sloops of war and four brigs, from 18 to 16; and five brigs and schooners, from 14 to 12 guns--employing a total of 7,296 seamen. This Administration, too, it should be remarked, not only built every frigate, every vessel of respectable force--yes, sir, built them from the stump--which the United States now have, but many others, which have been since sold, and the proceeds of which have gone into the Treasury. At this time, then, when the United States had this formidable force afloat; when nearly 8,000 seamen were employed; (I know the documents only state 7,300, but I am told from the best authority there were nearly 8,000;) when our flag at least triumphed in our own seas; when we had nothing of that system of drawing within our shell, which the gentleman from Connecticut so justly derides; when we had not reached the soft-shelled state in which we were placed by the non-intercourse law;--at that time, the Navy of the United States cost nearly three millions and a half, making for each seaman about $472. I know, sir, that these statements are dry, but they are useful in proportion as they are dry. According to the statement which my colleague (Mr. BASSETT) has made, and which he has told you not only came from the Secretary of the Navy, but was in the Secretary's own handwriting, the number of seamen which he had last year in employ was 2,723, which cost the nation $2,427,000--for each man employed, within a trifle of $900! Now, sir, if every seaman under the last Administration cost double the expense which was incurred for the same man under the preceding one, if the same system is continued, we have no reason to doubt that the seamen next year will cost double of their present expense. But, even suppose the expense to remain the same as it now is, will the Representatives of the American people agree to maintain a naval force which costs us $900 (within $13) per man, the use of which no man has attempted to guess, much less to demonstrate!

I wish to be indulged in a little further comparative political economy. I believe, sir, that the same good results in politics from comparing the merits of different Administrations, that results in medicine and surgery from the dissection of the human body--that they are fairly to be tried by the same rules. I find, then, that in the year 1800 the estimated pay of the officers is $391,000, and that the estimated pay of the seamen in the same year is $818,000. And yet, sir, by the estimate now before me, and which any gentleman can turn to, made for the year 1800, the subsistence of the officers, their pay, and that of the seamen, amounts only to $296,000--a sum less, by nearly $100,000, than the estimated pay alone of the officers in 1800--while the expense of the whole Establishment approach for the last year within $1,000,000 of the expense of the year first mentioned. I am at a loss to account for these manifest inconsistencies, and I might say solecisms, in our political arithmetic. We have a Navy which we are told employs 2,700 men, which costs within a third as much as a Navy employing nearly 8,000 men, and yet, when we come to compare the great objects of expense--to wit: pay and subsistence of the officers and seamen, the reward of valor and merit--we find a contrast which I believe no man in this House is prepared to explain.

Now, sir--for the whole subject, thank God, is now before us--let us look at the expenses of the Marine corps. I have always understood that marines were necessary in proportion to the extent of the Navy--that such a force is put on board of every ship of such a number of guns. I find that in the year 1800, when we had nearly forty ships of war in commission, manned with nearly 8,000 men, the expenses of the Marine corps amounted to $162,000; and in 1809, when we have ten or fifteen vessels of all sorts, manned with 2,300 seamen, the expense of the Marine corps amounts to $211,000. And yet, sir, if we look at the items, there does not seem to be a very great variation between some of the most important--for instance, I find that the clothing in 1800 was estimated at $33,000, in 1809 at but $32,000--and yet, the troops whose clothing costs $1,000 less, cost in the aggregate $50,000 more. But, if we look at some of the items of this account, we shall be struck at once with the difference. The pay and subsistence for instance in 1800 was $102,000, in 1809 it was $160,000. I have been at the pains even to note the prices of the most material articles of provision, and find that in the old estimate beef is rated at $13, pork at $14, and flour at $10 per barrel; while in the last year the same articles stood in the estimate of $14, $18, and $8. The material article (flour) being much lower than in 1800, and the market value of the others also, I believe the inference would necessarily follow, that the subsistence ought to have been cheaper. But, sir, look at their establishment at the navy-yard, and I believe we shall want no ghost--certainly no argument of mine--to show the cause of this difference of expense.

Then comes the navy-yards. Of these, that of Washington alone has cost nearly one-half of the sum expended on them all. Well might my colleague say it was worth as much as the whole, when it had cost as much; when, indeed, we have witnessed a considerable town--and the most flourishing town, too, in this wide region called the City of Washington--built out of the public treasury.

Yes, sir, we have economized until we absolutely have reduced the annual cost of a seaman from $472--as it was under the very wasteful expenditure of Mr. Adams's administration--down to the moderate sum of $887! We have economized until a paltry fleet, consisting of vessels built to our hand--to say nothing of those that have been sold, and the warlike stores of which have been retained and preserved; which fleet was built, equipped, and every cannon and implement of war purchased under the old Administration--has cost us $12,000,000, when it cost the preceding Administration but $9,000,000! Is this no argument for reduction? The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) tells you he does not wish an annihilation, but a reform of the Naval Establishment. Sir, as long as a single chip remains in that navy-yard, you will never see any thing like reform; as long as you have a chip of public property--one chip of live oak belonging to the United States--you will have a man riding in his carriage, with a long retinue and deputies and clerks to take care of it. And, sir, if the gentleman from Connecticut does not mean utterly to disgust the people of the United States against a navy--if in truth he is a friend to a navy--he ought to join and put down this navy-yard, and not, with my friend from North Carolina, (Mr. MACON,) keep it up, in hopes the enormity of the evil will at some time or other correct itself. Among the many reasons offered to this House for retaining the various parts of this Establishment, no one said a word in favor of the Marine corps--that went sub silentio--but a great deal was said in favor of Washington. We were told that our fleet might be Copenhagened, and that it was therefore necessary to stow it away here. We also heard of the great press of work in the large towns--of the mercantile employ which there came in competition with that of the United States. I believe, sir, that our workmen, and men of all descriptions, from the highest to the lowest--I speak of subordinates--have long ago found the truth of the old proverb, that "The King's chaff is better than other men's corn." But it seems, that in order to get a commodity cheap, we are not to go where it is to be had--oh no, there is competition!--but we must bring workmen here in the mail-coach, by which conveyance I understand not only live stock for the navy-yard but copper bolts, and such light articles, are sometimes brought, I suppose, to get out of the way of competition--competition in the markets of Philadelphia and Baltimore, where they are bought at private sale. In this way have seamen, in some instances, been conveyed; and unquestionably every material of ship timber and naval store has been repeatedly brought from Norfolk to this place at an immense cost, worked up here by men collected from Baltimore, Philadelphia, &c., in order that, so worked up, it might go back to Norfolk, there to remain. But, sir, if our object really be to prevent our fleet from being Copenhagened, we had better put it above the Falls of Niagara. There it would unquestionably be most secure, unless the party on the other side of the lake should fit out a fleet to attack it; in which case, I suppose, we must resort to another series of measures similar to those lately adopted for the protection of commerce and the Navy. An embargo to protect ships of war! This is, indeed, putting the cart before the horse. We are to have a navy for the protection of commerce, and all our measures in relation to it are calculated on the basis of keeping it (poor thing! like some sickly child) out of harm's way! On the same principle of economy on which the navy-yard is kept up here, viz: for fear that merchants and others should come into competition with the Government, I presume, we have sent abroad for workmen to carry on the public buildings. If the navy-yard is to be kept up here merely that it may be under our eye, I would humbly suggest, sir, that we first pluck out the beam that has so long blinded us. We need only to do that to see this building falling to pieces over our heads; and yet an enormous appropriation is called for towards finishing it, which I have no doubt my worthy colleague (Mr. LEWIS) will press very strongly before the close of the session.

I had forgotten the gunboats; and perhaps the best notice which can be taken of them, is that which is taken on some occasions of other things--to pass by them with contempt. They are not worth bringing into account, except for their expense. Children must have toys and baubles, and we must indulge ourselves in an expense of many millions on this ridiculous plaything!

But, sir, the sale of our superfluous vessels met with the high objection that they were to be purchased up by Christophe and Petion, and that the constituents of my colleague (Mr. BASSETT) are to be terrified, if not into bodily fear, at least out of their peace of mind, by these vessels; and, at the same time, we are told that Christophe was in such good credit, only forty miles off, that vessels are building at Baltimore for his use; and yet, sir, no gentleman has brought forward a bill making it penal to supply these barbarians with ships of war and warlike stores. In other words, sir, to avoid the possibility of Christophe and his seamen foundering on board these rotten hulks, my colleague would much rather drive him into Baltimore, where he can purchase good vessels, which will answer his purpose much better than these frigates, which the barbarians would not know how to manage, and which are not calculated, from their great draught, for predatory warfare in the West India seas. My worthy colleague has given us a curious illustration of the superiority of naval over military force, by comparing the navy of Great Britain with her army. I suppose, if the argument were retorted on my colleague by a comparison of the army of Bonaparte with his navy, he would say that the same amount was not there expended upon the navy as upon the army; whereas in England, the amount of money expended on each is equal. But, does not my colleague know that one and the chief cause of the superiority of the British navy over the army, is, that in the navy men rise by merit--that they do not get in, to use a seaman's phrase, at the cabin windows--and that the army, if we give credit to the Parliamentary investigation, is a mere sink of corruption--a mere engine of patronage--a place in which a corrupt commander-in-chief acts according to his vile pleasure, and the pleasure of all the pimps and parasites and harlots who environ him. This, sir, is the cause of the superiority of the naval over the military force of Great Britain. But, when the British navy shall have effected what the armies of other nations from time immemorial have done--when it shall have subjugated whole continents--then will I agree in the superior power of naval over military force. I have no hesitation in saying that I would rather vote for naval than military force, and it is because a naval force has not the same power as a military one. I have never heard of a despotic power created by a naval force, unless perhaps in the chieftain of a band of pirates.

But it would appear that the politics of my unfortunate friend from North Carolina, (Mr. STANFORD,) who sits near the Speaker, are a mere counting-house business of pounds, shillings, and pence, or dollars and cents; that, in fact, the spirit of lucre is transferred from the warehouses and counting-rooms of the merchants to the tobacco-fields and cotton plantations of the Southern planters; and that, to such a pitch has the patriotism of the mercantile class risen, that they are really ready to sacrifice one-half of their property for the protection of the Government of their country. If the gentleman from New York (Mr. MUMFORD) will permit me, I will protest against this idea. I have once before protested in company with that gentleman, and I hope he will permit me to protest, even when I have not the sanction of his respectable authority. With regard to the politics of my worthy friend from North Carolina, I recollect very well, in the days which were called the days of profusion, patronage and terror, his politics were not of that minute and microscopic grade that no scale could be graduated sufficiently low to measure them; that, if his republicanism was a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, then and now, it was not that sort of republicanism which was too cheap to be measured by the value of the smallest known coin, even by a doit. I really feel something like sympathy with the gentleman from North Carolina--and it is not at all to be wondered at; for the republicanism of that gentleman used to be that which I always have professed--and if the remark applied to the gentleman from North Carolina, who I believe is not yet quite out of the pale of the political church, how much more forcibly did it apply to an unpardonable political sinner like myself! With respect, sir, to this patriotism, or this republicanism, that has left the tobacco fields and cotton plantations, and taken up its dwelling in the counting-house, I beg leave to express my doubt of the fact. I never have had that high opinion of the mercantile class expressed by some gentlemen in this House. I think of them as of other men--that in proportion to the temptations to which they are exposed, so are they virtuous or otherwise. But, sir, I have not and cannot have confidence in a man to whom the great Emperor has given a paternal squeeze, whose property is sequestered at Bayonne or St. Sebastian--I disclaim any thing like personal allusion; I speak of a class--I cannot have the confidence, on the subject of our foreign relations, in a man so situated, that I can have in the planter or farmer whose property is growing on his land around the house in which he nightly sleeps--and why? Because, mutatis mutandis, I should not have the same confidence in myself. I should not believe it possible, if I had rich cargoes under sequestration in France, that I could vote free from the bias which the jeopardy of that property would throw on my mind.

Sir, I have been very irregular, because I have been compelled to follow, not the current of my own ideas, but the objections started by gentlemen in different quarters, and (as it is the fashion to express it) on different sides of the House, whom I have found united against the bill as reported by myself. I would ask, in a few words, if we ought to continue this establishment in its present state? I ask if it is necessary? For the expense of a navy has been proved to be in inverse ratio to its utility. To what purpose do we keep up the Marines, another branch of the Establishment? If I am correctly informed, these men are willing to run away whenever they have a chance to desert--if they can get an opportunity--and I am willing that they shall quit the service without being exposed to be brought to a court martial for desertion. Nothing, indeed, was said on the subject of the Marine corps, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. KEY) moved to strike out the whole section of the bill. Fertile as the gentleman may be in reasons, he did not offer one. He must have supposed it to be perfectly correct that a Marine establishment should be kept up for a navy employing 2,700 seamen, more expensive than the same establishment for a navy employing 8,000. It was, indeed, facetiously urged in the select committee, as a reason why these men should be retained, that they came to this House regularly on Sundays to serve the Lord--to assist at the weekly pageant here performed. Sir, far be it from me to say, or even to think, with the Protector Cromwell, that this is a House where the Lord has not been served for many years. But, permit me to state, that in our country, it is the practice to pay no man out of the public purse, even for advocating the cause of other people with the Most High, much less for advocating his own. In other words, that when men with us serve the Lord, they do it at their own expense.

We have heard to-day, sir--and I hope the report of Congress at their next session will verify it--that a grant of power to the Executive in relation to any subject--say borrowing of money--does not necessarily imply an exercise of that power. We have heard, too, that notwithstanding the power devolved on the President of the United States, by the bill authorizing him to borrow to an amount of upwards of five millions of dollars, which this day passed this House, to enable the Government to get along, we shall at our next session probably be presented with the joyful tidings that it is not necessary to make use of the power, at least in its full extent; but it depends upon our own act, whether this expectation be realized or not. We are, in this instance at least, of that description of prophets who have it in their power to bring about the event they predict. And I do earnestly hope that the House will not, by a disagreement with the report of the select committee, insure the defeat of their hope--the nonfulfilment of the prediction. I hope we shall take up the subject, and go through with it; that we shall account, and account rationally too, for some of the facts at least which I have presented to the House this day, in terms extremely defective, I know; but the time was short--now or never--and I presented them in the only mode in which I could possibly do it.

In the course of my observations, I think I forgot to mention that when the United States kept forty sail of armed vessels afloat, and employed 8,000 seamen, we had no navy-yards at all. If we had, there must have been some extraordinary oversight committed by the then Secretary of the Treasury; and I believe politicians were not any more apt then than now to omit any items of public expense; they crowded in all they could. In the estimate which I hold in my hand, there is no item of that expense. I hope, if the House agree (which God forbid!) to so much of the report of the Committee of the Whole as retains the frigates and ships of war, that they will at least consent to put down the navy-yard at this place, and break down the supernumerary Marines. Really, sir, I am fond of music, but I do not mean to grant $211,000 of the people's money annually for a song. I hope at least that the Marines will be reduced, and that we shall retain at least not more navy-yards than ships. What would an honest Dutchman in the West think of a man who kept as many stables as horses, and those of the most expensive construction, too?

I have done, sir. I have endeavored to discharge my duty. No man is more sensible of a failure in the manner than I am; but I will thank any one to convince me of the utility of a navy, according to the doctrines and practice of the new school, and to facts, as far as they have been stated.

Mr. BASSETT said that his colleague could not always adhere to the principle that it was his duty to ferret out every error. Error is the lot of human nature, said Mr. B., and no one is infallible. Give a small authority to-day, and it will increase to an unexpected amount before to-morrow. I am authorized to state that such has been the case in the Navy Department; that under the late Secretary of the Navy large expenses had been incurred; and that before he left his office he commenced a reduction of them. Since the present Secretary (Mr. HAMILTON) has been in office, the expenditures have been much reduced. In the navy-yard at this place, for example, a permanent reduction has been made in the expenses to the amount perhaps of 30 or 40 per cent., and a very considerable reduction also as to immediate disbursements. It is nevertheless our duty, after the suggestions that have been made, to commence a thorough investigation, and I can only regret that the subject has been introduced to our attention at so late a period of the session. Instead of regretting what has been said, I am glad of it, and hope that at an early period in the next session an investigation will be made. Without any particular direction of the House, the committee of the Naval Establishment thought it their duty to examine the whole establishment at the navy-yard in this city. All the good expected from doing so was to convince them that the eye of the Government was upon them. I am proud to say that not only myself, but every gentleman of the committee with me, was much pleased with the appearance of things as they stood. It was not in our power to investigate minutiæ. On visiting the establishment of the Marine corps we saw every thing in order; we saw the armory establishment, wherein we discovered that arms which had been injured were usefully and handsomely repaired. As well as we could discover by the eye, every thing was pleasing to my mind--and one innovation in discipline in the Marine corps gave me very great satisfaction, viz: the substitution of solitary confinement for personal chastisement. In the navy-yard, the expense of which has been much complained of, we saw great piles of useful buildings. These were not constructed without cost. The present establishment there, in addition to store-houses, &c., consists of an extensive forgery, where all the iron work for the navy is done, a lead foundry, a brass foundry, where articles are made out of worn-out old metals, which otherwise would be of no use. I was desirous, both for my own information as well as that of the House, to procure an account of the work done at the navy-yard, to compare it with the expense--for that is the only way of fairly estimating the value of the establishment; but the time allotted to us during this session is not sufficient to attain that object.

Some facts I will also mention, which, though not from an official source, are known to me as matter of fact, viz: that the vessels now in service have been lately repaired in so complete a manner that they are worth more than when they were built. The President, the United States, the Chesapeake, Essex, John Adams, and others, were repaired at the navy-yard at this place, besides the Congress, now repairing. There have been several small vessels also built here. In short, I believe that since the establishment of the navy-yard here, there has been but one vessel repaired any where but at this yard. The Constitution was repaired at Boston. When we come to get the account of the expenses of that ship's repairs and compare them with the expenses of repair at the navy-yard in this city, we shall know how to appreciate that object. A full examination of it would, I feel convinced, entirely reconcile us to the great amount apparently expended here. A remark made by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) here applies with great force: that it was indispensably necessary to economy that there should be system and order; and how shall we accomplish that object but by regularly established navy-yards? Can you have economy when you go into market to bid for what you want? Can you expect system and order unless you pay for it? You cannot. Money is well laid out if it be done with honesty and integrity to pay for system and regularity.

I did not yet mention one particular fact on the subject of naval equipments, which I should have done, in the article of sail cloth, making an immense difference in the expenditure of 1799 and 1809. The gentlemen acquainted with the prices at these times could inform the committee that the difference in the prices of sail duck is somewhere about 100 per cent.

I will mention another fact: that although the President has power to employ 5,000 seamen, he has employed but 2,700 men, who have received bounties. Sound economy would authorize the retaining them a few months longer, till we come here again in the fall, till we know whether it be proper to disband them or not.

Although friendly to a naval force, I am not for keeping up any great naval force when there is no appearance of danger. At the present evil time, when every thing is uncertain, I am not for giving up one single atom of defence. If gentlemen will but cast their eyes along our seacoast, and look at our unprotected waters, at the situation of my particular district, they would like me feel the necessity of some floating security; they would feel the value of that peace of mind necessary to me and to my constituents. With these observations I shall dismiss the subject.

Some further remarks were made by Mr. MACON and Mr. RANDOLPH.

The question was stated on concurrence with the Committee of the Whole in striking out so much of the bill as directs the unconditional sale of all the frigates but three.

Mr. RANDOLPH called for the yeas and nays on this question, considering it the pith and marrow of the business; and as the vote would show who were the navy and who the anti-navy men in the House.

Mr. SMILIE said it would be remembered that his object in voting to strike out this part of the bill was to introduce the amendment he had offered in Committee of the Whole, viz: to place the Navy on the same footing as in 1806.

The following were the votes on concurrence with the Committee in striking out so much of the bill as relates to the frigates--yeas 76, nays 32.

So that part of the bill was struck out.

The first section, which requires the dismissal of all the seamen in service, except so many as sufficient to man three frigates, &c., was struck out--ayes 60.

The next amendment made by the committee was to insert "Washington" among the navy-yards to be retained.

The yeas and nays on concurrence with the committee--58 to 46.

So the navy-yard at Washington is among those to be retained.

The next amendment was to strike out the section of the bill which reduces the Marine Corps to two companies.

Mr. RANDOLPH said on recurring to the documents he found the price of the ratio in 1800 to have been 28 cents, whilst in the last year it was put 20; so that rations were now nearly a third cheaper than they were nine years ago, and the difference in the expenses of the Naval Establishment was, therefore, the more unaccountable. I had also taken it for granted, said Mr. R., that my colleague (Mr. BASSETT) was right in his statement of the seamen's wages being only eight dollars per month. But, sir, here is a statement on the subject--and I only wish that in the estimate of last year we had had the same valuable details as there are in the estimate of the year 1800--for the estimate in relation to the Navy Department for the last year is most shamefully deficient, as I could demonstrate if the House had time and patience and I had lungs. I find that there is in this estimate of 1800 a minute and detailed statement of every item of expense. Instead of the wages being eight dollars then and twelve now, as my colleague has been told, the pay was then for able-bodied seamen seventeen dollars per month, ordinary seamen twelve, and boys eight; so that this saving in the pay does not account for the monstrous difference. I have not time to examine into the article of duck, but I believe the gentleman's duck will not swim any more than the rest of his arguments.

I trust, sir, that the House will not agree to the report of the committee for this reason: Referring to these documents, I discover that in 1800, when we had nearly 8,000 seamen, we had 890 marines; and in the year 1809, when we have only 2,700 seamen employed, we have agreeably to estimate precisely the same number of 890 marines. It would appear that something has taken place to render this species of force peculiarly valuable, or that these gentlemen possess a very successful art of keeping in, of not going out with others. And, sir, when I recollect the statements which I have heard on this floor and the sources whence some of them have probably been derived, I am not at all surprised that this navy-yard and this Prætorian camp, and everything connected with it, should keep up to the old height when every thing else has diminished. Eight hundred and ninety men! Call them 900, and you have one mariner for every three seamen. I have no doubt, if the House act on the principle on which they have done heretofore, that we shall have very polite assurances that these men are of the greatest imaginable service and have wrought wonders in defence of the country, but I cannot for my soul understand how this species of force goes to quiet the mind of my colleague or of his constituents on the Chesapeake.

I have done my duty on this subject, sir. From whatever motive, of that motive I am alone the human judge. I have acted the part of a real friend to the Administration of this Government. Like my friend from North Carolina, I belong to that "faction" which brought him from a minority to a majority on the very ground I now occupy. I have heard before of a people being their own worst enemies--but what shall we say to an assertion that persons selected from the people for their wisdom and discretion, should be their own worst enemies? Is it to the interest of the Administration that these abuses should continue, and that loans and taxes should be resorted to to cover them? Who, sir, are the true friends--I do not speak of motives--who in fact are the true friends of Administration? Those who move to abolish and retrench, or those who persevere in keeping up such establishments and resort to loans and taxes to defray the expense of them? Are you willing that any part of the loan authorized by the act which unhappily passed this House this morning should be borrowed for the purpose of keeping up as many marines as were deemed necessary in 1800, for treble the amount of naval force--and we then said it was a Government of profusion and patronage--yes, sir, we heaped a great deal of opprobrium and many hard epithets on it. I am just as tired now of maintaining idlers, and dissolute idlers too, out of the proceeds of my property as I was when I first came into Congress--and I care not whether it be under the Administration of a President called Republican, or of a man called a Federalist. I could repeat the very words then used. I do say that I never see one of those useless drones in livery crawling on the face of the earth that my gorge does not rise--that I do not feel sick. I see no reason why we should not maintain sturdy beggars in rags as well as beggars of another description in tinsel. I have as much respect as any one for the man who risks his life in his country's service--and I have shown it; but the man who has drawn on a livery and quartered himself on the public because he has not sufficient capacity to get a living elsewhere, I will not foster. The change may be rung to the end of time--gentlemen may talk about pounds, shillings, and pence, as long as they please, but these men shall never have a single cent of money with my consent. I wish every ploughman in the country could come and see these people, keeping equipages, living in splendor, in palaces almost--I hardly know five men in Virginia who could afford to live in such a house if their fathers had left it to them, much less if they had it to build, as some of these people occupy at the public cost. But because this proposition for reduction is made by a somebody, the cut of whose face or the cut of whose coat we do not like, we are to go on maintaining these locusts for spite. It is impossible to prevent the people from reading this. It may be said these are Federal lies. Ten years ago the same things were said to be Democratic lies; but they were tested by the most enlightened among the people, and found to be truth--even the story of Jonathan Robbins was then all a Democratic lie. You are to keep up the same number of marines that Mr. Adams kept up, but you maintain them at one-fourth greater expense, when not a man who hears me can pretend to designate the service they perform. I know you may be told these marines may be useful on shipboard, which, however, has not relation to the question before the House. The question is, how many marines are necessary, and in what battles are they employed? Recollect, sir, that in this estimate of the expenses of these marines, the Prætorian camp erected for their accommodation is not taken into question--nor do I believe there is a man in the House who can guess within a hundred thousand dollars what it has cost. I cannot--I do not even know the authority under which it was built. I suppose it was erected, like some other public buildings, without law, by authority unknown to the law. Yes, sir, and this is the place for Aaron Burr and such choice spirits. When they wish to turn us out of the House, where do they look but to men who are incarcerated and would run away at a bare invitation, much more would follow a military leader to plunder, to office, to cordons and legions of honor? I cannot consent to retain them. I feel indignant--I feel mortified at the conduct of that part of the House of Representatives calling itself Republican--because I believe, sir, that the hint given by my worthy friend from North Carolina, has been taken by the gentlemen of another denomination, and they have thrown their weight so equally on both sides as to poise the balance--they have worked a sort of political equation there. Yes, sir, we must have fifty per cent. increase of the present ad valorem taxes, and an additional third upon molasses and brown sugar, upon the articles on which the poorest families on the seaboard make their daily meal--and in return we shall have a man, the texture of whose coat, whether homespun or imported, you cannot tell for the gold lace with which it is covered, and an establishment of marines at an expense of more than two hundred thousand dollars--and whom to protect? To protect the constituents of my worthy colleague, in the enjoyment of their peace of mind? When you consider in what manner every claim of merit is treated in this House--when you consider the poverty and misery in which thousands and tens of thousands of the people of the United States live, from whose earnings you daily take a part, I hope you will pause and reflect before you dispose of one doit of this sum on such objects. Why, sir, should a poor man laboring out of doors not be suffered to take his breakfast or give it to his children without paying a tax to the Government, in order that the man who does not labor, and whose head is of no more use to the community than his arms, should live in idleness?

But, unfortunately for myself, I have been here too long--I have seen the profits made by individuals with no other visible resources than the cheese-parings and candle-ends of the Government; and it has got to that now that every branch of our establishments has become a department--we have almost got a door-keeping department--not only in this House but elsewhere. But all I have said is wrong, very wrong--we are all Republicans, all Federalists--all is right--this is all an idle clamor, made to effect a given purpose. Sir, I might go on and compare these two books of 1800 and 1809 and take up every item of expense, military, naval, or civil--the civil branch of the Army as well as the military, the civil as well as the naval branch of the Navy--they are all, all alike. In this book (the estimate of 1800) is such a detailed statement that the value of every ration is stated, and the amount of force in detail. What have we here, in the estimate of last year? In relation to the Navy you have some three or four pages. I really had not a conception, till I came to examine it, that there could be such a difference between the estimates of 1800 and 1809. But if I am overruled, which I think highly probable from the appearance of things, we shall have the satisfaction, in case I return here next year, and Messrs. Pepin and Breschard give their attendance, of a fine band of music to entertain the audience--and for this undoubtedly the good people, the fishermen of Marblehead, and the planters of Virginia, will be proud to pay $260,000. But this is all right--it is all Republicanism! All Federalism!

Mr. W. ALSTON spoke in favor of reducing them, and Messrs. LYON, MCKIM, BASSETT, and DANA, against it.

The question on concurring with the committee in striking out this section was decided in the affirmative--yeas 49, nays 43.

So the section for reducing the marines was stricken out.

A motion having been made by Mr. RANDOLPH to amend the bill so as to disband the master commandants now belonging to the Navy,

Mr. MCKIM said he should like to know the gentleman's reason for getting rid of them. The gentleman had appealed to the House to know why they would retain them? The onus probandi, however, lays with the gentleman himself. He ought to show why they should be dismissed. Mr. McK. said he did not like to vote in the dark. His vote given without knowledge might derange the whole system. He hoped the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) from his extensive knowledge on the subject, would favor them with the reasons why these men should be dismissed.

Mr. BOYD said he did not rise to make a long speech but to tell the House that he felt much imposed upon by the comparisons made between the late and Federal Administrations. If I were to do all this, said he, I might get into the newspapers and make believe that I am the first man in the nation; but I take things as I find them. The former Administration may have acted rightly in their day; but reason is to guide us. Sir, is it parliamentary, is it genteel, or agreeable to common sense, that a hundred and forty men should sit here listening to what one man says, and he having recourse to papers in every one's reach? I had rather consult the papers for myself: for I should not garble them, taking just what suited me, but should read the whole. No doubt gentlemen do what they think answers their own purpose and I what answers mine; and my purpose is the good of the nation. If a larger navy was necessary, I should vote for it; if an army of thirty thousand men was wanted, I should vote for it. Sir, have we no rights to defend? There never has been a time, in my opinion, since the Government was formed, that so preposterous a proposition was offered as this one to reduce the Army and Navy at this time--for what? Are the orders and decrees altered? I understand all Spain is in a state of blockade. For what have you given money to build fortifications? Pounds, shillings, and pence, are the order of the day--we sell a little tobacco, a little cotton--and our independence goes to wreck. But gentlemen even on their own principles go to work the wrong way. If they submit to get a little this year, they will get less the next, depend upon it. I think it my duty to speak in this open manner--not to please gentlemen, but for my country's good.

Mr. RANDOLPH said in reply to the gentleman from Maryland, who wished to know why he wanted to get rid of the masters commandant, that it was because there never had been a reason assigned in this House for their creation. The act which established them had come from the other House at the end of a session; it had not originated in this House, and he had never heard a reason assigned in favor of them--and he had no knowledge that the public service had suffered from the want of them during the whole of Mr. Adams's Administration, and more especially not from the 4th of March, 1801, to April 1806. That gentlemen who voted against the proposition to reduce the Army and Navy, said he, should vote against my amendment is nothing more than natural; and I suppose if those averse to reduction had been put on the committee, we should have had no such bill reported. If gentlemen who voted for the general proposition that it is expedient to reduce the Army and Navy are willing to be held up as bowing the knee to foreign powers, let it be so. They were a large and certainly not disrespectable majority. I feel no sensibility on the subject. The House may act as it pleases; in whatsoever manner it may act, it will not affect my vote or conduct. I stand here, as I always have done, and always will do, on ground independent of all party considerations. If this amendment be submission to the belligerents, what is the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) which is acknowledged to go further in reduction than the bill as first reported? It is in vain to oppose a reduction of the Army and Navy on the ground of submission. Gentlemen should prove that they are resistance. What resistance do they afford against their decrees or confiscation? Have they taken a single man out of a ship of war, or one man out of the dungeons of Paris or Arras? This is as plain a question of expediency as whether you will alter the time of holding the courts of the State of Maryland or any other question. Mr. R. had however some expectations that they should have some war speeches on this occasion, and they had them accordingly. They had heard some on the general proposition for reduction, and one this morning from the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. RHEA) on the bill. Was it proposed now to declare war? Was it believed that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) was disposed to submit to the belligerents? That the gentlemen on the other side of the House were divided on that subject, as they were upon the question of the reduction of the Navy? Was the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. QUINCY,) who represented the town of Boston, so strenuous an advocate at this moment for war (and he supposed especially for war with England) that he was obliged to oppose a reduction on that ground? Was the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. KEY) who represented the adjacent district, in the same belligerent temper? Did he too oppose this proposition on the ground of resisting the belligerents or of making war with England? The very moment any political touchstone was brought to test the objections to the bill which the committee had offered, they dissolved at once, and the opposition to it resolved itself into the principle of old Federalism. It was nothing else. It was office! patronage! expenditure of public money! And hence it was said (and for no other cause whatever) that these strange votes were seen. The gentleman from Connecticut, perhaps the only member or one of the very few on that side of the House who had a seat on this floor during the Administration of Mr. Adams, opposed the bill because, as he had told the house, he preferred his old principles--they had triumphed over his recent disgust, though even he acknowledged that great abuses had taken place. The gentleman had declared that he would stick to his old principles; and I, said Mr. RANDOLPH, am for sticking to mine; and my two friends from North Carolina (Messrs. MACON and STANFORD) who were also members under Mr. Adams's Administration, stick to their old principles, and I will venture to say will never relinquish them. It has not effected a change in the gentleman from Connecticut, that he and his friends are out, nor a change in my friends from North Carolina--I will not say that they are in the power, for of that they have not much to boast; but that their friends are in power. And why should this clamor be raised on the question whether you will or will not make a formal renunciation of the old articles of political faith? Although, on reconsideration, perhaps I have no cause to be surprised, and ought to pardon gentlemen. It is a situation in which no man likes to be placed, to be brought up and compelled either to forego present gratification or make a formal renunciation, something like the Christian at Algiers, who hesitates whether he will put on the turban and share the plunder of the day, or consent to abide by those principles which he received from his parents and from heaven. No doubt there are many who would infinitely prefer to slip over or slide under this question; and I am therefore glad, sir, that the decision of the chairman has enabled me to present the chalice to their lips and compel them to swallow it to the dregs.

Mr. RHEA said that the gentleman from Virginia held no obnoxious cup to him; for he should vote against the gentleman with the greatest imaginable pleasure. As to all that had been said about patronage, it had no weight with him. He had no relation in office, nor did he ever expect to have one. He had no object in view but the well-being and safety of the nation. He was unwilling to give the least evidence of a determination to relinquish any kind of opposition (though it was scarcely apparent) to the wrongful doings of other nations against the United States. He had made no war speech; if he had intended that, he should have made rather a different speech from any the House had heard from him yet. If they went on in this way he said they would hold out an inducement to all the marauders in the universe to come and plunder the trade of the United States as they pleased. He repeated that he did not make war speeches; but he thought our situation required a war speech against somebody--he would not say who. We have indeed, said he, had sufficient provocation for war; and I say now, as I have said often before, that had we taken a proper stand at a former time, the United States would have avoided all their present difficulties. But so long as we go on as we have gone, and encourage a peace in war and a war in peace, so long as the Federalists teach us to acquiesce in all the iniquitous decrees of the belligerents, so long will our difficulties continue. I shall vote to continue the Navy, and I hope that this proposition, and any other to reduce the Naval Establishment, will be negatived; for on this establishment depends the protection of our maritime border, and safety of the people upon and near it. It may be said that I and my constituents are safe, but I will act for others who are not so.

Mr. DANA congratulated the House that the only point of controversy now with gentlemen who had heretofore complained so loudly of Federalism, was, that in coming up to the mark of Federalism they should not do it with so much violence as to go beyond it. He thought it would be well if our relative expenditures could be brought back to the worst year of Mr. Adams's Administration, and our measures as to foreign affairs to the first eight years of the Federal Administration, which, when it resolved, did it so sincerely and so unalterably. He congratulated the nation that it was no longer an argument against a measure that it had been adopted by those called Federalists; he rejoiced that this slang of party was scouted from the House--that it was no longer a piece of artillery successfully wielded on all sides. He hoped it would forever be dismissed, and that gentlemen, convinced of their error, would come up and place their recantation on record. If for the same sum as was expended for those objects by the Federal Administration they could obtain the same number of fighting men on land and water, he thought they would make an extremely good bargain, when compared with the state of things which now existed. Until this session he said he had been unapprised of the enormities of expenditure in the Navy Department for so little effect; that there had been so much of waste and so much done instrumental to the extension of patronage. He wished it however to be understood that he deemed it essential that those who compose the main body of the Army and Navy, those on whom the brunt of the battle falls, those who stand in the front of danger, should be well paid, well fed, and well clad, in such a manner that one need not blush to see them on parade appearing like the ragged recruits of Sir John Falstaff. When he saw the soldier placed in this unfortunate situation, and the squalid unfortunate troops pointed at as objects of pity, and when this situation was the result of a want of attention in those who had the care of them, he could scarcely give utterance to his indignation.

Mr. D. said he did not feel disposed to diminish the number of fighting men afloat at the present time; though he was not influenced at all by the resolution which the House had passed not to submit. He had sometimes thought that they had passed too many resolutions to be resolute. No, sir, said he, if, when we were insulted on the water; if, when a British squadron remained in our waters in defiance of our laws, we had made use of our navy, our officers and men would have done their duty; but it was then deemed more expedient to deal in paper than in powder and shot. I feel that we have gone far enough, and too far, in the downhill course of debasement; by much too far. I would dismiss all this parade of words. I really would cease to think to terrify the French or British nation by them. Although those nations have hated each other for years, they look up to each other with reverence, because they know that victory would be glorious. I wish, too, that we should proceed in such a manner as that our actions should not wear the appearance of gasconade, and that we should march up to the works with a steady eye. I think, sir, that the population and strength of the United States and their commercial capital being augmented, it may be proper, after a lapse of ten years, to have a Peace Establishment somewhat extended beyond the former; and I am therefore against so great a reduction as is proposed.

On motion, the House then adjourned--41 to 38--at six o'clock, after a sitting of eight hours.

THURSDAY, April 26.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business.

Mr. SMILIE moved the following as a substitute for the sections stricken out:

"And further, that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to keep in actual service as many of the frigates and other public armed vessels as in his judgment the nature of the service may require, and to cause the residue to be laid up in ordinary in convenient ports; Provided, the whole number of officers and seamen shall not exceed that fixed by the act 'in addition to the act, supplementary to the act, providing for the Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes,' passed the 21st day of April, 1806."

Mr. S. spoke in support of his motion, and remarked that it would produce a saving in the next year's expenditure of near a million of dollars.

Mr. BACON, after observing that the amendment now offered would go to reduce the number of seamen in service to two hundred and ninety-five, a number smaller than that authorized by the bill as originally reported, as it would not man more than one frigate, three armed vessels, and the twenty-two gunboats at New Orleans, moved to amend the section by including also the seamen (five hundred additional) authorized by the act of the 3d day of March, 1807.

Mr. RHEA said that this proposition amounted to just the same as the original bill, as respected the number of men to be employed. He asked whether it was proper to ask this House to do (in other words to be sure) that which they had the day before refused to do. This was no time for those who voted to increase the Navy to vote to reduce it. What reason had been given for such a course? Gentlemen had said that they believed if nobody attacked us, we should attack nobody, and that, therefore, we should have no war. Gentlemen might have some internal evidence, incomprehensible to him, that we should continue in a state of peace, or might have some reasons evident to themselves; but unless these reasons were communicable, Mr. R. said he could not consent to the amendment. They had been told that there was no such thing as a disposition in this House to go to war. How had this indisposition for war got into the House? Mr. R. could not account for this dread of war. He said he had not the least disposition to give evidence of submission to foreign powers by putting down the small naval force we have; for doing so would evince our apathy and indisposition to protect our rights. If we go on in this manner, said he, we shall be the prey of every picaroon on the ocean. We shall become a prey to our black neighbors of St. Domingo. For what reason are we to subject even our coasters to plunder and abuse? To save money! Why, sir, if we do it we shall be plundered to an amount sufficient to fit out a little navy. At least let us defend ourselves against these black people of St. Domingo. We shall have nothing to prevent the barbarian cruisers from coming on our coast, and there is hostility enough in Europe against us to set those people, as well as the cruisers from St. Domingo, against us. The reduction will not comport with the safety of the nation. The House has already declared by its vote that it will not sell any of the frigates. Will it contradict itself by taking away the seamen? Now that our naval force consists of picked men and the very best officers, I am unwilling to disband them and pick up men just as they are wanted. I am utterly against any reduction now, when we have no evidence of better times; for we have no official information before us to that effect.

Mr. BASSETT said he was about to have proposed an amendment, but was prevented from so doing by Mr. BACON'S. He wished to retain the first part of Mr. SMILIE'S amendment, and to add to it a proviso that the number of seamen should not exceed two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three, (the number now in service.) The effect of the amendment thus amended would be to give to the President an authority which he has not now, to cause the frigates to be laid up at any time he thought proper.

Mr. TALLMADGE spoke of the obscurity in which the amendment was involved by a reference to so many different laws. He could not vote for it, he said, unless he could understand it.

On the suggestion of Mr. BACON, Mr. SMILIE modified his motion by making the proviso to read as follows: "Provided, That the number of seamen and boys to be retained in service shall not exceed ----." This blank Mr. BACON proposed to fill with one thousand five hundred.

Mr. RANDOLPH said he was afraid, after the pledge that this House had given to reduce the Naval Establishment, that that pledge was not to be redeemed; that the whole business was to end in smoke, unless some pitiful, paltry retrenchment, to the amount of a hundred thousand dollars, was made to enable them to swear by--to say here and out of doors, and to enable the public prints to say, that they had reduced the Naval Establishment. It is a matter of fact, said Mr. R., that when the Administration of Mr. Adams went out of power, they made the only reform which has ever taken place in the Naval Establishment of the United States, and that at the succeeding session no reform was made. The act of the 3d of March, 1801, authorized the President, when the situation of public affairs in his judgment should render it expedient, to cause to be sold all the vessels of the Navy except the frigates of the United States, Constitution, President, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, Constellation, Congress, New York, Boston, Essex, Adams, John Adams, and General Greene; and of that number the President was further authorized to lay up all except six. To the vessels laid up were attached one sailing master, one boatswain, one gunner, one carpenter, and one cook, one sergeant or corporal, and eight marines, and from ten to twelve seamen, according to the size of the frigate. This was the act which we found already passed when we came into power--I do not wish to be arrogant, but say we to save circumlocution. By the same act were retained in service--mark that, sir--nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen, to receive only half pay when not in actual service; and the officers dismissed under that act (and a very considerable number they were) received four months' pay in addition to their other emoluments as a gratuity on quitting the public service. This is the act on which we proceeded; and under that act you will find that the expenses of the Navy amounted, in 1802, to $915,000. Well, sir, it seems we were then of opinion that even our predecessors had in one branch of reform gone far enough. It was not my opinion; but it was the opinion of a majority of this House and of the other. In 1803 the President was authorized to buy or build four vessels, to carry not exceeding sixteen guns each, for the protection of our commerce in the Mediterranean, and towards this object $96,000 were appropriated. It was not until 1803 that any increase took place in the naval establishment left us (if the expression may be pardoned) by the Federalists. We had slept long enough, I suppose, on reform, and we made this little addition. But, sir, in the unfortunate year of 1806, the memorable year of the schism, as it is called, the year of non-importation-act memory, in that year when we had a war message against Spain on the table, and a message of a different character locked up in the drawer--in that year we passed an act which has been quoted, by which we repealed the second and fourth sections of the act to provide for the Naval Peace Establishment; that is to say, we undid the reform which had been carried into execution by our predecessors--with a very ill grace, I acknowledge, and at the very last time of asking, on the 3d of March, 1801, late at night--it was a forced put, no doubt of it--we passed an act in which we repealed the second and fourth sections of that act, and added to the officers of the Navy as follows: instead of nine captains, to which number the Federal Administration had reduced them, and which number we believed for four years to be amply sufficient, we added five new captains--and yet we ought to recollect that in the interim between these two acts the frigate Philadelphia had been wholly lost, and another frigate (the General Greene) retained in the service by the act of the 3d of March, 1801, worse than totally lost, as any one may see who will go and look at her remains in the navy yard--so that the number of officers made by Congress in 1806 was in the inverse ratio to the number of ships, and, with two frigates less, we determined to have five captains more. This same act of April 21st, 1806, only doubled the number of lieutenants. The act of the 3d of March, 1801, reduced the number to thirty-six; the act of 1806 repealed that reduction and authorized the appointment of seventy-two lieutenants--it is true, sir, that the same act made no addition to the number of midshipmen, nor to the number of ordinary seamen then in service. Then again the act of the 3d of March, 1807, added to that number five hundred seamen, making the whole number of seamen 1,425. Subsequently they have been increased by the act of January 31, 1809, as the House knows, to 2,700--and an increase is authorized to the number of 5,000, with 300 additional midshipmen. I do hope that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, will be prepared to give this House some reason, when we have not added a single frigate to the number retained by the act of 1801, when we have even lost two of those retained by that act, when several others are almost in the last stage of decay, why we should require five captains more than the Federal Administration required for a greater number of vessels, and why we should double the number of lieutenants? In other words, why the number of officers should now be fixed agreeably to the act of April 21, 1806, rather than that of the 3d of March, 1801? Sir, the gentleman from Massachusetts has already demonstrated to the House, and I am thankful to him for it--I know with what authority any statement comes from that gentleman--that the real protection afforded to the constituents of my worthy colleague by the bill, as reported by the select committee, is greater than that afforded by the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania--that is to say, that it would keep a greater number of seamen employed, with fewer officers to be sure, because we retain only as many as we want. The efficient protection afforded by the bill as it originally stood is greater at a less expense--because that branch of the naval service of which I have been compelled to present so hideous a picture to this House is left by the amendment untouched. My worthy colleague (Mr. BASSETT) stated yesterday--and I confess it was quite novel to me; I felt so astonished at it as not only to be unable but absolutely to forget to reply to it--that before he left the Department, the ex-Secretary of the Navy had commenced a system of economy, which system it seems is now prosecuting with renovated vigor by the present Secretary--the mantle of Elijah has descended on the shoulders of his successor. I am sorry, sir, to differ with my worthy colleague on so many points; but I am really not sorry that circumstances have put it in my power to prove, from the most incontestable authority, that where I have the misfortune to differ from him, I am most indubitably supported by facts. Now, sir, the first year's expenditure under the late Secretary of the Navy was $915,000. Even in that year the appropriation was exceeded, and we had to pass an appropriation bill to make up the deficit; and from that time to his going out of office, the expenditure of that department has regularly increased. The second year, the expenditure was $1,246,000; the next year, $1,273,000; the next year (and this was the year the Philadelphia was taken--she was taken about December, 1803, and that year, I believe, was about the most vigorous of the war) the expenditure was $1,597,000; the next year, $1,649,000; the next year, $1,722,000; the next year, $1,884,000; the next, two millions and a half within a trifle. Now, sir, this is a specimen of such economy as does not suit my taste, nor, I believe, the taste of the people of this country. I believe it is in proof and in the recollection of every member of experience on this floor, that that Department has long ago passed into a proverb of prodigality and waste; and if my honorable colleague will give himself an opportunity to probe it, he will find such was the fact. With respect to the present Secretary of the Navy, I have the best reason to believe that, on his coming into office, he did take various steps to introduce reform into the civil branch of the department--in regulating and checking the pursers, for instance.

Sir, a few days ago a bill was before this House for appropriating a small sum of $20,000 to prevent the most precious archives not only that this country but that any other country possesses, the evidence of the titles of our political independence, the title-deeds of the great American family, the great charters of our liberty, from destruction. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) did on that occasion vehemently oppose this bill, and on this ground--(the bill was brought in by a gentleman from Massachusetts--Mr. QUINCY) that though there was no impropriety perhaps in gentlemen on that side of the House voting for unnecessary expenditures of the public money, which in the present unexampled state of the Treasury, might tend to embarrass the Government--a strange doctrine to be sure--yet it did not become him to do it. I do hope that the worthy gentleman from Pennsylvania, who could not find it in his heart to loosen the purse-strings of the nation for the purpose of preserving the valuable archives of the country, and which, if another fire should break out in the building at the other end of the palace, between this time and the next session of Congress, might be irredeemably destroyed, for which those who were the cause of the destruction would have been answerable--if he would not vote money for this object, I hope he will not insist upon exceeding, in point of expense, as relates to the Navy, the reform which our predecessors, the Federalists, made before they went out of office, which we accepted at their hands and were contented to practise on for four years, and not compel us to go into unnecessary and wanton expenses authorized by the act of April, 1806--when, I have no hesitation in making the assertion, and am prepared to prove it, a material change was effected in the principles of those in Administration, such as I knew them, and such as they were practised upon for about the term of four years, when we began to find that patronage was a very comfortable thing, that office was desirable, that navies were not the bugbear we had thought them, and that armies were very good depositaries for our friends and relatives and dependents who had no better resource. I, therefore, move to amend the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania so as to reduce the Navy to the standard of the act of 1801.

This is indeed, said he, a novel situation in which I find myself--it is unprecedented. Little did I believe that the time would ever come when it would be my lot thus to press economy upon a Republican majority--to intreat that they would come down, not to any ideal imaginary standard of perfection--not to any theoretical proposition of mine--but that in practice they would come down, on the subject of naval expenditure, to the standard established by their Federal predecessors: and that too when we have lost, as I stated before, the Philadelphia and General Greene, and when, I believe, the John Adams is in a condition that I will not attempt to describe--I understand this vessel is so cut down and metamorphosed that nobody knows what to make of her; that she retains nothing of her former character. When I make this motion, sir, I do it with an intention of moving other amendments to other sections of the bill, so as to make the service of the United States in relation to the navy-yards and marine corps comport with the reduction which will have taken place, provided I have the good fortune to succeed.

Mr. R. then moved to amend Mr. SMILIE'S proposition by adding the following:

"And that the President shall retain in the Navy service of the United States nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen, including those employed on board of the frigates and other armed vessels to be kept in service; and that he be authorized to discharge all the other officers in the Navy service of the United States; but such of the aforesaid officers as shall be retained shall be entitled to receive no more than half their monthly pay during the time when they shall not be under orders for actual service. And provided further, That all the commissioners and warrant officers who shall be discharged as aforesaid shall be entitled to receive ---- months' pay over and above what may be due to them respectively at the time they were discharged."

Mr. JOHNSON expressed his hope that the House would come to some decision, without consuming more of the time of the House in debate.

Mr. SMILIE said he was seriously in favor of a reduction in the Navy, and was therefore opposed to Mr. RANDOLPH'S amendment to his amendment.

After some further remarks of Messrs. RANDOLPH and DANA in favor of a reduction, and Messrs. MCKIM, BOYD, and RHEA of Tennessee against it, the question was taken on Mr. RANDOLPH'S motion to amend Mr. SMILIE'S amendment, and negatived--yeas 36, nays 67.

Mr. NEWTON then said he was anxious to do his duty; but could not consent to stay here when one-third of the House at least had deserted their seats and fatigue oppressed the remainder. He therefore moved to adjourn.--Carried--yeas 60, after seven hours' sitting.

FRIDAY, April 27.

Mortality of the Troops at Terre aux Boeuf.

Mr. NEWTON, from the committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the mortality which prevailed in the detachment of the army ordered for the defence of New Orleans, made a long report, accompanied with various depositions and other papers. The report concludes as follows:

"The committee, from a knowledge which they have acquired of the climate of New Orleans and of the country surrounding it, and from the facts stated in the depositions, are of opinion that the mortality in the detachment ordered to New Orleans is to be ascribed to the following causes:

"1st. The detachment consisting of new levies.

"2dly. The insalubrity of the climate, the summer and autumn of the year 1809 being unusually sickly.

"3dly. To the nature of the ground on which the detachment was encamped at Terre aux Boeuf, and the detention of it at that place during the whole of the summer, contrary as the committee conceive to the instructions contained in the letter of the Secretary of War bearing date the 30th of April, 1809.

"4thly. To the want of sound and wholesome provisions and of vegetables--the want of an hospital and of hospital stores and medicines.

"5thly. The excessive fatigues to which the troops were subjected in clearing, ditching, and draining the ground on which they were encamped.

"6thly. To the want of repose during the night, owing to the troops not being provided with bars and nets to protect them from the annoyance of mosquitoes.

"7thly. The want of cleanliness in the camp, the nature of the position rendering it almost impracticable to preserve it.

"8thly. The sick and well being confined to the same tents, which neither protected them sufficiently from the heat of the sun, nor kept them dry from dews and rains."

The report and documents were ordered to be printed.

SATURDAY, April 28.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for reducing the Naval Establishment of the United States.

Mr. SMILIE'S amendment was modified so as to fix the number of officers, &c., to be retained in service, as follows: thirteen captains, nine masters commandant, seventy-two lieutenants, ---- midshipmen and ---- seamen, ordinary seamen and boys.

Mr. MUMFORD again moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject indefinitely--lost, yeas 40, nays 54.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to strike out the numbers thirteen, nine, and seventy-two, in the amendment, being desirous of reducing the officers, if any part of the establishment. Motion lost, ayes 40, noes 46.

Mr. N. R. MOORE called for a division of the question on Mr. SMILIE'S amendment.

And the question was taken on that part of it which authorizes the President to keep in service so many of the armed vessels as he may think proper, and to lay up the rest in ordinary in convenient ports. This part of the amendment was agreed to--yeas 61, nays 38.

The second clause of Mr. SMILIE'S amendment being under consideration--

Mr. SMILIE moved to fill the blank for the number of midshipmen with "one hundred and fifty" (about half the number at present in service)--Agreed to, ayes 51, noes 37.

The question was stated on filling the blank for the number of seamen to be retained with "two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three," as moved by Mr. BASSETT, and rejected, yeas 46, nays 52; also the question was taken on filling with 2,000, and rejected, yeas 39, nays 56; also on filling with 1,400, which was carried; and the House then adjourned.

TUESDAY, May 1.

General Wilkinson.

Mr. BUTLER, from the committee appointed to inquire into the conduct of Brigadier General, James Wilkinson, rose to make a report.

The question on reading the report was taken and carried, 58 to 32.

The report is as follows:

The committee to whom was referred the resolution of the 4th instant, directing an inquiry into the conduct of Brigadier General James Wilkinson, in relation to his having at any time, while in the service of the United States, corruptly received money from the Government of Spain, or its agents, or in relation to his having, during this time aforesaid, been an accomplice, or in any way concerned with the agents of any foreign power, or with Aaron Burr, in a project against the dominions of the King of Spain, or to dismember these United States, and to inquire generally into the conduct of the said James Wilkinson, as Brigadier General of the Army of the United States, report, that they have had under consideration the several subjects of inquiry, and have investigated them to the utmost of their power since the time of their appointment, but from the limited period in which they have acted, and from the extensive and complicated nature of the subjects, they are under the necessity of stating that they have not been able to make any thorough and conclusive investigation of the objects of their inquiry.

Such testimony, however, as they have been able to procure, they beg leave to submit as part of this report, and which may be referred to under the following heads and order:

In relation to the first objects of inquiry, to wit: the receipt of money by General Wilkinson from the Spanish Government or its agents, refer to the

[Here follows a list of papers, 19 in number.]

In relation to the second object of inquiry, to wit: the connection of General Wilkinson with the agents of Spain in a project to dismember the United States, refer to the

[Here follows a list of 11 papers.]

In relation to the third object of inquiry, to wit: General Wilkinson's connection with Aaron Burr, refer to

[Here follows a list of 14 papers.]

In relation to the fourth point of inquiry, to wit: the conduct of General Wilkinson, as Brigadier General of the army of the United States, refer to the

[Here follows a list of 6 papers.]

The committee think proper, also, to submit the following papers relating to tobacco and other commercial transactions in which General Wilkinson was concerned, from the month of ---- in the year 1788, to the month of ---- in the year 1790, to wit:

[Here follows a list of 10 papers.]

In making the last preceding statement the committee beg leave to remark, that from an examination of the sentence of the military court of inquiry, ordered at the request of General Wilkinson, and of which Colonel Burbeck was President, it appears that the tobacco transactions of General Wilkinson at New Orleans in 1789 and 1790 constituted a material part of that inquiry, and that a copy of an account current was laid before the said court by General Wilkinson and designated by No. ----, and several letters accompanying said account, supposed by the court to be in the handwriting of Philip Noland, the agent of General Wilkinson.

The committee conceiving that the papers collected by the said court would aid them in their investigation, made application for those papers to the Secretary of War, but were unable to obtain them, they having been taken from the office by General Wilkinson, as appears from the deposition of John Smith, chief clerk in the War Office. The committee then directed a subpoena to General Wilkinson, requiring him to send or produce all the papers which had been used or collected by the said court, in obedience to which General Wilkinson sent to the committee a packet of papers which did not contain either the account and letters referred to in the sentence of the court, or the defence of General Wilkinson, nor have the committee been able to procure them, and, consequently, have not had it in their power to compare the accounts herewith exhibited with those which were laid before the military court of inquiry. For the further elucidation, refer to Walter Jones's deposition, marked W. J.

The committee also submit the deposition of Daniel W. Coxe, authenticating the papers to which he specially refers, marked D. W. C.

Mr. GHOLSON observed that the reading of the documents accompanying the report would take until midnight, at least, and he hoped there would be no objection to dispense with the reading of them.

No one objecting, the reading of the documents was dispensed with, and the whole was ordered to be printed.

Adjournment.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly with such committee as may be appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him of the proposed recess of Congress.

The House proceeded to consider the resolution from the Senate to appoint a joint committee to wait on the President, and acquaint him of the proposed recess of Congress; and the same was concurred in by the House; and Messrs. CRAWFORD and ROANE were appointed the committee on the part of the House.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having completed the legislative business before them, are ready to adjourn.

Mr. CRAWFORD, from the joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him of the proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed that service, and that the President informed them that he had no further communication to make to Congress during the present session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House are now ready to adjourn; and that the clerk do go with the said message.

The clerk accordingly went with the said message; and, being returned, the SPEAKER adjourned the House until the first Monday in December next.

FOOTNOTES:

[9] Col. Isaac A. Coles, private secretary to Mr. Jefferson.

[10] By concurrence in the report of a committee, of which Mr. Madison was chairman, on the subject of a letter from Mr. Gunn to Mr. Baldwin, both members of Congress; as well as on the case of Mr. Frelinghuysen.

ELEVENTH CONGRESS.--THIRD SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 3, 1810.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

MONDAY, December 3, 1810.

The third session of the eleventh Congress, conformably to the Constitution of Government of the United States, commenced this day; and the Senate assembled at the city of Washington.

PRESENT:

NICHOLAS GILMAN and CHARLES CUTTS, from New Hampshire.

CHAUNCEY GOODRICH and SAMUEL W. DANA, from Connecticut.

JONATHAN ROBINSON, from Vermont.

OBADIAH GERMAN, from New York.

MICHAEL LEIB, from Pennsylvania.

OUTERBRIDGE HORSEY, from Delaware.

SAMUEL SMITH, from Maryland.

WILLIAM B. GILES, from Virginia.

JOHN GAILLARD, from South Carolina.

WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD and CHARLES TAIT, from Georgia.

JOHN POPE, from Kentucky.

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL, from Ohio.

JOHN GAILLARD, President pro tempore, resumed the chair.

The number of Senators present not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

TUESDAY, December 4.

JOHN LAMBERT, from the State of New Jersey, ELISHA MATHEWSON, from the State of Rhode Island, and PHILIP REED, from the State of Maryland, severally attended.

The credentials of CHARLES CUTTS, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Hampshire, in place of Nahum Parker, Esq., resigned; also, of SAMUEL W. DANA, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Connecticut, in place of James Hillhouse, Esq., resigned, were severally read; and the oath required by law was, by the PRESIDENT, administered to them, respectively.

Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives that a quorum of the Senate is assembled and ready to proceed to business.

Ordered, That Messrs SMITH, of Maryland, and GILMAN, be a committee on the part of the Senate, together with such committee as may be appointed by the House of Representatives on their part, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House of Representatives is assembled and ready to proceed to business. The House of Representatives have appointed a committee on their part, jointly with such committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.

On motion, by Mr. SMITH, of Maryland,

Resolved, That James Mathers, sergeant-at-arms and doorkeeper to the Senate, be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ one assistant and two horses, for the purpose of performing such services as are usually required by the doorkeeper to the Senate; and that the sum of twenty-eight dollars be allowed him weekly for that purpose, to commence with, and remain during the session, and for twenty days after.

Mr. SMITH, of Maryland, reported from the joint committee that they had waited on the President of the United States, and that the President informed the committee that he would make a communication to the two Houses to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

WEDNESDAY, December 5.

TIMOTHY PICKERING, from the State of Massachusetts, and STEPHEN R. BRADLEY, from the State of Vermont, severally attended.

President's Annual Message.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:

The embarrassments which have prevailed in our foreign relations, and so much employed the deliberations of Congress, make it a primary duty in meeting you to communicate whatever may have occurred in that branch of our national affairs.

The act of the last session of Congress concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, having invited, in a new form, a termination of their edicts against our neutral commerce; copies of the act were immediately forwarded to our Ministers at London and Paris, with a view that its object might be within the early attention of the French and British Governments.

By the communication received through our Minister at Paris, it appeared that a knowledge of the act by the French Government was followed by a declaration that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and would cease to have effect on the first day of November ensuing. These being the only known edicts of France within the description of the act, and the revocation of them being such that they ceased at that date to violate our neutral commerce, the fact, as prescribed by law, was announced by a proclamation, bearing date the second day of November.

It would have well accorded with the conciliatory views indicated by this proceeding on the part of France, to have extended them to all the grounds of just complaint which now remain unadjusted with the United States. It was particularly anticipated that, as a further evidence of just dispositions towards them, restoration would have been immediately made of the property of our citizens, seized under a misapplication of the principle of reprisals, combined with a misconstruction of the law of the United States. This expectation has not been fulfilled.

From the British Government, no communication on the subject of the act has been received. To a communication, from our minister at London, of a revocation, by the French Government, of its Berlin and Milan decrees, it was answered, that the British system would be relinquished as soon as the repeal of the French decrees should have actually taken effect, and the commerce of neutral nations have been restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those decrees. This pledge, although it does not necessarily import, does not exclude, the intention of relinquishing, along with the Orders in Council, the practice of those novel blockades, which have a like effect of interrupting our neutral commerce: and this further justice to the United States is the rather to be looked for, inasmuch as the blockades in question, being not more contrary to the established law of nations than inconsistent with the rules of blockade formerly recognized by Great Britain herself, could have no alleged basis other than the plea of retaliation, alleged as the basis of the Orders in Council. Under the modification of the original orders of November, 1807, into the orders of April, 1809, there is, indeed, scarcely a nominal distinction between the orders and the blockades. One of those illegitimate blockades, bearing date in May, 1806, having been expressly avowed to be still unrescinded, and to be, in effect, comprehended in the Orders in Council, was too distinctly brought within the purview of the act of Congress not to be comprehended in the explanation of the requisites to a compliance with it. The British Government was accordingly apprised by our Minister near it, that such was the light in which the subject was to be regarded.

On the other important subjects depending between the United States and that Government, no progress has been made from which an early and satisfactory result can be relied on.

In this new posture of our relations with those powers, the consideration of Congress will be properly turned to a removal of doubts which may occur in the exposition, and of difficulties in the execution, of the act above cited.

The commerce of the United States with the north of Europe, heretofore much vexed by licentious cruisers, particularly under the Danish flag, has latterly been visited with fresh and extensive depredations. The measures pursued in behalf of our injured citizens, not having obtained justice for them, a further and more formal interposition with the Danish Government is contemplated. The principles which have been maintained by that Government in relation to neutral commerce, and the friendly professions of His Danish Majesty towards the United States, are valuable pledges in favor of a successful issue.

Among the events growing out of the state of the Spanish monarchy, our attention was imperiously attracted to the change developing itself in that portion of West Florida which, though of right appertaining to the United States, had remained in the possession of Spain, awaiting the result of negotiations for its actual delivery to them. The Spanish authority was subverted, and a situation produced exposing the country to ulterior events which might essentially affect the rights and welfare of the Union. In such a conjuncture I did not delay the interposition required for the occupancy of the territory west of the river Perdido, to which the title of the United States extends, and to which the laws provided for the Territory of Orleans are applicable. With this view, the proclamation, of which a copy is laid before you, was confided to the Governor of that Territory, to be carried into effect. The legality and necessity of the course pursued, assure me of the favorable light in which it will present itself to the Legislature, and of the promptitude with which they will supply whatever provisions may be due to the essential rights and equitable interests of the people thus brought into the bosom of the American family.

Our amity with the Powers of Barbary, with the exception of a recent occurrence at Tunis, of which an explanation is just received, appears to have been uninterrupted, and to have become more firmly established.

Whilst it is universally admitted that a well-instructed people alone can be permanently a free people, and while it is evident that the means of diffusing and improving useful knowledge form so small a proportion of the expenditures for national purposes, I cannot presume it to be unseasonable to invite your attention to the advantages of superadding to the means of education, provided by the several States, a seminary of learning, instituted by the National Legislature, within the limits of their exclusive jurisdiction, the expense of which might be defrayed or reimbursed out of the vacant grounds which have accrued to the nation within those limits.

Such an institution, though local in its legal character, would be universal in its beneficial effects. By enlightening the opinions, by expanding the patriotism, and by assimilating the principles, the sentiments, and the manners, of those who might resort to this temple of science, to be redistributed, in due time, through every part of the community, sources of jealousy and prejudice would be diminished, the features of national character would be multiplied, and greater extent given to social harmony. But, above all, a well-constituted seminary, in the centre of the nation, is recommended by the consideration that the additional instruction emanating from it would contribute not less to strengthen the foundations than to adorn the structure of our free and happy system of Government.

Among the commercial abuses still committed under the American flag, and leaving in force my former reference to that subject, it appears that American citizens are instrumental in carrying on a traffic in enslaved Africans, equally in violation of the laws of humanity, and in defiance of those of their own country. The same just and benevolent motives which produced the interdiction in force against this criminal conduct, will doubtless be felt by Congress in devising further means of suppressing the evil.

In the midst of uncertainties necessarily connected with the great interests of the United States, prudence requires a continuance of our defensive and precautionary arrangement. The Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy will submit the statements and estimates which may aid Congress in their ensuing provisions for the land and naval forces. The statements of the latter will include a view of the transfers of appropriations in the naval expenditures, and the grounds on which they were made.

The corps of engineers, with the Military Academy, are entitled to the early attention of Congress. The buildings at the seat fixed by law for the present academy are so far in decay, as not to afford the necessary accommodation. But a revision of the law is recommended principally with a view to a more enlarged cultivation and diffusion of the advantages of such institutions, by providing professorships for all the necessary branches of military instruction, and by the establishment of an additional academy at the Seat of Government or elsewhere. The means by which war, as well for defence as for offence, is now carried on, render these schools of the more scientific operations an indispensable part of every adequate system. Even among nations whose large standing armies and frequent wars afford every other opportunity of instruction, these establishments are found to be indispensable for the due attainment of the branches of military science which require a regular course of study and experiment. In a Government happily without the other opportunities, seminaries, where the elementary principles of the art of war can be taught without actual war, and without the expense of extensive and standing armies, have the precious advantage of uniting an essential preparation against external danger, with a scrupulous regard to internal safety. In no other way, probably, can a provision of equal efficacy for the public defence be made at so little expense, or more consistently with the public liberty.

Reserving for future occasions, in the course of the session, whatever other communications may claim your attention, I close the present, by expressing my reliance, under the blessing of Divine Providence, on the judgment and patriotism which will guide your measures, at a period particularly calling for united councils, and inflexible exertions, for the welfare of our country, and by assuring you of the fidelity and alacrity with which my co-operation will be afforded.

JAMES MADISON.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1810.

FRIDAY, December 7.

JOSEPH ANDERSON, from the State of Tennessee, attended.

TUESDAY, December 11.

RICHARD BRENT, from the State of Virginia, attended.

WEDNESDAY, December 12.

The VICE PRESIDENT of the United States resumed the chair.

JESSE FRANKLIN, from the State of North Carolina, also took his seat in the Senate.

THURSDAY, December 13.

HENRY CLAY, from the State of Kentucky, took his seat in the Senate.

MONDAY, December 17.

JAMES LLOYD, from the State of Massachusetts, took his seat in the Senate.

TUESDAY, December 18.

JOHN CONDIT, from the State of New Jersey, and JOHN SMITH, from the State of New York, severally took their seats in the Senate.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. LEIB presented the petition of the President and Directors of the Bank of the United States, praying a renewal of their charter, for reasons therein stated; and the petition was read, and referred to a select committee, to consist of five members, to consider and report thereon; and that the petition be printed for the use of the Senate.

Messrs. CRAWFORD, LEIB, LLOYD, POPE, and ANDERSON, were appointed the committee.

Territory of Orleans.

Mr. GILES, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 8th instant, so much of the Message of the President of the United States as relates to the occupation of that part of West Florida which is included within the boundaries described by the treaty for the acquisition of Louisiana, reported a bill declaring the laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans, to extend to and to have full force and effect to the river Perdido, pursuant to the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th day of April, 1803, and for other purposes; and the bill was read, and passed to the second reading.

WEDNESDAY, December 19.

CHRISTOPHER GRANT CHAMPLIN, from the State of Rhode Island, took his seat in the Senate.

THURSDAY, December 27.

JENKIN WHITESIDE, from the State of Tennessee, took his seat in the Senate.

Occupation of West Florida.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill declaring the laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans, to extend to, and to have full force and effect, to the river Perdido, pursuant to the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803; and for other purposes.

The question was on the bill's passage to a third reading.

Mr. POPE.--Mr. President, I regret that the honorable chairman of the committee who reported this bill is not here to give it that support which his talents, information, and the importance of the subject authorize us to expect. His absence has devolved on me, as a member of the committee, and a representative of that section of the Union more immediately interested in the subject before us, to explain to the Senate some of the grounds which induced them to make this report. The first important question which the proclamation of the President and this bill presents for consideration is, whether or not the United States have a good title to the territory in question. Before I examine the treaty of cession from France to the United States, of 1803, the source of our claim, permit me to inquire what were the limits of Louisiana in that quarter to which this subject leads us before the treaty and cession of 1762-'3, between France, Spain, and Great Britain? On this subject, however, I believe there is no contrariety of opinion. Before this period, Louisiana extended east of the river Mississippi to the river Perdido. France and Spain, by the Treaty of 1719, established this boundary between Florida, now called East Florida, and Louisiana. The ancient limits of Louisiana have been so fully ascertained by the documents laid before Congress at different times, and the numerous discussions the subject has undergone, that I should only waste the time of the Senate in attempting to throw any new light on it. I shall only refer the Senate to one additional evidence that this river was the ancient eastern boundary of this province. Mr. Smollet, in his continuation of "Hume's History of England," states the answer of the British Government to the propositions made by France for peace early in the year 1761, from which it appears that France then claimed the river Perdido as their eastern limit, nor does this fact appear to have been contested by the British Minister. It appears that previous to the war which terminated in 1763, Louisiana comprehended nearly the whole country watered by the Mississippi and its branches. I find it stated in a pamphlet published in New York, that France, by a secret cession, contemporaneous with the treaty called the Family Compact of 1761, transferred this country to Spain, to induce her to become her ally in the war against Great Britain; and although I can find no evidence to support this statement, yet the events of that war, previous to that period, renders it at least probable. It will be remembered that the arms of Great Britain had triumphed over those of France, both by sea and land. France had lost Canada, and a great number of ships of war. Spain was not then a party in the war, and, to induce her to become so, it seems probable that France, under the pressure of adverse fortune, ceded to her this province. But, as this statement does not correspond with the documents on our tables, nor the views of others who have examined this subject, we are compelled to take it for granted, that the cession of West Louisiana, with the island of New Orleans, to Spain, and of East Louisiana, since called West Florida, to Great Britain, were made at the same time, in the year 1762. It is, however, well known that France made the cession to Great Britain at the instance, and for the benefit of Spain, to enable her, with the cession of Florida, now called East Florida, to obtain a restitution of Cuba. The whole of Louisiana, not conquered by Great Britain, may, with propriety, be said to have been given up, or ceded to Spain. Let us now examine that part of the treaty of cession between the United States and France of 1803, which relates to this question. By that treaty we acquired Louisiana as fully, and in the same manner, as it had been acquired by France from Spain, in virtue of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso of the 1st of October, 1800. By this treaty, Spain retroceded Louisiana to France, "with the same extent it then had in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." That this extract from that treaty is correct, cannot be doubted, as it has never been denied by Spain. The word "retrocede" in this treaty has, I believe, occasioned more doubt with regard to the meaning of this cession that any expression contained in it, but cannot, when the subject is properly examined, have the effect contended for. It is said that as France ceded to Spain, in 1762, Louisiana west of the Mississippi, including the island of New Orleans, the word "retrocede" must limit the cession to what had been previously ceded by France to Spain; but if it be true that Louisiana east and west of the Mississippi was ceded to Spain in the year 1761, although East Louisiana was afterwards ceded by France, with the consent of Spain, to Great Britain, the word "retrocede" might, with propriety, be used with reference to the original grant to Spain in 1661, or if, what will not be denied, the cession of East Louisiana to Great Britain by France, was at the instance, and for the benefit of Spain, Spain, in 1800, after she had acquired East Louisiana, alias West Florida, so called by Great Britain after 1763, could well say to France, I re-grant to you what you ceded to me, and on my account, or at least, so much as I can re-grant consistently with the treaties I have since made; and this seems to be the plain and evident meaning of the instrument. If the parties had meant to confine the retrocession to the limits of the cession, made by France to Spain, of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, including the island of New Orleans, they would have used the same deception. They would certainly have stopped after saying the extent it then had in the hands of Spain. But to prevent mistake or misconstruction, they add, "that it had when France possessed it," and, what is still more conclusive of the meaning of the parties, they go on to say, "and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." As Spain had never entered into any treaty with regard to the western boundary of Louisiana, and as the only treaties to which the parties could have alluded was that of 1783 with Great Britain, and of 1795 with the United States, both relative to limits on the east side of the Mississippi, it is perfectly clear that the contracting parties meant to comprehend whatever of Louisiana, on the east side of the Mississippi, Spain had a title to. If the construction I contend for is not admitted, then the latter parts of the description will have no effect, contrary to a settled principle of law and common sense, that every part of an instrument shall have effect, if it can by any reasonable construction. To strengthen the construction for which I insist, it may not be amiss to consider the views of the French Government at the time this treaty of St. Ildefonso was made. They no doubt acquired this province with an intention of holding it, and it was an object of national pride to regain as much as practicable of the colonies which had been lost under the old Government. Besides, they could not be ignorant of the importance of East Louisiana, now West Florida, to the security of New Orleans; and, as the practicability of obtaining it at that time from Spain cannot be doubted, the presumption is irresistible that the cession was intended to embrace it. I had intended to have ascertained at the Department of State the ground of objection with Spain to the surrender of that country to the United States, but have not made the inquiry. I do not, however, think it difficult to account for the conduct of Spain. My conjecture is, that France, after she had sold Louisiana to the United States, and received the price stipulated, secretly advised Spain not to surrender it, having at that time formed the project which she is now attempting to execute, of acquiring the whole Spanish Empire. Her interest was, therefore, identified with that of Spain, and she was, no doubt, willing to unite with Spain in giving the most limited construction to the cession to the United States. I find that Congress, by an act passed on the 24th of February, 1804, have solemnly asserted our right to this territory, and authorized the President to take possession of it and to establish a port of entry, &c., on the Mobile, whenever he should deem it expedient. The time when, and circumstances under which, this step should be taken, were submitted to the discretion of the Executive. I may be permitted to ask why, if we had no title to this territory, the President was urged to take possession by force, and censured for not doing it? If my recollection is accurate, all parties agreed we ought to have the country--they only differed as to the mode of acquiring it. The President, influenced by that policy which has hitherto guided the present Administration, of avoiding making this nation a party in the present European war, in the exercise of the discretionary power vested in him by that act, did not think proper to seize upon it by force, but to wait for the occurrence of events to throw it into our hands without a struggle.

The expediency of taking possession of this territory cannot, it appears to me, admit of a doubt. If the President had refused or hesitated to meet the wishes of the people of West Florida by extending to them the protection of the American Government, and they had sought security in the arms of a foreign power, what should we have heard? He would have been charged with imbecility, and fear of incurring responsibility. He would have been denounced as unworthy of the station his country had assigned him. Let it be remembered that the Orleans country is our most valuable part--remote from our physical force--a climate more fatal to our people than the sword of a victorious enemy--and that an enemy in possession of West Florida can with great facility cut off New Orleans from the upper country. If the fortunate moment had not been seized, this province would have fallen into the hands of a foreign power, or, if time had been given for intrigue to mature itself, another Burr plot would probably have risen from the ashes of the first, more formidable to the integrity of this empire. Burr, like Archimedes, fancied that if he had a place to stand upon--a place beyond the jurisdiction of the United States to rally his followers--he could overturn the Government. He has, it is true, fled from the frowns of an indignant country; but he was not alone. Let an opportunity be afforded, and a thousand Burrs would throw off the mask and point their arms against the Federal Union. On a subject of such interest, it would have been criminal in those appointed to watch over the national safety to have hesitated. I was surprised to hear this procedure pronounced a robbery, and making of war. Why should our sympathies be awakened in favor of Spain? What claim has the Spanish Government upon our moderation and forbearance? What has been her conduct? From the moment we became an independent nation she has been intriguing to separate the Western country from the Atlantic States. She has made, at different periods, and as late as the year 1797, in violation of her treaty of 1795 with this country, direct propositions to the Western people to secede from the Union, and to accomplish her object, at least attempted the use of means the most corrupt. What has been her conduct since we acquired Louisiana? If I am correctly informed, our deserters and slaves who have taken refuge in Florida, in many instances have not been surrendered, and enormous duties have been imposed on our vessels navigating the Mobile. Under all these provocations, sufficient to have drawn upon them from almost any other nation an open declaration of war, our Government, influenced by that pacific policy which has hitherto regulated its course towards foreign nations, exercised patience and forbearance. And since the late revolution in Spain, I believe it will not be pretended that this Government has manifested any disposition to throw our weight into the scale of France against the Spanish party. Our Government has taken no step in relation to West Florida, until compelled by a regard to our own safety. The Executive in the proceeding under consideration has used language the most conciliatory, and on the face of his proclamation given a pledge that this Government will at any time enter into amicable negotiations on the subject of our claim to this territory, if it shall be disputed.

There are other at least plausible grounds upon which this bill as an original proposition might be supported entirely independent of the cession. Spain is indebted to us a large amount for spoliations committed on our commerce; and as there is no Government at present towards which the ordinary proceeding can be pursued to obtain payment, could we not, on the principle of the attachment law, as an act of self-justice, seize on this territory to secure satisfaction?

As this measure has been emphatically called an act of robbery and war, it may not be amiss to consider the political state of the Spanish colonies in relation to the Spanish Government in the hands of the Junta, and the new dynasty about to be established by Bonaparte. It may be said, perhaps, that the late alienation of the Spanish Crown and the revolution in Spain have dissolved the tie which connects them with the mother country. On this point I will not detain the Senate. If the French arms shall be successful in Spain, of which I believe few entertain much doubt, and the Junta shall be driven from Old Spain to any of the colonies, their political character must cease, and they can no longer claim the exercise of any jurisdiction or sovereignty over the colonies. The colonies are not bound together by any political bond unconnected with the mother country; they are subject to the mother country, but the moment she is conquered, they are at liberty to provide for themselves, unless, indeed, the Emperor of France or King Joseph can claim them. France, in an official exposé, and King Joseph, by proclamation, have declared their willingness that the colonies should become independent, provided they did not connect themselves with Great Britain. If France, therefore, shall, which is probable, conquer the mother country, we are fully authorized by her public declaration to the world to acquire, with the consent of the inhabitants, not only West but East Florida, Cuba, or any other province which we shall deem it expedient to connect with the United States. This bill may be justified, independent of title, by the law of self-preservation. Have we any assurance that the Spanish Government will maintain their neutrality in this territory if we should be involved in a war with either France or Great Britain? Can they, or will they, prevent the march of an enemy's forces through that territory into the United States? No, sir; we have every reason to expect the contrary. Considering how vulnerable we are from this territory, its present state, and the aspect of our foreign affairs, it appears to me we are authorized to take possession of it as a measure of national security. It may be objected that taking the property of others by force tends to relax the morals of the people, by destroying that criterion of right and wrong, the observance of which is so necessary to the purity of our Republic; and I am ready to admit that we ought to proceed upon this principle of necessity and expediency with great caution, and never to act upon it but in extreme and evident cases. Had we a colony on the coast of England or France, similarly situated, we know they would not hesitate. When we reflect that our property is seized by almost every nation; that the laws and usages of nations are disregarded by nearly all Europe; that their conduct has been lately marked with a degree of perfidy and rapacity unexampled in the history of the civilized world; that they have in fact become States of Barbary; it appears to me that we ought not, as regards them, to be over nice or squeamish upon questions of this sort. Shall we sit here with our arms folded until the enemy is at our gates? If we waste our time in discussion and refining abstract questions of right and wrong, we shall lose our independence, and we shall deserve to lose it. I had hoped this bill would have passed without much debate; I know the people are tired of long speeches and documents. This fondness for lengthy discussions, has even drawn upon Congress the reproaches of the ladies; they begin to say--less talk and more action.

FRIDAY, December 28.

Occupation of West Florida.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill respecting the territory west of the Perdido.

Mr. HORSEY addressed the Senate as follows:

Mr. President: The bill under consideration contains two important provisions. The first in effect incorporates with the Territory of Orleans the province of West Florida east of the Mississippi, as far as the river Perdido; the second extends to that part of the province thus incorporated the laws now in force within the said Territory.

These provisions naturally involve two questions: first, whether the United States have a good title to that part of the province described in the bill; and secondly, whether it would be expedient for the Government of the United States to take possession of it by force.

Before I proceed to consider these questions, I beg leave, Mr. President, to advert to what may be considered a preliminary question. I refer to the authority of the President of the United States to issue his proclamation and the accompanying orders of the 27th of August last, directing the forcible occupation of that territory. I deem it material to consider this point, because, if the proclamation were unauthorized, then Congress are not committed by it, nor are they bound to give it their sanction.

If the President had any authority to issue this proclamation, that authority must have been derived either under the Constitution of the United States or under some act or acts of Congress. The President has no power which does not proceed from one or the other of these sources. The constitution has given to Congress the exclusive power of making laws and declaring war--to the President the power of executing the laws of the Union. The powers of the one are legislative, of the other executive. The question then would be, whether the President in issuing this proclamation has not transcended the limits of his powers.

Sir, what is the nature and import of this proclamation? In my humble conception both legislation and war. War--because it directs the occupation of this territory by a military force. The regular troops of the United States are ordered to march, and if they should not be found adequate to the object, the Governors of the Orleans and Mississippi Territories are directed to call out the militia of their respective territories, to co-operate with the regular forces. But we shall be told, sir, that the President, in issuing this proclamation, has taken the precaution to direct that in case any particular place, however small, should remain in possession of a Spanish force, the commanding officer is not to proceed to employ force against it, but to make immediate report thereof to the Secretary of State. Suppose while your commanding officer is making this report, the Spanish force sallies out and makes an attack upon your army, or suppose a Spanish army, with Governor Folch at their head, should march from East Florida with the view of repelling the invasion of this territory; what are Governor Claiborne and his army to do? Ground their arms and surrender themselves prisoners of war; or are they, sir, to drop their muskets and take to their heels? These are the only alternatives presented--they must either surrender, run, or fight. And who will doubt which of these alternatives the gallantry of an American army would impel them to choose! Sir, a conflict would be inevitable.

But while the President has been so affectedly cautious with respect to Spanish force, he has overlooked altogether the contingency of resistance on the part of the revolutionists. These patriots it would seem had called a convention and issued a declaration of independence, and now it appears have formed and established a regular Government, which is organized and in operation. If these proceedings are not all a sham, the territory in question is now in the possession of a people claiming to be sovereign and independent; and is it supposable that this people can behave so dastardly as to submit, without a struggle, to the incursion of a hostile army, whose avowed object is the conquest of the country and the subversion of its constitution and independence? And here permit me to remark, that the style and tenor of the letter from the Secretary of State of the 15th of November, 1810, to Governor Holmes, in answer to the letter of the President of the convention praying the recognition and protection of the United States, are not admirably calculated to give a welcome reception to the American Army. If then assistance should be offered on the part of the constitutionalists, what is your army to do? The orders contain no proviso in this particular, requiring that the fact should be reported to the Department of State; but their clear intent is, that force should be employed. Under such circumstances is it not to be expected that this measure of the Executive will result in war? Is it not to be expected, that either the Spaniards or the Conventionalists will attempt to repel this palpable infringement upon their rights and territory?

But, sir, this proclamation is not only war, but it is an act of legislation too. It annexes the territory in question to the Orleans Territory; it creates a Governor; it enacts laws, and appropriates money. It gives the Governor of the Orleans Territory all the authorities and functions over this particular territory which he possesses by virtue of his office as governor, and makes an appropriation of a sum of money, not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. This proclamation is substantially the bill under discussion, except that it goes much further. The first section of the bill only contains an annexation of the territory in question to the Orleans Territory--this the proclamation has already done. The second section only extends the laws of that territory to the particular territory in question--and this too the proclamation has already done. The only material difference in fact existing between the proclamation and this bill is, that the proclamation contains the further and important provision for raising the troops and the money necessary for carrying it into execution. And here, sir, I will take the liberty to remark that I do not consider this bill the only one intended on this subject. This is a mere entering wedge--when this is passed, Congress are permitted to pass another, providing the necessary military and pecuniary means to carry this act into execution; and, indeed, I should not be surprised, if, before the close of the session, a bill were introduced to take possession of East as well as West Florida.

If the President had no power under the constitution to issue this proclamation, I think it equally clear he had none under any existing laws of Congress. The act of the 31st of October, 1803, authorizing the President of the United States to take possession of and occupy the territory ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803, I apprehend, expired on the 1st day of October, 1804; to which period it was limited by the first section of the act for erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof, passed the 20th day of March, 1804.

This section enacts, that "the act passed the 31st day of October, entitled 'An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th day of April, 1803; and for the temporary government thereof,' shall continue in force until the 1st day of October, 1804, any thing therein to the contrary notwithstanding; on which said 1st day of October, this act shall commence, and have full force, and shall continue in force for and during the term of one year, and to the end of the next session of Congress, which may happen thereafter." Let it be recollected that at the time this last-mentioned act passed, the President had fulfilled his powers, under the act of the 31st of October, 1803, so far as it respected the taking possession of Louisiana. Possession had been actually and formally delivered, and the stock created and transferred to the French Government, according to the stipulations of the treaty. Besides, the very nature and design of the act of the 26th March, independent of the express limitation, superseded the act of the 31st of October.

But it is said, there are acts of Congress which, though contemplating a present possession in a foreign authority, also contemplate an ultimate possession by the United States, under which the proclamation may be justified, even though the act of the 31st of October should have expired. The acts here referred to, I understand to be the act of the 24th of February, 1804, for laying and collecting duties within the territories ceded by France to the United States, the act above mentioned of the 26th of March, erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and the act of the 2d of March, 1805, authorizing the establishment of a Government in the Territory of Orleans, similar to the Government of the Mississippi Territory. The President himself admits, in his message at the opening of the session, that those laws contemplate a present possession in a foreign Power; but he further says, they contemplate an eventual possession by the United States. But, sir, let me ask what sort of possession? A possession by force? No, sir, not a single provision can be shown to justify such a construction. But a possession to be obtained by a friendly negotiation. I am warranted in this construction, not merely by the letter of those laws, by the lapse of time since their enactment, by the express official declaration of Mr. Madison himself, while Secretary of State. It is a notorious fact, that when the act of the 24th of February passed, the Marquis D'Yrujo, then the Minister of his Catholic Majesty in the United States, in a solemn form protested against that law; and that Mr. Madison, by a letter dated on the 19th of March, assured the Marquis that the provisions relating to Louisiana "would not be extended beyond the acknowledged limits of the United States, until it shall be rendered expedient by friendly elucidation and adjustments with His Catholic Majesty."

Upon the whole, sir, I have not been able to discover the shadow of authority, on the ground of which the President issued this proclamation. He has recited none, amidst all his recitals, and none appears to me but his own mere will and pleasure.

The act I therefore cannot view in any other light than an unwarrantable assumption of power and a violation of the constitution.

Considering then, sir, this act of the Executive as illegal and unauthorized, we are fully at liberty to enter into the discussion of the great questions of title and expediency; a task which I will proceed to discharge to the best of my ability.

The first I propose to examine is, the title of the United States to the territory in question. With respect to this, I perceive, it unfortunately happens that honorable gentlemen who support the bill do not precisely accord in sentiment. The gentleman from Vermont (Mr. BRADLEY) has frankly conceded that the United States acquired no title under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. Another gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland) has declared that the United States did derive a title under that treaty, and disclaims the title set up by the honorable gentleman from Vermont. I shall not undertake to decide which of the two gentlemen is right, if either be, but shall contend, and humbly expect to prove, that both are wrong.

What is the nature of the title set up by the gentleman from Vermont? Not under the treaty, he has candidly owned, but he supposes a title to exist on the ground of certain quaint principles of the common law, relative to the doctrines of estoppel and occupancy. I am extremely happy, sir, to find that honorable gentleman introducing the common law as authority upon this floor, especially on so great an occasion. His doctrines certainly evince both research and ingenuity, and show that he, like many with whom he acts, has not absolutely lost his veneration for the black letter. What are his doctrines? Why in the first place, he says, admitting that Spain did not cede Florida to France by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, and admitting that France had no title to Florida on the 30th of April, 1803, when she ceded Louisiana to the United States, yet, as France has since acquired a title to the crown of Spain and her colonies, and as the French Plenipotentiary, when the treaty of 30th of April, 1803, was executed, did state and induce the American Ministers to understand and believe that Florida was comprehended in the cession, why the title, though France had it not when the treaty was signed, yet having it subsequently, immediately attached in the United States, and France is estopped from saying any thing to the contrary. This argument, sir, begs every thing: 1st. That the declarations on the part of the French Minister were made; 2dly, that being made they would operate to pass the title contrary to the express letter of the treaty; and lastly, that France has acquired a good title to the crown of Spain and her colonies. I will yield to the gentleman his first proposition, and grant, as he seems to desire it, that these representations were made--and what do they prove? Not that the title passed, but that the French Minister was too deep for the American Plenipotentiaries, and, to use a jockey phrase, took them in. Sir, the only legal effect of such a fraud would be, to violate the treaty--to annul the contract. France, to be sure, would be bound upon principles of equity to refund the purchase money.

If then, sir, I am correct in stating, that no conversations or verbal declarations, however fraudulent, would operate to control or vary the plain letter and intent of the treaty, as appearing on the face of it, then upon the gentleman's own acknowledgments no title to Florida could have passed to the United States under the treaty of 1803. For the gentleman has unequivocally admitted that Florida was not ceded by Spain to France by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, and France, it is admitted on all sides, by the treaty of 1803, only ceded to the United States Louisiana, as fully, and in the same manner she acquired it from Spain by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso; nor, sir, can I admit that France has acquired a legitimate title to the crown and colonies of Spain, which must also appear before the gentleman can avail himself of his argument. What, Mr. President, is the nature of this title? Was it obtained bona fide for a fair and full consideration? No, sir, but by the most abominable perfidy, corruption and duress, of which the pages of history furnish an example. Was not the royal family decoyed by artifice from Madrid to Bayonne? Was not the old Monarch compelled to resign his crown to Ferdinand the Seventh, and was not that Prince a prisoner of Bonaparte; and, while in this condition, and, for aught we know, the bayonet at his breast, or the cup to his lips, constrained to resign his crown to the Emperor of France? Sir, what sort of title is this? Upon the eternal principles of justice, upon the principles of the common law and common sense, an instrument thus obtained is not obligatory on the party executing it.

But have the people of Spain acquiesced? No, sir; the instant publicity was given to the transaction they became indignant, and with one voice rose, resolved to resist this usurpation. To this hour they have not submitted.

But the gentleman has said that Spain is no longer able to hold Florida; that foreign emissaries will take it if the United States do not, and that it may be lawfully taken by the United States on the ground of the law of occupancy.

That title may be acquired by occupancy is not to be doubted. It is the mode by which title to property was originally acquired; but to obtain a title in this way the country must be vacant, uninhabited and not claimed by another proprietor. But in this instance is the territory vacant--or uninhabited--or abandoned by its proprietors? No, sir. The territory is either in the possession of Spain and claimed by her, or of the revolutionists, and if either be in possession, by the law of occupancy, you have no right to disturb them. Clearly then, sir, upon the principles and admissions of the honorable gentleman from Vermont, the United States have no title to Florida.

And now, sir, with the indulgence of the Senate, I will proceed to consider as briefly as possible the nature of this title as derived under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. Here, it will be granted, I meet the question fairly. This, I presume, is the title relied upon, as well by the Executive as the majority of the supporters of this bill.

In order fully to understand this subject, it is necessary to inquire into the principal cause of the war of 1756. The eastern boundary of Louisiana, I believe, was the chief cause of that war. The French were in the possession of the Mississippi, and claimed as part of Louisiana not only the country to the west of that river, but east as far as the Alleghany mountains. France, having this claim, and being in possession of Canada, conceived the project of uniting Louisiana with Canada. To accomplish her purpose she established a line of posts from the Lakes to the Ohio, and commenced encroachments upon the then British colonies. These encroachments she was pressing so far that Great Britain perceived it would be necessary to repel them. This brought on the war of '56, which, after a bloody conflict of seven years, terminated disastrously to France and her allies, and resulted in the establishment of the Mississippi, the Iberville, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, as the boundary of Louisiana, giving to Great Britain all the territory on the east of that boundary, except the island and town of New Orleans, and to France all upon the west, including the island and town of New Orleans.

A more particular examination of the results of this war is important. By it France lost Canada and most of her West India islands. Spain, the ally of France, lost Cuba. By the preliminary articles of peace between Great Britain, France, and Spain, signed at Fontainebleau, and dated the 3d November, 1762, France renounced all pretensions to Nova Scotia, and ceded and guarantied to his Britannic Majesty, in full right, Canada with all its dependencies. The 6th article stipulates, "In order to re-establish peace on the most solid and lasting foundations and to remove every subject of dispute with regard to the limits of the British and French Territories on the continent of North America, it is agreed that for the future the confines between the dominions of His Britannic Majesty and those of his most Christian Majesty, (French King,) in that part of the world, shall be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn along the middle of the river Mississippi from its source, as far as the river Iberville, and from thence by a line drawn along the middle of this river, and of the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea; and to this purpose, the most Christian King cedes in full right, and guaranties to His Britannic Majesty, the river and port of Mobile, (now West Florida,) and every thing that he possesses, or ought to have possessed on the left (east) side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans, and the island on which it is situated, which shall remain to France." By the 18th article, Great Britain restores to Spain all that she had conquered in the island of Cuba, with the fortress of Havana. In consequence of which His Catholic Majesty (King of Spain) by the 19th article "cedes and guaranties in full right, to His Britannic Majesty, all that Spain possesses on the continent of North America, to the east or the south-east of the Mississippi, including Florida, with Fort St. Augustine and the bay of Pensacola." (Now consisting of East and a part of West Florida.) By the definitive treaty of peace and friendship between the Kings of Great Britain, France, and Spain, concluded at Paris on the 10th day of February, 1763, the preliminary articles were adopted, ratified, and confirmed. By another treaty bearing date the 3d day of November, 1762, the same day and year the preliminary articles are dated, as appears by the letter to M. L'Abbadie, which I will presently refer to, France cedes Louisiana to Spain, together with the town and island of New Orleans. This last-mentioned treaty has never been published, but the letter of the King of France to M. L'Abbadie recites the purport as well as date of it. This letter purports to be an order signed by the King of France, dated at Versailles, the 21st April, 1764, and directed to M. L'Abbadie, director-general, and commandant for His Majesty in Louisiana. This letter was published at New Orleans in October, 1764, and circulated amongst the French inhabitants there. It recites:

"By a special act, done at Fontainebleau, November 3, 1762, of my own will and mere motion, having ceded to my very dear and best beloved cousin the King of Spain, and to his successors, in full property, purely and simply, and without any exceptions, the whole country known by the name of Louisiana, together with New Orleans, and the island in which the said city is situated; and by another act done at the Escurial, November 13, in the same year, His Catholic Majesty having accepted the cession of the said country of Louisiana, and the city and island of New Orleans, agreeably to the copies of the said acts, which you will find hereunto annexed; I write you this letter to inform you, that my intention is, that on the receipt of these presents, whether they come to your hands by the officers of His Catholic Majesty or directly by such French vessels as may be charged with the same, you are to deliver up to the governor, or officer appointed for that purpose by the King of Spain, the said country and colony of Louisiana, and the posts thereon depending, likewise the city and island of New Orleans, in such state and condition as they shall be found to be in on the day of the said cession, willing that in all time to come they shall belong to His Catholic Majesty, to be governed and administered by his governors and officers, and as possessed by him in full property, without any exceptions."

From this document, and the treaties referred to, it appears that in the month of October, 1764, when the whole of Louisiana, with the island and town of New Orleans, was delivered to Spain, that Great Britain was in the peaceable possession of all the country on the east of the Mississippi. That with respect to Florida particularly, Great Britain was in possession, and nobody dreamed at that time, that Florida either East or West, was any part of Louisiana. Had it been so considered under the orders of the French King, to deliver the whole of the province to Spain, undoubtedly Florida would have been delivered.

Immediately after the cession of '62-3, Great Britain took possession of all the country on the east of the Mississippi, except only the town and island of New Orleans, and, in the year 1763 or '4, erected Old Florida, Pensacola, the river and port of Mobile, &c., into two distinct provinces, under the name of East and West Florida, names which they have borne ever since. In 1783, at the close of our Revolutionary war, Great Britain ceded to Spain East and West Florida, which, from that period to the present time, have been held by Spain under these names, as separate provinces from Louisiana. In the year 1800, when Spain was in possession of East and West Florida and Louisiana, as three several and distinct provinces, the famous Treaty of St. Ildefonso was concluded, whereby Spain "retrocedes to France the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." This treaty likewise has not been published, but the part just referred to is cited in the treaty between the United States and France of the 30th of April, 1803, whereby France cedes to the United States Louisiana, as fully and in the same manner as she acquired it of Spain by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. Spain delivered possession in pursuance of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso to France, and France, in pursuance of the treaty of 1803, delivered possession to the United States, both powers receiving the country on the West of the Mississippi, with the island and city of New Orleans, like Spain originally received it from France, as the whole of Louisiana.

I have now, I believe, sir, given a full and I trust fair and correct statement of the evidences and facts relative to the question of title. A few remarks will close what I have to say on this head. The letter from the King of France to M. L'Abbadie, is a very important document. It shows that the King of France, under whom we claim, and by whose admissions we are bound, so long ago as 1764, treated and considered the country on the west of the Mississippi as the whole of Louisiana. That, so considering it, he ceded and delivered it to Spain, together with the island and town of New Orleans, from which latter words it may be inferred that even the island and town of New Orleans were then not considered a part of Louisiana. In 1800, when Spain ceded back the colony of Louisiana to France, that country was only known on the west of the Mississippi. The war '56, and the treaties of '62-3, had fixed the line and obliterated forever the name of Louisiana on the east of that river.

The Treaty of St. Ildefonso, of 1800, is a mere treaty of retrocession. The translation purports to be a treaty of cession, it is true, but acknowledged on all sides to be erroneous. The original treaty was in the French language, and it is by that we are to be governed. The expression in the original is "Sa Majesté Catholique promit et s'engage, de son cote, à retroceder à la Republique Française," &c. A retroceder signifying to retrocede, to restore, or to use a term familiar in the State I have the honor to represent, reconvey the colony of Louisiana to France, as it was when France conveyed it to Spain. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. POPE,) pressed by this argument, could only get round it by alleging that the original treaty between France and Spain was dated in 1761, prior to the settlement of the line and the cessions to Great Britain. But, unfortunately, he could not produce one title of authentic evidence to establish his position, a position absolutely negatived by the official letter to M. L'Abbadie. But that gentleman has further told us, that from the words "with the same extent it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between other States," an intention may be raised to include Florida. I fully subscribe to the gentleman's rule, that we must give such a construction to the treaty, and particularly to the passage just referred to, as will give effect, if possible, to all the parts; and this I apprehend may be done without having recourse to the forced construction contended for. In the first place, the two first members of the passage may be reconciled and have effect by considering them as a twofold description of the same territory. From abundant caution it is not uncommon to give various descriptions of the same object. Sometimes the name is simply used, sometimes it is described by metes and bounds, and sometimes by the names of the adjacent countries. Sometime a twofold, and sometimes a threefold description is given. And upon a critical examination, I think it will be found that this is the only true construction the instrument will bear. If you give it the construction the gentleman contends for, to wit: that the second member of the passage is an extension of the description given by the first, then the second includes the first, and of consequence the first would be nugatory and superfluous; which would be doing violence to the gentleman's own rule of construction. But if the gentleman will insist on giving to the second member an enlarged or extended sense, it may be done by applying it to the western boundaries of Louisiana. It is said that when France ceded Louisiana to Spain, in '62, the country extended on the west to the river Sabine, and that Spain, prior to the treaty of 1808, detached from Louisiana the territory south of the waters emptying into the Red River, and erected it into a new province under the name of the "Province of Texas." Sir, the operations on the Sabine are memorable. It is well known how mysteriously they were suspended by an arrangement in 1806, by which it was agreed that the Spaniards should not cross the Sabine, and that the Americans should not extend their settlements as far as that river. And for this purpose, to prevent collisions, until the difference should be settled, instructions were given that no surveys should be made west of a meridian passing by Nachitoches.

If the gentleman is not satisfied by travelling to the west, by going to the east he may find an application--the town and island of New Orleans, which, though named in the cession to Spain, are not named in the treaty of retrocession to France.

As to the third member of the passage, it is a formal provision introduced into most treaties, and would be understood if not expressed. Of course the cession would be subject to prior treaties with other States. In 1795, Spain concluded a treaty with the United States, whereby she agrees that the navigation of the Mississippi, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, shall be free to the citizens of the United States, and that they shall have the right to deposite their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, free of duty for three years, and after that period, if the privilege is not extended at the port of New Orleans, she is to assign to the United States, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment. To these provisions the clause in question I apprehend refers.

The holding or possession of Louisiana is correspondent with the construction I have given the treaty. When possession was originally delivered by France to Spain, Florida was not delivered or considered any part of the cession. When Louisiana, under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso was restored to France, Florida was not delivered. When Louisiana, under the treaty of 1803, was delivered to the United States, Florida was not comprehended. Indeed the Government of the United States then treated the country on the west of the Mississippi, including the town and island of New Orleans, as the whole of Louisiana, by receiving it and paying the purchase money, which by the terms of the treaty they were not bound to do, and which by the act of Congress creating the Louisiana stock they were not authorized to do, till after full and entire possession had been delivered.

Mr. President, is it conceivable that after the boundary in question had been established by the most solemn compact of nations, and consecrated by a long and bloody war, and, too, by a lapse of near forty years--is it conceivable that the territory in question, excluded by that boundary, and raised into a distinct province under a distinct name--a name it ever bore after the establishment of the boundary--is it, I say, sir, conceivable, if the parties meant to have included this province in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, that it should not have been specifically named?

Mr. CLAY.--Mr. President, it would have gratified me if some other gentleman had undertaken to reply to the ingenious argument which you have just heard. But not perceiving any one disposed to do so, a sense of duty obliges me, though very unwell, to claim your indulgence while I offer my sentiments on this subject, so interesting to the Union at large, but particularly to the western section of it. Allow me, sir, to express my admiration at the more than Aristidean justice, which, in a question of territorial title between the United States and a foreign nation, induces certain gentlemen to espouse the pretensions of the foreign nation. Doubtless, in any future negotiations, she will have too much magnanimity to avail herself of these spontaneous concessions in her favor, made on the floor of the Senate of the United States.

It was to have been expected, that in a question like the present, gentlemen, even on the same side, would have different views, and although arriving at a common conclusion, would do so by various arguments. And hence the honorable gentleman from Vermont entertains doubts with regard to our title against Spain, while he feels entirely satisfied of it against France. Believing, as I do, that our title against both powers is indisputable, under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso between Spain and France, and, the treaty between the French Republic and the United States, I shall not inquire into the treachery by which the King of Spain is alleged to have lost his crown; nor shall I stop to discuss the question involved in the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy, and how far the power of Spain ought to be considered as merged in that of France. I shall leave the honorable gentleman from Delaware to mourn over the fortunes of the fallen Charles. I have no commiseration for princes. My sympathies are reserved for the great mass of mankind, and I own that the people of Spain have them most sincerely.

I will adopt the course suggested by the nature of the subject, and pursued by other gentlemen, of examining into our title to the country lying between the Mississippi and the Rio Perdido (which, to avoid circumlocution, I will call West Florida, although it is not the whole of it)--and the propriety of the recent measures taken for the occupation of it. Our title depends, first, upon the limits of the province or colony of Louisiana, and secondly, upon a just exposition of the treaties before mentioned.

On this occasion it is only necessary to fix the eastern boundary. In order to ascertain this, it is proper to take a cursory view of the settlement of the country; the basis of European title to colonies in America being prior discovery or prior occupancy. In 1682, La Salle migrated from Canada, then owned by France, descended the Mississippi and named the country which it waters, Louisiana. About 1698, D'Iberville discovered by sea the mouth of the Mississippi, established a colony at the Isle Dauphine or Massacre, which lies at the mouth of the bay of Mobile, and one at the mouth of the river Mobile, and was appointed, by France, governor of the country. In the year 1717, the famous West India Company sent inhabitants to the Isle Dauphine, and found some of those who had been settled there under the auspices of D'Iberville. About the same period Biloxi, near the Pascagoula, was settled. In 1719, the city of New Orleans was laid off, and the seat of the Government of Louisiana was established there. In 1736, the French erected a fort on Tombigbee. These facts prove that France had the actual possession of the country as far east as the Mobile at least. But the great instrument which ascertains, beyond all doubt, that the country in question is comprehended within the limits of Louisiana, is one of the most authentic and solemn character which the archives of the nation can furnish. I mean the patent granted in 1712, by Louis XIV. to Crozat. [Here Mr. C. read such parts of the patent as were applicable to the subject.] According to this document, in describing the province or colony of Louisiana, it is declared to be bounded by Carolina on the east and Old and New Mexico on the west. Under this high record evidence, it might be insisted that we have a fair claim to East as well as West Florida, against France at least, unless she has by some convention or other obligatory act, restricted the eastern limit of the province. It has, indeed, been asserted that by the treaty between France and Spain, concluded in the year 1719, the Perdido was expressly stipulated to be the boundary between their respective provinces of Florida on the east and Louisiana on the west; but as I have been unable to find any such treaty, I am induced to doubt its existence.

About the same period, to wit, towards the seventeenth century, when France settled the isle Dauphine and the Mobile, Spain erected a fort at Pensacola. But Spain never pushed her actual settlements or conquests further west than the bay of Pensacola, whilst those of the French were bounded on the east by the Mobile. Between those two points, a space of about thirteen or fourteen leagues, neither nation had the exclusive possession. The Rio Perdido, forming the bay of the same name, discharges itself into the Gulf of Mexico between the Mobile and Pensacola, and, being a natural and the most notorious object between them, presented itself as a suitable boundary between the possessions of the two nations. It accordingly appears very early to have been adopted as the boundary, by tacit if not express consent. The ancient charts and historians, therefore, of the country so represent it. Dupratz, one of the most accurate historians in point of fact and detail of the time, whose work was published as early as 1758, describes the coast as being bounded on the east by the Rio Perdido. In truth, sir, no European nation whatever, except France, ever occupied any portion of West Florida, prior to her cession of it to England in 1762. The gentlemen on the other side do not indeed strongly controvert, if they do not expressly admit, that Louisiana, as held by France anterior to her cession of it in 1762, reached to the Perdido. The only observation made by the gentleman from Delaware to the contrary, to wit, that the island of New Orleans being particularly mentioned could not for that reason constitute a part of Louisiana, is susceptible of a very satisfactory answer. That island was excepted out of the grant to England, and was the only part of the province east of the river that was so excepted. It formed in itself one of the most prominent and important objects of the cession to Spain originally, and was transferred to her with the portion of the province west of the Mississippi. It might with equal propriety be urged that St. Augustine is not in East Florida, because St. Augustine is expressly mentioned by Spain in her cession of that province to England. From this view of the subject I think it results that the province of Louisiana comprised West Florida, previous to the year 1762.

What is done with it at this epoch? By a secret convention of the 3d of November of that year, France ceded the country lying west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans to Spain; and by a contemporaneous act, the articles preliminary to the definitive Treaty of 1763, she transferred West Florida to England. Thus at the same instant of time she alienated the whole province.

Posterior to this grant, Great Britain, having also acquired from Spain her possessions east of the Mississippi, erected the country into two provinces, East and West Florida. In this state of things it continued until the peace of 1783, when Great Britain, in consequence of the events of the war, surrendered the country to Spain, who for the first time came into the actual possession of West Florida. Well, sir, how does she dispose of it? She re-annexes it to the residue of Louisiana; extends the jurisdiction of that Government to it, and subjects the Governors or commandants of the districts of Baton Rouge, Feliciana, Mobile, and Pensacola, to the authority of the Governor of Louisiana, residing at New Orleans; whereas the Governor of East Florida is placed wholly without his control, and is made amenable directly to the Governor of the Havana. And I have been credibly informed that all the concessions or grants of land, made in West Florida, under the authority of Spain, run in the name of the government of Louisiana, You cannot have forgotten that about the period when we took possession of New Orleans, under the Treaty of Cession from France, the whole country rung with the nefarious speculations which were alleged to be practising in that city, with the connivance, if not actual participation of the Spanish authorities, by the procurement of surreptitious grants of land, particularly in the district of Feliciana. West Florida, then, not only as France has held it, but as it was in the hands of Spain, made a part of the province of Louisiana, as much so as the jurisdiction or district of Baton Rouge constituted a part of West Florida.

What, then, is the true construction of the Treaties of St. Ildefonso and of April, 1803, from whence our title is derived? If an ambiguity exist in a grant, the interpretation most favorable to the grantee is to be preferred. It was the duty of the grantor to have expressed himself in plain and intelligible terms. This is the doctrine not of Coke only, (whose dicta I admit have nothing to do with the question,) but of the code of universal law. The doctrine is entitled to augmented force when a clause only of the instrument is exhibited, in which clause the ambiguity lurks, and the residue of the instrument is kept back by the grantor. The entire convention of 1762, by which France transferred Louisiana to Spain, is concealed, and the whole of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, except a solitary clause. We are thus deprived of the aid which a full view of both of those instruments would afford. But we have no occasion to resort to any rules of construction, however reasonable in themselves, to establish our title. A competent knowledge of the facts, connected with the case, and a candid appeal to the treaties, are alone sufficient to manifest our right. The negotiators of the treaty of 1803 having signed with the same ceremony two copies, one in the English and the other in the French language, it has been contended, that in the English version the term "cede" has been erroneously used instead of "retrocede," which is the expression in the French copy. And it is argued that we are bound by the phraseology of the French copy, because it is declared that the treaty was agreed to in that language. It would not be very unfair to inquire if this is not like the common case, in private life, where individuals enter into a contract, of which each party retains a copy, duly executed. In such case neither has the preference. We might as well say to France we will cling by the English copy, as she could insist upon an adherence to the French copy; and if she urged ignorance on the part of Mr. Marbois, her negotiator, of our language, we might, with equal propriety, plead ignorance on the part of our negotiators of her language. As this, however, is a disputable point, I do not avail myself of it; gentlemen shall have the full benefit of the expressions in the French copy. According to this, then, in reciting the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, it is declared by Spain in 1800, that she retrocedes to France the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it then had in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States. This latter member of the description has been sufficiently explained by my colleague.

It is said that since France in 1762 ceded to Spain only Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans, the retrocession comprehended no more--that the retrocession ex vi termini was commensurate with and limited by the direct cession from France to Spain. If this were true, then the description, such as Spain held it, that is in 1800, comprising West Florida, and such as France possessed it, that is in 1762, prior to the several cessions, comprising also West Florida, would be totally inoperative. But the definition of the term retrocession, contended for by the other side, is denied. It does not exclude the instrumentality of a third party. It means restoration or reconveyance of the thing originally ceded, and so the gentleman from Delaware acknowledged. I admit that the thing restored must have come to the restoring party from the party to whom it is retroceded, whether directly or indirectly is wholly immaterial. In its passage it may have come through a dozen hands. The retroceding party must claim under and in virtue of the right originally possessed by the party to whom the retrocession takes place. Allow me to put a case: You own an estate called Louisiana. You convey one moiety of it to the gentleman from Delaware, and the other to me; he conveys his moiety to me, and I thus become entitled to the whole. By a suitable instrument I reconvey or retrocede the estate called Louisiana to you as I now hold it, and as you held it; what passes to you? The whole estate or my moiety only? Let me indulge another supposition: that the gentleman from Delaware, after he received from you his moiety, had bestowed a new denomination upon it, and called it West Florida, would that circumstance vary the operation of my act of retrocession to you? The case supposed is in truth the real one between the United States and Spain. France in 1762 transfers Louisiana west of the Mississippi to Spain, and at the same time conveys the eastern portion of it, exclusive of New Orleans, to Great Britain. Twenty one years after, that is in 1783, Great Britain cedes her part to Spain, who thus becomes possessed of the entire province; one portion by direct cession from France, and the residue by indirect cession. Spain then held the whole of Louisiana under France, and in virtue of the title of France. The whole moved or passed from France to her. When, therefore, in this state of things, she says, in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, that she retrocedes the province to France, can a doubt exist that she parts with, and gives back to France, the entire colony? To preclude the possibility of such a doubt, she adds, that she restores it, not in a mutilated condition, but in that precise condition in which France had, and she herself possessed it.

Having thus shown, as I conceive, a clear right in the United States to West Florida, I proceed to inquire if the proclamation of the President directing the occupation of property, which is thus fairly acquired by solemn treaty, be an unauthorized measure of war and of legislation, as has been contended.

The act of October, 1803, contains two sections, by one of which the President is authorized to occupy the territories ceded to us by France in the April preceding. The other empowers the President to establish a provisional government there. The first section is unlimited in its duration; the other is restricted to the expiration of the then session of Congress. The act, therefore, of March, 1804, declaring that the previous act of October should continue in force until the first of October, 1804, is applicable to the second and not the first section, and was intended to continue the provisional government of the President. By the act of the 24th of February, 1804, for laying duties on goods imported into the ceded territories, the President is empowered, whenever he deems it expedient, to erect the bay and river Mobile, &c., into a separate district, and to establish therein a port of entry and delivery. By this same act the Orleans Territory is laid off, and its boundaries are so defined as to comprehend West Florida. By other acts the President is authorized to remove by force, under certain circumstances, persons settling or taking possession of lands ceded to the United States.

These laws furnish a legislative construction of the treaty, correspondent with that given by the Executive, and they vest in this branch of the Government indisputably a power to take possession of the country, whenever it might be proper in his discretion. The President has not, therefore, violated the constitution, and usurped the war-making power, but he would have violated that provision which requires him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, if he had longer forborne to act. It is urged that he has assumed powers belonging to Congress in undertaking to annex the portion of West Florida between the Mississippi and the Perdido to the Orleans Territory. But Congress, as has been shown, has already made this annexation the limits of the Orleans Territory, as prescribed by Congress, comprehending the country in question. The President, by his proclamation, has not made law, but has merely declared to the people of West Florida what the law is. This is the office of a proclamation, and it was highly proper that the people of that Territory should be thus notified. By the act of occupying the country, the Government de facto, whether of Spain, or the revolutionists, ceased to exist; and the laws of the Orleans Territory, applicable to the country, by operation and force of law, attached to it. But this was a state of things which the people might not know, and every dictate of justice and humanity required, therefore, should be proclaimed. I consider the bill before us merely in the light of a declaratory law.

Never could a more propitious moment present itself for the exercise of the discretionary power placed in the President of the United States, and, had he failed to embrace it, he would have been criminally inattentive to the dearest interests of this country. It cannot be too often repeated, that if Cuba on the one hand, and Florida on the other, are in the possession of a foreign maritime power, the immense country belonging to the United States, watered by streams discharging themselves into the Gulf of Mexico--that is, one-third, nay more than two-thirds of the United States, comprehending Louisiana, is placed at the mercy of that power. The possession of Florida is a guarantee absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the navigation of those streams. The gentleman from Delaware anticipates the most direful consequences from the occupation of the country. He supposes a sally from a Spanish garrison upon the American forces, and asks what is to be done? We attempt a peaceful possession of the country, to which we are fairly entitled. If the wrongful occupants under the authority of Spain assail our troops, I trust they will retrieve the lost honor of the nation in the case of the Chesapeake. Suppose an attack upon any portion of the American army within the acknowledged limits of the United States by a Spanish force? In such event there would exist but a single honorable and manly course. The gentleman conceives it ungenerous that we should at this moment, when Spain is encompassed and pressed on all sides by the immense power of her enemy, occupy West Florida. Shall we sit by, passive spectators, and witness the interesting transactions in that country--transactions which tend to jeopardize, in the most imminent degree, our rights, without interference? Are you prepared to see a foreign power seize what belongs to us? I have heard in the most credible manner that, about the period when the President took his measures in relation to that country, the agents of a foreign power were intriguing with the people there to induce them to come under his dominion.

Whether this be the fact or not, it cannot be doubted, that if you neglect the present auspicious moment--if you reject the proffered boon, some other nation, profiting by your errors, will seize the occasion to get a fatal footing in your southern frontier. I have no hesitation in saying, that if a parent country will not or cannot maintain its authority in a colony adjacent to us, and there exists in it a state of misrule and disorder, menacing our peace, and if moreover such colony, by passing into the hands of any other power, would become dangerous to the integrity of the Union, and manifestly tend to the subversion of our laws; we have a right, upon eternal principles of self-preservation, to lay hold of it. This principle alone, independent of any title, would warrant our occupation of West Florida. But it is not necessary to resort to it, our title being in my judgment incontestably good.

MONDAY, December 31.

JOHN TAYLOR, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in place of Thomas Sumter, resigned, produced his credentials which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having been administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.

WEDNESDAY, January 2, 1811.

ANDREW GREGG, from the State of Pennsylvania, took his seat in the Senate.

MONDAY, January 7.

JAMES A. BAYARD, from the State of Delaware, took his seat in the Senate.

TUESDAY, January 8.

THOMAS WORTHINGTON, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio, in place of RETURN JONATHAN MEIGS, resigned, produced his credentials, which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having been administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.

MONDAY, January 14.

JAMES TURNER, from the State of North Carolina, took his seat in the Senate.

TUESDAY, January 29.

Mississippi Territory.

Mr. ANDERSON presented the memorial of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory, praying that the said Territory may be admitted as a State into the Union, upon the footing of the original States, and the memorial was read, and referred to a select committee to consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise; and Messrs. ANDERSON, BAYARD, and DANA, were appointed the committee.

The memorial is as follows:

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled: The memorial unanimously adopted, of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of Mississippi Territory, in General Assembly convened, respectfully states, That by the articles of agreement and cession between the United States and the State of Georgia, an act for the amicable settlement of limits with the State of Georgia, &c., and an act supplemental thereto, the Government of the Mississippi Territory was organized and established, and "all and singular the rights, privileges, and advantages, granted to the people of the United States, northwest of the river Ohio, by an ordinance of the 13th day of July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, were extended to the people of the Mississippi Territory:" And by the said articles of agreement and cession, it is provided "That the Territory thus ceded shall form a State, and be admitted as such into the Union as soon as it shall contain sixty thousand free inhabitants, or at an earlier period, if Congress shall think it expedient."

Your memorialists state, that although they do not pretend to have the number required by the said articles of agreement and cession, and the ordinance to entitle our Territory as a matter of right into the Union, upon the footing of one of the original States; yet, we hope that our numbers (as will appear by the census now taken under a law of the United States) are sufficiently respectable to induce your honorable body to admit the Mississippi Territory into the Union, as a matter of expediency.

Your memorialists conceive it unnecessary to detail the many reasons which might be adduced in support of their petition, but think it sufficient to say, that, as the people of this Territory are able to bear the expenses of a State Government with convenience to themselves, and at the same time will relieve the Government of the United States from the cares and expenses incident to the Territorial form of government; and that whatever views the form of government (under which they have, perhaps, not very patiently lived) for about twelve years, was formed, it is found from experience, to be unfriendly to republicanism; and is such a one as every American in heart is solicitous to be relieved from. We, therefore, pray your honorable body to pass a law authorizing a convention to be called, for the purpose of forming a constitution and State Government in the Mississippi Territory, to be admitted into the Union upon the footing of the original States.

Your memorialists, from a knowledge of your indulgence to the people of the Territories northwest of the river Ohio, when in a situation similar to their own, are sanguine in their expectations, that your honorable body will grant to them the prayer of their petition.

And they will ever pray, &c.

F. L. CLAIBORNE, Speaker of the House.

ALEX. MONTGOMERY, President of Legislative Council.

Attest: WM. C. WINSTON,

Clerk House of Reps. M. T.

WEDNESDAY, January 30.

Territory of Orleans.

The Senate took into consideration the amendment proposed yesterday, by Mr. DANA, to the bill, entitled "An act to enable the people of the Territory of New Orleans to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes:" and, on motion, by Mr. CLAY, it was agreed to divide the question; and, on the question to agree to the first division of the amendment, to wit:

Provided, That this act shall not be understood to admit such State into the Union, as aforesaid, unless each of the States shall consent to the same:

It was determined in the negative--yeas 10, nays 18, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, and Reed.

NAYS.--Messrs. Campbell, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside, and Worthington.

On the question to agree to the second division of the amendment, to wit:

Provided, That this act shall not be understood to admit such State into the Union as aforesaid, unless there shall be a constitutional amendment empowering the Congress to admit into the Union new States formed beyond the boundaries of the United States, as known and understood at the time of establishing the Constitution for the United States:

It was determined in the negative--yeas 8, nays 17, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Lloyd, Pickering, and Reed.

NAYS.--Messrs. Campbell, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside, and Worthington.

On motion, by Mr. BRADLEY, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the second Monday in February next, it was determined in the negative.

On the question, Shall the bill be read a third time as amended? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Brent, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard, Gregg, Lambert, Mathewson, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, and Reed.

FRIDAY, February 1.

The credentials of JAMES A. BAYARD, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware, for the term of six years from the third day of March next: and of WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Georgia, for the term of six years from the third day of March next, were severally read, and ordered to lie on file.

WEDNESDAY, February 6.

Mr. BRADLEY presented the petition of Charlotte Hazen, relict of the late Brigadier General Moses Hazen, praying a grant of land may be made to her, as a Canadian refugee, or that a small addition, in lieu thereof, may be added to her present pension from Congress, for reasons stated at large in the petition; which was read, and referred to a select committee, to consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise; and Messrs. BRADLEY, FRANKLIN, and GERMAN, were appointed the committee.

MONDAY, February 11.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.

Mr. ANDERSON said that having been a member of the committee who reported the bill before the Senate, and not feeling himself at liberty to oppose the introduction of the report, yet, thinking it might be advisable to try the principle before they proceeded to discuss the details, he should move to strike out the first section of the bill. He would barely observe that, was this not a question which was generally understood, on which not only every member of this House, but every citizen of the United States had made up his mind, he should feel himself bound to offer reasons in support of the motion; but, inasmuch as it was a question which every gentleman had doubtless decided in his own mind, he felt unwilling to take up any more of the attention of the Senate, especially so late in the session, when there was so much business of importance before them which required to be acted on.

Mr. CRAWFORD said that he should proceed, though reluctantly, to explain the reasons of the committee for reporting the bill, which is now under consideration. After the most minute examination of the constitution, the majority of that committee were decidedly of opinion that the Congress of the United States were clearly invested with power to pass such a bill. The object of the constitution was twofold: 1st, the delegation of certain general powers, of a national nature, to the Government of the United States; and 2d, the limitation or restriction of the State sovereignties. Upon the most thorough examination of this instrument, I am induced to believe, that many of the various constructions given to it are the result of a belief that it is absolutely perfect. It has become so extremely fashionable to eulogize this constitution, whether the object of the eulogist is the extension or contraction of the powers of the Government, that whenever its eulogium is pronounced, I feel an involuntary apprehension of mischief. Upon the faith of this imputed perfection, it has been declared to be inconsistent with the entire spirit and character of this instrument, to suppose that after it has given a general power it should afterwards delegate a specific power fairly comprehended within the general power. A rational analysis of the constitution will refute in the most demonstrative manner this idea of its perfection. This analysis may excite unpleasant sensations; it may assail honest prejudices; for there can be no doubt that honest prejudices frequently exist, and are many times perfectly innocent. But when these prejudices tend to destroy even the object of their affection, it is essentially necessary that they should be eradicated. In the present case if there be any who, under the conviction that the constitution is perfect, are disposed to give it a construction that will render it wholly imbecile, the public welfare requires that the veil should be rent, and that its imperfection should be disclosed to public view. By this disclosure it will cease to be the object of adoration, but it will nevertheless be entitled to our warmest attachment.

The 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution contains among others the following grant of powers, viz: to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; to establish post-offices and post roads. This selection contains five grants of general power. Under the power to coin money it is conceived that Congress would have a right to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the money after it was coined, and that this power is fairly incidental to, and comprehended in, the general power. The power to raise armies and provide and maintain a navy comprehends, beyond the possibility of doubt, the right to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and yet in these three cases, the constitution, after making the grant of general power, delegates specifically the powers which are fairly comprehended within the general power. If this, however, should be denied, the construction which has been uniformly given to the remaining powers which have been selected, will establish the fact beyond the power of contradiction. Under the power to regulate commerce, Congress has exercised the power of erecting light-houses, as incident to that power, and fairly comprehended within it. Under the power to establish post-offices, and post roads, Congress has provided for the punishment of offences against the Post-Office Department. If the Congress can exercise an incidental power not granted in one case, it can in all cases of a similar kind. But it is said, that the enumeration of certain powers excludes all other powers not enumerated. This is true so far as original substantive grants of power are concerned, but it is not true when applied to express grants of power, which are strictly incidental to some original and substantive grant of power. If it were true in relation to them, Congress could not pass a law to punish offences against the Post-Office Establishment, because the constitution has expressly given the power to punish offences against the current coin, and as it has given the power to punish offences committed against that grant of general power, and has withheld it in relation to the power to establish post-offices and post roads. Congress cannot, according to this rule of construction, so warmly contended for, pass any law to provide for the punishment of such offences. The power to make rules for the regulation and government of the land and naval forces, I have shown to be strictly incidental to the power to raise armies, and provide and maintain navies; but, according to this rule of construction, all incidental powers are excluded except the few which are enumerated, which would exclude from all claim to constitutionality, nearly one-half of your laws, and, what is still more to be deprecated, would render your constitution equally imbecile with the old articles of confederation. When we come to examine the 4th article, the absurdity of this rule of construction, and also of the idea of perfection which has been attributed to the constitution, will be equally manifest. This article appears to be of a miscellaneous character and very similar to the codicil of a will. The first article provides for the organization of Congress; defines its powers; prescribes limitations upon the powers previously granted; and sets metes and bounds to the authority of the State Governments. The second article provides for the organization of the Executive Department, and defines its power and duty. The 3d article defines the tenure by which the persons in whom the judicial power may be vested shall hold their offices, and prescribes the extent of their power and jurisdiction. These three articles provide for the three great departments of Government called into existence by the constitution, but some other provisions just then occur, which ought to have been included in one or the other of the preceding articles, and these provisions are incorporated and compose the 4th article. The 1st section of it declares, that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." In the second section it declares, that a person, charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. A similar provision is contained in the same section, relative to fugitives who are bound to labor, by the laws of any State. In the first case which has been selected, express authority has been given to Congress, to prescribe the manner in which the records, &c., should be proved, and also the effect thereof, but in the other two, no authority is given to Congress, and yet the bare inspection of the three cases will prove that the interference of Congress is less necessary in the first than in the two remaining cases. A record must always be proved by itself, because it is the highest evidence of which the case admits. The effect of a record ought to depend upon the laws of the State of which it is a record, and, therefore, the power to prescribe the effect of a record was wholly unnecessary, and has been so held by Congress--no law having been passed to prescribe the effect of a record. In the second case there seems to be some apparent reason for passing a law to ascertain the officer upon whom the demand is to be made; what evidence of the identity of the person demanded and of the guilt of the party charged must be produced before the obligation to deliver shall be complete. The same apparent reason exists for the passage of a law relative to fugitives from labor. According, however, to the rule of construction contended for, Congress cannot pass any law to carry the constitution into effect, in the two last cases selected, because express power has been given in the first and is withheld in the two last. Congress has nevertheless passed laws to carry those provisions into effect, and this exercise of power has never been complained of by the people or the States.

Mr. President, it is contended by those who are opposed to the passage of this bill, that Congress can exercise no power by application, and yet it is admitted, nay, even asserted, that Congress would have power to pass all laws necessary to carry the constitution into effect, whether it had given or withheld the power which is contained in the following paragraph of the 8th section of the 1st article: "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof." If this part of the constitution really confers no power, it at least, according to this opinion, strips it of that attribute of perfection which has by these gentlemen been ascribed to it. But, sir, this is not the fact. It does confer power of the most substantial and salutary nature. Let us, sir, take a view of the constitution upon the supposition that no power is vested in the Government by this clause, and see how the exclusion of power by implication can be reconciled to the most important acts of the Government. The constitution has expressly given Congress power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," but it has nowhere expressly given the power to constitute a supreme court. In the 3d article it is said, "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The discretion, which is here given to Congress, is confined to the inferior courts, which it may from time to time ordain and establish, and not to the Supreme Court. In the discussion which took place upon the bill to repeal the judicial system of the United States in the year 1802, this distinction is strongly insisted upon by the advocates for the repeal. The Supreme Court was said to be the creature of the constitution, and, therefore, intangible, but that Congress, possessing a discretionary power to create or not to create inferior tribunals, had the same discretionary power to abolish them whenever it was expedient. But if even the discretionary power here vested does extend to the Supreme Court, yet the power of Congress to establish that court must rest upon implication, and upon implication alone. Under the authority to establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, the power to establish a Supreme Court would, according to my ideas, be vested in Congress by implication. And, sir, it is only vested by implication, even if the declaration, that Congress shall have power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the power vested in any department or officer of the Government should be held to be an operative grant. Under this grant, Congress can pass laws to carry into effect the powers vested in the judicial department? What are the powers vested in this department. That it shall exercise jurisdiction in all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, &c., in all cases affecting ambassadors, &c., but the power to create the department and to carry into effect the powers given to or vested in that department, are very different things.

The power to create the Supreme Court cannot be expressly granted in the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers vested in that court, but must, as I have endeavored to prove, be derived from implication. Let me explain my understanding of a power which exists by implication, by an example which will be comprehended by all who hear me. In a devise, an estate is granted to A, after the death of B, and no express disposition is made of the estate during the life of A; in that case A is said to have an estate for life, by implication, in the property so devised. So when the constitution gives the right to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, the right to create the Supreme is vested in Congress by implication. Shall we after this be told that Congress cannot constitutionally exercise any right by implication? By the exercise of a right derived only from implication, Congress has organized a Supreme Court, and then, as incidental to power, existing only by implication, it has passed laws to punish offences against the law by which the court has been created and organized. Sir, the right of the Government to accept of the District of Columbia, exists only by implication. The right of the Government to purchase or accept of places for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, exists only by implication, and yet no man in the nation, so far as my knowledge extends, has complained of the exercise of those implied powers, as an unconstitutional usurpation of power. The right to purchase or except of places for the erection of light-houses, as well as the right to erect and support light-houses, must be derived by implication alone, if any such right exists. The clause in the constitution which gives Congress the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," certainly gives no express power to accept or purchase any of the places, destined for the uses therein specified. The only power expressly given in this clause is that of exercising exclusive legislation in such places; the right to accept or purchase must be derived by implication from this clause, or it must be shown to be comprehended in or incidental to some other power expressly delegated by the constitution. I shall now attempt to show, that according to the construction which has been given to other parts of this constitution, Congress has the right to incorporate a bank to enable it to manage the fiscal concerns of the nation. If this can be done, and if it can also be shown that the correctness of such construction has never excited murmur or complaint--that it has not even been questioned, I shall have accomplished every thing which it will be incumbent on me to prove, to justify the passage of the bill upon your table. The power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, together with the power to pass all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, when tested by the same rule of construction which has been applied to other parts of the constitution, fairly invests Congress with the power to create a bank. Under the power to regulate commerce, Congress exercises the right of building and supporting light-houses. What do we understand by regulating commerce? Where do you expect to find regulations of commerce? Will any man look for them any where else than in your treaties with foreign nations, and in your statutes regulating your custom-houses and custom-house officers? What are the reasons for vesting Congress with the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States? The commerce of a nation is a matter of the greatest importance in all civilized countries. It depends upon compacts with other nations, and whether they are beneficial or prejudicial depends not so much on the reciprocal interest of nations as upon their capacity to defend their rights and redress their wrongs. It was therefore highly important that the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations should be vested in the National Government. If the regulation of commerce among the several States had been left with the States, a multiplicity of conflicting regulations would have been the consequence. Endless collisions would have been created, and that harmony and good neighborhood, so essential between the members of a Federal Republic, would have been wholly unattainable. The best interest of the community, therefore, imperiously required, that this power should be delegated to Congress. Not so of light-houses. The interest of the States would have induced them to erect light-houses, where they were necessary, and when erected they would have been equally beneficial to their own vessels, the vessels of their sister States, and of foreign nations. The performance of this duty could have been most safely confided to the States. They were better informed of the situations in which they ought to be erected than Congress could possibly be, and could enforce the execution of such regulations as might be necessary to make them useful. How then has it happened that Congress has taken upon itself the right to erect light-houses, under their general power to regulate commerce? I have heard and seen in the public prints a great deal of unintelligible jargon about the incidentality of a law to the power delegated and intended to be executed by it, and of its relation to the end which is to be accomplished by its exercise, which I acknowledge I do not clearly and distinctly comprehend, and must therefore be excused from answering. I speak now of the public newspapers, to which I am compelled to resort to ascertain the objections which are made to this measure, as gentlemen have persevered in refusing to assign the reasons which have induced them to oppose the passage of the bill. But, sir, I can clearly comprehend that the right to erect light-houses is not incidental to the power of regulating commerce, unless every thing is incidental to that power which tends to facilitate and promote the prosperity of commerce. It is contended that under the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and duties, you can pass all laws necessary for that purpose, but they must be laws to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and duties, and not laws which tend to promote the collection of taxes. A law to erect light-houses is no more a law to regulate commerce, than a law creating a bank is a law to collect taxes, imposts and duties. But the erection of light-houses tends to facilitate and promote the security and prosperity of commerce, and in an equal degree the erection of a bank tends to facilitate and insure the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue. If, by this rule of construction, which is applied to light-houses, but denied to the bank, Congress can, as incidental to the power to regulate commerce, erect light-houses, it will be easy to show that the same right may be exercised, as incidental to the power of laying and collecting duties and imposts. Duties cannot be collected, unless vessels importing dutiable merchandise arrive in port; whatever, therefore, tends to secure their safe arrival may be exercised under the general power; the erection of light-houses does facilitate the safe arrival of vessels in port, and Congress therefore can exercise this right as incidental to the power to lay imposts and duties.

But it is said the advocates of the bank differ among themselves in fixing upon the general power to which the right to create a bank is incidental, and that this difference proves that there is no incidentality, to use a favorite expression, between that and any one of the enumerated general powers. The same reason can be urged, with equal force, against the constitutionality of every law for the erection of light-houses. Let the advocates for this doctrine lay their finger upon the power to which the right of erecting light-houses is incidental. It can be derived with as much apparent plausibility and reason from the right to lay duties, as from the right to regulate commerce. Who is there, now, in this body who has not voted for the erection of a light-house? And no man who reads one of these will believe it to be a regulation of commerce. And no man in the nation, so far as my knowledge extends, has ever complained of the exercise of this power. The right to erect light-houses is exercised, because the commerce of the nation, or the collection of duties, is greatly facilitated by that means; and, sir, the right to create a bank is exercised because the collection of your revenue, and the safe-keeping and easy and speedy transmission of your public money is not simply facilitated, but because these important objects are more perfectly secured by the erection of a bank than they can be by any other means in the power of human imagination to devise. We say, therefore, in the words of the constitution, that a bank is necessary and proper, to enable the Government to carry into complete effect the right to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises. We do not say that the existence of the Government absolutely depends upon the operations of a bank, but that a national bank enables the Government to manage its fiscal concerns more advantageously than it could do by any other means. The terms necessary and proper, according to the construction given to every part of the constitution, imposes no limitation upon the powers previously delegated. If these words had been omitted in the clause giving authority to pass laws to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the National Government, still Congress would have been bound to pass laws which were necessary and proper, and not such as were unnecessary and improper. Every legislative body, every person invested with power of any kind, is morally bound to use only those means which are necessary and proper for the correct execution of the powers delegated to them. But it is contended, that if a bank is necessary and proper for the management of the fiscal concerns of the nation, yet Congress has no power to incorporate one, because there are State banks which may be resorted to. No person who has undertaken to discuss this question has, as far as my knowledge extends, ventured to declare that a bank is not necessary. Every man admits, directly or indirectly, the necessity of resorting to banks of some kind. This admission is at least an apparent abandonment of the constitutional objection; for, if a bank is necessary and proper, then have Congress the constitutional right to erect a bank. But this is denied. It is contended that this idea rests alone upon the presumption that the Government of the United States is wholly independent of the State governments, which is not the fact; that this very law is dependent upon the State courts for its execution. This is certainly not the fact. The courts of the United States have decided, in the most solemn manner, that they have cognizance of all cases affecting the Bank of the United States. Sir, it is true that the Government of the United States is dependent upon the State governments for its organization. Members of both Houses of Congress, and the President of the United States, are chosen by the State governments, or under the authority of their laws. But it is equally true, that wherever the constitution confides to the State governments the right to perform any act in relation to the Federal Government, it imposes the most solemn obligation upon them to perform the act. The Constitution of the United States, as to these particular acts, is the constitution of the several States, and their functionaries are accordingly sworn to support it. Can it, then, be seriously contended, that because the constitution has in some cases made the Government of the United States dependent upon the State governments, in all which cases it has imposed the most solemn obligations upon them to act, that it will be necessary and proper for Congress to make itself dependent upon them in cases where no such obligation is imposed? The constitution has defined all the cases where this Government ought to be dependent upon that of the States; and it would be unwise and improvident for us to multiply these cases by legislative acts, especially where we have no power to compel them to perform the act, for which we have made ourselves their dependents. In forming a permanent system of revenue, it would be unwise in Congress to rely, for its collection and transmission from one extreme of this extensive empire to the other, upon any accidental circumstance, wholly beyond their power or control. There are State banks in almost every State in the Union, but their existence is wholly independent of this Government, and their dissolution is equally so. The Secretary of the Treasury has informed you that he conceives a bank is necessary to the legitimate exercise of the powers vested by the constitution in the Government. I know, sir, that the testimony of this officer will not be very highly estimated by several honorable members of this body. I am aware that this opinion has subjected him, and the committee also, to the most invidious aspersions; but, sir, the situation of that officer, independent of his immense talents, enables him to form a more correct opinion than any other man in the nation of the degree of necessity which exists at the present time for a national bank, to enable the Government to manage its fiscal operations. He has been ten years at the head of your Treasury; he is thoroughly acquainted with the influence of the bank upon your revenue system; and he has, when called upon, declared that a bank is necessary to the proper exercise of the legitimate powers of the Government. His testimony is entitled to great weight in the decision of this question, at least with those gentlemen who have no knowledge of the practical effects of the operations of the bank in the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue. In the selection of means to carry any of your constitutional powers into effect, you must exercise a sound discretion; acting under its influence, you will discover that what is proper at one time may be extremely unfit and improper at another. The original powers granted to the Government by the constitution can never change with the varying circumstances of the country, but the means by which those powers are to be carried into effect must necessarily vary with the varying state and circumstances of the nation. We are, when acting to-day, not to inquire what means were necessary and proper twenty years ago, not what were necessary and proper at the organization of the Government, but our inquiry must be, what means are necessary and proper this day. The constitution, in relation to the means by which its powers are to be executed, is one eternal now. The state of things now, the precise point of time when we are called upon to act, must determine our choice in the selection of means to execute the delegated powers.

Mr. LLOYD.--Mr. President: This is indeed, sir, an up-hill, wind-mill sort of warfare--a novel mode of legislative proceeding. That a bill should be brought in on a very important subject which has been long under consideration, and that a gentleman should move to strike out the first section of the bill, which comprises all its vitality, (for it is the first section which provides for the continuance of the bank,) and should be supported in it, without deigning to assign any other reasons than may be derived from newspaper publications, which are so crude and voluminous that not one man out of ten will so far misspend his time as to take the trouble to read them, is indeed extraordinary. Still, if gentlemen choose to adopt this dumb sort of legislation, and are determined to take the question without offering any arguments in support of their opinions, I certainly should not have interfered with their wishes, had I not been a member of the committee who had reported the bill, who had heard the testimony offered by two very respectable delegations from Philadelphia; one from the master manufacturers and mechanics of the city, and the other from the merchants; and had I not taken minutes of this testimony, which I find it is expected from me that I should relate to the Senate.

Sir, I consider the motion to strike out, now under consideration, as going to the entire destruction of the bill, without any reference to its details or modifications; it therefore appears to me in order, to take into consideration only the material principle of the bill; that is, whether it be proper that the charter of the bank should be renewed on any terms whatever, let those terms be what they may.

Sir, it is admitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, in his communications to Congress, that the concerns of this bank have been "skilfully and wisely managed," that the bank has made a very limited and moderate use of the public moneys deposited with it; and that it has greatly facilitated the operations of Government by the safe-keeping and transmission of the public moneys. It has at all times met the wishes of the Government in making loans. It has done this even at six per cent., while the Government have been obliged, in one instance, for a considerable amount to pay eight per cent. to other persons for the loans obtained from them. It is admitted, sir, that the bank, at the request of the Treasury Department, has established branches for the purpose of facilitating the operations of the Government at places where such establishments could not but be inconvenient to them in point of management, and disadvantageous in point of profit. I allude more particularly, sir, to the branches of the bank which has been established at New Orleans and at Washington. We have been told this session, sir, by a gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. SMITH,) that the Territory of Orleans is a very wealthy one, that it probably contains a greater number of rich inhabitants, for its population, than any other district in the Union. Sir, if this be the fact, of whom does this wealthy population consist? Not of the inhabitants, but of the planters; men who are not borrowers of the bank, who, when they realize the sales of their produce, invest the surplus proceeds of it beyond their expenditure in the funds, or in the acquisition of new lands, or in the purchase of an additional number of negroes. Sir, it is notorious, that from the recent possession by the United States of Louisiana, and the certainty that New Orleans must soon be the emporium of an immense western commerce, that city has become more the resort of the young, the adventurous, the enterprising and the rash among the mercantile men of our country, than any other city in the Union; and it is obvious, sir, in proportion as the borrowers from a bank consist of persons of this description, in the same proportion must the circumstances of such bank be unsound; and without possessing any particular knowledge whatever on the state of this bank, if the collections of its debts are speedily made, I would not make the purchase at a discount of twenty-five per cent. from the nominal amount of them.

Sir, we can judge with more accuracy when we come nearer home. What is the state of the bank in this city? What the ability of its debtors to meet their engagements? It is stated the branch has a loan out here of four hundred thousand dollars. Where is the navigation?--where the wealthy merchants?--where are the opulent tradesmen?--the extensive manufacturers, to refund this money, when they are called on to do it? Sir, they are not to be found; they do not exist here; there are but very few opulent men in the city, and those are either not borrowers of the bank, or not borrowers to an amount of any importance. Where, then, is the money to be found, or what has been done with it? It has probably been taken out of the Bank of the United States to build up the five or six District banks which you have chartered the present session; to furnish the means of erecting the fifty or sixty brick houses which we are told have made their appearance during the last Summer; to encourage speculations in city lots, and to enable the proprietors to progress with the half-finished canal which nearly adjoins us. Well, sir, if the bank promptly calls in its loan of four hundred thousand dollars, will the debtors be enabled to meet their payments? Can they sell these lots, these brick houses, these canal shares? No, sir, in such a state of things they could find no purchasers, they could nearly as well create a world as to furnish the money; and if the bank is to stop, and the payment of this debt be speedily coerced, I would not give two hundred thousand dollars for the whole of it.

In addition to this, I shall show presently, from testimony which cannot be controverted, that the conduct of the Bank of the United States, or its directors, or rather the stockholders, whose agents they are, in addition to being wise and skilful, and moderate, as the Secretary of the Treasury states them to have been, that they have also been honorable, and liberal, and impartial; and if, in addition to this, it be proved that the bank has, in every instance where it had the ability to do it, met the wishes of the Government, and to facilitate its views in the security and collection of the revenue, it has also established branches where it must have been obviously and palpably to the disadvantage of the bank to do it--if it has furnished capitals for the extension of our commerce, if it has provided means for the establishment of important manufactories, if it has had a tendency to raise the price of our domestic produce, and has thus encouraged industry, and improved and embellished the interior of the country--it would seem pretty strongly to follow, that if it be expedient to preserve the existence of an institution similar to this, then these gentlemen, on the score of merit, added to the experience of twenty years' successful operation, have a fair claim on the Government for a preference in favor of that which is already in operation.

I am aware, sir, that it may be stated in opposition to this claim, that these stockholders have enjoyed a boon for twenty years from which others of their fellow-citizens have been deprived, except on such terms as the sellers of shares chose to prescribe; that the charter expires by its own limitation, and that beyond this period they have no right to expect any thing which may not arise from the interest and convenience of the Government. I admit, sir, there is considerable strength in these objections. The exclusive right contained in the charter ever appeared to me as furnishing the most solid constitutional objection against the bank. The creation of monopolies; the granting of exclusive privileges, except so far as to secure to the authors of useful inventions the benefit of their discoveries; the tying up of the hands of the Legislature, and depriving itself of the power of according to a set of citizens, who may come into legal existence to-morrow, or ten years hence, what it had given to another; ever appeared to me hostile to the genius and spirit of the people of the United States, and of all their institutions. Highly then, sir, as I am induced to think of the conduct of this bank, from the best evidence I can obtain, still, from the considerations I have just mentioned, did the question now before us simply affect the stockholders, I should certainly not trouble the Senate with any remarks in reference to it, and should sit down in entire acquiescence, whether the prayer of their petition for the renewal of the charter of the bank were granted or rejected.

Sir, before quitting this idea of constitutional objection, permit me to make one or two brief remarks in regard to it. It is impossible for the ingenuity of man to devise any written system of government, which, after a lapse of time, extension of empire, or change of circumstances, shall be able to carry its own provisions into operation--hence, sir, the indispensable necessity of implied or resulting powers, and hence the provision in the constitution that the Government should exercise such additional powers as were necessary to carry those that had been delegated into effect. Sir, if this country goes on increasing and extending, in the ratio it has done, it is not impossible that hereafter, to provide for all the new cases that may rise under this new state of things, the defined powers may prove only a text, and the implied or resulting powers may furnish the sermon to it.

Permit me, sir, to put one question on this head, in addition to those so ably, and to my view, unanswerably put yesterday by the honorable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. CRAWFORD.) Whence, sir, do you get the right, whence do you derive the powers to erect custom-houses in the maritime districts of the United States? To attach to them ten, fifteen, or twenty custom-house officers; and clothe these men with authority to invade the domicile, to break into the dwelling-house of perhaps an innocent citizen? Whence do you get it, sir, except as an implied power resulting from the authority given in the constitution "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises?" If, under this authority, you can erect these custom-houses and create this municipal, fiscal, inquisitorial gens d'armerie, with liberty to violate the rights of the citizen, to break into his castle at midnight, without even a form of warrant, on a plausible appearance of probability, or probable cause of suspicion of his secreting smuggled goods, which the event may prove to be unfounded--and it will be recollected that a majority of Congress voted for the grant of this power in its most offensive form, when two years since they voted for the act enforcing the embargo--I say, sir, if under this general power to collect duties, you can erect the establishment and give the offensive power just mentioned, can you not, with the concurrence even of the citizens, adopt another more mild and useful mode, and create an establishment for the collection and safe-keeping of the revenue, and place it under the direction of ten or twelve directors, and christen it an office of discount and deposit, or of collection and payment, as you like best? And can you not, when you have thus created it, give to the directors a power, which perhaps they would have without your grant, to receive and keep the cash of those who choose to place it with them and to loan them money at the legal rate of interest, and in some places, as at New York, at nearly fifteen per cent. above the legal rate of interest? If you can do this, then you have your bank established, sir--and, most assuredly, if you can do one of these things you can do the other.

Sir, the constitutional objection to this bank, on the ground that Congress had not the power to grant an act of incorporation, has ever appeared to me the most unsound and untenable. Still gentlemen of intelligence and integrity, who have thought long and deeply on the subject, think differently from me: and I feel bound to respect their opinions, however opposed they may be to my own. Yet, sir, I will venture to predict, without feeling any anxiety for the fate of the prophecy, that should this bank be suffered to run down, such will be the state of things before this time twelve months, that there are other gentlemen, who at present have constitutional objections, but who have not thought so long and deeply upon them, who will, before that time, receive such a flood of intelligence, as on this head perfectly to dispel their doubts, and quiet their consciences.

Sir, I shall now proceed as briefly as may be in my power to state the situation of this bank on the expiration of its charter, and the effects on the community consequent on it. There is now due to the bank from individuals fifteen millions of dollars. These fifteen millions of dollars must be collected--the power of the bank to grant discounts will have ceased, and the duty of the directors must require them to make the collection. Sir, how is this to be done? Whence can the money be obtained? I shall demonstrate to you presently, that already, from an apprehension of a non-renewal of the charter of the bank, business is nearly at a stand--that navigation, real estate, and merchandise are unsalable; and that a man worth one hundred thousand dollars, at the recently rated value of property, and owing ten thousand dollars, must still be utterly unable to meet his engagements. Suppose, sir, this property consists in houses or shipping; suppose his warehouse is full of goods, and he has a large sum placed at his credit in England? If, sir, he can neither sell his ships nor his goods--if he cannot sell his real estate nor scarcely give away his exchange, which hitherto, to men who had money in England, has been a never-failing source of supply in case of need; I say under these circumstances, sir, whatever may be his property, he cannot meet his engagements. Sir, can men thus situated, solvent as they ought to be ten times over, find relief from the State banks? Certainly not, sir. These banks have already gone to the extreme length of their ability; they have always discounted to an amount in proportion to their capital exceeding that of the Bank of the United States, which is incontrovertibly proved by the dividends they have declared, which have at most universally equalled and frequently exceeded those of the Bank of the United States, notwithstanding the advantage enjoyed by the latter from the deposit of public moneys. Sir, so far from having it in their power, in the case of the dissolution of the Bank of the United States, to assist the debtors to that bank in meeting their engagements to it--I affirm the fact, on which I have myself a perfect reliance, that, take the State banks from Boston to Washington, and after paying their debts to the Bank of the United States, they have not, nor do I believe they have had, for six months back, specie enough to pay the debts due to their depositors, and the amount of their bills in circulation. And here I beg it to be observed, that bank bills and bank deposits, or credits, are precisely the same thing--with this difference, that the latter, from the residence in the neighborhood of the banks, and the vigilance of the proprietors, would be the first called for. How idle is it then to expect to obtain relief from banks which have already extended themselves beyond the bounds of prudence, and have not even at present the ability to meet their existing engagements? It might nearly as well be expected, that a man who was already a bankrupt should prop and support his failing neighbor.

Sir, much has been recently said of the amount of specie in the United States. Theoretical men have made many and vague conjectures about it, for after all it must rest upon conjecture; some have estimated it at ten millions of dollars--some twelve, some twenty, and some newspaper scribblers at forty millions of dollars. Sir, I do not believe that for the last ten years the United States have at any time been more bare of specie than at the present moment. A few years since, specie flowed in upon us in abundance. This resulted principally from an operation of a very singular and peculiar nature. The Spanish Government, as it was then understood, agreed to pay to France a very large sum of money--many millions of dollars, the precise number I am unable to state, from her possessions in South America. France contracted with a celebrated English banking house, as was said at the time, with either the concurrence or connivance of the English Government, that this money should be obtained through the United States. These bankers, by their agent, contracted with certain American houses, principally I believe in Baltimore, for the importation of this specie from La Vera Cruz into the United States, from whence it was not transmitted in coin to Europe, but invested in adventures in the shipments of produce, the proceeds of which ultimately go into the hands of these bankers in London, or of their friends on the continent, from whom it was finally realized by the French Government, either by drafts from Paris, or remittances to that city. This operation had a trebly favorable effect on the United States--it made fortunes for some of the merchants, it furnished the means of shipments to Europe, and it also provided the funds for adventures to the East Indies and to China. But this contract has now been finished some years; and since that time there has been a constant drain of specie from the country. Where it is in future to be procured from, I know not. Not from South America. Specie is, I believe, protected from exportation there, except to Spain. From Spain we cannot get it--to a great part of what was Spain we have now scarcely any trade. From France it cannot be obtained, for if we can get it there even by license, we are obliged to bring back her produce or manufactures. From England it cannot be imported--it is now made highly penal to attempt to send it out of the kingdom. With South America we have but little trade--hitherto we furnished them with smuggled or licensed European and India goods; but now the markets are flooded with these goods by importations direct from England, and which have been attended with great loss to the shippers. For these reasons, it is difficult to find a vessel sailing from the United States to the Spanish ports in South America. These are among the reasons why the amount of specie now in the country is small, and has for some time past been gradually lessening. Sir, without indulging in vague conjectures, what are the best data we have to form an estimate of the amount of specie in the country? The Bank of the United States has five millions of dollars in its vaults. In Boston there are three State banks--in New York I believe four, Philadelphia four, and Baltimore eight--call these nineteen twenty, and allow on an average one hundred and fifty thousand dollars specie, which probably is as much as they generally possess, and this will make three millions of dollars; this amount, united to the sum in the vaults of the Bank of the United States, gives eight millions of dollars--to which, if you allow two millions of dollars for a loose circulation of specie, you get an aggregate of ten millions of dollars. We are sometimes told of the large sums of money hoarded in our country by individuals--probably there may be some among the German farmers in Pennsylvania--perhaps more in that State than in any other, or all the others in the Union; but still of no great amount--the reputation of a little money possessed in this way easily swells into a large sum. At any rate, let the amount be what it may, in time of distress and mistrust, it would afford no addition to your circulating medium; for it is precisely in times like these, that men who hoard money will lock it up most securely.

Sir, the circulation of our country is at present emphatically a paper circulation--very little specie passes in exchange between individuals--it is a circulation bottomed on bank paper and bank credits, amounting perhaps to fifty millions of dollars. And on what, sir, does this circulation rest? It rests upon the ten millions of dollars, if that be the amount of specie in the country, and upon public confidence.

The Bank of the United States has fifteen millions of dollars to collect--call it ten, sir--nobody will dispute this--no one will pretend that this bank is not solvent--the remnant of its surplus dividends, and the interest it will have earned, will be sufficient to cover its losses at New Orleans, at Washington, and perhaps elsewhere. In what are these ten millions of dollars to be collected? In bank bills, the credit of which is at least doubtful? No, sir, in specie; and when this is entirely withdrawn from the State banks, and the banks are unable to pay the money for their bills, who does not see that this confidence is instantly destroyed--that the bubble bursts--that floods of paper bills will be poured in upon them, which they will be unable to meet, and which will for a time be as worthless as oak leaves--that the banks themselves must, at least temporarily, become bankrupts, and that a prostration of credit, and all those habits of punctuality which for twenty years, we have been striving so successfully to establish, will inevitably ensue, and, with them, also, there must be suspended the commerce, the industry and manufactures of the country; and a scene of embarrassment and derangement be produced, which has been unexampled in our history.

I will now make a very few remarks on the effects which the dissolution of the bank will have on the revenue and fiscal concerns of the country. Can it be supposed, sir, that the source to which will be imputed the distress that will have flowed from this event, will be the first to be thought of to be guarded against a participation of the evils that will result from it, in preference to the claims of the most intimate friends and connections? No, sir, the bonds due to the United States will be collected only at the tail of an execution. But I mean not to press this consideration. Admit, for a moment, that they will all be equally well collected--that they will be paid as usual, although it is palpable that for a considerable time the merchants will be unable to find the means to pay them: yet, admit, sir, that the money is collected in the State banks, how is it to be transmitted? It must come to the centre of the seat of Government; very little of the public money is expended in the Northern section of the Union. Will it come from the Eastward, in bills of the State banks? Penobscot bank bills sometimes will not pass in Boston; Boston bills pass with difficulty in New York or Philadelphia; and the bills of New York State banks probably would not be readily current in Washington. You must, then, sir, if Boston gives you a revenue of two millions of dollars, transmit the greater part of it to the seat of Government, or wherever it may be wanted in specie. Can this be done? We have not two millions of dollars of specie in our town, and, I may almost venture to say, never had. Suppose you make this transmission once, can you do it a second time? No, sir, the thing is utterly impracticable. You must adopt some other mode. Exchange between the different cities will not reach the case; frequently it cannot be purchased even for an insignificant amount.

Sir, will your money, when collected, be safe in the State banks? Of this I am extremely doubtful. Solicitations will undoubtedly be made for it from all quarters. They have already been made. In one instance, I am told, sir, the agent of a bank, even during the few past weeks, has been here for the purpose--that suddenly the agent was gone, and in a few days it was discovered that, owing to the failure of one of the debtors to the bank which he represented, (a great broker,) the stock had fallen in one day near 20 per cent. What was this the evidence of, but that those who were most interested in this bank, the stockholders who were on the spot, and best acquainted with its solidity, were willing to wash their hands of their concern in it, at almost any rate of sacrifice? Sir, I only state this, as it was here reported. I have no personal knowledge on the subject. But will you trust your funds with an institution thus precarious, and whose solidity is distrusted even by its best friends?

WEDNESDAY, February 13.

The credentials of NICHOLAS GILMAN, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Hampshire, for the term of six years, commencing on the 4th day of March next, were read, and ordered to lie on file.

THURSDAY, February 14.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th of February, 1791.

The question being to strike out the first section--

Mr. GILES.--Mr. President: It is with great reluctance that I find myself compelled to enter into the discussion of the subject now under the consideration of the Senate, but the observations which fell from the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) were of such a character as to impose on me an irresistible obligation to present that view of the subject which has resulted from the best reflections I have been enabled to bestow on it. This obligation arises from the very high respect I entertain for the Legislature of the State I have the honor to represent, the great respect I feel for the gentleman who made the observations, as well as from the respect which is manifestly due to myself. In executing this unpleasant task, I labor under circumstances of peculiar embarrassment. This embarrassment arises from a conviction that the views of the subject now proposed to be exhibited will disappoint the expectations both of the opposers and the favorers of the bill, and that they will not be acceptable to either. I shall not, however, in this instance, depart from my invariable habit, when urged by duty to participate in debate before this honorable body, of disclosing in the most undisguised manner my real opinions upon the whole subject, free of any consideration of political difficulties or inconveniences which may consequently affect myself.

In the first place, I find myself called upon to oppose a law, on constitutional grounds, which has been in existence for nearly twenty years, and during that period, I am compelled to admit, has been acquiesced in by the several State governments, as well as by the General Government, and its republican administrations. It is peculiarly irksome to me to question the constitutionality of a law which has been thus and so long acquiesced in, because it tends to give the character of instability to the laws generally, and in my judgment, tends also to impair the sacred character of the laws, and of course, to lessen their efficacy. In a Government like ours, where the laudable boast of every citizen is that he lives under a government of laws, and not of men, no subject should be touched with more caution and delicacy than one which questions the validity of the laws, lessens the confidence of the citizens in them, or impairs the obligation of obedience to them. Yet, sir, the course of observations I propose to make may have some of these tendencies, which I should extremely regret, and this apprehension, of course, produces embarrassment. Connected with this idea is another circumstance of embarrassment. I cannot help observing the inordinate zeal manifested by the opposers of this bill, evidently resulting from a belief that its rejection will lessen the powers of the Federal Government. Although it may be properly directed in the present instance, yet I think I have seen, and fear I may hereafter see the same spirit directed against some of the powers and proceedings of the Government which I have deemed indispensable to its own preservation, and its beneficial efficacy towards the people. It may, perhaps, be thought by some not becoming in me to say that I have not been an inattentive observer of the progress of this Government for twenty years, and more particularly, since the Republican party came into power. Some of the scenes through which I have passed, have produced an impressive influence on my mind. Such is the nature of the Government that its administration will vibrate from one principle to another, and it will always require great wisdom to keep its oscillations from wandering too far. Whilst those who preceded us in power endeavored to legislate into the constitution an unnecessary constructive energy, leading to what has been called consolidation, it appears to me that we have taken too much the opposite course, leading to disunion and dissolution, by depriving it constructively of its legitimate, necessary, and proper powers. If this course should be unfortunately persevered in, it requires no spirit of prophecy to foresee that the Government will fall to pieces from the want of due energy in the administration of its legitimate powers, or that some extraordinary means must be resorted to for its resuscitation.

The honorable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. CRAWFORD,) who reported this bill, as the chairman of the committee, to whom the subject was generally referred, excited not a little surprise in my mind by the prefatory remarks which fell from him in support of it. The gentleman prefaced his arguments by observing, "that it had latterly become the fashion to eulogize the Constitution of the United States; and that whenever he heard lavish encomiums applied to it, he could not help apprehending mischief." I acknowledge I could not comprehend the bearing of this remark upon the question under discussion. I, sir, have long been in the habit of venerating the constitution, and have often expressed my admiration at the wisdom of its provisions; and I really had hoped that I might have been indulged in these sentiments and prepossessions, and even the expression of them upon proper occasions, without exciting in the mind of any gentleman apprehensions of mischief; nor can I divine what species of mischief the gentleman apprehends from that cause. Mr. President, when we look over the whole world known to us; when we particularly cast our eyes over that part of it with which we have the most intimate relations; when we see the rapid strides which despotism is making over the whole human race; when we observe the various and powerful means now in use to rivet its immovable dominion upon mankind; when we reflect that the Constitution of the United States now affords the only practical experiment upon the republican principle, and the only and last hope for the preservation and extension of the liberties of man; is it wonderful or alarming, that we should feel and express some partiality and even veneration for an instrument of so peculiar a character? or should even endeavor to teach others to venerate, to cherish, to support it? An instrument, whose provisions at least exempt us from the general scene of despotism, and may eventually extend their blessings to the whole human race? Or if, in dwelling upon the wisdom and importance of its provisions, we might pass over some possible defects from scrutinizing them with an hypercritical eye, might not the omission be indulged without producing animadversion or censure? Sir, we all venerate the republican principle. I know the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) does; nor do I pretend that my devotion to it is greater than his; but, sir, I have given the greatest attention to the observations of the gentleman upon the constitution; and I can now say that my veneration for the instrument, and admiration at the wisdom of its provisions, are not at all impaired nor diminished, notwithstanding the gentleman's criticisms, &c. I will now, Mr. President, endeavor to exhibit the general character of the constitution; to point out the mode for its correct interpretation, and apply it to the subject now under consideration. In doing so, I propose to follow the course of observations made by the honorable chairman of the committee who reported the bill.

The gentleman proceeded to remark, that in taking a review of the constitution he found general as well as incidental powers enumerated therein. I did not see the precise application the gentleman intended to make of this remark, but I have been induced to review the constitution in reference to this subject, and it does appear to me, that the classification and definition of powers is as well arranged as human wisdom could devise. I know that nothing is perfect which is the work of man; that no language is capable of perfect definition. But, as far as definition can be drawn from language, I conceive the constitution exhibits as perfect an example as is in existence. In the next place, the gentleman remarked that there was a number of cases in which Congress had departed from the particular enumerated powers in the constitution and had resorted to implication or construction for the derivation of its powers. The remark is perfectly correct, and I am very ready to admit that there is no such thing as carrying into effect enumerated powers in any instrument whatever, without the intervention of certain derivative and implied powers. But if the gentleman had succeeded in showing that there had been aberrations by the Congress of the United States from the enumerated powers of the constitution, would he think it correct to use those aberrations as precedents for still further aberrations? Ought they not rather to be considered as mementoes on the part of Congress to induce them to tread with more care, and, if they find that their former errors could not be supported by a fair and candid construction of the constitution, to restrain the laws within its wholesome provisions? Certainly that is the use to which the history of errors presented by the honorable gentleman from Georgia ought to be applied. But, before I proceed to examine the subject with more accuracy, I cannot avoid to express my surprise at another observation which fell from the gentleman. The gentleman observed, that the argument drawn from the distinction between ends and means was "incomprehensible;" and he went so far as to call it "nonsensical jargon." It is not only comprehensible to me, sir, as I conceive, but, in my opinion, is the only way in which a just construction of the constitution is to be attained. This results from the peculiar nature and organization of the instrument. Permit me here to endeavor to illustrate my idea by a reference to the constitution itself? The constitution is an instrument which grew out of the situation of the United States at the time of, and preceding its adoption; and to show that the constitution recited the great objects of its formation, and then prescribed the means for carrying them into effect, I beg leave to refer to a part of the instrument itself. The preamble, like all other preambles, was designed to express the objects of the instrument or the ends to be effected by its provisions. "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America." What is the plain language of this preamble? The answer is obvious. That certain great ends or objects are here proposed to be effected. In what mode, or by what means are they to be effected? The preamble tells you, sir, "by establishing this Constitution for the United States of America." That is the mode in which these great ends are proposed to be effected, and the body of the instrument prescribes the means which were deemed necessary and proper to the effectuation of these ends. The subject will be better understood by throwing the mind back to the period of time when this constitution originated, and reviewing the peculiar political situation of the United States then, and for some time antecedently thereto.

At the time, and antecedently to the establishment of the present constitution, the existing State Governments were in possession of all the powers of sovereignty, subject only to feeble and inefficient articles of confederation, without the means of executing their own will, and resting for its execution solely on requisitions upon the respective States, which might either comply or refuse to comply with such requisitions at their discretion. A non-compliance was almost invariably the result of State deliberations, and hence the feebleness of the old Confederation. The present constitution was adopted as the remedy for this great and alarming evil. Without it, disunion and ruin to the States would have been the inevitable consequence, because, upon actual experiment, the States were found utterly incompetent to the due administration of all the powers of sovereignty intrusted to their management. The reason of this incompetency was, that some of the most important powers of sovereignty inherently possessed a geographical influence beyond the geographical limits of the several States individually, and their jurisdiction could not transcend their geographical limits. Of this description of powers is the power to declare war, &c., to regulate commerce, &c., and all the other enumerated powers of the constitution. In consequence of the conflicting systems adopted by the several States in relation to some of these powers, which were then in practical operation; particularly in the conflicting regulations of commerce, the States were getting into the most serious collisions, &c. The formidable evils necessarily growing out of the state of things required a formidable and competent remedy. The great subject for the contemplation of every reflecting mind in America was, what that remedy should be? The wise framers of our admirable constitution, after great deliberation, conceived and executed the only practical expedient. It consisted in separating the powers of sovereignty; in establishing a General Government, and conferring on it all the powers of sovereignty whose geographical influence was found co-extensive with the geographical limits of the United States, and reserving to the State Governments respectively those powers which were of a mere local character, and which possessed no influence beyond the limits of the States respectively. And also to confer on the General Government "all the means necessary and proper" for executing its own laws in relation to these enumerated powers, without any dependence upon requisitions from the respective State Governments for this indispensable object. The idea was a grand one, and executed with an admirable simplicity, and the most consummate wisdom. Hence it appears that the great object of the framers of the constitution was to establish a General or Federal Government, and to confer on it all the powers of sovereignty, which in their nature and character possessed an influence co-extensive with the United States, and to reserve to the previously-existing State Governments all the powers of sovereignty of a more local character, and whose influence did not extend beyond the geographical limits of the States respectively, and therefore could be rendered completely subservient to State jurisdiction and management. These are the means prescribed in the constitution for effecting the ends expressed in the preamble. To the administrators of the General Government the framers of the constitution have said: We give to you all the powers of sovereignty of a general character; and to the administrators of the State Governments they have said: We reserve to you all the powers of sovereignty of a local character. I verily believe, that if those various Governments should be administered with the wisdom with which this separation of powers was made in the body of the constitution, the people of the United States will not be disappointed in the great and interesting objects proclaimed in its preamble. From this short history of the origin of the constitution, and the causes which produced it, it evidently appears, that the General or Federal Government is in its nature and character a Government of enumerated powers, taken from previously existing State Governments, enumerated and conferred on it, reserving all unenumerated powers to the State Governments, or to the people in their individual capacities. But if any doubts had existed upon this subject, two amendments to the constitution, growing out of some jealousies lest a contrary interpretation should be given to the constitution, have been adopted, which ought to put this question to rest forever. The 9th and 10th articles of amendments to the constitution are as follow:

"The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Now, sir, can language be more explicit than this, in declaring that this charter contains certain enumerated powers, and that all not enumerated are reserved to the States or to the people? There is one article reserving rights to the people, and afterwards another article reserving them to the States and to the people. While on this subject, I beg leave to read a clause in the constitution, which I find among the enumerated powers, and which has been construed by some, as intended to convey a general grant of powers among the enumerated powers: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." The words "and to provide for the common defence and general welfare," have by some been considered as conveying a general grant of power. Nothing is necessary to show that this is not a fair and correct construction of the constitution, but reading it with attention. These terms contain no grant of power whatever, but are used to express the ends or objects for which particular grants of power were given. Paying the debts and providing for the common defence and general welfare are great objects, intimately connected with the particular grants of power which are given for their effectuation; and without these particular grants of power, it would not have been possible for Congress to effect them. The framers of the constitution have simply selected some of the objects expressed in the preamble, and declared that to effect them, and to pay the debts of the United States, were the considerations which induced them to give to Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes," &c. Thus taxes are to be laid, &c. "to pay the debts, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare." Could they have chosen a more appropriate phraseology? The plain language to Congress is: "You shall have power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts," &c., and to provide for the common defence and general welfare, or, in other words, for the purpose of paying the debts, &c., and of providing for the common defence and general welfare. These words do not contain a general grant of powers, but express the objects of a particular grant of powers. The framers of the constitution could not have done an act so absurd as to make a general grant of powers, among an enumeration of specified powers.

I will now, Mr. President, proceed to examine those instances which the gentleman has presented of the supposed aberrations of the Congress of the United States from the enumerated powers, and I think it will not be difficult to show that there is not a single instance quoted, but which is deducible from a fair and correct interpretation of the express words of the constitution, giving them their common and appropriate meaning.

The first instance presented to our consideration by the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) of the exercise of a power by Congress not enumerated in the constitution, was the erection of light-houses. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD,) to whose dispassionate observations I listened with great pleasure, superadded the instance of the erection of custom-houses. On these, both of the gentlemen seemed to place great reliance, as cases in point with the one under consideration. Both these powers I conceive are given to Congress by the express words of the constitution; but if I should be mistaken in this idea, they are certainly comprehended as incidental and subservient to, or in other words, "necessary and proper" for carrying into effect some of the enumerated powers.

The express words of the constitution give to Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," &c.; "to regulate commerce with foreign nations among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;" "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever, &c., over all places purchased by consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." From these clauses of the constitution, taken in connection with each other, I think Congress possesses the power to erect light-houses and custom-houses by the express words of the constitution; for both of these descriptions of houses must necessarily be included within the term "needful buildings," or the only construction which is at all applicable to these cases is, that needful buildings is the general term, and light-houses and custom-houses are particular instances or examples under the general term; or, if I may be so allowed to express my ideas, needful buildings may be considered as the genus, of which light-houses and custom-houses are particular species. The reason with the framers of the constitution for using this general term is obvious. It was, because it was impossible for them to foresee all the particular species of needful buildings which might become necessary to the salutary operations of this Government in the course of its complicated and due administration; they therefore wisely left that subject to the discussion of Congress, restrained and limited, nevertheless, by the requisition of the consent of the Legislatures of the States respectively, in every case proposed for the exercise of this discretion. That this is a plain and correct interpretation of the constitution is evinced by the concurrent opinions of every Legislature of every State, which has heretofore ceded lands for any of these objects; and it is to be remarked, that Congress has never attempted to erect any of these buildings without the constitutional requisition of the consent of the States respectively. But if this term "needful buildings" had not been expressed in the constitution, I should not hesitate to admit with these gentlemen that the erection of light-houses and custom-houses might properly be deduced from the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, &c., which are particular grants of power enumerated in the constitution. Because custom-houses are appropriately necessary to the collection of duties, and have always been deemed indispensable for that object, as are light-houses to the due regulation of commerce.

These two powers are indispensably connected with, and subservient to, particular enumerated powers, and are therefore among the means which are necessary and proper for their effectuation; and as such are given to Congress by the express words of the constitution, which are: Congress shall have power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." From this course of interpretation, the gentlemen, reasoning from a supposed analogy, have asked, if Congress can derive the right to erect light-houses and custom-houses from their necessary agency in effectuating the particular powers to which they are said to be appendant or appurtenant, why may it not in the same way derive the right of granting charters of incorporation for the same objects? Or, in other words, if Congress can constitutionally erect custom-houses for the purpose, or as the necessary means of collecting duties; why may it not establish a bank for the same object, &c.? The question is admitted to be a fair one; and if a clear distinction cannot be made in the two cases, it will be admitted either that Congress may constitutionally establish a bank, or that it has heretofore transcended its powers in erecting custom-houses, &c. A clear and most obvious distinction appears to me to exist in the cases suggested by the gentlemen to be analogous, arising from the striking difference in the nature and essential character of these powers. A custom-house is in its nature incidental and subservient to the collection of duties. It is one of the common, necessary, and proper means to effect that end. It is believed that in no commercial country in the world are duties collected without them. Besides, the erection of custom-houses does not involve in it the exercise of any other higher or consequential powers. The same remarks will apply to light-houses, as among the common, necessary, and proper means for the regulation of commerce, &c.

Is the incorporation of a bank of this character? It is not among the common, necessary, and proper means of effecting either of the foregoing enumerated powers, nor of any other enumerated in the constitution; still less is it incidental or subservient to any of the enumerated powers. It wants that connection, affiliation, and subserviency, to some enumerated power, which are clearly pointed out in relation to the two powers, to which it has been said to be analogous. Besides, does granting a charter of incorporation to a bank involve no other higher or consequential power than merely erecting a needful building for collecting duties, &c.? It certainly does. It involves the power to grant charters of incorporation generally; and in this respect, principally, its character is essentially different from both of the powers cited by the gentleman. The power to grant charters of incorporation is not an incidental, subordinate, subservient power; it is a distinct, original, substantive power. It is also susceptible of the clearest definition; and not being among the enumerated powers, it seems to me that Congress can have no fair claim to its exercise in any case. If Congress had been expressly authorized to grant charters of incorporation generally, then granting a charter of incorporation to a bank would have been an instance, or among the means, of carrying into effect that enumerated power, and would have been as much connected and affiliated with it as is the erection of custom-houses with the collection of duties; but the power to grant charters of incorporation generally not being expressly given in the constitution, no particular instance involving the exercise of that power can be inferred by a fair and candid interpretation of the instrument. I do not mean to exaggerate the consequences which might result from an assumption of the power to grant charters of incorporation, &c. It is sufficient for me to say that it is a power of primary importance; that it involves as many incidental powers in its exercise as any one of the enumerated powers; that it is equal, if not paramount, to any; and, therefore, in my judgment, cannot be assumed by fair construction as incidental and subservient to any; and, of course, not as among the necessary and proper means for carrying any into effect. In fact, in its nature it does not in the smallest degree partake of the derivative, incidental character. It is original, substantive, distinct in itself, and susceptible of the plainest definition. Hence, whilst I am willing to admit that a power, which is in its nature incidental and subservient to any enumerated power, and also among the necessary and proper means for carrying it into effect, may be exercised by Congress without the express words of the constitution, I should be very unwilling to admit that Congress should also exercise a power neither incidental nor subservient to any of the enumerated powers, nor among the necessary and proper means for carrying any into effect; still less should I be inclined to this admission, when the power thus proposed to be derived, incidentally or constructively, involves in it the exercise of almost unlimited powers. To illustrate my idea still further in this respect, I would observe, that the power to regulate descents, and to regulate the distribution of intestates, I conceive to be original, distinct, substantive powers; and, being among the powers which could in all respects be limited by the geographical boundaries of the individual States, and were therefore among the powers reserved to the management of the States, might as easily be assumed by Congress as incidental to some one of the enumerated powers, as the assumption of the power to grant charters of incorporation, which I conceive was, for the same reason, left to the management of the States. I believe no gentleman will contend that Congress can, under any candid construction, go so far in relation to those powers; nor do I see how it can in relation to the power of granting charters of incorporation.

FRIDAY, February 15.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, 1791.

Mr. CLAY.--Mr. President: When the subject involved in the motion now under consideration was depending before the other branch of the Legislature, a disposition to acquiesce in their decision was evinced. For although the committee who reported this bill had been raised many weeks prior to the determination of that House on the proposition to recharter the bank, except the occasional reference to it of memorials and petitions, we scarcely ever heard of it. The rejection, it is true, of a measure brought before either branch of Congress, does not absolutely preclude the other from taking up the same proposition; but the economy of our time, and a just deference for the opinion of others, would seem to recommend a delicate and cautious exercise of this power. As this subject, at the memorable period when the charter was granted, called forth the best talents of the nation--as it has, on various occasions, undergone the most thorough investigation, and as we can hardly expect that it is susceptible of receiving any further elucidation, it was to have been hoped that we should have been spared a useless debate. This was the more desirable because there are, I conceive, much superior claims upon us for every hour of the small portion of the session yet remaining to us. Under the operation of these motives, I had resolved to give a silent vote, until I felt myself bound, by the defying manner of the arguments advanced in support of the renewal, to obey the paramount duties I owe my country and its constitution; to make one effort, however feeble, to avert the passage of what appears to me a most unjustifiable law. After my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) had instructed and amused us with the very able and ingenious argument which he delivered on yesterday, I should have still forborne to trespass on the Senate, but for the extraordinary character of his speech. He discussed both sides of the question, with great ability and eloquence, and certainly demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who heard him, both that it was constitutional and unconstitutional, highly proper and improper to prolong the charter of the bank. The honorable gentleman appeared to me in the predicament in which the celebrated orator of Virginia, Patrick Henry, is said to have been once placed. Engaged in a most extensive and lucrative practice of the law, he mistook in one instance the side of the cause on which he was retained, and addressed the court and jury in a very splendid and convincing speech in behalf of his antagonist. His distracted client came up to him whilst he was progressing, and interrupting him, bitterly exclaimed, "you have undone me! you have ruined me!"--"Never mind, give yourself no concern," said the adroit advocate; and turning to the court and jury, continued his argument by observing, "May it please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury, I have been stating to you what I presume my adversary may urge on his side. I will now show you how fallacious his reasoning and groundless his pretensions are." The skilful orator proceeded, satisfactorily refuted every argument he had advanced, and gained his cause! A success with which I trust the exertion of my honorable friend will on this occasion be crowned.

It has been said by the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) that this has been made a party question, although the law incorporating the bank was passed prior to the formation of parties, and when Congress was not biased by party prejudices. [Mr. CRAWFORD explained. He did not mean that it had been made a party question in the Senate. His allusion was elsewhere.] I do not think it altogether fair to refer to the discussions in the House of Representatives, as gentlemen belonging to that body have no opportunity of defending themselves here. It is true that this law was not the effect, but it is no less true that it was one of the causes of the political divisions of this country. And if, during the agitation of the present question, the renewal has, on one side, been opposed on party principles, let me ask if, on the other, it has not been advocated on similar principles? Where is the Macedonian phalanx, the opposition in Congress? I believe, sir, I shall not incur the charge of presumptuous prophecy, when I predict that we shall not pick up from its ranks one single straggler! And if, on this occasion, my worthy friend from Georgia has gone over into the camp of the enemy, is it kind in him to look back upon his former friends, and rebuke them for the fidelity with which they adhere to their old principles?

I shall not stop to examine how far a representative is bound by the instructions of his constituents. This is a question between the giver and receiver of the instructions. But I must be permitted to express my surprise at the pointed difference which has been made between the opinions and instructions of State Legislatures, and the opinions and details of the deputations with which we have been surrounded from Philadelphia. Whilst the resolutions of those Legislatures--known, legitimate, constitutional and deliberative bodies--have been thrown into the back ground, and their interference regarded as officious, these delegations from self-created societies, composed of whom nobody knows, have been received by the committee with the utmost complaisance. Their communications have been treasured up with the greatest diligence. Never did the Delphic priests collect with more holy care the frantic expressions of the agitated Pythia, or expound them with more solemnity to the astonished Grecians, than has the committee gathered the opinions and testimony of these deputies, and through the gentleman from Massachusetts, pompously detailed them to the Senate! Philadelphia has her immediate representatives, capable of expressing her wishes upon the floor of the other House. If it be improper for States to obtrude upon Congress their sentiments, it is much more highly so for the unauthorized deputies of fortuitous congregations.

The first singular feature that attracts attention in this bill is the new and unconstitutional veto which it establishes. The constitution has required only, that after bills have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, they shall be presented to the President for his approval or rejection, and his determination is to be made known in ten days. But this bill provides, that when all the constitutional sanctions are obtained, and when according to the usual routine of legislation it ought to be considered as a law, it is to be submitted to a new branch of the Legislature, consisting of the President and twenty-four Directors of the Bank of the United States, holding their sessions in Philadelphia, and if they please to approve it, why then it is to become a law! And three months (the term allowed by our law of May last, to one of the great belligerents for revoking his edicts, after the other shall have repealed his) are granted them to decide whether an act of Congress shall be the law of the land or not! An act which is said to be indispensably necessary to our salvation, and without the passage of which, universal distress and bankruptcy are to pervade the country. Remember, sir, that the honorable gentleman from Georgia has contended that this charter is no contract. Does it, then, become the representatives of the nation to leave the nation at the mercy of a corporation? Ought the impending calamities to be left to the hazard of a contingent remedy?

This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot whereupon to fasten, has been at length located by the gentleman from Georgia on that provision, which authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes, &c. In 1791, the power is referred to one part of the instrument; in 1811, to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself under the grant to coin money. The sagacious Secretary of the Treasury in 1791 pursued the wisest course--he has taken shelter behind general, high-sounding, and imposing terms. He has declared in the preamble to the act establishing the bank, that it will be very conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans, and will be productive of considerable advantage to trade and industry in general. No allusion is made to the collection of taxes. What is the nature of this Government? It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of specified powers for general purposes, conceded by existing sovereignties, who have themselves retained what is not so conceded. It is said that there are cases in which it must act on implied powers. This is not controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and obviously flow from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The power to charter companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend is of a nature not transferable by mere implication. It is one of the most exalted attributes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this gigantic power we have seen an East India Company created, which has carried dismay, desolation, and death throughout one of the largest portions of the habitable world. A company which is, in itself, a sovereignty--which has subverted empires and set up new dynasties--and has not only made war, but war against its legitimate sovereign! Under the influence of this power, we have seen arise a South Sea Company, and a Mississippi Company, that distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a total overthrow of all credit and confidence, and universal bankruptcy. Is it to be imagined that a power so vast would have been left by the wisdom of the constitution to doubtful inference? It has been alleged that there are many instances, in the constitution, where powers, in their nature incidental, and which would have necessarily vested along with the principal power, are nevertheless expressly enumerated; and the power "to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval forces," which, it is said, is incidental to the power to raise armies and provide a navy, is given as an example. What does this prove? How extremely cautious the convention were to leave as little as possible to implication. In all cases where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specified power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects which are not specified in the constitution. If then you could establish a bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. It is a mockery, worse than usurpation, to establish it for a lawful object, and then extend it to other objects which are not lawful. In deducing the power to create corporations, such as I have described it, from the power to collect taxes, the relation and condition of principal and incident are prostrated and destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the principal. As well might it be said that the great luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite to the humblest star that twinkles forth its feeble light in the firmament of heaven!

Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual department of this Government, could you, under the power to lay and collect taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could derive the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue, and while it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself through society, and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and commerce. Like the Virginia justice, you tell the man, whose turkey had been stolen, that your book of precedents furnishes no form for his case, but then you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount--to emit paper--to regulate commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind. But then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and, while occupied with that, you may do whatever else you please!

What is a corporation such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privileges. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. LLOYD) has said that the original law, establishing the bank, was justly liable to the objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege, the faith of the Government being pledged that no other bank should be authorized during its existence. This objection he supposes is obviated by the bill under consideration; but all corporations enjoy exclusive privileges--that is, the corporators have privileges which no others possess; and if you create fifty corporations instead of one, you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one.

I contend that the States have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of debtors to their creditors. If Congress have the power to erect an artificial body and say it shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual--if you can bestow on this object of your own creation the ability to contract, may you not, in contravention of State rights, confer upon slaves, infants, and femes covert, the ability to contract? And if you have the power to say that an association of individuals shall be responsible for their debts only in a certain limited degree, what is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals? Where is the limitation upon this power to set up corporations? You establish one, in the heart of a State, the basis of whose capital is money. You may erect others whose capital shall consist of land, slaves, and personal estate, and thus the whole property within the jurisdiction of a State might be absorbed by these political bodies. The existing bank contends that it is beyond the power of a State to tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power of Congress, by chartering companies, to dry up the whole of the sources of State revenue. Georgia has undertaken, it is true, to levy a tax on the branch within her jurisdiction, but this law, now under a course of litigation, is considered as invalid. The United States own a great deal of land in the State of Ohio; can this Government, for the purpose of creating an ability to purchase it, charter a company? Aliens are forbidden, I believe, in that State, to hold real estate--could you, in order to multiply purchasers, confer upon them the capacity to hold land, in derogation of the local law? I imagine this will hardly be insisted upon; and yet there exists a more obvious connection between the undoubted power, which is possessed by this Government, to sell its land, and the means of executing that power, by increasing the demand in the market, than there is between this bank and the collection of a tax. This Government has the power to levy taxes--to raise armies--provide a navy--make war--regulate commerce--coin money, &c. It would not be difficult to show as intimate a connection between a corporation, established for any purpose whatever, and some one or other of those great powers, as there is between the revenue and the bank of the United States.

Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800, requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the principal bank or any of its offices are situated, to deposit with them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the period to which the existence of this institution was limited, it was noways instrumental in the collection of that revenue, to which it is now become indispensable! The collection, previous to 1800, was made entirely by the collectors; and even at present, where there is one port of entry, at which this bank is employed, there are eight or ten at which the collection is made as it was before 1800. And, sir, what does this bank or its branches when resort is had to it? It does not adjust with the merchant the amount of the duty, nor take his bond; nor, if the bond is not paid, coerce the payment by distress or otherwise. In fact, it has no active agency whatever in the collection. Its operation is merely passive; that is, if the obligor, after his bond is placed in the bank, discharges it, all is very well. Such is the mighty aid afforded by this tax-gatherer, without which the Government cannot get along! Again, it is not pretended that the very limited assistance which this institution does in truth render, extends to any other than a single species of tax, that is, duties. In the collection of the excise, the direct and other internal taxes, no aid was derived from any bank. It is true, in the collection of those taxes, the farmer did not obtain the same indulgence which the merchant receives in paying duties. But what obliges Congress to give credit at all? Could it not demand prompt payment of the duties? And in fact does it not so demand in many instances? Whether credit is given or not, is a matter merely of discretion. If it be a facility to mercantile operations (as I presume it is) it ought to be granted. But I deny the right to ingraft upon it a bank, which you would not otherwise have the power to erect. You cannot create the necessity of a bank, and then plead that necessity for its establishment. In the administration of the finances, the bank acts simply as a payer and receiver. The Secretary of the Treasury has money in New York and wants it in Charleston; the bank will furnish him with a check, or bill, to make the remittance, which any merchant would do just as well.

I will now proceed to show by fact, actual experience, not theoretic reasoning, but by the records themselves of the Treasury, that the operations of that department may be as well conducted without as with this bank. The delusion has consisted in the use of certain high-sounding phrases, dexterously used on the occasion. "The collection of the revenue"--"The administration of the finance"--"The conducting the fiscal affairs of the Government," the usual language of the advocates of the bank, extort express assent, or awe into acquiescence, without inquiry or examination into its necessity. About the commencement of this year there appears, by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the 7th of January, to have been a little upwards of two millions four hundred thousand dollars in the Treasury of the United States; and more than one-third of this whole sum was in the vaults of local banks. In several instances, where an opportunity existed of selecting the bank, a preference has been given to the State bank, or at least a portion of the deposits has been made with it. In New York, for example, there was deposited with the Manhattan Bank $188,670, although a branch bank is in that city. In this District, $115,080 were deposited with the bank of Columbia, although here also is a branch bank, and yet the State banks are utterly unsafe to be trusted! If the money, after the bonds are collected, is thus placed with these banks, I presume there can be no difficulty in placing the bonds themselves there, if they must be deposited with some bank for collection, which I deny.

Again, one of the most important and complicated branches of the Treasury Department is the management of our landed system. The sales have some years amounted to upwards of half a million of dollars, are generally made upon credit, and yet no bank whatever is made use of to facilitate the collection. After it is made, the amount in some instances has been deposited with banks, and according to the Secretary's report, which I have before adverted to, the amount so deposited was in January upwards of three hundred thousand dollars, not one cent of which was in the vaults of the Bank of the United States, or in any of its branches, but in the Bank of Pennsylvania, its branch at Pittsburg, the Marietta Bank, and the Kentucky Bank. Upon the point of responsibility, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, if it is meant that the ability to pay the amount of any deposits which the Government may make under any exigency, is greater than that of the State banks; that the accountability of a ramified institution, whose affairs are managed by a single head, responsible for all its members, is more simple than that of a number of independent and unconnected establishments, I shall not deny; but, with regard to safety, I am strongly inclined to think it is on the side of the local banks. The corruption or misconduct of the parent, or any of its branches, may bankrupt or destroy the whole system, and the loss of the Government in that event will be of the deposits made with each; whereas in the failure of one State bank the loss will be confined to the deposit in the vaults of that bank. It is said to have been a part of Burr's plan to seize on the branch bank at New Orleans. At that period large sums, imported from La Vera Cruz, are alleged to have been deposited with it, and if the traitor had accomplished his design, the Bank of the United States, if not actually bankrupt, might have been constrained to stop payment.

It is urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD,) that as this nation progresses in commerce, wealth, and population, new energies will be unfolded, new wants and exigencies will arise, and hence he infers that powers must be implied from the constitution. But, sir, the question is, shall we stretch the instrument to embrace cases not fairly within its scope, or shall we resort to that remedy, by amendment, which the constitution prescribes?

Gentlemen contend that the construction which they give to the constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties, and under all administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in 1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans, and another act, of 1807, for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank. With regard to the first law, passed no doubt upon the recommendation of the Treasury Department, I would remark, that it was the extension of a branch to a Territory, over which Congress possesses power of legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than the bank--to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper, purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence, let me inquire what they would have had those to have done who believed the establishment of the bank an encroachment upon State rights? Were they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties, in 1800, it must be well recollected that the greatest calamities were predicted as consequences of that event. Intentions were ascribed to the new occupants of power of violating the public faith and prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they should act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in full operation a bank, chartered by a Congress who had as much right to judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in all probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding. The Judiciary would have been appealed to; and, from the known opinions and predilections of the judges then composing it, they would have pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a contract, beyond the repealing power of any succeeding Legislature. And, sir, what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have presented--an act of Congress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity on the judicial records! Was it not wisest to wait the natural dissolution of the corporation, rather than accelerate that event by a repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?

When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure, upon the ground of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniformity of decision exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is wise and proper; and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule exists but the constitution; and to legislate upon the ground merely that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedents, I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions under which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an established rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect, the mind of the judge who pronounced must have been awakened to the subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full argument. In technical language, it must not have been sub silentio. Now, the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the re-chartering this company, passed not only without any discussions whatever, of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a bank, but I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the Senate when the latter law passed; probably voted for it; and I declare, with the utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point; and I appeal confidently to every honorable member who was then present to say if that was not his situation.

This doctrine of precedents, applied to the Legislature, appears to me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great advantage of our system of government over all others is, that we have a written constitution defining its limits and prescribing its authorities; and that, however for a time faction may convulse the nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the season of reflection will recur, when calmly retracing their deeds, and all aberrations from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once substitute practice for principle, the expositions of the constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for the instrument in the instrument itself. It will be as diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and it must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. What would be our condition if we were to take the interpretations given to that sacred book, which is or ought to be the criterion of our faith, for the book itself? We should find the Holy Bible buried beneath the interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects, partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin than of a vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other. They ought to afford us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.

I conceive, then, sir, that we are not empowered by the constitution nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank and I might here rest the argument. But, as there are strong objections to the renewal upon the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestration in France, the Danish captures--in fine, the belligerent edicts, are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.

The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars; and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body who, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this Government, would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven-tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly upon the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English Premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other nations, ought most studiously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the downfall of almost every free Government that has hitherto existed; and yet gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital. If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic, will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession of this English capital gives us a certain influence over the British Government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better at once exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the arguments of gentlemen on the other side. But let us put aside this theory, and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic, and see what has been achieved for us there by Englishmen holding seven-tenths of the capital of this bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the Orders in Council--those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effects, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite sure that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests. It has often been stated, and, although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact, that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty; and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyze the efforts of this nation against British aggression?

The Duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the Bank of the United States. A late Lord Chancellor of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the Prince of Essling, the Duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries owned seven-eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the Senate) to recharter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?

I shall give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.

Mr. POPE.--Mr. President, in rising on this occasion, I never more entirely obeyed both my feelings and my judgment. The principle involved in the decision about to be given, is in my view of more magnitude than any which has been presented for our consideration since I had the honor of a seat here. It is no less than whether we shall surrender to the State Governments the power of collecting our revenue and rely upon the old system of requisitions. We are called upon to return to that state of imbecility and chaos from which this political fabric was reared by the wisdom and patriotism of the first statesmen of which any age or nation can boast. For twenty years we have collected our revenue, borrowed money, paid our debts, and managed our fiscal concerns through the agency of a national bank. That it has answered the most sanguine expectations of its authors; that it has been well managed, is admitted by the most decided opponents to the renewal of the charter. Although in public debate, in newspapers, court-yards, muster-fields, &c., we have heard much of dangerous powers, violations of the constitution, British influence, and poisonous vipers, &c., &c., which were to sting to death the liberties of the people, yet we find ourselves as free almost as the air we breathe, and hardly subservient to the mildest code of laws by which any nation was ever governed. In the city of Philadelphia, and the State of Pennsylvania generally, where these animals called banks have grown to the most enormous size, we find as sound morals, and as much real practical republicanism, as in those parts of the Union where the rattling of this viper's tail has never been heard, and in point of solid wealth and internal improvements, mark the contrast. We are required to disregard the lessons of that best teacher, experience, and to try some new scheme. However captivating new theories and abstract propositions were a few years since, I believe the thinking men of all parties in the nation are perfectly convinced that one ounce of experience and common matter-of-fact sense is worth more for the purposes of legislation than a ship-load of theory and speculation. We are told that we must force into the vaults of the bank a large portion of the circulating medium, and thereby depress the price of every thing in the market; we must give a shock to credit of every kind, check and embarrass every branch of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing industry; give up the young mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants with small capitals a prey to the cupidity of moneyed men, who will be tempted to withdraw their funds from trade to speculate on the wrecks of the unfortunate. This is not mere matter of calculation. I only state facts proved to us by the most unquestionable evidence. We are not only, sir, to ruin many innocent and unoffending individuals, but to derange the national finances; and for what is all this to be done? To promote the public good or advance the national prosperity? No, sir, it is not pretended. We are gravely told, that we, the Representatives of the people, must sacrifice the people to save the constitution of the people, whose happiness and welfare it was intended to secure. If this be true, it is indeed a strange Government under which we live. I advance the opinion with confidence, that no principle which, in its practical effects, outrages the common sense and feelings of mankind, can be a sound one, and we ought to examine it well, and hesitate much before we give our assent. To bring distress on the country, not to prevent a violation of any positive provision of the constitution; but to correct what we suppose to have been an erroneous construction of it by our predecessors, of which neither the States nor the people have ever complained, appears to be more nice than wise.

Disguise this question as you will, sir, and still it will clearly appear to be a contest between a few importing States and the people of the United States. Resolutions have been already laid on our table by gentlemen from the two large States; from which instructions have been received in substance, requiring Congress to give up to the State banks the collection of the national revenue. I am, Mr. President, on the side of the people of the United States. This is indeed a question of party, but of a very different character from that which will be attempted to be palmed on the people. It is a contest between the friends and enemies of the Federal Constitution revived; for, if I am not mistaken, the power of laying and collecting imposts and duties was strongly objected to by some of the large States having advantageous seaports, before the constitution was adopted. I am for preserving both the States and the Union. I consider the safety and independence of the several States, and the liberties of the people, inseparably connected with and dependent on the efficiency of the National Government, and it is to me unaccountable that gentlemen in favor of strong measures against foreign nations should be so solicitous to strip the General Government of this very essential part of its power. We were told, a few days since, that our army was so insignificant and contemptible, that it would require a constable, with a search warrant, to find it. I have heard another gentleman of very high standing suggest the propriety of retroceding the ten miles square to the States of Virginia and Maryland. Our gunboats are almost rotten. We have not more frigates and other armed vessels than sufficient to carry our Ministers and diplomatic despatches to foreign courts, and if we yield to the States the collection of our revenue, what will remain of the Federal Government with which the people can identify their feelings or affections? In what will this Government consist? It will be a mere creature of the imagination--a political fiction. And, analogous to the fiction in the action of ejectment, we shall have to suppose its existence, and then bottom our proceedings upon that supposition. If I was hostile to our Federal Union, or wanted to prepare the public mind for a surrender of this happy system of Government, I would join in the hue and cry against this institution; I would support every measure calculated to destroy all confidence in and respect for this Government, both at home and abroad; I would endeavor to produce throughout the country, confusion and disorder, and a state of glorious uncertainty; then persuade the people to seek security and tranquillity under some other form of Government. The transition from a wild, factious democracy, to despotism, is often easy, and generally sudden. The extremes are very nearly allied. A Republican Government, guided by the virtue and intelligence of a nation, is the first of human blessings, but when directed by the angry, vindictive passions of party, the worst of which the imagination can conceive. A republic, to be durable, must inspire confidence and respect. Such instability, such variable, unsettled policy as now appears to be the order of the day, could not have been anticipated by any man blessed with a tolerable degree of faith in the success of this great republican experiment. Mr. President, I have ever been opposed to yielding to the commercial interest an undue influence in this Government, but I am unwilling to make an unnecessary and wanton attack upon them. Coming from an agricultural State, I am not disposed to increase the jealousies which unfortunately exist, and thereby weaken the ties by which these States are held together. I am sensible, too, how much the prosperity of the State I represent depends on a prosperous state of trade, and although the shock from the dissolution of this bank will be first felt in the commercial cities, it must immediately react to the extremes of the empire. I know many are under an impression that Federalists and British agents are to be the victims; but very different will be the result. I refer to the evidence detailed by the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD.) But is it possible that an intolerant spirit of party has prepared us for this? Are gentlemen ready to injure their country, weaken our Federal Union, the sheet-anchor of our political safety, to reach their political opponents? I will not believe it. When I see around me some of the soldiers of the Revolution, actuated I am sure by nobler views; when I see the professors of a religion which teaches us to love our neighbors as ourselves, I cannot persuade myself that Christian charity, and all the noble, generous feelings of the human heart, are extinguished by this demon, party spirit. If there be a man in the nation who can witness with unfeeling apathy the distresses of his fellow-citizens, he would have figured in Smithfield in the bloody reign of Queen Mary of England, in binding heretics to the stake; or in the sanguinary time of Robespierre, in adding victims to the guillotine; but he is unworthy the blessings of a free Government.

Sir, I address the Senate under circumstances discouraging indeed. I have been told, and on this floor, that debate is useless; that no man's opinion is to be changed; that I shall find verified in the decision of this question the sentiment contained in two lines of Hudibras--"He that is convinced against his will, is of the same opinion still." I cannot admit this. I know there are gentlemen fully sensible of the evils about to befall their country, without any obstinate pride to conquer, who would rejoice at being convinced it is in their power to avert them. Let me entreat them to pause and reflect, before they inflict a wound on their country's interest, under the influence of constitutional doubt; and if they err, I would ask them, would it not be more safe and patriotic to err in favor of the people? Permit me now, sir, to redeem this subject from the constitutional difficulties with which it has been encumbered.

To form a correct opinion, we must retrospect the defects of the old Government, and ascertain the remedy which was anticipated in the present constitution. I believe it will be conceded that the great cause of the inefficiency of the former, was not because their principal field of legislation was too limited, but was owing to its dependence on the States for the means to carry their powers into effect. For the truth of this position, I appeal to the history of that day--to the candor of gentlemen who hear me. The present constitution was framed for national purposes, with ample authority to pass all laws necessary and proper for the attainment of its objects, independent of State authority, except so far as expressly made dependent by the constitution. The erroneous impressions with regard to this bank have arisen from ignorance of facts, relative to the practical fiscal operations of the Government, and from confounding an original, independent power, to establish banks and corporations, with a necessary auxiliary to the execution of the powers given. By the constitution it is expressly declared, that Congress shall have power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers previously enumerated, and all other powers vested in the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof. Our power to create a bank is not derived by implication. No, sir. If this express delegation of power had not been inserted, we must have implied the authority to provide the means necessary and proper, &c.

But the Convention, with a full knowledge of the defects of the old Confederation, and deeply impressed with the necessity of an efficient national Government, determined to exclude all doubt by granting to the new Government, in express and unequivocal language, ample authority to use all means necessary and proper for the attainment of the ends for which it was instituted. If a man was requested to look at the constitution and decide whether power is given to Congress to create a bank, or corporations generally, he would answer in the negative. This would very naturally be the answer of most men upon the first blush of the constitution. It is not pretended that Congress have power to create corporations as an independent proposition. The authority to establish a bank or corporations is only contended for so far as it can be fairly considered as a necessary and proper auxiliary to the execution of the powers granted by the constitution. The question of constitutionality depends upon facts, dehors the instrument, of which we must be informed before we decide, and which could not be ascertained before the attempt was made to give motion and energy to this political machinery. If the fact be ascertained, by the best evidence the nature of the subject affords, that a bank is necessary and proper to effectuate the legitimate powers of Government, then our power is express, and we need not resort to implication. To prove to the satisfaction of the Senate and the world, this material fact, will be my business before I request their assent to the position assumed, that Congress have an express power to incorporate a bank. To do this it is indispensable that we should understand the practical financial concerns of the Government, or have the information of those who do. We appropriate money for fortifications on the report of our engineer, Colonel Williams, and for the Capitol, &c., upon the report of Mr. Latrobe. To know how much timber or other materials are necessary for a ship or a house, you must understand the subject yourself, or have the information of those who do. For myself, I am ready to admit that I rely much upon the information and experience of others. To ignorant men, and those who do not profess to be fully acquainted with the nature and management of the national finances, the following evidence is presented. The first, and with many, perhaps the best, not heretofore particularly noticed, which I shall offer, is the Congress of 1781, which established a national bank, called the Bank of North America, during our revolutionary struggle, the utility and necessity of which were ascertained by the experience of that day.

It is worthy of remark, that they created a bank under powers much more limited than ours. That act was not passed precipitately, but was the result of the most mature and deliberate consideration. I beg leave to read the preamble of the law which contains the opinions of that Congress with regard to the utility and necessity of a National Bank. "Whereas Congress, on the 26th day of May last, did, from a conviction of the support which the finances of the United States would receive from the establishment of a National Bank, approve a plan for such an institution, submitted to their consideration by Robert Morris, Esq., and now lodged among the archives of Congress, and did engage to promote the same by the most effectual means; and whereas the subscription thereto is now filled, from an expectation of a charter of incorporation from Congress, the directors and president are appointed, and application has been made to Congress by the said president and directors, for an act of incorporation: and whereas the exigencies of the United States render it indispensably necessary that such an act be immediately passed--Be it therefore ordained," &c. This act passed on the 31st day of December, 1781. And here permit me to observe, that this National Bank, styled the Bank of North America, was not produced by British influence or party spirit. No, sir, the little, slandering, intriguing partyism of the present moment was unknown to the patriots of that awful period. They had no party but their country--liberty and independence were their objects. Their souls were fired with a noble, a generous enthusiasm, on which Heaven looked down with pleasure. It appears from the journals of the Congress of 1781, that the members from every State were unanimous in favor of a National Bank, except Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia--the two members from Massachusetts voted against it, the two members from Pennsylvania were divided--of the four from Virginia, Mr. Madison alone voted against it. Here it is evident that, in the very infancy of our Republic, before indeed it could with propriety be said to be born, when every bosom glowed with enthusiasm for liberty and a pure disinterested patriotism, a National Bank was not thought that dangerous, dreadful monster, which the very wise and exclusive patriots of 1811 are endeavoring to represent it to the American people. And the construction given to the grant of powers in the Articles of Confederation by the Congress of 1781, is strong evidence of our right to establish a bank under a grant of powers much more ample, and with money concerns vastly more extensive and complicated.

The next evidence I shall adduce for the consideration of the Senate, is the opinion of the late General Hamilton, appointed by President Washington, the first Secretary of the Treasury; whose province and duty it was to superintend the national finances. His attention was therefore particularly directed to the subject, and, in a very able report to the first Congress, assembled under the new constitution, he recommended a National Bank. Although opinions have been imputed to this gentleman very foreign to my feelings and notions about Government, yet he has ever been acknowledged, by the candid and liberal of all parties, one of the first American statesmen. For reasons, which it is unnecessary for me to assign, I will not press his opinion upon the attention of the Senate, but will introduce other and perhaps less exceptionable testimony. The Congress of 1791, which incorporated the present bank, merits the highest regard. It was composed of the most enlightened and distinguished men in America, many of whom had been members of the convention, and were fully apprised of the defects of the old and the objects of the new Government. A large majority of both branches voted in favor of the bank. They were not divided on the question by party. Many who have continued with the Republican party under every Administration voted in favor of this bank. Although different speculative or abstract political opinions were then entertained, yet the spirit and passion of party had not diffused itself so generally through the nation as at a subsequent period. The next authority in favor of this bank, and one which must at all times and on all occasions command the highest respect, is no less than our immortal Washington. He was President of the United States in 1791, when this bank law passed. After it had received the sanction of both branches of the Legislature, with that circumspection and prudence which regulated his conduct through life, he consulted the able men who composed his Cabinet Council on the constitutional question; they differed in opinion; he heard their arguments for and against the measure; and, after full consideration, approved the law. I cannot yet, sir, take leave of this very important testimony in favor of the bank. The opinion of our Washington has the strongest claim to our confidence. Let us pause before we disregard his solemn advice. This is the hero who led our armies to victory; this is the Washington, who, at the close of our Revolutionary war, disbanded a disciplined army in the bosom of the Republic, and voluntarily exchanged the splendid robes and ensigns of military power for the plain, humble garb of a private citizen. This Washington, who continued an American, a Republican in heart and in sentiment, until summoned to the mansions of bliss; yes, sir, this illustrious departed hero, this practical statesman, has solemnly declared to the American people that a National Bank is a necessary and proper auxiliary to the execution of the national powers. The last authority I shall particularly notice in support of this institution, is the opinion of the present Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin. If this gentleman cannot boast of the military laurels which have adorned the brows of the patriots I have mentioned; as a statesman and faithful public servant, he stands inferior to none. Mr. Gallatin, from his first appearance on the theatre of public life, has been considered by all parties an able financier. At a very early period the finances of the United States became the subject of his particular attention and inquiry; the result of which was a treatise, published in 1796, called "Gallatin, on the finances of the United States," in which he gives a decided opinion in favor of this bank. I rely much on his opinion at that period, because it must have been the result of conviction, and not of any party feeling or consideration, as he was then in the minority, and continued in it until the Administration changed. His report to the Senate during the last session of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, and his letter to the committee, show, that time and experience, so far from changing, have confirmed him in the opinion he first formed on the subject; to which I might add every Administration and almost every man practically acquainted with our money concerns. Is not this mass of evidence sufficient to substantiate the facts upon the existence or non-existence of which the constitutionality of this measure depends? I put the question to the candor and good sense of gentlemen, whether they are not satisfied, in the language of the constitution, that a National Bank is necessary and proper to effectuate the legitimate powers of the National Government? If they answer in the negative, I can only say, he who will neither regard the suggestions of experience, nor believe the report of the great political disciples who have gone before us, would not believe though one were to rise from the dead. And what is the answer to all this out of doors? Why, that we are not to be governed by the information or opinion of others, however well acquainted with the subject; we are so self-sufficient as to disregard the best lights which can be presented to us. The cry is up to the hub, down with the bank, huzza for the party! So long, Mr. President, as I shall be honored with a seat in the Senate of the Union, I am determined to respect my station and my own feelings and character too much to be driven along by any such idle, ridiculous clamor.

As I heard much said about absolute, indispensable necessity, I may be pardoned for giving what I consider the sound interpretation of the words "necessary and proper" in the constitution. This idea of absolute, indispensable, &c., must have originated in an excessive jealousy of power or a decided hostility to the Federal Union. This instrument was framed by and for the people of the United States, and, in the language used, was certainly intended to be understood in that sense in which it is used and understood by them generally. If you ask a plain man what are the necessaries of life, he will answer, something below luxury and extravagance, what is calculated to afford him reasonable comfort. Neither a house nor a bed is absolutely or indispensably necessary to a man's existence; he could live in a camp and sleep on boards, or on the ground, yet, the common sense of mankind would respond, they are necessary and proper. If a man had a journey to make, either to Richmond, in Virginia, or Lexington, in Kentucky, although every person would pronounce a coach and six superfluous and unnecessary, all reasonable men would say, he ought to have a horse or a hack, but it will not be pretended that either are indispensable, because he could perform it on foot. If a gentleman from Baltimore gives his agent instructions to provide every thing necessary for an East India voyage, what would he expect? Certainly that he should avoid unnecessary expense, but would consider him acting within the pale of his authority if he procured only what was reasonably necessary and proper, or, in other words, what was fairly suited to the master and crew, and well calculated to enable the vessel to reach her port of destination. That interpretation is correct which best accords with the common sense and understanding of mankind. It must, therefore, be evident that the only question as regards the constitutionality of the measure to be decided is a question of fact, and that is, whether a National Bank is reasonably necessary and proper, or fairly suited to, and calculated for, the collection of our revenue and the management of our money concerns. And this fact appears to be admitted by the gentlemen opposed to the bill, for their arguments are predicated upon the probability that the State banks will answer the national purposes. This is a complete surrender of the constitutional objection; for, if banks be necessary and proper, it follows that we have a constitutional power to create them, and it will be a mere question of expediency whether we will use State banks or a National Bank. My colleague (Mr. CLAY) has asked for the congeniality between a bank and the collection of our revenue? The argument in favor of using State banks shows it, but let the use hitherto made of the bank answer the question. Is not a bank a proper place for the deposit and safe-keeping of money--more so than the custom-house? Is it not a convenient agent for paying and receiving money? Through the agency of this bank our revenue, or the greater part of it, has been collected, our financial transactions done, and public money transmitted to such places as the necessities of the Government required. The revenue collected at Boston, Baltimore, or any other port, is paid, if required, at New Orleans, Natchez, St. Louis, or any other place without risk or expense. The money in the bank and its branches is payable at such of them as the convenience of the Government may require, and, by this arrangement, we can command the whole of the public money in any quarter of the Union without risk or expense. The operations of this institution have been confined to the seaboard. The principal bank is at Philadelphia, with a branch at New York, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. At all which places, the Government has considerable revenue to collect. No branches have been extended into the interior. It has been connected with our fiscal arrangements at all the places to which it has been extended, and may be fairly deemed a convenient, necessary, and appropriate auxiliary to the management of the national concerns. It is said that the revenue is collected at many ports where none of these branches are placed. This is true; the bank and branches are fixed only at the principal seaports, where a large amount of revenue is collected. Every one draws into its vaults, subject to the demands of Government, the revenue collected at the less important ports in the same quarter of the country. Boston being the commercial emporium of New England, the Government, by the agency of the branch bank there, is enabled to draw to that point most of the revenue received at the numerous ports in that quarter of the Union. The repeated sanctions this bank has received from the different Administrations, and especially from Mr. Jefferson and the Republican party, by authorizing the extension of a branch to New Orleans, and selling one million of the stock, the property of the United States, to British subjects, for four hundred thousand dollars more than the nominal amount, is indeed strangely accounted for; gentlemen say the Government were bound to fulfil their engagements, and that the charter, being in the nature of a contract, was sacred. I had thought the fashionable doctrine was, that an unconstitutional law was wholly null and void. It has been held by some of the States. However plausible the answer to the argument of acquiescence, it furnishes no apology for a positive confirmation. Permit me to assimilate a common case between individuals to the case before us: a man in Washington executes a joint power to five trustees in Kentucky to collect his debts, settle his land business, &c., and authorizes them to take all steps necessary and proper to effectuate the trust or power; in the progress of the business a measure is suggested as necessary, about which there is a diversity of opinion among the trustees. A majority, however, decide that it is within their authority; the principal is informed of it, does not complain or disavow, but positively and by the strongest implication assents to the construction given by his agents. In such a case there would be but one opinion. In 1791 a National Bank is proposed to Congress; they differ as to the constitutionality, a large majority decide in favor of it, the people and the States are informed of the measure, the States do not protest, nor do the people complain; many of the States pass laws to protect the institution, it receives the confirmation of three or four different Administrations, and particularly of the one composed of men originally opposed to it; it violates no positive provision of the constitution; no mischiefs have been produced, but great convenience and advantage have been experienced by the Government and community. I ask whether, under such circumstances, the question ought not to be considered settled? Is no respect due to the opinions of our predecessors? Is a question of construction never to be at rest? Why is a judge, sworn to support the laws and constitution of the country, bound by a train of decisions contrary to his own opinions? Because the good, the peace, the tranquillity of society require it. The conduct of a court, as well as every department of Government, must be regulated in its course in some measure by a regard for the public weal. It is worthy of remark that, notwithstanding all the fuss about implied and incidental powers--if you except the sedition law, which was supposed to violate a positive provision of the constitution--the same practical construction has been given to this instrument by every Administration of the Government. Indeed, the sphere of national legislation has been more enlarged under Mr. Jefferson's than any other Administration. All parties have found that the national vessel could not be navigated without sails, rigging, and every thing necessary and proper. Whence was derived a power to pass a law laying an embargo without limitation? There is nothing in the constitution about embargoes. Whence did we derive a power to purchase Louisiana, and incorporate it with the good old United States? There is no express delegation of power to purchase new territory. On these subjects the constitution is silent. I have approved both. No State can lay an embargo, or acquire new territory. Our power to perform these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty created by this constitution. The Republican Administrations have no pretensions to the approbation of the people on the ground of having restrained any latitude or liberality of construction. Their claim to the public confidence is founded on very different considerations. They have repealed the internal taxes, paid a large part of the public debt, purchased Louisiana, and preserved to the nation the blessings of peace. For these acts, they have, I believe, the thanks of the nation. They have mine, most sincerely.

Great stress is placed on the twelfth article of the amendments to the constitution, which declares the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. I must confess that I cannot discover what influence this can have on the bill under consideration, or any other measure which may be proposed. It appears to me to have been adopted rather to quiet State jealousies and popular fears than with a view to produce any positive effect, for the inquiry must ever be, Is the power given? And if granted, it is not retained. The supporters of this bill do not pretend to usurp any power retained by the States or the people, but contend that the power to pass the bill is expressly delegated, if the facts assumed are true.

It is not pretended that our fiscal concerns can be managed with gold and silver. If our territory was of no greater extent than Rhode Island, Delaware, or the city of Philadelphia, gold and silver would answer the purposes of the Government, but it would require a number of pack horses and wagons to transport the public money in gold and silver, over this immense country, to the different places where it is wanting. Our extensive commerce, and the great extent of this empire, renders a paper medium necessary. Is the power to create this paper medium, or national currency, an attribute of State or national sovereignty? I put the question to the candor of gentlemen, and solicit a serious answer! The argument of my honorable friend from Georgia against the power of the States to authorize the emission of bank paper, founded on that part of the constitution which declares that "No State shall emit bills of credit," acquires great additional force, when these bills of credit are made to assume the character of money, for national purposes. In the same article the power to coin money is expressly prohibited to the States, and in the catalogue of cardinal powers granted to this Government, is that to coin money. It will, perhaps, be contended that this only applies to gold and silver, but if that be admitted to be the literal meaning of the words, still it is evident that what shall be the national currency, whether specie or paper, is a proper subject of national legislation. No gentleman will be so absurd as to insist that any State or States ought to coin the current money of the United States. That the power of the States to establish banks may be questioned with at least great plausibility, is perfectly clear, but as this banking power has been so long exercised, as the National and State banks have conducted their operations very harmoniously, as no serious evils call for national interference, I am not for disturbing the existing state of things; it is better, perhaps, that the banking power should be divided between the States and the United States. That bank paper, if good, is in fact money, although not made a legal tender, cannot be denied. The currency of this bank paper of the United States, although made by law receivable in payment of revenue, rests upon a much better foundation than an act of Congress. Its national character, the extended operations of this bank from Boston to New Orleans, have given it credit with the people of every part of the empire, more than the bank paper of any particular State can be expected to have; so that, by common consent, this money coined by the national bank has become the current money of the United States. I hope we shall never be driven to the necessity of compelling our citizens by law to receive our paper. We should so guard and regulate our banking operations as to make the national paper at least equal to gold and silver, in every quarter of the Union.

If this bank is removed, the Secretary of the Treasury must nationalize the bank paper of the great importing States; for, I presume, Congress will never decide what State paper shall be used by the officers of the General Government. Most of the public money is now collected and deposited in the Bank of the United States; if that is destroyed, the Secretary of the Treasury is to deposit in the State banks, and with him is the power of selection--a power and patronage greater than any ever exercised by any officer in this nation. The deposits of the public money are sought after with great avidity, by all the State institutions. He can deposit the whole in one, or divide it between two, or three, or all the banks in any one place. He can change them at pleasure. He may, with great apparent fairness and propriety, make it a condition with every bank where deposits are made that they shall appoint a certain portion of the directors of his nomination, and through them he can reach the credit of any man who may have accommodations in it. It is true we have now a man at the head of the Treasury who may not be disposed to abuse this power, but we may not always have such an officer. This immense power and influence may be exercised in an invisible manner, and, of course, without responsibility. Is this republican? It was not a few years ago. I have always understood that one of the strongest and most popular objections to the Federal Administration was their disposition to increase Executive patronage.

Although this subject has received much false coloring through the country, by charges of British influence, &c., I did not expect to hear it from an honorable senator of the United States--it has not indeed been positively asserted, but hinted in such a manner as to make an impression on the community. Some stale circumstances connected with the British treaty have been very unnecessarily lugged in to increase the prejudices against this bill. It has been insinuated, that British influence, operating through this institution, has prevented the Government from taking strong measures against Great Britain; but in what manner this has been effected, gentlemen have not been good enough to explain. Did it prevent Mr. Jefferson from taking a war course? For I believe it is generally understood that he was opposed to a war. Has it operated upon the present Executive? Such a suggestion will not be made. I have, during my service here, given a fair and faithful support to the Administration, and I have certainly voted for stronger measures than they were willing to accept. It is due to the 10th and 11th Congresses, who have been so much abused, to state that their course, as regards the question of peace or war, has been in perfect unison with the views of the late and present Presidents. Let it not be inferred that I am disposed to find fault; I believe when we consider the very extraordinary state of the foreign world, and retrospect the embarrassing circumstances which have surrounded us, the course pursued by them ought to be deemed substantially correct, certainly so as respects their leading object, which has been to avoid making this country a party in the present war. If I was disposed to censure, it would be for not making an effort to chastise some of the British armed vessels which lay in our waters after the affair of the Chesapeake, in open contempt of the President's proclamation; if a single vessel had been driven out or compelled to strike her colors, it would have healed the wound inflicted on the national pride and feeling, committed by the Leopard.

That this Government should have an influence with foreign Governments proportioned to the interest their subjects have in our funds, is probable, but how this interest gives them an influence here I am at a loss to perceive: foreigners cannot even vote in the appointment of directors. If there is any reality in this idea of foreign influence through this institution, why did gentlemen permit the present stockholders to be incorporated into the bill introduced last year? And why was not a provision inserted to prevent foreigners from purchasing additional stock?

Gentlemen say the embarrassments in Philadelphia could not have been occasioned by the Bank of the United States, because they continue to discount as usual. If I recollect the evidence--and I hope to be corrected if I mistake it--it was this: that the calling in of ten per cent. on their debts occasioned such a pressure, that they were prevailed upon to extend their discounts until the ultimate decision of Congress should be known. I have heard it seriously urged that the evils and inconveniences to be experienced from its dissolution, prove it to be a dangerous institution; the same argument would prove that the Government ought to be destroyed. Nothing, indeed, seems too absurd for the human mind to seize upon, when under the influence of passion or misguided zeal.

My honorable friend from Georgia has been reminded of the Macedonian phalanx. I trust, sir, we shall ever be found associated with a phalanx American, Republican, in heart and sentiment. I will not sacrifice the interest of my constituents for fear of being called hard names. The epithets of quidism, quadroonism, or any other ism which malice or policy may suggest, shall not drive me from the course called for by the public good. I am proud that I represent a people just, generous, and independent, not to be carried away by unmeaning clamor. Before they discard a public servant, they will view him both on a political theatre, and in the walks of private life. They know, too well, that those are not always the best Christians who sing hallelujahs on the house top, nor have they forgotten the celebrated Sempronius, who, on the approach of Cæsar, thundered war in the Roman Senate, and at the same time was secretly co-operating with the traitor to overthrow the liberties of the Roman people.

Deeply impressed, Mr. President, with the opinion, that the rejection of this bill will give at least a temporary check to the prosperity of the rising State from which I come, I shall give my negative to the motion to strike out the first section. Yes, sir, not only the interest, but importance of that State in the Union is about to be sacrificed. When I look beyond the mountains, and remember that Kentucky has nurtured me almost from my cradle, that she has bestowed on me her choicest honors, my bosom is filled with emotions of gratitude, which impel me to say on this, as on all other occasions, Kentucky I am only thine!

SATURDAY, February 16.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, passed on the 25th day of April, 1791;" the motion to strike out the first section being under consideration.

Mr. SMITH of Maryland said, that in seconding the motion to strike out the first section of the bill, he had pursued a course which, in his opinion, was the most correct. When I first took a seat in Congress (said he) the course of proceeding was to fix the principle by resolution, and, that once fixed, to send it to a committee to report a bill. By a motion to strike out the first section the principle will be tried, and the Senate, if the motion fails, will go into a discussion of the provisions of the bill. This I conceive a better course, than, for the Senate to go into discussion of the details of a subject which would probably be ultimately rejected on the general ground of principle.

The gentleman who introduced this subject spoke with great animation and with great feeling against the press or presses which have undertaken to give their opinions upon this great and important question. He spoke with much warmth, and said that whoever knew him would not believe that he would permit himself to be driven out of his opinion by any man or set of men. There is no man, sir, the least acquainted with the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) but will believe his declaration. But another result may be apprehended, that those who feel so great an offence at the freedom the press has taken, may be driven into the opposite course by the irritation of their feelings. Certainly those feelings must have been extremely strong with the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. POPE) to have induced him to terminate his speech with an oration hostile to the press. Are the gentlemen from Georgia and Kentucky the only Senators who have had their feelings wounded by the conduct of the press upon this subject? Sir, if the gentleman's opinions and sentiments have been censured by one description of presses, he may find consolation in having been greatly eulogized in others. For more than a year those on the same side of this question with myself have had their opinions tortured into every shape to destroy them in the estimation of the people, not only in this session but during the last. Sir, there are some presses in the Union which could not exist, whose papers would not be read, but for the discussion of individual character. Is any advantage to be derived from complaining of this? It results from the nature and temper of our Government, and the best way I have ever found to treat it is with silent contempt. He who does otherwise engages in the contest at a great disadvantage, and will seldom come out the victor. In the same presses of which those gentlemen complain, I have seen them both eulogized, and properly, for their conduct on the subject of the embargo and West Florida questions.

If the press be an evil in this respect, we must submit to it; those gentlemen who take a high and prominent stand must expect to be noticed. Sometimes gentlemen will be put down by the press, but their conduct being correct will more frequently be written up by its abuse.

It has been objected that this question is discussed on the ground of party; and the gentleman from Georgia, as I understood him, said, that this had been made a party question elsewhere, and might be so here. [Mr. CRAWFORD said he had mentioned no place, but had said that this might be made a party question.] I understood the gentleman to say, said Mr. S., that this may again be made a party question. But for this observation of the gentleman the subject of party would probably not have been introduced at all; and we must indeed shut our eyes or we cannot avoid seeing that this is made a party question, at least on one side. Do you see one gentleman, one solitary gentleman of one party, discriminated generally as a Federal, who does not vote for this measure throughout? Do you see one public body in Philadelphia or New York which has a majority of Federal directors or agents, which has not come before you with memorials drawn up with the ingenuity of lawyers, to impose on your judgments? Have not the same party prepared memorials and got the subscription of every one of their caste, bringing forward nearly the same number of petitioners as they have of Federal voters? Have they not done so in Baltimore? Of that city I would say as little as may be, for being a manufacturing as well as a commercial city, it has stirred up an animosity in some gentlemen against it not easily accounted for. In Baltimore, on a warmly-contested election, the Federal party mustered eight hundred and fourteen votes, all they could parade with their every exertion. To the petition for the renewal of the charter of the bank, there are eight hundred and forty odd signatures! They have gained some few since the latest contest. Is this coincidence of members, this exclusively Federal petitioning, no mark of party? They have also got one public body in Baltimore to memorialize in favor of the bank; the rest were not to be intimidated by the threats of the Bank of the United States. What, sir, have the other party done? Have they disturbed the quiet of either House? Have they brought forward the mass of their voters as signers to petitions? No, sir, they have trusted the subject to their Representatives, confiding in their disposition and ability to speak their sentiments. The representation of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and Charleston, in the other House, have opposed the renewal of the charter. Every city high in estimation as a commercial city is opposed to the renewal of the charter, except Boston. This speaks with a strong voice what are the feelings of the people; stronger evidence cannot be presented to the human mind. Far be it from me, sir, to endeavor to work up the feelings of party spirit on this occasion; but the thing itself was one of the first causes which created the present parties, and separated man from man and brother from brother. This measure was originally brought forward and adopted when the representation in Congress was not bottomed on an actual supposed census of the United States. Sixty-five members composed Congress then, which was a representation taken by accident. If a proportionate representation had been given to the States according to their population, the law probably would not have passed. The States of North Carolina and South Carolina had each five Representatives, being thus placed on an exact equality. Now, North Carolina has twelve, South Carolina only eight. What was the vote then? Out of sixty-five members thirty-nine voted for the bill. It was not, as my friend from Kentucky said, a subject fully discussed, or carried by a tremendous majority.

The bank having been formed, it may not be improper for me to take some view of its beginning and its operation. At first its operations were confined to Philadelphia; it extended its branches some time afterwards to Boston, New York, Baltimore and Charleston. Wherever it extended its influence, dissension commenced; wherever it placed its foot it became absolutely necessary for the States to erect another bank to counterbalance its pecuniary and political influence. In Philadelphia it began to oppose certain people and turn down their paper. The State of Pennsylvania, in defence of its own citizens, created the Bank of Pennsylvania. Here was a check upon its pecuniary and political operations. I believe I am not mistaken when I say that soon after it commenced in Boston a new bank was established there, from what cause I know not. In Baltimore, sir, it soon taught us a lesson, and we met the lesson as other States had done. Charleston and New York acted in a similar way. Operating as the bank did on the politics of the country before its effects were neutralized by competition, man being man, place him where you will, those concerned in the direction of the bank felt power and exercised it. When the British treaty was pending before Congress, the president and directors (as I am informed) themselves carried about a memorial to Congress in its favor, with what view and with what effect may easily be conceived. In Baltimore (until we were able to check them by other banks) its political influence was great. Prior to the great struggle between the parties, in 1798, they did permit one democrat to be within the walls of the sanctuary (as a director), a gentleman of as much respectability and independence of character, as any one of the direction. He was, however, (immediately after daring to give his vote in favor of a democratic candidate,) put out, and since that time no man of democratic principles has been permitted to enter its walls as a director. Men must shut their eyes to the fact of this being a party institution, when they see that no democrat has been admitted to the direction of the bank but in this city and New York, where the collector was admitted a director for the purpose of protecting the public money at the instance (it is said) of the Secretary of the Treasury. Can we shut our eyes so as not to see that men hostile to the democratic party, and of course to the success of the administration of the Government, are not the most proper persons to have charge of its pecuniary concerns? I would have been very unwilling to have gone into this part of the subject; but when the gentleman from Kentucky, scarcely able to restrain his rage, cried out, party! party! I was bound to show that it was not those with whom I act who had any agency in pressing the subject of party into the present discussion.

The gentleman from Kentucky reprobates the system of petty mischievous intrigue for the purpose of carrying measures through Congress. No man, sir, despises or contemns such conduct more than I do. But on whose side has this intrigue been? It is necessary to put the saddle on the proper horse. Have we gone to insurance companies or corporations of one kind or another? Have we intrigued with the people to induce them to take sides with us? No, sir, we have been tranquil; we wanted no aid of that kind. Have we sent persons here to intrigue with members, or a deputy to remain here the whole of the last and present session, to explain to Congress the effect of putting down the bank, and threaten them with destruction and ruin to the United States if they passed the measure? No, sir, we have had no one here. Have we stirred up the people into town meetings to aid us by memorials? No such thing, sir. Have we called meetings and induced honest mechanics to come here to influence Congress by idle fears, impressed upon them by those who are interested, to tell a tale that shall answer our purposes? No, sir, we have pursued no such course.

Respectable merchants, I observe, form a part of the bank deputies--for what? To represent the late fall of the price of flour as a consequence of the danger of the bank charter not being renewed, and thereby to alarm the minds of members. I am sorry that men of such respectable character did permit themselves to come here on such an errand. I think I have seen in the papers, that one of the manufacturers (now here) on being asked to sign a petition for the renewal of the charter for twenty years, said he would rather cut off his right hand than sign it; he wished only a renewal for a short time to give the bank an opportunity to wind up its affairs. If this statement be true, and of its truth I have no cause to doubt, it shows the depth of that intrigue which sent this gentleman here, through the instrumentality of his excellent character, to get a renewal of the charter for a period which he never contemplated. These are intrigues for which men ought to blush, and from which, I thank God, we are exempt. At the time these deputies arrived, there were three mechanics of Baltimore here, of character inferior to none, and of wealth inferior to few in Philadelphia, and who would have given a different view of the subject, if they had been asked to appear before the committee. I thought it unnecessary--I wanted no assistance of that kind--no species of intrigue. They did, however, declare, sir, that granting this charter would be a death-blow to the politics of the State of Maryland. They did believe the renewal would be injurious to them, for neither they nor many of the manufacturers of Baltimore had received much advantage from the branch bank; they had their own banks from which they generally received accommodation. Another species of intrigue is carried on, to wit, by pamphleteering. The press is groaning with pamphlets--for what? To teach the minds of members on this question, the necessity of renewal and probability of destruction to the nation, if their demands are not complied with. Our tables are covered with pamphlets of that tendency. Has there been any thing of the kind on our part?

There is scarcely an evil which has not been attributed to the embargo, and which is not now, with as little justice, attributed to the expected non-renewal of the bank charter. Great failures have lately taken place at New York; bills of exchange on London, to a large amount, have returned protested, and the drawers are not able to pay the holders, and to the present critical situation of the bank some gentlemen attribute the distress brought upon those who have suffered by these failures and protests. But, Mr. President, what is the real cause of those failures? They are confined principally to New York, and may be attributed to the following causes: It is natural for men born in Great Britain to entertain predilections favorable to a commerce with that country, their connections, as well commercial as of family, are there; their credit is there; and, from those causes, the house which has failed, and carried so many others with it in its fall, has probably directed the principal part of its commerce to England; they have, no doubt, shipped cotton and tobacco, the trade in which being in a great measure confined to Great Britain, the natural consequence has been, that the markets of England were completely glutted; tobacco, except the very fine Virginia, scarcely paid the charges of freight and commission, and the loss on cotton must have been nearly fifty per cent. The consignees, under those circumstances, refused to pay the bills drawn upon shipments of those articles. The bills returned protested, and ruin to the American shipper has been the consequence. At any other time the English merchants would have accepted the bills, and held the cargoes for a better market; but, at that time, ruin stared every man in the face. No man in London knew who to trust, and very few would enter into engagements which they saw any difficulty in meeting. No censure ought to be attached to the American shipper, for, by the usage of trade between the United States and Europe, the American merchant is entitled to draw for two-thirds the amount of his cargo on transmitting invoices and bills of lading with orders for insurance. Other causes have existed to cause the present distress in New York and elsewhere, to wit, the seizure, detention and confiscation of property in Denmark, Prussia, and France, of ships and cargoes to the amount of many millions, on the proceeds of which cargoes merchants calculated to meet their engagements at home, and to meet their bills drawn on London. For, sir, the merchants who make large shipments to the continent, order the greatest proportion of their proceeds to be remitted from thence to London, and, on the expectation thereof, draw bills on their friends there. Disappointment has been the consequence of such seizures and losses; protests of such bills and ruin has followed. But, Mr. President, we might with as much propriety attribute the late great failures in England and on the continent to the expected non-renewal of the bank charter, as those which have happened in New York, or the present distress of the merchants of the United States. The returns of the bills protested, to so large an amount, of course destroyed the merchant's credit at bank; he failed, and, by his fall, has caused the ruin of others. When a great house fails, it is like a game of nine pins; knock one down and it will probably carry with it four or five others.

We have been told, Mr. President, in case the charter should not be renewed, that we shall find in future great difficulty in obtaining loans. What loans, I ask, have Government ever received from the Bank of the United States? I recollect, when I first entered Congress, that Government were indebted for loans made from the bank, but I also recollect that the bank complained of her loans as an inconvenience, and that Congress took the earliest measure in their power to pay them off, and have, since that period, made no new loan from the bank until that made payable the first of January last. I will not inquire whether even that loan was necessary, but I will venture to promise, sir, and will give any security that may be required, that the State banks will give a similar accommodation, to wit: If the Secretary of the Treasury will deposit with the State banks two millions five hundred thousand dollars of the public money, (the amount of the late loan,) they will lend Government to the same amount, and thus do as the Bank of the United States has done, lend you your own money, and very kindly receive from you an interest of six per cent. therefor. We are told that the bank has lately lessened the discounts of individuals ten per cent., and that the merchants are thereby greatly distressed. Is that a fact? If it is, and great distress has ensued therefrom, what will be the distress of the merchants if the bill now before you shall pass; and if, agreeably to its provisions, Congress should (at any time hereafter) call on the bank for the loan of four millions promised by the bill? If, sir, a lessening of their discounts one-tenth per cent. creates distress, what will be the consequence, when, by a loan of four millions, called for from the bank, the bank shall be compelled to lessen the discounts four-tenths?

But, sir, the promise to lend four millions from a bank of ten millions is idle; it is worse, it is deception on the face of it. The loan, if made, would not be from the bank but from the merchants, whose discounts would thereby be lessened, and whose ruin would follow.

We are told that, if the charter of this bank be not renewed, and the funds of the United States be deposited in the State banks, it will be extremely unsafe, because it is said we can have no control over them. And, I wish to know, sir, what control we have over the Bank of the United States? None, but the same as we may have over the State banks. We cannot check the operations of the Bank of the United States, and if they obtain this charter, they will know that they can have their charter renewed whenever they please; so that, the fear of a non-renewal of their charter will have no operation on them in future. You will have a much greater control over the State banks, because you are under no obligation to put money in them, and you can change them whenever you think proper; the danger of losing the public deposits will always be a sufficient control over their conduct. The security of the State banks is doubted, however; and we are told, very gravely, indeed, that there is much more security in the mother bank, and her nine children, than in ten independent banks. This I must deny. I should, as a merchant, place more confidence in ten independent houses than in one with nine branches.

MONDAY, February 18.

Bank of the United States.

Mr. BRENT said he had not the vanity to believe, after the subject had been so fully discussed, that he should be able to shed any new light on it; but having been instructed, by the Legislature of the State which he had the honor to represent, to vote on constitutional principles against the bill under consideration, and as he was reduced to the painful necessity of going counter to those instructions, it seemed to him to be indispensably necessary that he should submit to the Senate the grounds on which he acted. It is (said he) a most painful situation in which I stand in relation to the Legislature of Virginia, in being compelled to vote in opposition to their will, more especially as it is a prevalent opinion with many whose opinions are entitled to great respect, that instructions are obligatory on a Senator. This question is one which has never been settled, or even fully deliberated on. Instructions, when heretofore given to Senators, have generally been in accordance with the sentiments of the Senators, and only given to add the greater weight to their opinions. If called upon definitely to pronounce with regard to instructions on questions of expediency, I might be under some difficulty as to what course to pursue; because, although there is no clause in the constitution to that effect, I am under a strong impression that, according to the principles of our Government, there is much reason to believe that the respective State Legislatures should have such a right; but on a constitutional question (whatever may be the right of the State Legislatures in other instances) the right of instruction may be denied, in my judgment--that is, so far as to be imperative on the Senator. To give a vote in such a manner as in his estimation to inflict a vital wound on the constitution, is more than the Legislature of Virginia, or any other State Legislature in the Union, can compel me or any other Senator in the United States to do. The resolution of Virginia is bottomed, not on the ground of expediency, but on the principle that the constitution prohibited Congress from granting the bank charter in the first instance; that it now prohibited it, and therefore, because it was unconstitutional, the Legislature have instructed their Senators in Congress to oppose it. Now, sir, although I shall not immediately and directly violate the constitution by voting against the bank, yet, if I vote against it when I believe it constitutional and necessary, it must be known that I vote in conformity to the instructions of the Virginia Legislature; and so far as my vote goes, it will warrant and sanction that interpretation of the constitution which the Legislature of Virginia has given--which interpretation, in conscience, I believe to be erroneous. Therefore, though in ordinary cases the instructions of a Legislature may be imperative, (I will not determine that question,) I conclude that they cannot be so when they require of a Senator to commit either a positive or implied breach of the constitution, or to vote in such a manner as to warrant such interpretation of the constitution as will deprive it of an essential attribute. Virginia has the physical force, but has she a moral right to violate the Constitution of the United States? If she has it not, can she give it to her Legislature? If her Legislature possess it not, can they give it to a Senator? Can the Legislature give me a moral right to violate the Constitution of the United States, which I have sworn to support? I believe not, sir; and that, in the situation in which I stand, their instructions ought to have no operation on the vote I am to give on the subject under consideration.

The first question, whether the General Government, when it first came into operation, did not possess the power of creating a National Bank, is the primary object of investigation. In objection to this it has been said, that to carry into effect an enumerated power is one thing, and the right to incorporate a bank is a distinct power. Those who take this ground say that the creation of a National Bank is an original, independent, and substantive power. It is not sufficient, say they, to show that it is a convenient instrument to carry into effect an enumerated power, because it is an independent authority of itself, and the genius of our Government prohibits the derivation of any powers by implication with scrupulous limitation. It is true, sir, that our Government, being an emanation from the existing State governments, the rational construction is, that all power not given away is retained to them or to the people. If that construction does not result, then a positive amendment, which has been made to the constitution, has infused this principle into it. I therefore admit in its fullest latitude the construction that all powers not given away are still retained; yet I still contend that even in a Government like ours, there are some resulting powers. Or by what right do we create a military school? We have a right to raise armies; but we can have an army without a military school. Yet it is constitutional to create such an institution, because every given power implies rights inferior appertaining to the powers granted. We lay an embargo--is there any clause in the constitution authorizing us to lay embargoes? No, sir; we have a right to regulate trade, and we have a right to lay embargoes to protect it. We have a right to provide for arming and disciplining the militia. Under this authority we build armories. Is there any provision in the constitution directing it? We have erected forges and even purchased ore banks. These are inferior powers, necessarily resulting from the greater powers granted. But here gentlemen find the great difficulty. The creation of a corporation, say they, is an act of sovereignty; it cannot be used as a mean, because it is a sovereign act. Why, Mr. President, every law passed is quoad hoc a sovereign act. A law incorporating a military school is as much an act of sovereignty, as to the particular subject to which it relates, as an act incorporating, a bank. We create a military school--for what purpose? Because the sovereign authority has power to establish an army, and the power to create a military school is inseparably connected with and necessarily appertains to it. We establish a navy--we also establish a marine corps. There is no clause in the constitution giving that power, but we take it as inseparable from the power to create a navy, because the exercise of the greater implies every subordinate power necessarily connected with it. The great stumbling block, however, is, that this is one of those independent, original, and substantive powers, which cannot be given by implication. Blackstone says, "municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." Agreeably to this definition, every law passed by a deliberative body is an act of sovereignty as to the subject to which it relates. The establishment of a marine corps is as much an act of sovereignty as an act incorporating the Bank of the United States. The only question is, whether it be necessarily incident to the enumerated powers given to the General Government. Those who criticise most accurately on the constitution and most unwillingly concede resulting powers, will admit them to a certain extent even in our Government. The only question is the immediate and necessary connection of the means used with the object intended to be attained.

In inquiring then, sir, whether or not, at the first promulgation of the constitution, when it came into existence, it was intended that Congress should possess the power of incorporating the Bank of the United States, let us inquire whether there was any possibility of carrying into effect with any tolerable convenience and advantage the several provisions of the constitution, unless this power exists. It is said that you do not possess the power, because it is attempted to be derived by different gentlemen from so many different parts of the constitution. Now, Mr. President, I have never before understood that a capacity to derive a title from several different sources gives you less title than if derived from one source alone. I derive the power from the whole context of the constitution, although gentlemen seem to think that the title is invalidated in proportion to the number of sections in the constitution from whence we derive it. In order to avoid confusion of argument in examining this question, I will derive it from only one source at present, though I believe others equally give it by a necessary construction. At the time the constitution came into existence, I believe there were but three banks in the United States; none south of Philadelphia, and all of very limited capital. The Constitution of the United States gives the power to levy and collect taxes. Is it possible to imagine any system so convenient for the collection of this revenue, and sending it to the seat of Government, as that of the agency of banks? I am not inquiring whether the State banks can do it; but I say that the framers of the constitution must have had under consideration the state of things at the time when the constitution came into existence. At that time there was not one bank south of Philadelphia, and the banks which existed were very limited in their capital, and their paper had limited circulation. Congress, in such a state of things, then, has the power of levying and collecting taxes conferred on it, and yet Congress has not the power to create banks to aid in the collection of its taxes, notwithstanding a clause to make all laws necessary and proper for that purpose is contained in the constitution. No gentleman will say that the agency of banks is not necessary in some way or other in collecting the revenue. I admit without them you could have carried on our fiscal arrangements in an awkward and cumbrous form, but was that the intention of the constitution? When the power to collect taxes was given, it was intended to give all the means necessary to carry this power into execution. It was not to execute this power in a cumbrous form, but with the greatest facility with which the power is susceptible of being wielded. Now, is it possible that the constitution contemplated that the revenue should be collected and transmitted here, subject to all the risks and accidents and inconveniences that attend the transportation of specie? It is impossible. But all this doubt has arisen from its being a separate and independent power, although it is no more of that character than any other law passed to execute the enumerated powers of Congress.

In a word, Mr. President, it is admitted by all who have spoken on this question, whether for or against the bill under consideration, that the agency of a bank or of banks affords the greatest facility and security of any plan that can be devised for the collection of a revenue, and for its transmission to your Treasury.

It is admitted that no bank or banks of a capital or of sufficient circulating paper throughout the United States adequate to this object, did exist when the constitution was first formed, promulgated, or adopted. It is admitted that to levy and collect taxes is one of the enumerated powers of Congress. It is admitted that Congress has all power necessary and convenient to carry its enumerated powers into execution.

It is admitted there is no express clause in the constitution prohibiting the establishment of a National Bank.

If these principles and facts are admitted, does it not demonstrate, beyond the possibility of doubt, this unquestionable result, to wit: that as Congress is to levy and collect revenue; that as the agency of banks affords the most certain, speedy, and convenient means by which a revenue can be collected; that as neither, at the period when the constitution was made, promulgated, or adopted, banks of sufficient capital, or with paper of sufficient circulation, existed for the collection of the revenue, and its transmission to your Treasury; that as there was no positive clause prohibiting a National Bank in the constitution; that as Congress was to have all power necessary to carry its enumerated powers into execution; that as the convention who framed, and the people who adopted the constitution, must have had in view our then existing institutions, and the then general state of society, it was the intention of the convention who formed the constitution, and the people who adopted it, to give to Congress the power of establishing a National Bank. If at the time of adopting the constitution it was necessary and proper that Congress should possess it, for the exercise of any of its enumerated powers; if the foregoing result is undeniable, and I think it is, I would interrogate, if Congress, on the adoption of the constitution, possessed a power to establish a National Bank, what has since deprived that body of the power? I, Mr. President, can discover nothing which has. One argument, much confided in by gentlemen who have opposed the present bill, is, not that banks are not necessary to the collection of the revenue, but that State banks will answer. In return, I insist that no State banks did exist when the constitution was first formed, therefore the power to create a National Bank is necessarily given in the power to levy and collect taxes. To this it is replied that to create a National Bank is to legislate by implication; it is a separate, substantive, and independent power; to levy a tax is one thing, to make a bank another. I answer, to levy a tax is one thing, to create an officer for its collection another. By this kind of chop-logic we may prove any thing unconstitutional. I ask, when you levy a tax, if you do not provide officers for collecting it. I levy a tax and create a bank through whose instrumentality I mean to collect it; from the same authority by which I appoint a collector, I have a right to create a bank through whose instrumentality I mean to receive and transmit it. There is no clause in the constitution saying you may appoint officers for the collection of the revenue specifically; but the right to appoint officers to collect revenue is derived from the power of levying a tax, from which also may be derived the power of establishing a bank, if it be the best mode of collecting the revenue. It is said you may collect this tax by means of the State banks. Very well, sir, I say you may collect the revenue by means of State officers, and upon the principle that you cannot establish a bank to collect the revenue, because the State banks can collect it, I say that the State officers can collect our taxes, and if your argument is just, you cannot appoint any other officers. The constitution authorizes the President to appoint persons to fill all offices established by law, but says not a word about appointing officers to collect the tax you levy specifically. Upon the construction gentlemen contend for, they might say, because no power is expressly given to appoint officers of the customs, or for your taxes, and it is possible to collect the revenue by the agency of the State Governments, and nothing should be done by the United States authorities which can be done by the States, therefore these collectors of the customs or revenue should be such as are appointed by the States for State purposes. This kind of reasoning, sir, cannot be admissible, and is in hostility with a most manifest principle of the constitution, as it is evidently a prominent feature of that instrument that the General Government should have within itself all those powers necessary and convenient for the execution of its enumerated trusts, entirely free and independent of the interference and agency of the States, their officers, or ministers.

It is said that the corporation, which it is proposed to recharter, independent of the facility it affords to Government in the collection of the revenue, has also particular advantages given to it; that it is a monopoly; and what right, it is asked, has Congress to grant a monopoly? I will ask, in return, when an officer is appointed to collect the customs, has he not a salary and emoluments? Is not every office in law called a franchise or a particular privilege? If the officer who has these emoluments, privileges, or franchises, (call them what you will) receives these in consideration for his services, have you not the power to hold out inducements to associated bodies of men to form an institution from which the public may derive benefit, not with a view exclusively to their monopoly and benefit but on account of the advantages to be derived from it by the public?

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. CLAY,) with his usual ingenuity, spoke of the enormous evil and the danger to our liberties that is to be anticipated from giving the power to erect corporations, which he says is an original power, and has given being to institutions which have swelled to an enormous magnitude. The example of the East India Company and the South Sea Company were spoken of in an alarming, impressive, and ingenious manner. But, I ask, sir, if the State Governments do not possess this gigantic power? I see nothing to restrain them more than the General Government. I see that the only supervisors as to the State Governments are the people themselves, who are also the supervisors of Congress, who have also the invidious jealous eyes of the State Governments constantly upon them, as is illustrated in the conduct of some of the States on this very question, and who combined would guard this power from abuse by the General Government much more than the people alone will guard against abuses by the States. It is a visionary mode of reasoning to argue against the possession of power from the abuse of it. The gentleman may as well tell us that we may raise armies to so monstrous an extent as to crush our liberties; and, therefore, we ought not on any emergency to raise an army. He may as well say the creation of a military school, which is as much and no more a resulting power than the one in question, is giving to Congress a great substantive independent power to create a vast engine, under the name of a military school, which may swell to such an immense importance as to make it an instrument to swallow all the liberties of the country. So as respects sites for forts and armories, and ore banks, powers exercised by implication, the gentleman, from the unlimited indulgence he gives to a gloomy and foreboding imagination, may say, you may purchase the territorial rights of the States until you destroy their sovereignty. There is no end to the extent of such reasoning. We must rely in some degree on ourselves, on the vigilance of the State Governments, and on the discretion of the people. When the whole body politic is so corrupt that there are no eyes on our rulers to see when they transcend the powers of the constitution, all is lost, and no paper reservations can save us.

Mr. President, I am ready to admit that where a measure obtains, that inflicts a violation on our constitution that is unquestionable, palpable, and notorious, however frequently and however solemnly this measure had been sanctioned, however long it had been submitted to and endured, would not be considerations with me of any importance or create one moment of doubt. Error, however repeated and submitted to, is error still, and every occasion should be sought to get rid of it; but on an occasion in the origin of which the constitutional question was doubtful, when men of the purest integrity and most illumined intelligence might pause and differ and doubt, I should imagine that such case once acted on should never again be touched, unless considerations of irresistible importance lead to such a measure; and I imagine that every man of candor and intelligence who weighs with due deliberation the question under consideration, will at least admit, if the measure is not certainly constitutional, it is at least of that description of character I have last mentioned. In such an instance as this, will it be said that after this measure has been sanctioned by Congress on full deliberation and debate; after the bill establishing this bank had received the approbation of the President, who reserved his signature to it till the last moment permitted by the constitution, and after he had viewed the question with all its bearings in every attitude it could be presented, after full consultation with his Cabinet Ministers and others of high intellectual character; after the law thus sanctioned by the Legislature and the President has been acquiesced in and practised on for the space of twenty years, when it has been considered inviolable, and corroborating laws passed during the administration and legislation of different dominant political parties; when those laws have been sanctioned by the solemn adjudication of all our judges, both of the General and State Governments; to suppose that all these considerations are to have no influence as to putting to rest a constitutional question which was doubtful in its origin, is to be skeptical and scrupulous beyond all reasonable bound. If Congress had no right to incorporate a bank, was it not an act of usurpation in the President and Congress to pass laws punishing individuals for the forgery of its paper? Nay, more, Mr. President, when we inflict death for the support of institutions Congress had no right to create, and for the violation of laws the constitution prohibits that body from enacting--(and under the denomination of each of the political sects into which this country is divided, agreeable to the principles now contended for by gentlemen, such laws have been passed)--are not the Executive which sanctions, the Congress which passed, and the whole body of our Judiciary, both of the General and State Governments, which enforces such unconstitutional measures, and under their surreptitious authority inflicts death upon our citizens, worse than usurpers? Are they not murderers? Yes, Mr. President, I reiterate, are they not murderers? And are we prepared to pronounce so heavy a denunciation on our predecessors, on ourselves, and the other great Departments of our Government? Are we ready to inform the American people that this body and all their constituted authorities have sported with the lives and illegally shed the blood of our citizens? My colleague was foreman of the jury that pronounced sentence, or that found a verdict, on the famous or rather infamous Logwood, for forgery of the paper of the Bank of the United States. This verdict was confirmed by the judge of the court, and the criminal punished agreeably to the judgment. Is a measure of such weighty and awful import, so solemnly and deliberately acted on and decided, and multifarious other decisions of the same description, to have no influence on the decision we are about to give respecting the constitutionality of establishing a National Bank? If they are not, then gentlemen view the subject through a very different medium than that through which it is presented to my vision. Then, in my judgment, Mr. President, our situation is alarming indeed.

To recapitulate: I derive the power to create a National Bank, when this constitution came into existence, from the situation of society, and our legal institutions at that time, and the difficulty, as things existed, that the revenue could be collected with advantage in any other way than by the agency of a bank. If this reasoning be deemed erroneous, I insist that the constitutional power of Congress to create a bank was in the first instance doubtful, and the principle having been recognized, and having received every sanction the Government could give, and practised on for more than twenty years, is not now to be called in question. Admitting that on both these points my views are erroneous; say that the establishment of the bank, at its commencement, was improper, still, if it be demonstrated that the existence or re-chartering of the bank is indispensable, or highly expedient at present, to the due exercise of enumerated rights of Congress, that which was improper or even perhaps unconstitutional at first, because it was not necessary, becomes constitutional and proper, because now expedient or essential. Congress is clothed by the constitution with a variety of delegated rights. Now, admitting that the establishment of a bank in the first instance was not necessary for the due exercise of the legislative rights bestowed in any one of these enumerated powers, if our predecessors in office, by the creation of a bank, which at best was an improper institution, because not necessary, have placed our fiscal concerns in such a situation that it cannot be put down without great injury to the revenue, which Congress is bound to levy; and collect, without injuring our commerce, without impairing our public credit, without lessening the public welfare, all of which Congress is bound to provide for and protect; if this can be demonstrated to be the probable result of pulling down the bank at this period, I would ask whether that institution, which was improper at first, because not necessary, does not become proper, because almost indispensable at present?

In construing the Constitution of the United States, when legislating on the enumerated powers of Congress, I lay down this rule of construction: that the only limitation to the power of Congress is either some positive or implied prohibition in the constitution itself, or the exercise of an honest and sober discretion. If, therefore, there is any reason to believe, at the present period and existing state of things, that by putting down the bank your revenue will be greatly impaired, your commerce will be injured, the public credit lessened, all of which Congress is to protect; does not such a state of things make it proper that the bank, which ought not to have been created, because not necessary, now ought to be continued because indispensable? It may here be said, that I am varying the constitution if I say that a thing is proper to-day which was not proper five and twenty years ago; that this vibration will always keep the constitution in an uncertain state. I say, no. My doctrine is subject to no such accusation; the principles of the constitution are uniform and unalterable. It is an uniform and unalterable principle, that Congress have the power to lay and collect taxes; they have the same positive, unchangeable right to exercise all the enumerated powers, the only rule of construction relating to them being that the means you use have a necessary relation to the power on which you legislate. If the means be not enumerated, you exercise discretion as to the means, having a regard to the existing state of things when you legislate concerning them. The same means may be necessary and proper now, which would not have been twenty years ago. You change the means to attain the end, but the end itself, the enumerated power in the constitution, remains unchanged. As long as the constitution exists, you must select the means most proper for executing the enumerated rights at the precise moment at which you legislate respecting them. If this be the true construction of the constitution respecting the recharter of the bank, the question merely resolves itself into an inquiry how far such a measure is at present expedient. To determine at this moment whether or not it be constitutional, or in other words expedient, to incorporate the Bank of the United States, I am to say whether, under existing circumstances, in the present state of society, situation of trade and revenue, the preservation and continuance of this institution is essentially necessary. If it be essentially necessary, we have a right to recharter the bank. I have been precise in stating this view of the subject, because it has not before been taken by any other gentleman.

TUESDAY, February 19.

The credentials of JOHN CONDIT, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, for the term of six years, commencing on the fourth day of March next; and of WILLIAM B. GILES, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia, for the term of six years, commencing on the fourth day of March next, were severally read, and ordered to lie on file.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, 1791.

Mr. TAYLOR.--Mr. President: Although much time has been consumed in the discussion of the subject before us, and the ground completely occupied by those who have gone before me, yet the importance of the subject, the immense magnitude of the unhappy consequences likely to result to the nation from the rejection of the bill on your table, compel me to offer to it all the support in my power. Indeed, sir, to this sense of duty to the nation is superadded a very sacred, and to me indispensable duty--my duty to the State which I have the honor in part to represent, as well as another duty, which from the course the debate has taken, is not to be disregarded; I mean, sir, the duty which I owe to myself.

I cannot, as other gentlemen have boasted they can, put my hand into my drawer and pull out the instructions by which I am to be directed on this important subject.

The State of South Carolina is a very large stockholder in some of her State banks, and if a selfish policy, contracted to the narrow sphere of the unique advantage in dollars and cents of the Government of that State--in contradiction and disregard of the great body of her own citizens, and the citizens of the rest of the States in the Union--could have weighed a moment with her Legislature, I too might have been instructed. Let me not be understood, Mr. President, as drawing any comparison between the conduct of the State of South Carolina and the conduct of the great and leading States who have acted otherwise; but I must and will tell of the things that I do know. I rejoice, sir, that the State which I come from has, in this instance, been actuated by that magnanimity and patriotism which on all former occasions has distinguished her conduct; that neither selfishness, nor party rage, nor a spirit of intolerance, has induced her to counteract or embarrass the National Legislature in its pursuit of the great object of its institution, the good of the whole.

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