LIX. IN LOWER EGYPT
Whilst wars and rumours of wars prevailed on her frontiers, Egypt, internally, was enjoying peace and prosperity.
So completely tranquil was the condition of the country in January, 1887, that a considerable reduction in the strength of the Army of Occupation was decided on. This was effected gradually until the whole force numbered only 3,500 men. This had a double advantage. It not only set free the troops for service elsewhere, but it relieved Egypt from the burden of contributing to their support.[149]
The financial tension having been relieved by the London Convention of 1885, various reforms were taken in hand, and made steady, if not rapid, progress.
Amongst them the use of the "courbache" was abolished, and in criminal cases the punishment of imprisonment substituted--a humane and beneficent change, which nevertheless added to the difficulty of collecting the revenue, and led to a considerable increase of crime.
The Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, was himself a moderate but sincere reformer. He quite realized that the state of things which under Ismail's rule had brought the country to the verge of ruin could not be continued, and gave a loyal support to his European advisers. His Prime Minister, Nubar Pasha, who had replaced Cherif in January, 1884, when the latter could not be brought to accept British advice with regard to the abandonment of the Soudan, was not unfavourable to the English, and for some time found himself able to work in harmony with the various British officials who were now introduced into the Government service.
Unfortunately certain elements existed which were certain to produce friction sooner or later. Nubar Pasha was a statesman of too much ability and with too important a history to be able for any great length of time to quietly sit down and play a secondary part. Hence he gradually grew restive under the advice which England from time to time felt bound to tender to him. He fell out first with Sir Colin Scott Moncrieff, the head of the Irrigation Department, then with Sir Edgar Vincent, the financial adviser, and finally with Sir Evelyn Baring himself.
In June, 1888, Nubar was dismissed on a personal question which arose between him and the Khedive, and replaced by Riaz Pasha, who had been sulking in retirement ever since he was denied the pleasure of hanging Arabi in 1882.
Under Riaz's administration the work of reform continued. More particularly was this the case in the departments relating to finance and irrigation. Sir Edgar Vincent conferred a great benefit on the population by substituting a simple and convenient currency for the chaos of coins of all metals and all currencies which had for many years been in circulation.[150]
Extensive changes were introduced in the matter of irrigation. The work upon the "Barrage," which regulates the water supply of the Delta, was completed in 1890. A proper system of inspection was established, and the native cultivator was no longer compelled to rely upon the goodwill of a corrupt Egyptian engineer for the water for his lands.
The result was that increased areas of land were brought into cultivation, and the cotton crop in 1890-91 was nearly double that of the average for previous years.
The abolition of the ruinous system of forced labour for the execution of public works, begun in the days of Nubar, was completed during Riaz's term of office, notwithstanding the persistent obstacles put in the way by France. In 1890 the Egyptian finances had made such a recovery, and Egyptian stock stood so high, that it was found possible to convert the Privileged Debt and to reduce the interest from 5 to 3-1/2 per cent. The net result of this and of the conversion of the Daira Loan was to relieve the Budget by £E.314,000 a year.
The English, whilst all these improvements were being made, had not become more popular in Egypt, but their presence began to be tolerated by the natives, who could not but see, though they would not acknowledge, the benefits which it secured to them.[151]
In the civil service the Egyptian functionaries commenced to know their British teachers, and to learn that as long as the former did their duty they would be supported against the tyranny or caprice of their official chiefs, and a feeling of security such as had never been known before was the result.
In 1889 the question of reforming the native courts of justice had been considered. Sir Evelyn Baring's proposal was to strengthen them by increasing the number of European judges. Riaz, on the contrary, was not too favourable to the appointment of foreigners, but he had to give way, and in November, 1889, two additional Englishmen had been nominated to the Court of Appeal, making in all three English and three Belgian judges. This, however, did not effect all that was required, and in the spring of 1890 Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Scott, a judge of the High Court of Bombay, with extensive Indian as well as Egyptian experience, was appointed temporary "judicial adviser" to the Government. Scott drew up a report, pointing out the defects of the existing system, and, above all, the necessity for a further improvement in the personnel of the courts. Riaz Pasha strenuously opposed this, and his nominee Fakri Pasha, Minister of Justice, wrote a counter-report, condemning all the changes which Scott had recommended. Sir Evelyn Baring promptly recognized which side was in the right, and that the question was whether there was to be a reform or not. Scott's proposals were accepted, and his appointment was made permanent, so as to enable him to superintend the carrying of them into execution. Riaz Pasha had to accept the inevitable, which he did with a bad grace, and in May, 1891, he resigned.
Riaz was succeeded by Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, the present Prime Minister, the first Egyptian Premier really in sympathy with the English, with whom he from the first has cordially co-operated. So effectual had been the changes made in the administration of the finances, that, notwithstanding a considerable remission of the land tax, the revenue of the country had risen from £E.9,574,000 in 1886, the first year in which the benefit of "The London Convention" had been felt, to £E.10,539,460[152] in 1891, with a large surplus over expenditure, and besides this reserve funds amounting to £E.2,811,000 had been created.
Progress was also made in the work of putting down the slave trade, and in 1891 Sir Evelyn Baring was able to write that the traffic was practically extinguished. As a commentary upon this it may be mentioned that a few months later no less a personage than Ali Pasha Cherif, a large landed proprietor and the President of the National Assembly, was convicted in the native courts of law of, and sentenced to imprisonment for, being personally concerned in the purchase of slaves for his household.
Whilst events in Egypt were thus progressing the country sustained a severe loss in the death of the Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, which took place after a short illness at Helouan, on the 7th January, 1892. His Highness' eldest son, Prince Abbas Pasha Hilmy, the present Khedive, then seventeen years of age, succeeded to the throne of Egypt in virtue of the Imperial Firman of the 8th June, 1873.
Upon the new Khedive's arrival from Vienna, where he was completing his studies, he received a warm welcome, and by his subsequent acts created an excellent impression on all classes of society.
He at once confirmed the former Ministers in power and lent his aid to the work of reform.
Although on the death of Tewfik the new Khedive was de jure as well as de facto the ruler of Egypt, his recognition by an Imperial Firman from the Porte was a formality which nevertheless had to be observed. The preparation of this important document was known to have been completed at Constantinople, and an envoy was told off to bring it to Egypt. Still for some time it did not come. To do honour to the occasion a division of the British Mediterranean fleet was despatched to Alexandria. It did not, however, please the Sultan that his envoy should be thus received, and the official's departure from time to time was postponed. Then began a little game of "hide and seek." It was given out that the Firman would not be sent until after the approaching fast of "Ramadan," and the British Admiral, as if tired of waiting, withdrew his ships and put to sea. No sooner was this known to the Sultan than the Imperial yacht conveying the envoy was despatched in hot haste to Egypt. The Admiral, however, was not to be baffled. He had only steamed a hundred miles or so from land, and, with his ships in extended order, awaited the return of a fast vessel which he sent to Suda Bay for news. On her return with intelligence that the envoy had started, the fleet steamed slowly back to the coast of Egypt, where, on the arrival of the Turkish yacht, the stately ironclads, after saluting, formed in two lines dressed in colours, and escorted her into the harbour of Alexandria.
When the Firman reached Cairo it somehow leaked out that it differed in important particulars from what it ought to have been, and before the precious document, for which £E.6,000 was paid, was read on 14th April, the mistake had to be put right by telegraphic communication with the Porte.
In June, 1892, the great services rendered by Sir Evelyn Baring in connection with Egypt received their recognition in the shape of a peerage which was conferred on the distinguished Minister Plenipotentiary and diplomatic agent for Great Britain in Cairo. Honours were never better deserved. Writing of Lord Cromer, as the new peer must henceforth be called, an eminent author (Sir Alfred Milner), more than once quoted in this book, says:--
"It would be difficult to overestimate what the work of England in Egypt owes to the sagacity, fortitude, and patience of the British Minister. His mental and moral equipment, very remarkable in any case, was peculiarly suited to the very peculiar circumstances in which he found himself placed. Perhaps the most striking feature about him has been a singular combination of strength and forbearance. And he needed both these qualities in an exceptional degree. On one side of him were the English officials, zealous about their work, fretting at the obstruction which met them at every turn; on the other side were the native authorities, new to our methods, hating to be driven, and keen to resent the appearance of English diplomatic pressure. The former were often inclined to grumble with him for interfering too little; the latter were no less prone to complain of his interfering too much. What a task was his to steer an even keel between meddlesomeness and inactivity! Yet how seldom has he failed to hit the right mean. Slowly but surely he has carried his main points, and he has carried them without needlessly overriding native authority or pushing his own personality into the foreground. He has realized that the essence of our policy is to help the Egyptians to work out as far as possible their own salvation.... The contrast between Egypt of to-day and Egypt as he found it, the enhanced reputation of England in matters Egyptian, are the measure of the signal services he has rendered alike to his own country and to the country where he has laid the foundations of a lasting fame."
In January, 1893, an incident occurred in Cairo which attracted an amount of attention somewhat out of proportion to its real importance. The Prime Minister, Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, became so ill that his life was despaired of. The Khedive thereupon informed Lord Cromer of his desire to appoint another Egyptian statesman, Tigrane Pasha, in Mustapha's place. This was discouraged by the British representative on the ground that Tigrane was a Christian. The next thing was that the Khedive summarily dismissed Mustapha and three of his colleagues, and nominated Fakri Pasha, the late Minister of Justice, as Premier. Fakri had been dismissed shortly before, on Lord Cromer's suggestion, on account of his opposition to judicial reform. At the same time Lord Cromer was informed that what was taking place was to be followed by a wholesale dismissal of English officials, a report, however, which the Khedive has always denied. On the matter being telegraphed to Lord Rosebery, then British Foreign Secretary, his Lordship took the matter seriously and directed Lord Cromer to protest, and to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government expected to be consulted in such matters as a change of ministry, and that the appointment of Fakri could not be sanctioned. The Khedive, on this being pointed out to him, consented to cancel the appointment objected to, and to nominate Riaz Pasha as the substitute to Mustapha, which was accepted. The Khedive's nominations to the other vacant posts were not found fault with, and there the matter would have ended had not symptoms of an apparent anti-English feeling shown themselves in the capital, and in the tone of the native press generally. In consequence of this, it was determined to strengthen the Army of Occupation, then numbering only 3,000 men, by two additional battalions, which were promptly despatched to Egypt.
The amusing part of the incident was the interview which took place between Lord Rosebery and the French Ambassador on the 18th January, when the latter stated that he had called to protest against what he termed a high-handed proceeding which had occurred in Egypt. Lord Rosebery replied that he quite recognized that there was some high-handedness. It then turned out that they were not talking about the same thing, one referring to the action of Lord Cromer, and the other to that of the Khedive. On matters being explained, Lord Rosebery scored off the Ambassador by saying that he was at a loss to understand the latter's meaning, as he could hardly call Lord Cromer's making a protest a "high-handed proceeding," seeing that that was the express object for which the Ambassador had sought the present interview.
The serious part of the incident was the view which the British Government took of it. Lord Rosebery, in a despatch dated the 16th February, declared that 'if the Prime Minister and the heads of other important departments were to be summarily dismissed in disregard of British advice, there was nothing to prevent the dismissal of any other functionaries, European or native, who might not have the good fortune to fall in with the tendencies of the moment, or whose prominence might afford a favourable opportunity for the display of autocratic power. It was not too much to say that, under these circumstances, the whole fabric so laboriously built up during the last ten years would have been at the mercy of caprice or intrigue, and would rapidly and necessarily have crumbled away.'
Riaz Pasha on his return to power showed himself anything but disposed to work well with the Khedive's English advisers. His policy took the form of stubborn opposition rather than active resistance, and it required all the firmness and tact of Lord Cromer to keep things in the right path. With the promotion of Maher Pasha to the post of Under-Secretary at War, attempts were made to interfere with the authority of the Sirdar in matters relating to the army, and hardly were these defeated than the further difficulty known as the "frontier incident" occurred.
The Khedive on his visit to Wady Halfa in January, 1894, made some observations on the army which were taken by the British officers as a slight upon them, and the Sirdar, General Kitchener, in consequence, resigned. He, however, withdrew his resignation almost immediately after, at the request of the Khedive. The matter was regarded by the British Government as an attempt to discredit the English officers, and to undermine their authority with the troops, and Lord Cromer was instructed to ask that a general order should be issued expressing the Khedive's satisfaction with the army, and the officers generally, and also that Maher Pasha should be removed. Both these requirements were complied with and the incident was closed.
Riaz Pasha shortly after resigned, and Nubar again returned to power. Under his advice the relations of the Khedive with the British Government became more cordial, and no further "incidents" such as those above recorded took place.
LX. THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION
In a previous chapter, the history of events on the Nile frontier was brought down to the month of August, 1889, when Wad-en-Nejumi's forces, after the crushing defeat they encountered in the engagement at Toski, were retreating southwards, and the projected invasion of Egypt was suspended. The incidents which marked the next few years may be related in a few words.
The years 1890 and 1891 passed almost undisturbed on the frontier. The chief military command in the province of Dongola was vested in one of the Khalifa's emirs, called Mohammed Khalil Zogal, with a force and detachments at Sunnah, and at Suarda, fifty miles south of Akasheh. From this last point patrols occasionally went north to Akasheh itself, but the Nile frontier generally remained quite undisturbed.
From Korosko, Saba Bey, in the autumn of 1890, made a reconnaissance towards Abu Hamid, with some irregulars, and captured one of the Dervish outpost forts, which he, a few hours afterwards, was compelled to relinquish. The matter is only worth mentioning by reason of the fact that in the fight which accompanied Saba's retreat the notorious Suleiman Wad Gamr, Colonel Stewart's murderer, was killed.
In April, 1892, Colonel Kitchener succeeded Sir Francis Grenfell as Sirdar of the Egyptian army. In the same year there were signs of increased activity in the Nile Valley, and between Dongola and Suarda some 5,000 fighting men were kept under arms.
In January, 1893, the Dervishes again became aggressive, and 600 of them advanced to cut the railway connecting Sarras and Wady Halfa. The raid failed, owing to the precautions taken by Colonel Wodehouse. The Dervishes, however, managed to surprise and outnumber 120 of the Egyptian Camel Corps, who had been sent to follow up the retreat. The Egyptians fought courageously, but, having lost their two senior officers, Captain Pyne and Major Fuad Effendi, were defeated, and had to retire with a loss of no less than thirty-four men killed and fifteen wounded. The Dervish loss was estimated at more than double that number.
In July of the same year, the Dervishes made a sudden descent on Beris, the southernmost village of the El Khargeh Oasis, to the north-west of Assouan.
In November, the enemy made an attack upon the desert outpost of Murad Wells, but were repulsed.
From this date, with the exception of a raid on a village in the Wady Halfa district in 1895, the Dervishes in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian advanced posts observed a strictly defensive attitude.
The year 1896 brought with it great changes in the entire situation. The reoccupation of the province of Dongola had for some time been in contemplation by the Egyptian Government and its advisers. It was felt that a blow must sooner or later be struck at the power of the Khalifa, which, though it had succeeded in laying waste some of the most fertile provinces abandoned by Egypt, was known to be waning, if not dying, of its own unpopularity; but no one thought that the blow would be struck so soon. In choosing the moment for action, the British Government was influenced to a very large extent by a desire to assist a friendly Power in a position of extreme difficulty. Only a short time before (29th February, 1896) a terrible disaster had happened to the Italian army in Africa, which had been defeated at Adowa with heavy loss by the Abyssinians under Menelik. Driven back in the direction of Massowah, the remains of the Italian forces found it impossible to lend a helping hand to their comrades garrisoned at Kassala, who were threatened by the Dervishes, and in a situation of imminent peril. One object of the British and Egyptian advance which in March, 1896, was determined on, was, by making a diversion in the region of Dongola, to save Kassala, or at all events its garrison. It was not from purely disinterested motives that this step was decided upon. It was obvious that the moment when a large body of the Khalifa's forces was occupied with the Italians would be a favourable one for a movement on Dongola, whereas if Kassala was to fall into the hands of the Dervishes, the latter would be let loose to overrun the Nile Valley. Everything in fact was ripe for the expedition. There were, moreover, political reasons for not delaying it. In the valley of the Upper Nile, the race between the Powers for possession of that part of Africa was beginning to attract attention. The French were extending their influence from the south-west, and the Belgians were sending out expeditions from the south, and there was a general feeling that some corresponding action on the part of Great Britain was desirable, as soon as a favourable opportunity should occur.
Speaking in the House of Commons in March, Mr. Curzon, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that, "in view of the reported forward movements in various directions by the Dervishes and the threatened beleaguerment of Kassala, the Government, acting in conjunction with the Government of Egypt and their advisers, and in order to avoid danger to Italy, to Egypt, and to England, and in the interests of Europe, had ordered an advance to Akasheh." He added that the advance might be extended to Dongola, and that the future action of the Government was to be "regulated by considerations not merely military and strategical, but political and financial."
It was decided that the Dongola expedition should consist of about 9,000 Egyptian troops, under the command of the Sirdar. In addition to these, the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment was to be moved from Cairo to Wady Halfa to relieve the Egyptian garrison there, and also to be at hand if required. The route chosen was by rail and river to Wady Halfa, and thence by a march along the Nile bank to the front.
The decision of the British Government was arrived at so suddenly that it was not even communicated to the Khedive and his advisers. The news took Cairo by surprise. Without any previous intimation it became known at midnight on the 12th March that Colonel Hunter, who commanded the frontier force at Wady Halfa, had been ordered to advance and occupy Akasheh, that all available troops were to be pushed up the Nile with a view to an advance on Dongola, and that the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment (64th), then quartered in Cairo, was to leave immediately for Wady Halfa.[153]
Although the news took Cairo by surprise, it was the kind of surprise with which one hears that something long expected and long delayed has at last really come true. For years past the Egyptian army had been steadily trained and prepared for the event which the disaster to the Italian arms in Abyssinia only precipitated.
A few words may here be said concerning the state of the army at this period. Its formation, begun by Sir Evelyn Wood soon after Tel-el-Kebir, had progressed slowly but surely. The men had been gradually disciplined under British officers and accustomed by degrees to meeting the Dervishes in the numerous frontier skirmishes of the past ten years. In 1884-5, Egyptian troops were employed upon the lines of communication of Wolseley's Nile expedition, and some of the Camel Corps were under fire at Kirbekan. Backed by British troops, they fought well at Ginnis, and they crushed Wad-en-Nejumi single-handed at Argin and Toski. At the beginning of 1896 the army numbered 18,000 men. It consisted of sixteen battalions of infantry, each battalion having six companies of from 100 to 120 men each, and about eight squadrons of cavalry, with camel corps, artillery, &c. Of the infantry, ten battalions were composed of fellaheen, taken by conscription, and six of Soudanese blacks (volunteers enlisted for life). The fellaheen battalions numbered from 1 to 4 had British colonels and majors; those numbered from 5 to 8 were officered only by natives. The Soudanese Battalions numbered from 9 to 14 (this last only in course of formation) had British officers, whilst the 15th and 16th Battalions, made up of reservists called out for the campaign, were also partly officered by Englishmen. There were in all about eighty British officers, a number increased to 120 by others sent out on special service in the course of the campaign.
A glance must now be taken at the means of transport at the disposal of the Sirdar, and it will be seen that, as in Wolseley's expedition, the provisioning of the above force at a distance of nearly 1,000 miles from its base in Cairo formed one of the chief difficulties to be dealt with.
In March, 1886, the Upper Egypt Railway was open as far as Girgeh, 341 miles above Cairo, but it had been prolonged, for Government purposes only, to Belianeh, eight miles further on. Thence everything had to be carried in steamers and native boats to Assouan. Here men and stores had to be unloaded and conveyed overland by the eight-mile railway to Shellal, just above the First Cataract, where they were again shipped and taken on to Wady Halfa. From this last place to Sarras, a distance of thirty miles, a railway existed when the campaign began, and this line was continued as quickly as possible in the rear of the army as it advanced. It may here be observed that the rapid construction of this railway, under the direction of Nicour Bey and Captain Girouard, of the Royal Engineers, was not the least notable feature of the campaign. From the rail-head to the front stores had to be carried by convoys of camels and mules, aided on the less broken parts of the river by relief boats, as soon as the rising Nile had allowed them to be dragged up the cataract by steamers. The navigation of the Nile between Wady Halfa and Dongola is not easy, the broken water of the Second Cataract extending from Wady Halfa almost to Sarras, and at Hannek, 100 miles further on, the Third Cataract again obstructs the navigation.
On the 20th March, Mr. Morley moved a vote of censure of the House of Commons on the Government in connection with the Dongola expedition, but on a division the motion was negatived by 288 votes against 143.
There was an incident in connection with the expedition which is of sufficient importance to deserve notice.
A few days after the expedition was decided on, the Egyptian Government, on the 19th March, applied to the Commissioners of the Public Debt to advance towards the expenses the sum of £500,000, to be taken from what is known as the "Reserve Fund." This fund was created pursuant to the Khedivial decree of 12th July, 1888, under which the financial arrangements made by "The London Convention" of 1885, already referred to in a former chapter, were once more modified. The changes made comprised the suspension of the Sinking Fund of the Debt, and the application of the money to form a reserve fund, to meet unforeseen contingencies. One of these was declared to be "extraordinary expenses incurred with the previous sanction of the Commission of the Debt."
Four out of the six Commissioners agreed in considering the Dongola expedition as coming under the above category, and advanced the money. The French and Russian Commissioners dissented. This led to a lawsuit in the Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, which later on, viz., on the 9th June, ordered the Government to refund the money with interest. The judgment being confirmed on appeal on the 2nd December, 1896, the Khedive's advisers might have found themselves in a position of some difficulty had not Lord Cromer vigorously taken the matter in hand, and induced the British Government to lend the sum which had to be refunded. The amount due under the judgment, £515,600, was repaid to the "Caisse" on the 8th December, and the Khedive's Ministers expressed their lively gratitude. This was still further earned when later on the British Government released their claim to be repaid the sum advanced.
On 21st March the Sirdar, with Major Wingate and Slatin Pasha, and the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment, 917 strong, left Cairo for Assouan and Wady Halfa. At the same time the various Egyptian battalions were hurried up the river with all possible despatch.
As usual the enterprising firm of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son came in for the principal part of the river transport work. All their steamers, except those engaged in the postal service, were requisitioned by the Egyptian Government, and, deprived of their handsome fittings and luxurious accommodation, now figured as troopships between Belianeh and Assouan. Between the 21st and 26th March, these steamers shipped from the former place no less than 4,500 men, besides 750 animals and an enormous quantity of stores. A detachment of the Connaught Rangers was stationed at Belianch in charge of the store depôt established there.
It should be mentioned that the 9th Soudanese Battalion, forming part of the Souakim garrison, marched from Kosseir, on the Red Sea, to Keneh, on the Nile, following the route across the desert taken by General Baird and his army in 1801.
Meanwhile Colonel Hunter with his frontier force moved on to Akasheh, which for some time past had been the advanced post of the Dervishes, and occupied it without opposition.
The Egyptian troops now concentrated as rapidly as possible at the various posts between Wady Halfa and Akasheh, the Staffordshire Regiment being left to garrison the former place.
The railway was now being pushed forward, and on 24th May it was completed to a point three miles beyond Ambigol, sixty-three miles south of Wady Halfa.
To guard against raids on either flank in the proposed further advance, the west bank of the Nile was patrolled by native irregulars, and the important post of Murad Wells had its garrison of Ababdeh "friendlies" strengthened by some two or three companies from one of the Egyptian battalions.
The post of Murad Wells, situated about half-way between Korosko and Abu Hamid, was by far the most important of the desert posts. No Dervish descent upon the east bank of the river was possible unless these wells had been first secured; consequently there had been repeated struggles for their possession. Their guardianship had at the time now referred to been intrusted to the Ababdeh Arabs in the pay of the Government. The last attack on the wells was that made by the Dervishes as lately as November, 1893, but which was repulsed with severe loss. The chief of the tribe, Saleh Bey, who was in command of the defending force, lost his life on this occasion, but was succeeded by his elder brother, Ahmed Bey, an equally capable leader.
On the news of Hunter's advance to Akasheh, a younger brother, Abd-el-Azim, on the 11th April made a bold reconnaissance to the south. Crossing the desert with a party of his Ababdehs, he struck the Nile about forty miles south of Abu Hamid, and then continuing some eighty miles further along the river, he informed the people of the Egyptian advance. They received the news everywhere with the greatest delight, and expressed their joy at the prospect of being delivered from the Khalifa's reign of terror. Abd-el-Azim was able to obtain some useful information of the Dervish movements. At Abu Hamid there were only about 400 fighting men, but Berber was held by 6,000 of the Jehadia, Jaalin and Baggara tribes.
On the 1st of May the first fight of the season came off in the neighbourhood of Akasheh. About noon 240 of the Egyptian cavalry, under Major Burn Murdoch, when some four miles from Akasheh, suddenly came across 300 mounted Baggara, with a further force of about 1,000 men on foot, drawn up behind them. The odds being too great, the cavalry was ordered to retire. Seeing this movement, the Dervish horsemen, advancing amid a cloud of dust, charged down upon the rear troop just at the moment that the cavalry had entered a narrow defile. Several of the men were speared and stabbed in the back before the main body had time to wheel and in their turn charge the assailants. This they quickly did in dashing style, and then ensued a hand-to-hand fight which lasted about twenty minutes, at the end of which the Dervishes wheeled about and galloped off to the rear of the spearmen on foot. The ground not admitting of another charge, the cavalry then dismounted and opened fire on the enemy. This was kept up till at 3 p.m., just as the 11th Soudanese Battalion was arriving in support, the Dervishes retired, to the great satisfaction of the small Egyptian force, which with jaded horses, and suffering intensely from want of water, had been fighting continuously for three hours under a burning sun.
The cavalry had two killed and ten wounded, against eighteen killed and eighty wounded on the enemy's side.
On the 2nd June the arrival of the 10th Soudanese Battalion at Akasheh completed the concentration necessary for the further advance.
From information obtained by the Intelligence Department it was ascertained that the Dervish force, though inferior in number to that of the Egyptians, was composed of good fighting material, Baggara, Jaalins, and Jehadias, and was led by the well-known Emir Hamuda. Their total number was estimated at 3,000.
On the evening of the 6th the Egyptian troops commenced the advance, quitting Akasheh on the march to Ferket, on the east bank, sixteen miles distant. The Sirdar, who had shortly before reached the front, was in command. The force was divided into two parts, which may be called the River and the Desert Columns.
The River Column, under the command of Colonel Hunter, consisted of infantry and artillery. The infantry was divided into three brigades of three battalions each; the artillery was composed of two field batteries and two Maxims, the latter worked by thirty men of the Connaught Rangers.
The Desert Column, commanded by Major Burn Murdoch, consisted of seven squadrons of cavalry, the Camel Corps, one infantry battalion mounted on camels, one battery of Horse Artillery, and two Maxim guns. The total force of the two columns was not less than 9,100 men.
The Sirdar's plan for the attack was for the River Column to proceed along the Nile bank, and the Desert Column to make a detour to the east, so timed that both columns should reach Ferket at dawn, the former attacking from the north whilst the latter cut off the Dervish retreat east and south. On the west of their position was the Nile, the further bank of which was guarded by Egyptian irregulars, so as to prevent the possibility of escape on that side. Thus the Dervishes were to be completely hemmed in on every side.
The River Column bivouacked at 11 p.m. at a place distant only about four miles from the enemy, every precaution being taken to prevent news of the advance reaching the Dervish force. There were no bugle calls, no lights, and no firing.
At 12.15 on the morning of the 7th June the march was resumed, the 1st Brigade taking the ground nearest the river, the 2nd being on the left, and the 3rd in the rear.
Meanwhile the Desert Column was skilfully guided in the darkness across the desert until it reached the point south of Ferket where it had been arranged that it should take up its position.
The enemy became aware of the approach of the two columns almost simultaneously, saw that all prospect of retreat was cut off, and hurriedly prepared for action. Their formation was largely governed by the position of their camps. Their left wing, or wing next the river, occupied the huts of the Jaalin camp, and was thrown forward beyond the centre, which was opposite the Baggara camp; the right wing again was slightly in the rear of the centre.
The engagement began by the Dervishes opening fire at 5 a.m. from an outpost on the Jebel Ferkeh, a mountain on the north side of the village close down by the river under which the River Column had to pass.
The 2nd Brigade brought a heavy fire to bear upon the hill, and quickly clearing it, the march continued. As the column reached the more open ground beyond Jebel Ferkeh, the troops opened out, and the brigades on the right and left got into fighting formation, with two battalions thrown forward and one in reserve. The 1st Brigade then moved towards the river to attack the enemy's left wing, whilst the 2nd Brigade advanced on the right wing near the Jaalin camp; the 3rd Brigade coming up from the rear to fill the intervening gap.
The entire force then steadily advanced, firing as they went, whilst the Desert Column shelled the enemy from the south and rear. The Dervishes fought with the courage of despair, and frequently charged the Egyptian troops. Small bodies of the enemy continued fighting in the huts forming the different camps long after any organized resistance had ceased to be possible, and obstinately refusing quarter. Hut after hut had to be cleared at the point of the bayonet amid vigorous hand-to-hand fighting, and in one hut alone eighty Baggara corpses were subsequently found.
Position after position was taken, and an utter rout ensued. Such of the Dervishes as survived the attack of the River Column fled to the south, only to find their retreat cut off by the Desert Column, which by this time had advanced on the flank of the enemy, who were thus effectually caught as intended. Many of their mounted men, finding themselves headed off by the cavalry, galloped back to die in front of the lines of infantry.
The footmen, too, were seen hurrying to and fro seeking a way through the encircling Egyptian forces. Such of them as succeeded were closely pursued by the cavalry, and at least 150 were thus slaughtered within a few miles of Ferket.
The enemy's losses were estimated at 1,000 killed and wounded, and over 500 were taken prisoners. The Egyptian loss, on the other hand, was limited to twenty men killed and eighty wounded. The Dervish Emir in command was Osman Azrak, who had lately superseded Hamuda; and the former and at least forty other emirs were among the slain.
The whole fight was but a short affair, the first shot being fired at 5 a.m., and two hours later the whole thing was over.
Burn Murdoch, with the Desert Column, continued to follow up the pursuit as far as Suarda, which he occupied the next morning.
The effect of the engagement at Ferket was that fifty miles of the Nile Valley were cleared of the Dervishes; that the only organized army of the Khalifa near the frontier was destroyed; and that Suarda, which had for many years been the starting-place for raids on the Nile villages, became the advanced post of the Sirdar's army.
LXI. THE RECONQUEST OF DONGOLA
After the destruction of the Dervish force at Ferket and the occupation of Suarda, no further advance was undertaken for a period of three months. There was, however, plenty of hard work to do, and rarely has an army toiled through a long, hot summer in the way that the Sirdar's troops worked in those trying months of June, July, and August. In the year 1896, the railway had to be pushed on, stores had to be concentrated at the front, and steamers to be dragged up the cataracts. In addition to this, there was a severe cholera epidemic to be fought and overcome.
The advance post of Suarda was fortified and strongly held by the 2nd Infantry Brigade, with some artillery. The cavalry and Camel Corps made reconnaissances further south, but no additional posts were occupied during the summer.
One particularly successful expedition was made. It had been ascertained that the Emir Osman Azrak, with a body of Dervish cavalry, had come north to Kidden, a village near the Kaibar Cataract, with the intention of collecting the entire male population in the district, and driving them south to Dongola to assist in the defence of that place. On June the 17th, two squadrons of Egyptian cavalry and a company of the camel corps, under Captain Mahon, arrived; and the Dervishes, though greatly superior in numbers, fled without fighting. Eleven boats loaded with grain were captured, and the unfortunate inhabitants of the village were enabled to make their escape to the Egyptian lines north of Suarda.
From these refugees a good deal of information was obtained as to what the Dervishes were doing. The news of the defeat at Ferket had been received in Dongola with consternation. Wad-el-Bishara, the governor, sent the intelligence on to the Khalifa, asking at the same time for large reinforcements, if the town of Dongola was to be defended. In the meantime, he made preparations for defence, fortifying the place, enrolling all the able-bodied men in the province, and calling in from the desert such of the Bedouins as were friendly to the cause.
All this while the work of pushing forward supplies was rapidly continued. The field telegraph, laid for the most part in the desert sand, followed closely upon the heels of the army.
The railway was steadily pushed on by Captain Girouard, R.E., until it reached Kosheh (the scene of the engagement of 30th December, 1885), whither on July 5th the head-quarters camp had been moved for sanitary reasons.
During all this period the expedition was pursued by persistent ill fortune. The rise of the Nile was unusually late, and consequently the dragging of the gunboats over the Second Cataract was delayed. Heavy rain storms, most unusual in this part of the Soudan, occurred, and the last, on August the 25th, swept away part of the line near Sarras.
By far the worst visitation of all was the cholera. The disease was imported into Egypt in October, 1895, but made only little way during the winter. In the spring of 1896 it began to increase, and in the second week of June reached the first military post at Assouan. Here it was quickly stamped out, but was taken to Korosko by the men of the 5th Battalion, and shortly after appeared at Wady Halfa. Here the epidemic was very severe, and difficult to deal with, for Halfa could not be isolated, as all the troops and stores had to pass through it, and the epidemic followed them until it reached Kosheh. As soon as the cholera appeared at Wady Halfa the North Staffordshire Regiment was moved into camp at Gemai, six miles further off in the desert, but nevertheless many cases occurred among the men. The epidemic first reached Kosheh on July the 15th. The camp was at once moved back 2,000 yards into the desert, and the most stringent precautions were taken to insure the purity of the water supply, as well as to keep the men from bathing or washing clothes in the river.
With these precautions, the disease, which was of a very rapid and fatal type, was at last stamped out, but not until 235 Egyptian soldiers in all had fallen victims. Amongst others were four British officers and two English engineers, who had been sent to supervise the putting together of a new gunboat.
At the end of August, the concentration of the troops further south was begun, and begun badly. The 1st Brigade was advanced from Suarda, where it had been stationed, to Delligo, a distance of forty-five miles. To avoid a bend of the river the men were marched as far as Absarat, that is about half of the way straight across the desert. The heat was most oppressive, a scorching sand storm raged part of the time, and the men in heavy marching order, carrying two days' rations and 100 rounds of ammunition, were unaccompanied by water camels, but had to trust to two depôts which had been formed on the road. Out of 3,000 men no less than 1,700 fell out, and ten died and were buried, during this disastrous march, undertaken without any adequate motive.
On the 15th September the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment, which had moved up from Gemai, arrived, and the advance really began. Every available soldier being wanted, but small garrisons were left upon the line of communication. Kosheh, now the railway terminus, as the most important place, was guarded by the 6th Battalion, but the other posts northwards had only a few men each. The expeditionary force consisted of the North Staffordshire, the three brigades which fought at Ferket, and a fourth brigade, composed also of three Egyptian battalions.
With the artillery, Camel Corps, and infantry the total force amounted to nearly 15,000 men.
On the 14th the troops marched into Fereig, the North Staffordshires being conveyed by steamer. On the 17th the whole force moved on to Bargi, about ten miles further south, and on the 18th to a spot on the river bank opposite the island of Imbos. On the 19th the army started before daybreak to attack the Dervishes, who were reported to be strongly intrenched at Kermeh, but Wad-el-Bishara, who was in command, disappointed the Sirdar by moving the whole Dervish force across to the west bank during the previous night, and was now holding the village of Hafir. Then at 6.30 a.m. commenced the little battle of Hafir, between the Egyptian artillery and gunboats and the Dervishes on the left bank. A long line of shelter trenches, with loopholed mud walls, ran along the river front of the position, and here five small guns, which had been captured at Khartoum, were mounted. These were served by ex-gunners of the Egyptian army. The north and south sides of the position were protected by deep morasses, and on the left lay moored against the western bank a small gunboat built by Gordon at Khartoum, and some twenty-five large sailing vessels laden with grain. The engagement was opened at 6.30 a.m. by the Egyptian artillery, which was replied to by the Dervish guns and riflemen, but little damage was done on either side.
Half an hour later, Commander Colville, R.N., arrived with his steamboat flotilla, consisting of his flagship, the Tamaai, the Abu Klea, and the Metammeh.
The steamers then began to attack the forts, steaming up until they got abreast of them, pouring in their fire, and then dropping down stream until they were out of range.
The Dervish fire was wonderfully accurate, the ships being struck again and again by the shells while the rifle bullets pierced all the woodwork. One shell actually entered the magazine of the Abu Klea, but fortunately did not explode. There were several casualties. Two men were killed, and Captain Colville and twelve men wounded. This engagement lasted for three hours, and though the practice made by the gunboats was good, and the enemy must have lost heavily, still their fire was not silenced.
About 1,200 yards from the enemy's position was a large island, called Artaghasi, joined by a swampy isthmus to the mainland, now that the Nile was falling. Three batteries of artillery and the Maxim battery were sent to take up a position on the island, just opposite the Dervishes. The guns were promptly brought into action, and about an hour later the Dervish fire was silenced. Nevertheless shots were fired intermittently during the afternoon and through the night, especially in the neighbourhood of the grain boats which the Dervishes were trying to discharge.
Meanwhile the steamers, delivering their parting shots as they passed the forts, went on to Dongola, which they reached before sunset.
Thus ended the fighting for the day. The casualties on the Anglo-Egyptian side, as already stated, were but trifling; those of the enemy, though reported as heavy, were never exactly ascertained. One writer estimates them at 200.
On the morning of the next day, the 20th, it became evident that the Dervishes had evacuated Hafir. Some of the inhabitants came out and waved a welcome to the Egyptians, while others brought all the boats across to the east bank, where they were immediately taken possession of. It was found that Bishara, misled by false information, had evacuated Hafir at three in the morning, and marched with all his force to Dongola to oppose the crossing which he had been led to expect would take place there. The Sirdar, however, learning this, ordered that the river should be crossed at once at Hafir, and the movement was begun that very day.
It was no small undertaking to throw such a large force across a river a mile and a half wide, with only a few gunboats and sailing craft, and it is hardly surprising that the army was not ready to resume its march upon Dongola until the evening of the following day. In the meanwhile, Colville's gunboats returned, having thrown a few shells into Dongola, and captured several more boat loads of grain.
On the evening of September the 21st, the Anglo-Egyptian force marched twelve miles further south, and bivouacked on the river bank nearly opposite the island of Argo. On this day, too, the Abu Klea was sent on ahead to watch Dongola, where on the following day she was joined by the Tamaai and Metammeh.
Early in the morning of the 22nd, the force marched a few miles on to Zowerat and rested there.
At 4.30 a.m. on the 23rd, lighted by a brilliant moon, the Anglo-Egyptian force moved on Dongola. The gunboat Zafr arrived from the north, and was at once sent on to join Colville's command. The order of march was as follows:--The 1st Brigade was on the left near the river; on their right was the 3rd Brigade. Next came the artillery, Maxims, and North Staffordshire. On the right, next the artillery, was the 2nd Brigade with the Camel Corps, Horse Artillery, and cavalry on the extreme right, away in the desert. The 4th Brigade formed the rear guard. The force presented a front two miles in length. At seven o'clock the Dervishes came in sight, and the Egyptians briskly advanced to meet them. The former, however, would not fight. Time after time they halted in battle array as if to attack, but each time seeing the odds were so hopelessly against them, they suddenly retreated. In the distance, the sound of guns from Colville's steamers was heard; but the troops on shore never got a chance of a shot. At 9.30 the force was abreast of the Dervish camp to the north of the town of Dongola, where they saw the Egyptian flag waving over the old Mudirieh and learned that the blacks garrisoning the place had surrendered to the steamers. Then it was seen that there could be no fight, and that all that remained to be done was to pursue the Baggaras, Jaalins, and others now in full retreat. This task was thereupon taken in hand by the cavalry, Camel Corps, and Horse Artillery, whilst the remainder of the force, skirting a morass which lay between the town and the western desert, marched on, till at 11 a.m. they turned the southern end of the swamp and entered Dongola.
The inhabitants crowded amongst the troops, seizing and kissing the hands of the soldiers and displaying the utmost joy at being delivered from the oppression of the Baggara.
The important part taken by the gunboats in the capture of Dongola may be stated in a few words. They steamed up abreast of the town in the early morning, the rearmost steamer being only a little ahead of the infantry advance. They then opened fire on the defences on the river bank, but there was no effective reply. They also kept up a steady fire on the Dervish camp in the desert, already referred to, and afterwards on the Baggara Arabs, now retiring before the advancing infantry. Again there was no reply. At 9.30 the blacks garrisoning Dongola hoisted the white flag, and the cannonade ceased. Commander Colville then landed with a hundred Soudanese soldiers and hoisted the Egyptian flag.
The close pursuit by the mounted troops which ensued compelled the Dervishes to abandon a large portion of their black foot-soldiers, who were only too glad to remain. Indeed, it was one of the most satisfactory features of the day's work that, owing to the absence of fighting by the force on shore, only a few lost their lives. Those were of the unfortunate native population, who are always placed in the front ranks of the Dervishes.
The Baggara, however, offered some resistance to the pursuit, and made several charges whilst endeavouring to cover the retreat of the main body. Some 900 prisoners, in all, were captured. These were shortly afterwards converted into a black battalion and added to the Sirdar's forces.
On the night of the 24th, the Anglo-Egyptian force bivouacked in and around Dongola, or rather the ruins of that once flourishing town. The place was now practically deserted, and in the streets not a soul was to be seen. Everywhere was ruin and desolation.
On the 26th, there being no more work for the North Staffordshires to do, and the regiment suffering a good deal from sickness, it was sent back to Cairo.[154]
As a consequence of the fall of Dongola every Dervish fled for his life from the province. The mounted men made off across the desert direct to Omdurman, and the foot-soldiers took the Nile route to Berber, always being careful to keep out of range of the gunboats, which were prevented by the Fourth Cataract from pursuing them beyond Merawi.
LXII. THE ADVANCE TO BERBER
Preceded by the gunboats, the main body of the expedition after the capture of Dongola proceeded southwards, leaving detachments behind to guard the line of communication. Debbeh, Korti, and Merawi were successively seized and occupied.
The Sirdar also went south to inspect the different positions and receive the submissions of the most important sheikhs, after which he returned to Cairo, leaving his forces stationed at the three strategic posts above mentioned.
On Kitchener's departure the province was placed under military law, Major-General Hunter, who had fixed his head-quarters at Merawi, being in command.
Courts of justice and a police force were established in the province of Dongola, the rebuilding of the town was begun, and the railway was continued along the Nile to Kermeh, forty miles to the north, and which now became the southern terminus. The former inhabitants were invited to return to their lands, and cultivation was gradually resumed.
The principal difficulty in the way of progress was the lack of population, which since 1885 had fallen off from 75,000 to 56,000, and of these a large proportion consisted of women and children. The number of cattle had also diminished from 36,000 to less than 12,000 in the same period.
Whilst Dongola was being put in order, the Khalifa, who expected that the capture of that province would be followed by a further advance, hastily took steps to fortify Omdurman, where he gathered all his available warriors, and awaited events.
This was the situation at the end of 1896.
We now arrive at the year 1897, when the intended reconquest of the Soudan, by the aid of British money and arms, was announced in the House of Commons. This took place on the 5th February, when the "Dongola Expedition vote" of £798,802 was moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach declared on this occasion 'that, since the Dongola Expedition was undertaken, the British Government had never concealed, either from Parliament or the country, that, in their view, there should be a further advance in the same direction; that Egypt could never be held to be permanently secured so long as a hostile Power was in occupation of the Nile Valley up to Khartoum; and that England, having compelled the Egyptian Government to abandon the Soudan, had incurred towards its inhabitants responsibilities for the fulfilment of which the moment had arrived now that the baleful rule of the Khalifa was crumbling to decay.'
The Sirdar's policy of advancing gradually and consolidating at every step the authority of the Egyptian Government continued to be pursued in 1897.
The work of getting up supplies for the large force at the front occupied the first few months of the year, and this was a task of no small magnitude, considering that the country contained little or no produce, and that everything required had to be forwarded from the base in Cairo.
The necessity for the construction of a new railway for military purposes from Wady Halfa across the desert viâ Murad Wells to Abu Hamid now impressed itself on the Sirdar's mind. Such a line was almost indispensable in the event of operations being extended in the direction of Berber and Omdurman. The existing line to Kermeh had served its purpose in bringing up supplies and otherwise until the time of the capture of Dongola, but its further extension would have to be made through a difficult country, and at a great sacrifice of time and money. It was therefore determined to discard it so far as the expedition was concerned.
The immense advantage of making a short cut across the eastern desert instead of following the tortuous windings of the Nile Valley will be evident to any one who studies the map and notes the respective positions of Wady Halfa, Kermeh, and Abu Hamid. The saving in distance is about 330 miles.
Influenced by these considerations, the authorities sanctioned the new line, and the materials having been got together at Wady Halfa, the work was promptly taken in hand.
Once commenced, the line, laid for the greater part on the desert sand by working parties from Wady Halfa, progressed with almost inconceivable rapidity, under the able direction of Captain Girouard. The country over which the railway passed consisted mostly of undulating desert. There were no bridges, and but few cuttings, and the average rate of progress was a mile and a half a day.
Although it was known that there was a Dervish force at Abu Hamid, no opposition was encountered from it.
In order to present the history of events in chronological order, it is here necessary to make a slight digression and refer to what happened about this period in another part of the Soudan.
In the month of June the Khalifa was compelled to detach a portion of his army from Omdurman, and send it, under the orders of his cousin and principal emir Mahmoud, to suppress a revolt of the Jaalin Arabs at Metammeh. This tribe, which had long been kept under the Khalifa's rule by the terrorism of the Baggara, was anxious to join hands with the Egyptians, and now struck for freedom. They fortified Metammeh, and courageously awaited Mahmoud's attack. On the 1st July it came, and, hemmed in and outnumbered by the Dervish horde, the brave Jaalins, after three days' resistance, in which all their ammunition was exhausted, were utterly routed. Metammeh was captured and burnt, and the country round devastated by the victors, who killed men, women and children indiscriminately.
The Jaalins had exasperated their foes by their determined resistance, and when the town was taken no less than 2,000 of its defenders were massacred. The prisoners were drawn up in line and treated thus: the first was beheaded, the second had his right hand cut off, the third his feet, and so on in succession until they had all been-dealt with. Their chief, Abdullah Wad Sud, the head of the Jaalin tribe, was taken a prisoner to Omdurman, and walled in in such a position that he could neither stand nor sit, and was thus left to die of hunger and thirst.
Such of the Jaalins as escaped declared their allegiance to the Khedive, and, being supplied with firearms, and subsidized, joined the ranks of the "friendlies" and became useful allies. One of their first acts, when they had time to reorganize a little, was to seize and hold Gakdul Wells, a move which not only covered the Egyptian right on the subsequent advance, but also saved the province of Dongola from the danger of surprise by Dervish raiders.
Towards the end of July the desert railway line had advanced as far as it was deemed prudent to go whilst Abu Hamid remained in the enemy's possession, and it was determined to take the place by means of troops co-operating from what may be considered the opposite direction, viz., Merawi.
On the 29th July, General Hunter, with four battalions of Soudanese infantry and some artillery,[155] started from Merawi for Abu Hamid.
Following the route taken by the River Column under General Earle in 1885, and passing the battlefield of Kirbekan, Hunter arrived on the night of the 6th August within a few miles of Abu Hamid. The march, which covered 132 miles, made in the hottest time of the year, was accomplished in eight days.
At daylight on the 7th, the troops moved up to attack the enemy, who occupied an intrenched position in front of and within the village. Their centre was a rectangular mud-walled inclosure, extending over six acres, and in this were contained the wells, military stores, and quarters for the soldiers. The mud huts of the village were connected by walls, and these, as well as the walls of the inclosure, were loopholed for musketry. The whole position was held by about 1,500 men, one-third of whom were armed with rifles, and 150 were mounted.
The infantry deployed for the attack, and, as soon as the movement was completed, advanced in line covered by the fire of the artillery on their right. Some high ground overlooking the village was first carried with but little resistance. When the troops had approached within 300 yards of the walls they were met by a furious fusillade, and many of the Egyptians fell. The rest rushed onwards, and a stubborn house-to-house fight, in which several lives were lost, ensued. In some cases so determined was the resistance that the artillery were obliged to advance before a position could be carried. Eventually, when the enemy's mounted men had lost about half their number, the residue fled. They were followed by about 100 of the foot-soldiers, all that was left of the garrison, and Abu Hamid was then taken and occupied. Many prisoners were captured, including the Dervish leader, Mohammed Zein.
The serious nature of the fighting may be gathered from the fact that on the Egyptian side there were twenty-three killed and sixty-four wounded. Amongst the killed were two English officers: Major Sidney and Lieutenant FitzClarence. The Dervish loss must have been much heavier, quite four-fifths of the garrison being either killed or taken prisoners.
The fugitives continued their flight to Omdurman, spreading as they went the news of the defeat.[156]
Abu Hamid having fallen, every effort was now made to hurry up the rest of the army from Merawi, Debbeh, and Dongola with a view to an advance upon Berber, the next Dervish stronghold on the river.
The Nile having by this time risen sufficiently, the gunboats with further troops were enabled to pass the Fourth Cataract, and by the 29th August, with the exception of one which came to grief in the cataract, arrived at Abu Hamid. The sailing boats with more men and stores were also successfully hauled through, and reached Abu Hamid shortly after.
Before, however, they had time to arrive, intelligence was received to the effect that the Dervishes were evacuating Berber, the next stronghold on the river. The importance of this move was at once realized, and a party of "friendlies," under Ahmed Bey Khalifa, were sent on ahead of General Hunter's troops to seize the place. Meeting with no resistance, the "friendlies" entered Berber, where on the 6th September Ahmed was joined by the gunboat flotilla. Hunter, with the greater part of his army, entered Berber on the 13th. Berber, formerly a large and prosperous town and an important centre of trade, but now sacked and destroyed, was represented by a big Dervish village, built on a site some miles north of the original place, and some two miles from the river.
On the day that Ahmed Bey reached Berber, two of the gunboats went on to Ed Damer, a few miles beyond the junction of the river Atbara with the Nile. Here they exchanged some shots with the Dervish force which had retreated from Berber, and they also succeeded in capturing several boat-loads of grain.
Ed Damer, now become the Egyptian advanced post, was occupied by a half battalion of infantry; a fort was erected, and other steps were taken for putting the place in a state of defence.[157]
LXIII. ON THE RIVER--KASSALA
Whilst Hunter was making his advance upon Abu Hamid and Berber, the irrepressible Osman Digna, of Souakim notoriety, had collected a force of 5,000 men, besides a large following of women and children, at a spot called Adarama, on the bank of the Atbara river, about ninety miles above Ed Damer. Here Hunter proposed to attack him, but, owing to delays in bringing forward transport and supplies from Abu Hamid, he was not ready to advance till the 23rd of October. On this date, taking with him 400 of the 11th Soudanese, some detachments of the Camel Corps, and two guns, Hunter started. Marching by the Atbara river, the force reached Adarama on the 29th of October, only to find, to their disappointment, that Osman, hearing of the approach of the Egyptian troops, had evacuated that place only two days before, and crossing the river at Guidi, was now with his fighting men and followers making for Abu Deleh, 100 miles in the desert between Omdurman and Kassala.
Adarama was completely deserted, and on the 2nd November, after having set fire to the village, the expedition returned to Berber.
Osman Digna's retreat left the Eastern Soudan clear of Dervishes; and the Souakim and Berber route, after being so many years closed to trade, was now reopened. Amongst the first persons to take advantage of the reopening of the road was a batch of newspaper correspondents, who, being given to understand that no advance on Omdurman was likely to take place until the following year, chose that route for returning to Cairo. They met with no difficulty on the way, and reported that plenty of water was obtainable all along the route by merely improving the existing wells or digging new ones.[158]
The inaction of the Mahdist forces about this time is attributed to the differences which existed between the principal Dervish leaders. Mahmoud with 10,000 men was known to be in the neighbourhood of Metammeh, and, young, energetic, and full of ardour, was anxious to advance and meet the invaders. But between Mahmoud and Osman Digna, now at Abu Deleh, there was a feud on a question of women taken from Osman's tribe. Consequently Osman, like another Achilles, sulked in his tents and refused to co-operate in any way with Mahmoud. The Khalifa at Omdurman, under the impression that the attack on his capital could not be much longer delayed, refused to weaken his forces by sending either men or supplies to enable Mahmoud to make a move, an operation of which, by the way, he strongly disapproved. Mahmoud, not feeling strong enough to risk an attack unaided, was thus constrained to remain on the defensive.
On the 15th October, three of the gunboats were sent, under Commander Keppel, to reconnoitre Mahmoud's position. Passing Shendy, on the east bank, they steamed on until they sighted Metammeh (the scene of the fight with Stewart's column in 1885), on the opposite bank. The town was found to be protected by seven circular mud forts, placed at intervals along the river for a distance of one and a half miles. The gunboats cleared for action, and, with the Egyptian flag flying, formed in line of battle in true naval style. As they advanced, keeping always on the eastern or opposite shore, Baggara horsemen were seen galloping from fort to fort as if to stimulate the defenders. As the steamers approached they opened fire simultaneously on the two nearest forts at a range of 4,000 yards, making excellent practice with their quick-firing twelve and six-pounder guns. The Maxims were directed on the horsemen, and so effectively that in a few minutes they disappeared from the scene of action. The forts, mounting each one obsolete brass cannon, returned the fire, but their shell nearly always fell short. Two or three, however, struck the gunboats, and one man was mortally wounded.
After bombarding at long range for an hour, the flotilla moved up abreast of the position, and poured shell and shrapnel into any place where the enemy was supposed to be. The missiles burst in all directions, with the effect of causing the return fire to slacken perceptibly. As the gunboats passed the forts it was discovered that the embrasures existed only on the northern front, so that when once in the rear of the work no guns could be brought to bear.
Whilst steaming along the east bank and keeping a look-out for the enemy a party of riflemen opened fire on the vessels at a range of 100 yards. The bullets rattled against the sides of the gunboats, but no one was struck, and a few rounds from the Maxims speedily dispersed the sharpshooters, who fled amongst the scrub, leaving their dead behind them. The vessels then steamed past the town, firing as opportunities offered. They then turned and retraced their course down stream, shelling as they went till 2.30 p.m., when all firing ceased. The flotilla then dropped down to an island half a dozen miles to the north of Metammeh and made fast for the night.
On the morning of the 17th, the reconnaissance was resumed. During the night two additional guns had been mounted in the forts, making the total now nine instead of seven. The manoeuvres of the previous day were repeated, and after a few hours' shelling, the reconnaissance being completed, the gunboats proceeded to withdraw down the river. This being observed from the forts, they redoubled their efforts, and fired shell after shell at the retiring vessels, keeping it up long after they were out of range. At the same time a vast horde of Dervish warriors, probably Mahmoud's entire force, sprang into sight, streaming across the hills behind which they had fixed their camp. Led by a chief on a white horse, they waved their banners and shouted in wild exultation at the supposed defeat of the attacking vessels. Keppel does not appear to have thought it worth while to take any notice of the demonstration and continued his course to Berber. Beyond the casualty above mentioned the Egyptians sustained no loss in the two days' engagement. There were no means of arriving at the number of killed and wounded on the Dervish side, though from the accuracy of the gunboats' fire and the fact that they expended no less than 653 shells upon the defenders it may be assumed that their loss was considerable.[159]
On the 1st November General Hunter made another reconnaissance with the gunboats, this time as far as the foot of the Shabluka, or Sixth Cataract. As on the previous occasions, the flotilla, both in going and returning, shelled the forts whilst passing Metammeh, where a large number of Dervishes, both mounted and on foot, showed themselves. The fire in reply from the enemy was ill directed, and the gunboats got back to Berber with only three men wounded.
The result of the reconnaissance was to show that Mahmoud was still in force at Metammeh and meant fighting. His men were nevertheless in great difficulty for want of the supplies asked for from Omdurman. To procure food they took to raiding the neighbouring Jaalin villages, a party of about 1,000 of them having the temerity to proceed close to Berber, despite the presence of the large Egyptian force there. Evading the vigilance of the gunboat patrol, the marauders, divided into five bands, proceeded to attack the like number of villages simultaneously. The inhabitants, consisting of "friendlies," had, however, been furnished by the Government with Remingtons. Of these they made such good use that in each instance they beat off the Dervish attack and forced the aggressors to retire.
After the fall of Abu Hamid had insured the non-interruption of the work of constructing the military railway from Wady Halfa to Abu Hamid, the line was pushed on, and finally completed on 31st October. Abu Hamid was not, however, destined to be the terminal station. The advantage of continuing the railway to Berber for the purpose of bringing up supplies, as well as to facilitate the further advance in the direction of Omdurman was too obvious to escape attention. So, £200,000 being set apart by the Egyptian Government to meet the cost, the work was commenced and pushed forward with all possible rapidity.
Egyptian rule being now practically re-established in the Soudan, negotiations took place between the Egyptian and Italian Governments for the retrocession of Kassala, in accordance with the arrangement under which Egypt assented to the Italian occupation. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that the town and contiguous territory should be formally handed over to Egypt on the 25th December, 1897.
As the time drew near the Sirdar, now Major-General Sir Herbert Kitchener, who had been absent at Merawi, proceeded to Cairo and thence to Souakim and Massowah, to arrange with the Italian military authorities for the passage through the Italian colony of Erythrea of the Egyptian troops which were to relieve the existing garrison of Kassala.
Kassala, which, after being for many years lost to Egypt, was now about to be restored, is a place of such interest that any history of the Soudan would be imperfect without a reference to its past and present position.
The situation of Kassala is somewhat remarkable. As will be seen on referring to the map, it forms one of the corners of what may be considered an equilateral triangle, the other corners being at Berber and Khartoum. The distances between the three places are approximately the same.
Originally constructed by Mehemet Ali in 1840 for the protection of the fertile province of Taka against the Abyssinians, Kassala gradually acquired a large trade, and developed into a town of 60,000 inhabitants.
On the 30th July, 1885, after a siege which lasted twenty months, it fell into the hands of Osman Digna's followers.
Kassala, as a Dervish stronghold, constituted a grave danger to Egypt, which in 1891, being equally unable "to take it or leave it," at the suggestion of the British Government, consented to its transfer to the Italians, then established at Massowah. By the terms of the agreement, Italy was to give back Kassala as soon as the Khedive's rule should be re-established in the Soudan.
It was not, however, till 1894, and then only after a hard fight between 2,600 Italian and the like number of Dervish troops, that the Italians, under General Baratieri, succeeded in occupying their new possession.
Even after Kassala had passed into their hands, the Italians had anything but a happy time there. The Dervish hordes were constantly raiding round the place, and, though beaten off by the superior discipline and valour of the Italian troops, the Dervishes invariably returned and at times inflicted severe losses on the Italians and their native allies. In 1896 Kassala was regularly invested for three months by the Dervishes, and in March the situation reached a most critical stage. The Italians, numbering with their native allies 37,000 men, had been hopelessly defeated by the Abyssinians at Adowa on the 29th February, with a loss of 7,000 killed, wounded, and missing. The Abyssinians also captured 1,500 prisoners and fifty-two guns. As ill-luck would have it, the Italians had not only the Abyssinians, but the Mahdists, on their hands, and Kassala was then hemmed in by an immense force of Dervishes, and no means existed of relieving the Italian garrison.
This was the moment when the British Government, in the hope of creating a diversion in their favour, hurried forward the Dongola Expedition in the manner referred to in a previous chapter. This was followed by the Italians inflicting a severe defeat on the Dervishes, 5,000 in number, on the 2nd April, 1896, at Mount Mokram, killing some 800, and compelling the rest to retreat beyond the Atbara river.
In January, 1897, Kassala was again threatened by Dervishes, but General Vigano once more caused them to retire.
The Egyptian troops told off to occupy Kassala consisted of the 16th Egyptian Battalion and some artillery, in all 850 men, under Colonel Parsons.
Arriving at Massowah from Souakim on the 29th November, 1897, they only waited long enough to be reviewed by the "Sirdar," and then marched through the Italian territory of Erythrea to Kassala. They encountered the greatest consideration and kindness at the different Italian posts. On the force approaching Kassala on the 18th December, it was received by Major de Bernardis, the Governor, with a guard of honour; and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the fort as the Egyptian flag was hoisted side by side with that of Italy. Until the 25th, the date fixed for the formal cession, the Egyptians remained in camp about a mile from the fort.
Arrangements were now made for taking over a battalion of 700 natives which the Italians had raised from amongst the "friendlies," and who readily consented to take service under the Khedive.
In the interval before the 25th Colonel Parsons, by way of trying the qualities of the new levies, indulged them in a little fighting. Two places held by the Dervishes, El Fashir and Osobri, situated on the Atbara river, and about fifty miles from Kassala, were attacked and taken, the latter only, however, after a siege of six days.
Whilst the "friendlies" were thus engaged, Kassala, on Christmas Day, was handed over to Colonel Parsons. As the Italian flag was hauled down the Egyptian artillery saluted it with twenty-one guns, and the Italians quitting a place the defence of which had cost the lives of so many of their brave companions, marched away across the desert.[160]
LXIV. FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA
At the beginning of the year 1898, the position of the opposing forces was somewhat as follows:--The Khalifa's principal army, numbering upwards of 40,000 men, remained concentrated at Omdurman. Mahmoud, who had by this time been joined by Osman Digna, was still holding Metammeh with a force which had been increased to 20,000 men.
The Egyptian army was occupying Berber, with its most advanced post at Ed Damer. Abu Hamid, Merawi, Dongola, and all the other various positions along the line of communication down the river, were also held by Egyptian troops. Military posts had been established between Berber and Souakim, and Kassala was garrisoned by an Egyptian battalion and the "friendlies" taken over from the Italians. Progress had been made with the railway communications. The Egyptian line from Cairo had been extended to Luxor, and the military line across the desert from Wady Halfa had been brought forward from Abu Hamid to Abu Dis, or nearly a third of the distance to Berber.
On the last day of the previous year, the Intelligence Department learnt that Mahmoud, pressed, it was said, by the Khalifa, either to advance and destroy the Egyptians, or to fall back upon Omdurman, contemplated moving down the Nile on Berber. The 10,000 highly trained Egyptian soldiers, whom the Sirdar was able to put in the field, being deemed insufficiently strong to meet Mahmoud's undisciplined savages, a brigade of British troops was telegraphed for. In reply, Sir Francis Grenfell, commanding the Army of Occupation, gave orders on the 2nd January for the 1st Battalion of the Warwickshire Regiment, from Alexandria, and the 1st Battalions of the Lincolnshire and the Cameron Highlanders, from Cairo, to proceed up the river at once. The Seaforth Highlanders were also ordered to Egypt, from Malta. No time was lost in sending forward the reinforcements, and before the end of the month they had reached Wady Halfa, with the exception of the Seaforths, which it was intended to station, in the first instance, at Assouan. Major-General Gatacre, an officer who had seen much service in Burmah, was despatched from Aldershot to take command of the British brigade.
Whilst the British troops were finding their way to the front, the Nile Valley railway from Kermeh was being utilized for the purpose of bringing down as many of the Egyptian soldiers as could be spared from the Dongola district to Wady Halfa, whence they were rapidly transported across the desert by the military railway to Abu Hamid, and thence to Abu Dis.[161]
To give warning of Mahmoud's advance, the gunboats made frequent reconnaissances to Shendy and Metammeh, and parties of "friendlies" also patrolled the river banks above Ed-Damer, and the adjacent desert. The Dervishes, on their part, were not wholly inactive, and occasionally indulged in a little raiding, as opportunities offered.
On the 10th February, Mahmoud, probably considering that if he were to advance at all, he should do so before the Egyptian force was strengthened by the arrival of the British soldiers, commenced to move his army across the Nile to Shendy preparatory to marching them to attack Berber. The Dervishes having only a few native boats and some hurriedly constructed rafts as a means of transport, the crossing occupied an entire fortnight. During this period, Commander Keppel, with two gunboats, steamed to Metammeh, and on one occasion dispersed with his Maxims a party of riflemen stationed to cover the crossing. No serious attempt, however, was made to oppose the movement of Mahmoud's force across the river, and by the 25th February the operation was completed. Apparently a great opportunity was thus lost. With the absolute command of the river which the Egyptians possessed in the gunboat flotilla, nothing would have been easier than to have taken advantage of the moment when Mahmoud's army was divided into two sections by the Nile, to fall upon and destroy each section separately. That something of the kind was not attempted has been explained on the supposition that it formed part of the Sirdar's strategy to encourage Mahmoud to leave his fortified position at Metammeh, and attack the Egyptians on open ground.
Thanks to the facilities afforded by the railway, Gatacre's British brigade was, by this time, getting well forward. In the middle of February, the Warwicks, Lincolns, and Camerons were all assembled at Abu Dis, where they went into camp for some weeks. During this period, everything was done to get the men into good condition by means of route marching and field exercises. Following the precedent established by Lord Wolseley in previous campaigns, the most rigid abstinence in the matter of alcohol was enforced, even the use of the harmless and comforting beer being forbidden.[162] The result was that the men were in excellent condition, and, as Gatacre in one of his addresses to the soldiers told them, "there was an almost total absence of crime, and, he might say, of drunkenness also," the latter observation provoking roars of laughter.
The brigade was armed with the Lee-Metford magazine rifle. This weapon, though possessing great range and penetrating power, had, by reason of its small diameter (·303), the disadvantage of making so small a hole as to render it more than doubtful if it would be effectual in stopping the headlong rush which forms the principal feature of a Dervish attack. To remedy this defect, the tips of the bullets were scooped out at the pointed end to the depth of about half an inch. Experiments showed that a bullet treated in this manner expands like an umbrella on striking an object, and thus makes a sufficiently large hole for the purpose required. Whilst in camp at Abu Dis, details from each regiment were told off to conduct this operation, and over a million of bullets were subjected to this treatment. The result was that a thoroughly effective missile, appropriately named a "man-stopper," was created.
Curiously enough, at the moment when General Gatacre was preparing his dum-dum bullets for use against the Dervishes General Kitchener decided to discontinue the use of the dumb-dumb missiles which he had been employing against the correspondents of the press. These weapons, which were equally "man-stoppers," were in the form of general orders by which correspondents were forbidden to go beyond that ever-changing point known as "rail head." As "rail head" was necessarily always somewhat in the rear of the operations, the prohibition was considered a great hardship, as it curtailed the power of the correspondents to send the earliest intelligence of what was going on at the front. A great agitation was made in the English journals at the time, and before further operations were proceeded with the Sirdar modified the restrictions within certain reasonable limits. The prohibition thenceforth extended only to going out on reconnaissances, to going near the Sirdar, not in itself a serious privation considering the past friction between him and the pressmen, and to standing in front of the firing line during general actions. This last, however, was, according to one writer, Mr. G. W. Steevens, the author of "With Kitchener to Khartoum," not strictly insisted upon.
Space does not allow of entering into the merits of the controversy on the subject of the relations between newspaper correspondents and military authorities. At the same time it may be observed that a general who puts unnecessary obstacles in the way of the press, or exercises too rigid a censorship, always lays himself open to the remark that, like Cæsar, he prefers to write his own "Commentaries."
On the 25th February, when Mahmoud had completed his crossing to the east bank, General Gatacre received orders to proceed at once with his brigade to Berber. The orders reached him after the troops had been out all day exercising in the desert. Nevertheless, tents were at once struck, and the same evening the advance began. As far as "rail head," now at Sheriek, the men were transported by train, after which they proceeded on foot, and marching partly by night and partly by day, on the 2nd March they reached Berber, where, in the absence of the Sirdar at Wady Halfa, General Hunter had his head-quarters with two Egyptian brigades.
On the British soldiers reaching Berber, the Soudanese battalions turned out in force, and gave Gatacre's men an enthusiastic reception. The next day the Egyptian massed bands played the new arrivals well on their way to their camp at Debeker, ten miles south of Berber.
The only things which gave out during the march were the regulation boots. Whether from inferior workmanship, or the effect of climate, the stitching failed, and the soles came off in great numbers. Two hundred of the men fell out from footsores, and many of the remainder had to tramp along to their destination barefooted.
On the 10th March the Sirdar arrived at Debeker, and inspected the troops, which, two days later, moved camp into a healthier spot at Darmali.
On the 13th news was received that Mahmoud, leaving a garrison at Ben Naga in charge of his stores, had quitted Shendy the day before, and, after engaging Keppel's gunboats en route, had descended the Nile as far as Aliab, midway between Shendy and Berber.
All doubts as to his intentions being now at rest, a general advance of the Sirdar's army was ordered to be made to Kenur, a deserted village about ten miles north of the Atbara. One Egyptian battalion was left to guard the store depôt at Berber, and a half battalion was placed in charge of the railway, by this time advanced to Geneinetti, twenty miles north of Berber.
The British troops at Darmali, on getting orders, at once set out, and marching amid intense heat and over trying ground, reached Kenur on the night of the 15th. On the following day they were joined by the Seaforths, which had been sent forward from Wady Halfa to Geneinetti by rail and thence by steamer. The Egyptian troops had been advancing meanwhile, and, with the exception of Lewis's brigade, the entire Anglo-Egyptian force was concentrated at Kenur on the 16th.
On the 19th March, Mahmoud with his whole army quitted Aliab, and started across the desert in an easterly direction towards the river Atbara. His intention was known to be to ford the river near a place called Hudi and then, after turning the Sirdar's left, to operate against Berber from the desert.
On the intelligence being received, it was determined to intercept, if possible, the Dervish forces, and the 20th saw the Anglo-Egyptian army on the march to Hudi, where, on its arrival, it was joined by the 3rd (Lewis's) Brigade, which had just come from Fort Atbara, a strongly fortified post at the confluence of the Nile and Atbara rivers.
The total force with the Sirdar now amounted to about 13,000 men. It was composed of four infantry brigades, 800 cavalry, and four batteries of artillery with ten Maxims.
The British brigade, under Major-General Gatacre, consisted of the 1st Battalions of the following regiments: The Warwickshire (Colonel Quayle-Jones), Lincolnshire (Colonel Verner), Camerons (Colonel Money), and the Seaforth Highlanders (Colonel Murray). The Egyptian brigades were the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, formed by the 8th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Battalions; the 2nd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, consisting of the 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 11th Battalions; and the 3rd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, composed of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Battalions. To each of the four brigades an Egyptian battery of artillery was attached. The mounted troops consisted of eight squadrons of Egyptian cavalry, with Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood.
The Atbara at Hudi was at this season a narrow stream of clear water flowing slowly down a sandy valley, about a quarter of a mile wide, with steep banks covered with bush and Halfa grass. From Hudi the cavalry, with some Maxims under Colonel Broadwood, went forward to search for the enemy, whilst the remainder of the troops, after forming a zeriba from the surrounding mimosa bushes, bivouacked for the night. Each man lay down on the bare ground fully dressed with his arms and equipments beside him. The night, passed in the open air, was bitterly cold, and the dust permeated everything.
On the same day (the 20th) that the Sirdar's army encamped at Hudi, on the north side of the Atbara, Mahmoud and his followers crossed the river from the south side near Nakhila, some thirty miles further up. Here he established himself, and commenced intrenching his position.
On the 21st, the Sirdar's troops marched further up the Atbara, eventually halting at a spot marked in the maps "Ras-el-Hudi," where they were destined to remain for several days. The Sirdar thus placed his force directly between the Dervish leader and Berber, effectually frustrating the intended move in that direction. There were no houses, huts, or habitations at Ras-el-Hudi, which derives its name from its geographical position, the Arabic word "Ras" meaning "head." It was a pretty spot, green and fertile at this time of the year.
The Atbara here no longer flowed, but was represented only by a series of isolated pools of water, in which fish and an occasional crocodile were to be seen. A zeriba was at once made, and the camp generally put in a state of defence.[163]
Whilst the main body of the Sirdar's force was advancing, the Egyptian cavalry under Colonel Broadwood, with the Horse Artillery and Maxims, pushed on as far as Abadar on the 22nd, and here the enemy were found in force. They consisted principally of Baggara horsemen, who charged with great gallantry a squadron of cavalry, under Captain the Hon. C. Baring, who had to fall back upon his supports.
Mahmoud's position having been by this time pretty well ascertained, a force consisting of a squadron of cavalry, with a battalion of infantry and Maxims in support, was sent on the following day, under the command of Major Collinson, to tempt the Dervish leader to come out. When the party had advanced about six miles in the direction of the enemy's camp, the cavalry met and opened fire upon a force of 300 or 400 Baggara horsemen who attempted to surround them. The cavalry, however, managed to get away, and fell back upon the infantry now formed up in square, which, with rifle and Maxim fire, eventually forced the Baggara to withdraw. The party then returned to the camp.
As already stated, Mahmoud had left a garrison close to Shendy, to enable him to keep up his communications with Omdurman, and as a guard for his depôt. On the 25th March, the Sirdar detached one of his battalions, and sent it by Commander Keppel's steamers to take the position, capture the stores, and destroy Shendy. The expedition steamed past the last-named place to the depôt at Horh Ben Naga, and, on the following morning, disembarked the soldiers, who, encountering little resistance, drove out the Baggara garrison of 700 men, with a loss of 150 killed, seized the stores, and captured a large number of prisoners, including 650 women and children. Shendy was found to be in ruins. Such men as it contained gave themselves up. The forts were destroyed, and the place set fire to. The gunboats pursued the fugitives up to the foot of the Sixth Cataract, and then returned and re-embarked the soldiers, together with the booty, consisting of great quantities of grain, camels, donkeys, arms, and ammunition.
A reconnaissance made on the 30th March showed that Mahmoud occupied a strongly intrenched position, surrounded by brushwood, at Nakheila, on the north bank of the river, now quite dry, with his front towards the desert, and protected by a thorn zeriba running from his left, at right angles to the river, away to his extreme right. Deserters, who now came in daily, reported that Mahmoud was in great straits for food, his men existing principally on the nuts of the dôm palm, on cooked cabbage palms, and such other vegetables as could be found in the bush. Most of his warriors were disaffected, and were only prevented by strong measures from deserting en masse.
The Dervish chief was in a dilemma whilst the Sirdar was in front of him; the projected move on Berber was impossible. On the other hand, the reports received of the strength of the Anglo-Egyptian force convinced him that to move out into the open and attack would be simply to court destruction. To leave the shelter of his intrenchments, and retire on Omdurman, was not only a hazardous operation, but one which must result in the demoralization and desertion of his followers. Even if he succeeded in reaching Omdurman, Mahmoud may well have had misgivings as to the nature of the reception that he would meet with at the hands of the Khalifa. Under these circumstances, he decided that there was nothing for it but to remain where he was, and trust to the strength of his position to repel any attack the Sirdar might make.
This was not at all what the Sirdar wished for. It would have suited him much better to be attacked in the open desert, where his superior rifle and artillery fire would give him an immense advantage, than to have to attack Mahmoud in his zeriba in the bush, amid endless intrenchments and unknown obstructions. On the other hand, it was clear that something must be done. The Anglo-Egyptian force could not sit down for ever watching Mahmoud at a distance of only twenty miles. The difficulty of supplying 13,000 men by camel transport only was immense. The British troops, too, were beginning to suffer from the heat, inferior food, and inadequate shelter, and dysentery and enteric fever began to break out.
Realizing all this, the Sirdar determined on a general advance, and on the 4th of April struck his camp at Ras-el-Hudi, and moved up the river to Abadar. Though this as a camping place much resembled the last, the troops, who had got tired of Ras-el-Hudi, with its endless sand storms and discomforts, rejoiced at the change, and the more so because it appeared to indicate fighting.
On the 5th, a final effort to draw Mahmoud was made. At daybreak General Hunter went out with eight squadrons of cavalry, eight Maxims, and a battery of horse artillery. When about 1,000 yards from the front of the enemy's position, the troops halted, and Hunter, with a few of his officers, went forward to obtain a nearer view.
The Dervishes showed themselves in no mood to be trifled with, and soon gave Hunter as much fighting as he wanted, for, at 9 a.m., two large bodies of Baggara horsemen came out of the bush right and left from the enemy's zeriba, and directed their efforts to getting round the flanks of the cavalry, whilst a third party fiercely charged them in front. Hunter, to avoid being cut off, had to gallop back to the main body, now engaged in repelling the attack.
In this they were assisted by the guns and Maxims on the left of the cavalry, and after a sharp struggle, in which the officers had to use their swords and revolvers, the Dervish onslaught was repulsed. A large body of footmen then streamed forth from Mahmoud's zeriba, and Hunter's force found it necessary to retreat to avoid being surrounded. As the cavalry fell back their retiring movement was covered by the Maxims, which continued firing, and practically saved the situation. The Dervish horsemen still followed, and pressed the rear and flanks of the retreating Egyptians, who more than once had to turn and charge to lessen the pressure. When this had been effected, the retreat was continued more deliberately, two squadrons from time to time dismounting, and with their carbines keeping the foe in check, whilst other squadrons took up a position one or two hundred yards in the rear. At last, about 10 a.m., a combined charge of cavalry, headed by Colonel Broadwood, drove back the assailants, and both the opposing forces withdrew at 1 p.m. The Egyptian troops, without being further molested, got back to camp, where, the sound of the cannonading having been heard, the army had turned out ready for action.
The Egyptian loss in the fight was not heavy, being only eight men killed and fourteen wounded. The Dervish loss was put as high as 200. This, however, was only an estimate, as the retreating Egyptians did not stop to count the slain. At the same time, as the Maxims fired 6,000 rounds, it seems only reasonable to suppose that someone was hit.
Although the engagement on the 5th showed that Mahmoud meant fighting, it indicated that, so far as related to moving his army out into the open to be destroyed, he was still a "conscientious objector," and, with a view to attacking him in his position, the forward movement of the Sirdar's army was resumed on the 6th April, when the troops brought up at the deserted village of Umdabbia, seven and a half miles from the Dervish camp. Here they remained for two days, whilst the final preparations for the attack were made.
At 5 p.m. on the 7th, after the stores and all superfluous baggage had been left in camp in charge of a half battalion of Egyptian infantry, the rest of the troops marched out into the desert. They moved in echelon, with the British brigade in front. Behind them was Macdonald's brigade; then came Lewis's brigade and the Camel Corps, Maxwell's brigade bringing up the rear. The route selected was parallel to the river, and over broken ground and desert sand. Although when night fell there was a bright moon, the sand, driven by a strong wind, obscured the view a good deal, and frequent halts had to be made to preserve the formation. When, after marching for three hours, a spot called Mutrus, three miles distant from the enemy, was reached, a halt was ordered, and the men, lying down in the desert, rested.
LXV. THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
The Sirdar's troops were left unmolested during the short rest which they took at Mutrus.
At 1 a.m. on the 8th April, the order was quietly given to fall in, and the men promptly obeyed without noise or bustle. Half an hour later the final march began, and the full moon being now well overhead, it was possible to see a considerable distance. There was no smoking or talking in the ranks, and the orders were given in a low voice or by a wave of the hand. The rumble of the gun-carriages and the dull thud of thousands of tramping feet were the only sounds which broke the stillness of the desert.
At 3 a.m. a huge column of flame was seen on the right. After burning a few minutes it dwindled away, and whether it was a beacon to notify to Mahmoud the approach of the army or whether it was the result of accident was never ascertained.
At 4 o'clock the troops were abreast of Mahmoud's position, where the camp fires could be seen burning. There was then a halt of half an hour. When the advance was resumed at 4.30, the men were no longer in square, but marched in attack formation, the British brigade on the left, Macdonald's in the centre, Maxwell's on the right, and Lewis's in reserve. The artillery and Maxims accompanied the infantry marching in the rear upon the right and left. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were away half a mile to the left.
In this formation the troops continued to advance till 6 a.m., when they halted in a commanding position 600 yards from the enemy's camp, which was plainly visible now that the sun began to rise. From the number of men seen running to and fro, and from other signs of activity, it was clear that the approach of the Sirdar's force had been perceived.
The enemy's works presented a sufficiently formidable appearance. Behind the long row of cut mimosa bushes forming the zeriba, and constituting the outer line of defence, were palisades of dôm palm logs stuck endways in the ground; and further back amongst the trees was an encircling trench, with numerous cross-trenches, a few earthworks, and a great many shelter huts made of palm branches and grass.
At 6.15, the guns were run into position, and opened fire. Two batteries of six guns each were placed on the extreme right of the Egyptians, and the like number on their left, at the interval between the Egyptian and British troops. In this way a cross-fire of twenty-four guns was brought to bear on the position.
The artillery was assisted by a rocket battery under Lieutenant Beatly, R.N.
The artillery fire, carefully directed, told with much effect on the zeriba, and soon many of the palisades were seen to be knocked away, whilst the shells at the same time made havoc with the earthworks. The rocket battery, after a few rounds, set fire to the grass huts forming the Dervish camp, causing a furious conflagration.
The Dervishes had hitherto kept well out of sight, but all at once, whilst the cannonade was in full operation, a large party of Baggara horsemen was observed galloping from the bush at the southern side of the zeriba and forming up, as if intending to charge the British left. On the Maxims opening on them, the Baggara at once turned and disappeared in the bush to the south.
The bombardment went on for an hour and a half, during which time there was no reply from the zeriba except a few bullets which were fired in the direction of Macdonald's and Maxwell's brigades, but, being aimed too high, the missiles passed harmlessly overhead.
The order to cease firing was now given, and the infantry, who had hitherto been lying down, interested spectators of the scene, formed up for the assault. The Camerons, extended in line, composed the front of the British brigade. Behind them, in column of companies, were the Warwicks on the left, the Seaforths in the centre, and the Lincolns on the right; continuing the line to the right was Macdonald's brigade, with six companies in line and the remainder behind in column of companies as a support. Still further to the right was Maxwell's brigade, with eight companies in line and four companies in support, and on the extreme right were one of Maxwell's battalions, the 8th, and one of Lewis's, the 15th Soudanese, also in column of companies. A squadron of cavalry was sent down towards the river on this flank. On the extreme left, in the rear of the Warwicks, Lewis's reserve brigade of two battalions was placed to prevent any flank attack on that side. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were placed half a mile off in the desert to the left of the whole force. The four batteries of artillery were posted on the right of the line, and the Maxims, twelve in number, were distributed between the right and left flanks and the centre.
At a quarter-past eight, the Sirdar and his staff having selected a post of observation, about 900 yards from the zeriba, and General Gatacre and most of the field officers having dismounted and placed themselves at the head of their men, the "advance" sounded. Then the pipes of the Highlanders skirled, the bugles of the other British regiments and the bands of the native battalions played inspiriting tunes, and the whole line, with bayonets fixed, advanced in quick time.
The Camerons, headed by General Gatacre and Colonel Money, and with a huge Union Jack (the regimental colours were all left in Cairo) in the centre, marched in advance of the British troops.
At intervals of every few yards the men halted, and "independent firing" was kept up. Then the line again moved forward, and the same thing was repeated. Suddenly, when the front rank had got within 200 yards of the zeriba, the return fire from the Dervishes commenced. It was mostly aimed too high, but here and there the bullets came dropping in, and the men in front began to fall, sometimes singly and sometimes in little groups of two or three together. Still the line swept onward, the troops, both British and Egyptian, preserving their formation as perfectly as if on parade.
As the Camerons reached some elevated ground sloping towards the zeriba, then only a hundred yards off, they became more exposed, and the bullets came more thickly. At last a halt was sounded, and for a minute or two "independent firing" was resumed with good effect, the Lee-Metfords making no smoke to obstruct the view, whilst, on the other hand, the little white wreaths from the Dervish fire indicated to the soldiers the points on which to direct their rifles.
The "advance" was then sounded, cries of "Come on, men!" were heard, and, amid ringing cheers, the Camerons rushed for the zeriba. The first to reach it were General Gatacre and Captain Brooke, his aide-de-camp. Seizing the bush with both hands, the General tried to pull it aside, nearly losing his life in the attempt. A Dervish rushed upon him with a spear; the General called out to his orderly, Private Cox, of the Camerons, "Give it to him, my lad!" and Private Cox bayoneted the Dervish, just in time.
Immediately after, the Camerons, closely followed by the Warwicks, Seaforths, and Lincolns, were up to the zeriba, and beginning to pull away the thorn bushes, being covered, as far as possible, by their comrades. Alternate companies dragged at the bushes, whilst the others replied to the Dervish fire. In a few minutes, the men succeeded in making gaps in the hedge sufficiently wide to allow of the troops entering, and, in a quarter of an hour from the advance being sounded, the zeriba was entered. It was found necessary to modify the original plan of attack. According to this, the Camerons having cleared a sufficient pathway, the battalions in their rear were to pass through their ranks, deploy, and join in a general advance by the whole line.
A deployment, however, in face of the rifle fire which was encountered, was not to be thought of, and it could hardly be expected that the Camerons, who had hitherto occupied the front rank, were going to stand aside and give place to the men of the other regiments. Realizing this, Gatacre called on the Camerons to push forward, and the battalion, headed by its officers, and with the Union Jack in front, dashed through the openings. Captain Findlay, a young officer of the Camerons, six feet two inches in height, was the first to enter the zeriba. With sword in one hand and revolver in the other, he sprang over the palisade and first trench, and fell mortally wounded.
The rush of the Camerons was closely followed by the Seaforths and the Warwicks, the men pushing on as nearly in line as the obstacles in their way would allow.
Here the real fighting began. The trenches were full of crouching Dervishes, firing point-blank as fast as they could load, and neither asking nor receiving quarter. It soon became, not so much a question of clearing the trenches as of killing every Dervish separately. The latter never lost an opportunity. Major Urquhart, of the Camerons, and one of the first to enter the zeriba, was shot dead, from behind, by a Dervish who, concealed amongst a heap of dead and dying, was waiting his chance to kill.
The enemy's riflemen were not particular in their choice of weapons, and Remingtons, Martinis, fowling-pieces, and elephant guns were brought into play indiscriminately. Major Napier, also of the Camerons, was so severely wounded with a shot from an elephant gun, as to have to be carried off the field. He died afterwards in Cairo. His regiment lost sixty men, either killed or wounded, in less than an hour.
The Seaforths also suffered severely. Lieutenant Gore, the first of his regiment to enter the enemy's lines, was shot through the heart, and Colonel Murray, of the same regiment, was shot in the arm by a round bullet from a fowling-piece.
Captain Baillie had his leg shattered, and died subsequently in Cairo. Sergeant-Major Mackay, also of the Seaforths, had an experience which is probably unique. When jumping the palisades, a Dervish spearman made a drive at him in mid-air, as he was, so to speak, "on the wing." Fortunately, the spear only tore the sergeant's kilt, and he then finished his assailant with pistol and claymore. The leading company of the Seaforths had eleven men killed or wounded.
Colonel Verner, of the Lincolns, a man of such gigantic stature that he could hardly be missed even by an indifferent marksman, had bad luck. One bullet cut his helmet strap and grazed his cheek, whilst a third hit him in the mouth, gouging away his upper lip, and taking off his moustache. The gallant officer refused to retire, and, with a bandaged head, continued with his men till the end.
As the men pushed on through the bush, several small mud-built forts had to be carried. Each of these mounted an old brass cannon, and was garrisoned by riflemen, who had necessarily to be slain.
Meanwhile, the Egyptians, away on the right, gallantly led by General Hunter, had entered a zeriba a little in advance of the British brigade, and steadily fought their way, step by step, across the trenches. Several of their English officers fell wounded, though, fortunately, none were killed. Some of their hardest fighting took place at a sort of inner zeriba or stockade, situated some thirty yards in the rear of the trenches, and strongly held. From this work a deadly rifle fire was directed upon the advancing troops, and one company of the 11th Soudanese, which was the first to try to take it, was nearly annihilated. Other companies of the same regiment then came on in support, and, after hard fighting, effected an entrance and occupied the place.
Once this position was taken, the combined troops had little difficulty in making their way across the entire zeriba, the Dervishes fleeing before them in scattered masses through the palm trees to the Atbara river.
Occasionally a group of fugitives would stop, under cover of the bank, and open a rifle fire on their pursuers, but after a few volleys all made off down the dry bed of the river, which formed the limit of the Anglo-Egyptian advance.
The battle of the Atbara was then won, and the order to cease firing was given. This was just twenty-six minutes from the final advance to the assault.
Then, on the banks of the river, the troops crowded together and indulged in mutual congratulations. The Soudanese soldiers wildly danced with joy, and, waving their rifles in the air, shook hands with every British soldier whom they came in contact with.
After a brief halt on the side of the Atbara, the force was re-formed, and marched back out of Mahmoud's works. As the troops returned, they were met by the Sirdar, who was greeted with enthusiastic cheers. When he had addressed a few observations to the men, they formed up in squares of brigades to the right of the scene of the original assault.
The cavalry, directly the fighting was finished, had been sent off to pursue the Dervish horsemen, but they had got too long a start, so Colonel Broadwood's men only followed for about two miles, where the track was lost in the bush, and the force returned.
The losses of the British brigade were five officers (including three who died subsequently) and twenty-one men killed, and ninety-nine officers and men wounded. The Egyptian loss was much more severe, fifty-seven men being killed and 386 wounded, including ten of the British officers.[164]
The total, 568, though heavy enough, would doubtless have been greater had Mahmoud's forces been provided with anything like proper ammunition. As it was, their cartridges, originally of poor quality, mostly turned out from the arsenal at Khartoum, had much deteriorated; consequently the fire on the Dervish side was comparatively ineffective.
The enemy's loss could not have been much less than 3,000 men in killed and wounded; 2,000 bodies were counted in the zeriba, and about 500 more on the south side of the works and in the bed of the river. With the exception of Osman Digna, who escaped with the cavalry, and Mahmoud, who was made prisoner, all the principal Emirs were killed. Mahmoud's ten guns (only two of which bore traces of having been fired), over 100 banners, together with an enormous quantity of rifles (including a Tower rifle of 1856), swords, spears, ammunition, and equipments, besides some grain and stores, fell into the hands of the conquerors; and 2,000 men were made prisoners.
It is difficult to arrive at the exact numbers of the Dervish force engaged in the fight. Mahmoud was known to have left Shendy with 18,900 men, but some of these had been killed in the fights with the gunboats, and others in the various skirmishes and reconnaissances. His losses from deaths and desertions must have been even more considerable. All his cavalry, which, according to his statement referred to later on, numbered 4,000, were undoubtedly absent when the real fighting began.
After allowing for these deductions, it is improbable that the total of his force present at the fight could have exceeded 14,000, approximately the same number as his opponents.
The remains of Mahmoud's army, numbering probably about 8,000 men, continued its flight up the Atbara to Adarama, a distance of about fifty miles, losing many men on the way. Here the fugitives divided into two parties, one of which went to Gedaref, and the other, joined by Osman Digna, to Abu Deleh.
The battle of the Atbara was a striking success. The Dervish force, like that of Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, was broken up and dispersed. The Dervishes, opposed to an enemy nearly equal in point of numbers, fought well during the brief period that the engagement lasted; but, with their imperfect organization, insufficient artillery, and defective weapons, they would have stood no chance even against a smaller army than that which the Sirdar brought against them. This, however, in no way detracts from the merit of the British and Egyptian troops, who, not less by their patient endurance and discipline than by their valour in the field, achieved so successful a result. But to go further, and, as many writers have done, to magnify a fight in which a disciplined army in less than half an hour routed a horde of starving savages, into a "brilliant victory," would be exaggeration.
No sooner was the fight over, than parties of men were told off to search the interior of the zeriba, which, from all accounts, presented a gruesome spectacle. Dead bodies, many of them mangled into mere fragments of humanity, were lying about everywhere. Not only men, but women also, were amongst the slain.
In the trenches, numbers of unfortunate black prisoners were found lifeless and chained hand and foot, with rifles in their hands. Others were discovered with forked pieces of timber round their necks, to prevent their escape. In one place the body of a Dervish chief was found pinned to the trunk of a tree by a rocket which had passed through his chest.
The slaughter was not confined to the human race alone. Hundreds of dead camels, donkeys, sheep, and goats had also fallen victims to the shell and rifle fire, and lay scattered about within the zeriba.
Whilst the search proceeded a party of the 10th Soudanese came upon the Emir Mahmoud, concealed in one of the grass shelter huts. He was at once seized, and limping slightly from a bayonet wound in the leg, was conducted before the Sirdar. Throughout the interview Mahmoud, who was a man nearly six feet in height, wore an air of complete indifference. Addressing him in Arabic, General Hunter, pointing to Kitchener, said, "This is the Sirdar," a piece of information which failed to produce any impression. The Sirdar then asked, "Why have you come into my country to burn and kill?" To this wholly unnecessary question Mahmoud, with sullen dignity, answered, "As a soldier, I must obey the Khalifa's orders, as you must the Khedive's."
A few more questions were put as to Mahmoud's emirs and men, to which he gave curt replies. Being asked, "Where is Osman Digna?" Mahmoud replied, "I don't know. He was not in the fight; he went away with the cavalry.[165] All the rest of my emirs stayed with me. I saw your troops at five in the morning, and mounted my horse and rode round the camp to see that my people were in their places. Then I returned to my quarters and waited. I am not a woman to run away." Then, no one having any more conundrums to put, the prisoner was led off by an escort.
The same afternoon, as soon as the wounded had been collected, and the mournful duty of burying the dead had been performed, the Sirdar's forces, less one Egyptian battalion, left to take charge of the spoils and to clear up the Dervish camp, marched back to the zeriba at Umdabbia, where they arrived before nightfall. From this point, all the troops, with the exception of Lewis's brigade, which returned to its former quarters at Fort Atbara, went, by easy stages, into summer quarters on the banks of the Nile. The British troops and those of Maxwell's brigade went into camp at Darmali, and Macdonald's to Berber, where on the 14th the Sirdar made his triumphal entry.
The whole town was en fête, and the main thoroughfare was spanned with palm branches and banners. The route was kept by the troops of the garrison, and a salute was fired as the Sirdar approached. The cavalry met him as he entered the town, and escorted him to an elevated platform, which had been erected in the centre of the town and draped with flags. Here the Sirdar and his staff took their place, whilst the troops, with colours flying and bands playing, marched past in review order. Behind the cavalry came the captive Mahmoud on foot, with his hands tied behind his back. The Dervish leader, though hooted by the crowd, showed no signs of depression, and walked with head erect, as if realizing that he was the most important feature in the show. An immense concourse of people witnessed the sight, and welcomed the troops with acclamations. The women were especially demonstrative, and many of them approached and threatened Mahmoud, to whom the expression "Kalb!" (dog) was freely used. When the display was finished, the troops went to their camp, and Mahmoud was sent down the river and interned at Wady Halfa.
Before leaving, Mahmoud had an opportunity of seeing an old acquaintance in Slatin Pasha, whom he had known in the days when Slatin was a captive at Omdurman. Slatin "had suffered many things" at the hands of Mahmoud, and their meeting, now that the relative positions of the two men were reversed, was mutually interesting.[166]
A week later the indefatigable gunboats, sent up the river, returned, and reported having fallen in with many of the fugitives from Nakheila at Aliab. The Dervishes refusing to surrender, an engagement ensued, in which 200 of them were killed and 70 made prisoners. Some of these reported that many hundreds of their number had died of thirst in the retreat across the desert after the battle.
LXVI. THE ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN
In May, 1898, preparations began for the advance on Omdurman. The Egyptian head-quarters were moved forward to Fort Atbara, where three months' provisions for 25,000 men were directed to be accumulated. Though every article had to be sent up from Lower Egypt, this was rendered less difficult by the recent completion of the railway (hitherto carried as far only as Luxor) connecting Cairo with Shellal, as well as by the prolongation of the military line to Abadieh, twelve miles north of Berber.
At Abadieh a naval arsenal, with workshops and factories, was established. Here the new screw gunboats Sultan, Melik, and Sheikh, which had arrived from England in sections, were put together and launched.
Meanwhile, pending the advance, Gatacre's brigade, in their summer camp at Darmali, were being exercised in route marching and manoeuvring, to keep them in training. The men had by this time got accustomed to the heat, and suffered but little sickness.
Early in June, there being no immediate fighting in view, the Sirdar left for Cairo, and later on paid a flying visit to England. Several of the British officers also went on leave.
On the 22nd, the views of the British Government with regard to the impending advance were stated in the House of Commons by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in introducing the proposal to remit the loan contracted by Egypt in 1897 for the expenses of the Dongola Expedition. The Chancellor of the Exchequer declared that the Government did not contemplate the undertaking of any further military operations on a large scale, or involving any considerable expense, for the recovery of the great provinces to the south of Khartoum. "What we do anticipate," he went on to say, "is that expeditions may be made by the gunboat flotilla, which will be at the disposal of the Administration, to free the waterway of the Nile from any interference with the perfect freedom of commerce with the interior, so far as it can be carried on by that waterway."
In July the British Government decided to strengthen the Sirdar's force by additional troops, in the shape of another British brigade, together with cavalry and artillery. The British force which it was proposed to put in the field was a division consisting of two brigades, under General Gatacre. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H. G. Wauchope, was formed of the battalions which had fought at the Atbara, viz., the Warwicks, Lincolns, Seaforths, and Camerons; the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General the Hon. A. G. Lyttelton, consisted of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards from Gibraltar, the 1st Battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the 2nd Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers from Cairo, and the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade from Malta. In addition, there were the 21st Lancers from Cairo, a Maxim battery manned by a detachment of the Royal Irish Fusiliers from Alexandria, two field batteries (32nd and 37th) of the Royal Artillery, and details of Royal Engineers, Army Service and Medical Corps, making a total strength of about 7,500 men.
The Egyptian force which was to co-operate was also increased by another brigade. The whole was to consist of a division, under the command of Major-General Hunter, composed of four brigades, viz., the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, under Macdonald, Maxwell, and Lewis respectively, and a 4th brigade under Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Collinson, composed of the 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Battalions. The cavalry were to be ten squadrons, besides eight companies of the Camel Corps. The artillery force was to consist of one horse and four field batteries, and one Maxim battery.
The total Egyptian force represented about 12,500 men.
Fort Atbara was the point upon which, early in August, the British and Egyptian troops began to concentrate. Lewis's (3rd) brigade had already gone on ahead to cut firewood for the steamers, and establish depôts of stores at Nasri Island, ten miles below the Sixth Cataract. From there Lewis went on to Wad Habeshi, where the rapids commence.
The Egyptian troops were the earliest arrivals at Atbara, which soon became a scene of bustle and activity. The railway, by this time extended to within a short distance of the camp, lent important aid in bringing forward both men and supplies. The gunboats, increased by the new additions to ten in number, also materially assisted in the work of transport.
The Nile had risen superbly, and no difficulty was experienced in passing up the cataracts.
The next point of concentration was fixed at Wad Hamid, a short distance from Wad Habeshi, already mentioned, and but little time was lost in sending the troops forward.
On one day, viz., the 3rd August, no less than six Soudanese battalions left Atbara. The cavalry and transport animals went forward along the western bank of the Nile. As the black soldiers left, the white ones began to arrive. Even before the last of the steamers conveying the six Egyptian battalions had started, the first half of the Rifle Brigade appeared, the remainder turning up on the following day. The regiment had left Cairo on the 27th and 28th July, proceeding by rail to Shellal, above the First Cataract, thence by steamer to Wady Halfa, and then by rail viâ Abu Hamid to Atbara. General Wauchope and his staff came up on the 5th, closely followed by the artillery, the Grenadier Guards, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the 21st Lancers, and the rest of the 2nd British brigade.
It is worthy of observation that, notwithstanding the railway connection established between Cairo and Assouan, recourse had once more to be had to the steamers of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son for the transport of the horses belonging to the British brigade from Khizan, on the river just below Luxor, to Assouan.[167]
On the 13th steamers with the 1st (British) Brigade (Gatacre's) from Darmali passed Atbara, going direct to Wad Hamid. The same day, whilst many of the troops were still waiting for the means of transport, the Sirdar took his departure for the front. After he left, and up to the 21st, more Egyptian troops continued to arrive. Some of them had marched all the way from Souakim, and others had toiled up against the stream from Merawi.
All were hurried forward from Atbara as fast as the means of transport would allow. No sooner did a steamer return from the front than she was refilled and sent off again packed to overflowing with a fresh batch of men.
By the 23rd August all but the last boat-load of soldiers had arrived at Wad Hamid. The Camel Corps, following the route taken by the Desert Column under Stewart in 1885, had marched across the Bayuda desert to Metammeh, and thence to the front. Abu Klea was found still white with Dervish bones. Metammeh, the scene of the slaughter of the Jaalins in 1897, presented an aspect of utter desolation. When first visited by Englishmen after the Jaalin massacre, human remains lay about the town in heaps, but the tribe had since removed and buried these. One ghastly souvenir still existed in the shape of a gallows, with portions of eight men suspended thereon.
Meanwhile from Wad Hamid reconnaissances had been pushed on as far as Shabluka, at the southern end of the Sixth Cataract, which place, as well as the gorge leading to it, was found to be evacuated. The entrance to the Shabluka gorge, where the river is only 300 yards wide, was defended by four forts with embrasures, and might have formed a strong position against any force approaching by the river. It had, however, the disadvantage of being liable to be easily turned by troops operating on land, and probably for this reason the Khalifa, instead of making a stand at Shabluka, as had been expected, had left the place to take care of itself.
The reconnaissance was continued to the island of Jebel Royan, about thirty-four miles from Khartoum, whence, from an elevated position, a distant view of Omdurman and the white tomb of the Mahdi was obtained. The first person to set eyes on the spot which formed the object of the expedition was Major Staveley Gordon, the nephew of Gordon Pasha.
An advance post was established at Jebel Royan, and thither the stores which had been accumulated at Nasri Island were now transferred.
On the 23rd, preparatory to the further advance, the Sirdar held a review of the assembled forces, British and Egyptian, and the next day the troops began moving off in successive divisions. The cavalry and Camel Corps were the first to start, closely followed by General Hunter and the whole of the Egyptian division. On the 25th the British division marched out, and Wad Hamid was evacuated. The heat that day is described as most oppressive, and the march over the loose sand told severely on the men, and especially on those of the newly-arrived 2nd Brigade, who fell out in numbers. The steamers, most of them towing long trains of lighters, accompanied the force, whilst others scouted ahead. There being plenty of water in the cataract, the flotilla passed up without trouble.
After halting by the way the whole force, on the 27th, was assembled at El Hajir, opposite Jebel Royan. Whilst there news arrived of a disaster which had occurred to the gunboat Hafir. The vessel, when near Shendy, sprang a leak, and suddenly sank within a few yards of the shore. Fortunately no lives or stores had been lost.
The troops rested at El Hajir till 5 p.m. on the 28th, and then marched to Wady Abid, where a zeriba was made. The whole of the next day was spent at Wady Abid, where, on the night of the 29th, a terrific storm broke over the camp, deluging everything, and causing considerable discomfort. At 3 a.m. on the 30th the reveille was sounded, and soon after the men, drenched to the skin, set out for Sayal. On the 31st Sayal was evacuated, and the troops moved on to Suruab. The same day the gunboats shelled the Dervish advance camp at Kerreri.
On the night of the 31st another storm of wind and rain was experienced, which destroyed the field telegraph in places, and interrupted the telegraph communication for some days.
On the 1st September, the final advance was made to Egeiga, a village only six miles north of Omdurman. The troops started early, amid heavy rain. Several deserted villages were passed, and a little after midday a short halt for refreshments was made, at a place called El Gubeih, not far from Egeiga, which was reached an hour later.
Patrols of Dervish horsemen had been frequently seen during the march, falling back before the cavalry, and their outposts were driven in beyond Egeiga.
Some time before the main body of the army had reached Egeiga, the cavalry, striking off in a south-westerly direction, reached the slopes of Jebel Surgham, nearly a mile beyond. From this point, at noon, the entire Dervish army was seen drawn up in battle array in the desert outside the city. They were in five divisions, and their numbers were estimated at 35,000 men.[168]
It soon became evident that this huge force had not come out for the mere purpose of being looked at. It began steadily to advance, with a line in front extending over three miles. At one time the enemy halted, and then again moved forward.
The cavalry then proceeded to fall back on Egeiga, where the main body of the army, receiving news that the Dervishes were advancing to the attack, had hurriedly moved out and formed up in position.
After following the retiring troops for some time, the vedettes at 2 p.m. reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. So rapid was the Dervish advance that they all but came into action with the rear squadrons of the reconnoitring force.
Beyond a few shots exchanged between the Lancers and the enemy's scouts nothing further happened, and the Sirdar's troops, after remaining in position all the afternoon, retired at nightfall to their camp.
Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, had proceeded at daylight on the 1st towing the 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery in barges. Steaming up the east bank, with the aid of a party of friendlies, they cleared that side of the river. Several villages were found occupied, but these the friendlies took one after another.
On the steamers approaching Halfiyeh three forts opened on them. The gunboats returned the fire and soon silenced the works, which were then occupied by the friendlies. As the steamers, proceeding in line ahead, rounded Tuti Island, at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, they were fired on by the forts, both at Khartoum and at Omdurman. The fire, though fairly heavy, was ill directed, and did no harm. A suitable spot having been found on the east bank, the howitzer battery was landed and at once brought into action.[169] After a few rounds at a range of 3,000 yards, the dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially destroyed. The superior weight and accuracy of the steamers' guns ended the naval part of the fight almost as soon as it was begun, and the flotilla, leaving the Tamaai and Nazir to guard the battery, returned down stream to rejoin the army at Egeiga.
The night of the 1st September was an anxious one for everybody in the Sirdar's camp. Less than five miles separated the opposing armies. Information had been received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack upon the position, and preparations to repel it were made. The men all lay down fully dressed on the sand with their arms and accoutrements beside them. Though the moon was at its full only twenty-four hours before, the night being cloudy, there was not much light. The gunboats from time to time flashed their electric rays on Jebel Surgham and the surrounding country with a view to discovering any signs of a Dervish advance. At the same time, natives from the village of Egeiga were sent out in the direction of the enemy's camp to obtain information, so as to give the idea that the Sirdar intended to make a night attack, and in the expectation that this, coming to the Khalifa's knowledge, would decide him to remain in his position. As a result the ruse succeeded perfectly, and, with the exception of two false alarms which occurred, the night passed away tranquilly enough.
In not making a night attack the Khalifa lost a grand opportunity. Had he taken advantage of the comparative obscurity to hurl his enormous force upon the Sirdar's position there is no saying what might have been the result. The rifle fire of the British and Egyptian troops, which was the thing the Dervish leader had most to fear, would have been far less effective than by daylight, and might not have been successful in stopping at all points the Dervish rushes. Had the enemy once succeeded in breaking the line of troops and engaging hand to hand with, say, the Egyptian divisions, the difficulty of coming to their aid in the darkness and confusion would have been considerable, and though the ultimate result might have been favourable, it could only have been attained by an enormous loss of life.
LXVII. THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN
The force under the Sirdar's command on the 2nd September, was thus composed:--
British Troops: 21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery Royal Artillery; 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery; two forty-pounders Royal Artillery.
Infantry Division, 1st Brigade (Wauchope's): 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders; 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders; six Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
2nd Brigade (Lyttelton's): 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; four Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
Egyptian Troops: Nine squadrons cavalry; one battery Horse Artillery; four field batteries; ten Maxims; eight companies Camel Corps.
1st Brigade (Macdonald's): 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese Battalions.
2nd Brigade (Maxwell's): 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese Battalions.
3rd Brigade (Lewis's): 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions.
4th Brigade (Collinson's): 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian Battalions.
The gunboat flotilla, under Commander Keppel, consisted of the twin screw steamers Sultan, Sheikh, and Melik, each carrying two twelve-pounder quick-firing guns, one four-inch howitzer, and four Maxims; the large stern-wheelers Fatteh and Nazir, each armed with one twelve-pounder quick-firer, two six-pounder quick-firers, and three Maxims; and the small stern-wheelers Tamaai, Hafir (formerly El Teb), Abu Klea, and Metammeh, armed with one nine-centimetre Krupp and two Maxims.
Each vessel was commanded by a British officer, with a non-commissioned officer of the Royal Marine Artillery as gunnery instructor.
The total force, naval and military, may be put down as a little over 22,000 men.[170]
The position occupied by the Sirdar's force was a favourable one for defensive purposes. It stood on slightly elevated ground with a clear open space of desert dotted with scrub directly in front, and extending for five miles to the base of a group of hills to the westward. In a northerly and southerly direction was a series of hills of moderate elevation, culminating on the north at a distance of about two miles in the Kerreri Hill, and on the south at a distance of 1,200 yards in that of Jebel Surgham. Behind the position was the broad expanse of the Nile.
The camp formed a sort of angular crescent or horse-shoe, with the ends, practically the flanks of the position, resting on the river, and protected by the gunboats. In the centre were a few mud huts, and within the position, but a little to the north, stood the small village of Egeiga.
The troops were disposed as follows:--On the left was the 2nd British Brigade, composed of the Rifles, the Lancashires, the Northumberlands, and the Guards, with the Maxim battery worked by the Irish Fusiliers. Then came the 1st British Brigade, consisting of the Warwicks, the Camerons, Seaforths, and Lincolns, with a battery of Maxims manned by a detachment of the Royal Artillery. The Soudanese and Egyptian Brigades, under Maxwell, Macdonald, and Lewis, continued the fighting line round to the right, Collinson's Egyptian brigade being kept in reserve in the rear of Lewis's and Macdonald's. Maxims were placed between Lewis's and Macdonald's brigades. The 37th Howitzer Battery of the Royal Artillery had been detached and placed on the opposite bank of the Nile, as stated in the last chapter. The 32nd Field Battery of the Royal Artillery, under Major Williams, was posted, with two Egyptian batteries and Maxims, on the extreme left of the position close to the river. The two remaining Egyptian batteries were put on the north or right side of the position. The 21st Lancers were picketed at the south end of the camp, and the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps occupied a position away to the north in the direction of the Kerreri Hill. Along the front of the British line a breastwork of bushes was placed, whilst the Egyptian line was defended by a shallow trench.[171]
Of the gunboats, two remained to support the howitzer battery opposite Omdurman, three others guarded the camp, and the rest were stationed at various points between Egeiga and Omdurman.
At 3.30 a.m. on the 2nd September the bugles sounded the reveille, and the troops all stood to their arms, the hour before dawn being the most usual for a night attack. After waiting an hour, there being no signs of the expected assault, the Sirdar resolved to take the initiative and march out against the Dervish forces. At 5.30 the booming of the guns of the howitzer battery on the east bank and of the gunboats in front announced that the bombardment of Omdurman, which had begun the previous day, had recommenced. Before the cannonade had lasted many minutes the patrols reported the enemy to be advancing to attack. At 6.30 the Egyptian cavalry on the right were driven in and posted themselves with the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge, on the right flank of the position. The British infantry were led forward a few paces, and formed up in double rank in the rear of their zeriba defences, the Egyptian battalions doing the same behind their trenches.
At 6.40 the shouts of the advancing Dervishes became audible, and a few minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, which formed a semicircle round the front and left faces of the position. They came on in an immense mass, composed apparently of five divisions, with ranks well kept, and marching with military regularity. As they advanced they chanted, "La Ilah illa' llah wa Mohammed rasool Allah" ("There is but one God, and Mohammed is His prophet"). Emirs and sheikhs led the way, and Baggara horsemen trotted abreast of the men on foot.
At 6.45 Major Williams's battery of Royal Artillery, on the left of the position, opened fire at a range of 2,800 yards. The guns made good practice, the shells bursting in the midst of the Dervish ranks. The enemy replied with a few rounds from some guns on the Khalifa's left, but their shells all fell short. The intention appeared to be to cross the Sirdar's front, but, suddenly swerving to their right, the main body of the Dervish forces bore down towards the southern face, where the British division was posted. Simultaneously with this movement another mass of Dervishes swarmed out from behind Jebel Surgham, to assail the left flank of the position. Though their riflemen, mounting the hill, opened a long range fire on the zeriba, this attack, being checked by the fire of the gunboats, was not pressed home.
Thus far the fire of the artillery, which had been supplemented by that from the Maxim-Nordenfeldts, though it thinned the enemy's ranks, failed to stop their advance, and in a short time the troops on the left and front were hotly engaged.
The Guards, who were the first of the British infantry to engage, opened with section volleys from their Lee-Metfords at a range of 2,000 yards. Then, as the range diminished, the fire ran along to the Warwicks, the Highlanders, the Lincolns, and later on to Maxwell's brigade. From one end to the other there was a continuous blaze of flame, the men firing both in volleys and independently. The Lee-Metfords grew so hot that the men in the firing line had to change them for others held by their comrades in the rear. The weapons gave out no smoke, so the view was uninterrupted. The Dervishes were seen falling in heaps, whilst the ground in front was white with dead men's clothing. Constantly reinforced from the rear, the assailants made repeated efforts to reach the lines of infantry, and as whole ranks went down others rushed in to fill their places. When the front rank got within 800 yards of the British force, the fire became even more deadly, and the further advance was practically arrested. Even at this range, here and there, small bodies of Dervishes continued to make isolated attempts to reach the lines, but only to perish in the effort. What took place became less a fight than an execution. One old sheikh, bearing a banner, headed one of the rushes. In a few seconds he was left with but five comrades, who in their turn all dropped, and he alone charged to within 200 yards, at which point he folded his arms across his face and fell dead.
Up to this period there had been but few casualties, and the fight had been for the Sirdar's force about the least dangerous that a soldier ever took part in. While the original advance was being made, a few only of the Dervish riflemen paused to fire, and, more for the purpose of working up their martial ardour than anything else, discharged their weapons in the air. Even when they took the trouble to aim, the bullets from their Remingtons all fell short. As soon as the opposing forces got closer together, things changed, and the enemy's fire began to tell. At the moment when the Dervish spearmen were being shot down in their mad rushes, a party of 200 of their riflemen managed to get within about 300 yards of the front, from which point, under cover of a bank, they opened fire. The riflemen on Jebel Surgham, though shelled by the gunboats, persisted in their fusillade, and casualties became frequent. Captain Caldecott, of the Warwicks, was shot through the head, and died an hour later. One or two other officers, as well as two newspaper correspondents, were wounded, and twenty-five of the Camerons and over a dozen of the Seaforths had to be carried to the rear. Eventually the riflemen in front were dislodged by Major Williams's battery, which, firing shell among them, caused them to get up and run, only, however, to be shot down by the Warwicks, Camerons, and Lincolns, not a single rifleman being left alive.
The attack had hitherto been almost entirely directed on the British troops, but as the fight proceeded the enemy were gradually driven more and more to the right, thus leaving the 2nd Brigade (Lyttelton's) out of action, and giving the 1st Brigade (Wauchope's) and Maxwell's Egyptians all the work to do. Seeing this, Lyttelton moved up the Lancashires and the Rifles in support of the 1st Brigade.
After a while the enemy's onrushes began to diminish. It was not so much that the charging spearmen were driven back, as that they were all killed. The fire of the troops then slackened. Just before it ceased altogether a last Dervish effort was made. This time it took the form of a cavalry attack. A party of Baggara horsemen, about 200 in number, formed up at a distance of about 1,200 yards and gallantly charged Maxwell's whole brigade. A more hopeless enterprise could scarcely be imagined. Nevertheless, though swept down by rifle and Maxim fire, the remnant courageously dashed on till within 200 yards of the fighting line, when all that was left of them was a struggling mass of men and horses lying on the ground.
It was now about 8 a.m., the main attack was finished, and the great body of the enemy was gradually retiring in a westerly direction toward some hills three miles distant.
Whilst the Khalifa was delivering his first attack on the front and left of the Sirdar's position, a large and compact body of Dervishes, under the Khalifa's son, Sheikh-el-Din, and the Emir Wad Helu, marched round to attack the right of the position. Here, posted on the Kerreri ridge of hills, were the Egyptian mounted troops, under Colonel Broadwood, with whom, at 7 a.m., about 10,000 of the enemy, advancing rapidly, soon became engaged. On the approach of the Dervish force, the guns of the Egyptian horse battery at once opened fire at a range of 1,500 yards, and the cavalry and Camel Corps dismounting, joined in with their Martini-Henry carbines. The Dervishes, however, continued to advance, firing as they came on. The force was in far too great a number for Broadwood to hope to operate against it alone with any prospect of success, and seeing that the intention was to surround him and cut him off from the zeriba, he directed the Camel Corps and guns, covered by the cavalry, to fall back upon the right flank of the position.
There was some delay in getting the camels to move, and afterwards in taking them and the guns over the rough and broken ground. The Dervishes pursued closely, firing all the while. The Egyptians from time to time halted, and fired volleys in return. So hardly was Broadwood's force pressed at one moment, that two of his guns had to be abandoned. For some minutes the fighting was most severe, hand-to-hand encounters took place, and over sixty of his men fell.
The Egyptian force had by this time fallen back to a point not far distant from the river, and fortunately at the critical moment one of the gunboats told off to protect the flanks steamed down to afford assistance. It at once opened with shell fire at close range, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, upwards of 450 bodies being afterwards counted within a comparatively small area. The intervention of the steamers effectually checked the onslaught, and enabled the Camel Corps to get to the zeriba, although the Dervishes for some time continued the pursuit of the cavalry. After this encounter the Dervishes made no attempt to push home their attack on the right, but drew off in good order and retired under cover of the hills. This, with the repulse of the Dervish attack already recorded on the left flank, terminated the first stage of the fight.
All attacks on the position having now failed, the 21st Lancers, about 320 in number, under Colonel Martin, were sent out to clear the ground on the left front, and to head off any retreating Dervishes from the direction of Omdurman. They moved off about 9 a.m., and after crossing the eastern slopes of Jebel Surgham perceived what looked like a force of from 250 to 300 of the enemy concealed in a khor or ravine, from which a few scattered shots were fired. The Lancers then wheeled into line and charged. When they got to a distance of only 200 yards from the position, a body of Dervishes, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 3,000 in number, suddenly rose from the khor and opened fire. The trap laid was now evident enough, but the Lancers continued the charge, and, headed by their colonel, dashed on into the khor, fought their way through the Dervish ranks, and out at the opposite side.
This was not accomplished without the loss of several of their comrades. There was a three-foot drop into the ravine, and this caused many disasters. Colonel Martin's horse fell at this point, but, with the spearmen cutting and slashing all around him, he managed to get his charger on its legs again, and, with only a stick in his hand, rode through the fight uninjured.
The Dervishes made a desperate resistance. They reverted to their usual tactics of first hamstringing the horses and then spearing their riders.
Of the troopers who were unhorsed, hardly a man escaped alive. Lieutenant Grenfell was killed by a sword-cut received early in the fight, when charging by the side of his men. As soon as he was missed, Captain Kenna and Lieutenant de Montmorency rode back to search for him. Finding Grenfell's body, de Montmorency dismounted and proceeded to put it on his horse, which unluckily bolted, leaving him alone to face the Dervishes with his revolver. Happily Captain Kenna, with the aid of Corporal Swarbrick, succeeded in catching the animal, and De Montmorency was enabled to join his troop.
Major Wyndham's horse, after carrying him clear of the Dervishes, fell dead as he was mounting the slope of the khor. Captain Kenna, who was at the moment on foot searching for Grenfell, put the Major on Kenna's own horse and mounted behind him, and though the horse kicked them both off, they got safely out of the mélée.
When the Lancers had reached the opposite side they continued their gallop for a distance of about 400 yards, when they rallied. Then taking up a position whence they could fire down the khor, they dismounted, and with their carbines opened fire on the enemy, eventually driving them off to the westward. As soon as the Dervishes had retired, a party of troopers advanced and recovered the bodies of Lieutenant Grenfell and others who had fallen. They were hastily buried on the spot.
The loss of the Lancers in the charge was one officer and twenty men killed, and four officers and forty-six men wounded. Besides this, there were 130 horses either killed or injured. The charge itself has been the subject of much criticism. Most military men appear to consider that for cavalry to charge unbroken infantry of unknown quantity, over unknown ground, was, to put it mildly, a mistake. Its result, so far as the enemy was concerned, was practically nil. By the loss which the cavalry sustained in horses alone they were put out of action, instead of being reserved for the moment when they were required for the purpose of pursuing the fugitives. With the public, however, these considerations were lost sight of in the gallantry displayed by both officers and men, and the charge has long been one of the most popular episodes of the fight.[172]
Meanwhile the Sirdar about 8.30 a.m. had given orders to evacuate the camp and march upon Omdurman. The army advanced en échelon of brigades from the left, Collinson's brigade in reserve covering the rear of the transport column, and the Egyptian cavalry and camel corps on the right and left rear.
At 9.30, the front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from the west end of Jebel Surgham to the river, a halt was ordered to enable the rear brigades to get into position.
Information was then received that the Khalifa, with a large force, was present on the left slopes of Jebel Surgham, from the summit of which a party of the enemy were now firing.
It appears that the Dervish army had not returned to Omdurman on the previous night, but had bivouacked, some 40,000 strong, behind Jebel Surgham. When daylight appeared, and no attack was made on the Khalifa, he divided his forces into three sections. One of these, as already related, attacked the front and left of the Sirdar's position, the next moved towards the Kerreri heights with the object of enveloping his right, whilst the third, under Abdullah himself, remained concealed behind Jebel Surgham, ready to fall on the Sirdar's flank in the advance upon Omdurman.
The Sirdar realized the situation at once, and a change of front half right of the three leading brigades was ordered, whilst two companies of Maxwell's brigade stormed and occupied Jebel Surgham.
When the change of front was being effected, the sound of heavy firing on the right was heard, where Macdonald's brigade was by this time hotly engaged.
To enable Macdonald's men to take up position on the right of the echelon, his brigade had to change places with that of Lewis, and to move out to the right, so as to allow the latter to come into position on Macdonald's left front. Whilst carrying out this movement, and at the moment when he was separated by about a mile from the rest of the army, Macdonald found himself faced by a strong body of Dervishes, advancing from the west, from the direction of Jebel Surgham. He at once halted and deployed into line to the front to meet the attack. It was not long coming. The Dervishes, estimated at 20,000 in number, commanded by the Khalifa himself, made a determined onslaught on the brigade. The main attack was preceded by a charge of between 300 and 400 mounted Baggara, who, advancing in loose order, made straight for the long line of rifles which awaited them. The evident intention was to break Macdonald's line and give the men on foot an opening. The attempt was hopeless from the first; it was simply riding to certain death. Then the fusillade began, and horseman after horseman rolled in the dust.
Undismayed by the fate of their comrades, the Dervish footmen next came on, only to see their front ranks swept away by Maxim and rifle fire. Not a man got within 300 yards of the fighting line. The plain became dotted with white figures and black upturned faces. The Dervishes planted their banners in the ground and gathered round them, only to fall lifeless immediately after. At length the men behind, seeing the slaughter of those in front, stopped at a distance of about 400 yards, whence they continued firing, though assailed by the rifles of Lewis's brigade, which by this time was advancing to Macdonald's support.
The Sirdar, learning from General Hunter of Macdonald's position, despatched Wauchope's (British) brigade to his assistance, and ordered the remaining brigades to make a further change of front half right. Before, however, the reinforcements reached Macdonald, he had practically disposed of the first great attack.
Still, the fight was not nearly over. Whilst Macdonald was yet engaged with the Khalifa's force, and just at the moment when the order to advance was about to be given, the Dervishes behind the Kerreri heights emerged into the plain, and moved rapidly forward to deliver a second attack.
This new onslaught necessitated a further complete change in the disposition of Macdonald's brigade. Seeing his front and rear both threatened, and finding himself also in danger of being outflanked, he moved some of his battalions to the right, and deployed them into line, so as to form with the remainder of his brigade a sort of arrow-head, one side facing north and the other west.
The Dervishes came on in two masses, one commanded by Sheikh-el-Din, and the other by Wad Helu, and spread themselves out as if to envelop Macdonald's brigade. Between this and Lewis's there was a gap, into which the Warwicks, the Seaforths, and the Camerons were now rushing at the double, whilst the Lincolns hurried off to complete the line on Macdonald's right. As the Dervishes advanced, Macdonald's Soudanese received them with a fire so deadly, delivered in the open ground, that nothing could live in the face of it.
Whilst Macdonald was repelling the new assault on his right, Lewis's brigade was enfilading the Khalifa's attack on the left.
The Dervish onslaught now began to weaken, and shortly after, as Wauchope's brigade came up, ceased altogether. The enemy, who had made their last despairing effort without having been able to push home, now broke and fled.
Thus Macdonald, with the aid of Lewis's and Wauchope's brigades, crushed this second and determined attack. The masterly way in which he handled his force was the theme of general admiration.
The slaughter which took place is described as something appalling, and the ground around the scene of the fight was literally strewn with dead and dying Dervishes.
Meantime Maxwell's and Lyttelton's brigades, accompanied by the 32nd Field Battery, had been pushed on over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and driving before them the Dervish forces under Sheikh-el-Din, they established themselves in a position which cut off the retreat on Omdurman of the bulk of the Khalifa's army, who were soon seen streaming off in a disorganized mass towards the high hills many miles to the west, closely pursued by the mounted troops, who cleared the right and front flanks of all hesitating and detached parties of the enemy.
The battle was now practically over, and Lyttelton's and Maxwell's brigades marched down to Khor Shambat, in the direction of Omdurman, which spot was reached at 12.30 a.m.; and here the troops rested and watered. The remainder of Hunter's division and Wauchope's brigade arrived at the same place an hour and a half later.
The result of the fight before Omdurman was declared in the Sirdar's despatch to be "the practical annihilation of the Khalifa's army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Soudan, and the submission of nearly the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian authority."
The Sirdar, for the skilful generalship and judicious disposition of his forces, which secured him the victory, is entitled to the highest praise, and no one will grudge him the honours with which his services were recognized.[173]
As to the fight itself, it was in many ways, no doubt, a walkover. At the same time it was a lesson in the power of modern arms such as had never been seen before. It showed that against weapons of precision such as those carried by the Anglo-Egyptian troops even an overwhelming superiority of numbers is not in itself of any avail. It demonstrated once more the pluck and endurance of the British soldier, as well as the good fighting material of which his Egyptian allies are composed.
Whilst giving the Sirdar every credit for his victory, it is impossible not to see that the Khalifa, by his repeated blunders, completely played into his adversary's hands.
The first mistake of the Dervish leader was in not remaining within the fortifications of Omdurman, from which it would have been impossible to have dislodged him, except at a great sacrifice, instead of advancing out into the open and exposing his imperfectly armed legions to the deadly fire of the Sirdar's rifles. In doing this the Khalifa chose the one form of attack which gave him the least chance of success. He knew that his men had on other occasions broken the British and Egyptian squares, and was desirous of seeing if it could not be done again. In making this calculation the Dervish leader totally lost sight of the fact that his enemies possessed both better weapons and superior organization than in days gone by.
A second and fatal mistake was in not making a night attack on the Sirdar's position, where, if the Dervishes had attacked in the darkness with the same impetuous courage which they displayed in daylight, it is by no means impossible that they might have got within the Anglo-Egyptian lines.
A third error was in not originally occupying Jebel Surgham, which, situated on the left front of the Anglo-Egyptian force, possessed for defensive purposes unquestionable advantages. Had the Khalifa occupied this commanding position, the Sirdar would have been left with two alternatives. He might either have accepted the challenge, and have taken the hill at a heavy loss, or he might have elected to pass it by, and by making a wide detour in the desert so reach Omdurman. This last operation, with the Khalifa's forces still unbroken in the Anglo-Egyptian rear, would have been a hazardous undertaking, and would, moreover, have left the Khalifa free to continue his resistance.
A further fault was in directing the first attack mainly on the Sirdar's left, where the British troops were posted, instead of assailing the Egyptian and Soudanese battalions on the front and right. By adopting these tactics the Khalifa attacked his enemy at the very strongest instead of the very weakest point.
In short, the Khalifa, as a general, may be said to have been a complete failure, leaving undone those things which he ought to have done and doing those things which he ought not to have done, and there was no skill in him.
The Dervish loss was immense. No less than 10,800 bodies were counted on the field of battle in addition to over 300 in the town of Omdurman. Their wounded, estimated from the number who crawled down to the river and into the town, was 16,000 more, making a total of 27,000 altogether out of a fighting force of 52,000 men.[174] Besides these, 4,000 black troops surrendered and were made prisoners, and three of Gordon's old steamers were captured.
Bearing in mind the nature of the fight, the Anglo-Egyptian losses were remarkably slight.
The British killed were but two officers and twenty-five men; of these no less than twenty-one fell in the mistaken charge of the Lancers. The British wounded were eleven officers and 136 men. Of the Egyptian force one officer and twenty rank and file were killed, and thirteen officers and 222 rank and file were wounded. The total number of casualties in the Sirdar's entire army was forty-eight killed and 382 wounded.
The Sirdar in his despatch reporting the victory did full justice to the officers and men under his command, upwards of 300 of whom were specially mentioned for good service. Indeed, so long was the list that it excited a good deal of comment when the nature of the contest and the character of the enemy were taken into account. As a contrast to the above it may be mentioned that in Wellington's despatches after Waterloo, a fight in which the loss of the British alone was 1,759 killed and 5,892 wounded, only the names of thirty-two officers are specially mentioned.
LXVIII. THE CAPTURE OF OMDURMAN
At 2 p.m. on the day of the fight, the Sirdar, having ascertained that little or no resistance was to be expected in the town, advanced, with Maxwell's brigade and the 32nd Field Battery of Royal Artillery, through the suburbs of Omdurman to the great wall forming the Khalifa's inclosure.
On their way the force was met by a number of sheikhs, bearing a flag of truce, who informed the Sirdar that the inhabitants desired to surrender. This was accepted on condition that all the fighting men at once laid down their arms, and gave themselves up. The inhabitants then swarmed out in thousands from their houses, and cheered the troops.
Leaving two guns and three battalions to guard the approaches, the 13th Battalion and four guns of the field battery were pushed down by the north side of the wall to the river, and, covered by three gunboats, which had been previously ordered to be ready for this movement, the troops penetrated the breaches made in the walls by the howitzers of the 37th Battery, stationed on the opposite bank, marched south along the line of forts, and, turning in at the main gateway, found a straight road leading to the Khalifa's house and the Mahdi's tomb. The gates of the Khalifa's house were found to be barred, and the gunboats proceeded to shell the building from the river. In doing this they narrowly escaped killing the Sirdar, who had taken up a position close by. The Hon. Hubert Howard, one of the newspaper correspondents, was struck by a fragment of one of the last shells fired into Omdurman, and killed on the spot. The house was shortly after entered, but not without resistance from some of the Baggaras concealed there, and who had to be killed.
On the house being taken, a move was made on the mosque containing the tomb of the Mahdi. Here a couple of Dervishes rushed out and charged Maxwell's men, killing one, and wounding another. Both the assailants were bayoneted. The mosque was then entered, and found to be quite deserted.
The portion of the mosque in which was the wooden sarcophagus containing the Mahdi's remains was thirty-six feet square, and was surmounted by a dome some seventy feet in height. The building was much damaged by the fire from the howitzer battery and gunboats.
To the great disappointment of every one, there were no signs of the Khalifa, whose capture was the only thing necessary to complete the Sirdar's triumph. It appears that the Dervish leader had quitted the town only a short time before the entry of the troops, and after he had made a vain effort to collect his men for further resistance. So rapid was his flight that some of the least attractive of his wives, and other incumbrances, were dropped on the road, and over 100 of the baggage camels, which had been told off to accompany him, fell into the hands of the victors.
On the subject of the Khalifa's last days at Omdurman and his subsequent flight, Mr. Charles Neufeld (a German subject, who after eleven years' captivity was found and released by the Sirdar), in his lately published book, "A Prisoner of the Khalifa," writes as follows:--
"The Khalifa had been sitting for eight days in the mosque in communion with the Prophet and the Mahdi, and it was either on the Tuesday night or Wednesday morning immediately preceding the battle that the decision to move out of town was arrived at. On the Wednesday afternoon a grand parade of all the troops was held on the new parade ground, and, while it was being held, alarming news was brought by Abd-el-Baagi's messengers.... That night the rain came down in torrents, and the following day the army arose uncomfortable, and maybe a little dispirited, but Abdullah restored their good spirits by the relation of a vision. During the night the Prophet and the Mahdi had come to him and let him see beforehand the result of the battle; the souls of the faithful killed were all rising to paradise, while the legions of hell were seen tearing into shreds the spirits of the infidels.
"But all the time the gunboats were approaching, and soon shells were screeching through the air over the little shuddering group of prisoners. At night the soft thud of thousands of feet told of the host of fugitives entering the town. It was all very well for the Khalifa to order a salute to be fired in honour of a victory; other messengers were hurrying in with grave faces, and desiring to see one of the subordinate Emirs before facing Abdullah.
"Between ten and eleven at night a riderless horse from the British or Egyptian cavalry came slowly moving, head down, towards the Dervish lines. The Khalifa had related how, in one of his visions, he had seen the Prophet, mounted on his mare, riding at the head of the avenging angels, destroying the infidels. The apparition of the riderless horse was too much; at least one-third of the Khalifa's huge army deserted, terrified. When Yakoub told him of the desertions, Abdullah merely raised his head to say, 'The prophecy will be fulfilled, if only five people stay near me.' His Baggara and Taaishi stood by him, but they, too, were losing heart, for the Khalifa, on his knees, with head bowed to the ground, was groaning, instead of, as customary, repeating the name of the Deity. However, he pulled round a little as the night progressed, and invented visions enough to put spirits into the remaining but slightly despondent troops.
"When the day had gone hopelessly against him, and he had been persuaded to enter the town, he ordered the drums and ombeyehs to be sounded, and endeavoured to make a final stand at the large praying inclosure. But few obeyed the summons, and of those that came some slunk away, and others jeered at the disconsolate and discredited prophet. Finally he sent his secretary to collect his household, but the secretary did not return. Stopping two fugitives, he sent them to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, and they came upon the Sirdar and his staff not 1,200 yards away. Abdullah, warned in time, contrived to slip away, whilst the Sirdar changed his direction and made the complete circuit of Omdurman."
The gunboats which had been employed in clearing the streets having returned, the remainder of Maxwell's brigade, which had been left at the corner of the wall, was now pushed forward, and occupied all the main positions of the town. Guards were at once mounted over the principal buildings and the Khalifa's stores, and the Sirdar then proceeded to visit the prisons and release the European prisoners.
Amongst the captives liberated, besides Neufeld, were Joseph Ragnotti, Sister Teresa Grigolini, and thirty Greeks. Neufeld was in chains, which had to be filed off before he was restored to liberty.[175]
In the arsenal were found large stores of ammunition, with thousands of weapons of all sorts, including some sixty cannon, also Dervish spears, swords, banners, drums, flint-lock muskets, rifles, camel equipments, and military odds and ends of various kinds, many of them captured from Hicks's army nearly fifteen years before.
Whilst Maxwell's brigade was thus occupied, the British brigades and the remainder of the Sirdar's army had moved up from Khor Shambat, which they quitted at 4.30 p.m. On arriving at the wall they met with no opposition, and shortly after sunset marched into the town, amidst shouts of welcome from the populace. They continued their march, amid sickening stenches and scenes of misery and desolation, till they reached the open ground on the west side of the town. Here, as the various troops came up, they bivouacked for the night.
There was a certain amount of street fighting in the darkness, when isolated bands of Dervishes from time to time fired upon the Soudanese, who could not be restrained from retaliating. These struggles were attended by some loss of life, and no doubt partly account for the 300 or 400 dead bodies found in the town.
Of the services rendered by the gunboats during the day's fighting it is difficult to speak too highly. During the battle they guarded the left flank of the army, doing great execution with their guns on the dense masses of the enemy. As already related, when the Camel Corps were so hard pressed, one of the vessels was able, by dropping down stream, to turn back a large body of Dervishes coming round Kerreri Hill. As the Sirdar's victorious army advanced, the gunboats likewise pushed on, and went alongside the walls of Khartoum, helping to silence the fire from the houses near the river. Their services, however, did not end there, and at 8 p.m. they, together with the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps, started south in pursuit of the Khalifa, the gunboats proceeding up the White Nile. Unfortunately, they were unable to render much assistance owing to the state of the river, which, having overflown its banks, was, though two miles in breadth, only navigable near the middle.
In consequence of the flooded state of the country, which prevented the troops from communicating with the gunboats conveying the forage and rations of the troops, the latter were compelled to abandon the pursuit after following up the flying Khalifa for thirty miles over marshy ground.
The gunboats continued their course south for ninety miles, but were obliged to return without being able to come in touch with the Khalifa, who left the river and fled westward towards Kordofan.
At 4 a.m. on the 3rd September, the Anglo-Egyptian army marched out and bivouacked at a spot four miles south of Omdurman, whilst parties were told off to bury the soldiers who had fallen in the battle of the previous day.
The battlefield presented a sickening sight. The effect of the expanding bullet had been most deadly. The bodies of the slain lay closely strewn over acres and acres of ground, which were white with their calico uniforms. Some of the dead lay composedly with their slippers placed under their head for a last pillow; some knelt as if cut short in the middle of prayer; others were found literally torn to pieces by fragments of shells and by Gatling bullets. Mingled with the bodies were some seemingly as dead as the rest, but who sprang up when approached, and with sword or spear rushed at the nearest foe. These had in every case to be bayoneted or shot.
Incidents like those last referred to occurred not only during the search of the battlefield, but also at the period when, the Dervish attacks having been successively repulsed, the advance on Omdurman was resumed. They were taken advantage of to bring charges of cruelty against the Sirdar and his men, which on inquiry proved to be grossly exaggerated in those cases where they were not entirely unfounded.
It was alleged that the Sirdar ordered, or gave it to be understood, that the Dervish wounded were to be massacred; that the troops wantonly killed or wounded unarmed Dervishes when no longer in a position to do injury; that Omdurman was looted for three days after its occupation; that when the Sirdar's force was advancing on the town fire was opened by the gunboats on mixed masses of fugitives, including women and children, in the streets.
To these charges the Sirdar subsequently gave a categorical denial, which, so far as the allegations related to himself personally, was wholly needless.
Captain Adolf von Tiedemann, of the Royal Prussian General Staff, writing on the subject, says:--
"As regards the conduct of Lord Kitchener, I rode on the day of the battle from beginning to end--i.e., from 5.30 a.m. till 9 p.m.--with very short interruptions, in his immediate vicinity, and heard and saw everything ordered or done by him. It would be an insult to Lord Kitchener if I attempted to contradict the insinuations made against him personally; such evident calumnies would never be given credence to for a moment in the mind of any intelligent man possessed of common sense. If the Sirdar had been so bloodthirsty as the writer of the article in question[176] wishes us to believe, he would have found opportunities enough at every step during his entry into Omdurman to gratify his desires, for, after the Khalifa had fled from the town, crowds of unarmed Dervishes rushed towards him, and it would have been easy enough for his escort to have cut them down. Lord Kitchener received them with kindness, and, as every one on his staff can testify, he did all in his power to put a stop to the street fighting which broke out here and there in the town. Putting aside all regard for his personal safety, he, as I saw several times, rode into narrow streets and courtyards, with uplifted hand, calling out to the inhabitants gathered there, 'Amân!' ('Peace!').
"As regards the killing of the wounded on the battlefield, that was a necessary measure which was as regrettable as it was indispensable. After the first attack of the Dervishes had been repulsed, and when the Anglo-Egyptian army was moving off by brigades to its left towards Omdurman, I myself left the staff and rode over a great part of the battlefield, but I registered a mental vow never to do so again. A wounded and apparently defenceless Dervish lying on the ground is much more dangerous than his fellow with a whole skin and arms in his hand rushing against one. One knows perfectly what to expect from the latter, while the apparent helplessness of the former makes one forget the necessary caution and also the fact that a bullet fired by a wounded man makes quite as big a hole as one fired by an unhurt person. During my ride over the battlefield I several times saw Dervishes who had been lying on the ground suddenly rise and fire off their rifles into the ranks of the troops marching near them or who had already passed by them, and for these latter it was simply demanded, as a measure of self-preservation, that they should secure themselves against such attacks by a chain of scouts pushed to the front. It is not only the moral right, but the duty, of the soldier to make use of his arms against an enemy from whom it is to be expected that he will use his weapons to inflict loss on the troops to which he (the soldier) belongs, and the behaviour of the wounded Dervishes was such as to justify this belief. It is quite possible that here and there some wounded enemies may have been shot who had no hostile intentions, and who were only intent on saving their lives, but it is difficult to realize the peaceable intentions of such. To make out a few such isolated instances and accusations of useless cruelty against a whole army appears to me absurd.
"Besides, one heard of a large number of cases in which not only British, but also black, soldiers received and treated their wounded enemies with great kindness, although at times they had but a poor reward for it. I myself saw a man of the 32nd Field Battery giving a wounded Dervish a drink out of his water-bottle, holding up his head the while with his hand, and then leaving a piece of bread, which he took out of his own haversack, on the ground beside him."
It may be admitted that in the heat of the battle some of the enemy were killed whose lives might have been spared, but this is no unusual occurrence in the best-disciplined armies, also that a number of wounded were killed after the fighting was over. But in all or nearly all such cases it appears that these acts were dictated by necessity, on account of the Dervish habit of pretending to be dead, only to make a last and unexpected onslaught on his enemy. Such tactics were common at the battle of Omdurman, and many of the Sirdar's men fell victims in consequence. Mr. Bennett himself related how he saw with his own eyes a "slightly wounded man suddenly rise up and stab no less than seven Egyptian cavalrymen before he was finally despatched." That the troops had to adopt somewhat drastic measures in consequence is likely enough, though what took place was far from being the wanton cruelty and indiscriminate slaughter which was alleged.
That Omdurman was looted for three days was a charge with even less foundation, inasmuch as the morning after the battle the troops were marched out of the town before daylight to a position some miles distant, and from that time until they went down the river they were not permitted to enter the place, except on one occasion, to which reference is made later on. Between the place of bivouac and the town, a line of sentries was established, and through this none but officers were allowed to pass.
The charge that the gunboats fired on the fugitives is, if true, only partially so. The fugitives who fled from the battlefield into Omdurman were naturally shelled as long as they were within range, otherwise time would have been afforded them to organize a fresh resistance, in which case the town could only have been occupied with heavy loss. As regards the women and children, the Sirdar, the day before he directed the gunboats to bombard, sent a warning to the Khalifa to withdraw the women and children. More than one person who visited Omdurman has reported that, although several bodies of men were seen lying about, in no case was the body of a woman or child found.
Another accusation was that no attempt was made either on the day of the fight, or on the following day, to do anything for the wounded Dervishes, who were left without food, surgical assistance, or water. With reference to this, the Sirdar states that, considering the condition of the troops and the means at his disposal, he did everything in his power to relieve suffering amongst the enemy. It must be remembered that the total number of Dervishes wounded was estimated at 16,000. To attempt the medical treatment of anything like that number was manifestly far beyond the capabilities of the field hospitals. Of these, the large hospital established at Khor Shambat administered first aid to the wounded, and passed them on to Omdurman; some were also treated in the smaller field hospitals in the camps; but in Omdurman itself great difficulty was experienced in attempting to administer aid to the large number of wounded, scattered as they were amongst the native houses and huts. To provide for this, an Egyptian doctor, Hassan Effendi Zeki, who had been a prisoner with the Dervishes, formed a hospital in a central position in the town where upwards of 400 of the worst cases were tended, many outpatients coming daily to have their wounds dressed. According to the "Daily News" correspondent, from 6,000 to 7,000 wounded Dervishes were treated in this hospital, to which, according to the same authority, the Sirdar, on entering Omdurman, directed the inhabitants to bring the wounded. It is difficult to see what more could have been done under the circumstances.
Besides the matters already referred to, the Sirdar was attacked in regard to a step which was taken by his direction, although in his absence (on the subsequent Fashoda Expedition), namely, the destruction of the Mahdi's tomb and the disposal of his remains.
What occurred was that the tomb was destroyed by charges of gun-cotton, the body was disinterred, cast into one of the steamer's furnaces, and the ashes thrown into the Nile. The head, it is stated, was retained by a British officer in the Egyptian service.
As what happened excited a good deal of indignation in Europe, it is only just to give the Sirdar's explanation. He stated that after the battle of Omdurman he thought that it was politically advisable, considering the condition of the country, that the Mahdi's tomb, which was the centre of pilgrimage and fanatical feeling, should be destroyed; the tomb was also in a dangerous condition owing to the damage done to it by shell fire, and might have caused loss of life if left as it was. He was advised by Mahommedan officers that it would be better to have the body removed, as otherwise many of the more ignorant people of Kordofan would consider that the sanctity with which they surrounded the Mahdi prevented this being done. The Sirdar added that "the skull of the Mahdi was now buried at Wady Halfa."
When to the above it is added that so high an authority as Lord Cromer has declared that, under the exceptional circumstances of the case, the destruction of the tomb and the removal of the body were "political necessities," there is little more to be said with respect to an act which, at first sight, every one was disposed to regard with abhorrence.[177]
On the morning of Sunday, the 4th September, the Sirdar visited Khartoum, being transported across the Nile in the gunboat Melik. At the same time representatives of every corps belonging to the expedition passed over in the Dal and Akasheh. Khartoum, though in ruins, presented, as seen from the river, a picturesque and pleasing appearance, with its gardens and palm trees extending almost to the water's edge.
Gordon's palace, now a ruined mass of buildings, with the upper story fallen in, was still conspicuous. The staircase in front, where he met his death, no longer existed. The adjoining grounds, long since fallen into neglect, were still full of blossoming shrubs, and orange, citron, and pomegranate trees.
As the troops disembarked, just thirteen years too late to save the man who had so long and so heroically defended Khartoum, a crowd of wondering natives assembled to watch what was about to take place.
No sooner had the troops landed than they were formed up into three sides of a square, facing the front of the ruined palace. In the centre were the Sirdar, his staff, and the general officers commanding the different brigades. At a signal from the Sirdar, the British and Egyptian flags were simultaneously hoisted on flag-staffs erected on the palace, and the bands played "God save the Queen" and the Khedivial Hymn, whilst the gunboat fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns, the officers and men all standing at attention.
"Three cheers for the Queen" were then given, the men shouting enthusiastically and waving their helmets in the air. This was followed by "Three cheers for the Khedive," and again all present heartily responded.
The various chaplains attached to the British division now came to the front. The Guards' band struck up the "Dead March" in Saul, followed by a funeral march from the Egyptian band. The chaplains then performed a short but impressive service, and the Soudanese band concluded the ceremony by playing Gordon's favourite hymn, "Abide with me."
The service finished, several of those present, guided by Slatin Pasha, walked through what were once the streets of Khartoum, now only a collection of rubbish heaps. All the stone and building material had been removed to construct the houses at Omdurman. The only edifices spared in any way were the palace, the arsenal, and the Austrian mission building. Only a few of the inhabitants remained in the place which was formerly the capital of the Soudan.
A detachment of the 11th Soudanese was left to guard the flags which remained floating over the palace, and the rest of the troops then returned to Omdurman.
On the following day, the whole of the Sirdar's army was paraded and marched, with full military display, through the streets of Omdurman, as well to give the natives an idea of the strength of the Anglo-Egyptian force, as to impress on them that the Mahdist rule was a thing of the past. The place reeked with filth, and the smell was overpowering. Bodies of men and animals lay decomposing in the streets, and on every side was squalor and misery.
After this the British troops, with the exception of some companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers, were shipped off as rapidly as possible to Cairo. There was no more fighting to be done, and the men were beginning to feel the after-effects of the past week's marching and fatigue. In addition to this, enteric fever had begun to set in, and the hospital tents were crowded. However, by the end of the month, nearly the whole of the British division had left.
LXIX. FASHODA
On the 7th September a surprising and unlooked-for incident occurred. One of Gordon's old steamers, the Tewfikeyeh, which had been sent by the Khalifa up the White Nile, unexpectedly returned to Omdurman, only to find that the place had changed hands.
On being boarded she at once surrendered to the Sirdar. Her captain reported that on reaching Fashoda he had been fired on by a party of white men, and in support of his statement produced some nickel-plated bullets, of small calibre, and evidently of European manufacture.
There was no doubt that a European expedition of some kind had arrived at Fashoda, and opinions only differed as to its nationality and object.
The Sirdar's first step was to order all the newspaper correspondents back to Cairo.
At 6 a.m. on the 10th he left Omdurman in the postal steamer Dal. The gunboats Sultan, Nazir, and Fatteh, all towing barges, accompanied him. Later on he was joined by the Abu Klea. He took with him an Egyptian field battery, one company of the Camerons, and also the 11th and 13th, Soudanese Battalions. The river was at its height and very full. Steaming with all possible speed against the stream, the flotilla on the morning of the 15th reached a point called Renkh, 310 miles south of Khartoum. Here they found the Khalifa's steamer Safiyeh (the vessel employed in the rescue of Sir Charles Wilson in 1885) and eleven large nuggers with a party of Dervishes, who, it appeared, were awaiting reinforcements from Omdurman to renew an attack which they had already made on the white men established at Fashoda.
The vessels were lying on the east bank of the river close to a Dervish camp. The Dervishes resisted for a while and fired on the Sirdar's fleet. The gunboats returned the fire, one of the shells bursting in the Tewfikeyeh's boiler and disabling her. The enemy's fire was soon silenced, and a party of the 11th Soudanese then landed and cleared the Dervish camp.
The steamer and the nuggers having been captured, the flotilla went on its way about noon. The river here continued very wide, with much vegetation on its banks, where crocodiles and hippopotami were seen in numbers.
On the 18th a stop was made for the night ten miles below Fashoda, and a letter from the Sirdar informed the commandant of the post which was reported as being established there of the approach of the steamers.
Next morning, when the vessels were about five miles from Fashoda, a rowing boat flying a French flag was seen approaching. It contained one of the officers under the orders of Captain (afterwards Major) Marchand, the commander of a French exploring expedition, which it turned out had occupied Fashoda since the 10th July.
As Fashoda was neared the French flag was seen in the middle of the native village, and near the old Egyptian fort the Captain's force, consisting of eight officers and 120 Senegalese armed with repeating rifles, and some Shilluks with native spears, was drawn up. On the steamers making fast, Marchand went on board the Dal to visit the Sirdar, and remained in conference with him three quarters of an hour. The Sirdar declared that the presence of a French force was an infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and protested against the occupation of Fashoda and the hoisting of the French flag. Marchand stated, in reply, that he was acting under the orders of the French Government, and that without instructions it would be impossible for him to withdraw. He admitted that, in the face of a superior force, he was not prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag.
When the conference was over the steamers proceeded some 300 yards up stream and landed the Sirdar's troops. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted about 500 yards from the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the fortifications, and saluted with all ceremony by the gunboats. Marchand's force, which had been attacked by the Dervishes on the 25th August, was in great want of ammunition and supplies, and the Captain, in expectation of a further attack, had sent his steamer south to bring up reinforcements.
Leaving the 11th Soudanese with two guns and the steamer Nazir, the remainder of the force re-embarked and proceeded south to Sobat, where they arrived on the 22nd, hoisted the Egyptian flag, and established a second post. The Abu Klea remained with part of the 13th Soudanese Battalion, and the other steamers then proceeded down the Nile to Omdurman without further adventure.
On the Sirdar's arrival, he at once communicated to the Foreign Office the result of his mission.
Although want of space renders it impossible to deal fully with the diplomatic incident to which the French occupation of Fashoda gave rise, a few particulars may, nevertheless, be given.
In the beginning of 1898, a Cairo telegram coming through Paris announced, somewhat prematurely, that a French expedition, under Captain Marchand, had arrived at Fashoda, and letters from his officers and men, written on their journey, expressed their anxiety to reach the Upper Nile before the British, and "to display the French flag between Khartoum and Gondokoro."
Although little notice was taken at the time of these announcements and aspirations, the knowledge of the Marchand expedition was undoubtedly one of the causes which determined the British Government to hasten the advance on Khartoum.
What subsequently occurred seems to have been in great measure foreseen by Lord Salisbury, who appears to have anticipated that difficulties might arise, not only with regard to France, but with Abyssinia as well.
In a despatch dated the 2nd August, 1898, communicating to Lord Cromer the views of the British Government as to the line of action to be taken after the occupation of Khartoum, the British Premier stated that the Sirdar was authorized to send two flotillas, one up the White and the other up the Blue Nile. The flotilla up the White Nile was to be commanded by the Sirdar as far as Fashoda, and the officer in command of the Blue Nile flotilla was to go as far as the foot of the cataract commencing about Rosiéres. Should he before reaching that encounter any Abyssinian outposts, he was to halt and await further instructions. The despatch added that, "in dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who might be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition by the British Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley."
It was scarcely to be expected that at the moment when the Anglo-Egyptian operations, undertaken mainly with the object of restoring her lost provinces to Egypt, had been crowned with success, England could acquiesce in the occupation of any portion of them by a foreign Power, and frequent exchanges of views took place between the British and French Governments.
The British Government asked for the withdrawal of Marchand, whom the French Minister had termed an "emissary of civilization." This demand the French Government was disinclined to agree to.
The French contention was that the country bordering the White Nile, though formerly belonging to Egypt, had by abandonment become res nullius, and that the French had as much right to a position on the Nile as the Germans or the Belgians.
The British case was that the valley of the Nile still belonged to Egypt, although her title had been rendered dormant by the successes of the Mahdi; further, that whatever title the latter might have acquired passed on the 2nd September by right of conquest to the British and Egyptian Governments.
Lord Salisbury declared on the 9th September that Her Majesty's Government did not consider that this right was open to argument. Nevertheless, the discussions on the subject, to which the Foreign Office declined to give the name of "negotiations," continued for two whole months, and were marked throughout by great firmness on the part of the British Cabinet.
Lord Salisbury, besides being backed by the British nation generally, was supported by the leading men amongst the Opposition, including Lord Rosebery, who, in the middle of October, made a speech in which the following passage occurred:--
"Great Britain has been conciliatory, and her conciliatory disposition has been widely misunderstood. If the nations of the world are under the impression that the ancient spirit of Great Britain is dead, or that her resources are weakened, or her population less determined than ever it was to maintain the rights and honour of its flag, they make a mistake which can only end in a disastrous conflagration."
Simultaneously quiet but effective steps were taken to put the defences of the United Kingdom in order, and to prepare the fleet for any emergency.
In the end the French Government, seeing that England was in earnest, made up its mind to retire from an untenable position. The good news was appropriately communicated to the nation by Lord Salisbury on November 4th at the Lord Mayor's dinner to the Sirdar, and gave general satisfaction.
Shortly after, Marchand and his force returned to France, and an incident which had seriously threatened the good relations existing between England and France came to an end.
Whilst the Sirdar was making his excursion to Fashoda, General Hunter, accompanied by a small force, proceeded up the Blue Nile. Here he met no Abyssinian Marchand disguised as an "envoy of civilization," and returned without having encountered any serious opposition from the tribes along the river.
Notwithstanding the blow suffered by the Mahdist cause at Omdurman, there was still some fighting to be done in another quarter. This time the scene of operations was in the neighbourhood of Gedaref, about 130 miles south-west of Kassala and 180 from the Blue Nile. This place had, previously to the fall of Omdurman, been held by an emir called Ahmed Fedil with upwards of 5,000 men.
Ahmed, with the object of assisting the Khalifa, had withdrawn the greater part of his force from Gedaref, and on the 7th September, Colonel Parsons started from Kassala with 1,300 men composed of the 16th Egyptian Battalion and some irregulars to dislodge the garrison remaining at Gedaref.
On the 22nd Parsons arrived in front of the place, and, after defeating some 3,000 Dervishes, succeeded in occupying it. The fight was severe, the Egyptian losses being no less than thirty-seven killed and fifty-seven wounded. Meanwhile Ahmed Fedil, who had failed to reach Omdurman, was making his way back towards Gedaref, where, on the 28th, he turned up with 3,500 men. He made a determined assault on the town, but his Dervishes were defeated by Parsons with heavy loss. On the 1st October they withdrew to some distance, and the Egyptian force not being strong enough to pursue, occupied themselves in strengthening their defences.
General Rundle was then sent up the river to Parsons' assistance. Rundle reached Abu Harras, on the Blue Nile, whence Colonel Collinson, with the 12th Battalion, started across the desert and joined Parsons just in time to see Fedil's forces in full retreat in the direction of the river. At Rosiéres they found Colonel Lewis, who had been for several weeks on the look-out to intercept Fedil's crossing. A severe fight ensued between the Dervishes and the 10th Battalion under Lewis, aided by some of the gunboats told off to patrol the river. Many of Fedil's force were killed and many more surrendered. Out of Lewis's 400 soldiers, no fewer than 159 were either killed or wounded. The enemy were utterly routed, but Fedil succeeded in crossing the river with a few of his followers. Several days later he passed over the White Nile and joined the Khalifa in Kordofan.
The action at Rosiéres was the last fight of the campaign of 1898 which the Sirdar had so successfully carried on against the Mahdists.
If there is one thing more remarkable than another in the campaign, it is the excellent administration by the Sirdar of the force under his command. The construction of the railway, the management of the commissariat, the slow, sure, and irresistible advance, and the avoidance of accidents or reverses--all these constituted a triumph of administration. The manner in which the transport of the largest force ever sent into the Soudan under civilized conditions was effected will bear comparison with any campaign in modern times.
Another important feature was the comparatively small cost. According to Lord Cromer's report of the 26th February, 1899, the total expense from the spring of 1896, when the expedition to Dongola was decided upon, till the close of the operations in the Soudan, was only £E2,354,354. This included the construction of no less than 760 miles of railway at a cost of £E1,181,372, of 2,000 miles of telegraphs at a cost of £E21,825, and the building of six gunboats at an expense of £E154,934, thus leaving the military expenditure only £E996,223.
Whilst giving Lord Kitchener the fullest credit for the success achieved, it would be unjust not to refer to the powerful and steady support which in his task he received throughout from England's representative in Egypt, Lord Cromer, who, happily combining in himself the qualities of a soldier and a diplomat, was in a position to give most valuable advice in either capacity.[178]