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Preface

In the new and revised Edition of "THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS," the history of the military operations in Egypt has been brought down to the present time, so as to include all the recent fighting in the Soudan. This has been accompanied by a slight alteration in the title of the Book, as well as by the elimination of such details contained in the original work as are no longer of general interest. The space thus gained has been utilized for the purpose of bringing before the reader the chief events of a military character which have occurred in the interval which has elapsed since the Book first appeared.

It has been the object of the Author to make the work in its present form a complete narrative of the rise and fall of the Arabist and Mahdist movements, as well as a history of England's intervention in Egypt, this last a subject on which many persons entertain somewhat vague and indistinct ideas.

C. R.

CAIRO, December, 1899.

CHAP. PAGE.

I. EGYPTIAN FINANCE 1

II. ISMAIL PASHA 7

III. THE MILITARY MOVEMENT 12

IV. TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY 17

V. FOREIGN INTERVENTION 23

VI. CRITICAL POSITION 32

VII. THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA 44

VIII. THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT 60

IX. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT 75

X. THE DAY AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT 85

XI. ALEXANDRIA DURING THE BOMBARDMENT 90

XII. EVENTS ON SHORE 98

XIII. THE SITUATION 106

XIV. MILITARY OPERATIONS 114

XV. THE CONFERENCE 120

XVI. THE PORTE AND THE POWERS 127

XVII. WOLSELEY'S MOVE TO THE CANAL 131

XVIII. DE LESSEPS AND THE CANAL 137

XIX. SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 144

XX. TEL-EL-MAHUTA TO MAHSAMEH 153

XXI. KASSASSIN 159

XXII. TEL-EL-KEBIR 168

XXIII. CAPTURE OF CAIRO AND COLLAPSE OF THE REBELLION 180

XXIV. ENGLAND AND THE PORTE 193

XXV. RESTORATION OF TEWFIK AND EXILE OF ARABI 198

XXVI. THE SOUDAN AND THE MAHDI 210

XXVII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE 220

XXVIII. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHDI 232

XXIX. THE DESTRUCTION OF HICKS' ARMY 243

XXX. ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN: OSMAN DIGNA 250

XXXI. BAKER'S DEFEAT AT EL TEB 259

XXXII. GORDON'S MISSION 267

XXXIII. SOUAKIM EXPEDITION 272

XXXIV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT EL TEB 277

XXXV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT TAMAAI 290

XXXVI. THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION 309

XXXVII. PROGRESS TO DONGOLA 315

XXXVIII. ADVANCE TO KORTI 325

XXXIX. STEWART'S DESERT MARCH 333

XL. THE BATTLE OF ABU KLEA 341

XLI. THE ADVANCE ON METAMMEH 347

XLII. GORDON'S JOURNALS 355

XLIII. WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM 361

XLIV. THE FALL OF KHARTOUM 371

XLV. THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT 386

XLVI. THE NILE COLUMN 393

XLVII. WOLSELEY AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN 401

XLVIII. THE SOUAKIM EXPEDITION OF 1885 408

XLIX. THE ATTACK ON McNEILL'S ZERIBA 416

L. GRAHAM'S ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EASTERN SOUDAN 430

LI. EVACUATION 437

LII. CONTINUATION 443

LIII. THE MAHDIST INVASION 447

LIV. FINANCE, THE SUEZ CANAL, AND THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION 453

LV. THE EASTERN SOUDAN 459

LVI. THE NILE FRONTIER 466

LVII. WAD-EN-NEJUMI AND COLLAPSE OF THE INVASION 474

LVIII. THE EASTERN SOUDAN AGAIN 486

LIX. IN LOWER EGYPT 494

LX. THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION 501

LXI. THE RECONQUEST OF DONGOLA 512

LXII. THE ADVANCE TO BERBER 519

LXIII. ON THE RIVER--KASSALA 524

LXIV. FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA 530

LXV. THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA 541

LXVI. THE ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN 551

LXVII. THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN 559

LXVIII. THE CAPTURE OF OMDURMAN 574

LXIX. FASHODA 584

LXX. DESTRUCTION OF THE KHALIFA 590

CONCLUSION 595

THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS.

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I. EGYPTIAN FINANCE

Towards the close of the year 1875, Ismail Pasha, then Khedive of Egypt, had about got to the end of his resources. His liabilities on loans, contracted either in his own name or in that of his Government, amounted to £55,332,609; in addition to this there was a "Floating Debt" of £21,334,960--and £1,000,000--due for the expenses of the war with Abyssinia. The Treasury Bills were being daily protested, the salaries of the Government officials were in arrear, and everything pointed to impending bankruptcy.

This was the situation when Ismail sold to the British Government the shares in the Suez Canal Company which he had inherited from his predecessor, Said Pasha.[1]

By the transaction, which was due to the genius of the late Lord Beaconsfield, England made an excellent investment of capital. She also acquired an important interest in the great maritime highway to India, and indirectly in Egypt herself.

Attentive observers regarded what had taken place as only a prelude to a more intimate connection of England with Egyptian affairs, and the financial mission of Mr. Cave, an important Treasury official, undertaken about the same period, naturally strengthened this impression, notwithstanding Lord Derby's declaration that sending the mission to Egypt "was not to be taken to imply any desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the internal affairs of that country."

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Foreign Secretary in the matter. The policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, as well as that of Mr. Gladstone, which succeeded it, was originally one of non-intervention, and it was only the force of circumstances which led to its modification. England's first wish was that no Power should interfere in Egypt; her second, that in the event of interference becoming necessary, England should not be left out in the cold. When this is borne in mind, the attitude which Her Majesty's Ministers from time to time assumed in regard to Egyptian affairs becomes comparatively intelligible.

In confirmation of the preceding, the reader will observe that, although one of the causes which eventually led to England's action in the valley of the Nile was her mixing herself up with questions of Egyptian finance, all attempts to induce her to move in this direction met for a long time with failure.

When Mr. Cave's report, and, later on, that of Messrs. Goschen and Joubert, revealed the embarrassed condition of the country, and the necessity for the adoption of the financial scheme set forth in the Decrees of May and November, 1876, Her Majesty's Government declined to take any part in the arrangement. They even refused to nominate the Englishmen who were to fill the various posts created by the Decrees.

The French, Italian and Austrian members of the Commission of the Public Debt were nominated by their respective Governments as early as May, 1876, but their British colleague up to the end of the year remained unappointed. France, on the other hand, throughout the whole of the negotiations, appears to have been singularly ready to come to the front, and when in December, 1876, the Duke Decazes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was asked to nominate one of the Controllers of Finance, he declared "that he felt no difficulty whatever on the subject." Lord Derby, however, persisted in his policy of abstention, and eventually the Khedive was under the necessity of himself appointing the Englishmen required.

At last the financial scheme came into operation, and, combined with other reforms, for some time seemed likely to secure to Egypt and her creditors a fair share of the blessings intended. This, however, was not destined to last. As early as June, 1877, it became evident that the revenues set apart to meet the Interest and Sinking Fund of the Public Debt were insufficient. In fact, the estimates on which the Decrees were founded proved simply fallacious--a deficit of no less than £820,000 appeared in the revenues assigned to the service of the Unified Debt, and of £200,000 on those set apart for the Privileged Debt. Moreover, there was strong reason to suppose that considerable portions of the receipts were being secretly diverted from their legitimate channel by Ismail and his agents.

At the same period serious difficulty arose in satisfying the judgments obtained against the Government in the newly-established Mixed Tribunals. These courts, having been instituted by treaties with the Powers, partook largely of an international character, and when the European creditors, on issuing execution, found that it was resisted by force, they sought the aid of their respective Consuls-General.

The Honourable H. C. Vivian, then British Consul-General in Cairo, a diplomatist who took a prominent part in this stage of Egypt's history, had, as England's representative, to remonstrate with the Khedive. The advice which Mr. Vivian gave, that the amounts of these judgments should be paid, was excellent, but, under the circumstances, about as practical as if he had counselled His Highness to take steps to secure an annual high Nile.

Early in 1878, when things were going from bad to worse, Mr. Vivian wrote that the whole government of the country was thrown out of gear by financial mismanagement, and that affairs were becoming so entangled as to challenge the interference of foreign Governments. This very sensible opinion was backed up by M. Waddington, who had become French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and who, addressing Lord Derby on the financial and political situation, made the significant observation that if England and France did not exert themselves at once, the matter would slip out of their hands. This suggestion, pointing obviously to the probable intervention of other Powers, was not without effect, and the British Foreign Secretary in reply went a little further than he had yet done, and stated that "Her Majesty's Government would be happy to co-operate with that of France in any useful measure not inconsistent with the Khedive's independent administration of Egypt."

This was followed by Mr. Vivian pressing upon the Khedive the necessity for "a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the finances of the country."

This constituted a fresh departure in the policy of England with regard to the Egyptian question, and, as will be seen, ultimately led to that complete interference in Egyptian affairs which the British Cabinet had so much desired to avoid.

Of course, Ismail had to yield, and the famous Commission of Inquiry instituted by the Decree of 30th March, 1878, assembled in Cairo under the presidency of Mr. (afterwards Sir C.) Rivers Wilson, and revealed the most startling facts relating to the finances of Egypt. The Commission had no easy task before it, and it only attained its object through the dogged resolution of its chairman, backed by the moral support of the representatives of the Powers.

At the outset, the late Cherif Pasha, the Khedive's Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Justice, refused point-blank to obey the Decree, and submit to be personally examined by the Commission.

As Cherif was a statesman who will be frequently referred to in the following pages, it may be opportune to briefly describe him. He was then about sixty years of age, and, like most of those who have held the highest posts in Egypt, of Circassian origin. He was amongst the favoured individuals who had been sent to France by Mehemet Ali to be educated. He gradually passed through nearly every post in the State with that facility which is so frequently seen in Egypt, where a man is one day a station-master on the railway, the next a Judge in the Tribunals, and eventually a Master of Ceremonies, or a Cabinet Minister.

Cherif had pleasing manners, spoke French fluently, and was in every respect a gentleman. A Mahomedan by religion, he was, from an early period in Ismail's reign, a prominent character in Egyptian history. He soon became a rival of Nubar Pasha (referred to further on), and he and Nubar alternated as the Khedive's Prime Ministers for many years.

Of a naturally indolent character, Cherif always represented the laissez aller side of Egyptian politics. With an excellent temper, and a supremely apathetic disposition, he was always willing to accept almost any proposition, provided it did not entail upon him any personal exertion, or interfere with his favourite pastime, a game of billiards.

Cherif's notion in refusing to appear before the Commission was of a two-fold character. Educated with Oriental ideas, and accustomed to regard Europeans with suspicion, it is not unlikely that he resented the appointment of the Commission as an unwarrantable intrusion on the part of the Western Powers.

"Here," thought he, "were a number of people coming to make disagreeable inquiries, and to ask indiscreet questions. Others might answer them; he, for his part, could not, and for two reasons: first, because he couldn't if he would; and second, because he wouldn't if he could. Was he, at his time of life, to be asked to give reasons for all he had done? It was ridiculous; all the world knew that he had no reasons."[2]

Probably, also, Cherif had his own motives for not wishing to afford too much information. Though enjoying a deservedly high reputation for honesty, he belonged to what must be regarded as the "privileged class" in the country. For years this class had benefited by certain partial immunities from taxation, and these advantages the work of the Commission threatened to do away with. Further, Cherif's love of ease and comfort, and absence of energy, indisposed him to give himself unnecessary trouble about anything in particular. Be this as it may, Cherif, though expressing his readiness to reply in writing to any communications which the Commission might address to him, declined to do more.

The Decree, however, provided that every functionary of State should be bound to appear before the Commission. This might have placed a less astute Minister in a dilemma. Cherif at once evaded the difficulty by resigning office, rightly calculating on again returning to power when the Commission should have become a thing of the past. Riaz Pasha, then second Vice-President of the Commission, succeeded Cherif as Minister, and the inquiry proceeded without him.[3]

It will not have escaped notice that in authorizing Rivers Wilson, who held a high post in the Office of the National Debt, to sit on the Commission, and in granting him leave of absence for the purpose, the British Government had allowed itself to advance one stage further in its Egyptian policy. The significance of the event was only partially disguised by Lord Derby's cautious intimation that "the employé of the British Government was not to be considered as invested with any official character."

In April of the same year, whilst the Commission was still sitting, it became evident that there would be a deficit of £1,200,000 in the amount required to pay the May coupon of the Unified Debt. Further influences were brought to bear, and Mr. Vivian was instructed to join the French Consul-General in urging upon the Khedive the necessity of finding the requisite funds at whatever cost to himself. Ismail pointed out that this could only be done by ruinous sacrifices, which he promised should nevertheless be made if it was insisted on. The representatives of England and France remained firm, and the bondholders got their money. By what means this was accomplished it is needless to inquire. Rumours of frightful pressure being put on the unfortunate fellaheen, of forced loans and other desperate expedients, were prevalent in Cairo, and were probably only too well founded. It is said that even the jewellery of the ladies of Ismail's harem was requisitioned in order to make up the sum required.

Meanwhile the inquiry proceeded.

It would require too much space to give at length the details of the report which the Commission presented. Suffice it to say that it showed confusion and irregularity everywhere. Taxes were collected in the most arbitrary and oppressive manner, and at the most unfavourable periods of the year. The land tenures were so arranged that the wealthier proprietors evaded a great portion of the land tax, and the corvée, or system of forced labour, was applied in a way which was ruinous to the country. Further, the Khedive and his family had amassed, at the expense of the State, colossal properties, amounting, in fact, to as much as one-fifth of the whole cultivable land of Egypt, and this property the Commission declared ought to be given up. On every side the most flagrant abuses were shown to prevail. In conclusion, it was found that the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876 could not possibly be adhered to, and that a fresh liquidation was inevitable.

Ismail, after every effort to make better terms for himself, yielded to Rivers Wilson's requisitions, and accepted the conclusions of the Commission. He acquiesced with as good grace as he could in making over to the State the landed property of himself and family. He went even further, and in August, 1878, approved the formation of a Cabinet under the presidency of Nubar Pasha, with Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance and M. de Blignières (the French member of the Commission of the Public Debt) as Minister of Public Works. At the same time, as if to show Europe that he had seriously entered on the path of reform, the Khedive proclaimed his intention to renounce personal rule and become a Constitutional sovereign, governing only through his Council of Ministers.

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II. ISMAIL PASHA

Any history of Egyptian affairs at the time of the events referred to in the present chapter would be incomplete without a sketch of Ismail Pasha himself. He was then forty-six years of age, short in stature, and heavily and squarely built. He was corpulent in figure, of dark complexion, and wore a reddish brown beard closely clipped. With one eye startlingly bright and the other habitually almost closed, he gave one the idea of a man of more than ordinary intelligence.

Speaking French fluently, and possessed of a peculiarly fascinating manner, Ismail exercised an almost mesmeric influence on those who came in contact with him. His business capacity was unbounded, and not the smallest detail, from the purchase of a coal cargo to the sale of a year's crop of sugar, was carried out without his personal direction. He was entitled to the denomination of Merchant Prince more than any one who ever bore the title, combining the two characters profitably for a long time, but in attempting to add to them that of a financier also he ended by wrecking his country.

The three great passions of Ismail were, his ambition to render Egypt independent of the Porte, his desire to accumulate landed property, and his mania for building palaces. His prodigality was unbounded, and as a result the indebtedness of Egypt was raised in fifteen years from £3,292,000, at which his predecessor left it, to over £90,000,000 at the time now referred to.

To do Ismail justice, it must be admitted that a large part of this money was spent in the construction of railways, canals, and other improvements, and in beautifying Cairo, which it was his aim to convert into a sort of Oriental Paris. But after allowing for all this, and for the two millions sterling spent in the fêtes which attended the opening of the Suez Canal, there is still a large balance left unaccounted for.

One of the great defects of Ismail's character was his absolute insincerity. When his reckless administration had brought his country to the brink of ruin, he instituted the system of financial control set forth in the Decrees of 1876. It must not be supposed that he ever meant that the system should be carried into effect, or at most that it should be more than a temporary expedient. When he promulgated reforms and enlisted a number of Europeans in his service, did he intend that the reforms should become realities, or that the European officials should exercise the functions nominally intrusted to them? Not for an instant. All that he desired was to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. For a while he succeeded, but it was not to last. After a time it dawned on the Powers that they were being played with, and from that moment Ismail's downfall was assured.

In nominally transforming himself into a Constitutional ruler, Ismail was only following out his habitual policy. The change, at any rate, looked well on paper. It would, he expected, possess a further advantage--Ismail, by his personal rule, had brought Egypt to the brink of ruin, and by posing as a Constitutional Sovereign, he hoped to transfer his responsibility to his ministers.

The nomination of Rivers Wilson to the post of Egyptian Minister of Finance was so unprecedented an event that it required all the care of the Marquis of Salisbury, who had now succeeded Lord Derby, to attenuate its political importance. To save appearances it was arranged that Her Majesty's Ministers should do nothing more than give their consent to the appointment.

As a consequence of the installation of Constitutional government, with European Ministers in the Cabinet, the English and French Controllers were deemed unnecessary, and the Dual Control was declared suspended. On the adoption of the new order of things, a hint was given to the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government relied on his steady support being given to the new Cabinet, and that the position of himself and his Dynasty might become seriously compromised in the event of a contrary course being adopted.

It would have been well for the Khedive had he taken the advice given. Unfortunately, he was too much steeped in Eastern intrigue, and too fond of the authority which he had nominally surrendered, to bend to the new order of things.[4]

The earliest symptom of this was the military outbreak which took place in Cairo on the 18th February, 1879, when 400 officers and 2,000 discharged soldiers mobbed Nubar Pasha and the European members of his Cabinet at the Ministry of Finance. The ostensible grievance was the non-payment of their salaries; the real one was the reduction in the army, a measure which had been forced on the Khedive by his new advisers. Both Nubar and Wilson were actually assaulted, and the cry of "Death to the Christians" was raised. What further events might have taken place it is hard to say, but, all at once, Ismail personally appeared on the scene, and as if by magic order was restored.

Everything tended to show that Ismail himself had arranged this little comedy; but be this as it may, he speedily took advantage of it to inform the Consuls-General that the new state of things was a failure, and that he could no longer retain his position without either power or authority. Finally he declared that unless a change were made he would not be answerable for the consequences. This was followed by the resignation of his Prime Minister, Nubar, and the despatch of British and French vessels of war to Alexandria.

The progress made in the direction of British interference in Egyptian affairs will not fail to strike the reader.

Ismail's motive in bringing about the military disturbance of the 18th February was to demonstrate, in the same manner as Arabi Pasha did later on, that he was the only real power in the country. In doing this, however, he played a dangerous game, and one which shortly after cost him his vice-regal throne.

For the moment, a modus vivendi was found in the appointment of his son Prince Tewfik (afterwards Khedive) as Prime Minister, vice Nubar, and the Western Powers accepted the solution, at the same time giving Ismail another warning, namely, that any further disturbance would be regarded as the result of his action, and the consequences to him would be very serious.

The financial difficulties of the country now became so grave, that a Decree suspending payment of the interest of the Debt was issued at the end of March, by the advice of the Ministers. Then Ismail all at once turned round and declared that the measure was unnecessary, and proposed a financial scheme of his own. How far this could be reconciled with his declaration that he was a Constitutional ruler is not clear. This event was followed by the arbitrary dismissal of his Ministers and the formation of a purely native Cabinet under Cherif Pasha. So secretly had the change been brought about, that the former Ministers only discovered it when, on going to their offices, they found their places already occupied by their successors.

This veritable coup d'état placed the English and French representatives in a position of some difficulty. On the one hand, the right of the Khedive to change his Ministers, even under the reformed regime, could not be contested; on the other, the change was of so radical a nature, and so much opposed to the moral obligations which he had contracted with the Western Powers, that it could hardly be permitted. The two Consuls-General therefore waited on the Khedive, and plainly told him that the precipitate dismissal of Ministers whose services he had solicited from the Governments of England and France constituted an act of grave discourtesy, and warned him of the necessity of adopting the course which they recommended to him. Ismail had by this time become so used to warnings of this character, that the intimation produced but little effect. On the contrary, he at once ordered the army to be increased to 60,000 men, and followed this up by a Decree of the 22nd April, 1879, reducing the interest of the Debt, and otherwise modifying the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876.

It was scarcely to be expected that Ismail's action, conceived in defiance of all Europe, would be tolerated, but it might, nevertheless, but for another circumstance, namely, the continued non-payment of the sums due on the judgments of the Tribunals. Both England and France addressed strong representations to the Porte on the subject. Though anxious that Ismail should be taken to task, neither Power was prepared to go so far as to demand his deposition. At length the hands of both were forced by a statesman who had more will and less hesitation, namely, Prince Bismarck. He plainly intimated that if England and France did not demand Ismail's removal, Germany would. This decided the matter, and the two Powers, seeing the danger of the matter being taken out of their hands, summoned up sufficient resolution to apply to the Sultan for the removal of the man who had so long trifled with them.

Meanwhile intrigues of all kinds had been going on at Constantinople. Ismail was privately sounded on the subject, and was given his choice, either to abdicate or to be deposed. He was reluctant to come to any decision, and in this he was strengthened by the information which he received from his agent, Ibraim Pasha, at Constantinople. The latter, from time to time, misled his unfortunate principal. When things looked at their very worst, Ibraim repeatedly assured Ismail that if only sufficient money were transmitted to Stamboul, everything would yet be made right. Animated by this hope, the deluded Khedive sent fabulous sums to the Sultan, up to the moment when the latter threw him over. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, when the storm actually burst, and the news of his deposition arrived, he was simply thunderstruck. At four in the morning of the 25th June, 1879, the English and French Consuls-General sought out Cherif Pasha, and made him accompany them to the Palace, and after some difficulty succeeded in finding Ismail. They then communicated to him despatches from Constantinople, and insisted on his abdication as the only means of saving his Dynasty. Ismail at first refused point-blank, but later on, he qualified his refusal by stating that he would only yield to a formal order from the Porte itself.

The dénouement was not far off, for, only a few hours later, a telegram arrived, addressed to "Ismail Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt," informing him that the Sultan had deposed him, and nominated his son Tewfik in his place.

There was nothing for the fallen ruler to do but to bow to the inevitable, although he did not acquiesce with good grace. He showed himself most exigeant as to the conditions on which he would consent to leave Egypt. He wished for a large sum in ready money. He wanted Smyrna selected as his place of residence. He wished to take with him all his followers, including a harem of at least three hundred women. He also demanded that an Egyptian steamer should be placed at his disposal. In fact, he asked so many things that the Consuls-General were at their wits' end to know what to do. The great object was to get rid of him at any price, and he was, in effect, told that he could have almost anything he wanted if he would only go at once.

Eventually the parties came to terms, Ismail was given the money he demanded, he was allowed to choose Naples in place of Smyrna as a residence, and at the end of the month, accompanied by seventy ladies of his harem, he quitted Alexandria in the Khedivial yacht "Maharoussa" under a royal salute from the batteries and ships of war.[5]

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III. THE MILITARY MOVEMENT

No sooner was Egypt rid of Ismail Pasha, than the Firman of investiture of Tewfik was solemnly read at the Citadel in Cairo with great state and ceremony.

The Powers having insisted on the restoration of the Control, Major Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and M. de Blignières were appointed Controllers-General by the English and French Governments respectively, on the 4th September. Riaz Pasha, on the 23rd, became Prime Minister.

Riaz is a statesman who has played an important part in Egypt for many years, and is therefore deserving of a passing notice. He is of Circassian family and of Hebrew extraction, possesses a strong will, tenacious perseverance, and business-like habits, and he has always been remarkable for his independence. Riaz is a master of detail, and has all the ins and outs of Egyptian administration at his fingers' ends, and he was, therefore, all the more fitted for taking public affairs in hand at this period. His experience as President of the Council of Ministers in past times rendered his services especially valuable. Gifted with natural foresight, he was shrewd enough to see that, when the Control was re-established, England and France seriously intended to take Egyptian affairs in hand, and he accepted the situation accordingly. This led him to work cordially with the Controllers, with the happy result that, during the two years that his Ministry lasted, Egypt attained an unprecedented degree of prosperity.

In April, 1880, what was styled the Commission of Liquidation was appointed, and under its advice the Public Debt was subjected to various modifications, and other financial changes were made, including a reduction of taxation and other reforms.

How long this pleasant state of things would have lasted it is impossible to say, had not trouble arisen in another direction, and the military revolt under Arabi supervened and upset all previous calculations.

In order to understand the nature and causes of this movement, it is necessary to know something of the Egyptian military organization at the time referred to. The army, which had achieved such great things under Mehemet Ali, had gradually declined under his successors, and when Ismail came to power was represented by a total force of 10,000 fighting men. Ismail raised the number to 45,000, but the Firman of Tewfik's investiture limiting the number to 18,000, the force had to be reduced to that number. The soldiers were all brought into the ranks by the system of conscription. Those recruited from the Soudan were men possessed of considerable endurance and warlike qualities, but those taken from the other districts, that is, the ordinary fellah or agricultural class, had no taste for war. This is not to be wondered at when the character and habits of the latter are considered. The Egyptian fellah is a type in himself. Possessed of no national pride or patriotic aspirations, he cares nothing about politics, and still less for fighting. All that he asks is to be let alone, to till in peace and quietness his little plot of land on the banks of his beloved Nile. Do not vex him too much with forced labour, or tax him beyond his means, and he remains peaceful and fairly law-abiding from the moment of his birth till the day comes for him to be carried out to the little cemetery, the white tombs of which brighten the borders of the desert.

In the preceding observations the Egyptian soldier is spoken of as he was at the period under consideration. What he is capable of becoming, when placed under English officers, and properly trained under humane and just treatment, subsequent events will show.

Amongst the soldiers at the time of the occurrence of Arabi's outbreak there was a fair amount of subordination, and but little jealousy prevailed. Amongst the officers, however, the state of things was entirely different. The majority of them were of Egyptian or fellah origin, whilst the others were of Turkish or Circassian extraction. The latter, as belonging to the same race as the reigning family, naturally constituted the dominant caste; when there was a campaign in the Soudan, or any other unpleasant duty to be taken in hand, the fellah officers were selected for it. When, on the other hand, it was a question of taking duty in Cairo or Alexandria, the Circassians were employed. Naturally, a good deal of jealousy was thus created, though, as long as Ismail was in power, it was not openly manifested, and discipline was maintained, except where it answered that ruler's purpose (as in the case of the demonstration against Nubar and Rivers Wilson) that it should be otherwise. With the young and inexperienced Tewfik, however, things were different--a spirit of insubordination developed itself, and the two sets of officers entered upon a struggle for the mastery.

Among the prominent fellah officers was a certain Ali Fehmi, who was a favourite of the Khedive, and in command of the Guards at the Palace. In this capacity he was frequently called on to convey orders to Osman Pasha Rifki, the Minister of War. Osman was a Circassian, and felt hurt at receiving orders from a fellah officer. By what means the change was effected is uncertain, but eventually Ali fell into disfavour, and became one of a group of discontented officers belonging to the same class. There were two others, Abdel-el-Al, and Ahmed Arabi, subsequently known as Arabi Pasha. These three, afterwards known as "The Colonels," were joined by Mahmoud Sami Pasha, a politician, and, thus associated, they formed the leaders of what began to be known as "The National Party."

As Arabi forms one of the chief actors in the events which followed, some details relating to him may not be out of place here.

In person, Arabi was a big, burly specimen of the fellah type--his features were large and prominent, and his face, though stern, had a good-natured expression. He was born about the year 1840, in the Province of Charkieh, in Lower Egypt. His father was a fellah possessing a few acres of land, and working it himself. Arabi was one of four sons, and he got such education as could be afforded by the village school. In due time he was drafted by conscription into the army, and became an officer. At Said Pasha's death he was a captain, and one of the officers of the Guard at the Palace at Cairo. He was once rather boisterous under the Palace windows, and Ismail Pasha, exclaiming that he was more noisy than the big drum, and less useful, ordered him to be removed and to receive punishment.

This was his first grievance against Ismail, and it induced Arabi to join a secret society of native officers. The objects which this society proposed to itself were the abolition of the invidious favouritism shown to Circassian officers, and the deposition of Ismail, the sovereign.

War broke out between Egypt and Abyssinia; Arabi was in charge of the transports at Massowah, and a charge of corruption being made against him, he fell into disgrace. This fact strengthened his dislike to Ismail, and, with time lying idle on his hands, he took to attending lectures at the religious university, known as the Mosque El Azhar, in Cairo, where he acquired a certain degree of eloquence superior to that of most persons in his position. After a time, Ismail, always working to increase the army, allowed him to join a regiment, and he resumed his connection with the secret society, and soon became the head of it.

One of its members informed the Khedive of the aims and intentions of the society, upon which Ismail sent for some of the chiefs, and Arabi and his confederates waited on him. They went as his enemies in fear and trembling, and left as his friends; seventy native officers were, in one day, made lieutenant-colonels, including Arabi and his companions. Arabi, in addition, received the high honour of having one of the Khedivial slaves as his wife.

When the question of the deposition of Ismail came to the front, Arabi took a formal oath to defend him with his life, but this did not prevent him, forty-eight hours after, going to do obeisance to Tewfik as the new Khedive of Egypt. The latter let it be known that there was a tacit amnesty for the past, and made Arabi a full colonel.

Of Arabi's mental gifts it is impossible to form a high estimate. Ignorant of any language but his own, his forte seemed to be the enunciating of any number of quotations from the Koran, quite regardless of their relevancy. He had, however, original ideas at times, and must be credited, at all events, with the quality of sincerity. To Europeans and European influences he was strongly opposed. On one occasion he presided at a meeting of natives assembled for the purpose of founding a free school at Zag-a-zig. He pointed out the changes which European civilization had wrought in Egypt, and observed that, "before the native was brought in contact with Europe, he was content to ride on a donkey, to wear a blue gown, and to drink water, whereas now he must drive in a carriage, wear a Stambouli coat, and drink champagne. Europeans," he said, "are ahead of us, but why? Is it because they are stronger, better, or more enduring than we? No; it is only because they are better taught. Let us, then, be educated, and the boasted supremacy of the Christians will disappear." The result of this appeal was a large subscription, and the school was established.

Mahmoud Sami Pasha, unlike his associates, was not a fellah, but of Turkish descent. He was a man of consummate cunning, and of great personal ambition; basing his calculations on the power of the military movement, and not believing in the disposition of the English and French to resist it, he proposed to use the simple-minded Arabi and his friends as a means of bringing himself into power.

The crisis was brought about by agitators among the fellaheen officers, who objected to a proposed reduction of the army; petitions on the subject were presented, not only to the Minister of War, but to the Khedive himself, setting forth all their grievances, and demanding that an Egyptian should be appointed Minister of War. Osman Rifki, the actual Minister of War, could not brook this, and at a Cabinet Council, at which Mahmoud Sami was present, it was decided to put the three ringleaders, Ali Fehmi, Abdel-el-Al, and Arabi, under arrest.

According to Arabi, a steamer was in readiness to take the prisoners away, and iron boxes were prepared in which they were to be placed and dropped into the Nile, but of this there is no proof beyond his statement. Mahmoud Sami took care to warn "the Colonels" of what was going to happen, and it was arranged that if they did not by a certain time return from Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, to which they were summoned, the soldiers of their respective regiments should march down and liberate them.

It turned out exactly as provided for. On arriving at the barracks on the 1st February, 1881, "the Colonels" found themselves before a court-martial, but hardly had the proceedings begun before a turbulent crowd of soldiery broke in, upset the tables and chairs, ill-treated the members of the court, and carried off the prisoners in triumph to the Palace. Here the three colonels interviewed the Khedive, and demanded the substitution of Mahmoud Sami for Osman Rifki as Minister of War, an increase of the army to 18,000 men, and the establishment of a new system of promotion, which should exclude favouritism to the Circassian officers.

Tewfik having no force wherewith to resist, yielded all that was asked of him, and there the matter for the time ended.

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IV. TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY

Matters progressed for some time pretty quietly after the events referred to in the previous chapter, but in July, 1881, two incidents occurred which were followed by important results.

A native artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of Alexandria. His comrades bore the dead body to the Palace and forced an entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried, and the ringleaders were condemned to severe sentences. Next, nineteen Circassian officers brought charges against the colonel of their regiment, Abdel-el-Al, already mentioned. The charges were inquired into and found to be unfounded, whereupon the nineteen officers were removed from the active list of the army, but were restored subsequently by order of the Khedive.

These measures gave great umbrage to "the Colonels," who believed that the order was given with a view to encourage the insubordination of the officers towards them; and a letter was written by "the Colonels" to the Minister of War, contrasting the leniency shown towards the nineteen officers with the severity towards the soldiers in the case of the artilleryman.

The Khedive by this time had become completely dissatisfied with his new Minister of War, and alarmed at the bearing of "the Colonels." He determined to see if energetic measures would not be successful, and appointed his brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, a Circassian, to the Ministry of War, in the place of Mahmoud Sami. Measures were at the same time taken for getting the disaffected regiments out of Cairo.

These steps were viewed with the greatest possible dissatisfaction by Arabi and his colleagues. Not only so, but they began to entertain considerable fear for their own personal safety. A story had got abroad that the Khedive had obtained a secret "Fetwah," or Decree, from the Sheikh-el-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There was no foundation for the story, but it was currently believed. Under these circumstances, all the chief officers signed a declaration of loyalty to the Khedive and his Government. Their next step was to organize the demonstration of the 9th September, 1881.

The immediate origin of the disturbance was the order given by the Minister of War for the removal from Cairo to Alexandria of the regiment of which Arabi was the Colonel.

On the 9th September the Minister of War received a communication from Arabi, informing him that the troops in Cairo were going at half-past three in the afternoon to the Palace of Abdin to obtain from the Khedive the dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of the National Assembly, and the increase of the army to 18,000 men.

When the terms of Arabi's communication were laid before the Khedive at his palace at Koobah, none of the Ministers were present. In the absence of the British Consul-General, Tewfik consulted the British Controller, Mr. (afterwards Sir Auckland) Colvin, who invited the Khedive to take the initiative himself.

Two regiments were said to be faithful. Colvin advised the Khedive to summon them to Abdin Square with all the military police available, to place himself at their head, and when Arabi arrived to arrest him.

Colvin accompanied the Khedive to the Abdin Barracks, where the first regiment of the Guard turned out and made the warmest protestations of loyalty. The same thing occurred with the soldiers at the Citadel, though it was ascertained that the troops there had, previously to the Khedive's arrival, been signalling to Arabi's regiment at Abbassieh. The Khedive then announced his intention of driving to the Abbassieh Barracks, some three miles distant. It was already past the time fixed for the demonstration, and Colvin urged him instead to proceed at once to Abdin, taking with him the Citadel regiment. Tewfik, however, wavered. Either he desired to assure himself of the support of more of his soldiers, or more probably he desired to put off the critical moment as long as possible. He persisted in driving to Abbassieh. It was a long drive, and when he arrived there he found that Arabi had marched with his regiment to Cairo. The opportunity sought of anticipating his movements was, therefore, lost. The carriages were turned round, and on entering Cairo took a long détour, and arrived at Abdin Palace by a side door. The Khedive at first desired to enter the Palace, but, on Colvin's entreaty, consented to come out into the square. They went together, followed by half-a-dozen native and European officers. The place was filled with soldiers, some 4,000 in number, with thirty guns placed in position.

The Khedive advanced firmly towards a little group of officers and men (some of whom were mounted) in the centre. Colvin said to him, "When Arabi presents himself, tell him to give up his sword and follow you. Then go the round of the regiments, address each separately, and give them the 'order to disperse.'" The soldiers all this time were standing in easy attitudes, chatting, laughing, rolling up cigarettes, and eating pistachio nuts, looking, in fact, as little like desperate mutineers as could well be imagined. They apparently were there in obedience only to orders, and, without being either loyal or disloyal, might almost be regarded as disinterested spectators.

Arabi approached on horseback: the Khedive called out to him to dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot with several others, and a guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. As he advanced, Colvin said to the Khedive, "Now is your moment, give the word!" He replied, "We are between four fires. We shall be killed." Colvin said, "Have courage!" Tewfik again wavered, he turned for counsel to a native officer at his side, and repeated, "What can I do? We are between four fires." He then told Arabi to sheathe his sword. Arabi did so at once, his hand trembling so with nervousness that he could scarcely get the weapon back into its scabbard. The moment was lost. Instead of following Colvin's advice, and arresting Arabi on the spot, a step which would at once have put an end to the whole disturbance, the Khedive then walked towards him and commenced to parley.

He demanded what was the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied by enumerating his demands, adding that the army had come there on behalf of the people to enforce them, and would not retire until they were conceded. The Khedive addressed Colvin, and said, "You hear what he says?" Colvin answered that it was not befitting for the sovereign to discuss questions of this kind with colonels, and suggested his retiring to the Palace, leaving others to speak to the military leaders. The Khedive did so, and Colvin remained for about an hour, explaining to them the gravity of the situation for themselves, and urging them to withdraw the troops whilst there was yet time.

At this moment Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Cookson, Acting British Consul-General, arrived, and Colvin left the continuation of the negotiations to Her Majesty's representative. The latter pointed out to Arabi the risk which he and those with him incurred by the menacing attitude they had assumed. He told him that if they persisted in assuming the government of the country, the army must be prepared to meet the united forces of the Sublime Porte and of the European Powers, both of whom were too much interested in the welfare and tranquillity of Egypt to allow the country to descend through a military government to anarchy. Arabi answered that the army was there to secure the liberties of the Egyptian people. Cookson replied that the Khedive and Europe could not recognize a mere military revolt as the expression of the will of the people, and added that even now, if the troops were withdrawn, any representations presented in the proper manner would be attended to, and he would guarantee Arabi's personal safety and that of his associates.

Arabi, though civil, firmly refused to take the course proposed. He insisted on the adoption of the three points demanded. Cookson then communicated the result of the interview to the Khedive, adding that he was convinced that the only concession to which any real importance was attached was the dismissal of the Ministry. His Highness, after a conference with Riaz Pasha, consented to this, on the understanding that the other points demanded should be in suspense until the Porte could be communicated with.

Arabi accepted these terms, insisting only that no member of the Khedive's family should be included in the new Cabinet, and that the Minister of War should not be a Circassian. On these conditions Arabi promised to withdraw the troops. This, however, was not effected until an order had been signed announcing the dismissal of the Ministry and the nomination of Cherif Pasha as the new Premier.

After this, Arabi entered the Palace and made his submission to the Khedive, and the soldiers, with their bands playing and amid loud cheers for the "Effendina" (Sovereign), retired to their barracks. By eight o'clock all was over, and Cairo, which had been much excited, had relapsed into its ordinary tranquillity.

With regard to the outbreak--the third, it will be remarked, of its kind--it was on a larger scale than any previously organized, and was, as events showed, correspondingly more successful. The rebellious troops were, indeed, quieted, as on former occasions, but only by concessions which went far to place the whole government of the country under irregular military control.

With regard to the attitude assumed by the Khedive on the occasion, considerable allowance must be made. Tewfik in the life-time of his father had never, or at all events until the latest period of Ismail's reign, been allowed to come to the front. He was, therefore, the less fitted for dealing with a crisis of so formidable a character as that of the 9th September. Born of one of Ismail's female slaves in the year 1853, Tewfik was never a favourite with his father, and when his brothers were sent to Europe to be educated, he himself was kept in Cairo and lived in quiet obscurity. Whilst they were made much of, both at home and abroad, Tewfik remained quietly cultivating his farm at Koobah.[6]

The difference in developing the character and dispositions of the Princes was natural enough, and yet the late ruler of Egypt was in many respects in no way inferior to the other members of his family. He possessed a remarkable degree of intelligence, and although a strict Mahomedan he was the husband of only one wife, to whom he was devotedly attached. Determined to avoid, in bringing up his children, the error perpetrated towards himself, he sent his sons to Europe to be educated. In appearance he somewhat resembled his father, being short and inclined to stoutness.

Unlike Ismail, however, Tewfik was wanting in energy and determination. With either Ismail, or his grandfather, Mehemet Ali, the demonstration of the 9th September would have been impossible. With Ismail--supposing such an event could have taken place--the end would not have been far off. The fate of Ismail Pasha Saddyk, Minister of Finance, known as the "Mofettish," sufficiently shows the means by which Arabi would have been disposed of.[7]

With Mehemet Ali the procedure would have been yet more summary. The report of a pistol would have been heard, and Arabi would have rolled lifeless on the square of Abdin. A volley of musketry would have dispersed his followers, and the incident would have been closed.

Tewfik, with his genial kindly disposition, was not the man to adopt either of the above expedients, and, as has been seen, Arabi triumphed.

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V. FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Difficulty was at first experienced in getting Cherif Pasha to undertake the formation of a Ministry. His idea was that it was inconsistent with a due regard for his own reputation for him to pose before the world as the accomplice of the mutinous soldiery, and at one time, after an interview with Arabi, Cherif positively declined. Meanwhile, meetings of the officers were held in which the most violent appeared to have the upper hand, and the belief that they had nothing to fear from Turkish intervention emboldened them to reject an ultimatum of Cherif, which was that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing the safety of the leaders, they should withdraw their regiments to certain posts assigned to them.

Public opinion, more particularly amongst the Europeans, became much alarmed, and the Khedive declared himself ready to yield everything in order to save public security.

On the 13th September, however, things took an unexpected turn for the better. Arabi, at the suggestion of Mahmoud Sami, who hoped to render Cherif impossible, and to get himself nominated in his place, summoned to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. Cherif had acquired a good deal of popularity among the class to which the Notables belonged, and at their first meeting he found arguments to induce them to adopt a tone hostile to Arabi and his friends, whom they told to attend to the army, and mind their own business. The Notables went even further, and signed an address to Cherif entreating him to form a Ministry, and giving their personal guarantee that if he consented, the army should yield absolute submission to his orders. Arabi, it will be remembered, had all along professed to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, and the attitude of the Notables was a severe check to him, or rather to Mahmoud Sami, who was pulling the wires. This last individual, seeing that the Notables were playing into the hand of Cherif, at once declared himself the partisan of the latter and of the Chamber, and as a consequence Sami was reappointed Minister of War in the Cabinet which Cherif was eventually persuaded to form.

On the 14th of September the new Ministry was gazetted, and steps were taken for the dispersal of the disaffected regiments in the provinces. On the 6th of October Arabi and his regiment left Cairo for the military station of El Ouady, in the Delta. Before he left he was received by the Khedive, whom he assured of his respect and entire devotion. When one remembers how often Arabi had gone through this ceremony, one can hardly help thinking that Tewfik must, by this time, have begun to get a little tired of it. Before leaving, Arabi made speeches to the troops, in which he exhorted them "to remain united, and to draw even more tightly, if possible, those bonds of fraternity of which they had already given such striking examples." Finally, after pointing out--it must be presumed by way of a joke--that obedience in a soldier was the first of virtues, he declared that as long as he possessed a drop of blood, or a living breath, both should belong to his beloved sovereign.

Meanwhile the elections for the Chamber of Notables, which had been convoked by the Khedive for the 23rd of December, were proceeding. The Chamber was called together under an old law of Ismail's time, made in 1866, under which the Notables possessed but very limited functions. They were, in fact, simply a consultative body, with power only to discuss such matters as might be brought before them by the advisers of the Government.

There is no doubt that, apart from the military movement, there was a widespread feeling of discontent in the country at this time. Ismail's merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign money-lenders, had given rise to a desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and, above all, to abolish the Anglo-French Control, which was considered as ruling the country simply for the benefit of the foreign bondholders. The Control was further hated by the large landowners, because the law of liquidation (with which the Controllers in the minds of the people were associated) had in a measure sacrificed their claims for compensation in respect of the cancelling of a forced loan known as the "Moukabeleh," and it was still more detested by the Pashas and native officials, because it interfered with the reckless squandering of public money, and the many opportunities for corruption by which they had so long benefited.

In addition to this, there was a great deal of irritation at the increasing number of highly paid European officials which the reformed regime inaugurated in the latter days of Ismail involved. The people began to suspect that what was occurring was only part of a plan for handing the country over to Europeans. The examples lately set by England with regard to Cyprus, and by France in Tunis, were, it must be owned, but little calculated to inspire confidence in the political morality of either of these two Powers.

The prevailing irritation was kept alive by the native press, which began to indulge in the most violent abuse of Europeans. The army, too, continued to show signs of insubordination in many ways. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the colonels of the regiments which had been expressly sent away into the provinces had acquired the inconvenient habit of coming back to the capital, and joining in the many intrigues on foot.

Next followed a demand by the Minister of War for an augmentation of the War Budget, in order to increase the army to the maximum allowed by the Sultan's Firman.

Under these circumstances the Chamber of Notables assembled on the 25th of December, 1881.

The earliest trouble arose from the demand of the Notables that the law under which they were assembled should be modified so as to give them power to vote the Budget so far as it related to such of the revenues as were not assigned to the Public Debt.

The claim of the Chamber, though plausible enough at first sight, was really, if granted, calculated to infringe all the international arrangements for the Debt. It was obvious that if the Chamber had the power and chose to vote an extravagant Budget so far as related to the unassigned revenues, the administration of the country could not be carried on, national bankruptcy might ensue, and the collection of the assigned revenues would become impossible.

The Chamber, however, not only refused to give way on the question of the Budget, but it demanded that the law should be further amended by giving the Notables other privileges, namely, the right to control the acts of public functionaries, to initiate legislation, and to hold the Ministers responsible to the Chamber. By getting the Notables to make these demands, which he knew could not be accepted, Mahmoud Sami's object was to bring about a crisis which could only end in the downfall of Cherif's Cabinet. He had already persuaded Cherif to make Arabi Sub-Minister of War, under the pretext of securing him on the side of the Ministry, and so neutralizing the influence which the army was exercising over the Chamber. In reality the appointment only afforded Mahmoud Sami and Arabi increased facilities for intriguing against Cherif. The result was soon seen.

The amendments to the law giving the Chamber increased power were inadmissible on many grounds. Were there no other objection, there was the insurmountable one that the Sultan had already refused a Constitution to other parts of his dominions, and would certainly oppose its being granted to Egypt. To put it shortly, the amendments after being submitted to the English and French Governments were declared unacceptable.

This at once brought about a crisis, and the Chamber, on the 2nd February, sent a deputation to the Khedive to require him to summon a new Ministry.

At this period it was reported to the English and French Governments that activity was being displayed in putting all the coast fortifications in an efficient state, and that the strength of the army was being augmented under the provisions of the new War Budget.

These circumstances, taken in conjunction with the political events above recorded, led the English and French Governments to conclude that if the Khedive was to be maintained in power, the time was coming for them to think about doing something in Egypt. On the 20th of January, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote that "armed intervention had become necessary if the refusal to allow the Chamber to vote the Budget was to be agreed to, and yet it was impossible to do otherwise, as the measure only formed part of a complete scheme of revolution." As far back as December, 1881, M. Gambetta, then at the head of the French Ministry, had suggested that England and France should take "joint action in Egypt to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to cut short intrigues at Constantinople, as well as to make the Porte feel that any undue interference on its part would not be tolerated."

This proposal shortly after resulted in the famous Joint Note communicated by the English and the French representatives to the Khedive in Cairo, on the 8th January, 1882. The document was to the effect that the English and French Governments considered the maintenance of His Highness upon the throne in the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France were equally interested. It continued to say that "the two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, did not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their intention in this respect would tend to divert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them."

The parentage of the Joint Note is attributable to the French Government, which, up to this time, seemed bent on retaining the lead which it had from the first taken in regard to Egyptian affairs. The wording of the document had been altered more than once to suit the late Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, who appears to have been not quite sure how far he was getting out of his depth in regard to Egyptian matters.

It was under the influence of some such misgiving that Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed on the 6th January, 1882, in communicating to the French Government England's assent to the Note, to make the reservation that she must not be considered as thereby committing herself to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary. In reply, M. Gambetta, by a despatch dated the following day, stated that he observed with pleasure "that the only reservation of the Government of the Queen was as to the mode of action to be employed, and that this was a reservation in which he participated."

When one sees how, later on, when action became necessary, the attitude of the two countries became reversed, the extreme reluctance of the English Government to move at this time seems curious enough, especially when it is contrasted with the continued readiness of France to come forward in the interval. The explanation is that M. Gambetta, with his clear statesman-like intellect, foreseeing that some sort of intervention would become necessary, was determined that it should be limited to that of England and France to the exclusion of Turkey, and so long as he remained in power boldly shaped his policy with that object. The English Government, on the other hand, had throughout no real settled policy with regard to Egypt. Their first idea was to have no intervention at all; they hoped that things would mend of themselves. When they found that this was not likely to be the case, the idea of a Turkish intervention found favour. France, however, was resolutely opposed to this, and to allow the latter Power to take isolated action, as indeed she appeared disposed to do if thwarted, was open to serious objections. To avoid such a catastrophe the English Government found themselves under the necessity of following, for the time being, the masterly lead of M. Gambetta. However this may have been, England, by taking part in the Joint Note, assumed a definite position relative to Egypt, and, throwing off all hesitation as to "interference with the internal affairs of the country," pledged herself jointly with France to support the Khedive against all enemies from within or without.

The first to take offence at the Joint Note was naturally enough the Sultan, who caused Lord Granville to be informed that the Porte considered that sending the Khedive any such communication except through itself was highly improper. The Sultan added that, "To protect the immunities granted to Egypt, and to preserve the order and prosperity of that province, was the sincere wish and interest of the Porte, whose efforts had till then always been directed to that end, and that there were no circumstances in Egypt which could serve as a motive for any foreign assurances of the kind made." Finally, the Turkish Ambassador requested that the two Powers would give an explanation of what they meant. At the same time the Sultan sent a Circular to the other Powers, protesting against the action of England and France.

Lord Granville now began to doubt whether he had not gone a little too far, and drafted an answer to the Porte of an apologetic character. The tone of the proposed reply was somewhat of the kind that a schoolboy taken to task for an act of impertinence towards his master might be expected to give. Substantially, it was that the two Powers did not mean anything at all.

The despatch, as originally drafted, began by disclaiming any doubt whatever as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt. It proceeded to declare that there was no change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which was as anxious as ever for the continuance of the sovereignty of the Porte, and for the maintenance of the liberties and administrative independence secured to Egypt by the Sultan's Firmans. Having paid the Porte these little compliments, the despatch disclaimed all ambitious views with regard to the country (of which, by the way, the Sultan had been careful never to accuse the two Powers), but said that they could never be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and that it was only with a view to warding off such a catastrophe that Her Majesty's Government thought it advisable, in conjunction with the French Government, to forward a declaration showing the accord of the two in carrying out the policy described. The despatch finally pointed out that the form of the Note was not a new one, and that similar declarations had been on special occasions made to the Khedive without calling forth any remonstrance from the Porte.

Gambetta, however, viewed the matter in a different spirit. Having once gone forward he was not disposed to draw back. He had, moreover, the interests of the large body of French bondholders to protect. He at first objected that no explanation of the Joint Note at all was necessary, and that any attempt to explain it would only tend to encourage the military party. Seeing, however, that Lord Granville was determined to send some reply, Gambetta insisted on certain modifications in the despatch. Amongst them he suggested that the assertion of the Porte, that there were no circumstances that could justify the steps taken by England and France, should be answered, and proposed that it should be pointed out, first, that the authority of the Khedive had been modified and diminished; second, that the Chamber of Notables had arrogated to itself the right of interfering with matters expressly exempted from its jurisdiction by the Khedive's Decree; and third, that the Chamber had aimed at setting aside arrangements to which Egypt was bound by international engagements with England and France.

Lord Granville once more yielded to what he had begun to recognize as the superior mind of the French statesman, and Gambetta's amendments were agreed to.

It was not until the 2nd February, however, that the reply to the Porte's remonstrance was actually sent off.

In the meantime the Gambetta Ministry had fallen, and from this moment dates a marked change in the attitude of the French Republic with regard to Egypt. M. de Freycinet, the successor to Gambetta, though agreeing to the amended reply to the Porte, cautiously inquired what meaning was to be attached to the reservation as to "taking action" made by Her Majesty's Government in assenting to the original Note.

Lord Granville, no longer under the influence of Gambetta, and apparently anxious to recede as far as possible from the somewhat bold position which he had been induced to adopt, answered, contrary to the plain words in which the reservation had been expressed, that Her Majesty's Government reserved to themselves the right to determine, not merely the particular mode of action to be adopted in Egypt, but whether any action at all was necessary.

De Freycinet, who, it must be admitted, was equally glad to back out, then plainly declared that he was disinclined to any armed intervention in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either separately. This announcement must have been a surprise to the British Government, which, after being led by France into sending the Joint Note, now began to discover that in the event of its becoming necessary to take any steps to carry it into effect, England could no longer count on her as an ally.

Under these circumstances, and feeling that the time when action would have to be taken might not be far off, Lord Granville addressed a Circular to the other Powers, requesting them to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question.

The effect of the Joint Note upon the Porte has been stated. It only remains to consider its effect upon the Khedive and the Notables. The Khedive received the assurances of protection given by England and France gratefully enough. It was not so, however, with his Ministers, who, on the Note being communicated on the 8th January, wanted, like the Sultan, to know what it meant. Sir Edward Malet, in reply, assured them that the Note was merely intended to convey to the Khedive the assurance of the friendship of the Powers, and that in point of fact it did not really mean much.

It is obvious that to produce any good effect on the Chamber and the National Party it was necessary that the Note should have been backed by the display of force, and this unfortunately was just what was wanting. In short, England and France launched their threat without being prepared to follow it up by immediate action. It created great indignation on the part of the military leaders and in the Chamber; Arabi declared point-blank that any intervention on the part of England and France was inadmissible. Later on, when it was seen that the two Powers were not really to act, but, on the contrary, were busy doing all they could to attenuate the step they had taken, the feeling of indignation gave way to one of contempt, very natural under the circumstances.

Amongst those who misled the chiefs of the National Party none were so conspicuous as two Englishmen, namely, the late Sir William Gregory, an ex-Colonial Governor, and Mr. Wilfred S. Blunt. Both these gentlemen had, whilst spending some months in Egypt, conceived a violent sympathy for the National movement. They had witnessed during their stay in the country numerous instances of misrule and oppression, and they regarded Arabi and his friends as the leaders of a genuine popular effort to secure political liberty and good government.

In addition to the assurances which they received from Sir William Gregory and Mr. Blunt, the leaders of the National Party were led to believe, and as has been seen not without reason, that England and France were not really agreed to do anything, much less to take any decisive step in the way of intervention; that the two Powers were jealous of each other, and that the Joint Note might be safely disregarded. The Arabists further clung to the hope that even were France and England allied, the other Powers would prevent their interference, and the protests which four of them, namely, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy, made at the time against any foreign interference in Egypt without their consent, certainly tended to confirm this view.

This was the condition of affairs on the 2nd February, when, as already stated, the deputation from the Chamber requested the Khedive to summon a new Ministry. Tewfik had by this time become thoroughly alarmed. The tonic effect produced by the Joint Note had quite gone off, and he was beginning to doubt how far he could rely on support from England and France. He realized that by placing himself under the tutelage of the Western Powers he was injuring himself with the Porte, and he had daily proofs afforded him of his growing unpopularity with his subjects. Under these circumstances he saw nothing for it but to yield. At the suggestion of the Chamber, the intriguer Mahmoud Sami was directed to form a new Ministry, which he lost no time in doing, in conjunction with his confederate Arabi, who now filled the important post of Minister of War.

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VI. CRITICAL POSITION

Although the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was forced upon the Khedive, the position of the latter was at the time so hopeless that one must not be surprised at his endeavouring to make the best of it and put a good face upon the matter. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, 1882, Tewfik, in true Oriental style, wrote to his new Premier that, in accepting the task of forming a Cabinet, he had given a fresh proof of his devotion and patriotism, and the letter ended by approving of the programme which the new Premier had drawn up.

The programme in question referred to the arrangements for the Public Debt, including the Control. It spoke of the necessity for judicial and other reforms, and then passed on to the burning question of the Chamber of Notables, and stated that the first act of the Ministry would be to obtain sanction for the proposed law for the Chamber. This law, it was stated, would respect all rights and obligations, whether private or international, and would wisely determine the responsibility of Ministers towards the Chamber as well as the discussion of laws.

Mahmoud Sami's programme elicited from the English and French Controllers a memorandum, in which they very sensibly observed that it mattered very little whether or not the intention of attacking the Control was asserted, as by the very force of circumstances it became ineffectual when the Controllers found themselves no longer in the presence of the Khedive and of Ministers freely appointed by him, but of a Chamber and an army. It added that the Chamber, under the influence of certain military chiefs, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible with the social condition of the country; it had gone so far as to compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence, and, under pressure of certain officers, to impose on him the late Minister of War as Prime Minister, and concluded with the significant words: "The Khedive's power no longer exists."

After this it is not surprising that the Controllers resigned office. Sir Auckland Colvin was requested by the British Government to remain at his post and maintain "an attitude of passive observation." His French colleague was replaced by M. Brédif. There is no doubt that the Controllers' view of the situation was only too just. With Arabi as Minister of War, and his co-conspirator, Mahmoud Sami, President of the Council the country was simply under a military dictatorship.

Meanwhile, the reserves of the Artillery were called in and distributed amongst the coast fortifications, recruiting in the provinces was being actively carried on, ninety Krupp guns were ordered from Europe, and Arabi was created a Pasha by the Sultan.

The National Party had now become complete masters of the situation. Notwithstanding this, a collision might for some little time have been averted but for an incident which occurred shortly after.

The differences between the Circassians and the native-born Egyptians in the army have been already touched upon. One peculiarity of the Arab race is a revengeful disposition. Arabi and his friends had, as already stated, met with rough usage at the hands of the Circassian party. Hence it followed that the first idea of the former on getting into power was to avenge themselves on their old enemies. This was carried out by the wholesale arrest of fifty Circassian officers, and of Osman Pasha Rifki, former Minister of War, on a charge of conspiracy to assassinate Arabi. It was also alleged that the plot comprised the deposition of the Khedive and the restoration of Ismail Pasha.

The prisoners were tried in secret by a court martial appointed by the military leaders, and, of course, found guilty. They were, it is said, subjected to torture to induce them to confess, and persons of respectability testified that they heard at night shrieks of pain coming from the place where the prisoners were confined. The sentence passed on forty of them, including Osman, was that of exile for life to the remotest limits of the Soudan. This was equivalent to a sentence of death as regards most of the prisoners.

It was necessary that the sentences should be confirmed by Decree of the Khedive, and he consulted Sir Edward Malet as to the course to be taken. The story of the plot was, there is reason to believe, purely imaginary.

With some little hesitation, and after conferring with the diplomatic agents of the Powers, the Khedive boldly determined to exercise his prerogative without reference to his Ministers, and signed a Decree commuting the sentences to simple banishment from Egypt, without loss of rank and honours.

This was a defiance of Mahmoud Sami, to which he was not disposed to submit. On the 10th May, the Khedive summoned the Consuls-General, and informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that this Decree should be changed by condemning the prisoners to be struck off the strength of the army, and had threatened that his refusal would be followed by a general massacre of foreigners. The significance of this threat coming from Mahmoud Sami, the Minister who was in power when just a month later--namely, on the 11th June--a massacre of foreigners did take place in Alexandria, will probably be remarked.

The Chamber of Notables had ceased to sit on the 26th March, when the session closed; but Mahmoud Sami now announced that since the Khedive and his Ministers could not agree, and as it was impossible for the Ministry to resign, they had determined themselves to convoke the Chamber, and to lay the case before it, and that he did not intend to hold any further communication with the Khedive until the difference between them had been decided by the Chamber. He added that in the meantime the Ministry would answer for the public safety.

The alarm in Cairo now began to be general. It was open warfare between the Khedive, and his Ministry supported by the army. The National Party made no secret of their intention to depose the Khedive as soon as the Chamber assembled.

The Notables, when the day for assembly arrived, began to show a disinclination to support the National Party. They had commenced to realize that they had already gone further than they had intended, and also that they were being merely used as tools by Arabi and his colleagues.

At first they refused to meet at all, on the ground that they had not been convoked by the Khedive, but only by the Ministry. They were, however, induced to assemble, and on the 13th May they met at the house of Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber. Here Mahmoud Sami read an indictment against the Khedive, charging him principally with not governing through his Ministers, and with compromising the liberties of Egypt. On the 14th the Ministers were so little sure of the support of the Notables, that Mahmoud Sami and Arabi went to the Palace, and, in the names of themselves and their colleagues, offered to resign if the Khedive would guarantee public order. His Highness answered, that such a condition was a most unusual one, and that it would be the business of the Ministry to see that public order was not troubled; he added that the only persons likely to cause trouble were Arabi and his associates. On the 15th, the English and French Consuls-General gave notice to Arabi that if there was a disturbance of public order, he would find Europe and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, but that if, on the other hand, he remained loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person would be favourably regarded.

Arabi, in reply, stated that he would guarantee order only as long as he remained Minister, except that in the event of a fleet arriving he could not answer for the public safety. The same day the two Consuls-General announced to the Khedive that an Anglo-French fleet was hourly expected at Alexandria. This was followed by the Ministers going in a body to the Palace and making a complete submission to the Khedive.

A reconciliation of the Khedive with his Ministers was accepted by the former only on the earnest representations of the Notables and the Consuls-General, in order that tranquillity might not be disturbed, the idea was to keep the Ministry in office as a temporary measure, in order that there might be some one to treat with when the fleets should arrive.

Notwithstanding the improved aspect of affairs, the alarm in Cairo continued, and crowds of people daily left the city. To allay the panic, Mahmoud Sami and Arabi declared that they would guarantee the preservation of order on the arrival of the fleets.

On the 19th and 20th of May the much-talked-of "fleets" arrived at Alexandria. They consisted only of the British ironclad Invincible with two gunboats, and the French ironclad La Gallisonière, also accompanied by two gun-vessels. The remainder of the allied squadron was left at Suda Bay, in the island of Crete.

The despatch of the English and French ships to Alexandria by two Powers, each professing to be "disinclined to armed intervention in Egypt," was so important a step that it may be interesting to go back a little to consider the means by which it was brought about. Lord Granville, immediately after the Abdin demonstration of the 9th September, had intimated to the French Government as his idea of a remedy for the military insubordination prevailing the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Minister for Foreign Affairs, objected that this might lead to further steps, and possibly to the permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops. The French Minister expressed himself in favour of a "joint military control," consisting of an English and a French General, to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army. Nothing was done to carry out either suggestion.

In March, 1882, when the struggle between the Khedive and the Chamber was at its height, Lord Granville suggested that England and France should send two "technical advisers" to assist the representatives of the two Powers in settling the details of the financial matters then pending. The proposal was so ludicrously absurd under existing circumstances, that it says much for the politeness of the French Minister that he took the trouble to give a serious reply. He objected that the measure would give offence to the other Powers, as an attempt on the part of England and France to effect a separate settlement of Egyptian affairs, and also that it would tend to lower the Consuls-General in their own eyes and in those of the Egyptians.

Again baffled, Lord Granville, in April, 1882, could think of nothing better than that the Sultan should be asked "to send a General with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army, with the understanding that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General, who would be associated with him."

This proposal also fell through, the French Government objecting that the sending of a Turkish General at all would tend sooner or later to the sending of Turkish troops, which was not desirable.

The despatch of a Turkish Commissioner of some kind continued to be talked about, when, on the 7th May, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote to the Foreign Office that the Khedive's Ministers would certainly resist by force the arrival of any Commissioner from Turkey. After this, Lord Granville was for a time forced to abandon his favourite hobby of Turkish intervention. Sir Edward Malet's despatch contained the following significant passage:--

"I believe that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils which it has caused."

This very sensible opinion had its effect, for, on the 11th May, Lord Granville was so far able to make up his mind as to say that the English Government were willing to send two ironclads to Alexandria to protect European residents. This announcement, however, was only made after the idea had been suggested by the French Minister. Even at this period, Lord Granville could not help referring regretfully to his original idea of sending the three Generals (an expedient about as hopeful as sending three flower-pots with water to extinguish a fire), and in reply to M. de Freycinet, his Lordship said that he could still think of nothing better.

The French Government, in agreeing to the despatch of the Anglo-French fleet, appeared resolved to abandon the cautious attitude which it had assumed on M. de Freycinet taking office. The French Premier, on the 11th May, informed the Chamber of Deputies that in its Egyptian policy the Ministry had two objects, first, to preserve "the preponderating influence of France in Egypt"; and, second, to maintain the independence of Egypt, as established by the Firmans; and added that the means which would be employed to carry out this policy would be an intimate alliance with England.

M. de Freycinet, on the 12th May, informed Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, that as the Khedive had been acting under the advice of England and France, the French Government considered it the bounden duty of the two Powers to support His Highness as far as circumstances would allow, and that France would co-operate loyally and without arrière pensée with England in that sense. M. de Freycinet, with some sense of humour, added that sending the three Generals would be inopportune.

On the 13th the English Government notified their concurrence in the views of France with regard to the Khedive, and welcomed the co-operation of the French Government. Lord Granville, at the same time, expressed the readiness of himself and his colleagues to defer to the objections raised to the mission of the three Generals.

It now became known that the Notables were assembling in Cairo, and that the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was about to propose the deposition of the Khedive. It was also reported that Mahmoud Sami proposed to declare himself "Governor-General of Egypt by the national will."

These alarming reports caused the preparations for the departure of the ships to be hastened, and, at the same time, with a view to keep the ground clear, the two Western Powers sent an intimation to the Porte desiring it to abstain for the moment from all intervention in Egypt.

The instructions to the British Admiral were as follows:--

"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support the Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans, landing a force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ships' guns without instructions from home."

The French Admiral's instructions were somewhat different, and tend to show that the two Powers were not completely agreed as to the means to be employed to support Tewfik. His instructions were in these words:--

"On arrival at Alexandria communicate with the Consul-General, who will, if necessary, indicate to you what you will have to do to give a moral support to the Khedive. You will abstain, until you have contrary instructions, from any material act of war, unless you are attacked or have to protect the safety of Europeans."

The British and French Consuls-General, on the arrival of the fleets, advised the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable opportunity to dismiss the existing Ministry, and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif Pasha, or any other person inspiring confidence. Negotiations were simultaneously opened with Arabi in order to induce him, with the other rebel leaders, to retire from the country, in return for which they were to be guaranteed their property, rank, and pay.

None of these plans succeeded. The Khedive recognized the futility of dismissing a Ministry that insisted on remaining in power. Mahmoud Sami replied that the Ministry would not retire so long as the squadrons were kept at Alexandria, and Arabi declared that he must refuse either to retire from his position, or to leave the country.

On the 25th May, the representatives of England and France handed to Mahmoud Sami, as President of the Council of Ministers, an ultimatum in the form of a Dual Note, demanding the retirement of Arabi from the country, the withdrawal of "the Colonels" into the interior, and the resignation of Sami's Ministry. The Note added that the two Governments would, if necessary, insist on the fulfilment of these conditions.

The Ministers, on receipt of the "Dual Note," waited on the Khedive to ask his opinion as to the answer that should be given, and His Highness distinctly told them that he accepted its conditions. They urged a reference to the Porte, on which the Khedive told them that it was an internal question, and that it was strange that they, who had complained that he had failed to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest such a course. On the 26th the Ministers resigned, alleging as a reason that the Khedive, in accepting the conditions of England and France, had acquiesced in foreign interference in Egypt.

The Khedive promptly accepted the resignation of the Ministry, and sent for Cherif Pasha to form a new Cabinet. Cherif refused on the ground that no Government was possible while the military chiefs remained.

On the 27th an event occurred in Alexandria which tended to bring matters still more to a crisis. The officers of the regiments and the police force in that city held a secret meeting, and telegraphed to the Khedive direct that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi, and gave the Khedive twelve hours to reply, after which the officers declared that they would not be responsible for public tranquillity.

On receipt of this message, the Khedive summoned to his presence the chief personages of State, the principal members of the Chamber, and the head officers of the Cairo garrison, and placed the situation before them.

Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's strongest supporters, interrupted the Khedive in his speech, and stated that the army absolutely rejected the Dual Note, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognized. On the same day Arabi, at the head of a hundred officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Notables, and demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the recalcitrant. Nevertheless almost all present, excepting the officers, persisted in supporting their sovereign. Arabi and the officers demanded of the Khedive a decree reinstating Arabi as Minister of War. Amongst those present, Sultan Pasha and some of the Notables warned the Khedive of what had taken place, and told him his life was not safe unless he reinstated Arabi. The Khedive consulted the English and French Consuls-General, who advised him not to comply.

In the afternoon of the same day, a deputation consisting of the Coptic Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, the Notables, and others, waited on the Khedive, begging him to reinstate Arabi, adding, that though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain the Khedive's assent to his reappointment. In his perplexity, the Khedive, in order to prevent bloodshed, yielded, and issued a memorandum stating that at the repeated requests of the population, and with the desire of maintaining order and the tranquillity of the country, he reinstated Arabi.

Although one may be disposed to blame Tewfik for his conduct on this occasion, it must be owned that his position at the moment was a critical one. The despatch of the fleets on which he had been led to rely had turned out a ridiculous fiasco. Instead of ten vessels, there were only two accompanied by four gunboats, and no troops for landing. The lamentable weakness of the demonstration only excited the ridicule of the military party. It was beyond doubt that the guard at the Palace had been doubled, and that orders had been given to the sentries not to allow Tewfik to leave the Palace unless the deputation received a favourable reply, and to fire on him if he insisted on going out. All the outlets of the Palace were carefully watched, and a mob was collected for the purpose of rushing into the Palace and ill-treating him, if the prayer of the deputation were refused. It was also announced that there was to be a military demonstration at five in the afternoon, and that it was the intention of the army to depose the Khedive. Under these circumstances, and seeing how little material aid he had from England and France, it is not surprising that he yielded.

One of the first acts of Arabi on resuming office was to publish a declaration that now he had been reinstated, he guaranteed the security of the life and property of all the inhabitants of Egypt irrespective of nationality or religion. This assurance was not made before it was required.

For several days past a feeling of uneasiness had prevailed, especially in Alexandria; when the military and police in that city made their demand for Arabi's reinstatement, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, asked the Governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, if he could answer for the safety of Europeans. He replied that he had exhausted every effort to calm the officers and soldiers, but had entirely failed, and that he could not answer for their conduct, although he saw no reason to apprehend any disturbance.

In the prevailing state of things, the Consul thought it his duty to confer with Admiral Seymour as to the best means of protecting British subjects in case of a general attack upon Europeans, and was informed that the Admiral was not prepared to land any force, although he would protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek refuge on board ships in the harbour. The Admiral sent an officer with the Consul, and a spot for embarkation was selected.

This arrangement was communicated to the British residents at a meeting held at the Consulate the same day (the 28th).

The European population now became seriously alarmed, and on the 29th a memorial was drawn up by the British residents, calling upon Her Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. It pointed out that--

"During the twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th, Alexandria was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, it was reported, actually had cartridges served out to them to be used against Europeans." "There was," it said, "every reason to believe that the perils which had come without warning would recur again, and against them," it continued, "Europeans were absolutely defenceless. They had not even the means of flight, as in order to reach the ships in harbour they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron in port could only silence the forts, and when these forts were disabled, then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, whilst the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for those operations did not exceed 300 men." The memorial concluded by stating that "every day's delay increased the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."

Mr. Cookson at once telegraphed the contents of the memorial to the Foreign Office, where it was carefully placed amongst the archives.

The history of events has now been brought down to the 29th May, on which date Admiral Seymour reported that the Egyptians were raising earthworks opposite his flagship, the Invincible, then lying in the inner harbour at Alexandria, and suggested that his squadron should be strengthened by the despatch of three of the ships of war which had been left at Suda Bay.

In a later telegram he added that when the earthworks were armed, the position of the unarmoured vessels of his squadron would be untenable, if fired on without warning. In reply, the Admiral was directed to arrange with the French Admiral to dispose the ironclads so as to silence the batteries if they opened fire.

On the 30th May, the British ironclad Monarch, and two gun-vessels, the Cygnet and the Coquette, as well as three French vessels of war--the Alma, the Thétis and the Hirondelle--were ordered from Suda Bay to Alexandria, where they arrived between the 2nd and 5th June.

The rest of the British Squadron in Suda Bay were directed to cruise off the coast of Egypt, and to communicate with Alexandria for orders from time to time.

Arabi, on being applied to on the subject of the earthworks, answered that repairs only were being effected, and refused to order them to be discontinued. It was useless to remonstrate with the Khedive, whose orders that all warlike preparations should be stopped had already been disregarded. The Sultan was therefore appealed to, and he sent an order to Arabi to desist from further armament. Arabi gave the necessary instructions, and the new works, on which two guns were already mounted, were discontinued.

The Khedive, on his part, applied to the Sultan, and requested that an Imperial Commissioner should be sent to Egypt. On the 3rd June it was known that Dervish Pasha, a Marshal of the Ottoman Empire, had left Constantinople for Alexandria as special Envoy from the Sultan, and his arrival was awaited with anxiety by both the Khedive and the Arabists.

The following observations, taken from one of the highest authorities on Egyptian matters,[8] throw a light on Dervish Pasha's mission.

"The Sultan's aim naturally was not to reinforce, but to counteract Anglo-French influence in Egypt. By accepting his intervention England and France confessed themselves worsted, and opened the door for a host of intrigues. His Majesty was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity and tried to play a complicated double game. Dervish Pasha, the First Commissioner, was instructed to support the Khedive, and if possible intimidate the leaders of the military party, while Ahmet Essad, the Second Commissioner, was instructed to conciliate Arabi and his friends, and assure them that they had in the Sultan a sure friend and ally. The Third Commissioner's duty was to act as a spy on his two colleagues, and he in his turn was closely watched by a secretary, who sent secret reports direct to Constantinople."

On Dervish's arrival in Cairo, on the 7th of June, he was greeted by the acclamations of a mob of the lowest class of natives, who shouted before his carriage the praises of Arabi, and denounced the Christians.

"Dervish was known before his arrival to be accessible to Egyptian arguments, and there can be no doubt that they were boldly asked for and liberally given. Upon his arrival he showed marked favour to the Arabi party. Then he had a long interview with the Khedive, and then his conduct suddenly became very satisfactory to the Palace. Mahmoud Sami had arranged that the petitions from all the provinces should be brought to the Commissioner by deputation. Dervish received them graciously, placed the petitions in a pile on the divan, begged the deputation to consider all grievances settled by his arrival, and dismissed them. The Ministers came next. Mahmoud Sami entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues. Dervish remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary, and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation of the Palace of Ghezireh. The Ministers looked dumfounded, but Dervish, continuing his conversation, begged his secretary to repeat to him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali at the Citadel,[9] which he could see from the window where he sat. When the suggestive story was completed, the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog,' and with a remark on the weather dismissed them."[10]

After this slap in the face the Ministers left, feeling that there was no alternative between complete submission to the Khedive and absolute defiance of the Sultan.

Before two days elapsed, events occurred at Alexandria which demonstrated that Arabi was the only power in Egypt, and brought Dervish to his feet as a suppliant.

What those events were, will be recorded in the next chapter.

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VII. THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA

For some days previous to Sunday, the 11th June, 1882, the demeanour of the natives towards the European population of Alexandria had been growing more and more unfriendly; and there were many indications that some disturbance, the precise nature of which no one was able to discover, was impending.

The forenoon of the 11th passed off quietly enough and without any unaccustomed incident, and the European population attended the churches and places of worship as usual.

Between two and three in the afternoon the tranquillity of the town was disturbed by shouts and yells from some two thousand natives, who were suddenly seen swarming up the Rue des Soeurs, the Rue Mahmoudieh, and the adjacent streets, crying, "Death to the Christians!" Others came soon after from the Attarin and the Ras-el-Tin quarters; and the riot, which appears to have broken out in three places almost at the same time, became general.

The crowd rushed on, striking with their "naboots" all the Europeans whom they could meet, knocking them down and trampling them under foot. Shots were fired; the soldiers and police interfered; but, in most instances, only with the object of making the butchery more complete. Many Europeans, flying for refuge to the police stations, were there slaughtered in cold blood. Shops and houses were broken into and pillaged, and for four and a half hours, until the soldiers arrived on the scene, the usually quiet and prosperous city of Alexandria experienced a fair share of the horrors of war.

The signal for the massacre was a feigned Arab funeral procession, in which natives marched wearing green turbans, and which passed between 10 a.m. and noon through the main streets of Alexandria.[11]

The next thing which occurred was a disturbance which broke out about 1 p.m. between Europeans and natives in the neighbourhood of a coffee-house called the "Café Crystal," in the Rue des Soeurs.

Of the precise origin of the riot it is difficult to speak with certainty. It has been stated that it originated in a dispute between a Maltese and a native coachman or donkey-boy, in which the Maltese, being beaten with a stick, retaliated with his knife, and, according to one account, killed his adversary. Another version is that two natives attempted to break into the shop of a Maltese with whom they had previously quarrelled, and were violently resisted by the owner. Both accounts are involved in doubt, and the better opinion is that whatever may have been the origin of the alleged quarrel, it was only a pretext for what was to ensue. Anyhow, about the time last mentioned, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, was summoned by the local police to assist in quelling a disturbance between Maltese and natives in the quarter of the Caracol Labban, a police-station in the Rue des Soeurs. He found there the Governor and Sub-Prefect of Police, and, after waiting more than an hour, under the impression that they had succeeded in calming the excitement, Mr. Cookson returned to the Consulate. This was not, however, until he had been struck by one of the stones which were flying about.

About 3 p.m. he found a messenger, purporting to come from the Governor, to summon him with all the other Consuls to a meeting at the same Caracol as before.

There is good reason to believe that no such request was ever made by Omar Pasha Loutfi, and that the messages sent were part of a preconceived scheme to decoy the Consuls into the streets, where they would be in the power of the mob. It is a singular thing that there were considerable intervals of time between the delivery of the messages, not warranted by the positions of the different Consulates, as if the intention was for the Consuls to arrive separately. Mr. Cookson, accompanied only by a janissary in uniform, drove immediately towards the Caracol. He found marks of recent conflict in the streets and groups of excited natives moving about. On approaching within about ninety yards of the Caracol, at a place where four roads met, he was first assailed with stones and then felled to the ground with a blow from a "naboot." When the Consul recovered consciousness, he was lying in the street surrounded by a crowd, one or two members of which, including a native officer, were trying to protect him, whilst others were striking at him. Fortunately he was able to escape with his life to the Caracol, where he remained till about 4 p.m., when he was brought by a circuitous route to the Consulate.[12]

It has been stated that the inaction of the police at the different Caracols was due to the fact that the day previous all the officers and sub-officers in charge had been convoked, and told that the men were to remain at their posts under any circumstances, without interfering even in the event of an outbreak happening.

Almost at the same time and place, the other members of the Consular body, as they arrived on the scene, were similarly attacked.

All this time the Governor was at the door of the Caracol, giving orders to the mustaphazin (military police) to disperse the mob, though his orders were never executed. In fact, the mustaphazin were quite beyond his control, and at times openly cursed and reviled him when he tried to interfere on behalf of the Europeans.

Whilst the fighting went on, the Arabs, the police, and the soldiers occupied their time in breaking open and plundering the shops and houses on the line of route, tearing down doors and shutters, and using the materials as well as the legs of tables and chairs as weapons of offence.

The rioting gradually extended up the Rue des Soeurs, towards the Place Mehemet Ali (the great square), the Europeans here and there firing at times from the terraces and balconies of the houses, and the soldiers and the mob replying with firearms and stones.

At an early period of the fray, one of the mustaphazin was killed by a shot from a house, and his body being taken to an adjoining Caracol, his comrades became so exasperated, that they butchered every European who sought refuge there.

In the streets, the conduct of the mustaphazin was almost equally bad. When they did interfere, they did so in a half-hearted, indifferent manner. In the great majority of cases, where they did not join in the killing themselves, they encouraged their countrymen to do so. There is reason to believe that the mustaphazin did a large proportion of the killing, as they were armed with sword-bayonets. The natives, on the other hand, had in most cases only heavy sticks, with which they stunned and bruised their victims.

A considerable number of Bedouins were observed amongst the mob, which emerged from the Rue des Soeurs by the side streets leading into the adjoining quarters. The Bedouins were armed with their long guns, with which they shot down passing Europeans. One of a group of Bedouins, stationed opposite the European hospital to intercept the fugitives, was seen to shoot a man who was running past, and crouching down, in the hope of escaping observation.

About 4 p.m. a second mob came down from a different part of the town known as the Attarin quarter, and similar fighting went on, the natives attacking every European who came in their path. Amongst other victims was a little boy five years old, apparently a Maltese, who was killed with a naboot in front of the Austrian Post Office.

At half-past five, the portion of the Rue des Soeurs where the disturbance began was almost deserted, the ground being strewn with débris of wood and glass, and the windows shattered, many of them by bullets. Further up, and opposite the Lazarist College, in the same street, but nearer the Place Mehemet Ali, the crowd from the Attarin quarter mingled with the other mob were continuing the work of destruction. They hunted down every European they saw; one they fell upon and killed with sticks and pieces of wood at the very door of the college itself. All this while the mustaphazin, some thirty or forty in number, in front of the college, were observed firing off their rifles without any apparent motive. The street at this part was now filled with rioters. A number of Europeans found refuge at the college, the doors of which were bolted and barred by the inmates. From the terrace above these were able to look down on the work of destruction.

About 5.30 a European in black clothes, and apparently of good social position, covered with blood and with his trousers torn to rags, was seen running backwards and forwards, as if distracted. Just as he reached the corner of the Rue des Soeurs, a point guarded by two mustaphazin, a band of natives armed with sticks emerged from the street, rushed at once on him and beat him on the head. The two mustaphazin not only did not prevent the Arabs from ill-treating their victim, but, on the contrary, were seen to seize the wretched man by the arm, and laughing, thrust him into the midst of the band which was assailing him. Whether he subsequently escaped or not is unknown. One of these mustaphazin being remonstrated with, candidly replied, "We are ordered to do it."

In one spot in the Rue des Soeurs the bodies of three Europeans were found lying in a heap. One had a bullet-hole in the head, another was stabbed through the chest, and another with his skull fractured was lying on his face with his shoes and stockings stripped off.

The mob now turned their attention to indiscriminate pillage. The shops in the square itself were broken into and the kiosks wrecked. Next, crowds of looters were observed going back in the direction of Gabari, laden with goods from the neighbouring shops. These the mustaphazin allowed to pass without opposition; indeed, several of their own number were themselves carrying the stolen goods. Soldiers were seen to take from Europeans, whose lives they spared, their watches and such valuables as they had about them.

In the Strada Nuova both police and soldiers were observed encouraging the mob to break open shops, and each time this was done the police and soldiers entered first, and had the first choice.

In another quarter two native policemen were observed attacking even a native, who was carrying gold articles and a quantity of money, when a mounted soldier appeared on the scene, and he and the policemen shared the plunder between them, leaving the thief to go empty away. In their selection of objects of plunder the mob were far from particular. One soldier was seen walking down the street with a glass chandelier on his head. Another was seen riding down the street on a toy horse. The tobacco shops suffered more severely than any others; wherever one of these was seen, it was invariably broken into and the contents distributed among the crowd. Wearing apparel, also, was in great request, and one of the native officers was observed sitting on the pavement exchanging the trousers he was wearing for a new pair stolen from a neighbouring shop. In the few cases where a native had not succeeded in obtaining any plunder for himself, he invariably turned to one of his more fortunate comrades and helped himself to his stock. One man who was carrying off some dozens of slippers was stopped by no less than three of his fellow-countrymen, who made him wait whilst they selected those which fitted them best.

Whilst this was occurring similar scenes of violence were being perpetrated in another part of the town, namely, in the streets leading from the Place Mehemet Ali to the Marina and to Ras-el-Tin.

On that Sunday a considerable number of Europeans had been to visit the ships in the harbour. On their return, between 4 and 5 p.m., they found the Marina Street, Frank Street, and the adjoining thoroughfares in the possession of a mob armed with naboots. What happened may be learned from the case of an English missionary, Mr. H. P. Ribton, one of the victims. Ribton, accompanied by his little daughter and two friends, was amongst those who had been afloat in the afternoon. On landing from the ships they found the city gate, leading from the Marina into the town, closed; but they were allowed to pass through by a door in the police-office. The shops were shut, and the streets were filled with soldiers. Ribton and party were in the rear of some other Europeans who had landed with them. Suddenly the police called out in Arabic, "Quick! quick!" and all the Europeans commenced running. In a moment or two those in front wheeled round, crying that the mob were coming. Mr. Ribton and his friends turned at the same time, but the police with fixed bayonets drove them back, and in an instant they found themselves face to face with the mob, who had already overwhelmed the Europeans in front.

The mob consisted of the lowest class of Arabs in the city; they were armed, like the rest, with clubs, with which they beat their victims to death. As soon as the latter fell the Arabs dragged them out to the back streets, stripped their bodies and flung them into the sea.

The missionary and his two male companions in vain attempted to shield his daughter from the blows. Though Ribton himself was twice felled to the ground he again staggered to his feet, attempting to save his daughter. The third time he fell he rose no more, and when afterwards his body was found his head was so battered as to be unrecognizable.[13] Ribton's two friends were killed by his side. His daughter was seized by a native soldier, who, throwing her across his shoulders, carried her off to the Arab quarter. Here she was rescued by a friendly Sheikh, who had heard her screams, and who kept her in his house till nightfall, when he sent her home disguised in native clothes.

Some of the most atrocious acts of violence were perpetrated in immediate proximity to the Zaptieh, where is situated the Prefecture of Police. Here soldiers and mob, mixed together, pursued the Europeans who were passing on their way to the Marina in the hope of escaping to the ships. Whenever a European appeared in sight the mob cried out in Arabic, "Oh, Moslems! Kill him! Kill the Christian!"

The master of a Greek merchant ship was forced by the police to descend from his carriage, and bayoneted on the spot. A French subject, who was being pursued by the mob, applied to a soldier for protection. The latter responded by taking deliberate aim at him with his rifle and bringing him to the ground. A mustaphazin was seen holding a young man from behind, whilst a soldier shot him dead; his body was then maltreated and thrown into the sea.

A man on guard at the Zaptieh, or chief police office, was seen to shoot down a European who was running away from the mob, who speedily battered him to death.

Some officers of H.M.S. Superb, Lieutenants Saule and Dyrssen, Dr. Joyce and Mr. Pibworth, engineer, about 6 p.m., seeing the mob rushing towards them, attempted to obtain shelter at the Caracol Midan. The man on duty refused to admit them. They then ran to the Danish Consulate close by, where they were offered an asylum by the Consul. As their ship was going to sea at 7 p.m., the officers were unwilling to stop, and, taking advantage of a carriage which had been secured, they proceeded towards the Marina by Frank Street. When about half-way down they found themselves in the centre of the mob, who, howling and shouting, seized the horses' heads and commenced striking the officers with their sticks; several brandished knives, and one of them stabbed Mr. Pibworth, wounding him mortally, and attempted to stab the others. They then jumped from the carriage and managed to run through the crowd, receiving several blows in doing so. Mr. Pibworth was removed to the police station, where he died half-an-hour afterwards. A fireman of the S.S. Tanjore, who was in a carriage with five of his companions, also on his way to the harbour, was stopped about 4 p.m. by the mob in the open piece of ground near the Zaptieh, and ordered to alight. They were then surrounded and beaten by the natives, some of the party receiving wounds from the swords of the mustaphazin drawn up there. The party tried their best to escape, but the fireman was dragged by the arm into the Zaptieh. Two minutes later he saw one of his companions brought in by a soldier. Almost at the same moment the guard on duty at the gate drew his sword and struck the man twice, splitting his skull with the first stroke, and severing his head from his body with the second. The fireman was detained for three hours, and, according to his statement, all who were brought in during that time were slaughtered.

Witnesses living near the Zaptieh spoke of the cries and groans which came from the building at this period, and another witness has stated that from a window opposite he counted no less than thirteen bodies of Europeans being dragged out and taken down a side street towards the sea.[14]

The rioting in the Rue des Soeurs, near the Caracol, was at its height at 4.30 p.m., and that in Frank Street about 5.30 or 6, when the two mobs of rioters marched on until they united in the great square or Place Mehemet Ali.

The brutality of the mob extended even to the Arab children. One of them was seen to go up to the dead body of a European and fire off a toy-gun at his head, and the shoe-blacking boys in the Place Mehemet Ali were observed to beat out the brains of the wounded who lay groaning on the pavement.

Whilst this was going on, the troops, to the number of about 7,000, remained at the different barracks under arms, waiting instructions to act. The Governor, about four in the afternoon, had asked the Military Commandant of the town to place at his disposal a battalion of the regiment at Ras-el-Tin; but the messenger returned, saying the colonel required an order in writing before he could move. The Governor then sent the written order demanded, and also despatched an order to the colonel of the regiment at Rosetta Gate to send a battalion of his troops into the town without delay. He also, to prevent the disorder spreading to the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de l'Eglise, ordered a company of mustaphazin to each of those places.

The mustaphazin, this time, obeyed, but the soldiers still remained drawn up at the barracks. In spite of the Governor's request, they refused to march without an order from the Minister of War. Much valuable time was thus wasted.

Now came Arabi's opportunity. Arabi, it will be remembered, had, a few days before, been treated by Dervish Pasha as an ignoble rebel against the Sultan, and made to feel his inferiority. When the news of the riot was telegraphed to Cairo the great Envoy himself was sent to fetch Arabi, and had, almost on his knees, to beg him to intervene. Arabi consented, and the desired despatch was sent by telegraph from Cairo, and a little after 6 p.m. the soldiers began to march. As they advanced, the mob gradually fell back, and then dispersed as if by magic; and the tramping, shouting, and yelling suddenly ceased, and there was silence in the streets save for the groans of the wounded.

The behaviour of the troops was strictly in accordance with discipline. They had their orders to put an end to the disturbance, and they did so. One of them being asked if the massacre was finished, naively replied, "Yes; the order has come to cease striking."

In the course of the afternoon, hundreds of Europeans rushed for protection to the different Consulates, where they remained with the gates closed and guarded. Every moment increased the number of fugitives. The British Consulate was literally crammed with officers, civilians, ladies and children.

Telephonic communication was open with Admiral Seymour on board the Helicon. The Admiral had himself been on shore that afternoon, and narrowly escaped the rioters. His movements at this critical moment were marked by great indecision. His first idea appears to have been to land an armed force for the protection of the Europeans, for at 5.32 p.m. the Helicon made the general signal to the fleet, "Prepare to land armed boats." This order, however, was annulled five minutes later. The captains of the English men-of-war were then signalled to assemble on board the Flag-ship, when, after consultation, it was decided, as the only course open, to send boats round to the Eastern Harbour under cover of the guns of H.M.S. Superb, to be in readiness to embark those who had taken refuge in the Consulate; and boats were sent to the Arsenal and other landing-places to bring off the officers who remained on shore.

It had been arranged that the Superb was to take up a position off the Eastern Harbour, near the European quarter, and to have a force of seamen and marines ready for immediate service on shore, sending her boats as near as possible to the beach, with a view to the removal from the town of all the women and children whom they might be able to find. The landing party, to be used only in case of need, was, on a signal being made, to clear the streets leading to the English Consulate.

Between 8 and 9 p.m. the Governor, to whom the arrangements were communicated, begged that the boats might not be sent, as their appearance would, in his opinion, excite the troops beyond control. He also stated that the disturbance had now been suppressed, and that he could guarantee the safety of everybody. Under these circumstances, it was decided that the instructions to the Superb should be countermanded. This, however, appears not to have been communicated to that vessel.

The night passed off badly enough at the Consulate, which was crowded with terrified fugitives. There were, however, no serious alarms until about 11.30, when an event happened which might have brought about a catastrophe.

One of the Superb's armed boats, mistaking a bright light on the shore for the signal arranged in the event of the boats being required to land, answered the supposed signal with a blue light, and thus disclosed her position near the shore, hitherto concealed by the darkness. In an instant the bugles sounded the alarm, there was a call to arms all over the town, and a rush made by the troops towards the beach, showing that the Governor's fears were well founded, and that had the boats touched the shore, the troops, already much excited, would have been quite beyond the control of their officers. There was not a moment to be lost. A peremptory order was sent from the Consulate to the officer in charge of the boats to withdraw out of sight, and the soldiers, seeing no signs of a landing, retired to their posts.

The rest of the night passed quietly and without incident. The population mostly remained indoors, and detachments of soldiers with fixed bayonets guarded the various Consulates and stationed themselves at the corners of all the principal streets. But for these circumstances, and for the broken débris from the wrecked shops and houses, there was little to indicate that anything unusual had taken place.

There are no means of arriving accurately at the numbers killed on the 11th June, but they have been estimated, by competent persons, at one hundred and fifty Europeans, besides natives.[15] Many of the latter are known to have been carried off to the houses at nightfall and then secretly buried. The European doctors who visited the hospitals on the following day found forty-nine bodies--forty-four of which were Europeans. Thirty-seven were so battered as to be unrecognizable. Seventy-one persons were also found wounded; of these, thirty-six were Europeans, two Turks, and thirty-three natives. Of those killed or wounded, some had received stabs on their bodies, but the majority had their injuries inflicted by naboots. One witness speaks to having seen several cartloads of bodies thrown, at night, into the sea near the Western Harbour, and it is quite possible that many were so disposed of. In a fluctuating population, such as that of Alexandria, it is obvious that many persons might disappear and never be inquired for.

The Governor, on the 12th, visited the sacked and looted quarters of the town, and took note of the houses injured. He also arrested and imprisoned between two and three hundred natives who had taken part in the riot of the previous day.

On the same day, the women and children, who had taken refuge at the British Consulate, embarked under an escort provided by the Governor. Thousands of other Europeans of all nationalities also went afloat, and during the whole day the streets were blocked with fugitives. At first these were cursed and spat upon by the natives as they passed, but later on they were allowed to go by unmolested.

In Cairo a meeting was held at which the Khedive, Dervish Pasha, the Ministers, and the Consuls-General were present. This was to obtain a reply to a demand of the Consular body that measures should be taken to insure the safety of Europeans. Arabi promptly undertook to stop all inflammatory preaching, and to obey all orders given him by the Khedive. The Khedive engaged himself to issue orders immediately with the object of restoring public tranquillity. Dervish Pasha, on his part, consented to accept joint responsibility with Arabi for the execution of the orders of the Khedive.

It was then decided to increase the number of patrols and to reinforce the police stations by troops. Yacoub Pasha Sami, Under-Secretary of War, was sent from Cairo with two regiments of infantry and some artillery. Guards with their arms were placed at the corners of the streets, and at night they lay down on the ground in the Place Mehemet Ali and other open spaces. In the course of the day a proclamation was issued by the Consular body to the Europeans, pointing out that the disorder had been suppressed by the army, and that its chiefs guaranteed public tranquillity. It further called upon the European population to remain in their dwellings, and to abstain from carrying firearms. The effect of the proclamation in reassuring the inhabitants was simply nil, and many persons who might otherwise have remained on shore betook themselves to the ships.

On the 13th the Khedive and Dervish Pasha arrived from Cairo. Their reception was anything but enthusiastic.

Alexandria remained quiet, the streets being still patrolled by soldiers night and day. The general flight of Europeans continued. The number seeking refuge on board the ironclads was so great that the ships would have been useless in the event of their having to act. Three hundred were on board the Invincible, the same number on board the Monarch, and all the smaller men-of-war were similarly crowded. On the Admiral's representation, merchant-steamers were chartered by the British Government, and employed to take the refugees to Malta; one of the Poste-Khedive steamers was, subsequently, taken up as a temporary refuge, and some hundreds of persons were placed on board. Other steamers were thronged with passengers leaving for Cyprus, Constantinople, and other places; fabulous prices were charged the fugitives by the boatmen who took them off to the various vessels.

A Commission of Inquiry was next instituted by the Egyptian Government, with a view to discover the authors of the events of the 11th June. The President of the Commission, oddly enough, was Omar Pasha Loutfi, Governor of Alexandria, the official who was responsible for the maintenance of order on the day in question, and who was therefore himself, to some extent, on his trial. The Commission assembled, and evidence was taken from the wounded and others. An English barrister attended as the delegate of the British Consulate. Before the inquiry had proceeded far it developed into mutual recriminations, and a pretext was afforded to the Egyptian Government for bringing counter charges against Europeans. Eventually such determined opposition was raised by the Egyptian members to the institution of a satisfactory inquiry that the British delegate had to be withdrawn, and the Commission collapsed.

On the 20th of June a new Ministry under Ragheb Pasha, an old and infirm statesman, was formed. In this, as before, Arabi figured as Minister of War. The men forming the Cabinet were not such, however, as to inspire confidence. Many of them were pronounced Arabists, and the rest were about fair specimens of the usual Egyptian Minister.

Arabi, who had come to Alexandria at this time, now made a point of showing himself a good deal in public, driving out every evening, sometimes in the same carriage with the Khedive, and always attended by a cavalry escort. On these occasions great crowds of natives assembled, and showed unmistakably the interest they took in the de facto ruler of Egypt.

That Arabi and the Sultan were in accord at this time is unquestionable. But if any doubt existed it was removed by the fact that on the 25th June the Sultan decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh the man who had plunged his country into anarchy. The Order was presented by the Khedive personally, who (Arabi declares) expressed his satisfaction and gratitude for his faithful services and attention to duty.

The attitude of Tewfik, on this as on other occasions, appears at first sight inexplicable. It is only to be accounted for on the hypothesis that His Highness, having just reason to doubt how far he could calculate on the sincerity of England and France, or on receiving help from them, was unwilling to cut himself altogether adrift from the National Party.

It is due to Arabi to say that during the period which elapsed between the day of the massacre and the subsequent bombardment perfect order was maintained in Alexandria. It was not so in the interior, however, and on the 26th June it was reported that ten Greeks and three Jews were massacred at Benha, an important town in the Delta. In other provincial towns, Europeans were openly insulted by the natives, and soon began to join the fugitives to Europe. At Rosetta and Damietta, things grew so threatening that even the European lighthouse-keepers had to be withdrawn, and their duties confided to natives.

At Alexandria, the British Consul, disabled by the wounds which he received on the 11th June, had to leave for Europe. The Vice-Consul, incapacitated by age, and suffering from the shock brought about by recent events, had also to depart. Most of the Consular clerks and employés likewise found it necessary to quit their posts, and Sir Edward Malet, overtaken at a critical moment by severe illness, had to betake himself to Europe. In this emergency, Mr. Cartwright was called upon to discharge the duties of Consul-General, assisted by the knowledge and local experience of Sir Auckland Colvin.

On the 29th June, Mr. Cartwright wrote to Lord Granville as follows:--

"The exodus of Europeans and the preparations for flight, after seeming temporarily to have abated, continue with increased vigour. The hotels are closing; the shipping agents have transferred their offices to the neighbourhood of the port; and the banks which still remain open are preparing to transfer their staff to the ships. It is impossible to describe the collapse and ruin which have overtaken the country.... A large number of respectable natives are leaving. The departure of Turkish families is taking larger proportions, while 200 destitute Jews and Rayahs have been sent away at the expense of the Government itself."

Thrown out of employment by the exodus of Europeans, the greatest distress prevailed, and it was estimated that nearly 30,000 persons were left destitute in Alexandria alone.

Thus matters went on, until the measures taken by the Government in adding to the armament of the forts led to actual hostilities. On the part of the Europeans, a sort of stunned feeling prevailed; there was, with a few exceptions, absolute panic. On the side of the natives, there was a vague feeling of disquietude. They realized that they had irretrievably committed themselves, and imagined that the day of retribution was drawing nigh.

Ships of war continued to arrive from all parts, until a squadron of twenty-six vessels belonging to the navies of England, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, lay off Alexandria.

Meanwhile, the crowd of fugitives continued to embark. The French and Greek Governments sent transports to remove their subjects en masse, and ships laden with British refugees left for Malta as fast as the vessels could fill up. Europeans arrived from Cairo and the interior, and the trains were thronged with passengers, many of whom rode on the roofs and steps of the railway carriages. As many as 4,000 arrived on one day, the 15th.

Alexandria, at this period, presented a curious spectacle. Beyond the business of transporting the fugitives, there was nothing else done. The shops were shut, and the doors barred and padlocked. The banks were occupied in putting up iron shutters, and blocking up their windows. The few business firms which remained hired steamers in the harbour and removed their books and effects on board, so as to be ready for any eventuality. The streets in the European quarter presented a deserted appearance, the Arab soldiers being almost the only persons seen about.

In Cairo things were but little better, the whole of the foreign population had taken flight, together with most of the well-to-do natives.[16]

The events of the 11th June created a profound sensation in England. That a large number of unoffending Europeans, living in a civilized or quasi-civilized country, should have been without provocation suddenly attacked and slaughtered, was bad enough. But that this should have occurred at a moment when eight British ships of war, and nine others belonging to other Powers, were there, for the avowed purpose of protecting European life and property, was worse still.

The opportunity was not lost upon the Opposition. Indignation meetings were held throughout the United Kingdom, in which the conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Administration was denounced in the strongest terms. Lord Salisbury, as the leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, was particularly vehement in his condemnation of a policy which had resulted in British subjects being "butchered under the very guns of the fleet, which had never budged an inch to save them."

On board the vessels of the British fleet, a similar feeling of indignation prevailed. When the bodies of the officer and seamen massacred were on the 13th June taken out to sea for burial, officers and men alike clamoured for revenge. It was felt that an insult had been offered to the British flag, which ought to be avenged.

Public feeling at home became fully aroused, and Her Majesty's Government caused it to be intimated that it was their intention to demand reparation for the loss of life and property which had occurred. To strengthen the Mediterranean fleet, the Channel Squadron, consisting of the Minotaur, Achilles, Agincourt, Northumberland and Sultan, was despatched to Malta on the 15th, and placed under the temporary command of Admiral Seymour. More energetic measures still were in contemplation, but it was deemed unwise to decide upon them until the great body of Europeans should have had time to clear out of Egypt.

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VIII. THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT

On the 1st of July, 1882, matters had become so threatening that the Consular archives and such of the staff as remained were removed on board a Peninsular and Oriental steamer, chartered as a place of refuge for the British subjects whose duties compelled them to remain in Egypt.

The same day Admiral Seymour telegraphed that there were upwards of 10,000 men in the forts and barracks of Alexandria, and that Arabi hoped to get the allied fleets into a trap by sinking stone barges at the harbour mouth.

On the 3rd, Seymour received the following instructions:--

"Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks or fresh guns mounted, inform Military Commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire."

On the 4th, Dervish Pasha made a final attempt to get rid of Arabi and his party by diplomacy. The Turkish Envoy invited the Minister of War to go to Constantinople "to live with the Sultan and other friends." Arabi, to his credit, refused to desert his followers, and replied that the people would not suffer him to leave, and that as they were attached to him he could not abandon them.

The same day a telegram was sent to the Admiral as follows:--

"Acquaint Military Governor that any attempt to bar the channel will be considered as a hostile act, which will be treated accordingly. Concert with Consul-General as to notice to Europeans if occasion arises. Before taking any hostile step, invite co-operation of French Admiral; but you are not to postpone acting on your instructions because French decline to join."

The Admiral replied:--

"Two additional guns placed in Pharos Castle last night. Parapet facing sea-wall was also strengthened. Consul-General would prefer I postponed operations until Thursday morning to allow time for people to quit Cairo. No change in the works bearing on the harbour. French Admiral has asked for orders."

Seymour had now taken steps for strengthening the fleet, by ordering the ironclad Sultan from Malta. He had also received intelligence that two battalions had been ordered to Cyprus from Malta in ships of the Channel Squadron. He had, moreover, in concert with the Acting Consul-General, succeeded in getting nearly the whole of the European residents out of the country. It only remained to see how far, in the event of action becoming necessary, he could count on the support of the Power which had joined England in presenting the celebrated Joint Note.

On the question being put to M. de Freycinet by Lord Lyons, the French Foreign Minister replied that his Government had decided "not to instruct Admiral Conrad to associate himself with the English Admiral in stopping by force the erection of batteries or the placing of guns at Alexandria." The reasons given were, that such a step would be an act of war, which could not be resorted to without the consent of the Legislature, and that if the Government applied to the Chamber for sanction, they did not feel sure of obtaining it.

On the 6th, the French Ambassador called on Lord Granville and informed him, that in the event of a bombardment taking place, the French ships would go to Port Saïd.

On the same day, Admiral Seymour, finding that the warlike preparations on shore were continuing, wrote to the Military Commandant of Alexandria, that unless such proceedings were discontinued, it would become his duty to open fire on the works in course of construction.

The following reply was received:--

"To the Admiral of the British Fleet.

"MY FRIEND ENGLISH ADMIRAL,

"I had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th July, in which you state that you had been informed that two guns had been mounted and that other works are going on on the sea-shore, and in reply I assure you that these assertions are unfounded, and that this information is like the intimation given to you about the blocking up of the entrance to the harbour, of the falseness of which you were convinced. I rely on your feelings of humanity, and beg you to accept my respects.

"(Signed) TOULBA, "Commandant of Forces."

The Khedive during this period retained great self-possession. He realized perfectly the difficulties of his position, and sent for Sir Auckland Colvin, to whom he explained that should a bombardment be resolved upon he was determined to remain faithful to Egypt. He could not, he said, desert those who had stood by him during the crisis, nor could he, merely to secure his personal safety, abandon Egypt when attacked by a foreign Power. In the event of a bombardment taking place, His Highness announced his intention of retiring to a palace on the Mahmoudieh Canal, and added that the more rapidly the affair was conducted, the less danger there would be for himself personally.

On the 9th, Admiral Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty that "there was no doubt about the armament. Guns were being mounted in Fort Silsileh. He should give foreign consuls notice at daylight to-morrow, and commence action twenty-four hours after, unless forts on the isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered."

The information upon which Seymour proposed to act was partly a declaration made by Lieutenant Dorrien, of the Invincible, and which (omitting immaterial parts) was as follows:--

"On the morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30 a.m., I drove through the Rosetta Gate, and ... reached the old quarantine station, where I ... proceeded on foot to the fort marked on Admiralty Chart 'Tabia-el-Silsileh,' and when within fifty yards of the said fort I observed inside two working parties of Arabs about 200 strong, under the superintendence of soldiers, parbuckling two smooth-bore guns--apparently 32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour, and which seemed to have been lately placed ready for their reception."

On the 10th, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Admiral directing him to substitute for the word "surrendered" the words "temporarily surrendered for the purposes of disarmament."

The same day, the Admiral sent his ultimatum to the Military Commandant, in the terms following:--

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that as hostile preparations, evidently directed against the squadron under my command, were in progress during yesterday at Forts Pharos and Silsileh, I shall carry out the intention expressed to you in my letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th instant, unless previous to that hour you shall have temporarily surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarming, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria."

The actual danger to Admiral Seymour's ships from the Egyptian preparations was at this time simply nil, and even were it otherwise he had only to make a slight change in the position of his vessels to place them completely out of harm's way. At the same time, the bombardment which he threatened, had, after the events of the 11th of June, become, in a certain sense, a necessity, if only to restore European prestige in Egypt: moreover, it formed the first step towards shattering the power of Arabi and his army, which was now, to a great extent, concentrated in Alexandria.

In hurrying on the bombardment, the Admiral was probably influenced not a little by the desire to allay the growing impatience of the officers and men under his command. Ever since the murder of an officer and two men of the fleet, on the day of the riot, a good deal of dissatisfaction was expressed at the continued inaction of the naval force, not only by the seamen, but by the officers as well.

It was foreseen that the arrival of British troops was only a question of days, and the bluejackets naturally desired that, as what had taken place was an insult to the fleet, to the fleet should be given the work of avenging it. They were unwilling, as they put it, that they should be employed merely "to carry Sir Garnet Wolseley's baggage on shore."

The Admiral himself, whilst sharing these sentiments, may not unnaturally have had in his mind the fact that the Channel Squadron, under Admiral Dowell, was on its way to share in the honours of the day.

On the receipt of Admiral Seymour's ultimatum, a Cabinet Council was held at Ras-el-Tin, presided over by the Khedive in person. It was decided to send a deputation to the Admiral, to inform him that no new guns were being mounted in the forts, and to tell him that he was at liberty to send one of his officers, if he desired to test the truth of this statement. The deputation came back with the answer that the Admiral insisted on the disarmament of the forts.

The Council again met in the afternoon, and decided that the Silsileh Fort and Fort Pharos, and the guns placed in them on the Eastern Harbour, could not constitute any threat towards the vessels which were in the Western Harbour, and that the President of the Council should write to the Admiral in the terms of the despatch mentioned below. It was at the same time resolved that in the event of the Admiral persisting in opening fire, the forts should not answer until the fifth shot, when they were to reply.

"Alexandria, July 10th, 1882.

"ADMIRAL,

"As I had the honour to promise in the conversation I had with you this morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive, in a meeting of the Ministers and principal dignitaries of the State, the conditions contained in the letter you were good enough to address this morning to the Commandant of the place, according to the terms of which you will put into execution to-morrow, the 11th instant, at daybreak, the intentions expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the Commandant of the place, if before that time the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the port of Alexandria are not temporarily surrendered to you, to be disarmed.

"I regret to announce to you that the Government of His Highness does not consider this proposition as acceptable. It does not in the least desire to alter its good relations with Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any measures which can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet by works, by the mounting of new guns, or by other military preparations.

"Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation, and of our desire, to a certain extent, to accede to your demands, we are disposed to dismount three guns in the batteries you have mentioned, either separated or together.

"If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the Government reserves its freedom of action and leaves with you the responsibility of this act of aggression."[17]

The previous day the Acting British Consul-General visited the Khedive and urged his removal to Ramleh, a suburb about four miles to the east of Alexandria. On the 10th Sir Auckland Colvin called to say farewell to His Highness, and used every argument to induce him to embark in one of the British vessels, but in vain. Tewfik remained firm, and announced his intention of standing by his country.

At seven in the evening all the Consuls-General were warned to withdraw their subjects. The acting British Consul-General and Sir Auckland Colvin embarked on board the Monarch, and the few remaining British residents betook themselves to the P. & O. s.s. Tanjore.[18]

In the course of the day all the merchant vessels in the harbour left, and these were followed by the foreign men-of-war. One by one the latter steamed slowly out, and as they passed the British flag-ship her band struck up the different national airs. The last ship to leave was the Austrian frigate Landon, and when darkness closed in, the English ships of war were alone in the harbour of Alexandria.

At 9.20 p.m. the Admiral, in the Invincible, with the Monarch in company, weighed anchor, and steamed to a position outside the harbour. All lights were extinguished, and perfect silence was maintained as the ships cautiously felt their way through the water. At 10.10 both vessels came to an anchor off Mex, where their consort, the Penelope, was already lying.

In the meantime, all the ships, including the larger ironclads Sultan, Superb, Temeraire, Alexandra, and Inflexible, which were lying in the offing, had struck their upper masts, sent down top-gallant and royal yards, and got everything ready for action. In this state they remained for the night.

In order to give the reader an idea of the comparative strength of the opposing forces, it is necessary, in the first place, to give a short description of the fortifications of Alexandria and their armaments.

Alexandria is situated on a strip of land between the Mediterranean and Lake Mareotis; a considerable portion of the town stands on a promontory, which, jutting out from the rest towards the north-west, is bounded on the north-east by the new or Eastern Harbour, and on the south-west by the old or Western Harbour.

The fortifications, which were intended to protect the city from an attack, not only by sea, but also from the direction of Lake Mareotis, are said to have been planned in Paris, and executed under the direction of French engineers. The whole of the works were originally well built, but had fallen much out of repair.

The material used was a soft limestone but little calculated to withstand modern artillery. The parapets were of sand, covered with a thin coating of cement. The scarps and counterscarps were reveted with stonework. The rifled guns, without exception, fired through embrasures, and nearly all the smooth-bore guns fired over parapets.

The buildings were none of them bomb-proof; nor, except in the case of Fort Pharos, were there any casemated or covered batteries. The forts on the sea face of Alexandria may be summed up as follows:--

West of Alexandria--Forts Marabout, Adjemi, and Marza-el-Kanat.

South-west of Alexandria--Citadel of Mex, Old Fort of Mex, and Mex Lines.

South of Alexandria--Forts Kamaria, Omuk Kubebe, Saleh Aga, and a small battery between the two last named works.

North of Alexandria--Lighthouse or Ras-el-Tin Fort, Lines of Ras-el-Tin (including the Hospital Battery), Fort Adda, Fort Pharos, and Fort Silsileh.

Of the above, Fort Adjemi took no part in the subsequent bombardment.

The British squadron consisted of the ironclads Alexandra, Superb, Sultan, Temeraire, Inflexible, Monarch, Invincible, and Penelope, the torpedo-vessel Hecla, the despatch boat Helicon, the gun-vessels Condor and Bittern, and the gunboats Beacon, Cygnet, and Decoy. The battleships, with the exception of the Invincible and Penelope, were the most powerful then in the British navy. Their size and armament may be briefly summarized:--

The Alexandra, Captain C. F. Hotham, 9,490 tons, 8,610 h.p., 674 men, 2 11-inch 25-ton and 10 10-inch 18-ton guns.

The Superb, Captain Thomas Le Hunt-Ward, 9,170 tons, 6,580 h.p., 620 men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.

The Sultan, Captain W. J. Hunt Grubbe, 9,290 tons, 7,720 h.p., 620 men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.

The Temeraire, Captain H. F. Nicholson, 8,450 tons, 7,520 h.p., 530 men, 4 25-ton and 4 18-ton guns.

The Inflexible, Captain John Fisher, 11,407 tons, 8,010 h.p., 440 men, 4 80-ton guns (in two turrets).

The Monarch, Captain Henry Fairfax, 8,320 tons, 7,840 h.p., 530 men, 4 25-ton, 2 9-inch 12-ton and 1 7-inch 6-1/2-ton guns.

The Invincible, Captain R. H. Molyneux, 6,010 tons, 4,830 h.p., 480 men, 10 9-inch 12-ton and 4 64-pounder guns.

The Penelope, Captain St. G. D. A. Irvine, 4,390 tons, 4,700 h.p., 230 men, 8 8-inch 9-ton and 3 40-pounder guns.

The Hecla, torpedo vessel, 6,400 tons, 1,760 h.p., 251 men, and 6 guns.

The Helicon, despatch vessel, 1,000 tons, carrying 2 20-pounder guns.

The Condor and Bittern, gun-vessels, 805 tons, 100 men, 1 7-inch and 2 40-pounder guns each.

The Beacon, gunboat, 603 tons, 80 men, 1 7-inch and 1 64-pounder gun.

The Cygnet and Decoy, gunboats, 455 and 430 tons, 60 men, 2 64-pounder and 2 20-pounder guns each.

In addition to the armament above given, the eight ironclads each carried from six to eight 20-pounder rifled breech-loading guns, and, with the exception of the Penelope, from eight to twelve machine guns.

There were also 880 supernumerary seamen and marines on board the fleet, making the total force 5,728 men.

The relative strength of the opposing forces may be seen from the following tables:--

The ordnance mounted in the forts was as follows:--

-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+------- Fort or Battery. | R. Guns. | S. B. Guns. | Mortars. | Total. -----------------+----------+-------------+----------+------- Fort Silsileh | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6 " Pharos | 8 | 37 | 4 | 49 " Adda | 5 | 14 | 5 | 24 Ras-el-Tin Lines | 9 | 30 | 10 | 49 Lighthouse Fort, | | | | or Ras-el-Tin | 6 | 28 | 3 | 37 Fort Saleh Aga | ... | 12 | ... | 12 Battery | ... | 4 | ... | 4 Fort Omuk Kubebe | 2 | 16 | 2 | 20 " Kamaria | ... | 5 | 1 | 6 Mex Sea Lines | ... | 24 | ... | 24 " Fort | 5 | 9 | 5 | 19 Fort Marabout | 3 | 8 | ... | 11 +----------+-------------+----------+------- TOTAL | 40 | 190 | 31 | 261 -----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------

The guns on board the ironclads are shewn in the following table:--

------------------------------------------------------------------------- RIFLED GUNS. -----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------- SHIPS. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | pr. | pr. | Total. | 16 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 64 | 40 | -----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------- Alexandra | | | 2 | 10 | | | | | | 12 Inflexible | 4 | | | | | | | | | 4 Superb | | | 16 | | | | | | 16 | Sultan | | | | 8 | 4 | | | | | 12 Temeraire | | | 4 | 4 | | | | | | 8 Invincible | | | | | 10 | | | 4 | | 14 Monarch | | 4 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | 7 Penelope | | | | | | 8 | | | 3 | 11 -----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------- TOTAL | 4 | 4 | 6 | 38 | 16 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 84 -----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------

This does not include the six to eight 20-pounder guns and eight to twelve machine guns carried by each vessel.

Admiral Seymour's plan for the bombardment comprised two separate attacks: one by the Sultan, Superb, Alexandra, Inflexible, and Temeraire from outside the breakwater, the other by the Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope inside the reefs.

The three first-mentioned vessels, supported by the fire from the after turret of the Inflexible, which was anchored off the Corvette Pass, were directed to destroy the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin peninsula, and then to move to the eastward and attack Forts Pharos and Silsileh. The Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope, aided by the fire from the Inflexible's forward turret and by the Temeraire, which took up a position off the Boghas Pass, were ordered to open fire on the guns in the Mex Lines. The gun-vessels and gunboats were directed to remain outside until a favourable opportunity should offer for moving in to the attack on Mex.

At 7 a.m. the Admiral, whose flag was flying from the Invincible, signalled to the Alexandra to fire a shell into the recently armed works on Ras-el-Tin, known as the Hospital Battery, and followed this by a general signal to the fleet, "Attack the enemy's batteries." Upon this immediate action began between all the ships, in the positions assigned to them, and the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to the harbour.

A steady cannonade was maintained both by the attacking and defending forces, and for the next few hours the roar of the guns and the shrieks of passing shot and shell were alone audible. The spectacle as seen from the offing was imposing in the extreme. On the one side were the most powerful ships of modern times, all in fighting trim, with upper masts and yards struck, some slowly steaming ahead, others at anchor, but all pouring deadly broadsides into the Egyptian batteries. On the other were the forts, standing out bright and clear in the sunshine, vomiting forth volleys of fire and smoke in the direction of the attacking squadron.

The weather was fine and the sea smooth, both of which circumstances were to the advantage of the attacking force. On the other hand, the wind and sun were in the enemy's favour, and the smoke, which rose like a thick wall, at times prevented those on board the ships seeing the result of their fire.

At 9.40 the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, of the outside squadron, which had previously been under way and turning in succession at a range of about 1,500 yards, came to an anchor off the Lighthouse Fort. The batteries had proved stronger than had been anticipated, and the Egyptian gunners were making very good practice. The firing of the ships at the same time was less effective than could be wished. Under these circumstances, and to obtain the exact range, the three ships adopted a stationary position, and from this moment their fire steadily improved.

A little after 10 o'clock the harem buildings of Ras-el-Tin Palace were set on fire and partly destroyed by a shell.

At 10.30 the Alexandra had one of her heavy guns dismounted and rendered unserviceable. Shortly after the Inflexible weighed anchor and joined the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, and by 12.30 p.m. the combined fire of the four ships had nearly silenced all the guns in the Ras-el-Tin Forts. It should be mentioned that, in addition to helping these three vessels, the Inflexible had at the same time been engaging the Mex Forts, and doing great execution with her 80-ton guns.

The remaining vessel of the outside squadron, the Temeraire, was meanwhile supporting the attack of the inside squadron on the Mex batteries at a range of from 3,500 to 4,000 yards, and making great havoc with her guns. Unfortunately, in taking up her position, she had got too close to the shoal water of the Boghas Pass, and in swinging round had grounded on the reef. The gunboat Condor promptly went to the assistance of the huge ironclad, and eventually the ship was got off without injury.

Although the batteries at Ras-el-Tin had, as above stated, practically ceased firing, some heavy guns in Fort Adda still kept up a desultory cannonade.

At 12.30 p.m. the Sultan signalled to the Inflexible, whose work was now finished both at Ras-el-Tin and Mex, "Adda and Pharos are the only ones not silenced, all our filled shell are expended, and if you are going that way, one or two shells from your heavy guns would do much good, if you don't mind." At 12.35 the Sultan added, "Please silence Adda as well." The Inflexible then stood across to Fort Adda, and at 12.40 opened fire. Shortly after, the Temeraire was signalled, "Assist Inflexible in destroying Pharos and Silsileh." The Temeraire then weighed and steamed over to the position indicated, and assisted in shelling both forts.

About 1.30 p.m. a lucky shell from the Superb, whose practice was very good, blew up the magazine of Fort Adda. The explosion was terrific, and huge pieces of débris were thrown into the air, whilst a dense cloud of smoke for some seconds hid the works from view. The fort at once ceased firing, and when the smoke cleared away it was seen that the garrison had retreated from the blackened ruins.

As early as 1.30, the ships were beginning to run short of ammunition, and the Sultan signalled to the Alexandra, "How many filled shell have you?" and received the answer "Twenty." At one o'clock the Alexandra signalled that she had only thirty common shell left, and was answered by the Sultan that she had none at all, and that the Alexandra had better use common shell as the Sultan was doing.

At 1.35, with the exception of the Hospital Fort, where one rifled gun continued firing, all the batteries from Fort Adda westward being silenced, the Superb signalled the fact to the Sultan, and suggested getting under way. The Sultan replied in the affirmative, adding, "Can you touch up Pharos? Temeraire now on her way to assist Inflexible at Pharos. I have no shell filled, nor has Alexandra." The Superb accordingly proceeded towards Fort Pharos and opened fire.

At 2.0 the Sultan signalled to the Inflexible, which was engaging the Hospital Battery and Fort Pharos, "Proceed to Pharillon" (Silsileh).

At 2.55 a shot from the Hospital Battery struck the Inflexible aloft, carrying away the slings of the mainyard.

At 5 the Hospital Battery fired its last shot.

At 5.10 the Inflexible proceeded across to engage Fort Silsileh, all the other forts from Ras-el-Tin eastward having been silenced.

At 5.15 the general signal, "Cease firing," was made, followed at 6.5 by, "Anchor in same position as last night."

While the off-shore squadron was thus occupied, the other division of the fleet under the Admiral's immediate command was not idle. The Invincible at anchor, with the Monarch and Penelope under weigh inside the reefs, assisted by the Inflexible and Temeraire, in the Corvette and Boghas Channels, were engaging from a distance of 1,300 to 1,500 yards the batteries and lines of Mex, also the Forts of Marza-el-Kanat and Omuk Kubebe at various ranges. The enemy replied briskly both from rifled and smooth bore guns. At 8.45 one of the Monarch's shells exploded the powder magazine at Marza-el-Kanat. At 8.27 the Admiral signalled to her, "Close nearer the forts, keeping as close to them as possible." By 9 a.m. the enemy's guns, except four at Fort Mex, were silenced. These four nevertheless gave considerable trouble to the ships, for it was difficult to hit upon their exact position, placed as they were almost on a level with the water, and only dimly and occasionally seen through the smoke.

About an hour before this Lord Charles Beresford, in the Condor, stationed as repeating ship, saw that the 10-inch rifled guns in Fort Marabout were playing with great accuracy, at a range of 4,200 yards, upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, the shots falling only from 10 to 30 yards short. Steaming within range of his 7-inch gun, he chose with great skill a position, 1,200 yards off, upon which the enemy's guns could not be brought to bear, and engaged the fort single-handed for two hours. The Condor's excellent practice soon checked the fire from Fort Marabout, and elicited from the Admiral, who sent the other gunboats to his aid, the signal, "Well done, Condor." It is satisfactory to be able to add that during this operation no casualties occurred on any of the vessels engaged.[19]

At 10.35 the flag-ship signalled to the Monarch, "Steam close in to the batteries we have silenced and drop a few shells into them at close range." This was followed by, "Go as close to forts as water will permit." The Monarch then steamed in shore and poured in a tremendous fire from all her guns. At 11.30, there being no return fire, she, as well as the Invincible, ceased firing.

At 11.40, the gunboats having returned from Marabout, the Monarch, which remained under way, was signalled to support them in an attempt to destroy the Mex works, but ordered not to fire unless fired upon. All the gunboats were at the same time signalled to close in to the batteries, and, remaining under way, to destroy their rifled guns. The Condor, ten minutes after, signalled that she had only twenty-one shells for each gun left, and received the order to cease firing. The gunboats, supported by the Monarch, continued to fire on the works.

At 11.58, the Monarch observing soldiers running back into the batteries, permission was given her to reopen fire.

Permission was also given to the Penelope to fire at the rifled guns in the batteries with her 40-pounders. At 12.20 p.m. the Monarch ceased firing, signalling that she had driven about 200 soldiers out of the works. At 12.50 p.m. the Penelope was ordered to get under way, and taking advantage of her light draught, to try to dismount the guns at Mex. She then weighed and proceeded in towards Mex Fort, firing at intervals. At 1.10 the windmills in the neighbourhood of the forts were seen to be full of soldiers, and the Monarch was ordered to open fire on them with her light guns.

About 2 p.m. the Admiral, seeing that the gunners of the western battery of Mex had abandoned their guns, and that the supports had probably retired also, landed a party, under cover of the gun-vessels and gunboats, who destroyed with gun-cotton two 10-inch rifled guns, and spiked six smooth-bore guns in the right hand battery. The party returned without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats, which got capsized on the rocks, on an alarm (happily unfounded) being raised that some soldiers were approaching to attack the little force.

At 3.25 the Penelope signalled to the Admiral that Fort Kamaria had its guns manned, though, from her inshore position, the ship's guns would not bear on them. The Admiral, in consequence, directed the Penelope to change her position and open fire on the fort. About the same time soldiers were observed transporting light guns into one of the Mex batteries, and the Monarch was signalled to attack again. Both vessels promptly responded, and, steaming into position, poured in a devastating fire on the points indicated. At 5.30, there being no reply from the enemy, the inside squadron ceased firing. This concluded the operations of the day.

The casualties on board the ships were but slight, amounting only to five killed and twenty-eight wounded--a fact to be attributed partly to the protection afforded by the armour plating of the ships principally engaged, and partly to the inaccurate fire of the enemy's batteries.[20]

A courageous act was reported from the Alexandra. In the course of the bombardment a lighted shell from one of the Egyptian batteries fell on the main deck of the vessel. Mr. Israel Harding, gunner, rushed for the missile all burning as it was, and immersed it in a bucket of water.[21]

The Egyptians, it must be allowed, were overmatched both in the size and number of the guns brought into action, but the way in which they responded to the heavy fire was marvellous. When the Inflexible's 1,700 lb. projectiles struck the scarp of the Lighthouse Fort immediately underneath an embrasure they threw up a cloud of dust and fragments of stone as high as the Lighthouse itself. To the looker-on, it seemed impossible to live under such a fire, yet after a few minutes the dust would clear away, and the gun's crew would pluckily send another shell back at their huge opponent.

The Egyptian forces were under the immediate command of Toulba Pasha. From the best sources of information accessible, it is gathered that the defences contained no less than 2,000 artillerymen, and of infantry and civilian volunteers there was no lack.

The disposition of these troops has not been accurately ascertained, but it is known that Mex was commanded by an adjutant-major, who had with him one captain, three lieutenants, and 150 men. Of this small number one lieutenant was mortally wounded, 50 men were killed, and 48 wounded.

Fort Omuk Kubebe, as already mentioned, was subjected to the Inflexible's fire during the forenoon. Its garrison consisted of 75 artillerymen, aided by a considerable number of native volunteers. Eighteen of these were wounded. In all, along the southern or inside line, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed, and from 150 to 200 wounded.

In the northern line of defences at Ras-el-Tin, and also in Fort Adda, at least 50 men are believed to have been killed and 150 wounded, but the record is very vague. Stray pieces of shell are reported by the chief of police to have killed and wounded between 150 and 200 citizens, but this statement must be accepted for what it is worth.[22]

It is only fair to the other side to give the Egyptian narrative of the bombardment. The account published in the Arab paper El Taif, in Cairo, was as follows:

"WAR NEWS.--On Tuesday, 25 Shaban, 1299, at twelve o'clock in the morning (July 11th, 7 a.m.). The English opened fire on the forts of Alexandria, and we returned the fire. At 10 a.m. an ironclad foundered off Fort Adda. At noon two vessels were sunk between Fort Pharos and Fort Adjemi. At 1.30 p.m. a wooden man-of-war of eight guns was sunk.

"At 5 p.m. the large ironclad was struck by a shell from Fort Pharos, the battery was injured, and a white flag was immediately hoisted by her as a signal to cease firing at her, whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for ten hours without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts were destroyed, but they were repaired during the night. The shots and shells discharged from the two sides amounted to about 6,000, and this is the first time that so large a number of missiles has been discharged in so short a time.

"At 11 a.m. on Wednesday the English ships again opened fire and were replied to by the forts, but after a short time the firing ceased on both sides, and a deputation came from Admiral Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha, which he could not accept.

* * * * *

"No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy fire as did the Egyptians under the fire of twenty-eight ships during ten hours.

* * * * *

"At 9 a.m. on Thursday an English man-of-war was seen to put a small screw in place of the larger one which she had been using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried away by a shot from the forts. On examining other ships it was observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides, and that one had lost her funnel."

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IX. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT

The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was an occurrence of such importance, and so rare are bombardments in recent naval annals, that a few general observations will probably not be without interest.

The most obvious mode of attack on fortifications would be for the ships to form in line ahead and steam past the batteries, each ship delivering her fire in succession as her guns would bear. Having thus passed the line of defence, the ships would turn and repeat the process with the other broadside. By manoeuvring in this manner, the forts (which have the advantage of a fixed gun-carriage), would labour under the disadvantage of having a moving target to fire at. On this principle for two and a-half hours the bombardment of the forts from Ras-el-Tin to Pharos was conducted by the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra. From the fact that at 9.40 a.m. this mode of attack was changed for one which consisted in the systematic concentration of fire on individual forts, from ships more or less stationary, it may be concluded that the former plan was found faulty.

It is submitted that the best principle in practice is the consecutive silencing of individual batteries, and not a general, and so to speak collective, bombardment. In support of this principle it may be mentioned that from the time of the adoption of the second plan the fire of the ships improved very much in accuracy. This also had the further advantage of being accompanied by a simultaneous diminution in the accuracy of the fire of the enemy: as is shown by the circumstance that the majority of the hits received by the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra were sustained before 9.40--the time when these vessels came to an anchor and adopted the concentration principle.

That the fire of the ships would improve as soon as the vessels became stationary is intelligible enough, and is accounted for by the exact range being then attainable, but that the enemy should have made worse practice against a fixed than against a moving target appears a little difficult to understand. The naval officers engaged have, with some sense of humour, suggested that the vessels in manoeuvring from time to time steamed across the line of the Egyptian fire and so got struck. The explanation, however, is probably to be found in the increased state of demoralization of the artillerymen as soon as the ships anchored and made more accurate practice.

In the inshore squadron the flag-ship Invincible was anchored for the most part 1,300 yards from Mex, and was kept broadside to the wind on one side, and to the batteries on the other, by a kedge carried out to windward. The Monarch and Penelope remained under way, passing and repassing the forts. The Penelope adopted the plan of steaming out three-quarters of a mile towards the reef, and then drifting towards the shore broadside on until within about 700 yards, whilst the Monarch kept more way on, moving in a line parallel with the shore. The fire from these two ships was throughout less effective than that from the Invincible, which was at anchor.

The range at which the fleet generally engaged seems to have been needlessly great. The outside squadron could have got to within 1,000 yards of the Lighthouse Fort and 800 yards abreast of the Ras-el-Tin lines, to within 500 yards of Fort Adda and 200 yards of Fort Pharos, whilst the inshore division could easily have got within 400 yards of all the batteries in the neighbourhood of Mex. It can hardly be doubted that the boldness of this move would have been rewarded by the more speedy and extensive dismounting of the guns, which was confessedly the chief object of the attack, and would have allowed the machine guns in the vessels' tops to be used with greater effect.

It must be remembered that the target in each case was the muzzle of a gun, a mere pin's head at the distance at which the ships were engaged, and that a successful hit meant either good luck or phenomenally good shooting. This hammering away at long range was tolerably successful, but the length of the action was a disappointment to those who expected short work to be made of the Egyptians, while, as has been seen, it drained the stock of ammunition to a dangerously low ebb.

The enormous disproportion between the damage sustained by the ships and batteries respectively may be accounted for, partly by the inferior construction of the works, and partly also by the inferior practice of the gunners by whom they were manned. There were other faults in the defence. For example: the batteries were so placed as to be unable, except at Fort Pharos, to support one another; there was no bomb-proof cover; there was too small a stock of ammunition in readiness; and the men who should have been employed as reliefs for manning the rifled guns wasted their efforts with the smooth bores, which were practically useless.

With regard to the fire of the fleet generally, a variety of opinions has been expressed. One authority states that, with the exception of the Inflexible and Temeraire, the English gunners did not greatly distinguish themselves. Many of the shells of the Monarch, Inflexible, and Superb fell short.[23] The fire also was said to have been too slow, thus giving the enemy's artillerists time to recover themselves. The fire of the Inflexible was stated to have been particularly disappointing in this respect. That of the Alexandra was much more rapid than that of the others, as her much greater expenditure of ammunition shows.

A naval officer of experience has expressed the opinion that, considering the nature of the works attacked, an old line-of-battle ship, with her numerous though much smaller guns, would have been more effective than the modern ships which took part in the bombardment. If one considers the great size and weight of the majority of the projectiles used, as well as the capacity of the shell and the consequent amount of their bursting charges, one can hardly fail to be astonished at the small effect produced on the sand parapets, especially when it is remembered that the latter were in many cases, according to modern theory, too weak to afford any real protection. It is a fact, and one on which too much stress cannot be laid, that in only one instance was any one of the parapets pierced by a shell from the fleet, and that Fort Mex was the only battery which could not have been sufficiently repaired during the night to resume the action on the following day. One remarkable feature of the fire from the fleet was the enormous number of shells which failed to explode, and this has never been satisfactorily accounted for.

The expenditure of ammunition by the squadron appears from the following table:--

(A) Common. (B) Palliser. (C) Shrapnel. (D) Segment. (E) Empty Shell. (F) Shot. (G) Case. (H) TOTAL.[24] (I) Martini-Henry. (J) Nordenfeldt. (K) Gatling. (L) Rockets.

-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- SHIP. | (A)|(B)| (C)|(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|| (H) || (I) | (J) | (K) |(L) -----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- Alexandra | 379| 23| 1| | | 4| || 407 || | 4000 | 340| Superb | 257| 83| 25| 34| | 12| || 411 || | 1161 | 880| Sultan | 247| 24| 3| 44| 10| 10| || 338 || | 1800 | 2000| Penelope | 241| | 45| 32| | 62| || 380 || 5000 | 1672 | | Monarch | 227| 5| 129| | | 6| || 367 || 1800 | 3440 | 2680| 21 Temeraire | 139| 70| 13| 6| | | || 228 || | 160 | | Invincible | 221| | 25| | 2| 2| || 250 || 2000 | 2000 | 1000| Inflexible | 139| 21| 11| 37| | | || 208 || | 2000 | | Beacon | 21| | | 1| 61| 18| || 101 || 320 | | | 3 Condor | 162| | 8| | 31| | || 201 || 1000 | | 200| 13 Bittern | 66| 7| 1| | | 12| 3 || 89 || | | | Cygnet | 72| | | | 71| | || 143 || | | | Decoy | 69| | | | | | || 69 || 40 | | | Helicon | 6| | | | | | || 6 || | | | +----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- TOTAL |2246|233| 261|154|175|126| 3 ||3198 ||10,160|16,233| 7100| 37 -----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---

The hits received by the fleet were as follows:--

Alexandra. Twenty-four shot and shell penetrated the ship above the armour-plating. Several shot and shell struck the armour; of these, some made indentations on the plates from five inches to one inch in depth. The foremost funnel was struck in three places. The total number of hits was about sixty.

Sultan. Number of hits, twenty-seven, of which two struck the armour, denting two plates, and starting one. One shot went through the after funnel. The holes made in the side were as follows:--One sixteen inches by twelve inches; another fifteen inches in diameter; and a third fourteen inches in diameter. A hole sixteen inches by ten was made through the mainmast.

Superb. Fourteen hits, of which seven were on the hull, and seven on the upper works and spars. A 10-inch shell struck the port side, and, bursting, tore a hole in the side ten feet by four feet, within three feet of the water-line. The armour-plating on the port side was struck by two shells, of which one indented the armour three inches, and the other burst, starting a plate, and breaking fourteen rivet-heads. Some of the rigging was shot away, and a hole twelve inches in diameter was made in the foremast. Two other holes in the side were as follows:--One ten inches in diameter, four feet above the water-line; the other twelve inches in diameter (made by a 10-inch shot), five feet above the water-line.

Penelope. Eight hits, of which three were on the armour, making little or no indentation. Of the others, one passed through the after embrasure on the starboard side; another hit the starboard quarter gallery; the third struck a 9-pounder gun, carried off the sight and damaged the carriage; the fourth hit the mainyard, port side; and the fifth struck the muzzle of one of the 8-inch guns, then broke up and destroyed the transom plate of the carriage. The gun and carriage were put out of action.

Invincible. Eleven hits, six of which passed through the side. A large dent was made in the armour by a shot which also started a plate.

Inflexible. About six hits altogether. One shot struck the unarmoured part of the hull, and, penetrating, damaged the bollards and did other injury. Other shots damaged the upper-works, but the armour-plating was not struck.

The Monarch, Temeraire, Hecla, and gunboats received no hits at all.

With regard to the effects of the bombardment on the various forts, it is proposed to give a short account, taking them in the same order in which they were first presented to the reader.[25]

1. Fort Marabout.--A small store was burnt. There were several hits on the scarp, but none of the guns were in any way injured.

2. Fort Adjemi.--Uninjured.

3. Marza-el-Kanat.--No injury was done to the fort, but a store of gun-cotton was exploded.

4. The citadel of Mex had several breaches made in the works, but no guns were dismounted.

5. Old Fort of Mex.--Parapets were uninjured, but the buildings in the rear were almost swept away. A small store in front of magazine was levelled to the ground. The large store was riddled with shot, but the magazine was untouched. The barracks were much damaged. The fort was found to contain many fragments of shell, and the loss of life among the defenders was probably considerable. The damage to the guns was as follows:--A 10-inch Armstrong gun was struck in the second coil by a shell which cut a groove of an oval shape in the metal; the coil was shaken out of place and cracked, but the gun was left serviceable. A 9-inch Armstrong gun was struck by a shell, and received an oval graze 1·25 inch in depth. In the right portion of the battery, a 10-inch S.B. and two 8-inch Armstrong guns were struck by shrapnel bullets, and the fifth gun from the left, an 8-inch Armstrong, was struck on the coil by a shell. The blow dismounted gun, carriage and slide. The metal of the gun was ripped off for eighteen inches, and the trunnion ring was also started by the force of the blow. The remaining guns (36-pounders) were uninjured.

Left Flank Battery.--Left gun(10-inch S.B.). This gun was hit on the right of the carriage by a splinter, the gun was uninjured. No.3 gun (10-inch S.B.).--This was hit by a shell on the muzzle, gun uninjured.

6. The Mex Lines, armed with S.B. guns, were not fought, and the works escaped injury.

7. Fort Kamaria was not much injured. A 10-inch S.B. gun was dismounted by a shell.

In view of the tremendous fire to which Fort Mex was subjected, and the comparatively short range at which all the ships except the Temeraire engaged it, it is almost impossible to believe that not a single gun here was disabled or dismounted during the action proper. The 8-inch gun which was dismounted was bowled over by the Penelope long after the fort had ceased firing, and from a distance stated to be about 300 yards. The successful shot was the thirtieth of this series, and was aimed by the gunnery lieutenant.

"This fort was the only one which could not have resumed action on the following day, in consequence of the injury done by the landing-party by exploding gun-cotton and spiking the guns."[26]

8. Omuk Kubebe.--The effects of the bombardment were considerable, though they were due less to the number of hits than to the size and weight of the 16-inch shells which caused most of the injuries. The effect of three of these shells from the Inflexible was worthy of note. One shell having burst on the top of the scarp made an almost practicable breach. Two others, within a few feet of each other, hit the parapet, 24 feet thick, and almost pierced it. They appear to have struck the exterior slope, and having cut a trough in the parapet about 11 feet in width, burst after penetrating 17 feet, and formed craters 16 feet in diameter, and 5 feet and 4 feet 6 inches in depth, respectively. With regard to the ordnance, the only damage was the destruction of a 36-pounder S.B. gun.

9. Saleh Aga.--One 10-inch and one 6·5 S.B. gun were dismounted, and one of the 6·5-inch S.B. guns was destroyed, though not dismounted.

10. The adjoining battery received only slight injuries.

11. Lighthouse Fort, or Fort Ras-el-Tin.--The barracks to the north of the fort were riddled with shell, and in many parts left in ruins. The parapets on the west side were so scored with shell that it was difficult to estimate the number of hits, but at no point had they been pierced. The scarp also suffered severely, both at the bastions and on the curtain; and the right face of the bastion was much marked by shrapnel bullets. On the west front the parapet showed about twenty-three hits, and the scarp twenty-four; two stores were burnt, and the rifled-shell store was riddled with shell. The Lighthouse itself was hit by several shells, and the buildings round its base were reduced to ruins. Right gun (9-inch).--This gun was sent back to the end of the slide, and breaking the ties was tilted up on its breech with the muzzle in the air. Left gun (9-inch).--This was struck by two shells, and gun and carriage were both destroyed. The former was hit on the trunnion ring, which had been partially carried away, the carriage was in pieces, and the brackets were torn off and broken. The gun was thrown about twelve feet to the rear and crushed several of the gunners, ten bodies having been found beneath it. In the left bastion, a 10-inch Armstrong gun was hit on the muzzle, but the tube was not damaged. The sockets of the levers were broken by use, the tackle shot away, and the shot-crane broken and useless. A 9-inch gun was run back and tilted up on the breech in the same manner as the 9-inch gun in the right bastion. An 8-inch gun was struck in reverse by shells. The gun and carriage were capsized on the left side, but uninjured. One truck of the slide was cut away. The Lighthouse Fort suffered more severely than either Pharos or Adda, since there was not one of the rifled guns which could bear on the fleet left fit for service.

12. The Lines of Ras-el-Tin.--(Left or Harem Battery.) The effects of the bombardment on the fort were small, but the loss of life must have been considerable, as many shells burst in it. The rear face of the tower was in ruins. Right gun (8-inch Armstrong).--A 9-inch Palliser shell struck the lower side of the gun and burst on the breast of the carriage with the following results: the gun beyond being indented for a distance of 8 inches in length was uninjured, but had been thrown about 10 feet from its original position. Both brackets of the carriage were torn away. The entire carriage was a wreck. Centre gun (8-inch Armstrong).--The right-front truck of the carriage was broken, and the gun was struck by a splinter on the chase. The gun and the carriage, however, suffered no serious injury, though the left bracket of the latter was pierced by a splinter. The centre battery in the interior was almost uninjured, though the parapet was deeply scored in all directions by shells. The embrasure of the left gun (9-inch) was choked up by the ruins of the cheeks, whilst the revetment on each side of the neck was swept away. The condition of the guns was as follows:--10-inch Armstrong gun.--The right-front truck of the carriage was carried away, and the buffers of the slide were much damaged by the recoil of the gun. 9-inch Armstrong gun.--The gun and carriage were uninjured except that the lever of the elevating gear was bent, and the holdfast was rising off the pin. 9-inch left gun.--This was hit on the left trunnion by a shell which tore off the cap square, and also by a second shell, on the right bracket six inches in the rear of the trunnion. The gun and carriage were, however, practically uninjured. This battery in the early reports of the bombardment was miscalled the Moncrieff Battery, but there was in it no gun mounted on that system. The Moncrieff gun, 180 yards to the westward, was hit on the left side by a splinter of a shell, and a bolt in the rear of the left bracket was also cut out by a Nordenfeldt bullet. Beyond this it was unhurt, and remained perfectly serviceable.

The Hospital Battery.--The effects of the bombardment here were overwhelming. The entire gun portions were so entirely destroyed that it was difficult to discover where the original crest had been. The injuries to the guns were as follows:--Right gun (7-inch Armstrong).--The cheeks of the embrasure were driven in on the gun, and the trucks were jammed, otherwise the gun and carriage were uninjured. The former was, however, scored with forty-nine hits from a 10-inch shrapnel shell, the greatest depth of any hit being 5 inches. Left gun (7-inch Armstrong).--A shell burst under the front racer on the left side of this gun, tore it up and bent it into a vertical plane, twisting the truck and forcing it off the racer. The slide was also jammed by the ruins of the revetment. The gun-carriage and slide were otherwise uninjured, and were left fit for service.[27]

13. Fort Adda.--The barracks and stores, especially on the east side of the fort, were very much injured, but the batteries were not materially damaged. The only shell which entered, that on the southern half of the western side, blew up the magazine. The loss of life from the explosion was probably very great, and the entire space between the magazine and the gate was covered with stones, timber, and broken shell. The injury to the guns was as follows:--A 10-inch S.B. gun was dismounted by a shell which threw the gun and carriage to a distance of about 15 feet from the slide. Another 10-inch S.B. gun was similarly dismounted, whilst a third was struck on the left side of the platform by a shell which had previously cut off the cascabel of the second gun to the left; the beams of the platform were completely shattered, and the gun with its carriage was overturned and wrecked.

14. Fort Pharos.--The west tower and front were breached in many places; the minaret was partly knocked down, and the whole of the west front of the keep, with its two turrets, were in ruins. The south-east corners of the fort were also much shattered by the shells which passed over the west front. The stores and barracks suffered severely, and the destruction of so much masonry must have added considerably to the moral effect of the fire of the ships. With regard to the sea front, the parapet was hit in several places (seven in all), but only in three cases did a shell enter the battery. The corners of the traverse to the right of the 8-inch Armstrong guns were carried away by two shells; a third shell pierced the sole of the embrasure of the 10-inch Armstrong gun, and threw the large granite block which formed the sill on to the platform of the gun, so the gun might be said to be out of action. Of the S.B. guns, one heavy 10-inch on the west tower was dismounted, by a 16-inch shell from the Inflexible, one 10-inch gun on the west front was capsized and put out of action, and it is not unlikely that another, with its carriage, fell into the crater formed by a shell.

On the rear face, a 36-pounder, having been hit on the cascabel by a chance shell, was thrown completely over the parapet, and left standing on its muzzle at a distance of 30 feet from its original position. Another gun was also unserviceable, owing to the partial destruction of its carriage by a shell. But it was in the casemates below that the fire of the ships inflicted the greatest injury. The front wall of the casemates, which is faced with masonry two feet in thickness, was in many places torn away under the stress of fire, leaving only six feet of rubble as a protection to the guns. Through the latter the heavy shells pierced with ease. The results were as follows:--Under west tower, casemate penetrated, gun not disabled. In casemates Nos. 1 to 12, just one half of the guns were disabled. Of the casemates on the right sea front, No. 17 was the only one in which there was no gun hit. The loss of life in the casemates must have been out of all proportion to the effect produced by the feeble guns (six 5-inch S.B.) mounted within.

On the scarp of casemates Nos. 1 to 12 there were about 13 hits, of which seven pierced the wall.

15. Fort Silsileh.--The fire does not appear to have in any way injured the guns or stores of this fort, though fragments of at least two shells lay around the rifled guns.

The total number of guns dismounted was, four M.L.R. guns, sixteen S.B. guns, and one mortar.

The forts at Alexandria generally were badly knocked about, but the more modern parapets were not seriously injured. If the bombardment were directed against the forts in their defensive capacity, it must be pronounced a failure. If its object were the dismounting of the rifled guns, it must be conceded that such results as attended the work of either the inside squadron (where only one gun of this type was seriously affected), or even of the outside squadron (where less than half of the guns were permanently disabled), do not justify the verdict of success.

In the wider sense, however, of having driven the Egyptian gunners from their batteries and having silenced the forts, the fleet was unquestionably victorious.

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X. THE DAY AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT

The following day, the 12th July, when it was proposed to renew the bombardment, there was dull gloomy weather off Alexandria, with a haze hanging over the city. There had been a strong breeze from the sea during the previous night, and it was still blowing fresh from the N.N.W., causing the ironclads forming the outside squadron to roll somewhat.

The gunboat Beacon at daylight collected the bodies of the men belonging to the fleet, killed the previous day, and buried them at sea.

The Humber storeship appeared in sight, and working parties were sent to her for ammunition.

At 9 a.m. the Inflexible and Temeraire were sent to reconnoitre the batteries from Eunostos Point on Ras-el-Tin, to Fort Pharos.

At 10.15 the Temeraire reported that the Hospital Battery was prepared, that two large rifled guns were ready with guns' crews about them, and that numbers of men under arms were in the barracks and covered way. The Inflexible at the same time signalled that a large body of men, armed with rifles, was in the rear of the Hospital earthworks. In reply, the Sultan signalled to the Inflexible and Temeraire, "Close, and open fire with shell." At 10.40 the two ships, having taken up position, fired twelve shells, to which there was no reply, and the men were observed leaving the batteries.

At 10.48 flags of truce were displayed at the Lighthouse Battery and at Fort Adda. At the same time, a boat bearing a white flag came out towards the Inflexible. This being noticed, the vessels were ordered to cease firing. The boat then returned to the shore without communicating.

At 11 the Admiral signalled to the Penelope and Sultan, "Weather having moderated, Admiral intends to attack Marabout and Adjemi; approach with Sultan, Alexandra, Temeraire, and Superb. I will send gunboat to summon enemy to surrender."

At 11.10 the Bittern was sent with a flag of truce to communicate with the Egyptian authorities.

At 11.30 the squadron was reinforced by the arrival of the ironclad Achilles, belonging to the Channel Fleet.

At 2.50 p.m. the Bittern returned, and signalled, "Negotiations have failed, have informed authorities you will engage batteries at 3.30 precisely." At 3.40 the Bittern hauled down her flag of truce, and it was reported that the flag of truce at Ras-el-Tin was also taken down, though this was subsequently found not to have been the case.

At 3.50, the Egyptian flag at Marabout having been hauled down, the vessels there were recalled, and the Admiral signalled to the Sultan, "Engage batteries off Pharos and Ras-el-Tin with your squadron." At the same time the Invincible fired a shot into the Mex Forts, but got no reply.

At 4.40 a general signal was made to the ships to "take up position for engaging batteries, anchoring as convenient;" and at 5 the Alexandra, Temeraire, Achilles, Superb, and Sultan weighed anchor, and proceeded in line towards Fort Pharos. None of the ships, however, opened fire, as the flag of truce at Ras-el-Tin was seen to be still flying.

At 5.40 the Helicon was sent into harbour with a flag of truce. The instructions of the officer in command were to inform the authorities that if they wished to treat with the Admiral they could do so by returning in the Helicon, and that if they did not do so, no more flags of truce would be respected.

At 5.50 the signal was made for the squadron to anchor for the night.

The Helicon, pursuant to orders, steamed up the harbour and lay off the Arsenal wall, whilst the officer in command went on board the Khedive's yacht Maharoussa, expecting to find some one to treat with, but not a person was on board. After waiting half an hour, he signalled that he had been unable to find any of the authorities to communicate with, and returned at 8.20 p.m.

As early as four in the afternoon a part of the town had been observed to be on fire, and the conflagration soon after was seen to spread rapidly.

During the night the fires on shore continued to extend, and it became evident that it was the richest part of Alexandria, the European quarter, which was in flames.

The spectacle as viewed from the ships was grand, but awful in character. The sky on the land side was lighted up with a fierce red glare, and columns of smoke covered the city and surrounding country.

The Admiral's first idea was to send a landing-party to save the town. He, however, hesitated on account of the risk to his men. Eventually, to discover the state of things on shore, he landed a party of fifteen men from the Invincible. The streets were found completely deserted, and all was silent save for the roar and crackle of the flames and the sound of falling beams and walls. The party returned at three a.m. on the 13th.

Daylight revealed the town still wrapped in flames, and an immense cloud of smoke hung over its whole extent.

At 5.40 a.m. the Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope left their anchorage off Mex, and steamed into the outer harbour, with the Beacon and Bittern in company. At 5.50 the Helicon, which had again gone in to pick up refugees, embarked and brought 170 of them for distribution amongst the ships outside. They were of all classes and nationalities, and included several women and children. They had passed through the streets unmolested, and reported Alexandria deserted, and that all the troops had left the previous day, after setting fire to the town. It was believed that part of the soldiers had gone to Rosetta, and part to Damanhour. The Helicon reported that there were a great many more refugees, women and children, inside the mole waiting for an opportunity to come off.

In the meantime the Admiral held a consultation with some of the captains and officers under his command as to what was best to be done. On the one hand, there was the certainty that unless some step should be taken, a great part, if not the whole, of Alexandria would be destroyed. On the other, it was uncertain how far Arabi's troops had retired, and one report was that they were massed to the number of 9,000 outside the town, no further off than Moharrem Bey Gate. The number of men that could be landed without disabling the ships was not large. The Admiral found it difficult to decide. Already he must have begun to realize the error he had committed in opening fire with such precipitation. The Channel Fleet (of which, as already stated, the Achilles had arrived) were known to be on their way from Malta, as well as the Orontes, troop-ship, with troops from Gibraltar. The Tamar, too, with 1,000 marines, was at Malta. The ships of the Channel Fleet alone could have furnished a contingent of 1,800 men in addition to those whom Admiral Seymour could have disembarked from his own squadron.

The bombardment, so long delayed, might well have been retarded for the short period necessary to enable the reinforcements to arrive. What had occurred was not altogether unforeseen. Arabi had, before the bombardment, declared that if the ships opened fire he would burn the European quarter; and the fulfilment of his threat would have not only gratified his thirst for revenge, but would have also covered the retreat of his forces.

At last a landing was resolved on, and at 8.35 a.m. the general signal was made, "Prepare to land marines," followed ten minutes later by the order, "Prepare to land brigade of seamen." The Helicon, Bittern and Beacon were despatched to the outside squadron to bring in as many men as possible, whilst the Condor and Cygnet were told off to take the seamen and marines from the inshore vessels. At 9.5 the Alexandra was detached to reconnoitre off Rosetta Gate, and the remaining vessels of the outside squadron were directed to take stations for bombarding, in case the landing should be resisted.

At 10.30 the landing-party left the ships. The force consisted of four hundred men, including all the marines of the squadron; it was led by Commander Hammill, of the Monarch, and had with it a Gatling gun.

The Invincible, at the same time, sent ashore and spiked the guns at Fort Saleh Aga, and the other vessels landed men to destroy the guns in the Lighthouse Fort at Ras-el-Tin.

Whilst Commander Hammill's force was disembarking, large bodies of soldiers were seen moving towards Fort Silsileh, apparently accompanied by field-pieces, and the Sultan, Temeraire, and Achilles were ordered to watch that point, and to bombard if necessary.

In the intervals between carrying out the above-mentioned operations, the larger ships were engaged in recruiting their exhausted stock of ammunition from the store-ship Humber. In this matter a most unexpected difficulty arose. Through some unpardonable blunder the ship had been despatched from Malta without a single filled common shell on board, and actually without powder to fill the empty shells she had brought with her. Further than this, she had brought no fuzes, and as the vessels of war had no reserves of powder, they would, had hostilities been resumed, have been speedily reduced to a state of comparative impotence.

In the course of the day, anxiety being felt for the safety of the Khedive, the Condor was sent to cruise off the Palace at Ramleh.

Further parties of men were landed in the town, making the total force disembarked about 800 men. They took with them a day's provisions, Gatling guns, and ammunition.

At 3.25 p.m. the Temeraire signalled that great activity was observed about Ramleh Palace, and that Dervish Pasha was supposed to be there.

At 4.43 the Temeraire, having reported that Fort Pharos did not appear to be entirely deserted, had permission given her to send a party to spike the guns there.

At 5 the Bittern was directed to take a guard of fifty marines to the Palace of Ras-el-Tin, for the protection of the Khedive, who was expected from Ramleh.

What had been taking place on shore in the meantime is reserved for another chapter.

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XI. ALEXANDRIA DURING THE BOMBARDMENT

After the preceding narrative of events from a naval point of view, it may be convenient to relate what was taking place at the time in Alexandria itself.

During the whole of the night preceding the 11th July, the native population had been leaving the town in crowds, some in carts and others on foot, the women crying and uttering loud lamentations. Towards daylight the movement slackened. From three a.m. troops were marching through on their way to Ras-el-Tin; at five the last detachment passed.

The morning dawned on the city without a cloud in the heavens. There was a gentle breeze from the north-west, all was quiet as the early sun gilded the tops of the domes and minarets of the various mosques, and lighted up the acacia trees of the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de l'Eglise. In the streets the soldiers, who had passed the night on the door-steps of the houses, on the marble benches of the square, or on the ground, slowly roused themselves, and, yawning, looked about them in a somnolent way. The streets were being watered as usual, the "bowabs," or door-keepers, were tranquilly smoking their cigarettes at the house-doors, and the Arab women were going about selling milk as if nothing unusual were about to happen. With the exception of these few indications of life, the streets were deserted. The military posts were relieved at six o'clock, as usual each soldier carrying a linen pouch full of cartridges.

The clock of the church of St. Catherine struck seven, and before the sound had died away, the thundering boom of the first gun from the fleet startled the city, and the few civilians who were about sought refuge in their dwellings. The Egyptian soldiers remained at their posts.

Then came a solemn silence which lasted some minutes, after which the bombardment, with all its horrors, began. The English ships were seen in the distance vomiting volumes of fire and smoke, whilst the forts in their turn thundered forth a reply. The scene was of the grandest description, and a few seconds later the shrieks of the projectiles as they flew overhead mingled with the boom of the cannon, which echoed and re-echoed on all sides. The report from the huge 80-ton guns of the Inflexible was easily distinguishable above the general roar.

At a little before eight a shell fell in the Arab quarter, behind the Ramleh railway station, causing a panic, which forced many of the inhabitants into the forts close by.

Arabi, who had from an early hour stationed himself at the Ministry of Marine in the Arsenal, finding the missiles from the fleet falling thickly there, left with Toulba Pasha and an escort of cavalry, and at eight o'clock drove to the fortifications behind Fort Kom-el-Dyk, where he remained till four p.m.

By nine o'clock the streets were totally deserted except by the soldiers. The cannonade slackened, and sounds of rejoicing came from some of the native cafés, where it was reported that two ironclads were sunk and five were disabled.

At about the same time a shell fell on the terrace of a house alongside the Palace Menasce in the Rosetta Road, and another burst over the German Consulate. The discharges averaged about two per minute. The soldiers now commenced to send patrols to the houses of such Europeans as were ashore, to prevent any attempt at signalling to the English squadron.

The number of Europeans ashore at this period amounted to about 1,500. Of these some 100 were at the College of the Frères, a great number in the Greek Church, and in the Greek and European Hospitals. The German Hospital at Moharrem Bey also sheltered a large number of nurses, invalids, and refugees. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank, in the Rue Cherif Pasha, was held by a determined party of about twenty (subsequently increased to eighty-two). The Danish Consul-General had fortified the Danish Consulate, where a large number of people, including many women and children, found a refuge.

There were other Europeans, mostly of the poorest class, hidden away in their dwellings in various parts of the town, and to all these the movements of the patrols naturally occasioned serious disquietude.

Early in the forenoon, an Egyptian officer mounted the roof of the Crédit Lyonnais Bank, and commenced cutting away the telephone wires. Shortly afterwards a gang of native boys in the same street began pulling down all the wires they could reach, raising at the same time the wildest shouts.

At nine, a shell fell in some stables in the Rue Copt, and for a quarter of an hour the neighbourhood was enveloped in a cloud of dust. At ten, a shell fell in the Franciscan Convent, where a number of persons were assembled, but, as it did not burst, did no injury beyond destroying one or two of the walls.

Shortly afterwards a shell fell into a house in the Rue Cherif Pasha, making a large hole. Another pierced the wall of the Jewish Synagogue. Another hit the Zaptieh, and a fourth struck a house in Frank Street. As the missiles fell, the soldiers sought shelter in the doorways of the houses, but did not entirely desert their posts.

At eleven o'clock, the natives spread a report that only three ironclads remained afloat, and great rejoicings took place in the Arab cafés.

Half-an-hour later, an officer and a detachment of soldiers stationed themselves opposite the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and insisted on mounting to the roof to satisfy themselves that there was no signalling going on. They also went to the central Telephone Office and to the Telegraph Offices and cut the wires. At the office of the Eastern Telegraph Company, they found one of the employés, a French subject, who had refused to go afloat, and murdered him on the spot.

At this period, isolated firing from a westerly direction was all that was heard; otherwise the silence of death prevailed throughout the town.

At half-past twelve, two shells, one following the other in quick succession, struck the Khedivial Schools, in the Rosetta Road, and, bursting, destroyed the south-western angle of the building.

Soon after the cannonading commenced, a number of empty carts and drays was seen going towards the Marina. During the forenoon, these began to return laden with dead artillerymen. The first load passed up soon after ten in the morning, the bodies being stripped and tied in with ropes. A little later, the wounded began to arrive in great numbers, some in carriages and some in carts, many of the men showing ghastly wounds. Crowds of women followed them, uttering cries of distress and lamentations.[28]

At one p.m. a crowd of native children carrying a green flag passed down the Rue Cherif Pasha beating petroleum tins and calling on God and the Prophet. During the day many of the houses in which Europeans were seen on the terraces or roofs, watching the bombardment, were surrounded by soldiers, who, under the pretext that the inmates were signalling to the fleet, forced them to descend and accompany them to the police-stations. Eight or ten Europeans were dragged from their dwellings and set upon in the streets by the mob. As soon as they fell into the power of the latter, they were forced along by soldiers towards the Moharrem Bey Gate, and struck with the butt ends of rifles, and received blows from naboots. As they passed along they were subjected to every species of ill-usage. On their arrival, covered with blood and in a wretched condition, fresh troubles awaited them. They were cast indiscriminately into cells with natives, and endured the vilest usage.

A mob of natives in the course of the day broke into the German Hospital, where there were many European refugees as well as the patients. The inmates ran for the cellars, where the invalids had already been placed for safety. The Secretary of the German Consulate was the last to flee, and as a final effort he fired a shot from his revolver. The effect on the crowd was magical. They drew back, and contented themselves with demanding that the flag which was flying over the hospital, and which they imagined was being used for signalling to the fleet, should be given up to them. This was acceded to, and they then dispersed.

The Danish Consulate was surrounded by soldiers and a mob of Arabs, who required the Consul to haul down the flag flying over the house. This he courageously refused to do, and whilst the dispute was at its height, three Arabs were killed by shells almost at his door, and the rest fled.

At three, the fire of the ships, which had in the meantime slackened, was resumed with great vigour. One shell burst at Moharrem Bey Gate, and killed two officers and six men of the police.

According to Arabi's statement, he received during the day several messages from the Khedive, congratulating him on the behaviour of the troops. Shortly after four o'clock Arabi left the town in a carriage with an escort of soldiers, taking the route by the Rosetta Gate.

About this time the Inflexible and Temeraire were observed to approach Fort Pharos and reopen fire on the batteries there, and a great number of their shells were seen to strike the rocks, raising clouds of débris, and bounding in repeated ricochets over the face of the water. Towards five o'clock the picturesque mosque in the fort fell, burying in its ruins a number of the wounded who had taken refuge behind the walls. The two ships at the same time pitched a few shells at Fort Silsileh. The firing continued, at intervals, until past five o'clock, when it ceased altogether.

As soon as the cannonade was over, the exodus of natives from the town recommenced, and the streets were again filled. The desire of all was to escape from the town as soon as possible. Along the banks of the Mahmoudieh Canal, and the line of the railway to Cairo, was one vast stream of fugitives, which only ceased as night fell.

Then a great stillness came over Alexandria.

The night was calm. The gas was not lighted, and the city, plunged in darkness, resembled a vast necropolis. The only sounds heard from time to time were the plaintive howlings of forsaken dogs. A few fugitives ventured into the streets, and encountered only the sentries and patrols.

On the morning of the 12th, the movement of the natives recommenced. All those who had remained in the Ras-el-Tin and other quarters endeavoured to get out of the town with their luggage and effects. It was rumoured that the bombardment was to recommence, and the terror of the people was indescribable. The trains from Moharrem Bey Station were thronged with fugitives, who not only rode inside, but on the roof, the steps, and even the buffers of the carriages.

In the Place Mehemet Ali a regiment of infantry were scattered about, the men, with arms piled, seated or lying on the ground, tranquilly smoking their cigarettes. A few of the bowabs were seen going to the bazaars and returning to the houses with small stores of meat and other provisions. Amongst the Europeans, the greatest anxiety prevailed, and every one was asking when the disembarkation would begin. The soldiers on duty became more and more threatening, and the supplies of provisions began to run short. Gangs of disorderly natives from time to time appeared and made violent demonstrations in front of such houses as were known to shelter Europeans.

From early morning, bands of natives ran through the streets with soldiers at their head, looking for any Europeans who might be concealed. At a little before eleven the cannonade recommenced, and a dozen reports were heard coming from the westward. There was then a silence, and all wondered what next would happen.

As soon as the cannonade ceased, the troops at Moharrem Bey and Rosetta Gates precipitated themselves into the streets, calling on the natives to flee, as the dogs of Christians were going to disembark and massacre the Mussulmans. The news soon after spread that the convicts in the Arsenal had been let loose, and were going to pillage and fire the town.

An hour later, part of the garrison left the town by the Rosetta Gate, taking the road to Ramleh. The first of them marched in fours in fairly good order, and were followed by 1,500 more who passed in gradually increasing disorder, until they became confused with the rabble of fugitives who crowded the roads.

At one o'clock the soldiers in the street received the order to eat their midday meal, and, each opening his haversack, set to work with an appetite indicating hours of abstinence. When the men had finished their repast, mounted mustaphazin and officers, amongst whom was Soleyman Sami, appeared, and gave hurried orders to the soldiers at the various posts. It appears that these orders were for them to abandon the town, and retire outside. The military at once formed at certain given points, such as the Place Mehemet Ali, the Place de l'Eglise, and the Place de la Mosque d'Attarin, and shortly after the evacuation commenced the greater part of the soldiers proceeded to the Mahmoudieh Canal.[29] Then arose a general cry of "Death to the Christians!" People were heard hammering at the doors and windows of the houses. This was followed by the sound of falling shutters, and the crash of broken glass. Infuriated crowds appeared on the scene, armed with heavy sticks, with which they carried on the work of destroying and plundering the shops and dwellings. The soldiers, too, broke from the ranks and joined in the looting, and with the butt-ends of their rifles assisted in forcing open doors and windows.

Continuous lines of soldiers and civilians staggered past laden with plunder. In a short time the streets were literally blocked by the mob.

The order was given to the natives to quit the town, and from two p.m. a constant stream of fugitives flowed out of the Rosetta and Moharrem Bey Gates. When outside the town, they were met by Bedouins, who, in many cases, fought with them for the spoil. One eye-witness stated that a common handkerchief changed hands in this way no less than three times whilst he was looking on. Not only furniture, looking-glasses, and such things, were carried off, but horses and carriages as well. The soldiers, in many instances, undressed themselves and wrapped round their bodies all sorts of rich stuffs, such as silks and satins. Some brought gilt chairs and sofas with them, but, finding the articles too cumbersome, broke them to pieces, and tore off the velvet coverings, leaving the remainder in the road.

The large open space between the water-works and the European cemeteries was crowded by a huge mob of pillagers, fighting and struggling amongst themselves for the plunder. Those who could get away with their spoils took them either by the road to Ramleh, or by that leading to the Mahmoudieh Canal.

The wildest disorder prevailed, and amongst the fugitives were Turkish women and children of good position from the different harems. On arriving at the gates of the town the women were attacked by the mob and outraged. The marauders, in their haste to get possession of the jewellery which the women were wearing, even cut their ears and wrists, and to silence their cries stunned them with blows from their sticks. Soon afterwards several soldiers were seen returning to the town, apparently to share in the pillage, and struggling to force their way through the gates against the stream of pillagers and fugitives going the other way. Many of those coming out encumbered with heavy loads were upset in the mélée, and several of the soldiers, finding it impossible to re-enter the town, contented themselves with joining the Bedouins in seizing the loot of the fugitives.

About four p.m. volumes of smoke, accompanied by the crackling of flames, were observed in the neighbourhood of the British Consulate. These indications increased every instant, and as the sun went down the whole sky became lighted up with a lurid glare. This was accompanied by the shouts and cries of Europeans, who were either burned out or dragged from their dwellings by natives, who, with sticks and knives in their hands, spared few whom they met. A small number found refuge in the houses as yet untouched by the fire and guarded by Europeans, but most of the rest fell victims. Amongst those who humanely opened their doors to the fugitives was the Danish Consul, who sheltered no less than 150.

It was a night to be remembered. From the terraces of the houses the flames were observed extending in the direction of the Rue Cherif Pasha. The French Consulate, the Okella Nuova, and other parts of the Place Mehemet Ali, were already wrapped in flames.

During the night nothing was heard but the crackling of the flames, mingled with the cries of the incendiaries and the occasional fall of a heavy building. The volumes of smoke filled the air with the most nauseating vapours. In some cases, cotton soaked in petroleum and set on fire was thrown into the houses, whilst in others tins of paraffin were poured over the furniture and ignited. Where ingress to the dwellings could not be obtained, bedding soaked with petroleum was piled up on the outside and fired. On every side the smell of petroleum was distinguishable.

The night passed without slumber for those on shore, and on the morning of the 13th Alexandria presented the appearance of a vast bonfire. The Europeans who remained on shore saw the flames gradually closing in on them. The pillagers and assassins had disappeared, but the atmosphere had become unbearable. There was further a fear that the Arabs, seeing that no force was being landed, might return to complete the work of massacre.

All hope of a disembarkation appeared as remote as ever. Two of the ironclads had indeed been seen to approach Fort Pharos and send their boats ashore, and for a moment it was thought help was coming. The idea was a vain one. The landing was only for the purpose of spiking the Egyptian cannon, and this having been accomplished, the ships steamed away.

The courageous garrison of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, seeing there was no help to be expected, resolved to make a sortie, and early in the morning they all sallied forth together, the women and children were put in the middle of the troop, and thus they marched towards the Marina. On their way they were joined by others in the same condition as themselves. They passed, without encountering any opposition, over masses of burning and smouldering ruins. They broke open the gates at the Marina, and seizing some native boats rowed out to H.M.S. Helicon.

The Danish Consul and his party still held out, but the situation becoming worse and worse, at three in the afternoon, they, too, quitted their stronghold, and having secured the attendance of a European police officer, marched to the shore, having more than once to go out of their course to avoid the falling houses. On reaching the Custom-House Quay, they met the landing party under Commander Hammill. The fugitives passed the night in safety on board an Egyptian steamer in the harbour, and were next day taken off to the vessels outside.

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