XIII. DAILY DUTIES
[Sidenote: From principles to practice.]
=330.= As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the supreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions of the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice, our way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it were, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal law and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not to the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend towards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth of philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But her meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not closed behind her.
[Sidenote: The daily round.]
=331.= The region we have now reached is that of ‘daily duties,’ by which phrase we propose to translate here the Greek καθήκοντα and the Latin officia[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ‘that which it comes in one’s way to do[2],’ and its quiet sound at once brings it into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is common to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children, but also to the unreasoning animals[4] and to plants[5]. Virtue always contemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow the individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the trained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained to the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two there always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which Virtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and that in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the unwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].
[Sidenote: First laws of nature.]
=332.= The subject of ‘daily duties’ was treated both by Zeno[9] and by Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a whole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that daily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based upon primary ends which nature sets up (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, principia naturae)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the Stoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school and the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this subject; and when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly established. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set aside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is ‘that which when done can reasonably be defended[13]’; which definition closely corresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of Babylon ‘to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according to nature[14].’ Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of ‘making the best of both worlds.’ The subject was therefore congenial to Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of Plato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the republic. Panaetius’ book περὶ καθηκόντων was the basis of Cicero’s work de Officiis, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of information. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic views, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities, amongst which Cicero’s de Finibus best represents the older Stoics, and Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.
[Sidenote: From the animals to man.]
=333.= It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism when we learn that the ‘first lessons of nature’ are those which are imprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought for the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first natural lesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its completeness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union for procreation’s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each one’s offspring[18]. But nature’s best lessons are reserved for man; as to look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest himself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure the amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon him[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical or philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to refuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by wilful action[23]. ‘Such,’ says Cicero, ‘is the picture of a beautiful life; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].’
[Sidenote: Wavering as to the standard.]
=334.= In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are common to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating, drinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary man with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of nature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it down that man should aim specially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that is at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower animals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But the only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be introduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see, is to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].
[Sidenote: The four virtues.]
=335.= From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by the wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless we may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those adumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach of the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies. Panaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and Seneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who distinguished between virtues that are ‘arts’ (τέχναι) and which are based on theoretical principles, and those which are ‘acquirements’ (δυνάμεις), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the division of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the number of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic classifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their direct aim[30].
[Sidenote: Wisdom.]
=336.= Wisdom (φρόνησις, prudentia) is considered by Zeno not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that Courage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and Soberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science (ἐπιστήμη, scientia) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom side by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point of Zeno’s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to recognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced as a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue ‘Speculation’ (σοφία, sapientia)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must justify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called ‘liberal arts’ has a value for children, for it prepares the way for virtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious reasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty depends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues, that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry, law, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study when carried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and other learned time-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].
[Sidenote: Justice.]
=337.= The second cardinal virtue is Justice (δικαιοσύνη, iustitia), of which Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. ‘She is of virgin form, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad men; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked, confidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at once sad and awe-inspiring[41].’ Cicero distinguishes Justice in the narrower sense from ‘Beneficence.’ Justice proper is a political virtue, and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals. By nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth, individuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they have always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that even slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs the guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of person and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity; country, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then other relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The consideration of the degrees of propinquity (σχέσεις) was a favourite subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.
[Sidenote: Courage.]
=338.= The third cardinal virtue is Courage (ἀνδρεία, fortitudo), which retains the tradition of the ‘strength and force’ of Socrates. This again, according to Cicero, has two parts, one passive, which consists in despising fortune and its buffets, and is in harmony with the picture of the wise man as usually drawn; the other part, which we may call Greatness of Soul (μεγαλοψυχία, magnitudo animi) is shown in the undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is characteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart Wisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues; the knowledge of good and evil can only be attained by the soul that is duly strung to vigorous resolution[46]. The Stoics of the principate perhaps insist most of all on this virtue, which alone makes men independent of all that it lies with Fortune to give and to take away. The man of courage will therefore detach himself from fortune’s gifts; he will treat them as household furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled[47].
[Sidenote: Death not to be feared.]
=339.= Courage appears in its highest development in the face of tyranny and death. It is the tyrant’s boast that he has men in his power: but the brave man is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken away; he may be subjected to the torture; his life may be forfeited; but the soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant’s reach[48]. To pain he answers ‘if I can bear it, it will be light; if I cannot bear it, it cannot be long[49].’ Amidst all the extremities of fire and rack men have been found who never groaned, never begged for mercy, never answered a question, and indeed laughed heartily[50]. Of death the Stoic has no fear; not only is it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part of the course of nature[51]; it is the best of friends, for it offers a release from all troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the tyrant[52]. We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage, that nature’s first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in itself is a thing terrible to contemplate[53]; but life is not the more desirable for its length[54]; and when old age begins to shatter the powers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of a vegetable, nature is calling him to quit his mortal body[55]. At no period is life worth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, without which it loses its savour[56]. The philosopher therefore will not merely see with calm confidence the approach of death; he will go forward to meet it of his own free will, if only he is assured that reasonable choice points that way.
[Sidenote: Reasonable departure.]
=340.= The doctrine of ‘reasonable departure’ (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή, rationalis e vita excessus) plays a prominent part in the Stoic ethics. It cannot rightly be described as the recommendation of suicide; for the Stoics do not permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself, but only to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The doctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death gloriously met in fighting for one’s country or one’s friends; next when intolerable pain or incurable disease plainly indicates the will of the deity[57]; in the development of Roman history a third reason was found in the loss of political freedom[58]. These reasons are not added to, but only systematized, when we are told that it is an ‘ordinary duty’ to quit life when a man’s natural advantages (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) are outweighed by the corresponding disadvantages[59]; for amongst ‘natural advantages’ are included in this connexion all those considerations of which an honourable man will rightly take account; and the calculation may equally lead him to the conclusion that, in spite of old age and suffering, and though he has never attained to true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait quietly in life[60].
[Sidenote: Its dangers.]
=341.= The practice of ‘reasonable departure’ was largely recommended to the Stoics by the examples of Socrates (whose death they regarded as voluntary[61]) and of Cato[62]; and it was at first no small matter of pride to them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their system thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors that beset humanity. But under the Roman principate ‘free departure’ soon became so common that it was a reproach rather than a glory to its advocates, a social disease pointing to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy resolution[63]. Hence the philosophers turned from recommendation to reproof. ‘A brave and wise man must not flee from life, but quit it,’ says Seneca[64]; ‘nothing is more disgraceful than to long for death’[65]. ‘Friends,’ says Epictetus, ‘wait for God; when he shall give you the signal, then go to him[66].’
[Sidenote: Courage is active.]
=342.= The ‘free departure’ is the most striking illustration of passive courage, but even before it was abused Cicero at least had perceived the attraction which this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to the spirit of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and which he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. Still the Stoics had already defined Courage as ‘virtue fighting in the front rank in defence of justice[67].’ A good man must indeed regard power and wealth as things indifferent; but he is to be blamed if he makes this an excuse for avoiding public life, and leaving to others magistracies at home or commands in the wars[68]. In the old world the love of glory and praise on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, has led men to seek these positions; but now they should seek them at home that they may have a wide field for the exercise of their virtues[69], and in the wars in order that all war may be brought to an end[70]. By the older Stoics this Greatheartedness was advocated by precept and example: Zeno had said that the wise man should take part in public life[71], and his hearers Persaeus and Philonides had taken service under Antigonus Gonatas[72], and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of Sparta[73]. We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman political life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in an age in which there was a strong current of fashion in favour of a quiet life. We must therefore recognise in Courage, fully as much as in Wisdom or Justice, a political as well as a private virtue.
[Sidenote: Soberness.]
=343.= The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness (σωφροσύνη, temperantia). Of this there are various definitions, and amongst them that it is the principle which regulates our natural appetites so that they are neither in excess nor in defect[74]. From Cicero’s point of view Soberness embraces all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation of the impulses that virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a healthy state of the soul; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy of the body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and becoming (πρέπον, decorum)[75]. ‘Just as bodily beauty is symmetry established between the limbs mutually, and also between each and the whole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry between the reasoning power and its parts, and mutually between each of those parts[76].’ Although this is in principle a doctrine accepted by the whole Stoic school, yet in its application we may easily find an entirely new departure, that is, if the appeal is made to an artistic standard which depends upon the taste of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an abandonment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, and to the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which may easily be so stretched as to include existing prejudices and conventions. This danger is realized in Cicero’s treatment of the virtue of ‘decorum,’ which in its distinctive sense is defined as having the element of ‘gentlemanliness’ in itself[77]. It begins with respect for the feelings and opinions of others[78]; it avoids all rough games and obscene jests[79]; it makes choice of a profession adapted to the natural character of the individual[80]; it observes, as the actor does, the proprieties of youth and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner[81]; it prescribes dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women[82]. In particular decorum is displayed in modesty (verecundia). This is shown by keeping out of sight those parts of the body which nature, though she could not dispense with them, has concealed and covered; in attending to their functions with the utmost secrecy; and in referring both to these parts of the body and to their uses by words that do not properly describe them[83].
[Sidenote: Cynism or ‘decorum’?]
=344.= Cicero’s treatment of ‘decorum’ is so full of good sense that his de Officiis was the most widely-known textbook of Greco-Roman ethics in medieval schools, and has retained its importance in the classical public schools of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic principles is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find that, just as Zeno and the main body of his followers had proclaimed in advance that such doctrine was false in principle and ridiculous in detail, so conversely the followers of Panaetius found it necessary expressly to repudiate the teaching of a large number of Stoics[84]. We have in fact here a sharp conflict between the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the one side, and the general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero elsewhere treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that ‘the wise man will blurt things straight out[85]’; and the theory of ‘gentlemanly professions’ can never have appealed to any large social circle. In the period of the principate we find the theory of ‘decorum,’ as a whole, abandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero himself, recognises the absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a plain meaning[86], nor does he limit his choice of illustration even when addressing a lady of high social position[87]. We must look then in some other direction than the de Officiis for a duly proportioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of Soberness.
[Sidenote: The appetites.]
=345.= Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find, amongst those that are generally accepted, first, that it is ‘the science of things that are to be sought or avoided or neither[88]’; secondly, that it is ‘concerned with the human appetites[89].’ Now the term ‘appetite’ or ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή, appetitus) includes in the Stoic philosophy all those first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some object, and which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring revision and control by reason. But it seems clear that Soberness has little to do with those higher impulses that are characteristic of man, such as the love of knowledge or of society, since other virtues are concerned with these. It remains that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with the appetites common to men and the lower animals, which we may shortly call the ‘lower appetites’; they are, as we have already stated, the desires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is just in this sphere that Pleasure arises, in the sense in which it is condemned by the Cynics and popular moralists[90]. We may therefore shortly define Soberness as a right disposition of soul in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar characteristic is that it is in the main a negative virtue, displaying itself in abstinence from indulgence[91].
[Sidenote: Two views of Pleasure.]
=346.= In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Soberness, we need a clear idea of the attitude of the Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno, as we have seen, whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of things indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that it might be an advantage (προηγμένον), and the seeking after it natural (κατὰ φύσιν)[92]; and this is stated to have been the express teaching of Hecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus[93]. To other Stoics this appeared to be a disastrous concession to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had scornfully described the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure enthroned as queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her handmaidens[94], interpreted the word ‘indifferent’ more strictly; he refused to admit that pleasure was ‘natural’ or possessed any worth[95]. In this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, and practically by Archedemus, when he said that pleasure was natural but valueless, like the hairs under the armpit[96]. Hence followed the acceptable conclusion that no sensible man would pay much attention to so trivial a matter[97]. Thus the one word ‘indifferent’ came to include two views which were substantially opposed, the one inclining to the Academic standpoint, and the other to Cynism.
[Sidenote: Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.]
=347.= From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a distinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely a tickling (titillatio) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated in the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants it to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with that of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an ‘aftergrowth’ (ἐπιγέννημα, accessio), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached to it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical discussions, ‘pleasure’ denotes the excitement which is more strictly termed ‘hilarity’ (ἔπαρσις, sublatio animi), and is the unhealthy condition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of choice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term laetitia, which is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This ‘pleasure’ may be unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary to nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of the man who not only contemplates toil and pain with calm mind, but actually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true advantage[103].
[Sidenote: Active soberness.]
=348.= Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider Soberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of Hilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For Soberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly and a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider the proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of Tyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of common sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104]. The Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger, drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but it is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and favoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].
[Sidenote: Sober love.]
=349.= With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was favourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not without some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position) assert that love (ἔρως, amor) is an essential, both for the maintenance of the State[107] and for the character of the good man. Zeno had laid it down that ‘the wise man will love[108].’ We must, however, make a sharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the higher Love (ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή) which is defined anew as ‘an effort to make friends suggested by a beautiful object[109].’ Upon this impulse, which is natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy, the Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon equality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the Cynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates in the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies us with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate well perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived through the growing practice of celibacy[113].
[Sidenote: Of marriage.]
=350.= The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the following extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:
‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform the accustomed sacrifices?
Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in his wife’s.
But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of housekeeping to his partner[114].’
[Sidenote: Advantages sought.]
=351.= The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do not exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are ‘advantages’ (προηγμένα) are prima facie such that the good man aims at securing them; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, ‘art,’ and ‘progress’ are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion, good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth, reputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to Seneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind of beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without blame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain degree of neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For nobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true nobility[119]. Good name (δόξα, gloria) is commonly reckoned amongst ‘advantages’[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught that a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless some advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we are told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that they reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think of posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems to be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim; its place is taken by the approval of ‘conscience.’ This term, which originally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman period modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded to a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world disapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of mind[122].
[Sidenote: Wealth.]
=352.= On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory views amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth and praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the philosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent a practice[123] that his hearers found some inconsistency between his words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the position of the school is clear. ‘Riches are not a good’ is a Stoic paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but nevertheless they are an ‘advantage,’ and thus are rightly aimed at by the good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of the republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property (res familiaris) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his followers: ‘he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best use of it[127].’ Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on the acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter point are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of Justice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use it well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130]. As to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us to the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the capital[131].
[Sidenote: Liberty.]
=353.= Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the Stoic philosophy we must reckon ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία, libertas). In one sense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born citizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from the virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as ‘the power of living as you wish[134],’ and as such eagerly desired by the slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as ‘the right of saying what you please[135].’ In this sense liberty is equivalent to the παῤῥησία which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the equally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly different sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take a middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a precious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life or position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us that it is unreasonable to speak out one’s mind without regard to persons or circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be provoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul that has lost its self-control[141].
[Sidenote: Disadvantages.]
=354.= Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination (ἔκκλισις, alienatio), which is equally natural and right so long as it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is opposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily to refuse the other; and the doctrine of ‘reasonable refusal’ is that of reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient to give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that have negative value (ἀπαξία), may be subdivided according as they are disadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring about other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both reasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided into three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or things external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn vulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the organs of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and the contempt of our neighbours[144].
[Sidenote: Healthy affections.]
=355.= Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the soul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers, but to which none else can attain, some other name is required to describe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in contrast with the evil ‘affections’ or perturbations of the soul which will be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this direction with the three ‘good affections’ (εὐπάθειαι, constantiae, sapientis affectiones). Here a new use of terms is introduced. Strictly speaking an ‘affection’ is an evil state of soul; but as we have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of the word ‘affection’ is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these ‘good affections’ is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear is ‘Caution’ (εὐλάβεια, cautio), which is right avoidance, and is entirely consistent with Courage rightly understood. Subdivisions of Caution are (i) ‘Shame’ (αἰδώς, verecundia), the avoidance of deserved blame, and (ii) ‘Sanctity’ (ἁγνεία) the avoidance of offences against the gods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is ‘Readiness’ (βούλησις, voluntas), the reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted with Hilarity is Joy (χαρά, gaudium), the reasonable appreciation of present advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent with Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good affection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that reason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form of sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows which fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal bereavement[149].
The ‘good affections’ are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not all wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground the good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not altogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of ‘good affections’ may be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of feeling[153]; for the much derided ‘apathy’ of the school is substituted the doctrine of ‘eupathy.’ Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of ‘eupathy’ in its various applications.
[Sidenote: The ethical motive.]
=356.= We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main features, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars in the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question here suggests itself—what compelling force has this system? what motive is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this question the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves; nevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole. Thus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are prescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its highest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action, but at least by the spirit of reasonableness (εὐλογιστία). Secondly, that the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them; they are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in our way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do. As to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by Stoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living. But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of the wise man, the vision of that which is ‘absolutely good.’ Critics may urge: ‘it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men’s lives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never see or touch.’ This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty does not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope of attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of the ‘ordinary man,’ or, as the Stoics put it, of ‘us who are not wise men.’ But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in the system, but only for the ‘probationer’ (προκόπτων, proficiens). It remains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along which every good man is endeavouring to advance.
[Sidenote: Progress.]
=357.= The doctrine of progress (προκοπή, progressio) is not peculiar to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156]. Critics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice attained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that ‘virtue can be taught[157]’ and that ‘virtue is an art[158].’ Every man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies in degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this foundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161]. The child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of ‘modesty’ (αἰδώς, verecundia), which is essentially a readiness to defer to others and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though later it may turn to ‘false shame,’ which is a hindrance[163]. He will then learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his character ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more pleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now daily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties perfected (τέλειον καθῆκον, perfectum officium), and complete in every point[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must first perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must do so with regularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the ranks of the wise[168].
[Sidenote: Conversion.]
=358.= The stages of progress are variously expounded by Stoic writers[169]; but on one principle all are agreed. Progress is not a half-way stage between vice and virtue, as the Peripatetics teach[170]; it is a long preparation, to be followed by a change sudden and complete (μεταβολή, conversio)[171]. The final step, by which a foolish man becomes in an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone before. This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that ‘the good is not constituted by addition[172],’ and is enforced by various illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has long been under water; little by little he rises to the surface, but all in a moment he finds himself able to breathe. He is like a puppy in whom the organ of sight has been for days past developing; all at once he gains the power of vision[173]. Just so when progress reaches the end there dawns upon the eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision of the good, of which till now only shadows and reflections have been perceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realize his own wisdom; then again in a moment he passes on to the complete fruition of happiness[174].
[Sidenote: Duty.]
=359.= Thus from the lowlier conception of ‘daily duties’ we have again climbed upwards to the supreme ethical end, to absolute goodness, which is Virtue in her full royalty and the Universal Law (κοινὸς νόμος) as it appeals to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar in modern times under the name of Duty. The ancient Stoics perhaps never quite reached to any such complete formulation of their ethical theory in a single word; but their general meaning is perfectly expressed by it. Just as the Socratic paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with outworn ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation with the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms such as ‘conscience’ and ‘affection’ which are now familiar household words. We cannot indeed demonstrate that ‘Duty exists,’ any more than we can that deity or providence exists; but we may well say that without it ethical discussion would in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas from Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty,’ based upon a Stoic text[175], may be a useful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this conception in modern thought, but also of the continued tendency of the human mind to express its supreme convictions in anthropomorphic language.
‘Stern daughter of the Voice of God! O Duty! if that name thou love Who art a light to guide, a rod To check the erring, and reprove: Thou who art victory and law When empty terrors overawe: From vain temptations dost set free; And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity!
Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear The Godhead’s most benignant grace; Nor know we anything so fair As is the smile upon thy face: Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds And fragrance in thy footing treads: Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong; And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.
To humbler functions, awful Power! I call thee: I myself commend Unto thy guidance from this hour; O let my weakness have an end! Give unto me, made lowly wise, The spirit of self-sacrifice; The confidence of Reason give; And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect translation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak instead of ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ duties.
[2] κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘κατά τινας ἥκειν’ τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης Diog. L. vii 108.
[3] ‘est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis’ Cic. Fin. iii 18, 59.
[4] Stob. ii 7, 8.
[5] Diog. L. vii 107.
[6] Stob. ii 7, 8.
[7] τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι Stob. as above; ‘[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud esse’ Cic. Fin. iii 18, 59.
[8] See below, §§ 357, 358.
[9] Diog. L. vii 4.
[10] ib. 175.
[11] ‘omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae’ Cic. Fin. iii 6, 22.
[12] ‘Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ ib. iv 16, 45.
[13] καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν Diog. L. vii 107; ‘est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit’ Cic. Fin. iii 17, 58; ‘ratio [non] debet agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere’ Off. i 29, 101; ‘huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua ducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium’ Sen. Ben. iv 33, 2; and see above, § 159.
[14] See above, § 110.
[15] ‘quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum sed initium boni’ Sen. Ep. 124, 7.
[16] See above, § 306.
[17] ‘placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda’ Cic. Fin. iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a complete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb or deformity, ib. 17. ‘Universally (be not deceived) every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest’ Epict. Disc. ii 22, 15.
[18] ‘commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt’ Cic. Off. i 4, 11.
[19] ib.
[20] ib. 12.
[21] Cic. Off. i 4, 13.
[22] ib.
[23] ib. 14.
[24] ‘formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides; quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae’ ib. 5, 14.
[25] ‘in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur’ Fin. iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as a Stoic, can say: ‘[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu’ Off. i 30, 105. See below, §§ 346, 347.
[26] See below, §§ 343, 344.
[27] ‘in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt’ Cic. Off. iii 3, 13; ‘vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis’ ib. i 15, 46; ‘est autem quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis aufertur’ Tusc. disp. iv 13, 30.
[28] Diog. L. vii 92; ‘in duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et actionem’ Sen. Ep. 94, 45.
[29] ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας (leg. τέχνας Hirz. ii 482) εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.
[30] For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii 262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides, temperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et parsimonia, clementia, Ep. 88, 29 and 30.
[31] Plut. virt. mor. 2; de fort. 2; Sto. rep. vii 1.
[32] Thus φρόνησις became ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph. de fato 37 (Arnim iii 283).
[33] ‘omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur’ Cic. Off. i 6, 19; ‘natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni’ Sen. Dial. viii 5, 1.
[34] ‘quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant’ Ep. 88, 20.
[35] ‘sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse’ Cic. Fin. iii 21, 72.
[36] ‘qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione’ ib. 22, 73.
[37] ‘ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant’ ib. 21, 72.
[38] ‘ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a sordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta deterior’ Sen. N. Q. iii Praef. 18.
[39] ‘quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est’ Cic. Off. i 6, 19.
[40] ‘est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt non necessarias’ ib. 6, 18.
[41] A. Gellius, N. A. xiv 4, 4.
[42] Cic. Off. i 7, 21 and 22.
[43] ib. 13, 41.
[44] ‘principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui’ Cic. Off. i 17, 58.
[45] ‘I ought not to be free from affections (ἀπαθής) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen’ Epict. Disc. iii 2, 4; ‘Duties are usually measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards him’ Manual 30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply corresponding duties on the other side; ‘invicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis est’ Sen. Ben. ii 18, 2.
[46] ‘[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit’ Ep. 85, 28; ‘quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est, inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 24, 53.
[47] ‘quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget, liberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta vestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum dono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena adornatur’ Sen. Dial. vi 10, 1; ‘victrix fortunae sapientia’ Juv. Sat. xiii 20.
[48] ‘cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam omnes eorum impetus deficient’ Sen. Dial. ii 4, 1.
[49] ‘levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum’ Ep. 24, 14.
[50] ‘inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum est, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo’ ib. 78, 19.
[51] ‘mors optimum inventum naturae’ Dial. vi 20, 1; ‘fortem posce animum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat | naturae’ Juv. Sat. x 357-9.
[52] ‘caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo’ Sen. Dial. vi 20, 3; ‘nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod patet’ Silius Pun. xi 186-8; ‘adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio eius nihil timendum sit’ Sen. Ep. 24, 11.
[53] ‘[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros, quos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat’ ib. 36, 8.
[54] So Heraclitus had said ‘unus dies par omni est’ ib. 12, 7; ‘ut prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam mora non fit beatior vita, sed longior’ Ben. v 17, 6.
[55] ‘si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti’ Ep. 58, 35.
[56] ‘melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam | pro vita facienda putant’ Juv. Sat. xv 106 to 108.
[57] Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good reasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking up a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or (v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of (i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him violence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v) madness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.
[58] Notably in the case of Cato.
[59] ‘in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere’ Cic. Fin. iii 18, 60.
[60] ‘perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus’ ib. iii 18, 61.
[61] He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen. Mem. iv 4, 4.
[62] ‘Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem detraxeris gloriae’ Sen. Ep. 13, 14.
[63] ‘ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi’ ib. 24, 25; ‘quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed plus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et admittunt illam, non adtrahunt’ ib. 30, 15.
[64] ib. 24, 25.
[65] ib. 117, 22.
[66] Epict. Disc. i 9, 16.
[67] ‘probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate’ Cic. Off. i 19, 62.
[68] ib. 21, 71.
[69] ib. 26, 92.
[70] ib. 23, 80.
[71] ‘Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid impedierit’ Sen. Dial. viii 3, 2.
[72] See above, §§ 89, 90.
[73] See above, § 91.
[74] ‘efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant’ Cic. Off. i 29, 102.
[75] ‘hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine decorum potest; Graece enim πρέπον dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari’ ib. i 27, 93.
[76] Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; ‘ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur’ Tusc. disp. iv 13, 31.
[77] ‘id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali’ Off. i 27, 96.
[78] ‘adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum’ ib. 28, 99; ‘to order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters’ English Church Catechism.
[79] Cic. Off. i 29, 104.
[80] ‘id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium’ ib. 31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all the arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most truly liberal: ib. 42, 150 and 151.
[81] ib. 34, 122-124.
[82] ‘venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem’ ib. 36, 130. In the same spirit Epictetus says ‘we ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes’ Disc. i 16, 14.
[83] Cic. Off. i 35, 127.
[84] ‘nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis’ ib. i 35, 128; ‘Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo’ Fin. iii 20, 68.
[85] ‘habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυῤῥημονήσει. ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici’ Fam. ix 22, 5. See also above, § 318.
[86] ‘rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam illum matelam sumpsisse’ Sen. Ben. iii 26, 2.
[87] Dial. vi 20, 3.
[88] σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.
[89] τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ib. 7, 5 b 2.
[90] μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην was the expression of Antisthenes, see Diog. L. vi 3; ‘voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut vilium ministerio veniens’ Sen. Ben. vii 2, 2.
[91] ‘intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse’ Cic. Off. i 29, 103.
[92] See above, § 319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view (on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all “pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’s Socratics, p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat. Phileb. 44 B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected. Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 2).’ In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. Fin. iii 15, 51. See further §§ 347, 371.
[93] ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.
[94] Cic. Fin. ii 21, 69.
[95] Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ Sext. math. xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).
[96] Arnim iii 136, 155.
[97] ‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem animi’ Cic. Fin. iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari velit?’ Sen. Dial. vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ ib. 4, 4.
[98] ‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic. Leg. i 11, 31; ‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’ Off. iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen. Ep. 116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem] non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’ Dial. vii 9, 1. That this view was held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a); see also above, notes 92 and 93.
[99] Eth. N. x 7.
[100] ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν Diog. L. vii 114 (of Chrysippus); ‘hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui’ Cic. Fin. ii 4, 13; ‘vitium esse voluptatem credimus’ Sen. Ep. 59, 1.
[101] ‘quam [perturbationem] Stoici ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness by laetitia gestiens or nimia; Tusc. disp. iv 6, 13.
[102] Παναίτιος δὲ [ἡδονήν φησί] τινα μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν Sext. math. xi 73 (Arnim iii 155).
[103] See below, §§ 371, 402, 403. On the whole subject see further Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 110 to 112.
[104] ‘Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, praeterit[am] censet a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis tuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent’ Cic. Off. ii 24, 86.
[105] ‘hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis, quantum bonae valetudini satis est ... cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit adversus infesta corporis’ Sen. Ep. 8, 5; and so Musonius, below, § 381.
[106] Epict. Disc. iii 22 and 26.
[107] See above, § 304.
[108] Diog. L. vii 129; ‘Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 34, 72.
[109] ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον Diog. L. vii 130; ‘[Stoici] amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt’ Cic. as above. The ἐπιβολή or conatus is a variety of the ὁρμή or appetitio, Hirzel p. 390.
[110] Not of course new in any absolute sense; in the country at least such relations must always have been common.
[111] Diog. L. vi 96-98.
[112] See above, § 300, and § 306, note 29; and below, §§ 431, 439, 444, and 446.
[113] ‘in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit’ Sen. Ben. i 9, 4.
[114] Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, §§ 406, 407.
[115] Diog. L. vii 106.
[116] ‘non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse tamen se procerum volet’ Sen. Dial. vii 22, 2.
[117] ‘unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma’ ib. xii 16, 4.
[118] ‘contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. Ep. 5, 4; ‘non splendeat toga, ne sordeat quidem’ ib. 5, 3.
[119] ‘unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur’ Ben. iii 28, 2; ‘[philosophia] stemma non inspicit ... animus facit nobilem’ Ep. 44, 1 and 5.
[120] Diog. L. vii 106; Cic. Fin. iii 15, 51.
[121] ‘de bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt’ ib. 17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly sensitive to the judgment of posterity: ‘paucis natus est, qui populum aetatis suae cogitat: multa annorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice. etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine offensa sine gratia iudicent’ Sen. Ep. 79, 17.
[122] ‘pacem demus animo, quam dabit ... intenta mens ad unius honesti cupiditatem. conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus’ Dial. v 41, 2.
[123] ‘multis ad philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita est, secura est’ Ep. 17, 3; ‘transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam humanarum aerumnarum materiam’ Dial. ix 8, 1.
[124] ‘Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona. divitiae autem ... nihil horum faciunt; ergo non sunt [bonum]’ Ep. 87, 35.
[125] ‘divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum et habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor’ Dial. vii 24, 5; ‘[sapiens] non amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem virtuti suae materiem subministrari vult’ ib. 21, 4.
[126] ‘largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit’ Cic. Off. ii 15, 52; ‘mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat’ Sen. Ep. 120, 8.
[127] ‘is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget’ ib. 14, 17.
[128] Cic. Off. ii 24, 86.
[129] See above, § 337.
[130] ‘Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere “sapientis esse, nihil contra mores leges instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis amicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis”’ Cic. Off. iii 15, 63.
[131] ‘toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius a quibusdam optimis viris, ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur’ ib. ii 25, 90; and see further, § 408.
[132] See above, § 342.
[133] τὴν μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, ... δι’ ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον ἐλεύθερον Stob. ii 7, 11 i.
[134] ‘quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis’ Cic. Par. 5, 34.
[135] ‘asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera’ Hor. Ep. i 18, 6 and 8.
[136] Juv. Sat. i 151-153.
[137] ‘non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia parvo aestimanda sunt’ Sen. Ep. 104, 34, where the reference is to ‘libertas’ in both senses.
[138] ‘nec civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam impendere vero’ Juv. Sat. iv 90 and 91.
[139] οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὁντινοῦν λεκτέον ἃ φρονοῦμεν Muson. apud Stob. iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6).
[140] ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit; immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. Ep. 14, 7.
[141] ‘Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the tyrant within us, whom we have daily over us?’ Epict. Disc. iv 1, 86.
[142] Χρύσιππός φησι μαίνεσθαι τοὺς ... τὴν ἀπονίαν ἐν μηδενὶ ποιουμένους Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 2; ‘in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt] quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut ... in doloris vacuitate’ Cic. Fin. iii 15, 51.
[143] Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic. Fin. iii 17, 56.
[144] Stob. as above.
[145] For a similar change in the meaning of the word ‘conscience’ see above, § 351; the new use of this word as of the word ‘affection’ is that now commonly understood in ethical discussion.
[146] Diog. L. vii 116; ‘declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 6, 13.
[147] ‘eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem: quam sic definiunt—voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat’ ib. 6, 12.
[148] ‘cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur’ ib. 6, 13.
[149] See below, §§ 374, 379.
[150] ‘scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio suis bonis verisque fidentis’ Sen. Ep. 59, 1 and 2; ‘sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum’ ib. 27, 3.
[151] χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρόνιμον περιπάτησιν [λέγουσιν] οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί Stob. ii 7, 5 c.
[152] ‘in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo’ Sen. Ep. 23, 4.
[153] ‘ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est’ A. Gellius N. A. xii 5, 10.
[154] τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν Galen plac. Hipp. et Plat. iv 2, p. 368 K.
[155] ‘negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae; illi propter spem vivere’ Cic. Fin. iv 20, 56.
[156] See above, §§ 289, 324.
[157] For the Socratic paradox ‘virtue can be taught,’ see above, § 46, also Diog. L. vii 91; ‘nemo est casu bonus. discenda virtus est’ Sen. Ep. 123, 16.
[158] Arnim iii 214.
[159] ‘omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum’ Sen. Ep. 108, 8.
[160] The emphasis occasionally laid on εὐφυΐα (bona indoles) reflects aristocratic and Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; ‘those who have a good natural disposition (οἱ εὐφυεῖς), even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 9.
[161] ‘Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him’ ib. ii 9, 11; ‘What then is progress? if any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (προαίρεσις) to exercise it and to improve it by labour’ ib. i 4, 18.
[162] Cic. de Off. i 28, 99 (§ 343 above); ‘verecundiam, bonum in adulescente signum’ Sen. Ep. 11, 1.
[163] ‘[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit’ Dial. vi 24, 2; cf. Ep. 40, 14.
[164] ‘paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt’ Dial. i 4, 15.
[165] Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic. Off. i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14.
[166] ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος], προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii 510).
[167] ‘primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint; ... deinde ea [selectio] perpetua; tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae; in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici’ Cic. Fin. iii 6, 20.
[168] ἐπιγίγνεσθαι [τῷ προκόπτοντι] τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσι Stob. as above; ‘illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire te via credas’ Sen. Dial. ix 2, 2. Epictetus uses the technical term ἀμεταπτωσία ‘unchangeable firmness of mind’ Disc. iii 2, 8.
[169] See especially Seneca, Epp. 75 and 95.
[170] Diog. L. vii 127.
[171] τὴν δὲ μεταστροφὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ ἐκ μεταβολῆς φασὶ γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλλούσης τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν Clem. Al. Strom. iv 6, 28 (Arnim iii 221).
[172] Cic. Fin. iii 14, 45; and see above, § 322.
[173] ‘ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus; item, qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille qui nihil processit’ Cic. Fin. iii 14, 48.
[174] As to the man who is ‘wise without knowing it’ (διαλεληθὼς σοφός) see Arnim iii 539 to 542, and Plut. Sto. rep. 19, 3 and 4.
[175] ‘iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset’ Sen. Ep. 120, 10.
[176] Written in 1805.
XIV. SIN AND WEAKNESS
[Sidenote: Sin.]
=360.= The Stoic view of the universe is coloured by optimism. All comes from God, all works towards good. None the less the Stoic morals are stern. Men in the mass are both foolish and wicked; they defy God’s will and thwart his purpose. The world is full of sin, and all sins (to use the Socratic paradox) are equal. What then is sin? It is a missing of the mark at which virtue aims (ἁμάρτημα); it is a stumbling on the road (peccatum); it is a transgressing of the boundary line[1]. It is the child of ignorance, the outward expression of ill health of the soul. Everywhere and in every man it weakens, hampers, and delays the work of virtue. It cannot however finally triumph, for it is at war with itself. The Persians were wrong when they conceived an Evil Power, a concentration of all the powers of mischief in one personality. This cannot be, for sin lacks essential unity. It destroys but does not build; it scatters but it does not sow. It is an earth-born giant, whose unwieldy limbs will in the end be prostrated by a combatant, small to the outward view, but inspired with divine forcefulness. If we understand what sin is, we shall see its repulsiveness; if we learn how it spreads, we shall seek protection against its infecting poison; if we attack it in detail, in individual men and in their daily acts, we shall in the end lay it low. Philosophy then proceeds to arm itself for its task.
[Sidenote: The four sinful conditions are errors.]
=361.= Sin is ignorance; more accurately, it is that which appears to be knowledge, but is not knowledge; it is false judgment. If we follow the process by which knowledge is attained, we find that there is no error in the mind-picture (visum), whether it is sensory or partly sensory and partly rational; this is an adumbration automatically presented to the mind. But ‘assent is in our power’; it is both an intellectual and a moral act. A too hasty assent to that which appears to be but is not is both an error and an offence; and most particularly so when it lies in the application of the general conceptions (προλήψεις) of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to particular cases[2]. In this way we quickly reach four sinful conditions, which come about by mistaking things indifferent, that is, advantages and disadvantages, for things good or evil. These are:
(i) Fear (φόβος, metus), in which a future disadvantage is mistaken for a future evil;
(ii) Greed (ἐπιθυμία, libido), in which a future advantage is mistaken for a future good;
(iii) Grief (λύπη, aegritudo), in which a present disadvantage is mistaken for a present evil;
(iv) Hilarity (ἡδονή, laetitia), in which a present advantage is mistaken for a present good[3].
In the case of the last two evils the title presents difficulty in all languages; thus for Grief we might substitute any term such as Discontent, Vexation, Worry or Fretfulness; it is a lack of Courage in bearing pain or disappointment. Again for Hilarity we might substitute Elation, Exaltation, Excitement: it is a lack of Soberness in the moment of pleasure.
[Sidenote: They are also maladies.]
=362.= From another point of view all sin is due to a lack of moral force, a want of tone in the moral sinews, an unhealthy condition of the soul[4]. Ultimately this point of view agrees with that just described: for it is the lack of health and strength which leads to hasty and ill-judged assent[5]. But for practical purposes we may use this distinction to lead up to a difference of grade. Thus we may associate ignorance with that rooted perversity of mind which is the exact opposite of virtue, and which is therefore in the strictest sense ‘vice’ (κακία, vitium)[5]; and want of tone with a passing condition which we cannot deny to be an evil, but may nevertheless describe by the gentler terms ‘perturbation’ and ‘affection[6].’ Such an evil is a disturbance of the soul’s calm, an ‘infection’ of its health. It may exist in three grades to be hereafter described, as a ‘ruffling,’ a ‘disturbance,’ a ‘disease’; and in both the latter forms it must be rooted out, for in both grades it is an evil, and in the last it is a vice which threatens to poison the man’s whole nature. Hence we reach the Stoic paradox that ‘the affections must be extirpated[7].’ But although this is our only ethical standard, we are not debarred from suggesting remedies which may alleviate the malady in particular persons and under special circumstances.
[Sidenote: Fear.]
=363.= The evil of Fear (φόβος, formido, metus) is practically opposed to the virtue of Courage. Here philosophy builds upon the foundations of common opinion, and its task is the easier. The youth who is brought up not to regard suffering, poverty, exile, or death as evils, will never be afraid. Since it is death that most alarms mankind by its grim aspect, he who can face this giant without trembling will not know fear, or at the most will only feel a slight ruffling of the soul. In asserting that ‘fear should be rooted out’ the Stoics cross no general sentiment; the tradition of the heroic age is the same.
[Sidenote: Greed.]
=364.= The treatment of Greed (ἐπιθυμία, libido) is similar. This fault is opposed to the Soberness with which men should aim at advantages; and when we have determined the standard of Soberness every transgression of it reveals Greed. But under this heading the Stoics include the vices of Anger[8] and Cruelty, for which the heroic age had no condemnation. In regard to the former they come into conflict with the Peripatetics also, who maintain that Anger serves useful ends, and should be controlled, not extirpated[9]. The consideration of this condition of mind will therefore bring out the divergence between the two schools.
[Sidenote: Anger.]
=365.= The Peripatetics assign Anger to the passionate part of the soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν); they admit that it needs to be restrained by reason, but hold that within proper limits it is both natural and necessary. In war it is essential to heroic action; he who is filled with it despises danger, and rushes on to great achievements[10]. It is no less necessary in peace, in order that the wicked may not go unpunished[11]. Aristotle says compendiously that ‘anger is the spur of virtue[12],’ the armour of the man of high soul. To this point of view the Stoics are opposed alike on the ground of principle and of experience. We do not need disease as a means to health[13], or armour which sways instead of being swayed[14]. A good man will face danger unmoved, from the sense of duty; and will face it more firmly and more perseveringly than he whose passions are excited[15]. He will punish wrong-doers either for their amendment or for the protection of others, without being angry with them[16]. Fabius the Delayer conquered his own spirit before he overcame Hannibal[17]; and the very gladiators strike, not when their feelings move them, but when the opportunity has come[18].
[Sidenote: Degrees of anger; remedies for it.]
=366.= Anger is technically defined as ‘the greedy desire of avenging an injury,’ or (more precisely) as ‘the greedy desire to punish one whom you deem to have injured you unjustly[19].’ That it is a temporary madness has always been held by the wise[20]; and this is indicated by the appearance of the angry, the threatening look, the heightened colour, the gnashing teeth, the stamp of the foot[21]; also by the fact that children are specially prone to anger, even for frivolous causes[22], and that anger is often directed against harmless persons or objects[23]. Nevertheless anger does not consist of a merely instinctive feeling, but implies the assent of the will[24]; so that we can always trace the three stages, first the appearance of an injury done (species oblata iniuriae), secondly the assent (animus adsentit atque adprobat), thirdly the outbreak of anger (sequitur ira)[25]. To check anger the first necessity is time[26]: reflection will often show us that we have not been injured at all, or not so much as we supposed[27]. Then it is well to put ourselves in the place of the offender, and try to look at the offence from his point of view[28]. Where anger has become a disease (iracundia), more violent remedies must be used; some have been cured by looking at themselves in a mirror[29]; others must apply the ‘contrary twist[30],’ and learn when struck to turn quietly away[31].
[Sidenote: Variations of anger.]
=367.= Anger is an evil that has many varieties, and the precisians exercise their ingenuity in distinguishing the bitter-humoured (amarus), the fiery (stomachosus), the fierce (rabiosus), the man who is hard to get on with (difficilis), and many other shades of character. But one variety deserves special notice, because the evil disposition exists though its expression is checked. The angry man of this type does not allow himself to go beyond complaint and criticism, but he nurses his feeling in the depths of his heart[32]. He would on no account express himself in loud outcries, but his displeasure is easily excited and persistent. This evil we call moroseness; it is a feeling characteristic of a decadent society[33], and (like all other kinds of anger) it calls for unsparing repression.
[Sidenote: Cruelty.]
=368.= Cruelty, a tendency to excess in punishment[34], is an evil constantly attendant upon the possession of power, and directly opposed to the virtue of clemency. Roman history has exhibited many examples of it, beginning with Sulla who ordered seven thousand Roman citizens to be slain on one day[35], continuing with the many masters who are hated for cruelty to their slaves[36]. It cuts at the root of the ties of humanity and degrades man to the level of the beast[37]; in its extreme form it becomes a madness, when the slaying of a man is in itself a pleasure[38]. As a remedy for cruelty in its milder forms it is well to consider the true objects of punishment; first, to reform the offender; secondly, to make others better by a warning; thirdly, to give a sense of safety to the community by removing offenders[39]. All these objects are better effected if punishment is moderate and rare, and appears to be awarded with reluctance. When cruelty has become a disease it is necessary to remind the tyrant that his manner of life is a pitiable one[40], and that a complete cure can be worked by putting him to death[41].
[Sidenote: Grief.]
=369.= In reckoning Grief in its countless varieties as an evil the Stoics did not altogether run counter to public opinion. In the heroic age grief was indeed not forbidden, but it was sharply limited; women might grieve, men should remember. But in prescribing the total extinction of this state of mind the Stoics appeared to pass the bounds of human nature; public feeling revolted against what seemed impossible of attainment. Our position to-day is not greatly altered; but we may notice that whereas in ordinary social life Grief is not only tolerated but approved, yet in battle, earthquake, flood, and pestilence our ideal of the hero is one which almost entirely excludes the indulgence of this emotion.
Grief takes many forms, as Fretfulness, Disappointment, Restlessness, Pity, and Mourning; we proceed to examine them in order.
[Sidenote: Fretfulness.]
=370.= The simplest form of Grief is fretfulness under bodily pain, the effect of depression of the soul and contraction of its sinews[42]. In all ages and under all philosophies the capacity of bearing pain without flinching is the primary test of virtue; and in the Cynic and Stoic schools alike the dogma ‘pain is no evil’ is of critical importance. In this matter correct doctrine needs to be strengthened by life-long discipline; but it is not required by Stoic principles that general principles should be forced upon the acceptance of individual sufferers. Panaetius therefore acted quite correctly when, in writing to Quintus Tubero on the subject of the endurance of pain, he abstained from pressing the usual paradox[43]. But all who see this trial awaiting them will do well to consider how much hardship men willingly endure for evil purposes, such as those of lust, money-making, or glory. Cocks and quails will fight to the death for victory: jugglers will risk their lives swallowing swords, walking on tight ropes, or flying like birds, when in each case a slip means death[44]. If we compose our minds long before to meet suffering, we shall have more courage when the time comes[45].
[Sidenote: Discipline of pain.]
=371.= Still more effective is active training[46]. Happy was the Spartan youth who came to Cleanthes to ask him whether pain was not a good; his education had taught him that this was a more practical question than that other, whether pain is an evil[47]. Recruits cry out at the slightest wound, and are more afraid of the surgeon’s touch than of the sword; on the other hand veterans watch the life-blood draining away without a sigh[48]. Some men groan at a box on the ear, whilst others smile under the scourge[49]. Inexperience therefore is the chief cause for weakness under pain; familiarity with it brings strength[50].
[Sidenote: Disappointed ambition.]
=372.= The Grief that gives way to pain of mind has very various forms; but that which is due to disappointed ambition is perhaps the most typical. Even men who had overcome the fear of death were known to shudder at the bitterness of soul (aegritudo animi) which accompanies defeat in a contested election (repulsa) in a republic, or displacement from the favour of the powerful under a monarchy[51]. For this malady the complete remedy is found in the paradox that ‘the wise man is king,’ that virtue can never be unseated from the curule chair[52]; temporary alleviations may be found, even by philosophers, in biting sarcasms aimed at the incapacity of one’s fellow-citizens[53]. It may be in the abstract the duty of a good man to take part in politics; but experience shows that the State has yet to be discovered which can tolerate a sage, or which a sage can tolerate[54]. Hence we find even Stoic teachers relapsing into practical Epicureanism, and bidding their followers to let the community go hang, and to reserve their energies for some nobler occupation[55]. To these lapses from sound principle we need not attach any serious importance; the individual Stoic did not always live up to his creed.
[Sidenote: Restlessness.]
=373.= Restlessness is grief of mind without known cause; the unquiet soul rushes hither and thither, vainly seeking to be free from its own company[56]. The lesson that Horace had pressed a century earlier, that disquiet can only be cured by quiet, has not been learnt[57]. In Homer Achilles tosses on his bed in fever, lying first on his face, then on his back, never long at rest in any position; and so to-day our wealthy man first travels to luxurious Campania, then to the primitive district of the Bruttii; north and south are tried in turn, and alike disapproved, whilst after all the fault is not in the place, but in the man[58]. In this temper men come to hate leisure and complain that they have nothing to do[59]. This folly reaches an extreme when men trust themselves to the sea, take the chance of death without burial, and place themselves in positions in which human skill may avail nothing[60]. It even leads to great political disasters, as when Xerxes attacks Greece because he is weary of Asia, and Alexander invades India because the known world is too small for him[61]. The times will come, when men will seek novelty by travelling through the air or under the sea; they will force their way through the cold of the poles and the damp heat of the forests of Africa. The remedy lies either in humbler submission to the will of the deity, or in a sense of humour which sees the absurdity of taking so much trouble for so little advantage[62].
[Sidenote: Pity.]
=374.= Pity is that weakness of a feeble mind, which causes it to collapse at the sight of another man’s troubles[63], wrongly believing them to be evils. Pity looks at the result, not at the cause, and it is most keenly felt by women of all ages, who are distressed by the tears even of the most abandoned criminals, and would gladly burst open the doors of the gaols to release them[64]. The cause of pity lies in a too rapid assent; we are caught napping by every sight that strikes on our senses. If we see a man weeping, we say ‘he is undone’: if we see a poor man, we say ‘he is wretched; he has nothing to eat[65].’ Now we Stoics have a bad name, as though we recommended to governors a system of harsh punishments[66]; but, on the contrary, none value more highly than we the royal virtue of clemency[67]. Only let it be considered that a wise man must keep a calm and untroubled mind, if only that he may be ready to give prompt help to those who need it; a saving hand to the shipwrecked, shelter to the exile, the dead body of her son to a mother’s tears. The wise man will not pity, but help[68].
[Sidenote: Sensibility.]
=375.= Nearly akin to the evil of pity is that sensitiveness to the sufferings of others which leads men, contrary reason, to turn the other way and avoid the sight of them. Of this weakness Epictetus gives us a lively picture:
‘When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. ‘Miserable,’ the man said. Then Epictetus asked ‘In what respect? For men do not marry and beget children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy.’ ‘But I,’ the man replied, ‘am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered.’ ‘Well then,’ said Epictetus, ‘do you think that you acted right?’ ‘I acted naturally,’ the man replied; ‘this is the case with all or at least most fathers.’ ‘Let us be careful,’ said Epictetus, ‘to learn rightly the criterion of things according to nature. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good?’ Certainly.’ ‘Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection?’ ‘I think not.’ ‘Well then, to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains to inquire if it is consistent with affection.’ ‘Yes, let us consider.’ ‘Has the mother no affection for her child?’ ‘Certainly she has.’ ‘Ought then the mother to have left her, or ought she not?’ ‘She ought not.’ ‘And the nurse, does she love her?’ ‘She does.’ ‘Ought then she also to have left her?’ ‘By no means.’ ‘But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act[69].’
Seneca draws for us the same picture of sentimental neglect of duty. ‘Of our luxurious rich,’ he says, ‘no one sits by the side of his dying friend, no one watches the death of his own father, or joins in the last act of respect to the remains of any member of his family[70].’
[Sidenote: Sensitiveness.]
=376.= Another form of the evil of Grief is that of undue sensitiveness to criticism and abuse. This mental weakness is illustrated by the case of Fidus Cornelius, who burst into tears because some one in the senate called him a ‘plucked ostrich’; and in an earlier period Chrysippus had been acquainted with a man who lost his temper merely because he was called a ‘sea-calf[71].’ Others are annoyed by seeing their eccentricities imitated, or by reference to their poverty or old age. The remedy for all these things is humour; no one can be laughed at who turns the laugh against himself[72]. Another is to cease thinking about oneself[73].
[Sidenote: Mourning.]
=377.= The hardest to bear of all distresses is the loss of friends by death, and most particularly, the loss by parents of their children. To meet this trouble a special class of literature, called consolationes, grew up, not confined to any one school of philosophers. The treatise of Crantor the Academic was famous in Cicero’s time[74]; and in the letter of Servius Sulpicius to Cicero upon his daughter’s death we have an admirable example of the ‘consolation’ in private correspondence[75]. Sulpicius bids Cicero think of all the grief and trouble in the world, the loss of political liberty at Rome, the destruction of so many famous cities of antiquity, until he feels that man is born to sorrow, and that his own loss is but a drop in the ocean of the world’s suffering. He also calls on the mourner to think of his own character, and to set an example of firmness to his household[76]. Cicero found his real comfort in none of these things, but in industrious authorship. We have unfortunately no example of a ‘Consolation’ by Musonius. Seneca has left us two treatises in this style, one a formal document addressed to the minister Polybius on the death of his brother, the other a more personal appeal to Marcia, a lady of an ‘old Roman’ family, on the death of a son. Besides the arguments already used by Sulpicius[77], he recommends to Polybius attention to the public service and the reading of Homer and Virgil[78]. Both to him and to Marcia he pictures the happiness of the soul now admitted to the company of the blest[79], or at any rate at peace and freed from all the pains of life[80]. In writing to Marcia he recalls with effect the examples of Octavia the sister, and Livia the wife of Augustus, each of whom lost a promising son in early manhood. Octavia gave herself up to her grief, never allowed her dead son to be mentioned in her presence, and wore mourning to the day of her death, though she was surrounded by her children and grandchildren. Livia, after paying the last tokens of respect, laid aside her grief, recalled with pleasure her son’s achievements, and (advised so to act by her philosopher Areius) devoted herself to her social duties, refusing to make all Rome sad because one mother had lost a son[81].
[Sidenote: Resignation.]
=378.= The consolations of Epictetus include less philosophical speculation, and more religious resignation. To begin with, preparation should be made for the loss of children. Parental affection should not pass the bounds of reason; every time that a father embraces his child, he should reflect ‘this child is only lent to me,’ ‘this child is mortal[82].’ If the child dies, his first thought should be ‘he who has given takes away[83].’ To others he will say ‘I have restored the child[84].’ His abiding mood will be that of resignation to the divine will. He will realize that in the course of a long life many and various things must happen; and that it is impossible to live to old age, without seeing the death of many whom we love[85].
[Sidenote: Comfort.]
=379.= All ‘consolations’ aim at diminishing the grief of mourners, nature being inclined rather to excess than to defect in this matter. But the Stoics could not altogether avoid the direct issue whether or not grief is a sin, and weeping a weakness. The plain teaching of the school was that ‘death is no evil,’ and therefore that grief for the dead is against reason. And to this view the teachers give from time to time formal adhesion, as being the better cause[86]. But in individual cases they find that to a certain extent there is not only excuse, but justification, for grief and tears; and thus they come into touch with the common feelings of humanity[87], whilst the plea of ‘natural necessity’ serves to ward off the criticism of sterner philosophers[88]. From this concession emerges in the Roman period the definite precept of a time-limit for grief[89]; and its undue continuance is sternly denounced as due to love of ostentation[90], and the morbid enjoyment of sorrow by an ill-balanced mind[91]. Grief in this shape is a dangerous disease; there must be no trifling with it, but it must be totally destroyed[92].
[Sidenote: Misanthropy.]
=380.= Lastly, we include under the heading of Grief a weakness which often developes into serious disease; that general discontent, which is voiced in complaints as to the wickedness of the age[93] and the degeneracy of young Rome. Such discontent has always been characteristic of the old[94]; but under the principate it has developed into a special evil, the ‘hatred of the human race’ (odium generis humani). Of this fault even philosophers may be suspected; for it must be admitted that men are bad, have been bad, and always will be bad[95]; in short, that the whole human race is made up of madmen[96]. But wise men will bear with this fact quietly and with a smile[97]. It is futile to bring accusations against the whole race[98], and a delusion to think our own times worse than those of our predecessors. The old Romans, to whom we look up as models of virtue, made just the same complaints of their own times; and as a matter of fact the standard of general morality never varies greatly from its average, either in an upward or a downward direction[99].
[Sidenote: Eating.]
=381.= The fault of Hilarity (ἄλογος ἔπαρσις, elatio animi) is a departure from Soberness and cheerful Joy with regard to the things that appeal to our appetites, and this in the direction of excess. With regard to food, it corresponds to ‘greediness’ in modern speech. The matter is but little discussed, but we have two interesting lectures by Musonius, which are chiefly concerned with this vice, from which we take the following extracts:
‘Greediness’ is an unpleasant fault, making men to resemble pigs and dogs: but on the other hand healthy eating requires much supervision and practice (ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἄσκησις). Of all pleasures that tempt men, greediness is the hardest to contend against; for it assails us twice every day. To eat too much is wrong; to eat too fast is wrong; so it is also to take too much pleasure in food, to prefer the sweet to the wholesome, or not to give your companions a fair share. Another fault is to let meals interfere with business. In all these points we should look chiefly to health. Now we observe that those who use the simplest foods are generally the strongest; servants are stronger than their masters, countryfolk than townsmen, the poor than the rich. There is therefore good reason to prefer cheap food to that which is costly, and that which is ready to hand to that which is only obtained with great trouble. Further, some foods are more congenial than others to men’s nature; as those which grow from the earth, or can be obtained from animals without killing them. Food that requires no cooking has an advantage, as ripe fruit, some vegetables, milk, cheese, and honey. Flesh food is for many reasons objectionable. It is heavy and impedes thought; the exhalations from it are turbid and overshadow the soul. Men should imitate the gods, who feed on the light exhalations of earth and water. But to-day we have even worse corruptions. Many men are dainty and cannot eat food without vinegar or some other seasoning. Also we call in art and machinery to aid our pleasures, and actually have books written on cookery. All this may serve to titillate the palate, but is mischievous to health[100].’
The sarcasms of Seneca are aimed not so much against excess in quantity or fastidiousness in quality, as against the collection of dainties from all parts of the world[101].
[Sidenote: Drinking.]
=382.= As to drinking, the Stoic period marks a great change in feeling. In the times of Zeno, hard drinking had almost the honour of a religious ceremony; and the banquet (συμπόσιον) was the occasion of many a philosophical discussion. Zeno began by laying it down as a principle that ‘the wise man will not be drunken[102],’ and Chrysippus went so far as to name drunkenness as causing the loss of virtue[103]. But the prohibition was carefully guarded. The earlier teachers permitted ‘wininess[104]’; and Seneca justifies this means of banishing care, pointing out many instances of public men of drinking habits who discharged their duties admirably[105]. Yet on the whole he inclines to a stricter view, finding that ‘drunkenness is a voluntary madness,’ and that it removes that sense of shame which most hinders men from wrongdoing[106]. Meanwhile a change in public taste, and perhaps the continual example of Cynic missionaries, had produced a tide of feeling in favour of simple living. The philosophical discussions sketched by Cicero take place at all times of the day, but most usually in the morning hours; they are never associated with riotous banqueting, but if necessary the meal is cut short to make room for the talk. Under the principate the fare is of the simplest; Seneca himself was a vegetarian in his youth[107]; his teacher Attalus was well content with porridge and water, and found an audience ready to approve his taste[108].
[Sidenote: Sexual indulgence.]
=383.= A similar but more profound change had taken place at the same time in regard to sexual relations. In the time of Socrates courtesans and boy-favourites played a large part in social life; associated with the banquet, they formed part of the accepted ideal of cultured enjoyment; even moralists approved of them as providing a satisfaction to natural desires and indirectly protecting the sanctity of the home[109]. The same attitude of mind is shown by Seneca under similar circumstances, when he recommends that princes be indulged with mistresses in order to make their character more gentle[110]. But little by little a more severe standard prevailed[111]. From the first the Stoics set themselves against the pursuit of other men’s wives[112]. With regard to other relations, they did not feel called upon to condemn them in other men[113]; they were indeed, in themselves, matters of indifference[114]; but they found it contrary to reason that a man’s thoughts should be occupied with matters so low, or that he should bring himself into subjection to irregular habits and become a slave to a woman[115]. As the courtesan was gradually excluded by this rule[116], the general opinion fell back on the slave as the most accessible and least dangerous object of indulgence[117]. But the philosophers of the principate, following Zeno, who in these matters took the πρέπον (decorum) as his rule[118], find it in a high degree unfitting that the master, who should in all things be a model of self-control in his own household, should display so grave a weakness to his slaves.
[Sidenote: Chastity.]
=384.= Thus little by little there emerged the ideal of a strict chastity, to the principle of which not even the marriage relation should form an exception[119]. Every falling off from this ideal is sin or transgression[120]; and it is especially true in this matter that each act of weakness leaves its trace on the character, and that he who yields becomes a feebler man[121]. The Socratic paradox, that the wise man will be a lover[122], is consistently maintained by the Stoics; but the practical limitations of this doctrine are well illustrated by the following striking passage from the lectures of the Stoic Musonius:—
‘Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider that sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for the begetting of children; such as aim at mere pleasure are lawless, even in marriage. Even apart from adultery and unnatural relations, all sexual connexions are disgraceful; for what sober-minded man would think of consorting with a courtesan, or with a free woman outside marriage? and least of all would he do so with his own slave. The lawlessness and foulness of such connexions is a disgrace to all who form them; as we may see that any man who is capable of a blush does his utmost to conceal them. Yet one argues: “in this case a man does no injustice; he does not wrong his neighbour or deprive him of the hope of lawful issue.” I might reply that every one who sins injures himself, for he makes himself a worse and less honourable man. But at any rate he who gives way to foul pleasure and enjoys himself like a hog is an intemperate man; and not least he who consorts with his own slave-girl, a thing for which some people find excuse. To all this there is a simple answer; how would such a man approve of a mistress consorting with her own man-servant? Yet I presume he does not think men inferior to women, or less able to restrain their desires. If then men claim the supremacy over women, they must show themselves superior in self-control. To conclude; sexual connexion between a master and his female slave is nothing but licentiousness[123].’
[Sidenote: ‘Bear and forbear.’]
=385.= Thus our detailed study of the four perturbations has led us to lay little stress on Fear and Greed, the weaknesses of the heroic period when men’s minds were actively turned to the future, and to concentrate our attention on Grief and Hilarity, the two moods in which life’s troubles and temptations are wrongly met with as they arrive. As we follow the history of Stoic philosophy through the times of the Roman principate, we find that this tendency to lay stress on the training of the passive character increases: till Epictetus tells us that of all the vices far the worst are ‘lack of endurance’ (intolerantia), which is the developed form of Grief, and ‘lack of restraint’ (incontinentia), which is the persistent inclination towards Hilarity[124]. Hence the cure for vice is summed up by him in the golden word, ‘bear and forbear[125]’; that is, practise Courage and cast off Grief, practise Soberness and keep Hilarity far from you. ‘A good rule,’ a Peripatetic would reply, ‘for women and slaves.’
[Sidenote: Avoidance of temptation.]
=386.= This negative attitude is most strongly marked in Epictetus in connexion with the dangers of sexual passion. Thus his short advice to all young men with regard to the attractions of women is ‘Flee at once[126]’; and even in this his advice was countenanced in advance by the more tolerant Seneca[127]. It would appear from both writers that the battle between the sexes had become unequal at this period, so often is the picture drawn of the promising and well-educated youth literally and hopelessly enslaved by a mistress presumably without birth, education, or honour[128]. It causes us some surprise to find that the distinction between heavenly and earthly love[129] is not brought in as a corrective of the latter. Only in a general way the suggestion is made that seductive attractions should be driven out by virtuous ideals:
‘Do not be hurried away by the appearance, but say: “Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see who you are and what you are about; let me put you to the test.” And do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have.... This is the true athlete.... Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness. Remember God; call on him as a helper and protector[130].’
[Sidenote: Gradations of vice.]
=387.= From the study of the separate evils we revert to the general theory of Vice. And here we must recall the point that so far as vice is weakness or ill-health of the soul, it admits of gradations, which may conveniently be stated as three, namely (i) rufflings of the soul; (ii) commotions, infections, or illnesses; (iii) diseases or vices proper[131]. It is not quite easy to classify the rufflings or first slight disturbances of the soul (prima agitatio animi) under the four perturbations; but the bodily indications of them seem to be more marked in the weaknesses of the active or heroic character, namely Fear and Greed. Thus in the direction of Fear we meet with hair standing on end—pallor of complexion—trembling limbs—palpitation, and dizziness, all of which are bodily indications that fear is not far off; in the direction of Anger (a form of Greed) we meet with heightened colour, flashing eyes, and gnashing teeth[132]. In the direction of Grief we meet with tears and sighs, and in that of Hilarity the automatic sexual movements, amongst which we must perhaps include blushing.
[Sidenote: Rufflings.]
=388.= It does not appear that the early Stoic masters occupied themselves much with the gradations of vice; although a text can be taken from Zeno for a discourse on this subject. Neither does the earnest and cynically-minded Epictetus care to dwell on such details. On the other hand Seneca lays the greatest possible stress on the doctrine that ‘rufflings’ are not inconsistent with virtue. For this two arguments are available, which are perhaps not quite consistent. First, the bodily indications are beyond the control of the mind; they are necessary consequences of the union of body and soul, that is, of our mortal condition[133]. Secondly, the ‘rufflings’ correspond to the mind-pictures presented to the soul in thought, and therefore are neither moral nor immoral until the soul has given its assent to them[134]. From either point of view we arrive at a result congenial to this philosopher. The wise man is, in fact, subject to slight touches of such feelings as grief and fear[135]; he is a man, not a stone. Secondly, the sovereignty of the will remains unimpaired; give the mind but time to collect its forces, and it will restrain these feelings within their proper limits[136]. The doctrine is in reality, though not in form, a concession to the Peripatetic standpoint; it provides also a convenient means of defence against the mockers who observe that professors of philosophy often exhibit the outward signs of moral weakness.
[Sidenote: ‘Commotions.’]
=389.= If the soul gives way to any unreasoning impulse, it makes a false judgment and suffers relaxation of its tone: there takes place a ‘commotion’ or ‘perturbation’ (πάθος, affectus, perturbatio), which is a moral evil[137]. The Greek word πάθος admits of two interpretations; it may mean a passive state or a disease; we here use it in the milder sense. By an ‘emotion’ we mean that the soul is uprooted from its foundation, and begins as it were to toss on the sea; by ‘affection’ that it is seized or infected by some unwholesome condition[138]; by ‘perturbation’ that it has ceased to be an orderly whole, and is falling into confusion. When we regard these words in their true sense, and shake off the associations they carry with them in English, it is clear that all of them denote moral evils; nevertheless they cannot rightly be called ‘diseases’ of the soul[139]. The evils and weaknesses which have been discussed are commonly displayed in ‘commotions’ or ‘perturbations,’ and are normally equivalent to them.
[Sidenote: Diseases of the soul.]
=390.= The soul by giving way to perturbations becomes worse; it acquires habits of weakness in particular directions. This weakness from a passing disposition (ἕξις) changes into a permanent disposition or habit (διάθεσις), and this is in the full sense a ‘disease’ of the soul[140]. These diseases or vices are, strictly speaking, four in number[141]: but the Stoics run into great detail as regards their titles and subdivisions. Diseases in the ordinary sense (ἀρρωστήματα) display restlessness and want of self-control; such are ambition, avarice, greediness, drunkenness, running after women[142], passionate temper, obstinacy, and anxiety. An opposite class of maladies consists of unreasonable dislikes (κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, offensiones); such are inhospitality, misogynism, and quarrelling with the world in general[143].
[Sidenote: Men are good or bad.]
=391.= The study of vice in its various forms and gradations leaves untouched the main positions of Stoic ethics, including the Socratic paradoxes. Men are of two classes only, the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad[144]. This bold dualism the Stoics hold in common with the Persians[145]; and though it is on the one hand tempered so as to meet the common opinion that most men are of middling character, and on the other hand subordinated to the monistic principle that good shall in the end prevail, it remains the key-stone of this department of philosophy. Virtue is a right state of mind; everything that falls short of it is therefore a wrong state of mind. Virtue and vice lie in the inward disposition, not in the outward act[146]; and one who has crossed the line is equally out of bounds whatever the distance to which he has travelled on the far side[147]. Each man has therefore an all-important choice to make. The great Stoic teachers were filled with a yearning after righteousness and reconciliation with the divine purpose and a disgust and horror of the condition of the man who is at variance with his Creator, his neighbour, and himself[148]. These convictions they encased as usual in paradoxes and syllogisms.
[Sidenote: All sins are equal.]
=392.= That ‘the affections must be extirpated[149]’ ceases to be a paradox, as soon as we have defined affections as states of mind contrary to reason, and have made room for the ‘reasonable affections’ of caution, good will, and joy[150]. That ‘all sins are equal[151]’ remains still, as of old, a stumbling block[152]. Yet this Socratic paradox has a simple interpretation; it is a protest against the light-heartedness which tolerates ‘petty’ acts of wrongdoing, and is indifferent to the evil habits of mind thus acquired[153]. Two of the Stoic teachers of the transition period, Heraclides of Tarsus and Athenodorus, are said to have abandoned the paradox[154], and all Stoics were ready to admit that sins are ‘unlike’[155]. But, as usual, the main body held firmly to a doctrine in which they had discovered a real practical value. Just the same principle is expressed by other paradoxes, as that ‘he who has one vice has all, though he may not be equally inclined to all[156]’; and again that ‘he who is not wise is a fool and a madman[157].’
[Sidenote: Sin is curable.]
=393.= In spite of the parallelism of virtue and vice the latter is destined to subordination, not only in the history of the universe, but also in the individual man. Even if sins are equal, vice as ill health of the soul has degrees. The first ‘rufflings’ of the soul are, as we have seen, not to be reckoned as real evils; its ‘perturbations’ give the hope of a coming calm; and grievous though its ‘diseases’ are, we have no suggestion of incurable sin, or of the hopeless offender. Even he who has most fallen retains the germs of virtue, and these may again ripen under a proper discipline[158].
[Sidenote: Stoic austerity.]
=394.= The attitude of the Stoic school towards sin and weakness exposed it, as we have seen, to constant criticism and ridicule. To some extent this was due to the profession of philosophy in itself: for every such profession implied some claim to clearer knowledge and more consistent action than that of the crowd[159]. But the Stoics also sought to be ‘austere’ with regard to social pleasures, and thus it seemed that they neither offered others a share in their own happiness nor sympathetically partook in that of others[160]; whilst at the same time they claimed exemption from the weaknesses and failings of their neighbours. We have seen both Seneca and Epictetus anxious to meet criticism on these points by laying stress on those touches of natural feeling in which wise and foolish alike share. But in addressing the members of the sect their tone is very different; they hold out, as a prize worth the winning, the prospect of attaining to that calm and unchanging disposition of mind which has for ever left behind the flutterings of fear and greed, of grief and hilarity, and which is attuned to reason alone[161]. Epictetus indeed often expresses elation and pride upon this theme:
‘I will show the sinews of a philosopher. What are these? A desire (ὄρεξις) never disappointed, an aversion (ἔκκλισις) which never meets with that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (ὁρμή), a diligent purpose (πρόθεσις), an assent which is not rash. These you shall see[162].’
‘Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from everything. When a man has this peace (not proclaimed by Caesar, for how should he be able to proclaim it?) but by God through reason, is he not content when he reflects—Now no evil can happen to me[163]?’
FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. Par. iii 20.
[2] ‘Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things’ Epict. Disc. ii 17, 10 and 11.
[3] ‘omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures; aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35; ‘est igitur aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio venturi boni’ Tusc. disp. iv 7, 14; ‘hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque’ Verg. Aen. vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii 7, 10 b.
[4] Χρύσιππος ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κενὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τής ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη Galen Hipp. et Plat. v i, p. 429 K; cf. ib. iv p. 387 K (Arnim i 461).
[5] In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one of the virtues; they are ἀφροσύνη (insipientia), ἀδικία (iniustitia), δειλία (ignavia) and ἀκολασία (intemperantia); and each of these is rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all (Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).
[6] This view is summed up in the phrase that ‘the perturbations are κακά, but not κακίαι’ (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the principle that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman writers realized the difficulty in the use of words: ‘morbi autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 13, 29 and 30.
[7] ‘utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant’ Sen. Ep. 116, 1; ‘vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia’ Cic. Off. i 20, 69; ‘contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est’ Sen. Dial. x 10, 1.
[8] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται ὀργή ib. 10 b.
[9] Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: ‘ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest’ Cic. Off. i 38, 136.
[10] ‘[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum in bello fortitudo gerit’ Sen. Dial. iii 7, 1.
[11] ‘“non potest” inquit “fieri” Theophrastus, “ut non vir bonus irascatur malis”’ ib. 14, 1; ‘“quid ergo?” inquit “vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?”’ ib. 12, 1.
[12] ‘stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis’ Sen. Dial. v 3, 1.
[13] ‘abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo’ ib. iii 12, 6.
[14] ‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent non habentur’ ib. 17, 1.
[15] ‘adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio’ ib. 17, 5.
[16] ‘corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine ira’ ib. 15, 1.
[17] ‘[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem’ ib. 11, 5.
[18] ‘nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim perturbat artem’ ib. iv 14, 2 and 3.
[19] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [τοῦ] τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ‘ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a quo te inique putes laesum’ Sen. Dial. iii 2, 4.
[20] ‘ira furor brevis est’ Hor. Ep. i 2, 62; ‘quidam ex sapientibus viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam’ Sen. Dial. iii 1, 2.
[21] ib. 4.
[22] ‘non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus’ ib. 12, 4.
[23] ‘nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit’ ib. v 1, 3.
[24] ‘nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante’ ib. iv 1, 4; ‘nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est’ ib. 3, 4.
[25] ib. 3-5.
[26] ‘maximum remedium irae mora est’ ib. 29, 1; ‘Keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry’ Epict. Disc. ii 18, 12.
[27] ‘pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam laedunt’ Sen. Dial. v 28, 4; ‘contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself’ Bacon, Essay 57.
[28] ‘eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur’ Sen. Dial. 12, 3.
[29] ‘quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum’ ib. iv 36, 1.
[30] See below, § 403.
[31] ‘percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et excusationem’ ib. 34, 5.
[32] ‘quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam altae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae’ ib. iii 4, 3.
[33] ‘inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam enim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes’ Sen. Dial. 2 and 3.
[34] Defined as ‘atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis’ or ‘inclinatio animi ad asperiora’ Sen. Clem. ii 4, 1 and 3.
[35] ib. i 12, 1.
[36] ‘domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et detestabiles sunt’ ib. 18, 3.
[37] ‘ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus’ ib. 24, 3.
[38] ‘tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat’ ib. 25, 3.
[39] ib. 22, 1.
[40] ‘puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?’ ib. 26, 2.
[41] ‘optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est’ Ben. vii 20, 3.
[42] λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ Stob. ii 7, 10 b; ‘est aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 7, 14.
[43] See above, § 114.
[44] Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.
[45] ‘nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit’ Sen. Ep. 107, 4; and see further, § 339.
[46] ‘id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam malorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit’ Sen. Dial. i 4, 13.
[47] Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word πόνος, which corresponds equally to dolor and labor in Latin; see Cic. Tusc. disp. ii 15, 35.
[48] ‘tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis quam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine gemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur’ ib. xii 3, 1.
[49] ‘scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho’ Ep. 13, 5.
[50] ‘magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae putaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur’ ib. 76, 34.
[51] ‘quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam’ Hor. Ep. i 1, 43.
[52] ‘virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; | nec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae’ Hor. C. iii 2, 17-20.
[53] ‘Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied: ‘because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a good politician, to his fellow-citizens’ Stob. iv 4, 29.
[54] ‘si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit’ Sen. Dial. viii 8, 3.
[55] ‘si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe’ Ep. 19, 1.
[56] ‘mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et quietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima’ ib. xii 6, 6.
[57] ‘ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt’ Hor. Ep. i 11, 25-27.
[58] Sen. Dial. ix 12-15.
[59] ‘inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere quod agant’ ib. 2, 10.
[60] ‘incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope superabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti’ N. Q. v 18, 6 and 7; ‘non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli’ ib. 16; ‘quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?’ Ep. 53, 1.
[61] N. Q. v 18, 10.
[62] ‘magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita consumitur’ Sen. N. Q. 16.
[63] ‘misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis’ Clem. ii 5, 1.
[64] ‘anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent’ ib.
[65] Epict. Disc. iii 3, 17.
[66] ‘cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva mineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant homines’ Hor. Sat. i 3, 121-124; ‘scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est’ Sen. Clem. ii 5, 2 and 3.
[67] See below, § 409.
[68] ‘non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret’ Sen. Clem. ii 6, 3.
[69] Epict. Disc. i 11.
[70] ‘ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui sustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum propinquorumque extrema hora deseritur’ Sen. N. Q. iii 18, 6.
[71] Dial. ii 17, 1.
[72] ‘[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces concisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat’ Sen. Dial. ii 17, 3; ‘nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit’ ib. 2.
[73] ‘cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet’ Ep. 63, 3.
[74] Cicero wrote a treatise ‘de Consolatione’ based on this work, but only a few fragments remain. Plutarch’s ‘Consolation’ for Apollonius was drawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).
[75] Cic. Fam. iv 5.
[76] ‘denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium’ ib. 5, 5.
[77] ‘maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se passi sunt omnes omnesque passuri’ Sen. Dial. xi 1, 4. On the other side ‘malevoli solatii est turba miserorum’ ib. vi 12, 5; ‘[cogita] fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere’ ib. xi 5, 4.
[78] ib. 8, 2.
[79] ib. 9, 3; ‘inter felices currit animas’ ib. vi 5, 1.
[80] ib. xi 9, 4; ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ ib. vi 19, 6. See also above, §§ 298, 299.
[81] Sen. Dial. vi 3 to 5; above, § 123.
[82] ‘If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed’ Epict. Manual 3 (after Anaxagoras).
[83] Disc. iv 1, 101.
[84] ‘Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored’ Manual 11.
[85] Disc. iii 24, 27.
[86] ‘illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed cui ista firmitas animi continget?’ Sen. Ep. 63, 1.
[87] ‘inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis, quibus ipsos, videre’ Sen. Ep. 99, 15; cf. Dial. xii 1, 2.
[88] ‘cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis necessitas exprimit’ Ep. 99, 18.
[89] ‘nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus effuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori’ ib. 27.
[90] ‘at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit’ Dial. vi 7, 1.
[91] ‘fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor’ ib. 1, 7.
[92] ‘non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est’ ib.
[93] ‘obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens’ Sen. Dial. ix 2, 11.
[94] ‘difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor castigatorque minorum’ Hor. A. P. 173, 174.
[95] ‘idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse’ Sen. Ben. i 10, 3; ‘cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes’ ib. v 17, 3.
[96] ‘non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt’ ib.
[97] ‘satius est humana vitia placide accipere’ ib. ix 15, 5; ‘omnia vulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur’ ib. 2.
[98] ‘generi humano venia tribuenda est’ ib. iv 10, 2.
[99] ‘hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota’ Ben. i 10, 1.
[100] Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.
[101] ‘ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est’ Sen. Ep. 89, 22. Another form of luxury is in the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: ‘quemadmodum nihil illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos demittunt’ N. Q. iv 13, 10.
[102] See above, § 83, note 82.
[103] See above, § 324, note 155.
[104] καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μὲν [τὸν σοφόν], οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ Diog. L. vii 118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson in Journ. Phil. xxx pp. 221 sqq.
[105] ‘nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat nos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet’ Sen. Dial. ix 17, 8; see further Ep. 83, 14 and 15.
[106] ‘nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam’ Ep. 83, 18; ‘omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent’ ib. 83, 19.
[107] See above, § 126.
[108] Sen. Ep. 110, 14 and 18.
[109] Xen. Mem. ii 1, 5.
[110] ‘si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram’ Sen. Ben. vii 20, 3. The furthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application of this theory: ‘tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam’ Tac. Ann. xiv 2, 2.
[111] ‘non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe enim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est’ Sen. Ep. 97, 9.
[112] See above, § 306, note 27.
[113] ‘As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures’ Epict. Manual 33, 8.
[114] τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. § 317.
[115] ‘eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: “de sapiente” inquit “videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi”’ Sen. Ep. 116, 5; ‘Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? What then is slavery?’ Epict. Disc. iv 1, 15 and 17.
[116] ‘magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta’ Sen. Dial. ii 6, 7.
[117] Hor. Sat. i 2, 116-119.
[118] See above, § 318, note 104.
[119] ‘Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer’ Epict. Disc. i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were already practised in Seneca’s time; ‘vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus’ Dial. iv 12, 4.
[120] ‘lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus, si quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. Par. iii 1, 20.
[121] ‘When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also increased your incontinence’ Epict. Disc. ii 18, 6.
[122] καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων Diog. L. vii 129.
[123] Stob. iii 6, 23.
[124] ‘idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus’ A. Gellius, N. A. xvii 19, 5.
[125] ‘verba haec duo dicebat: ἀνέχου et ἀπέχου ib. 6.
[126] ‘At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy’ Epict. Disc. iii 12, 12.
[127] ‘id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime profugiamus’ Sen. Ep. 51, 5; ‘ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis’ ib. 69, 3.
[128] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 15-21.
[129] See above, § 349.
[130] Epict. Disc. ii 18, 24-29.
[131] The terms ‘ruffling’ (levis motus), and ‘commotions’ (emotiones) or ‘perturbations’ (perturbationes) are metaphors taken from the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe bodily ill-health. The English words ‘emotions,’ ‘affections’ have almost entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable as translations. The substitution of ‘commotion’ for ‘emotion’ has already been adopted by Maudsley, Pathology of the Human Mind.
[132] ‘ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba subfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes’ Sen. Dial. iv 2, 1; ‘erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia’ Cic. Leg. i 19, 50. See also the following notes.
[133] ‘si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris obsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus’ Sen. Dial. iv 3, 2; ‘est primus motus non voluntarius quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio’ ib. 4, 1.
[134] ‘prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species’ ib. 3, 5.
[135] ‘[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis carebit’ ib. iii 16, 7; ‘scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse’ ib. xi 18, 5; ‘nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est’ ib. xii 16, 1.
[136] ‘nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit’ ib. i 2, 2; ‘invicti esse possumus, inconcussi non possumus’ N. Q. ii 59, 3.
[137] ‘adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi’ Dial. iv 3, 1; ‘[Zeno] perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam’ Cic. Ac. i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis’ Fin. iii 10, 35.
[138] ‘neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur’ Sen. Dial. iii 8, 2.
[139] ‘perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad omnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? sed illi dicunt πάθος. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35.
[140] ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα Gal. loc. aff. i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a νόσημα is called ἕξις Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘adfectus sunt motus animi improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum’ Sen. Ep. 75, 12; ‘morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius haec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt’ ib. 11.
[141] For the technical terms see above, § 362, note 6.
[142] Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 11, 25.
[143] εἶναι δέ τινα [νοσήματα] κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 11, 27.
[144] ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων Stob. ii 7, 11 g.
[145] See above, § 8.
[146] See above, § 317.
[147] ‘cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet’ Cic. Parad. iii 20.
[148] Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who writes ‘the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school, could have no real consciousness of sin’ Philippians, p. 290. It may however be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than by Seneca.
[149] See above, § 362, note 7.
[150] See above, § 355.
[151] ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων Diog. L. vii 120.
[152] ‘omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit’ Cic. Mur. 29, 61.
[153] ‘parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt’ Cic. Par. iii 20; ‘facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere’ Sen. Dial. iii 7, 2; ‘optimum est ipsis repugnare seminibus’ ib. 8, 1; ‘si das aliquid iuris tristitiae timori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate’ Ep. 85, 11.
[154] Diog. L. vii 121.
[155] ἶσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια Stob. ii 7, 11 l.
[156] ‘stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur ...’ Sen. Ben. iv 27, 1; ‘omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet vitium unum, omnia habet’ ib. v 15, 1.
[157] ‘intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iii 5, 10.
[158] πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους Cleanthes ap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; ‘in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio’ Sen. Ben. vii 19, 5; ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia’ ib. v 25, 6.
[159] ‘satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur, invidiosum est’ Ep. 5, 2.
[160] αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι Diog. L. vii 117.
[161] ‘[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis’ Sen. Dial. vii 5, 1; ‘erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus’ ib. ii 9, 3.
[162] Epict. Disc. ii 8, 29.
[163] ib. iii 13, 11 to 13.
XV. COUNSELS OF PERFECTION
[Sidenote: Precepts.]
=395.= We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, both in its high philosophic framework and in its more detailed treatment, in which it prescribes what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the soul is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It remains for us to study the application of the system to individual cases, a matter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy as understood at the present day, but is an essential part of the work of churches and social organizations. This department of philosophy was termed by the ancients ‘precepts,’ or (more fully) ‘advice, dissuasion, admonition, exhortation, consolation, warnings, praise, reproof’ and so forth[1]; by some philosophers, as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in contempt, by others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone worthy of pursuit[2]. But the steady conviction of the main body of Stoic teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand[3]; that moral principles have no strength apart from their daily application[4], and that practical suggestions apart from a sound and reasoned system are like leaves cut from the bough, without lasting greenness[5]. Since precepts apply directly to individual persons and particular circumstances, they presuppose some relationship between teacher and hearer[6]; the latter must be either a convert to the school or one who has grown up under its influence. In the Roman period the department of precepts is of increasing importance; we have something to learn from Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material in the lectures (διατριβαί, ‘diatribes’) and letters of Musonius, Seneca, Epictetus and other teachers of the period of the principate.
[Sidenote: Training of the young.]
=396.= The ‘precepts’ which we find illustrated by our various authorities are not easily systematized, but they have all the more the charm of personal intimacy; through them we are admitted to the home life of the Stoics. As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic fathers, Stoic teachers, Stoic jurists, address those who came within their influence. Believing every man to have the seed of virtue in him, they had confidence that by their words it would often be stirred to life[7]; and that in other cases, in which the promising shoot had become overshadowed by ignorance or evil habits, it would by the same means begin to grow again[8]. But the full benefits of precepts could only be seen where they fell on well-prepared ground, and formed part of a training extending from infancy to the grave; where the instructor could daily ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This opportunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the young; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted to one period of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a ‘Theory of Education.’ It was under all circumstances guided by the rule of ‘little by little.’ Precepts must be few[9], and must be in themselves easy for the individual to carry out[10]; but by steady practice great things will be accomplished.
[Sidenote: The teacher’s example.]
=397.= Since the value of precepts depends on the personal influence of the instructor, it is clear that his example will be of the greatest importance, and we may first ask what the discipline is to which he himself submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advantage, for he lives in the sight of all men; and the Indian, who allows himself to be scorched or burnt to show his contempt for pain, makes a still more forcible appeal[11]. The Stoic does not parade himself in this fashion, but neither does he lock the door of his private life against any who wish to examine it[12]. In the early morning he shakes off sleep, rousing himself to do the day’s work of a man[13]. Having clothed himself, he turns his mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises; he resolves during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to bear cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him[14]. He will then give a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his health[15]; after which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter or summer, a plunge into the cold bath[16]; next comes the slightest of meals[17]; then a short nap or reverie[18]. From this he is aroused by the stir around him, and he then applies himself to the day’s studies, being careful to alternate reading and writing, so that his mind may be neither exhausted by the latter nor relaxed by the former[19]. Later on he will consider his practical duties towards his relatives, his friends, and society in general. He will order his household and settle the disputes of his dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and there in season[20], but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry[21]. He will encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and sharply warn those who are in danger of a fall[22]. He advises a young mother to nurse her child at her own breast; and when he meets with objections, points out the wisdom and propriety of obeying the prescriptions of nature[23]. Returning home, he will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining perhaps in a game of ball; his thoughts however will not always turn on success in the game, but he will consider how many principles in physics and ethics may be illustrated by it[24]. Now that evening comes on, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in the company of one or two favourite pupils[25]. Afterwards comes the temptation to burn the midnight oil in gathering seeds of wisdom for the morrow from the well-thumbed manuscript of Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus[26]. Retiring to his chamber, he will examine his conscience, review the events of the past day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps[27].
[Sidenote: The child’s life.]
=398.= With the training of children the Stoic teacher is perhaps not altogether familiar, but he knows its importance[28]; it must be based on simplicity and austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury are most dangerous stimulants to the passions[29]. The child must learn to eat and drink in a mannerly way[30], to refrain from loud talking and laughing[31], to express himself in respectful and graceful words[32]. He must be taught to do right before he can understand the reason why[33], or else by doing wrong he will make it difficult for himself afterwards to do right; he must be ruled until he can rule himself[34]. For this reason we give children proverbs (sententiae) or anecdotes (χρεῖαι) to write out and learn, such as ‘honesty is the best policy’ or ‘Socrates being asked of what city he was ...’; and these short pithy sayings sink deep[35]. But in the school life of children no attempt must be made to grapple with the real problems of life, because these are too hard for them, though parents often forget this objection[36]. Games and amusements may be permitted; for though in discussions on high principle the Stoics may be entirely opposed to ‘relaxation of soul[37],’ yet in practical life they freely admit its importance[38]. All dealings with children should be gentle; the discipline of the rod has long ago been abandoned by all sensible parents and teachers[39].
[Sidenote: Harm of soft living.]
=399.= Soft living is at all ages to be avoided[40]. It is in these days a danger to the bodily health; for when a man is accustomed to be protected from a draught by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm by foot-warmers constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even temperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him in danger of his life[41]. Those who envy men who ‘live softly’ forget that their character becomes soft thereby[42]. In particular clothing should not be such as altogether to protect the body from heat in summer, and from cold in winter. It is better to wear one shirt than two, best still to have only a coat. Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go without shoes; for after all to be shod is not very different from being fettered, and runners do not use shoes[43]. So also avoid luxurious furniture; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be made of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold? We eat, drink, and sleep better without these things. In all these matters the Spartans set us a good example; for while disease injures the body only, luxury corrupts both body and soul[44].
[Sidenote: Training of girls.]
=400.= Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature teaches us, for we train colts and puppies without any regard for the difference of sex. The true education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and these are the same for men and for women. Women need Wisdom to understand the ordering of a household, Justice to control the servants, Soberness that they may be modest and unselfish. But they also need Courage; in spite of the name ‘manliness’ (ἀνδρεία), this is not a virtue reserved for men. Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts. Females of all kinds fight to defend their young; the Amazons too were good fighters, and it is only for want of practice that women cannot do the same to-day. That men, being the stronger, should do the heavier work, and women the lighter, is an arrangement which is often convenient, but circumstances may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn equally with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low spirits about anything that happens; to avoid grasping habits, to love equality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or woman[45].
[Sidenote: Obedience to parents.]
=401.= Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of reason. We do not obey a father who gives orders for the treatment of a sick person contrary to those of the physician; nor one, who being himself ill, demands things that are not good for him; nor one who bids his son steal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful bloom. We do not even obey him when he tells us to spell a word wrongly or strike a false note on the lyre. If your father forbids you to philosophize, show him by your manner of life, by prompt obedience, by good temper, by unselfishness, how good a thing philosophy is. But after all, the command of the universal Father is more urgent upon you; which is, to be just, kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled; above labours and above pleasures; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not assume the outward appearance of a philosopher; for the power of philosophy is in the innermost part of the soul, which the father can no more reach than the tyrant[46].
[Sidenote: Example of gladiators and soldiers.]
=402.= The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the vision of virtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; they are like soft cheese which slips away from the hook by which it is taken up[47]. We must therefore put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in which the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent to the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, and the soldier[48]. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try again after each fall[49]; the trained boxer is eager to challenge the most formidable opponent[50]. The gladiator has learnt the lesson that pain is no evil, when he stands up wounded before a sympathetic crowd and makes a sign that it matters nothing[51]. But most of all the soldier’s oath serves as an example, when he pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully all his life: let the young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God as faithfully, to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to obey willingly the command to act or to suffer[52]. Without effort, as Hesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained[53].
[Sidenote: The ‘contrary twist.’]
=403.= In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength before they can be rooted out, and it will be well to anticipate this evil by exercising body and soul in advance in a direction contrary to that of the most common temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his precepts an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to bring about a proper standard in practice[54]. Thus since luxury is a chief enemy of virtue, the body should at least occasionally be brought low. A practice approved by the example of eminent men is to mark out from time to time a few days for the exercise of the simple life; during this time life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough dress and all the surroundings of poverty[55]. Since Cynism is a ‘short cut to virtue[56],’ philosophers may well employ the methods of Diogenes for short periods, as a corrective to any tendency to excess; rich people do as much for love of change[57].
[Sidenote: Personal appearance.]
=404.= On the question of personal appearance there is much to be said on both sides. Foppishness is a disagreeable vice, and it is contemptible that a young man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total disregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics; ‘it is against nature’ says Seneca ‘to be averse to neatness in appearance[58].’ In these outward matters a sensible man will conform to fashion, nor will he wish to make the name of philosopher still more unpopular than it is[59]. The founders of Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the same dress; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural distinction of the sexes; and to men the beard should be an object of just pride, for it is more becoming than the cock’s comb, or the lion’s mane[60]. This is to the Stoic a point of honour; he should part with his head more readily than with his beard[61]. But the beard may be trimmed; for, as Zeno has observed, nature provides rather against the ‘too little’ than against the ‘too much,’ and reason must come to her help. Women do right to arrange their hair so as to make themselves more beautiful; but for men any kind of artistic hair-dressing is contemptible[62].
[Sidenote: Solitude and society.]
=405.= The young should train themselves alternately to bear solitude and to profit by society[63]: since the wise man is never dependent on his friends, though none can take better advantage of them[64]. In living alone a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know his own heart[65]. But solitude must not be a screen for secret vices; a man only uses it rightly when he can without shame picture the whole world watching his hours of privacy[66]. The right choice of friends calls for true wisdom; for the soul cannot but be soiled by bad company[67]. The only true friendship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk[68]; therefore the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are unacquainted[69]. It is well to consider much before choosing a friend, but afterwards to give him implicit trust[70]; for a true friend is a second self[71]. Such friendship can only arise from the desire to love and be loved[72]; those who seek friends for their own advantage, will be abandoned by them in the day of trial[73]. In the companionship of well-chosen friends there grows up the ‘common sense,’ which is an instinctive contact with humanity as a whole, making each man a partner in the thoughts and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal aim of philosophy[74]. But the young philosopher should make no enemies; he should be free from that dislike of others which so often causes a man to be disliked, and should remember that he who is an enemy to-day may be a friend to-morrow[75].
[Sidenote: Comradeship in marriage.]
=406.= As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he will turn his mind towards marriage as a political and social duty[76]; but if he is really touched by the divine flame, he will also find in it that enlargement of his own sympathies and opportunities of which the wise man is always glad[77]. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid development of personal sympathy between husband and wife; and though in society girls who attended philosophers’ classes had an ill name as being self-willed and disputatious[78], yet it is from this very circle that the ideal of a perfect harmony of mind and purpose was developed most fully. Musonius often speaks on this subject:
‘Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn together, and to have all things in common, soul, body and property. Unlike the lower animals, which mate at random, man cannot be content without perfect community of thought and mutual affection. Marriage is for health and for sickness alike, and each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not seeking his own advantage, but that of his partner[79].’
‘A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable of hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But the soul is far more important; for as a crooked stick cannot be fitted with one that is straight, so there can be no true agreement except between the good[80].’
Seneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to doubt that his life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic marriages. Thus he excuses himself for taking more thought for his health than a philosopher should, by saying that the happiness of Paulina depends upon it. ‘Her life is wrapped up in mine, for its sake I must take care of my own. What can be more delightful than to be so dear to one’s wife, that for her sake one becomes dearer to himself[81]!’
[Sidenote: Celibacy.]
=407.= On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a contrary note, characteristic of his time, and of his bias towards Cynic practice:
‘In the present state of things, which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God? To say nothing of other things, a father must have a heating apparatus for bathing the baby; wool for his wife when she is delivered, oil, a bed, a cup; and so the furniture of the house is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to the public interests,
“The people’s guardian and so full of cares[82]”
whose duty it is to look after others; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his family well, and who does not? Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him[83]!’
To this very definite conception of a celibate order of philosophers, devoting themselves to the good of humanity and entitled thereby to become the rulers of society, Musonius makes the following reply in advance from the true Stoic standpoint:
‘Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates; and who were better philosophers than they? Since marriage is natural, philosophers should set the example of it. Why else did the Creator separate the human race into two divisions, making the honourable parts of the body distinct for each, and implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished them to live together and to propagate the race? He who would destroy marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No relationship is so essential or so intimate; friend does not agree so well with friend, nor does a father feel so keenly separation from his son. And why should a philosopher be different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a hindrance to a philosopher; but by doing his daily duty as a man he will become kindlier in disposition and more social in his thoughts[84].’
[Sidenote: Means of livelihood.]
=408.= The head of a household must have a means of living; and therefore the making of money (χρηματισμός, cura rei familiaris) comes within the range of precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means of livelihood; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a king’s minister or general; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting as a magistrate or a judge; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by teaching philosophy to those who are wishing to learn[85]. To each profession there are obvious objections; indeed the sharp critic of Stoicism can see no reason why a wise man, who lacks nothing, should trouble himself about money-making. Each of the three professions named assumes the existence of men willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not easily found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees should be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more reasonable that a student should only pay if he profits by his teaching; but on the other hand no one can absolutely promise to make a man good in a year, and deferred payments are often found unsatisfactory[86]. Under the Roman principate we hear little of the professions connected with public life; but it is clear that the teacher and the physician are held in special regard[87]. Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or the sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer[88]. Yet Chrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said that ‘the wise man will turn three somersaults for a sufficient fee[89]’; and no rule can be laid down except that a man should earn his own living without injuring his neighbour[90]. Agriculture, as a calling favourable both to health of body and to innocence of soul, continued to be praised, but was seldom practised except as an amusement[91].
[Sidenote: Kingly duties.]
=409.= For every profession philosophy has appropriate precepts, beginning with the king. There came one day to Musonius a king of Syria, for in those times there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius addressed him thus:
‘You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to protect and benefit your fellow-men; to do that, you must know what is good and what is evil. A king too must understand Justice; for wars and revolts come about because men quarrel about their rights. Also he must show Soberness and Courage, that he may be an example to his subjects[92]. The ancients thought that a king should be a living law (νόμος ἔμψυχος), and an imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.’
The king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any boon he would. ‘Abide by my words,’ said Musonius, ‘that will be the best boon both for me and for you[93].’
Two precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The first, that they should encourage friends who will speak the truth to them. Even Augustus Caesar needed this lesson; bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa and Maecenas, he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they lived[94]. The second, that they should practise clemency, following the example of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence upon which he might have punished his enemies[95]. None does this virtue better become than kings and rulers[96].
[Sidenote: Court life.]
=410.= To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to move in the society of the great and the powerful. Epictetus gives us a striking description of the man who desires to be on the list of the ‘Caesaris amici,’ which he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is not such.
‘Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? “Come forward and tell us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend?” Immediately you hear the answer, “Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me; you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth; then come troubles and cares.” “Well, and did you sup with more pleasure, now or before?” Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do anything foolish. As befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar[97].’
It is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough training in philosophy is of really practical value.
‘When you are going in to any great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than that other. He then who sees from above asks you: “In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace?” “That they are things indifferent.” “And the end of life, what is it?” “To follow thee.” “Do you say this now also?” “I do.” Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things: and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things, when he is among men who have not studied them. I imagine that you will have such thoughts as these; “Why do we make such great and so many preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which is named power? All this is nothing[98].”’
Yet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the powerful; he will turn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm[99]. The virtuous affection of caution must be called in to help him, so many are his dangers. An independence of look, a slight raising of the voice, an outspoken expression, an appeal to public opinion, even unsought popularity are enough to excite suspicion[100]. Perhaps after all the poet may be the wisest, who advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it is a place where there is no room for them[101].
[Sidenote: Life in the city.]
=411.= A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of city life. Here fashion dictates a round of occupations which are unnatural, but in which men and women are alike absorbed[102]. Half of the morning is absorbed in sleep[103]; then follows the visit to the public shows, which are centres of demoralisation[104], and conversation with numerous friends, each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle[105]. In the clubs all the most worthless members of society foregather[106]. The baths, which were at one time simply constructed, and for the purpose of cleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; and the water is now so hot as to be better fitted for torture than pleasure[107]. For the evening meal there must always be some novelty discovered, even if it is only to begin with the dessert and end with the eggs[108]; even the order of the seasons must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter[109]. Upon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy headache the next morning[110]. From the temptations of such a life the adherent of Stoicism will gladly escape.
[Sidenote: Life in the country.]
=412.= A more real happiness is reserved for the man who gives up town life for that of the country. For it is most natural to win sustenance from the earth, which is our common mother, and liberally gives back many times over what is entrusted to her; and it is more healthy to live in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It matters little whether one works on one’s own land or on that of another; for many industrious men have prospered on hired land. There is nothing disgraceful or unbecoming in any of the work of the farm; to plant trees, to reap, to tend the vine, to thrash out the corn, are all liberal occupations. Hesiod the poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him from telling the story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius) perhaps the best of all occupations; for even farm work, if it is exhausting, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body, whereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philosophizing also.
It is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and too refined to live a country life; but philosophy would be well rid of these weaklings. A true lover of philosophy could find no better discipline than to live with some wise and kindly man in the country, associating with him in work and in relaxation, at meals and in sleeping, and so ‘learning goodness,’ as Theognis tells us to do, ‘from the good[111].’
[Sidenote: The householder.]
=413.= Within the household the head of it is a little king, and needs to display the kingly virtues of Justice and Soberness. In his dealings with the perverse he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing the truth[112]. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small virtue; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as far as possible to correct his own ways[113]. Punishment must be reserved for extreme cases, and is always to be administered with calmness; it is felt more keenly when it comes from a merciful master[114]. Persistent kindness wins over even bad men[115]. It is further the privilege of the head of a household to distribute kindnesses to those below him. His wealth he must regard as given him in trust; he is only the steward of it, and must neither hoard nor waste; for he must give both a debit and a credit account of all[116]. But if the right use of money causes the possessor anxious thought, no trace of this should appear to others; giving should be without hesitation, and as a delight[117]. The good citizen will pay his taxes with special pleasure, because in his eyes the welfare of the community stands higher than his own or that of his family[118]; but he will not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is in need[119]; and in giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by his manner that he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his fellow-man[120]. In short, he will give as he would like to receive[121], and with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share with another[122].
[Sidenote: Treatment of slaves.]
=414.= The good householder will associate on easy terms with his slaves, remembering that they too are men, made of flesh and blood as he is himself[123]. It is however a difficult matter to decide whether a master should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find this a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in its favour[124]. We do not need to inquire into a man’s social position, if his character is attractive[125]. Plato has well said that we cannot find a king who is not descended from a slave, or a slave who is not descended from a king[126]; and in fact many a Roman slave was far better educated than his master[127]. Even if we do not suppose that Seneca’s rule was commonly practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws a pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the master was thus called upon to ignore differences of social position, as much might be expected of the slave. With him it was doubtless an instinct to prize liberty, ‘the power of living as you like,’ as the dearest of possessions. Yet many a slave who won this reward by years of faithful service found that liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in the home where he was valued[128].
[Sidenote: Large families.]
=415.= A question of pressing practical importance is that of large families (πολυπαιδία). Statesmen have always considered it best that the homes of citizens should be crowded with children; and for this reason the laws forbid abortion and the hindrance of conception; they demand fines for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large families. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of many children is honoured as he goes about the city, and how charming is the sight of a mother surrounded by a swarm of children[129]! No religious procession is so imposing. For such parents every one feels sympathy, and every one is prepared to cooperate with them[130]. But nowadays even rich parents refuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be the richer. But it is better to have many brothers than few; and a brother is a richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune attracts enemies, but a brother helps to repel them[131].
[Sidenote: Comfort in poverty.]
=416.= We have now accompanied the man of mature years in his duties and his temptations: philosophy has also a word to speak with regard to his trials. It is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets of fortune are no real evils; but this doctrine can be supplemented by other consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement by the death of friends and children, we have already spoken; we may now consider two other conditions usually held to be evil, namely poverty and exile. In poverty the first comfort is in the observation that poor men are usually stronger in body than the rich[132], and quite as cheerful in mind[133]. Further the poor are free from many dangers which beset the rich; they can travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the road[134]. Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes to philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor[135]. A poor man is not troubled by insincere friends[136]. In short, poverty is only hard for him who kicks against the pricks[137].
[Sidenote: Comfort in exile.]
=417.= The subject of exile has the special interest that in fact so many philosophers endured this evil. To the Stoic there is in principle no such thing as exile, since the whole world is his country; but he does not for this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero was plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but also when he was away from Rome in an honourable position; Seneca at least made the attempt to bear exile more bravely. Is it then so hard to be away from one’s native place? Rome is crowded with strangers, who have come thither for pleasure or profit, study or novelty[138]. True, it is a beautiful town; but there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly, not even this Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men choose it to reside in as a matter of taste[139]. Whole peoples have changed their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of barbarism, and the Macedonian language in India[140]; wherever he conquers the Roman dwells[141]. The exile has everywhere the company of the same stars above[142], of the same conscience within him[143]; even if he is separated from those near and dear to him, it is not for the first time, and he can still live with them in his thoughts and affections.
[Sidenote: Old age.]
=418.= Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, wherever a man stands in the order of society, old age comes at last and imperiously stops all ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time of sadness[144]; to associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only because it is paradoxical[145]. Cicero’s work de Senectute shows how old age became attractive according to Roman tradition; Seneca is hardly so successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to effort dies away in old age[146]; but though philosophy forbids idleness, nature cries out for rest. We cannot then approve when old men follow their professional occupations with undiminished zeal[147], and we must highly blame those who cannot quit their pleasures[148]. The great boon which old age brings is leisure; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have longed in vain[149]. This leisure gives the opportunity of making acquaintance with great men through their books, but better still, that of making acquaintance with our own selves.
[Sidenote: Musonius’ ‘viaticum.’]
=419.= ‘Give me,’ said one to Musonius, ‘a viaticum for old age.’ He replied as follows:
‘The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and according to nature[150]. Do not grieve because you are cut off from the pleasures of youth; for man is no more born for pleasure than any other animal: indeed man alone is an image of the deity[151], and has like excellences. And do not consider the divine excellences as beyond your reach; for we have no other notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing good men, whom therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has acquired in youth sound principles and systematic training will not be found to complain in old age of the loss of pleasures, of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by friends and acquaintance; he will carry about with him a charm against all these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not been rightly educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser than himself, and listen to his teaching and profit by it. And specially he will ponder over death, how it comes in nature’s course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such thoughts he will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life. But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age; that it does not bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a crowd of rich old men, who are in bad temper and low spirits, and feel deeply aggrieved[152].’
[Sidenote: Will-making.]
=420.= When we see death before us there remains a last act to be performed. We look at the wealth which no longer belongs to us, and consider to whom it can most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the position of a judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom and good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around us[153].
[Sidenote: Death.]
=421.= For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation; yet when it is no longer a matter of uncertain fear, but close at hand and sure, some last words are to be said. All this is in the course of nature, is according to the will of the Creator.
‘God opens the door and says to you, “Go.” “Go whither?” To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements[154]. What there was in you of fire goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, but all is full of gods and demons[155]. God has invited you; be content when he calls others to the feast in your place.’
The philosopher does not look forward to renewing his personal life, or to meeting again with parent, wife, or child. But death is a release from all his pains and troubles; and he who has striven to live his life well will know how to meet death also at its due time[156]. If it come to him in the shipwreck, he will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena, he will not shrink from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last short crisis he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal lot[157].
FOOTNOTES
[1] ‘omnia ista [monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes, obiurgationes, laudationes] monitionum genera sunt’ Sen. Ep. 94, 39.
[2] ‘eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta ... quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat’ ib. 94, 1 and 2. The Cynics gave exhortations, but without having a system for the purpose. See above, § 52.
[3] ‘Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat’ ib. 95, 65. Cf. Cic. Off. i 3, 7; Sen. Ep. 94, 34.
[4] ‘ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione, ad quam praecepta perducunt’ ib.
[5] ‘quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant; sic ista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae’ Sen. Ep. 95, 59.
[6] See below, § 397, note 21.
[7] Sen. Ep. 94, 29 and 108, 8.
[8] ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et situ, modo officii inscitia’ Ben. v 25, 6.
[9] ‘plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum’ Ben. vii 1, 3; ‘We ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater’ Epict. Disc. i 18, 18.
[10] ‘debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est opprimant onera, quae ferente maiora sunt’ Sen. Dial. ix 6, 4.
[11] Arnim i 241.
[12] ‘sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus’ Sen. Ep. 83, 1.
[13] ‘In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the thought “I am rising for man’s work. Why make a grievance of setting about that for which I was born, and for sake of which I have been brought into the world? Is the end of my existence to lie snug in the blankets and keep warm?”’ M. Aurel. To himself v 1.
[14] ‘I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising his acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him; and while I lived it was my duty to praise God’ Epict. Disc. iii 26, 29 and 30. See also above, § 258.
[15] ‘minimum exercitationi corporis datum’ Sen. Ep. 83, 3.
[16] ‘ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi’ ib. 5.
[17] ‘panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium’ ib. 6.
[18] ‘brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare desiisse. aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor’ ib.
[19] ‘nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus; altera res contristabit, vires exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet’ Sen. Ep. 84, 2.
[20] ‘nulli enim nisi audituro dicendum est’ ib. 29, 1.
[21] ‘[Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios monuerunt. hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum’ ib. 29, 1 and 3.
[22] ‘audebo illi mala sua ostendere’ ib. 4.
[23] A. Gellius, N. A. xii 1. Favorinus, of whom this is related, was not himself a Stoic.
[24] Sen. Ben. ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, 1 to 4.
[25] See above, § 125, note 90.
[26] ‘at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures | fruge Cleanthea’ Pers. Sat. v 62-64; ‘quid est tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas?’ Sen. Ep. 8, 8.
[27] ‘qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam tranquillus, quam altus ac liber!’ Dial. v 36, 2.
[28] ‘plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui’ ib. iv 21, 1.
[29] ‘tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis’ ib. 11; ‘nihil magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda’ ib. 6.
[30] ‘if he ... eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly progresses’ Epict. Disc. i 4, 20 and 21.
[31] ‘veritatis simplex oratio est’ Sen. Ep. 49, 12; ‘Let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few words. Let not your laughter be much’ Epict. Manual 33, 2 and 4.
[32] ‘loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa adicienda—pluris quam putas obligasti’ Sen. Ben. ii 24, 4.
[33] ‘inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire—hoc vitabis, hoc facies’ Ep. 94, 50.
[34] ‘regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere’ ib. 51.
[35] ‘facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa. ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant’ ib. 33, 6 and 7.
[36] ‘He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things; and we ought to use this fact as an argument to parents’ Epict. Disc. i 26, 4 and 5.
[37] See above, § 316.
[38] ‘lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et temperat’ Sen. Dial. iv 20, 3; ‘danda est animis remissio’ ib. ix 17, 5; ‘mens ad iocos devocanda est’ ib. 4.
[39] Chrysippus had approved of the rod: ‘caedi discentis, quamlibet receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim’ Quint. Inst. Or. i 3, 14. But Seneca writes quite otherwise: ‘uter praeceptor dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit ... an qui monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?’ Clem. i 16, 2 and 3.
[40] ‘fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem’ Sen. Dial. i 4, 9.
[41] ‘quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter fomenta subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet’ ib.
[42] ‘audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus invidetur—molliter vivit hoc dicunt—mollis est’ Ep. 82, 2.
[43] Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius).
[44] ib. 29, 75.
[45] Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123.
[46] Muson. ib. iv 79, 25.
[47] ‘It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold soft cheese with a hook’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 9.
[48] See above, § 326.
[49] ‘See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they say, wrestle again till you are made strong’ Epict. Disc. iv 9, 15.
[50] ‘[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere’ Sen. Dial. i 2, 3.
[51] ‘[gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat nihil esse et intercedi non patitur’ ib. ii 16, 2.
[52] ‘ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia’ ib. vii 15, 7; Epict. Disc. i 14, 15 and 16.
[53] See above, § 33; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood: ‘nil sine magno | vita labore dedit mortalibus’ Sat. i 9, 59 and 60.
[54] ‘quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant’ Sen. Ben. vii 22, 1; ‘We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure; I will incline to the contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise’ Epict. Disc. iii 12, 6 and 7.
[55] ‘interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo cibo, dura atque horrida veste, dicas tibi “hoc est quod timebatur?” ... grabatus ille verus sit et sagum et panis durus ac sordidus—hoc triduo ac quatriduo fer’ Sen. Ep. 18, 5 and 7; ‘quod tibi scripsi magnos viros saepe fecisse’ ib. 20, 13.
[56] Diog. L. vii 121.
[57] ‘divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro argentoque fictilibus utantur’ Sen. Dial. xii 12, 3.
[58] ‘contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. Ep. 5, 4; ‘I would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed’ Epict. Disc. iv 11, 25.
[59] ‘asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita. intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat’ Sen. Ep. 5, 2.
[60] ‘We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.... How much more becoming is the beard than the cock’s comb and the lion’s mane! For this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given’ Epict. Disc. i 16, 13 and 14.
[61] ‘Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.’ If I am a philosopher, I answer, ‘I will not shave myself.’ ‘But I will take off your head.’ ‘If that will do you any good, take it off’ Epict. Disc. i 2, 29.
[62] Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius).
[63] ‘miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac frequentia’ Sen. Dial. ix 17, 3.
[64] ‘ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit’ Ep. 9, 5.
[65] ‘proderit per se ipsum secedere; meliores erimus singuli’ Dial. viii 1, 1; ‘A man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For Zeus dwells by himself and is tranquil by himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 13, 6 and 7.
[66] ‘tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico; parietes plerumque circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed ut peccemus occultius’ Sen. Ep. 43, 3.
[67] ‘It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 16, 3.
[68] Diog. L. vii 124.
[69] ‘Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos; nihil est enim virtute amabilius’ Cic. N. D. i 44, 121; so Stob. ii 7 11 i.
[70] ‘post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum’ Sen. Ep. 3, 2.
[71] Ζήνων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος “ἄλλος ἐγώ” ἔφη Diog. L. vii 23.
[72] ‘Hecaton ait; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium: si vis amari, ama’ Sen. Ep. 9, 6; ‘multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt’ ib. 6, 3.
[73] ib. 9, 8.
[74] ‘hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem’ ib. 5, 4; ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ ib. 6, 4.
[75] ‘monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum’ ib. 95, 63.
[76] See above, § 349.
[77] ‘[sapiens] ducit uxorem se contentus, et liberos tollit se contentus’ Sen. Ep. 9, 17; ‘If indeed you had [this purpose], you would be content in sickness, in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true’ Epict. Disc. iii 5, 18 and 19.
[78] ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126.
[79] Stob. iv 22, 90.
[80] Stob. iv 22, 104.
[81] ‘nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?’ Sen. Ep. 104, 2 and 5.
[82] Hom. Il. ii 25.
[83] Epict. Disc. iii 22, 69 to 75.
[84] Stob. iv 22, 20.
[85] Stob. ii 7, 11 m.
[86] Plut. Sto. rep. 20, 10.
[87] ‘omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas, magna reverentia est’ Sen. Ben. vi 15, 1; ‘ex medico ac praeceptore in amicum transeunt’ ib. 16, 1.
[88] Ep. 88, 18 and 22.
[89] Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 3.
[90] ‘sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est; alteri deripere ius non est’ Cic. Off. iii 10, 42.
[91] See below, § 412.
[92] So too Epictetus: ‘To whose example should [the many] look except yours [the governors’]?’ Disc. iii 4, 3.
[93] Stob. iv 7, 67.
[94] Sen. Ben. vi 32, 4.
[95] Dial. iv 23, 4.
[96] ‘nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet’ Clem. i 3, 3.
[97] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 46 to 50.
[98] ib. i 30, 1 to 7.
[99] ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. Ep. 14, 7.
[100] Dial. iii 18, 2.
[101] ‘exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non coëunt: semper metuet, quem saeva pudebunt’ Lucan Phars. viii 493 to 495.
[102] Sen. Ep. 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21.
[103] ‘turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die incipit’ ib. 122, 1.
[104] ‘nihil tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo desidere’ ib. 7, 2.
[105] ‘inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit’ ib.
[106] ‘vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit]’ Dial. i 5, 4.
[107] Ep. 86, 9 and 10.
[108] ib. 114, 9.
[109] ib. 122, 8.
[110] ‘oculos hesterna graves crapula’ ib. 122, 2.
[111] Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country life: ‘non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nec frugalitatem docent rura; sed ubi testis et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt, quorum monstrari et conspici fructus est’ Ep. 94, 69.
[112] ‘de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur veri patiens sit’ Dial. v 36, 4.
[113] ‘moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est; flectendus est paucis animus, sui rector optimus’ Ben. v 25, 4.
[114] ‘gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur’ Clem. i 22, 3.
[115] ‘vincit malos pertinax bonitas’ Ben. vii 31, 1.
[116] ‘quid tanquam tuo parcis? procurator es, in depositi causa [divitiae] sunt’ Ben. vi 3, 2; ‘donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos eligens, ut qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse reddendam’ ib. 23, 5.
[117] ‘demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione’ Ben. ii 1, 1.
[118] Cic. Off. i 17, 57.
[119] ‘non desinemus opem ferre etiam inimicis’ Sen. Dial. viii 1, 4.
[120] ‘[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars maior horum qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos adiuvat contingique ab his timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit’ Clem. ii 6, 2.
[121] ‘sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere’ Ben. ii 1, 1.
[122] ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ Ep. 6, 4.
[123] ‘servi sunt? immo homines. servi sunt? immo humiles amici’ ib. 47, 1; ‘animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat paribusque elementis’ Juv. Sat. xiv 16 and 17.
[124] ‘cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem decet. rideo istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare’ Sen. Ep. 47, 1 and 2.
[125] ‘refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status’ Ben. iii 18, 2.
[126] Ep. 44, 4.
[127] ‘[Calvisius Sabinus] magna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum teneret, unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit. magno emisse illum non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos locavit’ Ep. 27, 6.
[128] Epict. Disc. iv 1, 33 to 40.
[129] But hear Epictetus on the other side: ‘Are those men greater benefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons contribute more to the community than Homer?’ Disc. iii 22, 77 and 78.
[130] Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius).
[131] ib. 27, 21.
[132] See above, § 399.
[133] ‘compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus; saepius pauper et fidelius ridet’ Sen. Ep. 80, 6.
[134] ‘etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est’ ib. 14, 9.
[135] ‘si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis’ ib. 17, 5.
[136] ‘[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis non te, sed aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum amanda paupertas quod, a quibus ameris, ostendet’ ib. 20, 7.
[137] ‘paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti’ ib. 123, 16.
[138] Dial. xii 6, 2.
[139] ‘usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hic quoque locus a patria quosdam abduxerit’ ib. 5.
[140] ib. 7, 1.
[141] ‘ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat’ ib. 7, 7.
[142] ib. 8, 6.
[143] ‘licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre’ ib. 8, 1.
[144] ‘subeunt morbi tristisque senectus’ Verg. G. iii 67 quoted by Sen. Ep. 108, 29.
[145] ‘plena est voluptatis [senectus], si illa scias uti’ Sen. Ep. 12, 4.
[146] ‘nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123; ‘iuvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere’ Sen. Ep. 108, 27.
[147] ‘adeone iuvat occupatum mori?’ Sen. Dial. x 20, 3. He instances an old gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post at that age; but when the time came, he threw his whole household into mourning until he got his work back again.
[148] ‘luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123.
[149] Sen. Dial. x 4, 1 and 2.
[150] τὸ ζῆν ὁδῷ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.
[151] ἄνθρωπος μίμημα θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων (see on hymn of Cleanthes, l. 5, in § 97).
[152] Stob. Flor. 117, 8 (M).
[153] ‘ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum iudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus; nec quicquam cura sanctiore componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet’ Sen. Ben. iv 11, 5.
[154] ‘reverti unde veneris quid grave est?’ Dial. ix 11, 4.
[155] Epict. Disc. iii 13, 14 and 15; ib. iv 1, 106.
[156] ‘male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori’ Sen. Dial. ix 11, 4; and see above, §§ 298, 299.
[157] ‘quod tam cito fit, timetis diu?’ Sen. Dial. i 6, 9; ‘puto fortiorem eum esse, qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem. mors enim admota etiam imperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia; sic gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et errantem gladium sibi adtemperat’ Ep. 30, 8; ‘the ship is sinking! what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish; for I am not an immortal being’ Epict. Disc. ii 5, 11 to 13.