VII. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS
[Sidenote: Physics.]
=171.= Under the general heading of Physics the ancients included a number of subjects which in modern times form independent branches of philosophy. Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper and Theology[1]. Here it will be convenient to make a larger number of subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the Foundations of Physics, generally called (after Aristotle’s treatise) ‘Metaphysics’; (ii) Physics proper, that is, the account of the Universe and its history; (iii) the final problems involved in the history of the Universe, such as its government by Divine Providence, the Existence of Evil, Free-will, and Chance; (iv) the problems of Religion, such as the existence of gods, their number, character, and claims on mankind; and (v) the nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology and Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, treated by the Stoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. According to Stoic principles these subjects cannot be separated one from the other, or from the other parts of philosophy; and therefore in treating each one we shall, as before, assume a general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid great stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for a scientific rule of human conduct; and some of them (beginning with Chrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity of the study of Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of philosophy as the highest and last of its three principal divisions[2]. We shall however, in accordance with a view more generally held, reserve the last place for Ethics[3].
[Sidenote: Fundamental Conceptions.]
=172.= To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, it appeared that a single bold intuition was enough, or almost enough, to discover a sufficient foundation upon which to construct a reasoned account of all things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a foundation one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But as soon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as ‘elements’ existing side by side, it became necessary to dig deeper, so as to secure a foundation for these as well. Thus Democritus resolved all four into ‘atoms’ and ‘void’; his theory was taken over by Epicurus, and remains to this day not only the most popular solution of the problem, but also that which (till quite recently) was tacitly assumed as the basis of all scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on different lines, began his account of the universe with ‘mind’ on the one hand and a primal conglomerate ‘matter’ on the other; a doctrine evidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, and still the basis of all transcendental philosophy and established religious conceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather an ‘active’ and a ‘passive’ principle, force which works and matter upon which it works. Besides these conceptions many others need to be considered, which if not absolutely fundamental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in all philosophical schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body, God, the universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the original inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes into a general study of fundamental conceptions; and it is at this stage that it is taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, which adds to the list certain conceptions on which it lays a special stress and to which it gives a characteristic colour; such are those of ‘body,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘tone.’
[Sidenote: The Stoic monism.]
=173.= The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the language of other schools or of popular speculation does not necessarily imply that this language is an adequate statement of their doctrine; and we frequently[4] find that the discussion of particular problems seems to be based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated to monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed the sharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external object of perception (αἰσθητόν, ὑπάρχον); nevertheless mind and object are ultimately declared to be akin[5]. So in particular the popular dualism of ‘soul’ and ‘body’ is often accepted by the Stoics, and yet as steadily superseded by the paradox that ‘soul is body.’ The reason given for this is that ‘body is that which acts and is acted upon[6]’; and this statement in the end overrides the Aristotelian distinction of force and matter, active principle and passive principle. ‘Body,’ as conceived by the Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning of the universe; it contains within itself the capacity of action, and nothing but ‘body’ has this capacity. Body, and nothing but body, exists in the true sense; that certain other things have a quasi-existence (as we shall see later in this chapter) is an embarrassment which only brings into clearer relief this distinctive feature of the system. The Stoic ‘body,’ though it is also called ‘matter’ (ὕλη, materia), must not be confused with the ‘matter’ of modern philosophy, which has derived from Aristotle the implication of passivity[7]; much more closely it corresponds with the ‘stuff’ by which modern monistic philosophers denote the substratum of mind and body alike. To call the Stoics ‘materialists’ will generally prove misleading; it is the Epicurean system, to which the Stoics were sharply opposed, which (as we have seen)[8] corresponds to modern materialism.
[Sidenote: The nature of ‘body.’]
=174.= The conception of ‘body’ therefore replaces in the Stoic system the various elements which the Ionic philosophers assumed as the basis of the universe, and combines both parts of such dualistic elements as were assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it is the foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very various shapes. In logic we have met with it under the name of the ‘substratum’ (τὸ ὑπάρχον, id quod est)[9], but it none the less includes the ‘subject’ or feeling and reasoning mind. In the universe as a whole it is ‘essence’ (οὐσία, essentia); in its parts it is ‘matter’ (ὕλη, silva)[10]; but it also appears, possessed of intelligence, as the deity[11], and again is identified with ‘breath’ or ‘spirit[12],’ and through this with the human soul[13]. Even in ethics it has its place; for all causes are bodily, and not least ‘the good’ and the respective virtues, all of which are bodies, for they act upon body[14]; similarly the emotions such as anger and melancholy, are of the nature of body[15].
[Sidenote: Motion, space and time.]
=175.= The Stoic ‘body’ in all its transformations is active and alert. It contains in itself the principle or power of movement; for though we observe that one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be the case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had movement of itself[16]. As to the nature of the primal movement, the Stoics agree with Anaximenes that it may be described as alternate rarefaction and condensation. Rarefaction is a wave or ‘spirit’ spreading from the centre to the extremities; condensation is a contrary movement from the extremities to the centre[17]. The extension of body is ‘space,’ which therefore does not exist of itself, but only as a function of body[18]. Where there is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only the ‘boundless void’ beyond the universe[19]; of this we cannot say that it ‘exists’; rather it ‘not exists.’ Time also does not exist of itself, but only in the movement of body[20]. Neither space nor time existed before the universe, but have been all along bound up with it[21].
[Sidenote: Body comprises life and thought.]
=176.= In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast between the Stoic conception of ‘body’ and the Epicurean ‘atom.’ The atom is extremely small and entirely unchangeable; ‘body’ is immensely large and in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void; but ‘body’ spreads continuously throughout the entire universe; it can never be torn apart or show a gap[22]. Atoms move downwards in parallel straight lines; ‘body’ moves from the centre to the circumference, and thence returns to the centre. Two atoms can never occupy the same space; but ‘body’ everywhere moves through body, penetrating it and combining with it throughout its whole extent[23]. The atom is a convenient hypothesis within the range of modern physical and chemical science; the conception of ‘body’ gains force as we enter the region of biology. For life also is a movement which proceeds from a warm centre (and warmth is body rarefied), and extends towards a circumference which is in comparison gross and cold[24]. Going further, we find that ‘body’ and its functions are so interpreted as to provide a key to the activities of the human reason and will.
[Sidenote: Tone or tension.]
=177.= To the central conception of body are attached in the Stoic system various supplementary conceptions, which serve to bring into clearer view its nature and powers. Of these the most characteristic is that of ‘tone’ or ‘strain’ (τόνος, intentio). This term appears originally to have expressed muscular activity[25], and was next used by the Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the true end of life; ‘no labour,’ said Diogenes, ‘is noble, unless its end is tone of soul[26].’ Although we cannot trace the term ‘tone’ directly to Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation of the soul, substantially agreeing with later writers who call it a ‘relaxation of the sensory tone around the soul[27].’ With Cleanthes the word becomes fairly common, first in the ethical application, in which ‘tone’ is ‘a shock of fire, which if it be strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil its duties is called strength and force[28],’ and then in physics to explain the unceasing activity of the universe[29], personified by Hercules in Stoic allegorical theology[30]. In later writers tone becomes constantly associated with the ‘spirit’ or ‘thrill’ which explains both the unity and the movement of all things[31], so that ‘tone of spirit’ or ‘thrill-tone’ (πνευματικὸς τόνος, intentio spiritus) explains to us the operations of body and mind alike[32].
[Sidenote: The seed power.]
=178.= Body however is not only active but creative; there is inherent in it a power, which is that of the ‘seed’ (σπέρμα, semen), and which is most conspicuously illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It is the characteristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a great plan, and that this plan never changes[33]. This plan or purpose is named by the Stoics its ‘reason’ or ‘word’ (λόγος), and at this point Stoicism incorporates the doctrine of the ‘Word’ or universal reason with which it became acquainted through Heraclitus. The ‘Word’ or ‘seed-power’ (λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe is one; it is the primal fire in its work of creation; it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter into the things that are to be[34]; it is wisdom which plies matter as it will[35]. But there are also in individual objects, animate and inanimate, indestructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed alike in growth, procreation, and purpose[36]; these seed-powers are, as it were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, everywhere shaping, peopling, designing, multiplying; they are activities of fiery spirit working through tension[37] in its highest development. But the seed-power of the universe comprehends in itself all the individual seed-powers; they are begotten of it, and shall in the end return to it. Thus in the whole work of creation and re-absorption[38] we see the work of one Zeus, one divine Word, one all-pervading spirit[39].
[Sidenote: Cause.]
=179.= Closely akin to the theory of ‘seed-powers’ and the Word is that of ‘cause’ (αἰτία, causa). Aristotle had already explained this term in connexion with cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe may come into being, three ‘causes’ are required; matter, without which nothing can be made; a workman, to make things; and the form or shape, which is imposed on every work as on a statue. To these may be added a fourth cause, the purpose of the work. Thus to produce a statue we need the bronze, the artist, the design, and the fee. Grammatically these causes may be expressed by the help of prepositions, as the ex quo, a quo, in quo and propter quod[40]. To this theory of multiple causes the Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single ‘first cause,’ the maker of the universe. This first cause can be none other than the primal creative fire in a new aspect; equally it is the creative Word.
It seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca on this point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his powers in continuous exposition:
The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker. Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. ‘The first cause,’ he says, ‘is the material itself, for without it nothing can be made. The second cause is the maker. The third is the design, which is impressed on every single work as on a statue;’ this Aristotle calls the εἶδος. I will now explain what he means.
The bronze is the first cause of a statue; for it could never have been made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought into shape. The second cause is the sculptor; for the bronze could never have been brought into the shape of a statue without the artist’s touch. The third cause is the design; for the statue would not be called the ‘javelin-man’ or the ‘crowned king’ had not such a design been impressed upon it.
There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose? It is that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the aim that he had in view. It may have been money, if he intended to sell it; or glory, if he wished to make himself a name; or religious feeling, if he proposed to present it to a temple. That for the sake of which a thing is done is therefore also a cause; for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes to omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been made.
Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes; but we maintain that the list is either too long or too short.
If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would never have been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is too short. We ought to reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be made without time. We ought to reckon space as a cause; for if there is no room for a thing to be made, it will certainly not be made. Movement too should be placed in the list; for without movement nothing can be produced or destroyed; without movement there can be neither art nor change.
We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must be single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what that cause is, and reply that it is the creative reason, the deity. The various causes in the list that has been made are not a series of independent causes, but are all variations of a single cause, namely ‘the maker[41].’
[Sidenote: Causation and free-will.]
=180.= Although the ‘first cause’ and the ‘Word’ are thus formally identified, their associations in connexion with cosmogony are very different. For whereas the ‘Word’ suggests reason and purpose, and leads up to the dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the term ‘cause’ suggests the linking of cause and effect by an unending chain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves no room for effort or hope. These terms therefore point to the supreme problems of Fate and divine Purpose, Determinism and Free-will, and as such will be discussed in a later chapter[42]. Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics not only accept, but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points of view, and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an ultimate reconciliation; and that the importance attached to the doctrine of a ‘single and general cause’ by no means excludes a multiplicity of individual causes depending upon it, and capable of classification according to their relative importance[43].
[Sidenote: The categories.]
=181.= Thus the conception of ‘body,’ so simple to the plain man, becomes to the philosopher manifold and intricate. Its interpretation is to some extent brought into harmony with common speech through the doctrine of the ‘categories’ based upon Aristotle’s teaching[44]. But whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the various but independent classes of existences, the Stoics considered the different aspects in which the one primary body might be studied. The first two categories, those of ‘substance’ (ὑποκείμενον) and of ‘quality’ (ποιόν), agree with those of Aristotle[45], and clearly correspond to the grammatical categories of noun and adjective. The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχον), as ‘lying down’ or ‘standing[46].’ The fourth is that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί πως ἔχον), as ‘right’ and ‘left,’ ‘son’ and ‘father[47].’ Some of the categories are further subdivided[48]; but enough is here stated to shew the object of the analysis, which in practice may have been useful in securing some completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions. Of ‘substances’ the Stoics, like others, say that they ‘exist,’ and are ‘bodies’; of qualities they boldly say the same[49]. But they do not consistently apply the same terms to disposition and relative position; in this direction they are at last led, like other philosophers, to speak of things which ‘do not exist.’ They could not take the modern view that all such discussions are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is possible, because they believed that there was a natural harmony between words and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined to follow their analysis into its manifold details[50].
[Sidenote: Substance.]
=182.= The analysis of the first two categories, those of Substance and Quality, leads us at once to the profoundest problems of Metaphysics; and even if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and resolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive and Adjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with all our habits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect from the Stoics perfectly clear and consistent language on this point; they absorb into their system much from popular philosophy, and much from the teaching of Aristotle in particular. The view which is distinctively Stoic is that Substance and Quality are both body[51], but in two different aspects. The terms ‘body’ and ‘substance’ refer to the same reality, but do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the very word ‘substance’ (οὐσία) suggests existence, the Stoics are drawn also to speak of ‘substance without quality’ (ἄποιος οὐσία), and seem to identify it with a dead ‘matter’ (ὕλη), or ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον), as though life must be introduced into it from without[52]. This is practically the view of Aristotle, embodied in the phrase ‘matter without quality is potentially body’[53]; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a dualistic explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable with the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must therefore be understood with reservations. It may often seem that the three terms ‘body,’ ‘substance,’ ‘matter,’ are practically interchangeable, but they are of different rank. For body exists eternally of itself; whereas substance and matter, except when loosely used as equivalents of body, do not exist of themselves, but substance always in association with quality[54], and matter always in association with force. Further we may distinguish between ‘substance’ in general, or ‘first matter,’ which is a ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον) to the universe, and the ‘matter’ of particular things[55]. The former never grows greater or less, the latter may alter in either direction[56].
[Sidenote: Quality.]
=183.= Quality (ποιότης, τὸ ποιόν, qualitas) constitutes the second category. It is defined by the Stoics as a difference in a substance which cannot be detached from that substance, but makes it ‘such and such,’ as for instance ‘sweet,’ ‘round,’ ‘red,’ ‘hot[57].’ Qualities, say the Stoics, are bodies[58]. This paradoxical statement may be understood in two ways; first, in that qualities do not exist independently, but are aspects of ‘body’ which possesses quality; secondly, in that qualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may consider it evidence of the second point of view that language describes the qualities by nouns, as ‘sweetness,’ ‘rotundity,’ ‘redness,’ ‘heat’; and indeed it is not so long since our own chemists described heat as a ‘substance’ under the name of ‘caloric.’ This point of view is carried to an extreme when the Stoics say ‘qualities are substances,’ thus throwing the first two categories into one[59]. Much stronger is the tendency towards Aristotle’s views, so that as substance becomes identified with dead matter, quality is explained as the movement, tension, or current which endows it with life. Hence the Stoics say ‘the movement of rarefaction is the cause of quality[60]’; ‘matter is a dull substratum, qualities are spirits and air-like tensions[61]’; ‘quality is a spirit in a certain disposition[62]’; ‘the air-current which keeps each thing together is the cause of its quality[63].’ All these expressions must however be interpreted in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we notice that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and particular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the ‘generically qualified’ (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the ‘individually qualified’ (ἰδίως ποιόν); for instance, heat in the universe and heat in particular objects[64].
[Sidenote: Disposition.]
=184.= The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχοντα, res quodammodo se habens). It differs from quality in its variableness; for a brave man is always brave, and fire is always hot; but a man is sometimes standing, sometimes lying; fire is sometimes lambent, sometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond generally to the συμβεβηκότα (coniuncta) of Epicurus, in that they can never be separated from a body[65]; and dispositions rather with the συμπτώματα (eventa), which come and go[66]. The third category appears to be used by the Stoics in a very wide sense, and to correspond to several of the categories of Aristotle[67]. Disposition is attached to quality as quality is attached to substance[68]; and though dispositions are not expressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as the terms in the Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies in particular aspects.
In the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as defined above appears to be replaced in Greek by the term ἕξις. But this term is used in two different senses. In the first place it is the movement of rarefaction and condensation, by which a spirit or thrill passes from the centre of an object to the extremities, and returns from the extremities to the centre[69]; in this sense it is translated in Latin by unitas, and takes bodily form as an air-current[70]. This force, when it requires a further motive power in the direction of development, becomes the principle of growth (φύσις, natura), and is displayed not only in the vegetable world, but also in animals, as in particular in the hair and nails[71]. Growth when it takes to itself the further powers of sensation and impulse becomes soul (ψυχή, anima), and is the distinctive mark of the animal world[72].
In a rather different sense ἕξις or temporary condition is contrasted with διάθεσις or ‘permanent disposition.’ In this sense the virtues are permanent dispositions of the soul, because virtue is unchanging; the arts are temporary conditions. The virtues belong to the wise man only, the arts to the ordinary man. This distinction however does not hold its ground in the Roman period, the word habitus (representing ἕξις), our ‘habit,’ being used in both senses[73]. The virtues are bodies, being dispositions of the soul which is bodily[74].
[Sidenote: Relative position.]
=185.= The fourth category, that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί πως ἔχον) appears to be of less importance than the others[75]. Its characteristic is that it may disappear without altering that to which it belongs. Thus that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by the disappearance of that which was on its left; a father may cease to be such on the death of his son[76]. It seems difficult to describe the fourth category as one consisting of ‘body,’ but at least it is a function of body. Also it does not appear that ‘relative position’ can be predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar to individual objects, but works towards their combination in a larger whole. The fourth category has an important application in practical ethics in the doctrine of daily duties, for these are largely determined by the relative positions (σχέσεις) of the parties concerned: such are the duties of a king to his people, a father to his son, a slave to his master[77].
[Sidenote: Combination.]
=186.= Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, we proceed to consider their combination. In ordinary experience we meet with three kinds of combination; juxtaposition (παράθεσις), as in a mixture of various kinds of grain; mixture (μῖξις), when solid bodies are interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (κρᾶσις), when fluids are interfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture (σύγχυσις), when each of the two bodies fused disappears[78]. Of these the second in its most completed form (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, universa fusio) is of high importance. For in this way we find that soul is fused with body[79], quality with substance[80], light with air[81], God with the universe[82]. Aristotle admits that there is this mixture between substance and qualities; but as both of these are to the Stoics bodies, and so too are the members of the other pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine must be summed up in the paradox ‘body moves through body[83].’ This also follows from the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the universe. Correspondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects and mixtures completes the whole (ὅλον), which is identical with the ‘world-order’ or ‘universe’ (κόσμος)[84]. It seems likely that this important conception had been reached in very early times by the Chaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded by Pythagoras[85], had been taken up by Socrates[86] and the Sophists[87], and was in Stoic times generally accepted both in popular philosophy and in scientific investigation.
[Sidenote: Quiddities.]
=187.= Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided by a determined monism. Body is; that which is not body is not. Yet in the end the Stoics feel compelled to speak of certain things which are not body (ἀσώματα, incorporalia). In the first instance there is the void beyond the universe[88]. It is possible to dispute as to whether void may more correctly be said to exist or not to exist; but at least it is a part of nature[89], and we need some term like ‘the all’ (τὸ πᾶν) to include both the universe and the void beyond[90]. Next we have to deal with statements (λεκτά), and mental conceptions of every kind, which stand as a class in contrast with the real objects to which they may or may not respectively correspond[91]. Lastly, the Stoics included space and time, which they had previously explained as functions of body, in the list of things not bodily[92]. Having thus reached the two main classes of ‘bodies,’ and ‘things not bodily,’ the monistic principle can only be saved by creating a supreme class to include both. Let this then be called the existent (τὸ ὄν, quod est)[93], or, if it be objected that things incorporeal do not exist[94], we may use the name ‘quiddities’ (τινά, quid)[95]. In this way the monistic theory, though a little damaged in vitality, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use of words can help.
[Sidenote: Statements.]
=188.= The language of the Stoics with regard to the phenomena of speech and thought is not always easy to follow, and perhaps not altogether consistent. On the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning power, they desire to include its operations in that which is real and bodily. Thus the ‘mind-pictures’ and indeed all mental conceptions are bodily and even ‘animal,’ in the sense that they are operations of body[96]; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art are all bodies in the sense that they are dispositions of the soul, which is bodily[97]. But ‘phrases’ (λεκτά) are definitely incorporeal, and with them appear to be ranked all mental conceptions and general ideas; about these there is a question, not merely whether they exist or not, but whether they may even be classed in the most general class of all as ‘quiddities[98].’ Nor can we call general conceptions true or false[99]; though of some of them, as of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are formed by false mental processes[100]. Finally statements are either true or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion therefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, which may be real or ‘existent,’ and the predication which may be ‘true’; and the attempt to unite these two conceptions is not persisted in[101].
[Sidenote: Force and matter.]
=189.= Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic standard, they make frequent use of dualistic statements, some of which we have already noticed. The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from the standpoint of ethics[102]; and we meet in all the Stoic writers, and often in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism of force and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and passive principles. ‘Zeno’ (we are told) ‘laid down that there are two principles in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is matter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity within it[103].’ So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus taught[104]; and in the Roman period Seneca regarded this as a well-understood dogma of the whole school[105]. But even if direct evidence were lacking, the whole bearing of the philosophy would shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an ultimate monism. God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one apart from the other[106]. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives a proof; matter could never have held together, without some force to bind it; nor force without matter[107]. We must not therefore be led by the term ‘principles’ (ἀρχαί, principia) to think of force and matter in any other way than as two aspects of primary body, separable as mental conceptions, inseparable as physical realities. The interpretation is essentially the same, whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe, matter and cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has been already discussed with some fulness under these separate headings.
[Sidenote: The elements.]
=190.= The position of the four ‘elements’ (στοιχεῖα, elementa) is similar; these are in the Stoic philosophy subdivisions of the two principles just discussed. For fire and air are of the nature of cause and movement; water and earth of receptivity and passivity[108]. Body is therefore made up of the four elements mixed[109], or perhaps rather of the elementary qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they represent[110]. The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been taught before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician, and by Aristotle[111]; the list of the four elements is traced back to Empedocles. For Aristotle’s ‘fifth element’ Zeno found no use[112].
[Sidenote: Conclusion.]
=191.= Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates with which the Stoics approach the problems of physics. It is not necessary for our purpose to compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a value on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder of the Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the Stoics have perfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or have even produced an orderly and rounded scheme. But at least it seems clear that their work shews intellectual power, and that speculation is not necessarily less profound because it is pursued with a practical aim[113]. The founders of the Stoic philosophy had a wide reach; they took all knowledge to be their province; and they worked persistently towards the harmonization of all its parts.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Diog. L. vii 41.
[2] Arnim ii 42 and 44.
[3] Diog. L. vii 40.
[4] Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, § 35, note 22.
[5] See above, §§ 149, 153.
[6] ‘[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura], quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 39; ‘cui tanta vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et iubeat, corpus est’ Sen. Ep. 106, 9.
[7] See above, § 67.
[8] § 43.
[9] See above, § 157, note 84.
[10] ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι Clem. Alex. Strom. ii p. 436 (Arnim ii 359); διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ [τῇ ὕλῃ] Plot. Enn. ii 4, 1 (Arnim ii 320). οὐσία in this sense is also called πρώτη ὕλη, see § 182, note 52.
[11] τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν ... ποιοῦντες Plut. comm. not. 48, 2.
[12] ‘vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior est’ Sen. Ep. 50, 6.
[13] ‘et hoc [animus] corpus est’ ib. 106, 4.
[14] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ Aët. plac. i 11, 5; ‘placet nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse’ Sen. Ep. 117, 2; ‘quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit, corpus est’ ib. 106, 4.
[15] ‘non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira, amor, tristitia. si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem. quid ergo? tam manifestas notas corpori credis imprimi nisi a corpore?’ ib. 106, 5.
[16] ‘dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit mobile ex semet’ Sen. N. Q. ii 8; ‘is ardor, qui est mundi, non agitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte [movetur]’ Cic. N. D. ii 11, 31.
[17] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ... κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν (sc. πυκνωτικὴν) ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 74; ‘tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium’ Censorinus de die nat. p. 75 (Zeller, p. 128).
[18] τόπον δ’ εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος Ar. Did. fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503).
[19] κενὸν μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον δὲ Sext. math. x. 3 (Arnim ii 505); τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ’ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι Ar. Did. (as note 18).
[20] Χρύσιππος διάστημα [τὸν χρόνον εἶπε] τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 88 l (Arnim ii 510); οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν [χρόνου οὐσίαν] αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν Aët. plac. i 22, 7.
[21] χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου ἀλλ’ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἢ μετ’ αὐτόν Philo de mundi op. § 26 (Arnim ii 511).
[22] The question is thus stated by Seneca: ‘[quaeramus] continua sit omnis et plena materia ... an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit’ Sen. Dial. viii 4, 2; and answered as follows ‘nihil usquam inane est’ N. Q. iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 and ii 425.
[23] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Hipp. Phil. 21 (Arnim ii 469).
[24] ‘animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio’ Cic. Tusc. disp. i 18, 42. The principle is however not carried out in the Stoic universe, in which the heat resides in the periphery, and the central earth is cold.
[25] νέων τι δρᾶν μὲν εὐτονώτεραι χέρες Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31 (Arnim i 514); ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νευροῖς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστί Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.
[26] Epict. Fr. 57.
[27] See below, § 290.
[28] ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ... εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος Plut. Sto. rep. 7, 4.
[29] Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησι ... τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία τόνον μὴ παύεσθαι Stob. i 17, 3.
[30] Ἡρακλῆς δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ’ ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ κραταιά ἐστι Cornutus 31.
[31] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 8.
[32] ‘quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio?’ ib. ii 6, 6; ‘quid cursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt? hic facit vim nervis, velocitatem currentibus’ ib. ii 6, 4.
[33] καταβληθὲν τὸ σπέρμα ἀναπληροῖ τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους καὶ ἐπισπᾶται τὴν παρακειμένην ὕλην καὶ διαμορφοῖ Simpl. Ar. cat. Ο γ β.
[34] οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον [τὸν Δία] σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ... εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν Diog. L. vii 136; τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν ib. 134.
[35] ‘ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. Ep. 65, 2. Cf. Tert. Apol. 21.
[36] ἀφθάρτους [τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους] ἐποίησαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς Proclus in Parm. iv 135. See further Stein, Psychologie der Stoa, i p. 49; Heinze, Lehre vom Logos, pp. 107-127.
[37] ‘The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first momentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs of future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of realisation, change, and phenomenal succession.’ M. Aurelius, To himself ix 1.
[38] ‘ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc. τὸν λόγον] toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγων] singula proprie figurantem’ Sen. Ep. 90, 29. See also the interpretation of the picture of Samos, § 254, note 83.
[39] ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου Athen. Supp. 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45).
[40] See above, § 67.
[41] Sen. Ep. 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12.
[42] See below, ch. ix.
[43] ‘causarum enim,’ inquit [Chrysippus], ‘aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae’ Cic. de Fato 18, 41.
[44] See above, § 66.
[45] οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ ... ποιοῦνται τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα Simpl. Arist. cat. f 16 Δ (Arnim ii 369).
[46] Plotinus Ennead. vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[47] Simpl. Arist. cat. f 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[48] For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100.
[49] See § 183.
[50] For the position of ‘things not existent’ in the Stoic system see further below, § 187.
[51] σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία Diog. L. vii 150; ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι Stob. i 11, 5 c.
[52] οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται Diog. L. vii 150; ὕλην, σῶμα ὥς φασιν οὖσαν Plot. Enn. ii p. 114 (Arnim ii 375).
[53] ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει σῶμα Ἀριστοτέλης φησί Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[54] See Plutarch, comm. not. 50, 6.
[55] ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον πᾶσιν ἡ πρώτη ὕλη, τισὶ δὲ ὑποκείμενον γιγνομένοις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηγορουμένοις ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Dexippus Arist. cat. p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).
[56] Diog. L. vii 150.
[57] Simplic. Arist. cat. p. 57 Ε (Arnim ii 378).
[58] ὁ περὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων λόγος καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἁπάντων, ἅ φασιν εἶναι Στωϊκῶν παῖδες σώματα Galen qual. incorp. 1 xix, p. 463 K (Arnim ii 377).
[59] τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι Plut. comm. not. 50, 1.
[60] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ κίνησιν [τὴν μανωτικήν see above, note 17] τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 68 Ε (Arnim ii 452).
[61] τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 4.
[62] ἀναιροῖτο ἂν τὸ τὴν ποιότητα εἶναι πνεῦμά πως ἔχον Alex. Aph. Arist. Top. iv p. 181 (Arnim ii 379).
[63] τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστι Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 2.
[64] Zeller, pp. 103-107.
[65] ‘pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquaï, | tactus corporibus cunctis’ Lucr. R. N. i 454, 455.
[66] ‘servitium contra, paupertas, divitiaeque, | ... cetera quorum | adventu manet incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare’ ib. 456-9.
[67] εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399).
[68] τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δὲ πὼς ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιὰ Plot. Enn. vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).
[69] ἡ δὲ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό Philo quod deus, § 35 (Arnim ii 458).
[70] οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναι [Χρύσιππός] φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 2; ‘esse autem unitatem in aere vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent. quid est enim aliud quod teneret illa, quam spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 6, 6.
[71] ἡ δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά. καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δέ ἐστιν ἐοικότα φυτοῖς, ὄνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἕξις ἤδη κινουμένη Philo Leg. Alleg. ii § 22 (Arnim ii 458).
[72] ψυχὴ δέ ἐστι φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν. αὔτη κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν ib.
[73] ‘voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; habitus porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit’ Sen. Ep. 95, 57.
[74] ‘virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens’ ib. 113, 2.
[75] ‘Relative position’ must be distinguished from ‘correlation’ (πρός τι). Such terms as ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter,’ ‘living’ and ‘dead’ are said to be correlated. Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).
[76] Simpl. as in last note.
[77] See below, § 337.
[78] So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. de mixt. p. 216, 14 Br. (Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: ‘quaedam continua esse corpora, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem; quaedam ex distantibus, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus’ Sen. Ep. 102, 6.
[79] οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ... διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας, ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Simpl. Arist. phys. p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467).
[80] Arnim ii 411 and 467.
[81] τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρύσιππος κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει Alex. Aph. de mixt. p. 216, 14 (Arnim ii 473).
[82] ‘Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos’ Tertull. adv. Hermog. 44; and see below, § 207.
[83] Note 2 above.
[84] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον Achill. Is. 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).
[85] See Rendall, M. Aurelius Introd. p. xxix.
[86] ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων Xen. Mem. iv 3, 13.
[87] ib. i 1, 11.
[88] See below, § 193.
[89] ‘in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[90] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον· πᾶν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Achill. Isag. 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).
[91] Sen. as above.
[92] τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἴδη καταριθμοῦνται, ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον Sext. math. x 218 (Arnim ii 331).
[93] ‘etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia, quid ergo erit ex quo haec deducantur? illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, “quod est”’ Sen. Ep. 58, 11.
[94] οἱ Στωϊκοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον Sext. math. viii 258.
[95] ἐκεῖνοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] νομοθετήσαντες αὑτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι ... τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι, κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἀσωμάτων Alex. Aphr. Arist. Top. iv p. 155 (Arnim ii 329); ‘primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur “quid”’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[96] ‘animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur; sequitur ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt’ Sen. Ep. 113, 3 and 9 (Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking).
[97] ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε Sext. math. vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129).
[98] τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels).
[99] οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι] Sext. math. vii 246.
[100] ‘haec ... quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam’ Sen. Ep. 58, 15.
[101] οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον· οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὄντα δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι Plut. comm. not. 30, 12.
[102] See below, § 287.
[103] δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, κ.τ.λ. Diog. L. vii 134.
[104] ib.; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην Sext. math. ix 11 (Arnim ii 301).
[105] ‘dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. Ep. 65, 2; ‘universa ex materia et ex deo constant. deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei’ ib. 23.
[106] ἄλλων δὲ καὶ ποιητικὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἀπολειπόντων, ἀχώριστον δὲ ταύτην τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Syrianus Arist. met. (Arnim ii 308). ‘Stoici naturam in duas partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. in illa prima esse vim sentiendi, in hac materiam; nec alterum sine altero [esse] posse’ Lact. Div. inst. vii 3.
[107] ‘neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine ulla materia’ Cic. Ac. i 6, 24.
[108] Arnim ii 418; ‘e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram’ Cic. Ac. i 7, 26.
[109] κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γινομένου τοῦ σώματος Justin de res. 6 (Arnim ii 414).
[110] ὅσα τοίνυν σώματα πρῶτον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει ποιότητας, ἐκεῖνα στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς σαρκός· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ Galen const. art. med. i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405).
[111] Galen meth. med. i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411).
[112] See below, § 196.
[113] Cf. Mahaffy’s Greek Life and Thought; ‘it is quite wrong to suppose that these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with practical life, despised or avoided speculation. Their philosophical theories demand hard reading and hard thinking’ p. 137.
VIII. THE UNIVERSE
[Sidenote: Study of the heavens.]
=192.= In including in their system the study of the physical universe the Stoics broke daringly with Socrates and his faithful followers the Cynics. These had joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced[1] in ridiculing those whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst they saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned them more closely. But it was not for nothing that the most highly civilised nations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and Babylonians, had studied the starry heavens, mapped out the constellations, measured the paths of the wandering stars, predicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the seasons, and the winds; with the result that their successors defied the common opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold inhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk with their feet turned up towards ours[2]. All this body of knowledge, called generically the knowledge of the sky (though it included the whole physical geography of the earth), had impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed that as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was elevated and made ampler and nobler[3], leaving behind it the petty contentions and rivalries of common life; and further that true knowledge had surely been reached, when the positions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses of sun and moon could be predicted so long before with unfailing accuracy. These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were fully shared by the Stoics. ‘Is not the sun,’ says Seneca, ‘worthy of our gaze, the moon of our regard? When the sky displays its fires at night, and countless stars flash forth, who is not absorbed in contemplation of them? They glide past in their company, concealing swift motion under the outward appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of a few of them, but the greater number are beyond our ken. Their dignity fills all our thoughts[4].’ In the golden age which preceded our iron civilisation ‘men lay at nights in the open fields, and watched the glorious spectacle of the heavens. It was their delight to note the stars that sank in one quarter and rose in another. The universe swept round them, performing its magnificent task in silence[5].’ ‘Their order never changes, spring and autumn, winter and summer succeed according to fixed laws[6].’ And in the same tone writes the Stoic poet: ‘unshaken the lights of heaven ever move onwards in their proper orbit[7].’ The emotion roused in the Stoic by the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that expressed in Judaic poetry by the ‘Song of the Three Holy Children[8],’ and in more modern times by Addison’s famous hymn[9].
[Sidenote: The world-order.]
=193.= The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in the general opinion of intelligent men, to show the existence of a ‘world-order’ or ‘universe[10].’ The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics from Heraclitus, who had declared that ‘neither god nor man created this world-order,’ as in their ethics from Diogenes, the ‘citizen of the universe[11].’ They therefore needed only to adjust an established notion to their own physical postulates. We observe at once that the very conception of an ordered whole differentiates that whole from the absolute totality of all things. The universe is indeed on the one hand identified with the substance of all things (οὐσία τῶν ὅλων), but only as a thing made individual by the possession of quality (ἰδίως ποιόν)[12], and necessarily one[13]. It is self-created; and it may therefore be identified with its creator, the deity[14]; it also includes all that is bodily[15]; but outside there remains the boundless void[16]. It is therefore defined by Chrysippus as ‘the combination of heaven and earth and all natures that are in them,’ or alternatively as ‘the combination of gods and men and all that is created for their sake[17].’
[Sidenote: Its position.]
=194.= The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that of a continuous body, having a definite outline, and stationed in the boundless void. That the universe has shape the Stoics deduce from its having ‘nature’ (φύσις), that is, the principle of growth, displayed in the symmetry of its parts[18]; and its shape is the perfect shape of a sphere[19]. Within this sphere all things tend towards the middle[20]; and we use the terms ‘down’ meaning ‘towards the middle,’ and ‘up’ meaning thereby from the middle[21]. The Peripatetics are therefore needlessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down, if it stands in the void; for, first, there is no ‘up’ or ‘down’ outside the universe; and, secondly, the universe possesses ‘unity’ (ἕξις)[22] which keeps it together[23]. And here we see the folly of Epicurus, who says that the atoms move downwards from eternity in the boundless void; for there is no such thing as ‘downwards’ in that which is unlimited[24]. Further, the universe is divided into two parts, the earth (with the water and the air surrounding it) which is stable in the middle, and the sky or aether which revolves around it[25].
[Sidenote: The heliocentric theory.]
=195.= Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to make two assertions on questions of scientific fact, in which they opposed the best scientific opinion of their own time. For many authorities held that the earth revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky was only apparent. Such were HICETAS of Syracuse[26], a Pythagorean philosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by Theophrastus, and later ECPHANTUS the Pythagorean, and HERACLIDES of Pontus[27]. From the point of view of astronomical science this view seemed well worthy of consideration, as Seneca in particular emphasizes[28]. Other astronomers had gone further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that the earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated that Plato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had wrongly placed the earth in the centre of the universe; and the heliocentric view was put forward tentatively by ARISTARCHUS of Samos, and positively by the astronomer SELEUCUS, in connexion with the theory of the earth’s rotation[29]. For this Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have put Aristarchus on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb ‘the hearth of the universe[30].’ This outburst of persecuting zeal, anticipating so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective in preventing the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great astronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoretically possible[31]; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an orrery, shewing the motion of all the planets[32], he must have been aware of its superior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed it vigorously on theological grounds, and perhaps more than any other man was responsible for its being pushed aside for some 1500 years[33]. The precise ground of the objection is not made very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive rather than reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun, whom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the universe; but that the earth should be reckoned merely as one of his attendant planets was humiliating to human self-esteem, and jeopardised the doctrine of Providence, in accordance with which the universe was created for the happiness of gods and men only.
[Sidenote: The elements.]
=196.= Having determined that the earth is the centre of the universe, and the sun above it, the way is clear to incorporate in the system the doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα, naturae)[34], which probably had its origin in a cruder form of physical speculation than the doctrine of the heavenly bodies. As we have seen above[35], the elements are not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate position between the two principles of the active and the passive on the one hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the other. Earth is the lowest of the elements, and also the grossest; above it is placed water, then air, then fire; and these are in constant interchange, earth turning to water, this into air, and this into aether, and so again in return. By this interchange the unity of the universe is maintained[36]. The transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but gradual; the lowest part of the aether is akin to air[37]; it is therefore of no great importance whether we speak with Heraclitus of three elements, or with Empedocles of four. The two grosser elements, earth and water, tend by nature downwards and are passive; air and fire tend upwards and are active[38]. Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element as the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance[39].
[Sidenote: Fire and breath.]
=197.= Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are the source of all life[40]. Thus the elemental and primary fire stands in contrast with the fire of domestic use; the one creates and nourishes, the other destroys[41]. It follows that fire, though it is one of the four elements, has from its divine nature a primacy amongst the elements[42], which corresponds to its lofty position in the universe[43]; and the other elements in turn all contain some proportion of fire. Thus although air has cold and darkness as primary and essential qualities[44], nevertheless it cannot exist without some share of warmth[45]. Hence air also may be associated with life, and it is possible to retain the popular term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, spiritus) for the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic philosophy we seldom hear again of air in connexion with coldness; and between the ‘warm breath’ (anima inflammata) and the primary fire there is hardly a distinction; we may even say that ‘spirit’ has the highest possible tension[46].
[Sidenote: God in the stone.]
=198.= Air on its downward path changes to water. This change is described as due to loss of heat[47], and yet water too has some heat and vitality[48]. Even earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements, contains a share of the divine heat; otherwise it could not feed living plants and animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed the sun and stars[49]. Thus we may say even of a stone that it has a part of the divinity in it[50]. Here then we see the reverse side of the so-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, and that the soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the damp and cold element, and earth, the dry and cold element, are both penetrated by the divinity, by the creative fire without the operation of which both would fall in an instant into nothingness[51].
[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.]
=199.= We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. These are set in spheres of various diameter, all alike revolving around the earth. The succession we find described in Plato’s Timaeus[52]; the moon is nearest to the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by Aristotle and after him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to Aratus and Chrysippus[53]. A tradition derived from Chaldaean sources gave a different order, setting Venus and Mercury nearer to the earth than the sun; and this order was accepted by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and Posidonius, the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore further from the sun, than Mercury[54]. The moon, like the earth, obtains her light from the sun, being crescent-shaped when nearest to him, full-orbed when furthest away. Her distance from the earth is two million stadia (250,000 miles); when she lies between the earth and the sun she eclipses his light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly away from the sun she is herself eclipsed[55]. Her phases are explained by her position relative to the sun[56]. The sun is 60 millions of miles from the earth[57]; his diameter is 37½ times as large as that of the earth[58]; he appears larger when on the horizon because his rays are refracted through the thick atmosphere[59]. The planets, whether they revolve round the earth or the sun, are falsely called ‘wandering stars,’ since their orbits have been fixed from all eternity[60]. The fixed stars revolve round the earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared with it, is merely the central point[61]. All the heavenly bodies are, like the earth, of spherical form[62]. Finally Seneca, in advance of the school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the celestial world[62a].
[Sidenote: Cruder theories.]
=200.= Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with the best astronomical teaching of their time, they combined with it many views based on much cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to suggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth[63]; and it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but also the heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations from the Ocean[64]. Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed the astronomers with suspicion. He alone regarded the moon not as a sphere, but as a hemisphere with the flat side turned towards us[65]; the stars he considered to be conical[66]. These views, very probably derived from Heraclitus, seem to point to the conception of the sky or aether as a single fixed fiery sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from the surrounding element by containing more closely packed masses of fiery matter[67]; a conception which harmonizes far more closely with the Stoic theory of the elements than the doctrines which are astronomically more correct. Cleanthes also explained that the sun could not venture to travel beyond his solstitial positions, lest he should be out of reach of his terrestrial food[68]. And Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun keeps within the ‘torrid zone’ of the sky, because beneath it flows the Ocean, from which the sun sucks up his nutriment[69].
[Sidenote: Deity of the stars.]
=201.= From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the element of fire the Stoics draw the conclusion that they are animated, reasoning, self-determined, and divine; in short, that they are gods[70]. This godhead pertains particularly to the sun[71]. Of this doctrine Cleanthes is especially the upholder[72], deeming that the sun is the ruling power in the universe, as reason in man[73]. It is not clear whether the Stoics derived their theory of the divinity of the heavenly bodies from logical deduction, or whether they were here incorporating some Eastern worship. In favour of the latter point of view is the consideration that at this time the association of Mithra with the sun was probably making some progress in the Persian religion, and that the popular names of the seven days of the week, following the names of the sun, moon, and five planets, must have been already current.
[Sidenote: Deity of the universe.]
=202.= But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed by the paradox that the universe itself is a rational animal, possessed of free-will and divine. This is the teaching of all the masters of the school, beginning with Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow logically from two principles, the first that the universe possesses a unity, the second that the whole is greater than its parts. ‘There cannot be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient[74].’ ‘The rational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe is rational[75].’ ‘The universe is one[76]’; we must not therefore think of it as of an army or a family, which comes into a kind of existence merely through the juxtaposition of its members. By the same reasoning the universe possesses divinity[77]. Upon this favourite Stoic text is based the frequent assertion of modern commentators that the philosophy is pantheistic[78]; but the more central position of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the universe as a man’s soul to his body[79], and the universe is therefore no more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is expressed with great clearness by Varro, who says: ‘As a man is called wise, being wise in mind, though he consists of mind and body; so the world is called God from its soul, though it consists of soul and body[80].’ The Stoics are however in strong conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who hold that the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind are developments from matter. ‘Nothing that is without mind can generate that which possesses mind,’ says Cicero’s Stoic[81], in full opposition to modern popular theories of evolution. Further, just as it may be questioned in the case of man whether the soul is situated in the head or in the heart, so in the case of the universe we may doubt whether its soul, or rather its ‘principate,’ is in the sun, as Cleanthes held[82], or in the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain[83], or in the aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught[84].
[Sidenote: The earth’s inhabitants.]
=203.= In the study of the universe we are not called upon merely to consider the earth as a member of the celestial company; we have to contemplate it as the home of beings of various ranks, which also display to us the principle of orderly arrangement. Preëminent amongst the inhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by being the sole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition owns all those capacities which are shewn in beings of lower rank. The nature of man constitutes so large a part of philosophy that we must reserve its full consideration for a special chapter[85]; and must restrict ourselves here to treating of lower beings, which fall into the three orders of animals, plants, and inanimate beings. But since each of the higher orders possesses all the properties of every order that stands lower, the study of the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of human nature. The number and classification of these orders are not to be treated mechanically. From one point of view gods and men form one class, the rational, as opposed to every kind of non-rational being. On the other hand, from the standpoint with which we are rather concerned at this moment, gods, men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of animate beings, below which stand the plants, and lower still things without life. Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul; the two lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower in degree. The general term which includes soul in the animal and that which corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless bodies is ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα); soul therefore is the highest type of ‘spirit.’
[Sidenote: The animals have not reason]
=204.= To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the faculty of reason; and this position must have seemed to them self-evident, since the same word Logos expresses in the Greek both reason and speech. In the Latin the point was no longer so clear; still the words ‘ratio’ and ‘oratio,’ if not identical, appeared to be connected by a natural association. Since the animals then are necessarily unreasoning, those acts of animals which appear to show reason must be explained in some other way. A dog pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be admitted that in a way the dog recognises that ‘this scent is the sign of the wild animal[86]’; still he is incapable of expressing this belief in the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is disposed of in a more summary way; this animal shows a ‘restless helplessness,’ climbing up and down straws in meaningless industry; many men however are no wiser[87]. For their young the animals have a certain feeling, yet their grief at losing them is comparatively short-lived[88]. In spite, however, of these limitations the animal world is one part of the wonders of nature, and is deserving of our admiration; all animals have strong affection for their young so long as these need their protection[89], and the dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence and for his loyalty towards his master[90].
[Sidenote: but a sort of reason.]
=205.= To define more accurately the nature of animals we must to some extent anticipate the discussion of human nature in a later chapter, which follows the same general lines: for in every point the animals are like men, but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason[91]; by soul we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent movement[92]. In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling part[93]. Their power of observation enables them to distinguish what is healthful to them from that which is injurious; their power of movement shapes itself into pursuit of the healthful and avoidance of the injurious[94]. They possess also properties which resemble the human feelings, such as anger, confidence, hope, fear; but they do not in a strict sense possess the same feelings as men[95]. As they cannot attain to virtue, neither can they fall into vice[96].
[Sidenote: Plant life.]
=206.= From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem to have soul, because they live and die[97]; yet they have not soul in any strict sense of the word. It will therefore be better not to use this word, but to speak of the ‘growth-power’ (φύσις)[98]. The governing part is situated in the root[99]. The growth of plants both in size and in strength is very remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find themselves place in crevices, attain such power that they split huge rocks and destroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is meant by tone or tension; for it is a spirit which starts from the governing part (the root) and spreads to the trunk and branches, conveying a force equally strong to construct and to destroy[100]. From another point of view we may say that the seed contains the Logos or law of the fully developed plant, for under no possible circumstances can any other plant grow from that seed except the plant of its kind[101].
[Sidenote: Cohesion.]
=207.= Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as stones[102]. Yet even these have a property which corresponds to soul, and which keeps them together in a particular outward form or shape; this property we call ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις, unitas)[103]; like soul itself, it is a spirit pervading the whole[104], and again it is the Logos of the whole. An external force cannot impart this unity: so that the water contained in a glass is not an ‘inanimate object’ in this sense[105]. In this lowest grade of ‘spirit’ we read in Stoicism the antithesis of the materialism of Epicurus, who postulates for his ‘atoms’ the fundamental property of indivisibility, and can only account for the coherence of the bodies formed from them by supplying them with an elaborate system of ‘hooks and eyes,’ which was a frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus makes the indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and from it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical combination; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great whole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual shedding of primitive force. God is in fact in the stone by virtue of his power of universal penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων)[106].
[Sidenote: Gradations of spirit.]
=208.= No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades of spirit without also possessing all the lower. Stones therefore have cohesion, plants growth and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion; for these are not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but appearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. Man clearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape; there does not however seem to be any part of him which has merely cohesion. But in the bones, the nails, and the hair are found growth and cohesion only, and these parts grow as the plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are sensation, as well as growth and cohesion; that is, there is soul in the sense in which the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only which in man possesses soul in the highest grade[107].
[Sidenote: The conflagration.]
=209.= This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and adaptation, in spite of its apparent equipoise and its essential divinity, is destined to perish. ‘Where the parts are perishable, so is the whole; but the parts of the universe are perishable, for they change one into another; therefore the universe is perishable[108].’ Possibly this syllogism would not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not long before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final conflagration, familiar to us from its description in the ‘second epistle of Peter[109].’ According to this theory, the interchange of the elements already described[110] is not evenly balanced, but the upward movement is slightly in excess. In the course of long ages, therefore, all the water will have been converted into air and fire, and the universe will become hot with flame[111]. Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted for want of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their vitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers will cease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be swallowed up, star will collide with star. All living things will die, and even the souls of the blest and the gods themselves will once more be absorbed in the fire, which will thus regain its primitive and essential unity[112]. Yet we may not say that the universe dies, for it does not suffer the separation of soul from body[113].
[Sidenote: Is the universe perishable?]
=210.= In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration the Stoics were called upon to take sides upon the favourite philosophic problem whether the universe is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold, or imperishable, as the Peripatetics say[114]. In replying to this question, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the authority of Heraclitus[115]. The word universe is used in two senses: there is an eternal universe (namely that already described as the universal substance made individual by the possession of quality[116]), which persists throughout an unending series of creations and conflagrations[117]. In another sense the universe, considered in relation to its present ordering, is perishable[118]. Just in the same way the word ‘city’ is used in two senses; and that which is a community of citizens may endure, even though the collection of temples and houses also called the ‘city’ is destroyed by fire[119].
[Sidenote: Dissentient Stoics.]
=211.= The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained by all Stoic teachers with equal conviction. Zeno treated it with fulness in his book ‘on the universe[120]’; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that the whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that from which, as from a seed, it has sprung[121]. In the transition period, owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, and the critical acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned the theory[122]. Posidonius however, though a pupil of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of the doubters[123]), was quite orthodox on this subject; though he pays to his master the tribute of asserting that the universe is the most permanent being imaginable[124], and that its existence will continue through an immense and almost unlimited period of time[125]. In the Roman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, but one that makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with the conflagration there comes to an end the struggle of the evil against the good; and the Deity may at last claim for himself a period of rest, during which he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has passed away[126], and plan for himself a better one to follow[127].
[Sidenote: The reconstruction.]
=212.= Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction of the world (παλιγγενεσία, renovatio), which will lead again to a conflagration; the period between one conflagration and the next being termed a ‘great year’ (περίοδος, magnus annus). The conception of the ‘great year’ was borrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans[128], and leads us back ultimately to astronomical calculations; for a great year is the period at the end of which sun, moon and planets all return to their original stations[129]. The phenomena of the sky recur in each new period in the same way as before; and hence we readily infer that all the phenomena of the universe, including the lives of individuals, will recur and take their course again. Although this doctrine appears only slightly connected with the general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it: and Seneca expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when he says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they knew they were so doing[130].
[Sidenote: Creation.]
=213.= We have put off till the end of this chapter the discussion of the Stoic theory of Creation, because it is in fact one of the least defined parts of the system. According to the theory of the great year creation is not a single work, but a recurring event; and therefore in one sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end. It would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of view was always present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The question of the beginning of things is of primary importance to every philosophy, and the Stoics approached it from many points of view, popular, scientific, mythological and theological, and gave a number of answers accordingly. To the orthodox Stoic all these answers are ultimately one, though the language in which they are expressed differs greatly; whilst the critic of Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different sources and are fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests four answers to the question ‘Who made the universe?’ It may be an omnipotent deity; or the impersonal Logos; or the divine Spirit working in all things by tension; or (lastly) destiny, that is, the unalterable succession of cause and result[131]. These answers we may examine in order.
[Sidenote: The golden age.]
=214.= The view that ‘God made the world’ is that of the theology which was now everywhere becoming popular; and it is usually associated, even when expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before the creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and damp[132]; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and light into the mass: from ‘chaos’ it became ‘cosmos’[133]. This deity is the same that is commonly named Ζεύς[134] or Jove, and is called the ‘father of gods and men.’ The universe so created was at first happy and innocent, as is expressed in the tradition of the Golden Age. Men lived together in societies, willingly obeying the wisest and strongest of their number[135]; none were tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt in natural grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment from tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made progress in the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to make use of metals. These views were especially developed by Posidonius, who believed that in the Mysians of his day, who lived on milk and honey, and abstained from flesh-meat, he could still trace the manners of this happy epoch[136]. It seems probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the Pythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, which has become familiar to us in turn through the version given by Ovid in his Metamorphoses[137].
[Sidenote: Older stoic theory.]
=215.= These conceptions however are only familiar in the later forms of Stoicism. The teaching of the founders of Stoicism is on this matter monistic, and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world was in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator and the material of creation. The process of creation (διακόσμησις) may be regarded as identical with that of the mutation of the elements on the downward path[138]; with the special note that when the stage of water is reached[139] the deity assumes the shape of the seed Logos (σπερματικὸς λόγος)[140], and begets in the first instance the four elements[141]; then, from a combination of these, trees and animals and all other things after their kind[142]. Yet even this statement is simplified if we regard the original fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all things that are to be created[143]. To this is to be added that all this is well ordered, as in a duly constituted state[144]. From this point of view the Cosmos is a Cosmopolis, and we reach the border of the investigations which deal with the moral government of the universe, and the political organization of mankind.
[Sidenote: Summary.]
=216.= We may sum up the history of the universe according to the Stoics somewhat in the following way. Body is neither burden on the soul nor its instrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, and life, which are essentially the same. This motion is not entirely that of contraction, or immobility would result; nor entirely that of expansion, else the universe would be scattered into the far distance[145]. One of these motions constantly succeeds the other, as Heraclitus says ‘becoming extinguished by measure, and catching light by measure[146]’; as when a swimmer with all his strength can just hold his own against the force of the stream, or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended in the air[147]. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or tension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the fiery breath begins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction asserts itself, the universe settles down and shrinks; the aether passes into air, and air in its turn to water. All this while tension is slackening, first in the centre, lastly even in the circumference; yet the vital force is not entirely quenched; beneath the covering of the waters lurks the promise of a new world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon the watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements as we know them. On its outer edge where it meets the expansive aether, the water rarefies until the belt of air is formed. All the while the outward and inward movements persist; particles of fire still pass into air, and thence into water and earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water to air, and air to fire (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω). Thus by the interaction of conflicting tendencies an equilibrium (ἰσονομία) is established, and the result is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world[148]. Finally the upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, water becomes absorbed in air and air transformed into fire, once more the conflagration results and all the world passes into the fiery breath from which it came[149].
FOOTNOTES
[1] As, for instance, Aristophanes in the Clouds.
[2] ‘vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos Antipodas vocatis’ Cic. Ac. ii 39, 123.
[3] ‘cum tu, inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri, | nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures; | quae mare compescant causae; quid temperet annum; | stellae sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent’ Hor. Ep. i 12, 14-17.
[4] Sen. Ben. iv 23, 2 to 4.
[5] ‘in aperto iacentes sidera superlabebantur et insigne spectaculum noctium. mundus in praeceps agebatur silentio tantum opus ducens ... libebat intueri signa ex media caeli parte vergentia, rursus ex occulto alia surgentia’ Ep. 90, 42.
[6] ‘[vides] ordinem rerum et naturam per constituta procedere. hiems nunquam aberravit. aestas suo tempore incaluit. autumni verisque, ut solet, facta mutatio est. tam solstitium quam aequinoctium suos dies rettulit’ N. Q. iii 16, 3.
[7] ‘caelestia semper | inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu’ Lucan Phars. ii 267, 8.
[8] ‘O all ye Works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord; praise and exalt him above all for ever’ Daniel iii 57 to 82.
[9] ‘The spacious firmament on high, | with all the blue ethereal sky, | and spangled heavens, a shining frame, | their great Original proclaim,’ etc. J. Addison (1728).
[10] See above, § 186.
[11] See below, § 303.
[12] καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας Diog. L. vii 138.
[13] ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστιν [ὁ κόσμος] Ζήνων τέ φησιν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος ib. 143.
[14] λέγεται δὲ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός Stob. i 21, 5.
[15] οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἕνα κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, ὃν δὴ τὸ πᾶν ἔφασαν εἶναι καὶ τὸ σωματικόν Aët. plac. i 5, 1.
[16] See § 187, note 90; Seneca however thinks there may be more outside the universe than void; ‘illud scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda vastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit habitus exclusis’ Dial. viii 5, 6.
[17] Ar. Did. fr. 31.
[18] Arnim ii 534.
[19] Arnim ii 547.
[20] μέρη δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, πῦρ, ἃ πάντα νεύει ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον Achilles Isag. 9 (Arnim ii 554). But according to another view only earth and water, being naturally heavy, tend towards the middle; whereas air and fire, being naturally light, tend from it; ib. 4 (Arnim ii 555). See § 196.
[21] Arnim ii 557.
[22] See above, § 184.
[23] Arnim ii 540. The universe, being ‘body,’ possesses ‘up’ and ‘down,’ ‘front’ and ‘back,’ and all the other relations, according to the fourth category.
[24] Plut. Sto. rep. 44, 1.
[25] Ar. Did. fr. 31, quoting from Chrysippus. So Cornutus 1; ὁ οὐρανὸς περιέχει κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν.
[26] ‘Hicetas Syracosius caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae si stante terra caelum moveretur’ Cic. Ac. ii 39, 123, on which see Prof. Reid’s note.
[27] Plut. plac. phil. iii 13, 3. The question of priority in the statement of this theory has been much discussed in recent years; and it is contended that Hicetas and Ecphantus never existed except as characters in dialogues composed by Heraclides of Pontus, the true discoverer. See H. Steigmüller, Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin 1892; Otto Voss, de Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis, Rostock, 1896; Tannery, Pseudonymes antiques (Revue des études grecques, 1897).
[28] ‘pertinebit hoc excussisse, ut sciamus utrum mundus terra stante circumeat an mundo stante terra vertatur. fuerunt enim qui dicerent nos esse, quos rerum natura nescientes ferat’ Sen. N. Q. vii 2, 3. Seneca however appears for himself to reject the doctrine: ‘scimus praeter terram nihil stare, cetera continua velocitate decurrere’ Ep. 93, 9.
[29] Plut. qu. Plat. viii 1, 2 and 3; Aët. plac. ii 24, 8 and iii 17, 9.
[30] Plut. fac. lun. 6, 3.
[31] Simplic. Arist. phys. p. 64.
[32] ‘si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus’ Cic. N. D. ii 34, 88.
[33] Schmekel, p. 465.
[34] ‘in rerum natura elementa sunt quattuor’ Sen. N. Q. iii 12, 3.
[35] See above, § 190.
[36] ‘ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether; deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum ultro citro commeantibus, mundi partium coniunctio continetur’ Cic. N. D. ii 32, 84.
[37] ‘necesse est ut et imus aether habeat aliquid aeri simile, et summus aer non sit dissimilis imo aetheri, quia non fit statim in diversum ex diverso transitus; paulatim ista in confinio vim suam miscent, ut dubitare possis an aer an hic iam aether sit’ Sen. N. Q. ii 14, 2; cf. iv 10.
[38] Arnim ii 555. But see above, § 194, note 20.
[39] ‘de naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensum et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus.’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 39; cf. Fin. iv 5, 12.
[40] ‘sic enim se res habet, ut omnia quae alantur et crescant, contineant in se vim caloris: sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere.’ N. D. ii 9, 23 and 24; ‘caloris [natura] vim [habet] in se vitalem, per omnem mundum pertinentem’ ib.
[41] ‘hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat alit auget sustinet sensuque afficit’ ib. ii 15, 41. Cicero is quoting from Cleanthes (fr. 30 P); the teaching of Zeno was the same (fr. 71 B).
[42] τὸ δὲ [πῦρ καὶ] κατ’ ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 21; ‘Stoici ignem, ... unum ex his quattuor elementis, et viventem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem ..., eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt’ Aug. Civ. De. viii 5.
[43] ‘[ignem] natura sursum vocat; in illo igne purissimo nihil est quod deprimatur’ Sen. N. Q. ii 13, 1 and 2.
[44] οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τῷ ἀέρι τὸ πρώτως ψυχρὸν ἀποδιδόντες Plut. prim. frig. 9, 1; ‘aer frigidus per se et obscurus’ Sen. N. Q. ii 10.
[45] ‘ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris’ Cic. N. D. ii 10, 26; ‘aer nunquam sine igne est. detrahe illi calorem; rigescet, stabit, durabitur’ Sen. N. Q. iii 10, 4.
[46] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 8. Aristotle held that air was warm (Arnim ii 431).
[47] ‘detrahe [aeri] calorem; transiet in humorem’ Sen. N. Q. iii 10, 4.
[48] ‘est aliquid in aqua vitale’ ib. v 5, 2.
[49] ‘non esse terram sine spiritu palam est ... illo dico vitali et vegeto et alente omnia. hunc nisi haberet, quomodo tot arbustis spiritum infunderet non aliunde viventibus, et tot satis?... totum hoc caelum, ... omnes hae stellae ..., hic tam prope a nobis agens cursum sol ... alimentum ex terra trahunt’ ib. vi 16, 1 and 2.
[50] Philod. de ira p. 77 Gomp.
[51] ‘ex quo concluditur, calidum illud atque igneum in omni fusum esse natura’ Cic. N. D. ii 10, 28.
[52] cap. xi, p. 38 D.
[53] Schmekel, pp. 463, 4.
[54] ib. p. 464.
[55] Diog. L. vii 145 and 146; Posidonius is his general authority, but the theory of the solar eclipse he refers to Zeno.
[56] ‘[lunae] tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum’ Cic. N. D. ii 19, 50.
[57] Pliny, Nat. hist. ii 21.
[58] Such was the calculation of Posidonius; see Mayor’s note on Cic. N. D. ii 36, 92. The sun’s diameter is in fact three times as large as Posidonius thought.
[59] This explanation has so plausible a sound that it may not be superfluous to remark that it is scientifically valueless.
[60] Cic. N. D. ii 20, 51.
[61] ‘persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi caeli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κέντρον illi vocant.’ Tusc. disp. i 17, 40.
[62] Diog. L. vii 144 and 145.
[62a] ‘ego nostris non adsentior; non enim existimo cometen subitaneum ignem sed inter aeterna opera naturae’ N. Q. vii 21, 1.
[63] ‘omni terrarum ambitu non semel maior’ Sen. N. Q. vi 16, 2.
[64] Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἐπιγείου ἀναθυμιάσεως Aët. plac. ii 17, 4; ‘[sidera] marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis [aluntur]’ Cic. N. D. ii 16, 43; ‘totum hoc caelum ... halitu terrarum [sustinetur]’ Sen. N. Q. vi 16, 2.
[65] Ar. Did. fr. 34; for the text and interpretation see Hirzel, pp. 121, 122.
[66] Aët. plac. ii 14, 1 and 2.
[67] ‘solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur’ Cic. N. D. ii 15, 41.
[68] Cic. N. D. iii 14, 37.
[69] ‘ideo enim, sicut et Posidonius et Cleanthes adfirmant, solis meatus a plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus’ Macrob. Sat. i 23, 2.
[70] ‘hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur; ... totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur’ Cic. N. D. ii 15, 39.
[71] Sen. Ben. vii 31, 3.
[72] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ Cic. Ac. ii 41, 126.
[73] Diog. L. vii 139.
[74] ‘idemque [Zeno] hoc modo: “nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu mundus”’ Cic. N. D. ii 8, 22.
[75] ‘quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur. nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur’ ib. 8, 21; see also § 83.
[76] Diog. L. vii 143; ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur’ Cic. N. D. ii 7, 19. This unity of the universe is technically termed συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων, ‘consentiens conspirans continuata cognatio rerum’ (Cic. as above). It was denied by Panaetius (Schmekel, pp. 191, 192).
[77] ‘est ergo in eo virtus: sapiens est igitur et propterea deus’ Cic. N. D. ii 14, 39; ‘quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui dei pars est? totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra’ Sen. Ep. 92, 30.
[78] ‘From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted no essential difference between God and the world. Their system was therefore strictly pantheistic’ Zeller, p. 156.
[79] ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὔτη καλεῖται Ζεύς Cornutus 2.
[80] Varro Fr. i 27 b (Aug. Civ. De. vii 6).
[81] ‘nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis’ Cic. N. D. ii 8, 22.
[82] See above, § 101.
[83] Diog. L. vii 139.
[84] ib.
[85] See below, chap. xi.
[86] Sext. math. viii 270 (Arnim ii 727).
[87] ‘inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta repentibus, quae in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur. his plerique similem vitam agunt, quorum non immerito quis “inquietam inertiam” dixerit’ Sen. Dial. ix 12, 3.
[88] ib. vi 7, 2.
[89] ‘quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque eis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem, dum possint se ipsa defendere?’ Cic. N. D. ii 51, 129.
[90] ‘canum vero tam fida custodia, ... quid significat?’ ib. 63, 158.
[91] δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ Plut. virt. mor. 12.
[92] τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινήσεως [αἰτίαν ὀνομάζομεν] ψυχήν Galen adv. Iul. v (Arnim ii 718).
[93] ‘omnem naturam necesse est ... habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis’ Cic. N. D. ii 11, 29; ‘ipsum principale parum subtile, parum exactum. capit ergo visus speciesque rerum quibus ad impetus evocetur, sed turbidas et confusas’ Sen. Dial. iii 3, 7 and 8.
[94] ‘bestiis [natura] et sensum et motum dedit, et cum quodam appetitu accessum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum’ Cic. N. D. ii 12, 34; and so again, ib. 47, 122.
[95] ‘irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere; muta animalia humanis adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impetus’ Sen. Dial. iii 3, 5 and 6.
[96] ‘[ira], cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam nascitur, nisi ubi rationi locus est’ ib. 3, 4.
[97] ‘sunt quaedam quae animam habent nec sunt animalia. placet enim satis et arbustis animam inesse; itaque et vivere illa et mori dicimus’ Sen. Ep. 58, 10; cf. N. Q. vi 16, 1.
[98] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τὰ φυτὰ διοικοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν Galen de Hipp. et Plut. vi. 561 K (Arnim ii 710). Aristotle had used the term θρεπτικὴ ψυχή in the same sense. So too Cicero: ‘iis quae [gignuntur] e terra natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur’ N. D. ii 12, 33.
[99] ib. ii 11, 29.
[100] ‘parvula admodum semina ... in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa disturbent et monumenta dissolvant. hoc quid est aliud quam intentio spiritus?’ Sen. N. Q. ii 6, 5; and again ‘quid aliud producit fruges et segetem imbecillam ac virentes exigit umbras ac distendit in ramos quam spiritus intentio et unitas?’ ib. ii 6, 6. See also Cic. N. D. ii 32, 81.
[101] Arnim ii 713.
[102] ‘quaedam anima carent, ut saxa; itaque erit aliquid animantibus antiquius, corpus scilicet’ Sen. Ep. 58, 10.
[103] This use of ἕξις must be kept distinct from that which is contrasted with διάθεσις, as habitus from dispositio: see above, § 184.
[104] ἑκτικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστι πνεῦμα τὸ συνέχον τοὺς λίθους Galen introd. s. med. xiv p. 726 K (Arnim ii 716).
[105] ‘[unitas corporum] ad naturam corporis [refert], nulla ope externa, sed unitate sua cohaerentis’ Sen. N. Q. ii 2, 4.
[106] Alex. de mixt. p. 226, 24-30 Bruns (Arnim ii 1048); Lucian Hermot. 81. See above, § 186.
[107] This gradation of soul-power is most clearly explained by Varro; ‘idem Varro tres esse adfirmat animae gradus in omni universaque natura; unum qui omnes partes corporis, quae vivunt, transit et non habet sensum sed tantum ad vivendum valetudinem; hanc vim in nostro corpore permanare dicit in ossa ungues capillos, sicut in mundo arbores sine sensu ... crescunt et modo quodam suo vivunt; secundum gradum animae, in quo sensus est; hanc vim pervenire in oculos aures nares os tactum; tertium gradum esse animae summum, quod vocatur animus, in quo intellegentia praeminet; hoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales’ Aug. Civ. De. vii 23.
[108] Diog. L. vii 141.
[109] ‘The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up.’ 2 Peter iii 10.
[110] See above, § 196.
[111] The theory of the conflagration appears to have been attached to the Stoic system from without, and the logical contention is obviously weak. For if the upward movement is in excess, the earth should disappear before the water. It should also always be remembered that the fire that finally remains is not the destructive, but a constructive element.
[112] ‘ex quo eventurum nostri putant id, ... ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum humore consumpto neque terra ali posset neque remearet aer; cuius ortus, aqua omni exhausta, esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque idem ornatus oriretur’ Cic. N. D. ii 46, 118. ‘cum tempus advenerit, quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent et sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igne quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. nos quoque felices animae atque aeterna sortitae, parva ruinae ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur’ Sen. Dial. vi 26, 6.
[113] οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνῄσκειν τὸν κόσμον Plut. Sto. rep. 39, 2.
[114] ‘[quaeramus] immortalis sit mundus, an inter caduca et ad tempus nata numerandus’ Sen. Dial. viii 4, 31.
[115] ‘Heraclitus after all his speculations on the conflagration of the universe’ To himself (Rendall’s transl.), iii 3. Aristotle interpreted Heraclitus in the same way; thus he paraphrases fr. 26 (B), 66 (D); πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται as follows: Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ Met. xi 10.
[116] See above, § 193.
[117] Clem. Al. Strom. v 14 (Arnim ii 590) relying on fr. 20 (B), 30 (D). Philo inc. mund. p. 222, 2 (Arnim ii 620).
[118] Clem. Al. as before, relying on fr. 21 (B), 31a (D); φθαρτὸς μέν [ὁ κόσμος] ὀ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, Philo as above.
[119] Ar. Did. fr. 29.
[120] Diog. L. vii 142.
[121] Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ Ar. Did. fr. 36.
[122] See above, § 109.
[123] See above, § 115. For a full discussion of the motives of this change see Schmekel, pp. 304-318.
[124] ‘ita stabilis mundus est atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius’ Cic. N. D. ii 45, 115.
[125] ‘[mundi partium coniunctio] certe perdiuturna [est,] permanens ad longinquum et immensum paene tempus’ ib. 33, 85.
[126] ‘[Iuppiter,] resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper cessante natura adquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus’ Sen. Ep. 9, 16. On the relation of Ζεύς to the ἐκπύρωσις see Alex. de mixt. p. 226, 16 B; Philo inc. mund. c. 14, 15.
[127] ‘[conflagratio] fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri’ N. Q. iii 28, 7.
[128] Zeller, p. 166.
[129] Cic. N. D. ii 20, 51: see also Schmekel, p. 241.
[130] ‘veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies; quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret’ Sen. Ep. 36, 10. Socrates and Plato will live again, their friends and fellow citizens will be the same, and they will be again treated as before; Nemes. nat. hom. p. 277 (Arnim ii 625). This theory is plainly not reconcileable with Seneca’s hope of better things (see note 127). See also Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 33 sqq.
[131] ‘quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima et minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series’ Sen. Dial. xii 8, 3.
[132] This chaos the Stoics identified with the watery stage which preceded the creation of earth in the history of the elements: see Pearson on Zeno fr. 112, 113.
[133] Seneca’s writings are penetrated with this conception: ‘hoc universum ... dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenebrasque demerget’ Dial. xi 1, 2; cf. Ep. 65, 19.
[134] Δία δ’ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν γίνεται καὶ σώζεται τὰ πάντα Cornutus 2.
[135] ‘illo ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius iudicat’ Sen. Ep. 90, 5.
[136] Strabo vii 296. See generally Schmekel, pp. 288-290.
[137] Ov. Met. xv 96-142; Schmekel p. 288.
[138] κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ Diog. L. vii 136.
[139] This stage, at which the whole universe is water, even though the four elements have not yet been created, reflects the popular tradition as to Chaos as in the last section: see Pearson p. 102. For the process of creation as described by Cleanthes see Pearson p. 252.
[140] See above, § 178.
[141] καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὔτω καὶ τοῦτον, σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ... ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα Diog. L. vii 136.
[142] εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη ib. 142.
[143] τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἁπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους Arist. apud Euseb. praep. ev. xv (Arnim i 98).
[144] ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ ib.
[145] Galen de trem. 6 VII, p. 616 K (Arnim ii 446).
[146] ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα Heracl. Fr. 20 (B), 30 (D).
[147] Galen de musc. i 7 and 8 (Arnim ii 450).
[148] ἐκπύρωσιν μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δυναστείαν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικρατήσαντος, διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν ἀλλήλοις Philo an. sac. II 242 M (Arnim ii 616).
[149] This concluding section is based upon a note, which was prepared by Mr A. C. Pearson for an edition of Chrysippus now abandoned, and which has been kindly placed by him at my disposal.
IX. THE SUPREME PROBLEMS
[Sidenote: The ‘mauvais pas.’]
=217.= In the preceding chapter we have discussed the universe from the scientific standpoint. ‘Such,’ say the Stoics, ‘we find that the universe is; such and such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the end.’ Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification, and analysis; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that there is also employed that power of scientific imagination which the ancients call ‘divination.’ Still on the whole the investigation has been that of the student, and the method that of speculation or contemplation dissociated from any consideration of the usefulness of the results attained. In the study we now undertake all this is changed. Our philosophy proceeds to assert that the universe is good, that it is directed by wise purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience of mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with moral approval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such conclusions cannot be reached by purely discursive reason; but they are such as are everywhere sought by practical men. They appeal to a side of human nature different from that which passes judgment on the conclusions previously reached. From the first position ‘the universe is’ to the second ‘the universe is good’ the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of philosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers find their way they know not how, and can hardly hold out a hand to help those who are in distress. The Stoic teachers did not perhaps always follow the same track, and now and again they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often proved a weak support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the refuges on which their eyes were all along set.
[Sidenote: Fate, providence, and fortune.]
=218.= To the problem of the meaning and government of the universe three answers were current in the epoch with which we are dealing. Either all things take place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine providence; or else fortune is supreme[1]. These three terms are not always mutually exclusive: Virgil speaks commonly of the ‘fates of the gods[2]’; and ‘fortune’ is frequently personified, not only in common speech, as when the Romans spoke of the ‘fortune of the city,’ but even by a philosopher like Lucretius, who speaks of ‘Fortune the pilot[3],’ with a half-humorous abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of not only recognising fully these three powers, but also of using the terms with relative consistency. By fate then we mean an abstract necessity, an impersonal tendency, according to which events flow; by providence a personal will; by fortune the absence of both tendency and purpose, which results in a constant shifting to and fro, as when a man stands upon a ball, and is carried this way and that[4]. All explanations, both of general tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve themselves into one or other of these three; every constructive system must necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately coincide, and that philosophy is the guardian and guide of mankind in the understanding of their relations one to another[5].
[Sidenote: Fate.]
=219.= The Stoics hold that ‘all things happen by fate[6].’ To this conclusion they are brought by the same reasoning that moved the Chaldaeans. The visible universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies move incessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or without them that can turn them aside a hair’s breadth, or make their pace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no prerogatives of gods can make them change[7]. Without cause there is no effect; and each effect is in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed an endless chain, in which all things living and inanimate are alike bound. If a man knew all the causes that exist, he could trace out all the consequences. What will be, will be; what will not be, cannot be. This first Stoic interpretation of the universe is that of Determinism; it reiterates and drives home the principle that is here our starting-point, ‘the universe is.’ ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place according to fate; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or the system by which the universe is conducted[8].’ This ‘fate’ is only another name for ‘necessity[9]’; fates cannot be changed[10].
[Sidenote: The ‘fallacies’ of determinism.]
=220.= The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the belief in human free will, and to lead up to the practical doctrine of laziness (ἀργὸς λόγος, ignava ratio). Once we allow it to be true that ‘what will be, will be,’ it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the present time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says to the sick person, ‘if it is your fate to recover, then you will recover whether you call in the physician or not; and if it is your fate not to recover, then you will not recover in either case. But it is your fate either to recover or not to recover; therefore it will be useless to call in the physician.’ To which another will reply: ‘you may as well argue that if it is your fate to beget a son, you will beget one equally whether you consort with your wife or not; therefore it will be useless to consort with your wife[11].’ With such verbal disputes Chrysippus delighted to deal; his reply to the ‘lazy argument’ was that certain things go together by fate (iuncta fato, confatalia)[12]. Thus in the above cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call in a physician and recover, both consort with your wife and beget a son.
So once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his ships:
Keep watch, my lads: let sleep seize no man’s eyes, Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize[13].
Some one then replies, ‘No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it is predestined that the dock be not seized.’ To such an objection any one can give the right answer: ‘all these things are equally predestined, and go together by fate. There is no such thing as a watch kept by sleepers, a victory won by runaways, or a harvest reaped except after sowing good clean soil[14].’
[Sidenote: Logic of possibility.]
=221.= The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some of the commonest forms of speech. For if it is correct to say ‘Either this will happen, or it will not happen,’ it seems incorrect to say ‘it may happen’; and still more of the past, since we must admit of any event that ‘it has happened’ or ‘it has not happened,’ there seems no room for the statement ‘it might have happened.’ Chrysippus however maintains that the words ‘may’ and ‘might’ are correctly used, or (in other words) that we may assert that it is or was ‘possible’ for things to happen, whether or not they will happen or have happened. For example, the pearl here is breakable, and may be broken, though fate has ordained that it never will be broken. Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth, though the oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time that he would be[15]. This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus the Megarian; and the controversy was summed up in the ‘master argument.’ This is stated as follows: there are three propositions in conflict with one another in the sense that if any two of them are true, the third is false. They are these: (i) every past event is necessary; (ii) the impossible cannot follow on the possible; (iii) there are things possible that neither are nor will be true. Diodorus accepted the first two; he therefore drew the conclusion that there is nothing possible except that which is or will be true; or in other words he denied the existence of any category of ‘things possible’ distinct from that of facts past or future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and third propositions: Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied the second[16]; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the breaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate had decided to the contrary. The choice intimates much; it shows that the Stoics, however strongly they assert the rule of fate or necessity, intend so to interpret these terms as to reconcile them with the common use of words, that is, with the inherited belief in divine and human will, breaking through the chain of unending cause and effect[17].
[Sidenote: Definitions of fate.]
=222.= The next step is professedly taken by way of definition of the word ‘fate’ (εἱμαρμένη, fatum). Exactly as the stuff of the universe, fire, has been explained to be no mere passive or destructive element, but one possessed of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to be no blind or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power which regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name for the Logos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers are in the main agreed. ‘Fate,’ said Zeno, ‘is a power which stirs matter by the same laws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or nature[18].’ Chrysippus gives us several alternative definitions: ‘the essence of fate is a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe[19]’; it is ‘the Logos of the universe[20],’ or ‘the law of events providentially ordered in the universe[21]’; or, ‘the law by which things that have been have been, that are are, that will be will be[22].’ But an important difference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. They are agreed that all that happens by providence also happens by fate. But Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared to do, that all things that happen by fate happen providentially[23]. With Cleanthes the conception of fate is wider than that of providence, just as in Virgil the fates are more powerful than Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious of the evil existing in the universe, refused to hold providence responsible for it. Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the deity[24].
[Sidenote: Providence.]
=223.= Providence (πρόνοια, providentia) differs from fate, if at all, by including an element of personality. It is a principal dogma of the Stoics that ‘the universe is ruled by providence.’ Cicero indeed assures us that the word ‘providence’ is merely an abbreviation for ‘the providence of the gods,’ and that the dogma really asserts that ‘the universe is ruled by the gods with foresight’; and Balbus, the Stoic advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for having travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as ‘a fortune-telling hag,’ as though she were some kind of goddess governing the world[25]. But the travesty is at least as instructive as the exposition. If ‘providence’ is on the one hand interpreted as God’s providence[26], it is on the other hand equivalent to Nature[27], and again to the Mind of the universe; it is the Logos, the universal Law, the creative force[28]; not merely an attribute, but a manifestation and bodily presentment of deity. After the final conflagration three joining in one will be left, Zeus, providence, and the creative fire[29]. Lastly, if we consider the process of logical demonstration, it is from the reality of providence that the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods; only from the standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed.
[Sidenote: Beauty of the universe.]
=224.= The work and functions of Providence are open to our view, for it has an aim and pathway of its own[30]. Its first aim is to create a universe capable of enduring; next, it makes that universe complete; thirdly, it endows it with every beauty and excellence[31]. The beauty of the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators discourse at length; this is, in their view, the best world that could possibly have been created[32]. This sense of beauty appears to be derived from two sources, the admiration and awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun moon and stars moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep caves[33]; and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile field, the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds, which all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we pass to usefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world has been created and is maintained for the use of man[34]. In strict language, however, we must say that the universe is made for the use of rational beings, that is, for gods and men[35], that it is a home or city in which gods and men alike have a share[36]. From the protection of providence the animals, according to the Stoic view, are in principle entirely excluded. Yet it did not escape notice that nature has often provided for their comfort in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them to maintain life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions of their existence[37]. And Seneca especially found that man was apt to swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day and night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no man observed them[38]. On the other hand zealots like Chrysippus worked out the detailed application of this theory in a way that provoked the amusement of their critics[39].
[Sidenote: Particular providence.]
=225.= Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore for the parts of mankind, the various continents, nations, and cities. The Stoics are also inclined to hold that it cares for the individual[40]. The difficulty of this belief is great. Busy cities are overthrown by the earthquake; the crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the hailstorm; Socrates is condemned to death by the Athenians; Pythagoras, Zeno and Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that in any of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by the gods; it is rather an inevitable necessity that has worked their ruin. The gods who have great things in their charge, must sometimes overlook small matters; they must save the community by sacrificing the individual[41]. The storm may rage in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain heights[42]. The philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great whole cannot even see the flaws in its details. ‘If the gods care for all men,’ says Cicero’s authority, ‘it follows logically that they care for each single man[43].’ ‘Nothing occurs on earth, nor in the heaven above, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,’ sings Cleanthes[44]. ‘It is impossible,’ says Chrysippus, ‘that even the least of particulars can fall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his Word, with law, with justice, and with providence[45].’
[Sidenote: Existence of evil.]
=226.= The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme, leads to the denial of the existence of evil. But the Stoics did not draw this conclusion; had they done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have become futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language that they employ. If we meet with the paradox that ‘this is the best of all possible worlds,’ we must remember that all paradoxes need for their interpretation some sense of humour, and that the ‘best possible’ is not the same as the ‘best imaginable.’ Somewhere or other there is, in a sense, a limitation to the sphere of providence. If again in poetical passages we learn that ‘nothing occurs without God,’ we must not forget the doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end into harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of Stoic doctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is not the equal of the good either in intensity or in duration; it is an incident, not a first principle of the universe[46]. From this point of view it becomes possible to ‘plead the cause of the gods,’ to defend providence from the heavy accusations men bring forward against it[47]. Thus the Stoics set about to prove that, in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is ruled by the foresight of a beneficent deity.
[Sidenote: Logical solutions.]
=227.= The first argument for the defence is logical, and is pressed by Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, evil. ‘There could be no justice, unless there were also injustice; no courage, unless there were cowardice; no truth, unless there were falsehood[48].’ Just in the same way we find coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself, and yet somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole[49]. The second argument is based upon the doctrine of ‘necessary consequence’ (παρακολούθησις). The general design of the human head required that it should be compacted of small and delicate bones, accompanying which is the inevitable disadvantage that the head may easily be injured by blows[50]. War is an evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of superfluous population[51].
In many other cases there may be explanations that are beyond our present knowledge, just as there are many kinds of animals of which we do not yet know the use[52].
[Sidenote: Moral solutions.]
=228.= More important are those arguments which introduce moral considerations. In the first place the generous intentions of providence are often thwarted by the perverseness of wicked men[53], just as many a son uses his inheritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it to him did him a service[54]. The Deity treats good men as a Roman father his children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow in virtue[55]; those that he loves, he hardens[56]. Earthquakes and conflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar catastrophes in the sky, because the world needs to be purified from the wickedness that abounds[57]. The punishment of the wicked, for instance by pestilence and famine, stands for an example to other men, that they may learn to avoid a like disaster[58]. Often, if the wicked have gone unpunished, the penalty descends on their children, their grandchildren, and their descendants[59].
[Sidenote: Divine power limited.]
=229.= The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses betrays the weakness of the case, and the Stoics are in the last resort driven to admit that the Deity is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that the sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. Thus Chrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that ‘the Deity cannot know everything[60],’ and though he ascribes to the Deity all power, yet when hard pressed he admits that he cannot do everything, and that ‘there is a good deal of necessity in the matter[61].’ In this way he is forced back to the position which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken from the first[62]. After we have taken away from fate all that has life or meaning, there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to some ‘natural necessity[63].’ This point once granted, we realize that it includes many of the detailed explanations previously given. Thus it is by ‘natural necessity’ that good cannot exist without evil; that the past cannot be altered; that the one must suffer for the many[64]; that the good cannot always be separated from the bad[65]; that character grows by the defiance of pain; that the individual is everywhere exposed to disaster from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake.
[Sidenote: God and men allied.]
=230.= The recognition of the limitations of divine power creates a new tie between gods and men. Men are no longer the mere instruments of providence, they are its fellow-workers; we may even go further, and boldly call them its fellow-sufferers[66]. God has given man what he could, not what he would[67]; he could not change the stuff on which he had to work[68]; if anything has not been granted to us, it could not have been granted[69]. Under such circumstances a sensible man will not find fault with the gods, who have done their best[70]; nor will he make appeals to them to which they cannot respond[71]. Even less will he quarrel with a destiny that is both blind and deaf[72].
[Sidenote: Fortune.]
=231.= In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays no part; it has no existence in the absolute sense of the term[73]. But in practical life, and from the limited point of view of the individuals concerned, fortune is everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have just seen to be ascribed to ‘natural necessity’; storms, shipwrecks, plagues, wars, and tyranny[74]. Fortune therefore by no means excludes causality, but includes all events which are without meaning from the point of view of the individual[75]; all advantages or disadvantages which he has not personally merited, and which are not designed for his individual discipline. So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first that she is mistress of human life; and we may picture her as a tyrant, mocking and merciless, without principle and without policy[76]. The further consideration of Fortune belongs to the department of Ethics.
[Sidenote: Has God or man free will?]
=232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free will. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range than the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute to it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something of that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or must we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an unchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real share in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under the control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in creating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the animals also possess it?
[Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.]
=233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the opposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited about their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas, asserting that ‘all things take place by destiny’ and that ‘something rests with us[78].’ To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of physics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science of ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by sacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy. They go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away with the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have a bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have already noticed in the vindication of the word ‘possible[80].’ If our eyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall hardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it denies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with equal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the battle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word ‘possible’ opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when we say of gods and men that they ‘can[81].’
[Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.]
=234.= In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and possibility, we must first distinguish between outer and inner compulsion, between ‘proximate’ and ‘principal’ causes. If a boy starts a cylinder rolling down hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it could not have rolled; this is the proximate cause (προκαταρκτική, proxima). But the cylinder would not continue rolling except by an inner compulsion, a law within itself, by which it is the nature of cylinders to roll downwards[82]. This is the leading or principal cause (προηγουμένη, antecedens or principalis). So neither in thought nor in action can a man form a judgment, unless there be a picture (φαντασία, visum) presented to his mind. The picture is a proximate cause[83]. But assent to the picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason, his will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma which is the foundation of ethics: ‘assent is in our power.’ Upon this rests the right of the philosopher to praise or blame, the right of the lawgiver to reward and punish.
[Sidenote: The divine nature immutable.]
=235.= We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, the principal cause. With regard to the gods their own disposition is a law to them, their character holds them to their purpose, their majesty makes their decrees immutable[84]. This is the final answer of philosophy, even though men cannot content themselves with it. Even amongst those most disposed to accept Stoic principles, there is a wish that the gods should be allowed a little play, a choice at any rate in small matters not hampered by considerations of destiny and morality[85]; and upon this issue the poet may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the philosopher[86]. Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of the gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer[87].
[Sidenote: Man’s wickedness.]
=236.= In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden of responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and brought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny, when their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears witness:
‘Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained[88].’
‘Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished, fools[89].’
Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90]. Of their wrongdoing the ‘principal cause’ lies in their own natures; if these are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if they are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and error[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for his own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in ethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent to undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse, but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper subjects for praise and blame.
[Sidenote: No result without cause.]
=237.= Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of cause. Action without cause (τὸ ἀναίτιον), effect which is self-caused (τὸ αὐτόματον), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he must begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is always a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases of ‘chance’) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way destiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which after all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ‘All things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to necessity[94]’; thus is saved the principle of free choice (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). In other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living, willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind non-moral unbending ‘necessity’ of things, even whilst he admits that such necessity is there.
[Sidenote: Pons Stoicus.]
=238.= Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our philosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them by a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that the steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at least so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and defied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:—
‘If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good, goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom. And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95]. If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment.
Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be rewards and punishments[96].’
All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a Stoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; ‘dicet aliquis—quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt, philosophandum est; sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet’ Sen. Ep. 16, 4 and 5.
[2] e.g. Aen. vi 376.
[3] ‘quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans’ R. N. v 108.
[4] ‘vaga volubilisque Fortuna’ Cic. Milo 26, 69; ‘fortuna ... amica varietati constantiam respuit’ N. D. ii 16, 43.
[5] Seneca as in note 1.
[6] Diog. L. vii 149; ‘[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt’ Cic. de Fato 15, 33.
[7] ‘et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel constituta nec a numinibus posse mutari’ Comment. in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim ii 924).
[8] So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable clearness the conception of fate: ‘fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat’ Cic. Div. i 55, 125; ‘quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat’ Sen. N. Q. ii 36; cf. Ep. 19, 6 and N. Q. ii 35, 2.
[9] Χρύσιππος μὴ διαφέρειν [εἶπε] τοῦ εἱμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον Aët. plac. i 27, 2.
[10] ‘Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata mutari’ Serv. ad Verg. Aen. i 257 (Arnim ii 923).
[11] Orig. cont. Cels. ii 20 (Arnim ii 957).
[12] Cic. de Fato 12, 28 to 13, 30.
[13] Hom. Il. xi 192 and 193.
[14] Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25).
[15] Cic. de Fato 7, 13.
[16] Epict. Disc. ii 19, 1 sqq.
[17] Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention: ‘περὶ δυνατῶν me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. nunc vide, utra te κρίσις magis delectet, Χρυσιππείαne, an haec, quam noster Diodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, otiosi cum erimus, loquemur; hoc etiam κατὰ Χρύσιππον δυνατόν est’ ad Fam. ix 4.
[18] Aët. plac. i 27, 5.
[19] ib. i 28, 3.
[20] εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ib.
[21] ἤ, λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων Aët. plac. i 28, 3.
[22] ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται ib.
[23] ‘ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes’ Chalc. in Timaeum 144 (Arnim ii 933).
[24] ‘Chrysippus ... deum dicit esse ... fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. N. D. i 15, 39.
[25] ‘a te dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat. plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum administrari’ ib. ii 29, 73 and 74.
[26] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο ... διὰ πάντων διήκειν τήν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ Hippolyt. Philos. 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).
[27] ἥντινα [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν Aët. plac. i 27, 5.
[28] ‘talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur) ...’ Cic. N. D. ii 22, 58. The term ‘nature’ is used in the same sense by Epicurus also, though it does not harmonize very well with his theory; ‘natura gubernans’ R. N. v 78.
[29] ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους Plut. comm. not. 36, 5.
[30] ‘habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur’ Cic. N. D. ii 22, 57.
[31] ib. 22, 58.
[32] ‘[mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi possit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit, effectum est’ ib. 34, 86.
[33] ib. 39, 98.
[34] ‘omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata’ ib. ii 61, 154.
[35] ‘deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum’ ib. 53, 133.
[36] ‘est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque’ Cic. N. D. ii 62, 154; ‘intraturus es urbem dis hominibusque communem’ Sen. Dial. vi 18, 1.
[37] Cic. N. D. ii 47, 122.
[38] ‘neque enim omnia deus homini fecit. quota pars operis tanti nobis committitur?’ Sen. N. Q. vii 30, 3; ‘nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur’ Dial. iv 27, 2.
[39] Thus ‘horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting: lions and leopards provide a discipline in courage: the sow is convenient for sacrifices to the gods, who have given her a soul to serve as salt, and keep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is created for his tail, and the peahen accompanies him for symmetry’s sake. The flea is useful to wake us out of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless in leaving the cheese about.’ All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus (Arnim ii 1152, 1163).
[40] ‘etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet’ Cic. N. D. ii 65, 164.
[41] ‘nec vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, ... eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo [iudicabimus]. magna di curant, parva neglegunt’ Cic. N. D. ii 66, 167; ‘[universorum] maior dis cura quam singulorum est’ Sen. Dial. i 3, 1. See also note 64.
[42] ‘lege deum minimas rerum discordia turbat, | pacem magna tenent’ Lucan Phars. ii 273.
[43] ‘licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos’ Cic. N. D. ii 65, 164.
[44] Hymn, vv. 15, 16.
[45] Plut. comm. not. 34, 5; Sto. rep. 34, 10.
[46] This appears to be the correct interpretation of the saying of Epictetus—‘as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world’ Manual 27 (Long’s transl. ii p. 269, where see his note).
[47] ‘faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam’ Sen. Dial. i 1, 1.
[48] Gell. N. A. vii 1, 4 and 5; ‘nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus potest esse’ Sen. Ep. 124, 19.
[49] Plut. comm. not. 14, 1; M. Ant. vi 42.
[50] A. Gellius, N. A. vii 1, 9 to 11.
[51] Plut. Sto. rep. 32, 2.
[52] Lactantius de ira 13 (Arnim ii 1172).
[53] πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις Cleanthes Hymn 18.
[54] Cic. N. D. iii 28, 70.
[55] ‘patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter amat; operibus, inquit, doloribus, damnis exagitentur, ut verum colligant robur’ Sen. Dial. i 2, 6.
[56] ‘deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet’ ib. 4, 7; ‘when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with rough young men’ Epict. Disc. i 24, 1.
[57] This view of Origen is conjecturally assigned to a Stoic source (Arnim ii 1174). See also Philo ap. Euseb. praep. ev. viii 13.
[58] Plut. Sto. rep. 15, 2.
[59] Cic. N. D. iii 38, 90; Sen. Ben. iv 32, 1.
[60] Arnim ii 1183.
[61] φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι Plut. Sto. rep. 37, 2.
[62] See above, § 222.
[63] Seneca uses the term ‘law of mortality’: ‘minime dis [irascamur]: non enim illorum, sed lege mortalitatis patimur quicquid incommodi accidit’ Dial. iv 28, 4.
[64] ‘sciat illa ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, et ex iis esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant’ Ep. 74, 20.
[65] ‘di multa ingratis tribuunt. sed illa bonis paraverunt: contingunt etiam malis, quia separari non possunt. excerpere singulos non potuerunt’ Ben. iv 28, 1.
[66] ‘quicquid est quod nos sic vivere sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate et deos adligat’ Dial. i 5, 8.
[67] ‘[God] has given me the things which are in the power of the will. How was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole possessions, household things, house, children, wife’ Epict. Disc. iv 1, 100. ‘What says Zeus? since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us’ ib. i 1, 10-12.
[68] ‘non potest artifex mutare materiam’ Sen. Dial. i 5, 9; see also Plut. comm. not. 34, and Mayor on Cic. N. D. ii 34, 86. In technical language, the gods cannot control the ἐπακολουθήματα and συναπτόμενα.
[69] ‘quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit’ Sen. Ben. ii 29, 3.
[70] ‘dementes itaque et ignari veritatis illis imputant saevitiam maris, immodicos imbres, pertinaciam hiemis’ Dial. iv 27, 2.
[71] ‘frustra vota ac studia sunt; habebit quisque quantum illi dies primus adscripsit’ ib. vi 21, 6.
[72] ‘accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus: stant dura et inexorabilia’ ib. xi 4, 1.
[73] See above, § 226, note 46. Fortune only has ultimate existence if identified with fate or providence; ‘sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate’ Ben. iv 8, 3.
[74] ‘fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas, tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia; deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus, impetus, etc.’ Cic. Off. ii 6, 19; ‘saepe ... optimorum virorum segetem grando percussit. fert sortem suam quisque’ Sen. Ben. ii 28, 3.
[75] So Fortune is technically defined as ‘a cause not discerned by human reason’; οἱ Στωϊκοὶ [τὴν τύχην] αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ Aët. plac. i 29, 7.
[76] ‘in regnum Fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri’ Sen. Dial. vi 10, 6; ‘hanc imaginem animo tuo propone, ludos facere fortunam’ Ep. 74, 7.
[77] ‘Chrysippus aestuans laboransque quonam pacto explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo’ Gellius N. A. vii 2, 15.
[78] ἐκεῖνο γὰρ δὴ τὸ καταγελαστότατον ἁπάντων, τὸ μίγμα καὶ ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τι εἶναι, καὶ εἱρμὸν (seriem causarum) οὐδὲν ἧττον εἶναι Oenom. apud Euseb. pr. ev. vi p. 258 (Arnim ii 978); ‘manente fato aliquid est in hominis arbitrio’ Sen. N. Q. ii 38, 3.
[78a] ‘ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in nobis ipsis?’ Cic. Ac. ii 12, 39.
[79] ‘mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret ... altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tanquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt’ Cic. de Fato 17, 39.
[80] See above, § 221.
[81] It seems clear that so far as human thought goes ‘possibility’ is only an abstraction from that which ‘a man can do,’ reached by widening the subject ‘man’ so as to include both superhuman powers and half-personified unseen forces. In other words δυνατόν is derived from δύναται, possibilitas from potest. Such a combination as fortuna potest, though quite common, is really a contradiction in terms.
[82] ‘qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit’ Cic. de Fato 19, 43.
[83] ‘quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ ib. 18, 42.
[84] ‘non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas est. statuerunt quae non mutarent, ... nec unquam primi consilii deos paenitet. vis sua illos in proposito tenet’ Sen. Ben. vi 23, 1 and 2; ‘[deus] scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel iussit’ Dial. i 5, 8. So Lucan: ‘qua cuncta coercet se quoque lege tenens’ Phars. ii 9, 10.
[85] ‘disco ... liceat illi [sc. deo] hodieque decernere et ex lege fatorum aliquid derogare, an maiestatis diminutio sit et confessio erroris mutanda fecisse?’ Sen. N. Q. i Prol. 3.
[86] ‘illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur, | pro Latio obtestor’ Verg. Aen. xii 819, 820.
[87] ‘nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi ac potestate fatorum’ Sen. N. Q. ii 37, 2; ‘deos quorum notitiam nulla res effugit, rogamus; et illos vota non exorant, sed admonent’ Ben. v 25, 4.
[88] Hom. Od. i 32-34 (Butcher and Lang’s translation).
[89] ib. 7.
[90] ‘propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur’ A. Gellius N. A. vii 2, 5.
[91] ‘contra ea Chrysippus argute disserit: ingenia, inquit, ipsa proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt. sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia ... sua scaevitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt’ A. Gellius N. A. vii 2, 6 to 8.
[92] πρὸς τούτους ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀντιλέγων ... [εἶπε] τὸ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον Plut. Sto. rep. 23, 2 and 3.
[93] τί γὰρ ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ὁριζόμενοι αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ; Alex. Aph. de fato 8 (Arnim ii 970).
[94] ib. 10 (Arnim ii 960).
[95] ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορός, οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ Them. Or. ii p. 27 c (Arnim iii 251).
[96] Alex. Aphrod. de fato 37 (Arnim ii 1005).
X. RELIGION
[Sidenote: Philosophy crystallized.]
=239.= We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy to the formulation of religious belief and practice. A complete change comes over the spirit of our study. Until now we have been reaching out to observe, to define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every object, every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind can rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to learn from the East and from the West, from the idealist and the materialist, from the poet and from the critic. At last we have reached our highest point in the dogmas of the providential ordering of the universe and the moral obligation of the individual man; dogmas which, as we have seen, are expounded in logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither establish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain air of supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of common life, and to find the due application of its theories in the ordering of practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated as the first stage in this downward path; it is the adaptation of philosophy to the language of social life and individual aspiration. By ‘religion’ we mean here the theory of the existence and character of the gods; the practice of ceremonies in their honour and of prayers for their favour; and further, the theory and practice of divination. Upon all these questions philosophy sits as the supreme judge: external authority, embodied in the traditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim consideration, but not submission, from the intellect.
[Sidenote: Historical changes of view.]
=240.= In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can easily distinguish certain historical changes. Zeno represents in the main the critical temper; his tone is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates the entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for a purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, but finer expression in a more cheerful spirit; he has no bitterness as to the present, and much confidence in the future. With Chrysippus there sets in a tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical interpretation are set to work to prove that the old religion contains, at least in germ, the substance of the new. The practical dangers of this method are obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics of Stoicism. It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by allowing him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning; it is not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal conversion, by which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents men who give it no real submission, and increases its numbers at the cost of its sincerity. Posidonius stands out as the type of this weakness; with him begins the subordination of philosophic principle to religious sentiment. In the first period of Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute; many of the Stoics had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their fellow-countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn the Stoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in order that they might hold the honoured and lucrative positions of defenders of the national religion[1], show a lack both of sympathy and of critical discernment. All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory a definite and consistent position, which will be expounded in this chapter; in the application of their principles to practical problems they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has always to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men. But it must be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their devotion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in Marcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the man in whom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected to the play of old associations and prejudices.
[Sidenote: Dogmas of natural religion.]
=241.= The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology follows a very definite programme. Four dogmas need to be established: (i) that gods exist; (ii) that they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that they govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of men. To each of these dogmas is attached a series of ‘proofs,’ such as are still in vogue as ‘evidences of natural religion[2].’ The whole of this body of teaching may be treated by us as an exposition in popular language of the central dogma that ‘the universe is ordered by providence.’ We have therefore first to consider whether the language used is really appropriate to the philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much to accepted beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the ‘proofs’ employed really correspond to the monistic point of view as understood by the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in principle are regaining their old position in connexion with practical problems. Now the third and fourth dogmas, so far as they add to the first two, import nothing more than the general doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas, taken together, substitute for the abstract term ‘providence’ the more concrete, and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a ‘god’ or ‘gods.’ The supreme question of the Stoic religion is therefore whether these terms are rightly used; and it falls into two parts, the use of the singular ‘god,’ carrying with it associations derived from Persism and Judaism; and the use of the plural ‘gods,’ which carries with it a qualified approval of the polytheism of the Greek and Roman pantheons. In accordance with the general principles of our philosophy, the wider question must be first determined.
[Sidenote: The ‘nature’ of gods.]
=242.= The ‘gods,’ according to the Stoics, form a ‘natura,’ a department of the universe, a category including one or more individuals. Hence the title of Cicero’s work, ‘de natura deorum’; that is, ‘of the class of beings called gods.’ Each department of philosophy, according to the Stoic interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world of deities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, the Logos or Word, whose divine being permeates the universe[3]. Metaphysics point us to Body in the purest form[4]; to Spirit which reaches from end to end of the universe[5]; to a first Cause, a Cause of causes, the initial link in the unending chain of events[6]. If we look to the elements in their unceasing interchange, we find deity in all things that shift and suffer metamorphosis, in water, in earth, and in air[7]; how much more then in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements, and in another is the creative rational substance from which the whole universe issues[8]? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in it, though not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused throughout all things[9]. Look towards this earth, which lies at the centre of the world-order; even in its most repulsive contents, in its grossest matter, there is deity[10]. Lift up your eyes to the heavens; God is the all-encircling sea of fire called Aether[11]; he is sun[12] and stars[13]. Consider the universe in its history; God is its creator[14], its ruler, its upholder[15]. Analyze it; he is its soul[16], its mind[17]. Strain your sight to perceive the meaning of all things: he is fate[18]; he is nature[19]; he is providence; he is necessity[20]. And if we look forward to the problems of politics and ethics, we must say that God is the Universal Law that calls for the reverence of gods and men as a community[21], and equally demands, under the name of conscience, the unhesitating obedience of the individual[22]. Lastly, in the history of mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic masters recognised the element of divinity[23]. In the language of to-day, God is the pole in which all the parallels of human inquiry merge, the x of the problem of the universe, the unknown that is known in his works.
[Sidenote: Unity of God.]
=243.= That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take over from the Cynics[24] (who therein follow Socrates), and from the general opinion; without making this a formal dogma, they constantly assume it tacitly by using the term ‘God’ (ὁ θεός, deus). With equal readiness they accept in use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception, as di immortales, vis divina. The interpretation of this apparent conflict of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic monism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the creative fire in its changing shapes: just as the virtues are many, and yet there is but one Virtue appearing under different circumstances: so there is but one Deity, appearing under many names[25]. This view the assailants of Stoicism reduce to the absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and mortal, whilst others are uncreated[26]; and again that Zeus is worse than a Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those seemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is nothing so foul that he does not in turn become[27]. No one however who is familiar with the many points of view from which Greek philosophers approach the problem of ‘the one and the many’ will be readily disturbed by this rather superficial criticism.
[Sidenote: Zeus.]
=244.= In its practical application the belief in the one-ness of God assimilated itself to the worship of the Greek Ζεύς and the Latin Jove or Juppiter. It would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace the growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in connexion with the names of these two deities, which in the mythologies are members of societies. We have already suggested that the most direct impulse came from Persism: but in connexion with Roman history it is important to notice that a similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion[28]. The nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated by the Hymn of Cleanthes[29]; the intimate sense of companionship between Zeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps with a tinge of Cynic sentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. A special emphasis is laid on the fatherhood of Zeus. This attribute could be traced back to the poems of Homer, and is prominent throughout Virgil’s Aeneid[30]. It can be explained in connexion with the growth of all living substances[31], but has a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods the inheritance of reason[32]. But the Homeric association of Zeus with mount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in favour of the Persian conception of a god dwelling in heaven[33]. Further the Stoics agree with the Persians that this god must not be thought of as having the form of any animal or man[34]; he is without form[35], but capable of assuming all forms[36].
[Sidenote: Definition of ‘god.’]
=245.= In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one and supreme much exceeds in importance the conception of a multiplicity of gods. We may therefore reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of the Stoic theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of the word ‘god.’ As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs thus: ‘a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing to what it wills and made like to all things[37].’ This definition corresponds satisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics; but even so we must notice that the statement ‘God is necessity[38]’ is an exaggeration, since ‘necessity’ is entirely devoid of the qualities of reasonableness and plasticity. We find a different definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which is emphasized by the Stoics of the transition period generally:—‘God is a living being, blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind[39].’ This definition points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion. The difference between the two definitions marks then the step that has here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property of personality; we pass from a ‘rational spirit’ to a ‘living being.’ There is the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic substance to a beneficent will. The existence of deity in the first sense has been displayed to us by our whole analysis of the universe; it is with regard to the existence of deity in the second sense that we need the constant support of the dogma of providence, expounded in the technical proofs which we now proceed to examine.
[Sidenote: Gods exist: the proof from consent.]
=246.= The first Stoic dogma is ‘that gods exist’; and of this the first and most familiar ‘proof’ is that which depends upon common consent. Amongst all men and in all nations there is a fixed conviction that gods exist; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven on the minds of all men[40]. To this proof the Stoics attach the highest possible importance; but its justification, as we have seen, presents great difficulties[41]. Cleanthes, the most religiously minded of the early Stoics, had not troubled to conceal his contempt for the opinions of the crowd[42]; and the ridiculous belief in Tartarus[43] is as widespread as that in the gods. Here then we must distinguish; it is not sufficient that a conception should be universal, if it appeals most to foolish folk, and even so is decaying[44]. We must not however at this moment inquire into the causes of this belief[45]; for this is to pass from the question at issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that the value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine of ‘inborn conceptions,’ which we have already discussed[46]. Without going over the whole ground again, the substance of the argument as applied to the present question may be thus stated. The mind of each individual man is by descent akin to the universal reason (κοινὸς λόγος, universa ratio)[47]. Therefore all men carry with them from their birth predispositions in favour of certain preconceptions; and the fact that these preconceptions are common to all is evidence of their divine origin. These predispositions by the growth and training of the individual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on the other hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. Now all men are born with a predisposition to explain what is beyond their own reasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living and reasoning agent. The belief in gods is therefore a ‘preconception’; and if it is confirmed by growth and experience, it must be of divine origin and therefore self-proving. In the language of our own times, the belief in deity cannot be dispensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames human reason.
[Sidenote: The proof of the ‘higher Being.’]
=247.= The second proof ‘that gods exist’ is particularly associated with the name of Chrysippus; it may be summed up by saying ‘there must be a Being higher than man.’ We begin by assuming that reason is the highest power in the universe[48]; an axiom which is always subject to limitation on account of the existence of ‘natural necessity.’ According to the Stoics, reason is common to gods and men; if, for the sake of argument, this is denied, then reason is possessed by men alone, for we can certainly find no better name than ‘god’ for higher reasoning beings[49]. If then there exists something greater than human reason can produce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater than man, that is, it must be the work of the gods. But the heavenly constellations are such a work; therefore they are the work of the gods, and therefore gods exist[50]. To this argument two others are supplementary. First, human reason itself must be derived from some source, and what other can we name but the deity[51]? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be the supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation[52]. The same arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno[53]; nay, so cogent are they that they are in part accepted even by Epicurus[54].
[Sidenote: The proofs from the elements and the universe.]
=248.= There follow two proofs connected with gradations in the scale of being. Earth and water are the two lower and grosser elements; and since temperament depends greatly upon climate, we find that men and the animals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air and fire are the higher and more refined elements; how then can we think otherwise than that they are the home of more lofty beings[55]? Then again the universe is either a simple or a composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the harmony (συμπάθεια, concentus) of its parts; it is therefore simple. A simple body must be held together by spirit in some one of its grades, either as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held together merely by unity, like stones or logs, admit of very simple changes only; but the universe admits of every kind of change and development, and yet keeps together; it must therefore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that is by soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its parts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater than man, and possessing soul and reason, is god[56].
[Sidenote: The proof from providence.]
=249.= The proof from the good gifts of providence has been already given in substance; we may however notice the sharp reply given to Epicurus, who maintains that the wondrous contrivances of the Creator for the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles. ‘As well contend,’ replies the Stoic, ‘that words and verses come from the chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, and that the poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking together a sufficient quantity of these in a box, and then pouring them out on the ground! Chance would hardly produce a single verse[57].’ The terrors of the universe, its storms, earthquakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which seem to militate against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth proof[58]. A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the movements of the heavenly bodies[59], we have sufficiently considered in connexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian thought.
[Sidenote: The proof from worship.]
=250.= There remain two proofs, which at first sight may appear singular, but are nevertheless very strongly urged, the proofs from worship and divination; which according to the Stoics are practices that must be justified, but cannot be justified without the postulate of the existence of gods. The proof from worship is best known in the paradoxical form, ‘if there are altars, there are gods,’ which is attributed to Chrysippus[60]. This proof is fused by Seneca with the proof from general consent[61]; but its true character seems to be different. ‘Without gods there can be no piety, for piety is the right worship of the gods. Without gods there can be no holiness, for holiness is a right attitude towards the gods. Without gods there can be no wisdom, for wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine[62]. But without piety, holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be constructed. Therefore gods exist.’ The argument in its simplest form is attributed to Zeno himself. ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods. But it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent. Therefore gods exist[63].’
[Sidenote: The proof from divination.]
=251.= The final argument is that from divination; which is remarkable in view of the close association between divination and astrology, and the derivation of the latter from a scientific system which finds no place for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the forecasting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, upon the hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of coming events. In accepting the truth of divination the Stoics were following the Socratic tradition[64]. This belief was accepted by all the great Stoic masters, and was a ‘citadel’ of their philosophy[65]. It is true that on this point Panaetius exercised the privilege of a suspense of judgment[66]; but all the more did his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon the subject, on which he composed five books[66], of which the spirit is preserved to us in Cicero’s books de Divinatione[67]. To Roman writers their inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate though half-forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining this belief[68]; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi maintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned with even greater reluctance[69]. Nevertheless the whole group of beliefs was quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of the empire, if we may judge from the words of Epictetus—‘what need have I to consult the viscera of victims and the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he (the diviner) says “it is for your interest?” Have I not within me a diviner[70]?’
[Sidenote: Divine qualities.]
=252.= Our next enquiry is ‘of what kind are the gods?’ ‘what are their qualities?’ Here the Stoics break more decidedly with tradition. Antipater of Tarsus, as we have seen, defined the deity as ‘a living being, happy, immortal and benevolent towards men[71].’ It is clear that this description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme deity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general conflagration[72]. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and of reason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; but we have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against those that hold that the world is governed by blind destiny and chance. In stating that the gods are happy the Stoics agree with Epicurus; but according to them this happiness consists not in rest, but in activity. In this distinction the whole difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals of happiness, that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight. The Stoics affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters of the greatest concern: and that any other conception is unworthy of them[73]. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the happiness of men is plainly the doctrine of providence; and in making benevolence an attribute of deity[74] the Stoics turn their backs for ever upon the belief in gods that are greedy, jealous, mischievous, and haughty; that is, not merely on such deities as were still a part of the creed of the rustic[75], but also such as had provided the problems of the whole of Greek tragedy, and given the opportunity for the stinging attacks of Epicurus on religion[76]. In examining these attributes of the gods we have anticipated the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth categories; namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods. Incidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the logical importance of definition and the four categories. Definition implies in advance what is contained in each of the categories, and each category contains implicitly what is contained in the other three; but the logical mechanism enables us so to express the doctrine that it is for ever fixed on the memory. Nor can we easily imagine that the world will ever forget this conception of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being; in his attributes immortal, immutable[77], active and benevolent; in his disposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great work the universe, and in his relation to his creatures constantly concerned for their comfort and happiness.
[Sidenote: Stoicism and the old mythology.]
=253.= It must by this time be plain that the whole atmosphere of Stoic religion was alien to that in which the gods of the Greek and Roman mythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods in the Stoic system has therefore no theoretical importance; it was a work of political adaptation. The Stoics themselves doubtless believed that they were restoring the original meaning of the pantheon, and freeing it from corruptions for which the poets were responsible. The original meaning was also, in their judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion was already in revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and on moral grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible and revolting[78]; the worship of them too often an attempt to silence the voice of conscience[79]. The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their interpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively the heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods represent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To a lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These interpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the doctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole process may seem to the modern critic puerile, because the practical occasion for it has passed away; but there are still to be found thinkers who hold that by such processes alone it is possible for human thought to progress without civil society being disrupted.
[Sidenote: The Stoic metamorphoses.]
=254.= According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery heaven, the chief of the elements, the source of all life[80]; Juno is the softer air, into which the fire enters to become the germinating seed[81]. Thus she is called sister as a fellow-element[82], and wife as an instrument in the creative process. From a slightly different point of view Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter; and their union as the commencement of the Creation, when God spread throughout matter the seed Logoi[83]. So again Hephaestus (Vulcan) represents fire; Poseidon (Neptune) is the sea; Dis (Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the earth[84]. Demeter (Ceres) again is the corn-land[85], and Persephone (Proserpine) the growing crop; as such she is lost to her mother and lamented by her for six months in every year[86]. Apollo is the sun, Luna or Diana the moon[87]; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos (χρόνος) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because all that is begotten of time is in turn consumed by time[88]. Athene or Minerva is the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has given birth without a partner, because she is the divine Reason by which he made the universe[89]. Chrysippus wrote at length on the allegorical interpretation of the three Graces[90]; and the work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of this system.
Other gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications of actions or feelings; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and Pothos (regret) of feelings; Hope (Ἐλπίς, Spes), Justice (Δίκη, Iustitia) and Wise Law (Εὐνομία) of actions[91]. So in particular Ares (Mars) stands for war, or the setting of array against array.
[Sidenote: Minor deities.]
=255.= We have already noticed that the gods that are borrowed from the popular mythology do not possess the divine attribute of immortality; and in some of them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent. There was thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature of lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already constituted by the popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the whole universe is full of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others mischievous. Highest in the former class stand the divine messengers, who everywhere throughout the universe keep watch over the affairs of men and bring report thereof to God[92]. This was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the principles of Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda[93] and in the poems of Hesiod[94]. These watchmen are however not the spies of a cruel tyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find them early in Roman literature identified with the stars[95], and this may account for the special recognition of the twins Castor and Pollux, as kindly daemons that protect sailors from shipwreck[96]. There are also spirits which are careless, idle, or mischievous[97]; these the deity may employ as his executioners[98]. A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil or mischievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan of Judaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. Amongst daemons are also to be recognised the souls of men parted from their bodies, some good and some evil[99]. All beliefs of this kind are specially characteristic of the type of Stoicism introduced by Posidonius[100]. We may specially note the belief in the Genius which accompanies each man from his birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the guardian angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in the Roman world[101].
[Sidenote: Deified men.]
=256.= The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities with the recognition of men raised to the sky for their services to their fellow-men. Such were Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters; Castor and Pollux; Aesculapius the inventor of medicine; Liber the first cultivator of the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder of the city. These are deities established by the laws of each city[102]. The Stoics do not raise their own leaders to this position, but (as we shall see in dealing with the question of the ‘wise man’) they assign to them almost equal honours. This part of their theory appears to open the door to great practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of the sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their lifetime, and those of the Roman emperors that their predecessors should be worshipped as such after their death. But it does not seem that such an abuse actually occurred; and this part of the theory of gods always seems to have been regarded by the Stoics rather as an explanation of historical facts than as a principle of civic submission.
[Sidenote: Worship.]
=257.= Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly to the department of politics, so far as public worship is concerned, and of ethics, so far as individuals are concerned. It may however be convenient to anticipate the discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate the Stoic views of religion apart from their practical application. We must therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accordance with its Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in the popular language atheistic. Not only did it follow the principles of Persism in condemning altogether the worship of images, but it also poured scorn upon the building of temples and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book on ‘the State’ forbids the making of temples and images, because they are unworthy of the deity[103]; an idea which the Romans recognised as not altogether strange to their own history, seeing that for a hundred and seventy years (presumably during the Etruscan supremacy) no images had been known at Rome[104]. The Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly expressed by silence, but it finds words in Seneca[105]. Although they thus denounced in principle the whole existing system of public worship, the Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it as a seemly and ancient custom[106]; and the Roman Stoics took a special pride in the reputation of the city for attention to ‘religion,’ that is to say, to the ritual observances due to the gods[107].
[Sidenote: Stoic hymnology.]
=258.= Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own ideal of worship, namely the rendering of praise and honour to the gods by means of hymns. ‘It is reasonable,’ said Zeno, ‘to honour the gods[108].’ The hymn of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find expression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual conviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnology[109]. The value of music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of Babylon[110]. Posidonius laid it down that the best and most pious worship of the gods is to honour them with pure mind and voice[111]. Epictetus speaks continually in this spirit, and gives us examples of prose hymnology: ‘great is God, who has given us implements with which we shall cultivate the earth[112]’; ‘I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administration[113].’ Thus ought we ‘to sing hymns to the deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits[114].’
[Sidenote: Prayer.]
=259.= Prayer to the gods may be taken as more characteristic of private and individual worship, though the paradox is worthy of attention that men should ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly[115]. The whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon Stoic lines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can be added to his exposition but the evidence that his teaching is in fact Stoic. Let us then enter the temples and listen to men’s prayers. First they beg the doorkeeper for admission, though the deity is equally near to them outside; then they raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths close to the ear of an image[116]. To the unlistening deity they pour out wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share their secret[117]. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, and make themselves out younger than they are[118]. Another prays for riches[119], or for some other thing that will do him harm[120]. Undertakers pray for a busy season[121]. Parents and nurses (and these are the nearest to innocence) pray for the success of their children in life[122]. They may be excused, but the thoughtful man should know that the advantages for which friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man’s destruction[123]. He should examine his own heart, and recognise that his prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish[124]. Since the gods wish us well, let us leave it to them to choose what is best for us[125]. ‘Look up to God, and say:—deal with me for the future as thou wilt: I am of the same mind as thou art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases thee[126].’ ‘Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things that happen to be as they are: and you will have a tranquil flow of life[127].’
[Sidenote: Self-examination.]
=260.= Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of resignation, in which a man ceases to battle against a destiny that is too strong for him; it is a daily examination of his soul, to know whether it is in tune with the purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious exercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both by Seneca and Epictetus. ‘How beautiful’ says Seneca, ‘is this custom of reviewing the whole day! how quiet a sleep follows on self-examination! The mind takes its place on the judgment-seat, investigates its own actions, and awards praise or blame according as they are deserved[128].’ And Epictetus adopts the verses ascribed to Pythagoras:
‘Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes Before each daily action thou hast scanned; What’s done amiss, what done, what left undone; From first to last examine all, and then Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice[129].’
[Sidenote: Religious duty.]
=261.= We are now in a position to sum up in technical language[130] the obligations of religion freed from superstition[131]. Our duty towards the gods is rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness and benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the universe[132]. We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath-days, nor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the morning; we may not offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror[133]. Our service to them is to make ourselves like to them; he who would win their favour, must be a good man[134]. Wheresoever they call us, we must follow with gladness, for they are wiser than we[135]. Without God we must attempt nothing, but we must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the divine will[136]. We came here when it pleased God, and we must depart when he shall please[137]. ‘So live,’ says the Stoic teacher, ‘with your fellow-men, as believing that God sees you: so hold converse with God, as to be willing that all men should hear you[138].’
FOOTNOTES
[1] e.g. Theodor Mommsen, Roman History iii 432 (Dickson’s translation).
[2] ‘omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem in partes quattuor. primum docent esse deos; deinde quales sint; tum, mundum ab iis administrari; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis’ Cic. N. D. ii 1, 3.
[3] ‘λόγον, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat’ Lact. ver. sap. 9 (Arnim i 160); ‘rationem deum vocat Zeno’ Min. Felix 19, 10 (ib.); ‘[Zeno] rationem quandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam putat’ Cic. N. D. i 14, 36.
[4] ἀρχὴν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον, ὑπέθεντο ὅ τε Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων Hippol. Phil. 21 (Arnim ii 1029).
[5] τὸ δι’ ὅλου κεχωρηκὸς πνεῦμα θεὸν δογματίζουσιν Theoph. Autol. i 4 (Arnim ii 1033).
[6] ‘ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent’ Sen. Ben. iv 7, 2; ‘hic est causa causarum’ N. Q. ii 45, 2.
[7] ‘[Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse], ut aquam et terram et aera’ Cic. N. D. i 15, 39.
[8] ‘[Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse’ ib.; ‘et deum ipsum ignem putavit [Zeno]’ August. adv. Ac. iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157); τὸν θεὸν πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες Euseb. pr. ev. 15 (Arnim ii 1050).
[9] οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν Diog. L. vii 148; ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ Cic. N. D. i 14, 37; ‘vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris’ Sen. N. Q. ii 45, 3; ‘quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum; solus est omnia’ ib. i Prol. 13; ‘Iuppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris’ Lucan Phars. ix 580.
[10] Arnim ii 1037 and 1039.
[11] ‘Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus’ Cic. Ac. ii 41, 126.
[12] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ ib.
[13] ‘[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit’ N. D. i 14, 36; ‘[Cleanthes] divinitatem omnem tribuit astris’ ib. 14, 37.
[14] ‘tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare’ Sen. Ben. iv 7, 1.
[15] ‘rectorem custodemque universi’ N. Q. ii 45, 1; ‘stant beneficio eius omnia’ Ben. iv 7, 1.
[16] Arnim i 532.
[17] ‘[Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae animo atque mente’ Cic. N. D. i 15, 39; ‘quid est deus? mens universi’ Sen. N. Q. i Prol. 13; cf. Arnim i 157.
[18] Arnim iii Ant. 35; ‘hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris’ Sen. Ben. iv 7, 2.
[19] ‘quid aliud est natura quam deus?’ ib. 1.
[20] ‘[Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. N. D. i 15, 39; cf. Arnim ii 1076.
[21] οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον | οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν Cleanthes Hymn 38, 39; ‘naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam esse censet’ Cic. N. D. i 14, 36.
[22] ‘[Chrysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae atque magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse’ ib. 15, 40.
[23] ‘[Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti [deos dicit esse]’ ib. 15, 39; ‘Persaeus ... inventa ipsa divina dicit’ ib. 15, 38.
[24] ‘Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]’ ib. i 13, 32.
[25] κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε ... Ζεῦ Cleanthes Hymn 1 and 2; ‘Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae pro ratione officiorum variis nominibus appellatur’ Servius ad Verg. Georg. i 5 (Arnim ii 1070).
[26] οἱ μὲν γενητοὶ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ [λέγονται], οἱ δ’ ἀγένητοι Plut. Sto. rep. 38, 5 (quoting from Chrysippus).
[27] Galen qual. inc. 6 (Arnim ii 1056).
[28] ‘ne hoc quidem [illi altissimi viri] crediderunt, Iovem, qualem in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit ... idem Etruscis visum est’ Sen. N. Q. ii 45, 1 and 3.
[29] See above, § 97.
[30] ‘hominum sator atque deorum’ Aen. i 254, and so passim.
[31] ‘tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in gremium laetae descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus’ Virgil Georg. ii 335-327.
[32] This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text of Cleanthes Hymn 4; Pearson well compares κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (scil. θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν Euseb. praep. ev. xv 15. See above, § 97.
[33] οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον Diog. L. vii 138; ..., ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς Corn. N. D. 8.
[34] [Χρύσιππός φησι] παιδαριωδῶς λέγεσθαι καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ πλάττεσθαι θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς, ὃν τρόπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμούς Philod. de piet. 11 (Arnim ii 1076); ‘est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nec cor nec caput habet’ Sen. Apoc. 8, 1.
[35] ‘Stoici negant habere ullam formam deum’ Lact. de ira 18 (Arnim ii 1057).
[36] In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may say (but only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form; ἰδίαν ἔχει μορφὴν τὸ σφαιροειδές Frag. Herc. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060); ‘quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo?’ Cic. N. D. i 10, 24.
[37] πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δ’ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν Aët. plac. i 6, 1.
[38] See above, § 242, note 20.
[39] θεὸν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων Plut. Sto. rep. 38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii 147 as indicating the view of the Stoics generally.
[40] ‘inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos’ Cic. N. D. ii 4, 12; ‘nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat’ Sen. Ep. 117, 6.
[41] See above, § 158.
[42] οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν | οὔτε καλήν Cleanthes apud Clem. Al. Strom. v 3 (Arnim i 559).
[43] See below, § 294.
[44] ‘videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse ... quae [enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum enim commenta delet dies’ Cic. N. D. ii 2, 5.
[45] As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) N. D. ii 5, 13.
[46] See above, § 158.
[47] ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. math. ix 93, see § 149.
[48] See the next note.
[49] ‘si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius’ Cic. N. D. ii 6, 16.
[50] ‘si enim’ inquit [Chrysippus] ‘est aliquid in rerum natura, quod potestas humana efficere non possit; est certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius. atqui res caelestes ab homine confici non possunt. est igitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum?’ ib.
[51] ‘et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates’ ib. 18.
[52] ‘esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, insipientis arrogantiae est’ ib. 16.
[53] See above, § 83.
[54] ‘placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius’ Cic. N. D. ii 17, 46. See however Mayor’s note.
[55] ‘tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium ... si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?’ etc. Cic. N. D. ii 6, 17. For the original argument of Chrysippus see Sext. math. ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014).
[56] ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur’ Cic. N. D. ii 7, 19. Here cf. Sext. math. ix 78 to 85 (Arnim ii 1013).
[57] Cic. N. D. ii 37, 93.
[58] The third in the exposition of Cleanthes: ‘tertiam [causam dixit Cleanthes esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus ... pestilentia terrae motibus’ ib. 5, 14.
[59] ‘quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli’ ib. 5, 15.
[60] Arnim ii 1019.
[61] ‘[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia’ Sen. Ben. iv 4, 2.
[62] Sext. math. ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017).
[63] ib. 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as a ‘transparent sophistry’; but at the present time there is a widespread tendency towards its revival; see Höffding, Philosophy of Religion, ch. iii.
[64] Xen. Mem. i 1, 2.
[65] Cic. Div. i 5, 9 and 6, 10.
[66] ib. 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149.
[67] Divination is based upon the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων (continuatio coniunctioque naturae), Cic. Div. ii 69, 142. See also Epict. Disc. i 14, and above, § 248.
[68] ‘[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia’ Sen. N. Q. ii 32, 2.
[69] ‘non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica sedes | quod siluit’ Lucan Phars. v 111-113; cf. 86-96.
[70] Epict. Disc. ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very severely criticized by Zeller: ‘these vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science’ Stoics, etc. p. 280. But the belief in μαντική is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly ‘practical’ men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word.
[71] See above, § 245.
[72] See above, § 209.
[73] Cic. N. D. ii 30, 77.
[74] ‘[di immortales] nec volunt obesse nec possunt. natura enim illis mitis et placida est’ Sen. Dial. iv 27, 1; ‘di aequali tenore bona sua per gentes populosque distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse’ Ben. vii 31, 4.
[75] ‘Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura | lenis incedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis’ Hor. C. iii 18, 1-4.
[76] ‘tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum’ Lucr. R. N. i 102.
[77] ‘Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say—Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail’ Epict. Disc. ii 8, 26 (quoting from Hom. Il. i 526).
[78] ‘sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iuppiter ineptias poetarum, quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua; alius adulterum illum induxit et abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in homines, alius parricidam et regni alieni paternique expugnatorem’ Sen. Dial. vii 26, 6.
[79] This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of Hannibal; ‘hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | Iovem se placare posse donis, hostiis; | et operam et sumptum perdunt’ Plaut. Rud. 22 to 24.
[80] ‘[Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem appellarent’ Cic. N. D. i 15, 40.
[81] ‘aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, Iunonis nomine consecratur ... effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius’ ib. ii 26, 66.
[82] ‘quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana’ Serv. ad Verg. Aen. i 47 (Arnim ii 1066).
[83] Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers later, concurred in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this principle of interpretation to a ‘disgraceful’ representation found in Argos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine seed in her mouth; yet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of the conception of the Virgin Mary through the ear (‘quae per aurem concepisti’ in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated the absurdity of criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of social decency, and by so doing relieved the pious souls of his own day from a real source of distress. See Arnim ii 1071-1074.
[84] Cic. N. D. ii 26, 66.
[85] ib. i 15, 40 and ii 26, 66.
[86] ‘Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt’ ib.
[87] ib. 27, 68.
[88] καὶ ὁ χρόνος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τί ἐστι· δαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν αὐτῷ Cornutus N. D. 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus is thus explained by the Stoics: ‘caelestem naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum’ Cic. N. D. ii 24, 64.
[89] Justin Apol. i 64 (Arnim ii 1096).
[90] Sen. Ben. i 3, 9.
[91] Aët. plac. i 6, 13.
[92] φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων Diog. L. vii 151.
[93] ‘ásya [váruṇasya] spáśo ná ní miṣanti bhūrṇayaḥ’ Rigv. ix 73, 4.
[94] τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ | ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων Hes. Op. et Di. 252, 253; see also § 33.
[95] ‘et alia signa de caelo ad terram accidunt; | qui’st imperator divum atque hominum Iuppiter, | is nos per gentis hic alium alia disparat, | hominum qui facta mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus’ Plaut. Rud. 8-12.
[96] καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθούς τινας εἶναι δαίμονας “σωτῆρας εὐσέλμων νεῶν” Sext. math. ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); ‘clarum Tyndaridae sidus ab infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates’ Hor. C. iv 8, 31 and 32.
[97] φαύλους δαίμονας ἀπέλιπε Χρύσιππος Plut. def. orac. 17.
[98] καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους qu. Rom. 51.
[99] Arnim ii 1101.
[100] ‘Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit immortalium animorum’ Cic. Div. i 30, 64.
[101] ‘Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae, mortalis in unum | quodque caput’ Hor. Ep. ii 2, 187-189; ‘sepone in praesentia, quae quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari deum, ex eorum numero quos Ovidius ait “de plebe deos”’ Sen. Ep. 110, 1; ‘Zeus has placed by every man a guardian, every man’s daemon, to whom he has committed the care of the man; a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived’ Epict. Disc. i 14, 12. M. Aurelius identifies this daemon with the principate (To himself v 27).
[102] Aët. plac. i 6, 9 and 15; Cic. N. D. ii 24, 62.
[103] Arnim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan: ‘estne dei sedes, nisi terra et pontus et aër, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid quaerimus ultra?’ Phars. ix 578-9.
[104] ‘Varro dicit antiquos Romanos plus annos centum et septuaginta deos sine simulacro coluisse: “quod si adhuc mansisset, castius di observarentur”’ August. Civ. De. iv 31.
[105] ‘ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor’ Sen. Ben. i 6, 3.
[106] ‘To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do’ Epict. Manual 31, 5.
[107] ‘si conferre volumus nostra cum externis; ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum superiores’ Cic. N. D. ii 3, 8.
[108] See above, § 250.
[109] ὄφρ’ ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ, | ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε Hymn 36, 37.
[110] περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τ(ῶν μου)σικῶν (τ)οῦ θείου τει(μῆς εἴρη)ται μὲν αὐτάρκως καὶ πρότερον Philod. mus. iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64).
[111] ‘cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur’ Cic. N. D. ii 28, 71.
[112] Epict. Disc. i 16, 17.
[113] ib. iii 5, 10.
[114] ib. i 16, 15.
[115] See above, § 121.
[116] ‘non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos ad aurem simulacri admittat; prope est a te deus’ Sen. Ep. 41, 1.
[117] ‘turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem, conticescent’ ib. 10, 5.
[118] Sen. Dial. x 11, 1.
[119] ib. xi 4, 2.
[120] Ben. ii 14, 5.
[121] ib. vi 38, 1.
[122] Ep. 32, 4.
[123] ‘etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut mater? o quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum!’ Sen. Ep. 60, 1.
[124] ‘se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et inspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi fateri pudet! quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!’ Ben. vi 38, 5.
[125] This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus: ‘stulti hau scimus frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis: quasi quid in rem sit possimus noscere’ Plautus Pseud. 683-5.
[126] Epict. Disc. ii 16, 42.
[127] Manual 8.
[128] Sen. Dial. v 36, 2. He describes his practice with naïve detail: ‘cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et conticuit uxor moris mei iam conscia, totum diem meum scrutor’ ib. 3.
[129] Epict. Disc. iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long’s transl.).
[130] ‘quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi’ Sen. Ep. 95, 47.
[131] ‘non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt’ Cic. N. D. ii 28, 71.
[132] ‘primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire illos esse, qui praesident mundo’ Sen. Ep. 95, 50.
[133] ib. 95, 47.
[134] ‘vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est’ ib. 95, 50.
[135] ‘You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey them, and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence’ Epict. Manual 31, 1.
[136] Disc. iii 22, 53 (compare Long’s transl. ii p. 83).
[137] ib. iii 26, 30.
[138] ‘sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat; sic loquere cum deo, tanquam homines audiant’ Sen. Ep. 10, 5.