Opening…

Preface

This book is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by me in successive years to Latin Honours students in accordance with the regulations of the University of Wales. It is therefore primarily intended for the assistance of classical students; but it may perhaps appeal in its present form to a somewhat wider circle.

At the time that the book was begun the best systematic exposition of the Stoic philosophy available for English readers was to be found in Prof. E. ZELLER’S Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, translated by O. J. REICHEL (Longmans, 1892). This work, admirable in detail, is nevertheless somewhat inadequate to the subject, which appeared to its learned author as a mere sequel to the much more important philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle. Since its first appearance many qualified writers have been inclined to assign a higher rank to Stoicism, amongst whom L. STEIN, A. SCHMEKEL, and HANS von ARNIM in the German-speaking countries, and A. C. PEARSON, G. H. RENDALL, and R. D. HICKS in our own, are perhaps most conspicuous.

The view taken in this book corresponds generally to that taken by the writers named. Shortly expressed, it regards Stoicism as the bridge between ancient and modern philosophical thought; a position which appears to be accepted by W. L. DAVIDSON writing on behalf of students of modern philosophy. Mr Hicks and Mr Davidson have recently published works dealing with the Stoic philosophy as a whole; but as neither of these quite covers the ground marked out for this book, I believe that room will be found for a further presentation of the subject.

To the writers named and to many others, my obligations are great, and their extent is generally indicated in the Index. I owe a more intimate debt to Mr A. C. PEARSON and Prof. ALFRED CALDECOTT, who have given me ungrudgingly of their knowledge and counsel during the whole period of the preparation of this book.

The appearance of H. von Arnim’s ‘Stoicorum veterum fragmenta’ made available to me a mass of material from Greek sources, and has (I hope) made this book less imperfect on the side of Greek than it would otherwise have been. For the quotations in the notes from the Greek and the less-known Latin authors I have generally given references to von Arnim’s collections, which will doubtless be more accessible to most of my readers than the original writers. These references include those to the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, for which von Arnim is in the main indebted to the earlier work of Pearson.

So general a treatment of the subject as is here presented must necessarily leave room for correction and amplification in its various branches, and I trust that I am pointing out to younger students a field in which a rich harvest may yet be gleaned. To such students the appended Bibliography, though necessarily incomplete, may be of use as an introduction to the considerable literature which is available to them.

The concluding chapter makes its appeal not so much to classical students, as such, as to those who are interested in the problem of Christian origins; the further problems of the influence of Stoicism on modern literature and philosophy, though at first included in my programme, I have not ventured to enter upon. But I hope that at least I have been able to show that the interest of classical studies, even as regards Hellenistic philosophy, does not lie wholly in the past.

My sincere thanks are due to the Council of the University College of North Wales for granting me special assistance in my College duties during the Spring term of 1910, in order that I might give more time to this book; to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for undertaking its publication; and to Mr Clay and his expert staff for the admirable execution of the printing.

E. VERNON ARNOLD

25 January 1911

CORRIGENDA ET NOTANDA

In the text the accentuation of Greek words should be corrected as follows:

P. 117, l. 10, χρεῖαι. P. 239, l. 6, μέρων. P. 423, l. 16, ἀγάπη.

(Transcriber’s Note: These have been corrected.)

For the quotations in the notes from Greek writers, more precise references will usually be found in the sections named of von Arnim’s Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. In addition the following amplifications or corrections are needed:

P. 105, n. 44; Clem. Strom. ii 21, 129. P. 133, n. 38; Nem. nat. hom. vi 13. P. 142, n. 86; Sext. math. vii 184. P. 158, n. 17; Simp. Arist. cat. p. 269, 14 K; Cens. fr. 1, 1. P. 159, n. 20; Simp. Arist. cat. p. 350, 16 K. P. 160, n. 30; for τόνος the word λόγος is now read, making the quotation inapplicable. P. 161, n. 133; add the words τοὺς ἐν ἑαυτῷ λόγους. The reference is to Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 306, 23 K. P. 164, n. 45; Simp. Arist. cat. p. 66, 32 K; n. 47, ib. p. 165, 32 K. P. 166, n. 60; ib. p. 269, 14 K. P. 168, n. 75; ib. p. 165, 32 K. P. 173, n. 110; Galen const. art. med. p. 253 K; n. 111, meth. med. i 2 p. 16 K. P. 185, n. 79; for ἀπὸ read ὑπὸ. P. 187, n. 86; Sext. math. viii 271. P. 193, n. 130; Nemes. nat. hom. xxxviii 95. P. 196, n. 145; Galen de temp. p. 617 K. P. 222, n. 33; Corn. N. D. ii. P. 224, n. 47; Sext. math. vii 93. P. 251, n. 76; Galen plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 242 K. P. 255, n. 86; for μῖγμα read μίγμα. P. 264, n. 139; to the quotation from Comm. in Luc. ix 6 add ‘et esse sic immortales ut non moriantur sed resolvantur.’ P. 298, n. 184; Alex. Aph. de fato 28, p. 199, 18 B.

Spotted a typo or a problem in this chapter? Tell us

I. THE WORLD-RELIGIONS

[Sidenote: Roman literature.]

=1.= The present work treats of a subject of outstanding interest in the literature which is associated with the history of the Roman State, and which is expressed partly in Hellenistic Greek, partly in Latin. In the generations preceding our own, classical study has, to a large extent, attended to form rather than to matter, to expression rather than to content. To-day it is beginning to take a wider outlook. We are learning to look on literature as an unveiling of the human mind in its various stages of development, and as a key to the true meaning of history. The literature of Greece proper does not cease to attract us by its originality, charm, and variety; but the new interest may yet find its fullest satisfaction in Roman literature; for of all ancient peoples the Romans achieved most, and their achievements have been the most enduring. It was the Roman who joined the ends of the world by his roads and his bridges, poured into crowded towns unfailing supplies of corn and perennial streams of pure water, cleared the countryside of highwaymen, converted enemies into neighbours, created ideals of brotherhood under which the nations were united by common laws and unfettered marriage relations, and so shaped a new religion that if it shattered an empire it yet became the mother of many nations. We are the inheritors of Roman civilization; and if we have far surpassed it in scientific knowledge and material plenty, we are not equally confident that we possess better mental balance, or more complete social harmony. In this direction the problems of Roman life are the problems of Western life to-day; and the methods by which they were approached in the Roman world deserve more than ever to be studied by us. Such a study, if it is to be in any true sense historical, must break through the convention by which ancient Greece and Rome have come to be treated as a world apart; it must seek its starting point in the distant past, and count that of chief importance which will bear fruit in the ages that follow.

[Sidenote: Beliefs of the Romans.]

=2.= Great achievements are born of strong convictions; and Roman statesmen, jurists, soldiers, and engineers did not learn to ‘scorn delights and live laborious days’ without some strong impulse from within. These inner convictions do not come to the surface everywhere in the Latin literature with which we are most familiar. The Roman orator or poet is generally content to express a conventional view of religion and morals, whilst he conceals his real thoughts in a spirit of reticence and almost of shame. Yet here and there every attentive reader will catch the accent of sincerity, sometimes in the less restrained conversation of the lower classes, sometimes in flights of poetic imagination, or again in instruction designed for the young. In this way we learn that the Romans of the last century of the republic and of the first century of the principate were profoundly concerned, not so much with questions connected with the safety of their empire or the justice of their form of government, as with problems in which all mankind has a common interest. What is truth, and how can it be ascertained? What is this universe in which we dwell, and by whom and how was it made? What are the beings called gods, and do they concern themselves with the affairs of men? What is man’s nature, his duty, and his destiny? These the Romans called the problems of philosophy, and they eagerly sought for definite and practical solutions to them[1]. Such solutions when embodied in theoretical systems we still call ‘philosophies’; but when such systems are developed in a practical form and claim the obedience of large bodies of men they become religions. Stoicism is in the first instance a philosophy, and amongst its many competitors that one which appealed most successfully to the judgment of men who played a leading part in the Roman world; but as its acceptance becomes more general, it begins to assume all the features of a religion. All Latin literature is thickly strewn with allusions to Stoicism and the systems which were its rivals, and thus bears witness to the widespread interest which they excited.

[Sidenote: Origin of Philosophy.]

=3.= The Romans learnt philosophy from Greek teachers; and they were not free from a sense of shame in thus sitting at the feet of the children of a conquered race. But they acknowledged their obligations in a generous spirit; and from Roman literature an impression has arisen, which is still widespread, that Greece was the birthplace of philosophy, and that its triumphs must be placed to the credit of Hellenic culture. But to the Hellenes themselves philosophy equally appeared as a foreign fashion, assailing their national beliefs and dangerous to their established morality; and of its teachers many of the most distinguished were immigrants from Asia Minor. Thus Greece itself appears only as a halting-place in the movement of philosophy; and we are carried more and more to the East as we seek to discover its origin. Yet at the time with which we are concerned it had also spread to the extreme West. ‘The Magi,’ says Aristotle, ‘taught the Persians philosophy; the Chaldaeans taught it to the Babylonians and Assyrians; the Gymnosophists to the Indians; the Druids and Semnothei to the Gauls and Celts[2].’ It was a world-wide stirring of the human intellect, and we must attempt to outline its meaning more completely.

[Sidenote: National and World-Religions.]

=4.= Philosophy, in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term, appears to be a general name for a great change in man’s intellectual attitude towards his environment, corresponding to a definite era in the history of civilization. Before philosophy came nationalism, the habit of thinking according to clan and race; and nationalism remains on record for us in the numerous national religions in which each people does reverence to the deity which lives within its borders and goes forth to fight with its armies. Philosophy is at once broader in its outlook and more intimate in its appeal. It breaks down the barriers of race, and includes the whole world in its survey; but on the other hand it justifies the individual in asserting his own thoughts and choosing his own way of life. Thus philosophy on its arrival appears in each particular country as a disintegrating force; it strikes at the roots of patriotism and piety, and challenges equally the authority of king and of priest. But everywhere in turn philosophy, as it gains ground, begins to construct a new patriotism and a new piety, and gradually takes concrete shape as a new religion. To us, as we look backwards to the past, the track of philosophy is recorded by a series of religions, all alike marked with the note of world-wide outlook, reverence for reason, and the sentiment of human sympathy. The era of philosophy is the era of the world-religions. It belongs to that millennium when from China to Ireland men of good will and bold spirit realized that they all looked up toward one sky, breathed one air, and travelled on one all-encircling sea; when they dreamed that before long all men should be united in one kingdom, converse in one language, and obey the one unchanging law of reason.

[Sidenote: Spread of the World-Religions.]

=5.= The general importance and direction of this movement will best be seen if we select for consideration a certain number of the world-religions in which it was from time to time embodied. Aristotle has already called our attention to the ‘philosophies’ of the Chaldaeans, the Persians, and the Indians; amongst these last Buddhism at least was a movement which had shaken off limitations of race and class. To these he has added the Druids, whom we may well keep in mind if only because they are representatives of Western Europe. Stoicism best represents the part played by the Greco-Roman world, and Judaism and Christianity come under consideration as forces with which Stoicism in the course of its history came into close contact. The Greeks little realized that they were being carried along in so mighty a stream. Regarding themselves as isolated and elevated, the sole pioneers of civilization in a ‘barbarian’ world, the beliefs of neighbouring peoples seemed to them beneath their notice. To this prejudice they clung in spite of the protests of their own men of learning[3]; the Romans inherited it from them; and though the Europe of the Middle Ages and of to-day professes an Oriental faith, its religious survey is still limited and its critical power impaired by the same assumption of superior wisdom. Our information is however wider than that of the ancient world, and our sympathies are beginning to be quickened; and we are thus in a position to trace generally the history of these seven religions. In this work we shall use, as far as possible, the classical authorities, supplementing them (where deficient) from other sources.

[Sidenote: Chaldaism.]

=6.= The oldest of these philosophical or religious systems is that of the Chaldaeans, as the Romans termed a pastoral, star-gazing folk[4] presumably identical with the people which, in or about the year 2800 B.C.[5], mapped out the constellations as we now know them, traced the orbits of the planets[6], and predicted their future movements. This work was not carried out entirely in the spirit of modern science; it was further stimulated by the belief that the skies displayed a written message to mankind. But the nature of that message, of which fragments are possibly embodied in the names of the constellations, was not preserved to the Romans by any tradition. Two principles seem to have survived, those of the inexorable tie between cause and effect called ‘fate[7],’ and of the interdependence of events in heaven and on earth[8]. Hence arose the hope of prophetic insight into the future; and the people of Babylon, under Chaldaean influence, are said to have spent four hundred and seventy years in collecting observations of the history of boys born under particular combinations of the heavenly bodies[9]. We are not acquainted with the results of these observations; but undoubtedly they established a profession of astrologers, whose craft it was to observe the position of sun, moon and stars at a man’s birth or at some other critical hour, and thence to deduce his future character or career. These wanderers, called by the Romans ‘Chaldaei’ or ‘Mathematici,’ spread over all Europe, and founded a lucrative trade on men’s fears and ambitions. Philosophers studied their methods, and did not always entirely deny their validity[10]. In society the astrologer is a common figure[11]; he found his way to the chambers of princes[12], and was regularly consulted by conspirators. The dramatic scene in Walter Scott’s Betrothed is as true in character to Roman times as to the Middle Ages. Roman literature is full of allusions to the horoscope[13]. But whether we attribute these practices to fraud or to self-deception, there is every reason to believe that they only form a diseased outgrowth from a system which at an earlier time was of much wider import.

[Sidenote: Persism.]

=7.= The popular expression ‘magic’ still recalls to us the system of which the Magi of Persia were the professed exponents, and of which the Romans had a knowledge which is to a large extent confirmed from other sources. This system we shall here call ‘Persism,’ in order to free ourselves of the popular associations still connected with such terms as Magism, Parsee-ism, and so forth; meaning by ‘Persism’ the teaching of Zarathustra (the Latin Zoroastres) as it affected the Greek and Latin world. Persism has its roots in the older nationalism, inasmuch as its deity is one who takes sides with his believer and brings him victory in war; but on the other hand it grows into a world-religion because that which begins as a conflict between races gradually changes into a struggle between right and wrong. It is based also on the Chaldaean system, in so far as it looks up to the heaven as the object of human reverence and to the sun, moon and planets as at least the symbols of human destiny; but here again the outlook is transformed, for in the place of impersonal and inexorable forces we find a company of celestial beings, intimately concerned in the affairs of men, and engaged in an ardent struggle for the victory of the better side. The meaning of Persism and its immense influence on the Greco-Roman world are still so little realized that it is necessary here to deal with the subject with some fulness.

[Sidenote: Zarathustra.]

=8.= The Greeks and Romans refer to the teachings of Zarathustra as of immemorial antiquity[14]; whilst on the other hand the direct Persian tradition (existing in a written form from about the year 800 A.D.) ascribes them to a date 258 years before the era of Alexander’s invasion of Persia[15]. The best modern authorities incline to the Persian view, thus giving the date of about 600 B.C. to Zarathustra, and making him roughly a contemporary of the Buddha and Confucius[16]. On the other hand considerations, partly of the general history of religion, partly of the linguistic and metrical character of such fragments of Zarathustra’s writings as still remain, indicate a date earlier than this by many hundred years[17]. Zarathustra belonged to the tribe of the Magi, who maintained religious practices of which the nature can only be inferred from such of them as survived the prophet’s reforms[18]; in their general character they cannot have differed widely from those recorded in the Rigveda. In the midst of this system Zarathustra came forward as a reformer. He was deeply learned in the doctrines of the Chaldaeans[19], and was an ardent student of astronomy[20]. In a period of solitary contemplation in the desert[21], it was revealed to him that a great and wise being, named Ahura Mazdā, was the creator and ruler of heaven and earth[22]. Upon him attend Angels who do him service; whilst the spirit of Mischief and his attendants ceaselessly work to oppose his purposes. Ahura is the light, his enemy is the darkness[23]. The struggle between them is that between right and wrong, and in it every man must take one or the other side. His soul will survive what men call death, and receive an everlasting reward according to his deeds. After quitting the mortal body, the soul will pass over the Bridge of Judgment, and will there be turned aside to the right or to the left; if it has been virtuous, to enter Paradise, but if vicious, the House of Falsehood. Full of this doctrine, Zarathustra enters the court of King Vishtāspa, and converts him and his court. The monarch in turn sets out to convert the unbelieving world by the sword, and the War of Religion begins.

[Sidenote: Spread of Persism.]

=9.= We cannot trace the long history of the War of Religion through its whole course, but in the end we find that the Religion has welded together the great kingdom of Persia, and its warlike zeal is directed towards establishing throughout the world the worship of the ‘God of heaven,’ and the destruction of all images, whether in the shape of men or of beasts, as dishonouring to the divine nature. In the sixth century B.C. Babylon opposed the Religion in the east, and Lydia in the west; both fell before Cyrus the Great. The fall of Babylon set free the Jews, who accepted the king’s commission to establish the Religion in Jerusalem[24], and (at a rather later date) in Egypt[25]; on the other hand that of Lydia exposed the Hellenes, a people devoted to idol-worship, to the fury of the image-breakers[26]. The battles of Marathon and Salamis checked the warlike advance of Persism, and the victories of Alexander suppressed its outward observance and destroyed its literature and its priesthood. But in this period of apparent depression some at least of its doctrines were winning still wider acceptance than before.

[Sidenote: Persism invades Greece.]

=10.= The departure of the Persians from Europe was the signal for an outburst of enthusiasm in Greece for the old gods and their worship with the aid of images. Yet, unfavourable as the time might seem, a monotheistic sentiment developed apace in Hellas, which we shall follow more closely in the next chapter[27]. Even Herodotus, writing as a fair-minded historian, no longer regards the Persians as impious, but realizes that they are actuated by conviction[28]. Socrates was an outspoken defender of all the main articles of the Religion, to the horror of nationalists like Aristophanes, who not unjustly accused him of corrupting the loyalty of the youth of Athens to the institutions of their mother city. Xenophon, the most intimate of his disciples, translated this bias into action, and joined with the 10,000 Greeks in a vain effort to re-establish the strength of Persia: he did not even hesitate to engage in war against his native land. To him Cyrus the Persian was a greater hero than any Homeric warrior or Greek sage; and from Cyrus he drew the belief in the immortality of the soul which from this time on is one of the chief subjects of philosophic speculation.

[Sidenote: Persism welcomed in Rome.]

=11.= The Romans had not the same national motives as the Greeks to feel an antipathy to Persism. For the doctrine of monotheism they had probably been prepared by their Etruscan sovereigns, and the temple of Capitoline Jove kept before their eyes a symbol of this sentiment. But in the Roman period Persian sovereignty had receded to the far distance, and the doctrines of Persism only reached Rome through the Greek language and in Greek form. Thus of the doctrines of the Evil Spirit, the war between Good and Evil, and the future punishment of the wicked, only faint echoes ever reached the Roman ear. On the other hand the doctrines of the divine government of the world and of the immortality of the soul made a deep impression; and Cicero in a well-known passage repeats and amplifies the account Xenophon gives in his Cyropaedia of the dying words of Cyrus, which is doubtless to some extent coloured by recollections of the death of Socrates:

‘We read in Xenophon that Cyrus the elder on his death-bed spoke as follows—“Do not think, my very dear children, that when I quit you I shall no longer be in existence. So long as I was with you, you never saw my soul, but you realized from my actions that it dwelt in this my body. Believe then that it will still exist, even if you see nothing of it. Honours would not continue to be paid to great men after death, did not their souls assist us to maintain their memory in freshness. I have never been able to persuade myself that souls live whilst they are enclosed in mortal bodies, and die when they issue from them; nor that the soul becomes dull at the moment it leaves this dull body; I believe that when it has freed itself from all contact with the body and has begun to exist in purity and perfection, then it becomes wise. Further, when the framework of humanity is broken up in death, we see clearly whither each of its parts speeds away, for all go to the elements from which they have sprung; the soul alone is not seen by us either whilst it is with us or when it departs. Lastly nothing resembles death so closely as sleep. But men’s souls, whilst they themselves sleep, most clearly reveal their divine nature; for then, being set free from their prison house, they often foresee things to come. From this we may gather what their properties will be, when they have utterly freed themselves from the fetters of the body. If then this is so, do reverence to me as a god; but if the soul is destined to perish with the body, still do reverence to the gods, who guard and rule all this beauteous world, and while so doing keep up the memory of me in loyal and unalterable affection.” So spoke Cyrus on his death-bed[29].’

[Sidenote: The manifold deity.]

=12.= The Persian doctrine of the ‘Angels’ seems to have been very little understood either in Greece or at Rome, but, as we shall see in the course of this book, it profoundly influenced the course of religious history. The ‘Angels’ or good Spirits of Persism are, from one point of view, identical with the Creator himself, forms under which he manifests himself to men. Their names are all those of abstractions: the Good Mind, the Best Reason, the Desired Kingdom, Holy Humility, Salvation, and Immortality[30]. On the other hand, they gradually assume to the worshipper who contemplates them the appearance of separate personalities, dwelling, like the Creator himself, in an atmosphere of heavenly Glory. Thus a system which is in principle strictly monotheistic gradually developes into one in which the deity is sevenfold, as in the following hymn from the later part of the Avesta:

‘We praise the heavenly Glory. The mighty, the god-given, The praiseworthy, the life-giving, Healing, strengthening, watching High above the other creatures.

The Glory that belongs to the Immortal Spirits, The rulers, that act by a look alone, The lofty, all-powerful ones, The strong servants of the All-wise, That live for ever, and work justice.

All seven have the same Thought, All seven have the same Word, All seven have the same Deed. One Thought, one Word, one Deed, one Father and Master The All-wise, the Creator[31].’

Of these ‘Angels’ one was destined to play a considerable part in several of the world-religions; namely that which the Persians called the ‘Best Reason,’ and which the Greeks knew as Wisdom (σοφία) or the Word (λόγος). Sometimes an aspect of the Deity, sometimes an emanation from him, and then again a distinguishable personality, this figure is again and again presented to our consideration. The personification of abstractions appealed with special force to the Romans, for from the earliest periods of their history they had raised temples to Faith (fides), Concord (concordia), and other deified virtues; and its character can perhaps best be appreciated by reference to the personification of Light in Christian hymnology, both ancient and modern:

‘Hail, gladdening Light, of his pure glory poured Who is the immortal Father, heavenly, blest[32]!’

‘Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom Lead thou me on[33].’

[Sidenote: Sanctity of the elements.]

=13.= Amongst the subsidiary, but still important, doctrines of Persism, is that of the sanctity of the four elements. Earth, air, fire and water are alike holy. Hence the dead must not be buried, for that would be to defile the earth; nor burned, for that would be to defile fire[34]; nor may any impurity be thrown into the water. This respect for the elements often appeared to strangers as worship of them[35]. Between the elements they sometimes discriminated, considering earth and water as more akin to darkness and the evil spirit, but fire and air to light and the good spirit[36]. The element of fire they held in special reverence, so that at all times they have been called fire-worshippers[37]. More careful observers have always recognised them as monotheists, distinguished by a certain rapturous language in their description of the deity which they refused to picture in any concrete shape[38]. They were also zealous that their teaching should find its expression in a healthy social and political life[39]. In the education of the young they laid a special stress on speaking the truth[40].

[Sidenote: Alexander in the East.]

=14.= ‘The Gymnosophists taught philosophy to the people of India[41].’ Who are the teachers thus indicated? An answer may be found, though of a later date, in Plutarch’s ‘Life of Alexander,’ where he describes the meeting of Alexander with some eminent gymnosophists, who had stirred up opposition to his rule:—

‘[Alexander] captured ten of the Indian philosophers called Gymnosophistae[42]; who had been instrumental in causing Sabbas to revolt, and had done much mischief to the Macedonians. These men are renowned for their short, pithy answers, and Alexander put difficult questions to all of them, telling them that he would first put to death the man who answered him worst, and so the rest in order.

The first was asked whether he thought the living or the dead to be the more numerous. He answered “The living, for the dead are not.”

The second was asked, “Which breeds the largest animals, the sea or the land?” He answered “The land, for the sea is only a part of it.”

The third was asked, “Which is the cleverest of beasts?” He answered “That which man has not yet discovered.”

The fourth was asked why he made Sabbas rebel. He answered “Because I wished him either to live or to die with honour.”

The fifth was asked, which he thought was first, the day or the night. He answered “The day was first, by one day.” As he saw that the king was surprised by this answer, he added “Impossible questions require impossible answers.”

Alexander now asked the sixth how a man could make himself most beloved. He answered “By being very powerful, and yet not feared by his subjects.”

Of the remaining three, the first was asked how a man could become a god. He answered “By doing that which it is impossible for a man to do.”

The next was asked which was the stronger, life or death. He answered “Life, because it endures such terrible suffering.”

The last, being asked how long it was honourable for a man to live, answered “As long as he thinks it better for him to live than to die.”

The king loaded them with presents, and dismissed them[43].’

[Sidenote: Were the Gymnosophists Buddhists?]

=15.= In these ‘gymnosophists’ it is easy to recognise a type familiar to Indian antiquity. These men, who have almost dispensed with clothing and know nothing of the luxuries or even the conveniences of life, are nevertheless influential leaders of the people. They, like the Persians, have broken away from the old religions; they talk lightly of the gods, and do not guide their actions by any decrees supposed divine. The sight of human sorrow fills them with sympathy for the ills of life, and makes them doubt whether death is not the better choice. Their ethical standard is high, and includes both courage and gentleness. That they are Buddhist monks is probable enough, but not certain, because India contained at this time many sects professing similar principles. But the teaching of Gautama, the Buddha or ‘enlightened,’ represents to us in the most definite form the nature of this propaganda. It implies a revolt against national rivalries, ritualist observances, and polytheistic beliefs; it is severely practical, and inculcates obedience to reason and universal benevolence; and it is spread from East to West by devoted bands of ascetic missionaries.

[Sidenote: Buddhist teaching.]

=16.= The fundamental teachings of Buddhism appear clearly in the traditional account of the Sermon of Benares:

This is the holy truth of Sorrow; birth is Sorrow, age is Sorrow, disease is Sorrow, death is Sorrow; to be joined with the unloved is Sorrow, to be parted from the loved is Sorrow; to lose one’s desire is Sorrow; shortly, the five-fold clinging to existence is Sorrow.

‘This is the holy truth of the Origin of Sorrow; it is the thirst to be, leading from birth to birth, finding its pleasure here and there; the thirst for pleasure, the thirst to be, the thirst to be prosperous.

This is the holy truth of the Removing of Sorrow; the removal of the thirst by destroying desire, by letting it go, by cutting oneself off from it, separating from it, giving it no place.

This is the holy truth of the Path to the Removing of Sorrow; it is the holy Path of eight branches, which is called Right Belief, Right Aspiration, Right Word, Right Act, Right Life, Right Effort, Right Meditation, Right Annihilation of Self[44].’

Specially characteristic of Buddhism is that gentleness of temper, instinctively opposed to all anger and cruelty, which no provocation can turn aside. We read in the Dhammapada:

‘Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love; this is an old rule. Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth[45].’

[Sidenote: Buddhists and Cynics.]

=17.= The doctrines of Buddhism were not inculcated in India alone. From the first it was a missionary religion; and its emissaries must often have appeared in the Hellenistic world, promising ‘to seekers after God eternal communion with his very essence, to the weary pessimist eternal forgetfulness[46].’ From contemporary Indian inscriptions we learn of missionaries sent out by Açoka, the first great Buddhist king of India, ‘with healing herbs and yet more healing doctrine’[47] to Ptolemy II king of Egypt, Antiochus of Syria, and others, before the year 250 B.C.; and this mission can have been but one out of many. It thus appears very remarkable that we have no record of Buddhist communities established in the Greco-Roman world. But if the name of Gautama remained unknown to the West, and his community had no formal adherents, the manner of life of his apostles did not lack imitators. In the Cynic preacher the Buddhist monk reappears. In Greek literature he is usually an object of ridicule; his uncouth appearance, his pitiable poverty, and his unconventional speech give constant opportunity for the wit of his critics. But the Cynics carried with them not only the outward garb of the Buddhist monks, but also their lofty ethical standard, their keen sympathy with human troubles, and their indifference to purely speculative problems[48]. In spite of the contempt heaped upon them (or perhaps in consequence of it) they gradually won respect and admiration as the sincere friends and helpers of the poor. Thus Buddhism at its best is pictured for us in the sketches drawn by Epictetus of Diogenes and the Cynic preachers of his own day, of which the following are examples:

‘Did Diogenes love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily suffering? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was his country, and not one particular place; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens. Thus is freedom acquired[49].’

‘And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you a man to shew you it is possible. Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want? Am I not without sorrow? Am I not without fear? Am I not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my desire, or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever blame God or man? did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countenance?

This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this their purpose[50].’

Except that a simple form of theism has replaced the Buddhist atheism, there is hardly a word here that we might not expect from a Buddhist monk.

[Sidenote: Stoicism.]

=18.= The Stoic philosophy was founded by Zeno of Citium (350-260 B.C.). Although he lived and taught at Athens, his youth was spent in a city that was half Phoenician, and many of his most distinguished followers had a like association with the Eastern world. The system deals with all the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, and Buddhism. Like the first, it insists that there exists an unchanging Destiny, according to which events throughout the universe are predetermined from all eternity. Like the second, it sets up as claiming the worship and allegiance of men a Supreme Deity, who governs the world with boundless power and benevolent will, and is manifested to men as the Logos or ‘divine Word.’ In its interpretation of the physical universe it accepts as a first principle a living and creative fire, ultimately identical with the deity, and containing the germs of the whole creation. It sees in the will of man an independent and divine power, subject to no compulsion from without, but attaining its highest and best by willing submission to the Supreme Being. In its practical ethics, though it does not advocate the suppression of all desires, it so far agrees with Buddhism as to hold that happiness is only found in the subordination of individual claims to the voice of universal reason. Finally, its teachers are actively engaged in propagating its doctrines and guiding its disciples. Stoicism has, in short, the inward and outward characteristics of the other great movements we have described, and may claim without presumption to be reckoned amongst the world-religions[51].

[Sidenote: Comprehensiveness of the Stoic view.]

=19.= If however we reckon Stoicism amongst the world-religions, we must not forget that of all of them it is the most philosophical, and this in a double sense. In the first place the founders of Stoicism are conscious of the problems to which preceding schools of thought have endeavoured to find answers, and attempt to reconcile or at any rate to bring into relation the answers which their predecessors have found. Secondly they are greatly occupied with intellectual problems, and clearness of thought is to them almost equally important with rightness of thought. The theory of Fate which we have attributed to the Chaldaeans is to the plain man irreconcileable with the doctrine of the government of the world by a Supreme Deity; yet the Stoics hold both dogmas. The theory of the freedom of the human will is a limitation equally of the dominion of Fate and of that of the Deity: the Stoics maintain the freedom of the human will and refuse to admit the limitation of either power. The Persians maintained that the power of the principle of Good was balanced by that of the principle of Evil; and from this they drew what seemed to be the legitimate conclusion that man may choose to obey the one or the other, to do good or to do evil. The Stoics omitted the principle of Evil altogether from their scheme, and yet maintained the theory of the moral choice. To understand the Stoic system it is necessary to know exactly in what balance its different elements were maintained, and to avoid identifying it with other systems, ancient or modern, which are more sharply cut. Thus when it is commonly asserted that Stoicism on its religious side is Pantheism, the very brevity of this summary must create suspicion. Certainly the Stoics frequently speak of the universe as divine; but they hold with equal firmness the doctrines that the universe is governed by Providence, and that human perversity may thwart the divine purpose, both being doctrines which in ancient as in modern times are associated with Theism, and held to be inconsistent with pantheistic views.

[Sidenote: God and the ‘Word.’]

=20.= A similar difficulty confronts us when we ask whether the deity of the Stoics is to be considered as personal. All the terms commonly used in association with a personal deity are adopted by the Stoics: their god is Lord and Father. But then they use with equal freedom terms commonly associated with materialism: for the Supreme Being is to them body or stuff, a primitive fire which converts itself by natural laws into every form of being. For this reason the Stoics are commonly called materialists, and yet the main body of their teaching is contrary to that usually associated with materialism[52]. Further, beside the personal and the material conceptions of the Deity, they adopted and developed a conception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other systems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of deity to the divine Word, which from one point of view is the deity himself, and from another is something which emanates from him and is in some way distinct. Thus the term ‘God,’ which to children and child-like religions appears so simple, is in the Stoic system extraordinarily complex; and its full content cannot be grasped without a willingness to revise the meaning of many conceptions which seem firmly established, such as those of personality, material, and quality. If we are to suppose that the Stoic conception of the Word arose ultimately from similar conceptions in Hebraism or Persism, by which the voice of a personal God attained to a quasi-independent personality, we must allow that the Stoics made use of this term with a boldness and consistency which from the time of their appearance brought it into the forefront of religious and metaphysical controversy. Through the Stoics the doctrine of the Word passed into the systems of Judaism and Christianity, to perform in each the like service by reconciling doctrines apparently contradictory. Of all the systems we may perhaps say that Stoicism makes the fewest new assertions or negations, but introduces the most numerous interpretations.

[Sidenote: Influence of Stoicism.]

=21.= We have comparatively little means of judging of the influence of Stoicism in the world of Asia Minor, but incidentally we may infer that it was very considerable. In Athens the moral earnestness of its teachers found little response in public feeling, whilst it laid the exponents of its tenets open to many a sharp thrust from keen critics whose constructive powers were after all inferior. In Rome itself Stoicism took root rapidly. The brilliant circle that gathered round Scipio Africanus the younger was imbued with its ideals; Cato, the leading republican of the first century B.C., was a living representative of its principles; and Cicero and Brutus, with many others less known to fame, were greatly influenced by it. In the first century of the principate Stoicism imparted a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which otherwise would evoke little sympathy[53]; in the second century A.D. its influence was thrown on the side of the government; the civilized world was ruled under its flag, and its principles were embodied in successive codes of law which are not yet extinct. Its direct supremacy was not long-lived; for at the very time when a Stoic philosopher sits in the seat of the Caesars its followers seem to be losing their hold on its most important doctrines. It came into sharp conflict with Christianity on matters of outward observance; but in the cores of the two systems there was much likeness[54], and from Stoic homes were drawn the most intelligent advocates of the newer faith.

[Sidenote: Judaism.]

=22.= By Judaism we mean here the way of thinking which was prevalent in the Jewish world from the date of the return from Babylon to that of the destruction of Jerusalem. Judaism was of course by no means restricted to the soil of Palestine; it was carried by the diffusion of the Jewish race to all the coasts of the Mediterranean; besides its national centre at Jerusalem, it included a great centre of learning at Alexandria, and its branches, as we have seen[55], extended to the south of Egypt. The chief external impulse which affected it was the spread of Persism. The two systems agreed in their belief in a God of heaven, and in their dislike to idol-worship; and it can be no matter of wonder if one party at least among the Jews readily accepted the more strictly Persian doctrines of the ministry of angels, the struggle between good and evil, the immortality of the soul, and the reward after death, as well as such observances as the washing of hands[56]. Strong Persian influence has been traced in the book of Daniel[57], and as Jewish speculation developed at Alexandria, it took up the use of the Greek language, and so came into touch with the influences that were moulding thought throughout Asia Minor[58]. The most interesting and elevated production of Alexandrine Judaism is the book known as the Wisdom of Solomon, probably composed in the first century B.C.[59]

[Sidenote: ‘The Wisdom of Solomon.’]

=23.= The author of this book, whilst himself a firm adherent of monotheism, shews a not altogether intolerant appreciation of those systems in which either the heavenly bodies or the elements seem to occupy the most important place:—

1.

For verily all men by nature were but vain who had no perception of God, And from the good things that are seen they gained not power to know him that is, Neither by giving heed to the works did they recognise the artificer;

2.

But either fire, or wind, or swift air, Or circling stars, or raging water, or the luminaries of heaven, They thought to be gods that rule the world.

3.

And if it was through delight in their beauty that they took them to be the gods, Let them know how much better than these is their sovereign Lord: For the first author of beauty created them:

4.

But if it was through astonishment at their power and influence, Let them understand from them how much more powerful is he that formed them:

5.

For from the greatness of the beauty even of created things In like proportion does man form the image of their first maker.

6.

But yet for these men there is but small blame, For they too peradventure do but go astray While they are seeking God and desiring to find him.

Wisdom of Solomon, xiii 1-6.

The same author rises to still greater heights when he personifies Wisdom or Philosophy as a Spirit attendant upon, and almost identified with the deity. Here his language resembles that of the Avestic hymns, describing the angels attendant upon Ahura Mazdā[60]:—

22.

For there is in Wisdom a spirit quick of understanding, holy, Alone in kind, manifold, Subtil, freely moving, Clear in utterance, unpolluted, Distinct, unharmed, Loving what is good, keen, unhindered,

23.

Beneficent, loving toward man, Stedfast, sure, free from care. All-powerful, all-surveying, And penetrating through all spirits That are quick of understanding, pure, most subtil:

24.

For wisdom is more mobile than any motion: Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness.

25.

For she is a breath of the power of God, And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty: Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her.

26.

For she is an effulgence from everlasting light, And an unspotted mirror of the working of God, And an image of his goodness.

27.

And she, being one, hath power to do all things: And remaining in herself, reneweth all things, And from generation to generation passing into holy souls She maketh men friends of God, and prophets;

29.

For she is fairer than the sun, And above all the constellations of the stars.

Wisdom of Solomon, vii 22-29.

[Sidenote: Philo the Jew.]

=24.= The fusion of Greek and Judaic modes of thought is most complete in the works of Philo the Jew (c. 20 B.C.-54 A.D.). This writer in commenting upon the books of the Old Testament, finds himself able by way of interpretation to introduce large parts of Greek philosophies. The place of Wisdom in the writer last named is taken in his works by the Logos or ‘Word[61]’; and the ‘Word’ is many times described as an emanation of the deity, after the Persian fashion[62]. Without anticipating the further discussion of this philosophical conception, we may well notice here how characteristic it is of an age which paid boundless homage to reason, and how it supplies a counterpoise to conceptions of the deity which are rigidly personal. But Philo is of still more direct service to the study of Stoicism, because he had so completely absorbed the system that, where other authorities fail us, we may often trust to his expositions for a knowledge of details of the Stoic system.

Another work of about the same period is the Fourth book of the Maccabees, in which Stoic ethics, only slightly disguised, are illustrated from Jewish history. In this fusion of Hebraic and Hellenistic thought, unfortunately interrupted by political convulsions, eminent modern Jews have recognised the natural development of the teaching of the Hebrew prophets[63].

[Sidenote: Christianity.]

=25.= The foregoing discussions will already have suggested that Christianity is bound by intimate ties to the other world-religions; though it is beyond our present purpose to examine the precise nature of those ties. It is pre-eminently concerned with the breaking down of Jewish nationalism, and its constant appeal to ‘the truth’ is essentially the same as the appeal of kindred systems to ‘wisdom’ or ‘philosophy.’ The Lord’s Prayer, addressed to the ‘Father in heaven,’ and with its further references to ‘The Name,’ ‘The Kingdom,’ ‘The Will,’ ‘temptation,’ and ‘the Evil One,’ reflects the principal conceptions of Persism, of which we are again reminded in the Apocalypse by the reference to the ‘seven spirits of God[64].’ The Sermon on the Mount has been, not without reason, compared to the Buddhist sermon of Benares. With Stoicism Christianity has special ties, both direct and indirect. Its chief apostle was Paul of Tarsus, who was brought up in a city from which more than one eminent Stoic teacher had proceeded[65], and whose ways of thinking are penetrated by Stoic conceptions. The most profound exponent of its theology (the author of the Gospel according to John) placed in the forefront of his system the doctrine of the ‘Word’ which directly or (more probably) indirectly he derived from Stoic sources. The early church writers felt the kinship of thought without perceiving the historical relation. To them Cicero in his Stoic works was ‘anima naturaliter Christiana’; and they could only explain the lofty teachings of Seneca by the belief that he was a secret convert of the apostle Paul[66]. Parallelism between Stoic and Christian phraseology is indeed so frequently traced that it may be well to emphasize the need of caution. It is not by single phrases, often reflecting only the general temper of the times, that we can judge the relation of the two systems; it is necessary also to take into account the general framework and the fundamental principles of each.

[Sidenote: Druidism.]

=26.= Of the systems named by Aristotle far the least known to us is Druidism. It appeared to Caesar and other Romans to be the national religion of the Gauls and Britons, exactly as Magism appeared to the Greeks to be the national religion of the Persians. But other evidence indicates that Druidism was a reformed religion or philosophy, not unlike Persism in its principles. The training of Druidical students was long and arduous; it claimed to introduce them to a knowledge of heavenly deities denied to the rest of the world, and to reveal to them the immortality of the soul. Our best authority is the Latin poet Lucan:—

‘To you alone it has been granted to know the gods and the powers of heaven; or (it may be) to you alone to know them wrongly. You dwell in deep forests and far-away groves: according to your teaching the shades do not make their way to the still regions of Erebus or the grey realm of Dis below; the same spirit guides a new body in another world; if you know well what you say, then death is but an interlude in life. If not, at least the peoples, on whom the northern star gazes directly, are happy in their illusion; for the greatest of terrors, the fear of death, is nothing to them. Hence it comes that their warriors’ hearts are ready to meet the sword, and their souls have a welcome for death, and they scorn to be thrifty with life, in which they can claim a second share[67].’

Druidism, like Stoicism, seems to have prepared its adherents for a specially ready acceptance of Christianity.

[Sidenote: The goal not reached yet.]

=27.= The story of the world-religions, with their countless prophets, teachers, confessors and martyrs, has its tragic side. We ask what was attained by so much study and self-denial, such courageous defiance of custom and prejudice, such bold strivings after the unattainable, so many hardly spent lives and premature deaths, and feel puzzled to find a reply. To the problems proposed the world-religions gave in turn every possible answer. Some found life sweet, others bitter; some bowed before the inexorable rule of destiny, others believed in a personal and benevolent government of the universe; some looked forward to a life after death, others hoped for annihilation. Their theories crystallized into dogmas, and as such became the banners under which national hatreds once more sought outlet in bloodshed. Their adherents sacrificed everything in the hope of reaching certain and scientific truth, and, at the end of all, religion still appears the whole world over to be in conflict with science, and the thousand years during which Wisdom was counted more precious than riches are often looked back upon as a time of human aberration and childishness. It is not to be denied that thousands of noble spirits set out during this period for a goal that they never reached; and those who are inclined to destructive criticism may plausibly characterise their enterprise as vanity.

[Sidenote: The path still onward.]

=28.= It is the task of literary research to pierce through this limited view, and to trace the real effect of philosophical effort on the life of individuals and nations. All over the civilized world it raised a race of heroes, struggling not for power or splendour as in the epoch of barbarism, but for the good of their fellow-men. It gave a new value to life, and trampled under foot the fear of death. It united the nations, and spread the reign of law and justice. Where its influence has weakened, the world has not changed for the better; so that the very failures of the world-religions most attest their value. India has relapsed from Buddhism, its own noblest work, to its earlier creeds, and they still bar its path against social progress. Europe, no longer united by the sentiment of a catholic religion, and increasingly indifferent to literary sympathies, is falling back into the slough of frontier impediments and racial hatreds. From all this there is no way out except in the old-fashioned quest of truth and good will.

[Sidenote: Estimates of Stoicism.]

=29.= Both in ancient and in modern times the importance of Stoicism has been very variously estimated, according as the critic has set up a purely literary standard, or has taken into account historical influence. To those who look upon philosophy as it is embodied in books, and forms a subject for mental contemplation and aesthetic enjoyment, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have always seemed of far higher rank. As contributions to the progress of humanity, in politics and law, in social order and in the inventive adaptation of material surroundings, they can hardly claim to approach any one of the systems discussed in this chapter. But it is with no wish to depreciate the great masterpieces of Hellenic culture that we now set against the criticisms of some of its ardent advocates the maturer judgment of writers who have approached with greater sympathy the study of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. ‘In Plato and Aristotle,’ says Zeller, ‘Greek philosophy reached its greatest perfection[68].’ ‘Its bloom was short-lived[69].’ ‘Greece was brought into contact with the Eastern nations, whereby it became subject to a back-current of Oriental thought[70].’ ‘With the decline of political independence the mental powers of the nation were broken past remedy[71].’ ‘What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy would become practical, if indeed it were studied at all[72]?’ To minds of another temper it does not seem so fatal that ‘philosophy should become practical.’ ‘It should be insisted,’ says Prof. Mahaffy, ‘that the greatest practical inheritance the Greeks left in philosophy was not the splendour of Plato, or the vast erudition of Aristotle, but the practical systems of Zeno and Epicurus, and the scepticism of Pyrrho. In our own day every man is either a Stoic, an Epicurean, or a Sceptic[73].’ The greatness of Stoicism in particular was eloquently recognised by a French writer of the eighteenth century: ‘elle seule savait faire les citoyens, elle seule faisait les grands hommes, elle seule faisait les grands empereurs[74]!’ With these tributes may be compared that paid by a writer who approaches the subject from the standpoint of modern philosophy and theology. ‘[Stoicism] has perennial fascination; and there are not wanting signs that it appeals with special attractiveness to cultured minds at the present day. It has both speculative and practical value; its analysis of human nature and its theory of knowledge, no less than its ethical teaching, giving insight into the problems of the universe and the right mode of guiding life. As an important stage in the march of philosophical thought, and as a luminous chapter in the history of natural theology, it solicits our attention and will repay our study[75].’

[Sidenote: Interpretative Stoicism.]

=30.= Judgments so contradictory reveal the fact that ancient divergencies of philosophic sympathies have their counterparts to-day; and perhaps in studying and judging the systems of antiquity a little more is needed of the sympathy and interpretative elasticity which every man unconsciously uses in maintaining the political, philosophic and religious views to which he is attracted by inheritance or personal conviction. Thus to understand Stoicism fully a man must himself become for the time being a Stoic. As such he will no longer bind himself by the letter of the school authorities. In many a phrase they use he will recognise an obsolete habit of thought, an exaggerated opposition, a weak compliance in the face of dominant opinions, or a mistaken reliance upon what once seemed logical conclusions. At other points he will see difficulties felt to which an answer can now easily be supplied. At each step he will ask, not so much what the Stoics thought, but what a Stoic must necessarily think. Whilst constantly referring to the original authorities, he will allow much to be forgotten, and in other cases he will draw out more meaning than the writers themselves set in their words. If he can walk, boldly but not without caution, on this path, he will assuredly find that Stoicism throws light on all the great questions to which men still seek answers, and that to some at least it still holds out a beckoning hand.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See below, § 441.

[2] Diog. L. Prooem. 1.

[3] Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, ii p. 161; and below, § 94.

[4] ‘principes Chaldaei, qui in patentibus campis colebant, stellarum motus et vias et coetus intuentes, quid ex his efficeretur observaverunt’ Gellius, N. A. xiv 1, 8.

[5] Sir E. Walter Maunder, in the Nineteenth Century for September 1900.

[6] ‘quinque stellarum potestates Chaldaeorum observatio excepit’ Seneca, N. Q. ii 32, 6.

[7] This is well described by Cicero, translating from a Stoic source: ‘cum fato omnia fiant, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui colligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat quae futura sint’ Div. i 56, 127. It seems reasonable to suppose that this general conception of ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’ is deduced from the unchanging movements of the heavenly bodies.

[8] ‘videbis quinque sidera diversas agentia vias; ex horum levissimis motibus fortunae populorum dependent’ Sen. Dial. vi 18, 3.

[9] ‘aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiundisque pueris, quicunque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse’ Cic. Div. ii 46, 97. I assume that the original tradition named the smaller number suggested above.

[10] ‘duo apud Chaldaeos studuisse se dicunt, Epigenes et Apollonius Myndius’ Sen. N. Q. vii 4, 1; ‘Diogenes Stoicus [Chaldaeis] concedit, aliquid ut praedicere possint’ Cic. Div. ii 43, 90. Seneca concludes against their authority, observing (i) that a proper horoscope should include all the stars in the heaven at the moment of birth, and (ii) that twins should always have the same fortune, which is obviously untrue; see N. Q. ii 32, 6 to 8, Ben. vii 1, 5.

[11] ‘tu ne quaesieris (scire nefas), quem mihi, quem tibi | finem di dederint, Leuconoe, nec Babylonios | temptaris numeros’ Hor. C. i 11, 1-3.

[12] See the interesting tale of Thrasyllus and Tiberius in Tac. Ann. vi 21, to which the author affects to give some credit.

[13] e.g., ‘seu Libra seu me Scorpios adspicit | formidulosus, pars violentior | natalis horae, seu tyrannus | Hesperiae Capricornus undae, | utrumque nostrum incredibili modo | consentit astrum’ Hor. C. ii 17, 17-22.

[14] ‘Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque [artem magicam] intellegi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit: sic et Aristoteles’ Pliny, N. H. xxx 2, 1; cf. Diog. L. Prooem. 2 and 8.

[15] Williams-Jackson, Zoroaster, p. 161.

[16] ib. p. 174.

[17] K. Geldner, Encycl. Brit. ed. x, article ‘Zoroaster.’

[18] Williams-Jackson, p. 7.

[19] ‘Magiam ... cuius scientiae saeculis priscis multa ex Chaldaeorum arcanis Bactrianus addidit Zoroastres’ Amm. Marc. xxiii 6, 32.

[20] [Zoroastres] ‘primus dicitur mundi principia siderumque motus diligentissime spectasse’ Justinus, Hist. Phil. i 1, 9 (Williams-Jackson, p. 237): ‘astris multum et frequenter intentus’ Clem. Rom. Recogn. iv 27.

[21] ‘tradunt Zoroastrem in desertis caseo vixisse’ Pliny, N. H. xi 97.

[22] ‘[Ahura Mazdā] created the paths of the sun and the stars; he made the moon to wax and wane’ (Yasna 43, 3); ‘he made the light and the darkness’ (ib. 5); ‘he is the father of the good’ (ib. 46, 2).

[23] ‘Ζωροάστρης ὁ μάγος ... προσαπεφαίνετο, τὸν μὲν ἑοικέναι φωτὶ μάλιστα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὸν δ’ ἔμπαλιν σκότῳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ’ Plut. Isid. et Osir. 46.

[24] ‘Thus saith Cyrus, king of Persia:—all the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord, the God of heaven, given me; and he hath charged me to build him an house in Jerusalem’ Ezra i 2.

[25] See the interesting papyri records recently discovered in Elephantine, and published by Dr Sachau of Berlin. A general account of them is given by Prof. Driver in the London Guardian for Nov. 6, 1907.

[26] Cicero rightly appreciated the religious character of the Persian invasions: ‘delubra humanis consecrata simulacris Persae nefaria putaverunt; eamque unam ob causam Xerxes inflammari Atheniensium fana iussisse dicitur, quod deos, quorum domus esset omnis hic mundus, inclusos parietibus contineri nefas esse duceret’ Rep. iii 9, 14. So Themistocles as represented by Herodotus: ‘the gods and heroes grudged that one man should become king both of Asia and of Europe, and he a man unholy and presumptuous, one who made no difference between things sacred and things profane, burning and casting down the images of the gods’ History viii 109 (Macaulay’s translation).

[27] See below, § 41.

[28] ‘Images and temples and altars they do not account it lawful to erect, nay, they even charge with folly those who do these things; and this, as it seems to me, because they do not account the gods to be in the likeness of men, as do the Hellenes. But it is their wont to perform sacrifices to Zeus, going up to the most lofty of the mountains, and the whole circle of the heavens they call Zeus: and they sacrifice to the Sun and the Moon and the Earth, to Fire and to Water and to the Winds; these are the only gods to whom they have sacrificed ever from the first’ History i 131 (Macaulay’s translation).

[29] Cic. Sen. 22, 79 to 81, after Xen. Cyr. viii 7.

[30] In the hymns of Zarathustra we can only trace the beginnings of this system, as in the following: ‘All-wise Lord, all-powerful one, and thou Piety, and Righteousness, Good Mind and the Kingdom, listen ye to me and prosper my every beginning’ Yasna 33, 11.

[31] Yasht xix 15, 16. The translation follows Geldner, Drei Yasht aus dem Zendavesta, p. 15.

[32] Ancient Greek hymn, φῶς ἱλαρὸν ἁγίας δόξης, translated by J. Keble.

[33] J. H. Newman.

[34] ‘Zoroaster taught the Persians neither to burn their dead, nor otherwise to defile fire.’ Xanthos (B.C. 465-425), as quoted by Nicolaus of Damascus (1st century B.C.).

[35] See § 10, note 28; Strabo xv 3, 16.

[36] ‘Zarathustra said:—the earthly demon is water derived from earth; the heavenly demon is fire mixed with air’ Origen, contra haereses, i col. 3025.

[37] ‘The Persians first worshipped fire as a god in heaven’ Clemens Romanus, Hom. ix 4 f.

[38] ‘Zoroaster the Magian says:—God is the primal, the incorruptible, the eternal, the unbegotten, the indivisible, the incomparable, the charioteer of all good, he that cannot be bribed, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of good laws and justice, the self-taught, the natural, perfect, and wise, the only discoverer of the sacred and natural’ Euseb. Praep. ev. i 10.

[39] ‘From the writings of Zoroaster it is inferred that he divided philosophy into three parts, physics, economics, and politics’ Schol. on First Alcibiades, p. 122 A (Williams-Jackson, p. 231).

[40] ‘They educate their children, beginning at five years old and going on till twenty, in three things only; in riding, in shooting, and in speaking the truth’ Herod. i 136.

[41] See above, § 3.

[42] Alexander had reached the river Hyphasis, the modern Bias.

[43] Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, ch. lxiv (translation by Aubrey Stewart and George Long, London, 1892).

[44] Mahāvagga i 6, 19 to 22, after H. Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 139, and the translation in S. B. E. xiii pp. 95, 96.

[45] Dhammapada i 5 and xvii 123 (S. B. E. x pp. 5, 58).

[46] Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 164. These alternative interpretations of the doctrine of Nirvana must not be accepted as uncontroversial.

[47] Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 163; V. A. Smith, Açoka, p. 174.

[48] See Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 155-162, and below, § 52.

[49] Epict. Disc. iii 24, 64 to 66 (Long’s translation).

[50] ib. iii 22, 45 to 50.

[51] ‘The system that stood to Pagan Rome more nearly than anything else in the place of a religion’ Crossley, M. Aurelius, iv Pref. p. xii. ‘Its history resembles that of a religion rather than a speculative system’ Rendall, M. Aurelius, Pref. p. xv.

[52] See below, § 173.

[53] ‘Patricians, as we call them, only too often fail in natural affection’ M. Aurel. To himself, i 12 (Rendall’s translation). See also below, §§ 442, 443.

[54] ‘Dying, [Stoicism] bequeathed no small part of its disciplines, its dogmas, and its phraseology to the Christianity by which it was ingathered’ Rendall, M. Aurelius, Pref. p. xv. ‘The basis of Christian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical’ Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, p. 170. ‘[The post-Aristotelian period] supplied the scientific mould into which Christianity in the early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us’ O. J. Reichel in his Preface to the translation of Zeller’s Stoics, etc.

[55] See above, § 9.

[56] It is not admitted by the best authorities that the term ‘Pharisee’ is in any way connected with the name of ‘Persian’ or its modern equivalent ‘Parsee.’ But the resemblance in beliefs and habits is very striking, especially if we contrast the Pharisees with their Sadducee opponents. ‘The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both’ Acts xxiii 8.

[57] D. A. Bertholet, ‘The value of the history of religions,’ Homiletic Review, Nov. 1908.

[58] See Fairweather, Background of the Gospels, ch. vii (on ‘the apocalyptic movement and literature’).

[59] ib. p. 337.

[60] See above, § 12.

[61] Heinze, Lehre vom Logos, pp. 251, 252.

[62] ‘The Logos is related to God as Wisdom, and is the full expression of the Divine mind. He is the sheckinah or glory of God, the first-born Son of God, the second God’ Fairweather, Background of the Gospels, p. 358.

[63] Friedländer, Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judaïsmus, 1905.

[64] ‘There were seven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which are the seven Spirits of God’ Revelation iv 5.

[65] Of these Antipater of Tarsus is the best known, for whom see § 110; others are Heraclides, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Nestor, Athenodorus, etc., for whom see Index of Proper Names.

[66] Winckler, Der Stoicismus, p. 2; Lightfoot, Philippians, pp. 270, 271.

[67] Lucan, Phars. i 452-462.

[68] Stoics, etc., p. 1.

[69] ib. p. 10.

[70] ib. pp. 13, 14.

[71] ib. p. 15.

[72] ib. p. 16.

[73] Greek Life and Thought, Introd., pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.

[74] Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, ii 24.

[75] W. L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. v.

Spotted a typo or a problem in this chapter? Tell us

II. HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES

[Sidenote: Greek thought.]

=31.= We have seen already that the great problems of which Stoicism propounds one solution were agitated during the millennium which preceded the Christian era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the one hand, and in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other. To the beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date; but the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved from East to West. But just at the same time the influence of Greek art and literature spreads from West to East; and it is to the crossing and interweaving of these two movements that we owe almost all the light thrown on this part of the history of human thought. The early history of Stoicism has reached us entirely through the Greek language, and is bound up with the history of Greek literature and philosophy[1]. But long before Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in kind had reached Greece; and the whole of early Greek literature, and especially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discussion of the physical and ethical problems to which Stoicism addressed itself. From the storehouse of this earlier literature the Stoics drew many of their arguments and illustrations; the speculations of Heraclitus and the life of Socrates were especially rich in suggestions to them. The study of Greek literature and philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for a full appreciation of Stoicism; and the way has been made easier of late by excellent treatises, happily available in the English language, dealing with the general development of philosophic and religious thought in Greece[2]. Here it is only possible to refer quite shortly to those writers and teachers to whom Stoicism is most directly indebted.

[Sidenote: Homer.]

=32.= Although the HOMERIC POEMS include representations of gods and men corresponding to the epoch of national gods and to other still earlier stages of human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least the dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the gods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background; and though heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move in an atmosphere of greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of them are restrained both in word and in act by a strong feeling of self-respect, the αἰδώς or shamefastness which entirely differentiates them from the heroes of folk-lore; in particular, the typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness, and sexual unrestraint are amongst the things of which it is a shame to speak without reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape; yet they are somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly brilliance in which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems to encircle also the heights where the gods dwell on mount Olympus[3]. Gradually too there comes to light amidst the picture of the many gods something resembling a supreme power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (αἶσα, μοῖρα), sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly of all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods[4]. Thus Zeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men[5]; he is the dispenser of happiness to men, ‘to the good and the evil, to each one as he will[6],’ and the distributor of gracious gifts[7], unbounded in power[8] and in knowledge[9]. The gods again, in spite of the many tales of violence attached to their names, exercise a moral governance over the world. ‘They love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice and the righteous acts of men[10]’; ‘in the likeness of strangers from far countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men[11].’

Whilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly object to Homer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor worthy of their nature, there was on the other hand much in the Iliad and Odyssey, and particularly in the latter, which was in harmony with philosophical conceptions. It was not without reason that the Stoics themselves made of Ulysses, who in Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example of the man of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who through self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his way to the goal[12]. From this starting-point the whole of the Odyssey is converted into a ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’; the enchantress Circe represents the temptations of gluttony, which turns men into swine[13]; the chant of the Sirens is an allegory of the enticements of sensual pleasure.

[Sidenote: Hesiod.]

=33.= In HESIOD (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt to construct a history of the universe; his Theogony is the forerunner of the Cosmology which later on is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the company of the personal gods we find not only the personified lights of heaven, Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and Ocean, Night and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and Death, all bearing witness to the emergence of the spirit of speculation. In Hesiod again we first find the description of the ‘watchmen of Jove,’ who are no longer the gods themselves as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings, corresponding to the Persian angels and the δαίμονες of later Greek.

‘Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen over mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness, walking all ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist[14].’

But it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly a forerunner of the Stoic school: for neither the warlike valour nor the graceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the stern sense of justice and the downright hard work of the plain man.

‘Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the sweat of the brow; long and steep is the path that reaches to her, and rough at the beginning; but when you reach the highest point, hard though it is, in the end it becomes easy[15].’

[Sidenote: The Orphic poems.]

=34.= Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of the ‘Orphic’ movement, belonging to the sixth century B.C., and exercising a wide influence over various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries. For an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere[16]; here we can only notice that it continued the cosmological speculations of Hesiod’s Theogony, and in particular developed a strain of pantheism which is echoed in the Stoic poets. According to an Orphic poet

‘Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the male and the female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day; he is the one force, the one great deity, the creator, the alluring power of love; for all these things are immanent in the person of Zeus[17].’

Here amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see the budding principle of philosophic monism, the reaching after a unity which will comprehend all things. To the same school is attributed the doctrine that ‘the human soul is originally and essentially divine[18].’

[Sidenote: The Hylozoists.]

=35.= To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek philosophers who are known to us by name. In all of these the early polytheism is either abandoned or becomes so dim in its outlines that the origin and governing force of the universe is sought in quite other directions. The philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem of the elements. THALES of Miletus was a man of many attainments; he had travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an active political reformer. To him water was the primary substance, from which all others proceeded and to which they returned[19]. ANAXIMANDER of the same town was the first who undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known world. To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the same as any visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of undefined character (ἄπειρον), capable of assuming in turn all shapes[20]. ANAXIMENES (once more of Miletus) assumed air as the first principle, and derived the other elements from it by processes of condensation (πύκνωσις) and rarefaction[21]. But on one point all the Ionian philosophers were agreed: the primary substance was the cause of its own motion; they were ‘hylozoists,’ since they hold that matter (ὕλη) is a living thing (ζῷον). They are from the standpoint of physics ‘monists,’ as opposed to those who hold matter and life, or matter and force, to be two things eternally distinct, and are therefore ‘dualists’ in their theory[22].

[Sidenote: Pythagoras.]

=36.= To the same sixth century belong two other notable philosophers. PYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had travelled widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of a tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half religious and half political, which in its original form was not long-lived. But a widespread tradition remained as to his doctrines, in which the theory of Numbers held a leading position. Pythagoras appears to have been a good mathematician and astronomer, and followers of his school were at an early date led to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis and the central position of the sun in the planetary system[23]. His name is also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, which we may suppose him to have derived ultimately from some Indian source; and to the same country we must look as having suggested to him and his followers the practice of abstaining from animal food[24].

[Sidenote: Xenophanes.]

=37.= If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, it might seem as if the old mythologies and theogonies were already dead. But in fact the battle was yet to come. XENOPHANES of Colophon (born circ. 580 B.C.) witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering progress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the power of the invader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, and finally settled in Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic school. But in his religious convictions he was whole-heartedly on the Persian side. ‘There is one God, greatest amongst gods[25] and men, not like mortal men in bodily shape or in mind[26].’ Thus the worship of many gods and that of images of the deity are alike condemned; and it is probable that in this false worship he found the cause of his country’s fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic of the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as teachers of immorality, since they ‘ascribed to the gods theft, adultery, and deceit, and all acts that are counted shame and blame amongst men[27].’ With keen criticism he pointed out that myths as to the birth of the gods dishonoured them just as much as if they related their deaths; for on either supposition there is a time when the gods do not exist[28]. The conception of the deity formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism or Nature-worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity; but the fragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this point clear[29]. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his religious zeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic principle of an ultimate Unity in all things.

[Sidenote: Heraclitus.]

=38.= With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach HERACLITUS of Ephesus, a philosopher of the highest importance to us, since the Stoics afterwards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own system of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century were all examined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him; his own solutions of the problems of the world are set forth in a prophetic strain, impressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, and lending itself to much variety of interpretation. For the opinions of the crowd, who are misled by their senses, he had no respect[30]; but even learning does not ensure intelligence[31], unless men are willing to be guided by the ‘Word,’ the universal reason[32]. The senses shew us in the universe a perpetual flowing: fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to earth (in rainfall), which is the downward path; earth changes to water (rising mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path[33]. Behind these changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging[34]. Anaximander did well when he pointed to the unlimited as the primary stuff, but it is better to describe it as an ‘ever-living fire[35].’ Out of this fire all things come, and into it they shall all be resolved[36]. Of this ever-living fire a spark is buried in each man’s body; whilst the body lives, this spark, the soul, may be said to be dead[37]; but when the body dies it escapes from its prison, and enters again on its proper life. The ‘Word’ is from everlasting[38]; through the Word all things happen[39]; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in the physical world and in the soul of man. For man’s soul there is a moral law, which can be reached only by studying the plan of the world in which we live[40]. But of this law men are continually forgetful; they live as in a dream, unconscious of it; it calls to them once and again, but they do not hear it[41]. Most of all it is needed in the government of the state; for ‘he who speaks with understanding must take his foothold on what is common to all; for all human laws are nourished by the one divine law[42].’

[Sidenote: The Word.]

=39.= The general import of the physical teaching of Heraclitus, and the indebtedness of the Stoics to it, have long been recognised: the bearing of this teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable matter. Does Heraclitus by the ‘Logos’ which he so often names mean merely his own reasoning and message? is he speaking of the common reason of mankind? or does the term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction, a divine power through which the world is created and governed? For the fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before Heraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. The latest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up in three propositions: first, the ‘Logos’ is eternal, being both pre-existent and everlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes; secondly, all things both in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the ‘Logos’; it is a cosmic principle, ‘common’ or ‘universal’; and in the third place, it is the duty of man to obey this ‘Logos,’ and so to place himself in harmony with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with many recent writers, he adopts the translation ‘the Word’ as on the whole the most adequate[43]. Even the Romans found it impossible to translate λόγος by any single word, and they therefore adopted the phrase ratio et oratio (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to include also the broad notion of ‘Universal Law’ or the ‘Laws of Nature.’ If we can rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in the interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a great creative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by bold generalizations such diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics; ‘he was the first [in Greece, we must understand] to build bridges, which have never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual life[44].’ It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching so suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and intellectual force.

[Sidenote: Zarathustra and Heraclitus.]

=40.= The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus has very naturally suggested that his doctrine is borrowed from that of Zarathustra[45]. The historical circumstances are not unfavourable to this suggestion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and definitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very time at which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion was akin to a religious crusade, and had for a principal aim the stamping out of the idle and superstitious habit of worshipping images, by which (according to the Persians) the true God was dishonoured. The elevated character of the Persian religion could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already dissatisfied with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the resemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of Heraclitus is not restricted to the language used of the divine fire; the doctrines of an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the λόγος or Word, and of the distinction between the immortal soul and the corruptible body, are common to both. But the differences between the two systems are almost equally striking. Heraclitus is a monist; according to him all existences are ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, everywhere opposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful; his system is dualist[45a]. Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, Heraclitus is cosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find no trace of the belief in Judgment after death, in Heaven, or in Hell. We may in fact well believe that Heraclitus was acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it, but we have not the means to determine what the extent of that influence was. It is related of him that he received (but declined) an invitation to the court of Darius; and that his dead body was given up to be torn to pieces by dogs in the Persian fashion[45b].

[Sidenote: The tragedians.]

=41.= The development of philosophic thought at Athens was, as we have noticed, much complicated by the political relations of Greece to Persia. Although the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was decisively repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the centre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories of Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian statesmen and warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not only maintained their political independence, but saved the images of their gods from imminent destruction. A revival of polytheistic zeal took place, as might have been expected. The wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly expended in the achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor’s art, and their housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines strikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The same Aeschylus who (in his Persae) celebrates the defeat of the national enemy, a few years later (in his Agamemnon) questions whether the Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus, and the Greek method of worshipping him[46]. His more conservative successor Sophocles was contented, in the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate from the old myths all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature. Euripides adopts a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact fidelity, he ‘assails the resulting picture of the gods with scathing censure and flat contradiction[47].’ With equal vigour he attacks the privileges of noble birth, and defends the rights of the slave; he has a keen sympathy for all the misfortunes that dog man’s life; but his ethical teaching in no way derives its sanction from any theology. The Hellenes have lost confidence in their inherited outlook on the world.

[Sidenote: The Sophists.]

=42.= The same problems which the poets discussed in the city theatre were during the fifth century B.C. the themes of a class of men now becoming so numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These were the ‘sophists,’ who combined the functions now performed partly by the university professor, partly by the public journalist[48]. Dependent for their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as they could attract, and therefore sensitive enough to the applause of the moment, they were distinguished from the philosophers by a closer touch with the public opinion of the day, and a keener desire for immediate results. Their contribution to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating with particular care the art of words, they created a medium by which philosophic thought could reach the crowd of men of average education; eager advocates of virtue and political progress, they gave new hopes to a people which, in spite of its material successes, was beginning to despair because of the decay of its old moral and civic principles. In PRODICUS of Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of the period of the principate[49]:

‘A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they heard his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the frail body that contained it. Now he would describe the hardships of human existence; now he would recount all the ages of man, beginning with the new-born child, who greets his new home with wailing, and tracing his course to the second childhood and the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at death as a stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free movement of his limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus, he sought to arm his disciples against the horrors of death by explaining that death concerned neither the living nor the dead. As long as we live, death does not exist; as soon as we die, we ourselves exist no longer[50].’

To Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the parting of the ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure on the other, each invite him to join company with her[51]. This tale we shall find to be a favourite with the Roman philosophers. The same Prodicus introduced a doctrine afterwards taken up by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession, that of the ‘indifference’ of external advantages as distinct from the use to which they are applied. He also propounded theories as to the origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as personifications of the powers of nature, others as deified benefactors of the human race[52]; theories which later on were adopted with zeal by the Stoic Persaeus[53]. To another sophist, HIPPIAS of Elis, we owe the doctrine of the ‘self-sufficiency’ of virtue, again adopted both by Cynics and Stoics[54]. ANTIPHON was not only the writer of an ‘Art of Consolation,’ but also of a treatise of extraordinary eloquence on political concord and the importance of education. ‘If a noble disposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower that will endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be withered by drought[55].’

[Sidenote: The Materialists.]

=43.= Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted ANAXAGORAS, born at Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a diligent student of the Ionic philosophers. But in his explanation of nature he broke away from ‘hylozoism’ and introduced a dualism of mind and matter. ‘From eternity all things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them[56].’ More famous was his contemporary EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum, whose name is still held in honour by the citizens of that town. In him we first find the list of elements reaching to four, earth, air, fire, and water; and the doctrine that visible objects consist of combinations of the elements in varying proportions, first brought together by Love, then separated by Hatred. Just in so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single origin for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of the more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was carried further by LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS, both of Abdera, who for the four elements substituted invisible atoms, of countless variety, moving by reason of their own weight in an empty space. This simple and powerful analysis is capable of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena, and with comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in chemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the neighbouring sciences of physics and botany. When however (as has frequently been the case both in ancient and modern times) the attempt is made to build upon it a general philosophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion of matter in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena of mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly correspond to the attitude of mind now called materialism, because in them the atoms, endowed with the material properties of solidity, shape, and weight alone, are conceived to be the only true existences, all others being secondary and derivative. This materialism (with some significant qualifications) was a century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and is of importance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic system of physics.

[Sidenote: Socrates.]

=44.= The value of these scientific speculations was not for the time being fully recognised at Athens. It was in the atmosphere of sophistic discussion, not free from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise of civic and even of martial virtue that SOCRATES of Athens (circ. 469-399 B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example of the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave almost to rashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. As a magistrate he discharged his duty unflinchingly. After the battle of Arginusae the ten Athenian generals were said to have neglected the duty of succouring certain disabled ships and the people loudly demanded that all should be condemned to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding senators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal procedure[56a]. Again, when Athens was under the rule of the Thirty, Socrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders[57]. But when himself condemned to death, he refused to seize an opportunity for flight which was given him; for this, he said, would be to disobey the laws of his country[58].

His private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens was now wealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered together for festive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed the greatest moderation in eating and drinking: such a course, he said, was the better for health and also produced more real pleasure. Over the grosser temptations of the senses he had won a complete victory[59]. His temper was calm and even; he was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor did he allow himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal habits, though simple, were careful: he did not approve any neglect either of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress.

Thus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self-control (ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος); and by his character, even more than by his speculation, exercised an influence which extended widely over many centuries.

[Sidenote: His teaching.]

=45.= The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the set formulae of a philosophic school. But clearly it was focussed upon the life of men in the city and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the phenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the universe. So Cicero well says of him that ‘Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men, compelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil[60]’; and Seneca that he ‘recalled the whole of philosophy to moral questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish between good and evil[61].’ He had no higher object than to send out young men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to take an active part in the affairs of the community, and to this course he urged them individually and insistently[62]. But it must not be supposed that he put on one side problems concerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the constitution and government of the universe. His views on these points carried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated by him not as personal opinions, but as points upon which he desired to share the convictions of his neighbours, if only they could assure him that reason was on their side.

[Sidenote: Reason the guide.]

=46.= Socrates more than any other man possessed the art of persuasive reasoning, thereby making his companions wiser and better men. First he asked that terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should know what the nature is of each thing that exists[63], and should examine himself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced the practice of induction (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι), by which men make larger the outlook of their minds, understand one thing by comparison with another, and arrange the matter of their thought by classes[64]. By induction we arrive at general truths: not however by any mechanical or mathematical process, but (at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that is, by a kind of divine enlightenment[65]. He who has accustomed himself to think with deliberation, to look on the little in its relation to the great, and to attune himself to the divine will, goes out into the world strengthened in self-restraint, in argumentative power, and in active goodwill to his fellow-men.

Most directly this method appeals to the future statesman. Of those who seek the society of Socrates many intend to become generals or magistrates. Let them consider well what these words mean. Is not a pilot one who knows how to steer a ship? a cook one who knows how to prepare food? must we not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide the state? And how can he know this but by study and training? Must we not then say generally that all arts depend on knowledge, and knowledge on study? Do we not reach the general truths that ‘virtue is knowledge’ and that ‘virtue can be taught’? We may hesitate as to how to apply these principles to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on this point; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never fails to warn him when his mind is turned towards a course which the gods disapprove.

[Sidenote: His dualism in physics.]

=47.= In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates could find no satisfaction. But one day he discovered with pleasure the words of Anaxagoras: ‘it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all things[66].’ Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe, in which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the beginning there existed a chaos of unordered dead meaningless matter, and also mind, the principle of life, meaning, and order. Mind touched matter, and the universe sprang into being. Mind controls matter, and thus the universe continues to exist. The proof is found in the providential adaptation of the world for the life and comfort of mankind: for it is only consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work of mind[67]. He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears to hear with, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the organs of sight and smell; he implanted in him a love of his offspring, and in the offspring a love of its parents; and lastly endowed him with a soul capable of understanding and worshipping his maker. For the divine power Socrates uses quite indifferently the words ‘god’ and ‘gods’: but his belief is essentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he has ceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon their altars in good-humoured conformity with the law, and even adopts the popular term ‘divination[68],’ though in a sense very different to that in which the official priesthood used it.

In the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar dualism. Man consists of body and soul: the soul is lord and king over the body, and indeed may rightly be called divine, if anything that has touch with humanity is such[69].

[Sidenote: His pietism.]

=48.= The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely dominated by his religious principles. The gods, he held, know all things, our words, our deeds, and the secrets of our hearts: they are everywhere present and give counsel to men concerning the whole of life[70]. The first duty of man is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by prayer, asking them to give us the good and deliver us from the evil, but not qualifying the prayer by any instruction to the gods as to what is good or evil; for this the gods themselves know best[71]. In these words then we may pray: ‘Zeus our king, give us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not; what is evil, even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us[72].’

In this spirit of what we should to-day call ‘pietism’ we must interpret his principle that ‘virtue is knowledge[73].’ This not only asserts that no one can rightly practise any art unless he has studied and understands it, but also that no one can rightly understand an art without practising it. We say that there are men who know what is good and right, but do not perform it; but this is not so; for such men in truth think that some other course is good for them. Only the wise and pious man has a right understanding; others cannot do good even if they try[74]; and when they do evil, even that they do without willing it[75].

In its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came into collision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. To say the least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of kings. He distinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, saying that the rule of one man with the assent of his subjects and in accordance with the laws was kingship, but without such assent and according to the man’s arbitrary will was tyranny. But under whatever constitutional form government was carried on, Socrates asserted that those who knew the business of government were alone the true rulers, and that the will of the crowd, if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and impious[76].

[Sidenote: Why Socrates was condemned.]

=49.= So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in Athens till his seventieth year was past, and then died by the hands of the public executioner. This fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed almost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses amazement that the jurors should have condemned a man so modest and so wise, and so practical a benefactor of the Athenian people[77]. Modern historians, with a wider knowledge of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates was allowed to live so long[78]. The accusers complained that Socrates offended by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new deities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view of conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply justified. Clearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official gods of the city, but also in the deities it worshipped most earnestly, democracy and empire. Not only did he introduce new deities, but it might fairly be argued that he was introducing the most essential parts of the religion of the national enemy, Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical doctrines upon young men of the highest families in Athens, he might well be the cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served than before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on wide observation and general truths could not be considered to make them less dangerous. Athens had already passed the time when its political power could be of service to its neighbours; it had not reached that when it could be content with intellectual influence; Socrates, just because he was in harmony with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its present.

[Sidenote: The companions of Socrates.]

=50.= It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that we trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe self-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by him no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape of irony (εἰρωνεία), that is, the continual withholding of his personal convictions, and obstetrics (μαιευτική), the readiness to assist others in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator rather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was worthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he professed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself; he left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus whilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself to any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct out of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible contrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All the teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards their common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical speculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by the Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use of the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue, the attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such were the Socratic schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply divided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again established its importance.

[Sidenote: The Cynics.]

=51.= Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic system. Of these the Cynic school, founded by ANTISTHENES of Athens (circ. 440-365 B.C.) and developed by DIOGENES of Sinope, is its immediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the moral earnestness[80] and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master’s favourite pupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked by simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true missionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of the figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared to his own disciples.

The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many, but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82]; and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83]. Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage unspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek world[85].’

[Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.]

=52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself. Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists; horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all. In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just or unjust, reckless or farseeing.

[Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.]

=53.= Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which exercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity, which is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which it is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing is more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist monks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation of natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with their master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste, and kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the type of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in their country, their birth, and their literary studies[88].

[Sidenote: Xenophon.]

=54.= The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of literature to disseminate their views; but in the works of XENOPHON of Athens (440-circ. 350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost exactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples which patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving him free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another to join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen. From adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person) and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way depends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in his Memorabilia (ἀπομνημονεύματα) is not always to be depended upon; it is at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher; but it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence it exercised over Latin literature.

[Sidenote: The Cyrenaics.]

=55.= In the opposite direction ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene shared the sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness or his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest appeal of Socrates that he should take part in politics. ‘It seems to me,’ he says, ‘to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do to find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is not successful.’ Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in which the Cynics represented his master’s teaching, and held that the wise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest pleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as his followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of Epicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics.

[Sidenote: The Megarians.]

=56.= The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly from these ethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic. From the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine of the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it identified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly indebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the same school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in any real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived an interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly occupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this school we first meet with the puzzles of ‘the heap’ (Sorites), ‘the liar’ (Pseudomenos), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus and other Stoics sharpened their wits[89]. DIODORUS the Megarian set out certain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the necessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem of free-will[90]. Finally STILPO, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C., and who made a violent attack upon Plato’s theory of ideas, adopted an ethical standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted amongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst his contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in doing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching, and know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind of Zeno.

[Sidenote: Advance of Philosophy.]

=57.= With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned; the consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers we must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow from being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its subject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better defined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined attempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to enquiring minds.

FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West’ Lightfoot, Philippians, p. 274.

[2] Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’ Greek Thinkers (transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’s Religious teachers of Greece (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).

[3] ‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it’ Hom. Od. 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also Adam, Religious Teachers, p. 31.

[4] ‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of Zeus’ Od. 5, 103.

[5] Il. 24, 308; Od. 14, 404.

[6] ib. 6, 188.

[7] Od. 8, 170.

[8] ib. 4, 237.

[9] ib. 20, 75.

[10] ib. 14, 84.

[11] ib. 17, 485.

[12] See below, § 325.

[13] So already Socrates understood it; Xen. Mem. i 3, 7.

[14] Hesiod, Works and Days, 252-255; and see below, § 254.

[15] ib. 289-292, quoted Xen. Mem. ii 1, 20.

[16] For instance, to Adam, Religious Teachers, Lect. V; Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, bk. i, ch. ii.

[17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).

[18] Adam, p. 114.

[19] Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48.

[20] ib. 48-56.

[21] ib. 56-59.

[22] The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language.

[23] See below, §§ 71, 195.

[24] Gomperz, i 127.

[25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204.

[26] Xen. apud Euseb. Praep. ev. xiii 13.

[27] Xenophanes apud Sext. math. ix 193.

[28] Id. apud Arist. Rhet. ii 23.

[29] On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.

[30] ‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit’ Heracl. Fr. 4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).

[31] ‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’ Fr. 16 B, 40 D.

[32] ‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private understanding’ Fr. 92 B, 2 D.

[33] ‘All things move and nothing remains’ Plato Crat. 402 A.

[34] ‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things are one’ Fr. 1 B, 50 D.

[35] ‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and goods with gold’ Fr. 22 B, 90 D; ‘neither God nor man created this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living fire’ Fr. 20 B, 30 D.

[36] ‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’ Fr. 26 B, 66 D.

[37] ‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls revive and live’ Sext. Pyrrh. inst., iii 230 (Fr. 78 B, 88 D).

[38] ‘This Word is always existent’ Fr. 2 B, 1 D.

[39] ib.

[40] ‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are steered through all’ Fr. 19 B, 41 D.

[41] ‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep’ Fr. 2 B, 1 D.

[42] Fr. 91 B, 114 D.

[43] Adam, pp. 217-222.

[44] Gomperz, i p. 63.

[45] See Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster; Ueberweg, Grundriss, p. 39; above, § 13.

[45a] Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).

[45b] Clem. Strom. i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75).

[46] Agam. 155-161, 167-171.

[47] Gomperz, ii p. 13.

[48] ‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.’ Gomperz, i p. 414.

[49] See below, §§ 124, 130, and 131.

[50] Gomperz, i p. 428.

[51] Xen. Mem. ii 1, 21 to 34.

[52] Gomperz, i p. 430.

[53] See below, § 89.

[54] Gomperz, i p. 433.

[55] ib. p. 437.

[56] Arist. Phys. viii 1; and see below, § 173.

[56a] Xen. Mem. i 1, 18.

[57] Plato, Apol. p. 32.

[58] Plato, Crito, p. 44 sqq.

[59] Gomperz, ii p. 48.

[60] Cic. Ac. i 4, 15; Tusc. disp. v 4, 10.

[61] Sen. Ep. 71, 7.

[62] Xen. Mem. iii 7.

[63] Xen. Mem. iv 6, 1; Epict. Disc. i 7, 11.

[64] Xen. Mem. iv 5, 12; Arist. Met. xiii 4.

[65] Xen. Mem. iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in connexion with achievements in poetry and art.

[66] Plato, Phaedo, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.

[67] Xen. Mem. i 4, 4.

[68] ib. i 4, 2.

[69] ib. i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic. N. D. ii 6, 18.

[70] ib. i 1, 19.

[71] ib.

[72] Plato, Alc. ii 143 A.

[73] Xen. Mem. iii 9, 4 and 5.

[74] ib.

[75] οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see Plato Prot. p. 345 D, Apol. p. 25, Xen. Mem. iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.

[76] In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or ‘divinations.’

[77] Mem. i 1, 1.

[78] Grote, History of Greece, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school; Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 94-97.

[79] ‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic. de Orat. iii 16, 61.

[80] παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L. vi 2.

[81] ‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’ Cic. N. D. i 13, 32.

[82] οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 46 C.

[83] Epict. Disc. iii 22, 91.

[84] See below, § 303.

[85] Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book, Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats (Halle 1851).

[86] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L. vi 103.

[87] ib. vi 11.

[88] See Plato, Theaet. 155 E, Soph. 251 B; Aristotle, Met. vii 3, 7.

[89] See below, § 163.

[90] See below, §§ 220 and 221.

[91] ‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen. Ep. 9, 3.

[92] Gomperz, ii p. 196.

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III. THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH

[Sidenote: Political changes of the 4th century.]

=58.= Before a hundred years had passed since the death of Socrates, the face of the Greek world had been completely changed. Athens, Lacedaemon, Corinth, Thebes, which had been great powers, had sunk into comparative insignificance; their preeminence was gone, and even of their independence but little remained. Throughout Greece proper the Macedonian was master. But if the old-fashioned politician suffered a bitter disappointment, and the adherents of the old polytheism despaired of the future, there was rich compensation for the young and the hopeful. Petty wars between neighbouring cities, with their wearisome refrain ‘and the men they killed, and the women and children they enslaved[1],’ began to be less common; internal and still more murderous strife between bigoted oligarchs or democrats began to be checked from without. For the enlightened Greek a new world of enterprise had been opened up in the East. Alexander the Great had not only conquered Asia Minor, and established everywhere the Greek language and a Greek bureaucracy; he had opened the way to the far East, and pointed out India and even China as fields for the merchant and the colonizer. His work had been partly frustrated by the disorders that followed his death; but if achievement was thus hindered, hopes were not so quickly extinguished. These new hopes were not likely to be accompanied by any lasting regrets for the disappearance of ancient systems of government now regarded as effete or ridiculous, or of inherited mythologies which were at every point in conflict with the moral sense[2].

[Sidenote: East and West.]

=59.= The same historic events which opened the East to Hellenic adventurers also made the way into Europe easy for the Oriental. As the soldier and the administrator travelled eastward, so the merchant and the philosopher pushed his way to the West. Not merely in Persia had ancient superstitions been swept away by reforming zeal; the Jews were now spreading from town to town the enthusiasm of a universalized religion which was ridding itself of bloody sacrifices; and, for the time at least, the humane philosophy of the Buddha was dominant in India, was being preached far and wide by self-sacrificing monks, and was inspiring the policy of great monarchies. We find it hard to picture the clashing of ideals, enthusiasms, and ambitions which was at this time taking place in all the great cities of the old world; but it is certain that in the universal excitement the old distinctions of Greek and barbarian, Jew and Gentile, rich and poor, free and slave, man and woman were everywhere becoming weakened, and community of thought and temperament were beginning to reunite on a new basis individuals who had broken loose from the ties of ancient society.

[Sidenote: New schools of philosophy.]

=60.= During this fourth century B.C. the foundations were laid of the four philosophical schools which were destined to vie one with another for the allegiance of the Roman world. The Socratic schools which we have already mentioned, those of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, did not perhaps altogether die out; in particular the Cynic missionaries appear to have been a social force until the second century B.C. But their intellectual basis was too narrow to admit of their effective transplantation to new soil. At the end of the century each gave place to a new school, which preserved the central doctrines of its predecessor. The Socratic paradoxes were handed on from the Cynics to the Stoics; the doctrine that pleasure is the good was accepted by Epicurus. Stoics and Epicureans disputed with a bitterness as yet unequalled, finding themselves just as much opposed upon the subjects of logic and physics, which they introduced anew into popular philosophy, as upon the questions of ethics on which their antipathies were inherited. Between them stood two schools which had meanwhile established themselves. Plato, himself a companion of Socrates, founded the Academy at Athens about 380 B.C.; and if he did not impress his own teaching upon it with absolute fixity, still the school flourished under a succession of leaders, always proud of the fame of its founder, and rendering him at least a nominal allegiance. From the Academy branched off the school of the Peripatetics, founded by Plato’s pupil Aristotle about 350 B.C. After Aristotle’s death this school gravitated towards the Academics, and in later centuries there seemed little difference, if any, between the two. If Stoicism may be called the child of Cynism, it largely drew nourishment from these two schools and their founders. Some account of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle is therefore needed here, partly because of the great importance of both in the general history of philosophy, partly because of their direct influence upon the subject of this book. On account of the much greater prominence of the Academy in the later history we shall often use this term to refer to the general teaching of the two allied schools.

[Sidenote: Plato.]

=61.= Of all the companions of Socrates far the most famous is PLATO of Athens (427-347 B.C.), the founder of the philosophical association known as the ‘Academy.’ In the general judgment of lovers of Greek letters he stands out not merely as a great master of Attic prose style, but also as the ablest exponent of the true mind of Socrates[3], and the most brilliant light of Greek philosophy[4]. On the first point this judgment stands unchallenged; for delicate and good-natured wit, felicity of illustration and suggestiveness of thought the Platonic dialogues are unrivalled. But it is only in his earlier writings that we can accept Plato as a representative of Socrates; after the death of his master he travelled for many years in Egypt, Lower Italy, and Sicily, and absorbed in particular much of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. The theory of ‘ideas,’ the special characteristic of Plato’s later work, is not strictly Socratic. Neither, we must add, is it of first-rate importance in the history of human thought; from our point of view it lies apart from the main current both of speculation and of practice. It was a still-born theory, not accepted even by Plato’s successors in the control of the Academy[5]. We are therefore very little concerned with the direct teaching of Plato; but all the more readily it should be acknowledged that the Stoics were often indebted to him for help in the treatment of important details, and that the Platonic attitude remained for them a factor of which they needed continuously to take account.

[Sidenote: Plato’s realism.]

=62.= A striking feature of the Platonic dialogues is that their results are usually negative. First the opinions of the crowd, then those of Socrates’ contemporaries the ‘sophists’ and of the other Socratic schools are subjected to a cross-examination, under which they are one and all shewn to be unreasonable. This cross-examination is quite in the Socratic spirit, and is before all things a mental gymnastic, training the dialectician to observe with keener eye and to discuss with apter tongue than his fellows. Gradually there emerges from a mass of doubts something like a positive theory that Plato is prepared to adopt. The true reasoning is that of induction from the particular to the general, from the individual to the class. In the class name we come upon the true being of the individual, and by a right definition of it we discern what each thing really is. The ‘idea,’ which corresponds to the class name, is alone really existent; the individual is a more or less imperfect imitation of it (μίμησις). In this way Plato found what seemed to him a solution of a difficulty which Socrates hardly felt, that of explaining the participation (μέθεξις) of the particular in the general (ὑπόθεσις or ἰδέα). Thus where ordinary men see ‘horses,’ and Antisthenes holds that they are right, Plato sees ‘horsiness,’ or the idea of ‘horse.’ In the language of medieval philosophy Plato is a realist, that is, one who holds that our Ideas are more than what men mean when they say ‘mere ideas’; that they are Realities, and have their being in a truly existing world; and that in knowing them we know what is. But just as Plato holds that general conceptions are alone true and real, so he necessarily maintains that objects perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and that the ordinary man lives in a world of illusions. Thus the thoughts of the philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which men live and die.

[Sidenote: God and the soul.]

=63.= Upon the basis of the individual ‘ideas’ Plato builds up by a process of classification and induction higher and smaller classes of ideas, until we begin to see the vision of a single idea, a class which includes all classes, a supreme ‘being’ from which all being is derived. This highest idea is variously suggested by the names ‘the Good,’ ‘the Beautiful,’ ‘the One.’ By a sudden transformation it becomes the Creator (δημιουργός) of the universe. Containing in itself all being, it needs for its operation some kind of formless and inert matter; for this the name ἄπειρον, ‘the unlimited,’ is taken from Anaximander. The whole created universe may be considered as the joint production of the ‘idea’ and the ‘unlimited’; and the cosmology of Anaxagoras, ‘all things were together, and mind came and ordered them,’ is substantially justified. The world thus created is both good and beautiful, for it is made by a good Creator on the best of patterns.

The human soul is of triple nature. The highest part, the rational soul (τὸ λογιστικόν), is seated in the head; the emotional soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) in the heart; the appetitive soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) in the belly. Over these two lower souls the reasoning part should hold control, as a driver over two unruly steeds[6]. The rational soul has existed before birth, and may hope for immortality, for it is knit up with the idea of ‘being.’ Ultimately it may even attain to perfection, if it is purified as by fire from baser elements that have attached themselves to it.

[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=64.= Plato himself does not formulate an ethical ideal of the same precision that his successors used, but we infer from his works a goal towards which he points. Thus the ethical end for each man is the greatest possible participation in the idea of the good, the closest attainable imitation of the deity. The virtue of each part of the human soul lies in the fit performance of its proper work; that of the reasoning soul is Wisdom (σοφία); of the emotional soul Courage (ἀνδρεία); of the appetitive soul Soberness (σοφροσύνη). Over all (it is hinted rather than stated) rules the supreme virtue of Justice (δικαιοσύνη), assigning to each part its proper function. Thus the four cardinal virtues are deduced as a practical application from the Platonic psychology. The high position assigned to Justice leads up to the practical doctrine of Moderation (μετριότης); even the virtues are restricted both in their intensity and in their spheres of work, and if any virtue passes its proper limit it becomes changed into the vice that borders on it. Thus the ideal of practical life is the ‘moderate man,’ calm, considerate, and self-respecting, touched with a warm flow of feeling, but never carried away into excitement; and even this ideal is strictly subordinate to that of the life of philosophic contemplation.

The ideal State is modelled on the individual man. To the three parts of the soul correspond three classes of citizens; the rulers, whose virtue is Wisdom; the guardians, on whom Courage is incumbent; the labourers and tradesmen, who owe the State Soberness and obedience. Thus the political system to which Plato leans is that of an Aristocracy; for the middle class in his state has only an executive part in the government, and the lower orders are entirely excluded from it.

[Sidenote: Aristotle.]

=65.= By far the greatest of Plato’s pupils was ARISTOTLE of Stagira (384-322 B.C.), who introduced into philosophy, now convulsed by the disputes of the disciples of Socrates, a spirit of reconciliation. From his point of view the various contentions are not so much erroneous as defective. To attain the truth we need first to collect the various opinions that are commonly held, and then to seek the reconciling formula of which each one is a partial statement.

[Sidenote: The ten categories.]

=66.= In his investigation Aristotle did not altogether break with Plato’s theory of ideas, but brought them from a transcendental world into touch with common life. He held fast to the method of induction (ἐπαγωγή) from the particular to the general, and agreed that we reach the true nature of each thing when we have determined the class-conception. But the class-conception or idea (ἰδέα), though the most real existence, does not exist independently, but only in and through the particulars, which compose the class. Having thus come to see that there are gradations of existence, we need to inquire what these are; and to classify the various kinds of judgment with regard to which we inquire whether they are true or false. Now by observation we find that judgments or predications have ten different shapes, to which therefore there must correspond ten kinds of existence. These are the well-known ‘categories’ of Aristotle, and are as follows:

(i) ‘substance,’ as when we say ‘this is a man,’ ‘a horse’; (ii) ‘quantity,’ as that he is ‘six feet high’; (iii) ‘quality,’ as ‘a grammarian’; (iv) ‘relation,’ as ‘twice as much’; (v) ‘place,’ as ‘at Athens’; (vi) ‘time,’ as ‘last year’; (vii) ‘position,’ as ‘lying down’; (viii) ‘possession,’ as ‘with a sword’; (ix) ‘action,’ as ‘cuts’; and (x) ‘passion,’ as ‘is cut’ or ‘is burned.’

Aristotle thus reinstates the credit of the common man; he it is who possesses the substance of truth and gives it habitual expression by speech, even roughly indicating the various kinds of existence by different forms of words. It is now indicated that a study of grammar is required as the foundation of logic.

Aristotle also greatly advanced the study of that kind of reasoning which proceeds from the general to the particular, and which is best expressed in terms of the ‘syllogism’ (συλλογισμός), of which he defined the various forms.

[Sidenote: The four causes.]

=67.= In the study of physics Aristotle picks up the thread which Socrates had dropped deliberately, that is, the teaching of the Ionic philosophers. Either directly from Empedocles, or from a consensus of opinion now fairly established, he accepted the doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα), earth, water, air, and fire; but to these he added a fifth (πεμπτὸν στοιχεῖον, quinta essentia), the aether, which fills the celestial spaces. Behind this analysis lies the more important problem of cosmology, the question how this world comes to be. Collecting once more the opinions commonly held, Aristotle concludes that four questions are usually asked, and that in them the search is being made for four ‘causes,’ which will solve the respective questions. The four causes are:

(i) the Creator, or ‘efficient cause,’ answering the question;—Who made the world? (ii) the Substance, or ‘material cause’;—of what did he make it? (iii) the Plan, or ‘modal cause’;—according to what design? (iv) the End, or ‘final cause’;—for what purpose?[7]

Reviewing these ‘causes’ Aristotle concludes that the first, third, and fourth are ultimately one, the Creator containing in his own nature both the plan and the purpose of his work[8]. The solution is therefore dualistic, and agrees substantially with that of Plato; the ultimate existences are (i) an informing power, and (ii) matter that has the potentiality of accepting form.

In consequence of this dualism of Aristotle the term ‘matter’ (ὕλη, materia) has ever since possessed associations which did not belong to it in the time of the hylozoists. Matter now begins to suggest something lifeless, inert, and unintelligent; and to be sharply contrasted not only with such conceptions as ‘God’ and ‘mind,’ but also with motion and force. For this reason the Stoics in reintroducing monism preferred a new term, as we shall see below[9].

[Sidenote: The microcosm.]

=68.= What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the body, which is a ‘little universe[10].’ But the reasoning part of the soul only is entirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body from without; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its end. The lower parts of the soul are knit up with the body, and must perish with it. So far Aristotle’s teaching differs little from that of Plato; but a new point of view is introduced when he speaks of the soul as subject to ‘diseases’ (παθήματα), and thus assigns to the practical philosopher a social function as the comrade of the physician. Amongst the diseases he specially names Pity and Fear, which assail the emotional part of the soul. Their cure is found in ‘purging’ (κάθαρσις), that is to say in their complete expulsion from the soul, as reason and circumstances may require; but Aristotle by no means considers that the analogy between body and soul is complete, or that the emotions should always be regarded as injurious[11].

[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=69.= In setting forth an ideal for human activity Aristotle conceives that other philosophers have differed more in words than in substance, and he hopes to reconcile them through the new term ‘blessedness’ (εὐδαιμονία). This blessedness is attained when the soul is actively employed in a virtuous way, and when it is so circumstanced that it commands the instruments of such action, that is, in a life which is adequately furnished. On such activity pleasure must assuredly attend, and it is therefore needless to seek it of set purpose. Further, virtue appears personified in the ‘true gentleman’ (καλὸς κἀγαθός), who ever avoids vicious extremes, and finds his highest satisfaction in pure contemplation, just as the Creator himself lives to contemplate the world he has produced[12].

In politics Aristotle can find ground for approving in turn of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, according to the circumstances of each state. We cannot however but feel that his sympathies point most towards monarchy, and that his personal association with Alexander the Great was in full harmony with his inmost convictions. As a means of government he advocates before all things the education of the young.

[Sidenote: Social prepossessions.]

=70.= The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, comprehensive in their range, brilliant and varied in their colouring, nevertheless appeal effectively only to a limited circle. Socrates had been the companion of rich and poor alike; Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to men of wealth, position, and taste. Their sympathies appear clearly in their political systems, in which the sovereign or the aristocracy is considered fit to play a part, whilst the many are practically excluded from the commonwealth, sometimes as a harmless flock which needs kindly shepherding, and at other times as a dangerous crowd which must be deceived or enslaved for its own good. These prepossessions, which we shall find reappearing within the Stoic system, appear to weaken the practical forcefulness of both philosophies. In the ideal character the Socratic ‘force’ has disappeared, and ‘self-restraint’ alone is the standard of virtue; the just man moves quietly and conventionally through life, perhaps escaping blame, but hardly achieving distinction. In resuming the study of ontology, which Socrates had treated as a ‘mist from Ionia,’ bright fancies had been elaborated rather than dominating conceptions; the deity of Aristotle seems but a faint reflex of the god of Socrates and the Cynics, and neither the ‘idea’ of Plato or the ‘matter’ of Aristotle is so well fitted for the world’s hard work as the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. The teachers who succeeded to the control of the two schools inclined more and more to engross themselves in special studies, and to leave on one side the great controversial problems.

[Sidenote: The Academics.]

=71.= The followers of Plato were known as the ‘Academics’: amongst them we must distinguish between the members of the ‘old Academy,’ as Cicero terms them[13], and those who followed the innovations of Arcesilaus. The old Academy chiefly developed the ethical side of Plato’s teaching, finding that the path of virtue is indicated by the natural capacities of the individual. Thus XENOCRATES of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) taught that each man’s happiness resulted from the virtue proper to him (οἰκεία ἀρετή)[14]; whilst POLEMO of Athens (head of the school 314-270 B.C.) is said by Cicero to have defined it as consisting in ‘virtuous living, aided by those advantages to which nature first draws us,’ thereby practically adopting the standard of Aristotle[15]. The teaching of Polemo had a direct influence upon that of Zeno the founder of Stoicism.

But with the first successes of Stoicism the Academy revived its dialectical position, in strong opposition to the dogmatism of the new school. ARCESILAUS of Pitane in Aeolia (315-240 B.C.) revived the Socratic cross-examination, always opposing himself to any theory that might be propounded to him, and drawing the conclusion that truth could never be certainly known[16]. Life must therefore be guided by considerations of probability, and the ethical standard is that ‘of which a reasonable defence may be made[17].’ This sceptical attitude was carried still further by CARNEADES of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), whose acute criticism told upon the Stoic leaders of his time, and forced them to abandon some of their most important positions. From this time a reconciliation between the two schools set in[18].

[Sidenote: The Peripatetics.]

=72.= The members of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle are of less importance to us. The Romans found little difference between their teaching and that of the earlier Academy. Cicero mentions that the Stoic Panaetius was a keen student of two of the pupils of Aristotle, THEOPHRASTUS (his successor as head of the Peripatetic school) and DICAEARCHUS[19]; amongst later teachers in whose views he is interested he names HIERONYMUS, who held that the supreme good was freedom from pain[20]; CALLIPHO, who combined virtue with pleasure, and DIODORUS who combined it with freedom from pain[21]; and amongst his contemporaries STASEAS of Naples, who stated the same doctrines in a slightly different form[22], and CRATIPPUS, whom he selected as a teacher for his own son[23]. It was a common complaint of these teachers that the Stoics had stolen their doctrines wholesale, and (as is the way with thieves) had altered the names only[24]. All these writers however agree in denying the doctrine which Zeno accepted from the Cynics that ‘virtue is sufficient for happiness,’ and lay stress upon the supply of external goods (χορηγία) as needed to admit of the active exercise of virtue. They were diligent students of the written works of their founder, and thus opened the way for the work of erudition and interpretation which found its centre in Alexandria in a later period.

[Sidenote: Zeno.]

=73.= Amidst the conflict of these schools ZENO grew up. Born in Citium on the island of Cyprus in 336 B.C., in the same year in which Alexander became king of Macedon, he heard as a boy of the Greek conquest of the East, and was only 13 years of age when its course was checked by the death of Alexander. Of the town of Citium the inhabitants were partly Greek, partly Phoenician; and Zeno, whether or not he was of Phoenician blood, certainly derived from his environment something of the character of the enterprising and much-travelled Phoenician nation, and imparted this trait to the school which he founded. He was nicknamed by his contemporaries ‘the Phoenician,’ and the title clung to his followers[25]. His father was a merchant of purple, and often travelled in the one direction to Tyre and Sidon, in the other as far as Athens, whence he brought back a number of ‘Socratic books,’ which were eagerly read by the young Zeno, and in time attracted him to the famous Greek city[26]. We may presume that when he first came to Athens he intended to carry further his studies without abandoning his calling; but when news reached him of the wreck of the ship which carried all his goods, he welcomed it as a call to devote himself entirely to philosophy[27]. His first step in Athens was to seek out the man who best represented the character of Socrates, as represented in Xenophon’s Memoirs; and it is said that a bookseller accordingly pointed him to CRATES of Thebes[28], the pupil and (it would seem) the successor of Diogenes as acknowledged head of the Cynic school.

[Sidenote: Zeno joins the Cynics.]

=74.= Our authorities busy themselves chiefly with narrating the eccentricities of Crates, who wore warm clothing in summer and rags in winter, entered the theatre as the audience were coming out, and drank water instead of wine. But doubtless, like his predecessors in the Cynic school, he was a man of the true Socratic character, who had trained himself to bear hunger and thirst, heat and cold, flattery and abuse. His life and wisdom won him the love of the high-born Hipparchia, who turned from her wealthy and noble suitors, choosing instead the poverty of Crates, who had abandoned all his possessions. In his company she went from house to house, knocking at all doors in turn, sometimes admonishing the inmates of their sins, sometimes sharing with them their meals[29]. In such a life Zeno recognised the forcefulness of Socrates, and in the dogmas of the Cynic school he reached the foundation on which that life was built. From that foundation neither Zeno nor his true followers ever departed, and thus Stoicism embodied and spread the fundamental dogmas of Cynism, that the individual alone is really existent, that virtue is the supreme good, and that the wise man, though a beggar, is truly a king.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s Republic.]

=75.= Whilst still an adherent of the Cynic school[30], Zeno wrote his Πολιτεία or Republic, which is evidently an attack on Plato’s work with the same title[31]. If this work does not reveal to us the fully developed philosopher, it at least shews us better than any other evidence what the man Zeno was. His ideal was the establishment of a perfect State, a completion of the work in which Alexander had failed; and he found a starting-point in a treatise by Antisthenes on the same subject. The ideal State must embrace the whole world, so that a man no longer says, ‘I am of Athens,’ or ‘of Sidon,’ but ‘I am a citizen of the world[32].’ Its laws must be those which are prescribed by nature, not by convention. It will have no images or temples, for these are unworthy of the nature of the deity; no sacrifices, because he cannot be pleased by costly gifts; no law-courts, for its citizens will do one another no harm; no statues, for the virtues of its inhabitants will be its adornment[33]; no gymnasia, for its youth must not waste their time in idle exercises[34].

The people will not be divided into classes (and here Plato’s Republic is contradicted), for all alike will be wise men[35]; nor will men and women be clothed differently, or shamefacedly hide any part of their bodies[36]. No man will speak of a woman as his property, for women will belong to the community only[37]. As for the dead, men will not trouble whether they bury them (as the Greeks), burn them (as the Indians), or give them to the birds (as the Persians); for it matters not at all what happens to men’s dead bodies[38], but whether their souls shall reach the abodes of the blest, or need hereafter to be purged by fire from the foulness they have contracted through contact with the body[39]. To conclude, Love shall be master throughout the State, being as it were a God cooperating for the good of the whole[40]; and the wise man shall be a citizen in it, not a missionary, and shall be surrounded with wife and children[41].

[Sidenote: Zeno seeks knowledge.]

=76.= Zeno, after writing his Republic, took up a position more independent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, avoid noticing that the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of the philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack of clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of dialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic teachers would allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea of uniting the Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned first to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school[42]. Crates, we are told, tried to drag him back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno retorted that argument would be more to the point[43]. From this time he no longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also for argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations of his state must be surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion, but on the rock of knowledge. That a wise man should hesitate, change his views, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach[44]. If indeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that knowledge is within the reach of man?

[Sidenote: Zeno’s theory of knowledge.]

=77.= The chief cause of error, Zeno found, lay in hasty assertion; and this he held was a fault not so much of the intellect as of the will. In the simplest case the senses present to the mind a ‘picture’ (φαντασία, visum), carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. ‘that is a horse’). But it is for the man to consider well whether this suggestion is true, and only to give his ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις, adsensus) when he is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, and therefore in our power. Of a picture to which he has given his assent the wise man should retain a firm hold; it then becomes an item of ‘comprehension’ (φαντασία καταληπτική, comprehensio), and may be stored in the memory, thus preparing the way for further acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end combine in ‘scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη, scientia).

This theory is little more than an exhortation against the prevailing error of hasty thought (δόξα, opinio); but it made a very deep impression, especially as enforced by Zeno’s gestures. He stretched out his fingers and shewed the open palm, saying ‘Such is a picture.’ He partially contracted his fingers, and said ‘This is assent.’ Making a closed fist, he said ‘This is comprehension.’ Then closing in the left hand over the right he pressed his fist tight, and said ‘This is science, and only the wise man can attain to it[45].’

We have no reason to suppose that this theory was in any way suggested by Stilpo, from whom however Zeno probably learnt to attach importance to the formal part of reasoning, such as ‘definition’ and the use of the syllogism. With Stilpo he shared an aversion to the Platonic theory of ideas, maintaining that ideas are by no means realities but have only a ‘kind of existence’ in our minds, or (as we should call it to-day) a ‘subjective existence[46].’

[Sidenote: Zeno studies under Polemo.]

=78.= In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine, entered a new world. He left behind the rough manners, the stinging retorts, and the narrow culture of the Cynics and Eristics[47], to sit with other intelligent students[48] at the feet of a man of cultured manners[49] and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and Sophocles[50] had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge of the works of Plato and Aristotle, was himself a great writer[51], and yet consistently taught that not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to be attained. That Zeno profited much from his studies under Polemo we may conjecture from Polemo’s good-natured complaint, ‘I see well what you are after: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you dress in Phoenician clothes[52].’ From this time it became a conventional complaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics: yet the sharp conflict between the two schools shews that this cannot apply to essentials. But in two important matters at least Zeno must have been indebted to Academic teaching. This school had elaborated the doctrine of Anaxagoras, which so attracted Socrates, that the world began with the working of mind upon unordered matter. So too, according to all our authorities, Zeno taught that there are two beginnings, the active which is identified with the deity or Logos, and the passive which is inert matter, or substance without quality[53]. This doctrine appears to pledge Zeno to a dualistic view of the universe.

[Sidenote: ‘Soul is body.’]

=79.= On the other hand the Platonic teaching on the soul was reversed by Zeno. He denied the opposition between soul and body. ‘Soul is Breath[54],’ he taught, and ‘soul is body[55].’ With Plato’s threefold division of the soul he would have nothing to do; rather he maintained that the soul has eight parts[56], each displaying itself in a distinct power or capacity, whilst all of them are qualities or operations of one soul in various relations[57]. In this part of his philosophy Zeno appears as a strong monist, and his debt to the Platonists is necessarily restricted to details.

[Sidenote: Zeno studies Heraclitus.]

=80.= It would seem then that Zeno after seeking for philosophic safety for some twenty years in one harbour after another had so far made shipwreck. But from this shipwreck of his intellectual hopes he could afterwards count the beginning of a fair voyage[58]. As he eagerly discussed with his younger fellow-student Arcesilaus the teaching of their master Polemon, he took courage to point out its weak points[59], and began to quote in his own defence not only his previous teachers Crates and Stilpo, but also the works of Heraclitus[60]. He thus broke down the barrier which Socrates had set up against the Ionic philosophers. From Heraclitus Zeno drew two doctrines of first-rate importance; the first, that of the eternal fire[61] and its mutation into the elements in turn[62]; the second (already referred to) that of the Logos[63]. It is evident that the Heraclitean doctrine of fire breaks down the distinction between God and the world, active and passive, soul and body; and is therefore inconsistent with the dualism which Zeno had partly borrowed from Plato. It is not clear whether Zeno attained to clearness on this point; but in the general teaching of the Stoics the monistic doctrine prevailed[64]. Hence God is not separate from body, but is himself body in its purest form[65]. The Logos or divine reason is the power which pervades and gives shape to the universe[66]; and this Logos is identical with the deity, that is with the primitive and creative Fire[67]. The Logos (ὀρθὸς λόγος, vera ratio) brings into harmony the parts of philosophy; for it is also on the one hand the guide to right reasoning[68]; on the other hand the law which prescribes what is right for the State and for the individual[69].

[Sidenote: Zeno opens his school.]

=81.= When Zeno definitely accepted the teaching of Heraclitus, he felt bound to break finally with the school of Polemo, and he founded soon after 300 B.C. a school of his own, which was rapidly crowded. His followers were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards Stoics, from the ‘picture porch’ (so called because it was decorated with paintings by Polygnotus) in which he delivered his lectures. He now applied himself afresh to the problem of ethics. Whilst still adhering to the Cynic views that ‘virtue is the only good,’ and that ‘example is more potent than precept,’ he entirely rejected the intuitional basis which the Cynics had accepted, deciding in favour of the claims of reason. He found his ideal in ‘consistency’ (ὁμολογία, convenientia)[70]; as the Logos or Word rules in the universe, so should it also in the individual. Those who live by a single and harmonious principle possess divine favour and an even flow of life[71]; those that follow conflicting practices are ill-starred[72]. In this consistency there is found virtue, and (here again he follows the Cynics) virtue is sufficient for happiness[73], and has no need of any external support.

[Sidenote: His theory of virtue.]

=82.= But whilst the virtue of the Cynics is something detached and self-contained, and is ‘natural’ only in the sense that it is not determined by custom or authority, that of Zeno is bound up with the whole scheme of the universe. For the universe puts before men certain things, which though rightly named ‘indifferent’ by the Cynics, and wrongly named ‘good’ by the Academics, have yet a certain value (ἀξία, aestimatio), and are a natural goal for men’s actions[74]. Such are health, prosperity, good name, and other things which the Academics named ‘things according to nature’ (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν). These Zeno took over, not as a part of his theory of virtue, but as the basis of it[75]; and for things having value introduced the term ‘of high degree’ (προηγμένα), and for their opposites the term ‘of low degree’ (ἀποπροηγμένα), these terms being borrowed from court life. Thus virtue alone is queen, and all things naturally desired are subject to her command[76]. The end of life is therefore to live consistently, keeping in view the aims set before us by nature, or shortly, to live ‘consistently with nature.’ Our authorities do not agree as to whether Zeno or Cleanthes was the first to use this phrase[77]; but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is that of Zeno, that it is a fundamental part of the Stoic system, and that it was maintained unaltered by all orthodox Stoics. On the other hand the Academics and Peripatetics ridiculed these new and barbarous terms προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα, and their view has generally been supported both in ancient and modern times[78]. We cannot however question the right of Zeno to reserve a special term for that which is morally good; he was in fact feeling his way towards the position, still imperfectly recognized, that the language of common life is inadequate to the exact expression of philosophic principles[79].

[Sidenote: Zeno’s syllogisms.]

=83.= In expounding his system Zeno made much use of the syllogism, thereby laying the foundations of a new style of oratory, consisting of short and pointed clauses, which became a characteristic of his school[80]. He no doubt regarded this form as a sure method of attaining truth; but even at the present day the principle that truth can only be reached from facts and not from words is not everywhere admitted. The syllogisms of Zeno have all their weak points, and as a rule the term which is common to the major and minor premisses suffers a shift of meaning. These syllogisms can no longer convince us, and even in antiquity they were severely criticized. But they are excellent aids to the memory, and so serve the same end as the catechisms of the Reformation period. Amongst the syllogisms attributed to Zeno are these: ‘That which has reason is better than that which has not reason; but nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe has reason[81].’ ‘No one trusts a secret to a drunken man; but one trusts a secret to a good man; therefore a good man will not be drunken[82].’ ‘No evil is accompanied by glory; but death is accompanied by glory; therefore death is no evil[83].’ Such syllogisms were embedded in the numerous works of Zeno, of which many were certainly extant as late as the time of Epictetus[84].

[Sidenote: Epicurus and Arcesilaus.]

=84.= At the very time when Zeno was elaborating the doctrines of the Porch, another school of equal eminence was established at Athens by EPICURUS (341-270 B.C.) in his Gardens. Epicurus combined the ethical principle of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is the end of life, with the atomistic philosophy of Democritus; he had no respect for the study of dialectic, but placed the criterion of truth in the observations of the senses, leaving little room for the participation of mind or will. Thus in every part of philosophy his teaching was opposed to that of Zeno, and the two schools during their whole existence were in the sharpest conflict. We may nevertheless notice some points of contact between them. Both founded, or conceived that they founded their ethical doctrine upon physical proofs; that is, both maintained that the end of life which they put forward was that prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they agreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the pursuit of natural science. Both again were positive teachers, or (in the language of the ancients) propounders of dogmas; and here they came into conflict with the Academic school, which maintained, and was soon about to emphasize, the critical spirit of Socrates and Plato. For in the last years of Zeno’s life his old fellow-pupil Arcesilaus became head of the Academic school (270 B.C.), and at once directed his teaching against Zeno’s theory of knowledge[85]. Following the practice of Socrates and of Plato’s dialogues, he argued against every point of view presented, and concluded that certain truth could not be known by man[86]. He pressed Zeno closely as to his definition of ‘comprehension,’ and induced him to add a clause which, in the opinion of his opponent, shewed the worthlessness of the whole doctrine[87]. Thus was raised the question of the κριτήριον or test of truth, which for at least a century to come sharply divided the schools[88].

[Sidenote: Zeno at Athens.]

=85.= The conflict between these three schools, which from this time on greatly surpassed all others in importance, did not embitter the political life of Athens. The citizens watched with amusement the competition of the schools for numbers and influence, and drew their profit from the crowds of foreigners who were drawn to Athens by its growing fame as a centre of adult education. To the heads of the schools they were ready to pay every mark of respect. With Zeno they deposited the keys of their gates, and they awarded him during his lifetime a gold crown and a bronze statue. His fame spread abroad, and those of his fellow-citizens of Citium who were then resident at Sidon claimed a share in it. In his old age the high-minded Antigonus Gonatas (who occupied the throne of Macedonia with varying fortune from 278 to 239 B.C.) looked to him for advice and help. But no offers of public employment could draw Zeno himself from his simple life and the young companions who surrounded him: like Socrates, he thought that he could best serve the State by sending out others to take part in its duties[89]. He died in the year 264 B.C.[90], having been engaged in teaching for more than 30 years from the time when he ‘discovered the truth[91].’

[Sidenote: Honours paid to him.]

=86.= The vote which the Athenians passed in honour of Zeno, shortly before his death, deserves record by its contrast with that by which their predecessors had condemned Socrates. It ran somewhat as follows:

‘Whereas Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium has spent many years in this city in the pursuit of philosophy; and has been throughout a good man in all respects; and has encouraged the young men who resorted to him in virtue and temperance, and has sped them on the right path; and has made his own life an example to all men, for it has been consistent with the teaching he has set forth;

Now it seems good to the people of Athens to commend Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium, and to crown him with a golden crown (in accordance with the law) for his virtue and temperance, and to build him a tomb on the Ceramicus at the public expense. And the people shall elect five Athenian citizens to provide for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the town clerk shall engrave this vote on two pillars, and shall set up one in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And the treasurer shall make due allotment of the expense, that all men may see that the people of Athens honours good men both in their life time and after their death[92].’

We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this tribute. It is true that all the charges brought against Socrates hold even more forcibly as against Zeno. But the spirit of political and religious independence was now dead, and the advantage of the philosophical schools to the fame and business interests of the city had become clearer; so that nothing prevented any longer the open recognition of Zeno’s virtues and eminence. Who will may also read in the decree a belated mark of respect to the memory of Socrates.

[Sidenote: Zeno’s breadth of view.]

=87.= In this sketch of the life of Zeno no attempt has been made to give a complete view of his philosophy; but a few landmarks have been indicated, by which it may be possible to distinguish which parts of it were his own, which were taken over from others, and how all were gradually combined in one whole. Zeno had not the kind of originality which begins by assuming a general principle, and then explains all things human and divine by deductions from it. Instead of this he gathered together (as Aristotle had done before, but with a very different bias) what seemed most sound and illuminating in the teaching of all the schools which surrounded him. He did this in a positive spirit, feeling assured that truth exists and is discernible, and must be consistent in all its parts. We seem unable to say that in his writings he attained to this consistency, but at least he worked steadily towards it. The effort for consistency led him in the direction of monistic principle, though his points of departure both in physics and in ethics are dualistic. But the teaching of Zeno does not lend itself to that kind of study which assigns all new facts to compartments of thought ready labelled in advance, nor can it be summarized by any of the technical terms which are in use in modern philosophical thought. Enough has perhaps been said to shew that, great as was the debt of Zeno to his predecessors, he was no mere imitator or plagiarist; the history of the following centuries will shew that he had in some sense touched the pulses of human life more truly than any of his contemporaries.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Thucydides, passim.

[2] Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, ch. 1.

[3] ‘Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity’ Ueberweg, Eng. transl. i p. 89.

[4] ‘The philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle’ Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 11. ‘The bloom of Greek philosophy was short lived’ ib. p. 10.

[5] The phrases ‘cum Platone errare,’ ‘amicus Plato, magis amica veritas’ agree in expressing the general incredulity with which Platonism was received in the ancient world. In our own days an ill-balanced sympathy for Platonic dogma is often a serious hindrance to philosophic progress.

[6] See further, § 284.

[7] See below, § 179.

[8] Aristotle, Physics, ii 7.

[9] See below, § 173.

[10] εἰ δ’ ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ar. Phys. viii 2, 252 b.

[11] See Ueberweg’s note, i (Eng. trans., pp. 178-180; tenth German edition, pp. 238-240), and below, § 362.

[12] ‘vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis [Peripateticis] placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum; quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima’ Cic. Fin. v 4, 11.

[13] See note 15, below.

[14] Clem. Strom. ii p. 419 a.

[15] ‘honeste autem vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (ut indicant scripta Polemonis), et Aristoteles eiusque amici huc proxime videntur accedere’ Cic. Ac. ii 42, 131. Here Prof. J. S. Reid suggests that Polemo may merely have used the phrase κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, as opposed to κατὰ θέσιν (conventionally).

[16] ‘quem [sc. Arcesilan] ferunt ... primum instituisse, non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare’ Cic. de Or. iii 18, 67. ‘Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset’ Ac. i 12, 45.

[17] ‘[cuius] ratio probabilis possit reddi’ Cic. Fin. iii 17, 58. See further below, §§ 105, 332.

[18] See especially §§ 113 and 123.

[19] Cic. Fin. iv 28, 79.

[20] ‘non dolere ... Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit’ ib. v 25, 73.

[21] ‘at vero Callipho, et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, alter vacuitatem doloris: neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime’ ib.

[22] ib. 25, 75.

[23] Off. i 1, 1.

[24] ‘[Stoici] quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. atque, ut reliqui fures, earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutaverunt’ Fin. v 25, 74.

[25] Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, Athen. Deipnos. xiii 2; ‘tuus ille Poenulus,’ ‘e Phoenicia profecti’ Cic. Fin. iv 20, 56.

[26] Diog. L. vii 31 and 32.

[27] ‘nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa: iubet, inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari’ Sen. Dial. ix 14, 3.

[28] Diog. L. vii 3.

[29] Diog. L. vi 96 and 97.

[30] ib. vii 4.

[31] ἀντέγραψε πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν Plut. Sto. rep. 8, 2 (Arnim i 260).

[32] This doctrine can be traced back to Diogenes and even to Socrates: see below, § 303.

[33] τὰς πόλεις κοσμεῖν οὐκ ἀναθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρεταῖς Stob. iv 1, 88.

[34] See below, § 305.

[35] παριστάντα πολίτας τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον Diog. L. vii 33.

[36] See below, § 318.

[37] § 306.

[38] § 307.

[39] §§ 296, 297.

[40] § 304.

[41] § 315.

[42] See above, § 56.

[43] He said ‘O Crates, the best handle of philosophers is that by the ear; persuade me if you can, and lead me that way; if you use violence, my body will stay with you, but my soul will be with Stilpo’ Diog. L. vii 24.

[44] ‘errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque [Zeno] removebat’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 42.

[45] ‘hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, ‘visum,’ inquiebat, ‘huiusmodi est.’ deinde cum paulum digitos contraxerat, ‘adsensus huiusmodi.’ tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat; cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat: cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem’ Cic. Ac. ii 47, 145.

[46] See below, § 188.

[47] So the Megarians were commonly called on account of their disputatious methods.

[48] As for instance Arcesilaus; Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως συσχολαστὴς παρὰ Πολέμωνι Strabo xiii p. 614 (Arnim i 10).

[49] Diog. L. iv 18.

[50] ib. 20.

[51] ib.

[52] Diog. L. vii 25.

[53] See below, § 189.

[54] See § 268, note 2.

[55] οἵ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νοοῦσι Iamb. de an. (Stob. i 49, 33).

[56] Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Nemes. nat. hom. p. 96 (Arnim i 143).

[57] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν διαδοξάζουσι, περὶ [ἣν] τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονίκῳ ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας συγκαταθέσεως ὁρμῆς λόγου Iamb. de an. (Arnim i 143). See below, § 270.

[58] τῶν προειρημένων ἤκουσεν ἕως ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν· ἵνα καί φασιν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· νῦν εὐπλόηκα, ὅτε νεναυάγηκα Diog. L. vii 4. It must not however be assumed that Zeno himself used the phrase in this sense: see the other references in Arnim i 277.

[59] ‘iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate, valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam’ Cic. Ac. i 9, 34 and 35.

[60] ἐπεὶ συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις, συμπαρέλαβον εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Στίλπωνα ἅμα καὶ Κράτητα Euseb. Praep. ev. xiv 5, 11 (quoting Numenius) (Arnim i 11).

[61] Zeno often calls it aether: ‘Zenon ... aethera ... interim vult omnium esse principium’ Min. Felix xix p. 58: Cleanthes calls it spirit, see below, § 100. ‘The fire of Heraclitus becomes aether or πῦρ τεχνικόν—for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian—and is thereby spiritualised and rarefied’ Pearson, Fragments, Intr. pp. 22, 23.

[62] See below, § 196.

[63] See above, § 39.

[64] Stein, Psychologie, i 62 sqq.

[65] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον Hippolyt. Philos. 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).

[66] ‘rationem quandam per naturam omnem rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat’ Cic. N. D. i 14, 36.

[67] ‘Zeno [deum nuncupat] naturalem divinamque legem’ Lact. Div. inst. i 5, 20.

[68] ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησί Diog. L. vii 54 (quoting Diocles Magnes). It is much disputed who the authorities are to which Posidonius here refers.

[69] ‘Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria’ Cic. N. D. i 14, 36.

[70] τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων Stob. ii 7, 6 a. ‘summum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam’ Cic. Fin. iii 6, 21.

[71] εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὔροια βίου Stob. ii 7, 6 e.

[72] See note 70 above.

[73] See below, § 322.

[74] For a fuller treatment see below, §§ 319-321.

[75] οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις (sc. Peripateticis) ἠκολούθησεν ὑποτιθέμενοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; Plut. comm. not. 23, 1; ‘[a Polemone] quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ Cic. Fin. iv 16, 45.

[76] τὰ μὲν [οὖν] πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς πράγμασι Stob. ii 7, 7 g; see also below, § 320.

[77] Diogenes Laertius says distinctly that Zeno used the phrase, and names the book in which he found it; Diog. L. vii 87. On the other hand Stobaeus (ii 7, 6 a) attributes it to Cleanthes.

[78] ‘Zeno Citieus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex’ Cic. Tusc. v 12, 34.

[79] See below, § 165.

[80] ‘illa vetus Zenonis brevis, et ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio’ Cic. N. D. iii 9, 22.

[81] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος Sext. math. ix 104 (Arnim i 111); see also below, § 202.

[82] ‘ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit; viro autem bono committit; ergo vir bonus ebrius non erit’ Sen. Ep. 83, 9; for the original see Arnim i 229.

[83] ‘nullum malum gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non est malum’ Sen. Ep. 82, 9.

[84] ‘If you would know, read Zeno’s writings, and you will see’ Epict. Disc. i 20, 14.

[85] ‘cum Zenone, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit’ Cic. Ac. i 12, 44.

[86] ‘Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit’ Cic. de Or. iii 18, 67.

[87] ‘hic Zenonem vidisse acute, nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum [sc. quale non possit esse a falso]. incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse’ Cic. Ac. ii 24, 77.

[88] See below, § 157.

[89] ‘compositus sequor Zenona Cleanthen Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, et nemo non misit’ Sen. Dial. ix 1, 10; see also viii 6, 4.

[90] Pearson, Introd. p. 1.

[91] προσεμαρτύρησ[εν ἑαυτῷ] τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας Sext. math. vii 321. Pearson, Introd. p. 4.

[92] Diog. L. vii 10 and 11.

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