The American Democrat

Front matter

THE

AMERICAN DEMOCRAT,

OR

On Government

ON GOVERNMENT.

Man is known to exist in no part of the world, without certain rules for the regulation of his intercourse with those around him. It is a first necessity of his weakness, that laws, founded on the immutable principles of natural justice, should be framed, in order to protect the feeble against the violence of the strong; the honest from the schemes of the dishonest; the temperate and industrious, from the waste and indolence of the dissolute and idle. These laws, though varying with circumstances, possess a common character, being formed on that consciousness of right, which God has bestowed in order that men may judge between good and evil.

Governments have many names, which names, in all cases, are dependent on some one of the leading features of the institutions. It is usual, however, to divide governments into despotisms, limited monarchies, and republicks; but these terms are too vague to answer the objects of definitions, since many aristocracies have existed under the designation of monarchies, and many monarchies have been styled republicks.

A despotism is a government of absolute power, in which the entire authority is the possession of the prince. The term "despot," as applied to a sovereign, however, is not properly one of reproach. It merely signifies a ruler who is irresponsible for his acts, and who governs without any legal restraint on his will. The word "tyrant" had originally the same meaning, though, in a measure, both have become so far corrupted as to convey an idea of abuses.

A limited monarchy is a government in which the will of the sovereign is restrained by certain provisions of the state, that cannot lawfully be violated. In its true signification, the word monarch means any prince at the head of a state. Monarchs are known by different titles; such as emperors, kings, princes, grand dukes, dukes, &c. &c.; but it is not now common to apply the term to any below the rank of kings. The title of sovereign is of more general use, though properly meaning the same thing as that of monarch.

A republick is a government in which the pervading acknowledged principle is the right of the community as opposed to the right of a sovereign. In other words, the term implies the sovereignty of the people, in lieu of that of a monarch. Thus nations which have possessed kings, dukes, and princes at their heads, have been termed republicks, because they have reserved the right to elect the monarchs; as was formerly the case in Poland, Venice, Genoa, and in many other of the Italian states, in particular. Even Napoleon continued to style France a republick, after he had assumed the imperial diadem, because his elevation to the throne was sanctioned by the votes of the French nation. The term, in his case, however, was evidently misapplied, for the crown was made hereditary in his family, while the polity of a repub supposes a new election on the death of the last ruler, if not oftener. In the case of Napoleon, the people elected a dynasty, rather than a prince.

In a republick the chief of the state is always elective. Perhaps this fact is the most accurate technical distinction between a monarchy and this form of government, though the pervading principle of the first is the right of the sovereign, and of the last the right of the community. The term republick, (respublica) means the public things, or the common weal. Hence the term commonwealth, the word wealth, in its political sense, meaning prosperity in general, and not riches in particular.

If these theoretical distinctions were rigidly respected, it would be easy to infer the real character of a government from its name; but nothing can be less alike than governments ordinarily are, in their action, and in their professions. Thus despotism can scarcely be said to exist in truth, in any part of Christendom; monarchs being compelled to govern according to established laws, which laws are formed on principles reasonably just, while they are restrained in the exercise of their will by an opinion that has been created by the advanced intelligence of the age.

Some kings are monarchs only in name, the power having essentially passed into the hands of a few of their nominal subjects; and, on the other hand, some princes, who, by the constitutional principles of the system, are deemed to be but a part of the state, effectually control it, by means of bribes, rewards, and political combinations, submitting to little more restraint than the nominal despots. Just at this time, Prussia is an instance of the first of these truths, England of the second, and France of the last.

Prussia, though a despotism in theory, is governed as mildly, and, apart from political justice, as equitably and legally, as any other country. The will of the sovereign is never made to interfere, arbitrarily, with the administration of law, and the law itself proceeds from the principles that properly influence all legislation, though it can only receive its authority from the will of the king. That country furnishes a proof of the progress of opinion, as well as of its power to check abuses. It was only the great grandfather of the present sovereign who caused tall men to marry tall women at his command, in order to gratify a silly desire to possess a regiment of the tallest troops in the world. The influence of opinion on governments has been greatly aided by the wars and revolutions of the last, and of the present century, in which privileges have been diminished, and the rights, as well as, what is perhaps of more importance, the knowledge of their rights among the people, have been greatly augmented.

England, which is called a monarchy, is in fact a complicated but efficient aristocracy. Scarcely one of the powers that is attributed to the king by the constitution, and which were in truth exercised by his predecessors, is possessed by the present monarch in fact. By the constitution, the king of England is supposed to form a balance between the nobles and the people, whereas, in truth, his utmost influence is limited to holding a balance between parties, and this only in cases of a nearly equal force between contending factions. The extent of the authority of the king of England, at the present day, amounts to little more than the influence which he is permitted to use in minor cases, the aristocracy having devised expedients to control him on all occasions that are deemed of moment. As the mode in which this change has been effected, illustrates the manner in which govern are made to take one character, while they profess to belong to another, a brief exposition will aid the reader in understanding the subject.

The king of England can do no wrong, but the ministers are responsible to parliament. As the country has no written constitution, and laws enacted by the king, lords and commons, have the force of constitutional provisions, a system has been established, by taking advantage of the necessities of different sovereigns, by which no executive act is legal, that is not sanctioned by at least one responsible minister. It follows, the monarch can do nothing to which his parliament is seriously opposed, since no minister will incur the risk of its displeasure. It is true that the nominal assent of the king is necessary to the enactment of a law, but the ministers being responsible for the consequences if it is withheld, and the parliament alone being the judge of these consequences, as well as of the criminals, while it has an active jealousy of its own power, no instance of the exercise of this authority has occurred for more than a century. The right to withhold supplies has been the most efficient agent of the parliament, in subduing the authority of the crown.

By the theory of the British constitution, the king can declare war. Formerly this prerogative was exercised by different warlike sovereigns for personal motives. Now, the right exists only in name, for no minister would consent to give the declaration the legal forms, with the certainty of being impeached, and punished, unless acting in accordance with the wishes of parliament.

Although parliament exercises this authority in all cases of importance, the ministers are permitted to perform most minor acts of authority unquestioned, so long as they have a party in the legislature to sus them. This party, however, is necessary to their remaining in the ministry, and it follows that the majority of parliament controls the very appointment of ministers, the only important political function that the king can now, even in theory, exercise without the intervention of a responsible minister. Were he, however, to appoint a minister in opposition to the wishes of parliament, that body would refuse the required laws. The first requisite, therefore, on the formation of a new ministry, is to enquire who can "meet parliament," as it is termed; or, in other words, what ministers will be agreeable to a majority of the legislature.

Thus, while the king of England says who shall be his ministers, the parliament says who they shall not be; and, in this instance, supported as it is by a control of all legislation, the negative power is found to be stronger than the affirmative. In reality, the ministers of Great-Britain are appointed by the parliament of the country, and not by the king, and this is virtually neutralizing, if not directly annihilating, all the available authority of the latter.

In theory, the government of France and that of Great-Britain have the same general character. In practice, however, owing to the greater political advancement of the last of these two countries, France, to-day, is not far from the point where England stood a century since. Then the king of England ruled through his parliament, whereas now the parliament rules through the king. On the other hand, with much of the machinery of a free state, the king of the French governs himself. A dread of the people's getting the ascendancy, causes the aristocracy to lend itself to the power of the crown, which not only dictates the law, but, in many cases, proves to be stronger than the law itself. Of the three countries, perhaps legality is more respected in Prussia and Austria, both despotisms in theory, than in France, which has the profession of a limited monarchy. This difference is owing to the security of the two first governments, and to the insecurity of the last.

These facts show the necessity of distinguishing between names and things in governments, as well as in other matters. The institutions of no country are rigidly respected in practice, owing to the cupidity and passions of men; and vigilance in the protection of principles is even more necessary in a democracy than in a monarchy, as their violation is more certain to affect the interests of the people under such a form of government than under any other. A violation of the principles of a democracy is at the loss of the people, while, in a monarchy, it is usually their gain.

On Republicks

ON REPUBLICKS.

Republics have been as liable to frauds, and to departures from their professions, as any other polities, though no government can properly be termed a republick at all, in which the predominant authority of a single hereditary ruler is acknowledged. In all republicks there must be more or less of direct representation, however much its influence is lessened by the duration and by the magnitude of the trusts.

Poland was formerly termed a republick, because the kingly office was elective, and on account of the power of the Diet. At that time any member of this body could defeat a law by exclaiming in Latin, Veto, (I forbid it,) from which usage the word veto has been adopted as a substantive, in most of the languages of christendom, to express the same power in the different executive rulers; which it is now common to term the "veto-power." The exercise of this right was found so inconvenient in practice, that, at length, in cases of gravity, the nobles of the Diet would draw their swords, and menace the dissenting member with death, unless he withdrew his "veto." As a negative authority often has the efficiency of that which is affirmative, it is scarcely possible to conceive of a system in which the will of a majority was less consulted than in this.

The republick of Venice was an hereditary aristocracy, as, in a great measure, was that of ancient Rome. The term, in its true signification, perhaps, infers a free government, for it means a representation of the general interests of the state, but, as in practice, this representation became confined purely to the interests of the state, and the state itself was under the control of a few who did not fail to turn their authority to their private advantage, the system has oftener resulted in abuses than even that of monarchies. The profession of a free government, in which the facts do not frankly concur, usually tends to gross wrongs, in order to conceal and protect the frauds. In Venice, such was the jealousy and tyranny of the state, that a secret council existed, with an authority that was almost despotick, while it was inquisitorial, and which was removed from the usual responsibility of opinion, by an expedient that was devised to protect its members from the ordinary liabilities of common censure. This council consisted of three nobles, who held their office for a limited period, and were appointed by drawing lots, each person concealing the fact of the lot's having fallen on himself, until he met his associates at an appointed place. It is an extraordinary fact, that the same expedient was devised to conceal the murderers, in the well known case of Morgan, who fell a victim to the exaggeration and weakness of some of the members of the Masonic Fraternity.

By examining the different republicks of ancient and modern times, it would be found that most of them had little more than the profession of liberty, though all substituted in thorn the right of the community for that of a monarch, as a primary principle. This feature, then, must be taken as the distinction between this form of government and that of kingdoms, or of the sovereignties in which one rules, or is supposed to rule.

Republicks may be aristocratical, or democratical; and they may so nearly approach both, as to render it matter of doubt to which class they properly belong; for the political combinations of communities, in a practical sense, are so numerous as almost to defeat accurate general definitions.

On the Republick of the United States of America

ON THE REPUBLICK OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The government of the United States, differs from all others that have preceded it, though some imitations have been attempted in the southern parts of this continent. Its novelty, no less than its complicated nature, arising from its double system, has given birth to many errors in relation to its principles and its action, even among its own citizens, as well as among strangers.

The polity of the United States is that of a confederated republick, but the power of the federal government acting in most instances on the body of the community, without the intervention of the several states, it has been better styled a Union. This word, which is original as applied to a political system, was first given to this form of confederation, and is intended to express the greater intimacy of the relations of the parties, than those of all previous examples. It exists in the constitution, however, only as it is used in setting forth the motives for substituting that instrument for the old articles of confederation: the constitution being silent as to the particular polity of the country, except as it recognizes the general term of a republick.

The word constitution, of itself, properly implies a more identified form of government, than that which is usually understood to exist under a confederation; the first inferring a social compact, fundamental and predominant, the last a league between independent sovereignties. These distinctions have a certain weight, though they are rather arbitrary than logical, since men may create any degree of allegiance, or of liability they may deem expedient, under any form, or modes of government. To deny this is to deny to bodies of human beings the right of self-government, a gift of nature. Though possessing a common end, governments are, in reality, subject to no laws but those of their own establishing.

The government of the United States was formed by the several states of the Union, as they existed at the period when the constitution was adopted, and one of its leading principles is, that all power which is not granted to the federal authority, remain in the states themselves, or what is virtually the same thing, in the people of the states. This principle follows as a necessary consequence from the nature of the grants to the federal government, but it has been clearly expressed in a clause of the instrument, that was introduced by way of amendment, in 1801. This feature distinguishes this federal government from all the federal governments that have gone before it, as it was the general and ancient rule that liberty existed as a concession from authority; whereas, here, we find authority existing as a concession from the ruled. Something like the same principle exists in the governments of the several states, and it once existed in the ancient democracies, though, in no other known system perhaps, as clearly and as unequivocally as in this, since it is a general maxim that governments should have all power, however much they may restrain themselves in its exercise.

In the conflict of parties, the question by whom the federal government was formed, has been agitated with more seriousness than the point at issue merited, since, the fact admitted that the power which framed it did not exceed its authority, it is much more essential to know what was done, than to ascertain who did it. The notion that the people of the United States, in the popular signification of the word, framed the government, is contrary to fact, and leads to a wrong interpretation of many of the distinctive features of the system. The constitution of the United States was formed by a convention composed of delegates elected by the different states, in modes prescribed by their several laws and usages. These delegates voted by states, and not as individuals, and the instrument was referred back to conventions in the respective states for approval, or ratification. It is a governing principle of political maxims, that the power to ratify, is the power that possesses the authority in the last resort. Thus, treaties between independent sovereign , are never valid until ratified by the high treaty-making powers of the respective countries. As the several states of this Union first acted through delegates of their own appointing, and then ratified their acts, in conventions also chosen by constituencies of their own selection, it is not easy to establish any thing more plainly than the fact, that the constitution of the United States was framed by the states then in existence, as communities, and not by the body of the people of the Union, or by the body of the people of the states, as has been sometimes contended.

In favor of the latter opinion, it is maintained that the several states were an identified nation previously to the formation of the government, and the preamble of the constitution itself, has been quoted to prove that the compact was formed by the people, as distinct from the states. This preamble commences by saying that "We the people of the United States," for reasons that are then set forth, have framed the instrument that follows; but in respecting a form of phraseology, it, of necessity, neither establishes a fact, nor sets up a principle, and when we come to examine the collateral circumstances, we are irresistably led to regard it merely as a naked and vague profession.

That the several states were virtually parts of one entire nation previously to the formation of any separate general government, proves nothing in the premises, as the very circumstance that a polity distinct from that of Great Britain was established by our ancestors, who were members of the great community that was then united in one entire nation, sufficiently shows that these parts can separate, and act independently of each other. Such a circumstance might be, and probably it was, a strong motive for forming a more identified government, but it cannot properly be quoted as authority for, or against any of its provis . The latter are a mere question of fact, and as such their construction must depend on their intention as explained in language.

The term "people," like most other substantives, has its general and its specific significations. In its general signification, the people of a country, means the population of a country; as the population of a country includes the women and children, nothing can be clearer than that the "people," in this signification, did not form the American constitution. The specific significations of this word are numerous, as rich, poor, wise, silly, good and bad people. In a political sense, the people means those who are vested with political rights, and, in this particular instance, the people vested with political rights, were the constituencies of the several states, under their various laws, modifications and constitutions, which is but another name for the governments of the states themselves. "We the people," as used in the preamble of the constitution, means merely, "We the constituencies of the several states."

It follows, that the constitution of the United States was formed by the states, and not by the people of the entire country, as contended; the term used in the preamble being used in contra-distinction to the old divine right of sovereigns, and as a mode of expressing the general republican character of the government. The states, by a prescribed majority, can also amend the constitution, altering any of its provisions, with the exception of that which guaranties the equal representation of the states in the senate. It might be shown, that states possessing a minority of all the people of the Union can alter the constitution, a fact, in itself, which proves that the government of the United States, though a republick, is not necessarily a popular government, in the broadest meaning of the word. The constitution leaves the real character of the institutions of the country, with the exception that it prohibits monarchies, to be settled by the several states themselves.

On the other hand, too much importance is attached to what is called the reserved sovereignties of the several states. A community can hardly be termed sovereign at all, which has parted with all the great powers of sovereignty, such as the control of foreign relations, the authority to make war and peace, to regulate commerce, to coin money, keep fleets and armies, with all the other powers that have been ceded by the states to the federal government. But, admitting that the rights reserved are sovereign in their ordinary nature, they are scarcely so in the conditions under which they are enjoyed, since, by an amendment of the constitution, a state may be deprived of most of them, without its own consent. A community so situated can scarcely be deemed sovereign, or even independent.

The habit of drawing particular inferences from general theories, in matters as purely practical as those of government, is at all times dangerous, and the safest mode of construing the constitution of the United States, is by looking only at the instrument itself, without adverting to other systems, except as they may serve to give the proper signification of the terms of that instrument, as these terms were understood at the time it was framed.

Many popular errors exist on the subject of the influence of the federal constitution on the rights and liberties of the citizen. The rights and liberties of the citizen, in a great degree, depend on the political institutions of the several states, and not on those of the Union. Many of these errors have arisen from mistaking the meaning of the language of the con . Thus, when the constitution says that no laws shall be passed abridging the rights of the citizen in any particular thing, it refers to the power which, under that particular constitution, has the authority to pass a law at all. This power, under the government of the United States, is Congress, and no other.

An example will better show the distinction. In art. 6th of the amendments to the constitution, we find the following clause: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," &c. &c. &c. It is not the meaning of this provision of the constitution, that, under the laws of the several states, the citizen shall be entitled to a public trial by a jury, but that these privileges shall be assured to those who are accused of crimes against the laws of the United States. It is true, that similar privileges, as they are deemed essential to the liberties of their citizens, are assured to them by the constitutions of the several states, but this has been done by voluntary acts of their own, every state having full power, so far as the constitution of the United States has any control over it, to cause its accused to be tried in secret, or without the intervention of juries, as the people of that particular state may see fit.

There is nothing in the constitution of the United States, to prevent all the states, or any particular state, from possessing an established religion, from putting the press under the control of censors, from laying restrictions and penalties on the rights of speech, or from imposing most of the political and civil restraints on the citizen, that are imposed under any other form of government.

The guarantees for the liberties of the citizen, given by the constitution of the United States, are very limited, except as against the action of the government of the Union alone. Congress may not pass any law establishing a religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, but the provisions of the constitution relating to these subjects, have no reference to the rights of the states. This distinction is very essential to a correct understanding of the institutions of the country, as many are misled on the subject. Some of the states, for example, are rigid in enforcing respect for the sabbath, and a popular notion has prevailed that their laws are unconstitutional, since the federal compact guaranties liberty of conscience. This guarantee, like most of the others of the same nature, is only against the acts of Congress, and not against the acts of the states themselves. A state may pass any law it please to restrain the abuses of the sabbath, provided it do not infringe on the provisions of its own constitution, or invade a right conceded to the United States. It cannot stop the mail for instance, or the passage of troops in the service of the federal government, but it may stop all who are not thus constitutionally protected by the superior power of the Union.

This reading of the constitution is in conformity with all the rules of construction, but that it is right, can be shown from the language of the instrument itself. In article 1st, section 9th, clause 3d, we find this provision—"No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed." In article 1st, section 10th, clause 1st, which section is composed entirely of restraints on the power of the states, we find this provision—"No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, &c. &c." Had the provision of clause 3d, sect. 9th, been intended to limit the powers of the states, clause 1st, sect. 10th, would clearly have been unnecessary. The latter provision therefore, is one of the few instances, in which the power of the states themselves, is positively restrained by the constitution of the United States.

Although the several states have conceded to the United States most of the higher attributes of sovereignty, they have reserved to themselves nearly all of the functions that render governments free, or otherwise. In declaring war, regulating commerce, keeping armies and navies, coining money, which are all high acts of sovereignty, despotisms and democracies are alike; all forms of governments equally controlling these interests, and usually in the same manner.

The characters of institutions depend on the repositories of power, in the last resort. In despotisms the monarch is this repository; in aristocracies, the few; in democracies, the many. By the constitution of the United States, its government is composed of different representations, which are chosen, more or less directly, by the constituencies of the several states. As there is no common rule for the construction of these constituencies, their narrowness, or width, must depend on the fundamental laws of the states, themselves. It follows that the federal government has no fixed character, so far as the nature of its constituency is concerned, but one that may constantly vary, and which has materially varied since the commencement of the government, though, as yet, its changes have always been in the direction of popular rights.

The only distinctive restriction imposed by the constitution of the United States on the character of the state governments, is that contained in article 4th, section 4th, clause 1st, which guaranties to each state a republican form of government. No monarchy, therefore, can exist in this country, as existed formerly, and now exists, in the confederation of Germany. But a republican form of government is not necessarily a free government. Aristocracies are oftener republicks than any thing else, and they have been among the most oppressive governments the world has ever known.