Political Tracts

Front matter

POLITICA

TRACT

CONTAINING,

The False Alarm

THE

FALSE ALARM.

[1770.]

THE

FALSE ALARM.

One of the chief advantages derived by the preent generation from the improvement and diffuion of Philoophy, is deliverance from unneceary terrours, and exemption from fale alarms. The unuual appearances, whether regular or accidental, which once pread conternation over ages of ignorance, are now the recreations of inquiitive ecurity. The un is no more lamented when it is ecliped, than when it ets; and meteors play their corucations without prognotick or prediction.

The advancement of political knowledge may be expected to produce in time the like effects. Caueles dicontent and editious violence will grow les frequent, and les formidable, as the cience of Government is better acertained by a diligent tudy of the theory of Man.

It is not indeed to be expected, that phyical and political truth hould meet with equal acceptance, or gain ground upon the world with equal facility. The notions of the naturalit find mankind in a tate of neutrality, or at wort have nothing to encounter but prejudice and vanity; prejudice without malignity, and vanity without interet. But the politician’s improvements are oppoed by every paion that can exclude conviction or uppres it; by ambition, by avarice, by hope, and by terrour, by public faction, and private animoity.

It is evident, whatever be the caue, that this nation, with all its renown for peculation and for learning, has yet made little proficiency in civil widom. We are till o much unacquainted with our own tate, and o unkilful in the puruit of happines, that we hudder without danger, complain without grievances, and uffer our quiet to be diturbed, and our commerce to be interrupted, by an oppoition to the government, raied only by interet, and upported only by clamour, which yet has o far prevailed upon ignorance and timidity, that many favour it as reaonable, and many dread it as powerful.

What is urged by thoe who have been o indutrious to pread upicion, and incite fury from one end of the kingdom to the other, may be known by peruing the papers which have been at once pre as petitions to the King, and exhibited in print as remontrances to the people. It may therefore not be improper to lay before the Public the reflections of a man who cannot favour the oppoition, for he thinks it wicked, and cannot fear it, for he thinks it weak.

The grievance which has produced all this tempet of outrage, the oppreion in which all other oppreions are included, the invaion which has left us no property, the alarm that uffers no patriot to deep in quiet, is compried in a vote of the Houe of Commons, by which the freeholders of Middleex are deprived of a Briton’s birth-right, repreentation in parliament.

They have indeed received the uual writ of election, but that writ, alas! was malicious mockery; they were inulted with the form, but denied the reality, for there was one man excepted from their choice.

Non de vi, neque cæde, nec veneno, Sed lis et mihi de tribus capellis.

The character of the man thus fatally excepted, I have no purpoe to delineate. Lampoon itelf would didain to peak ill of him of whom no man peaks well. It is ufficient that he is expelled the Houe of Commons, and confined in jail as being legally convicted of edition and impiety.

That this man cannot be appointed one of the guardians and counellors of the church and tate, is a grievance not to be endured. Every lover of liberty tands doubtful of the fate of poterity, becaue the chief county in England cannot take its repreentative from a jail.

Whence Middleex hould obtain the right of being denominated the chief county, cannot eaily be dicovered; it is indeed the county where the chief city happens to tand, but how that city treated the favourite of Middleex, is not yet forgotten. The county, as ditinguihed from the city, has no claim to particular conideration.

That a man was in jail for edition and impiety, would, I believe, have been within memory a ufficient reaon why he hould not come out of jail a legilator. This reaon, notwithtanding the mutability of fahion, happens till to operate on the Houe of Commons. Their notions, however trange, may be jutified by a common obervation, that few are mended by imprionment, and that he whoe crimes have made confinement neceary, eldom makes any other ue of his enlarge , than to do with greater cunning what he did before with les.

But the people have been told with great confidence, that the Houe cannot control the right of contituting repreentatives; that he who can peruade lawful electors to chue him, whatever be his character, is lawfully choen, and has a claim to a eat in Parliament, from which no human authority can depoe him.

Here, however, the patrons of oppoition are in ome perplexity. They are forced to confes, that by a train of precedents ufficient to etablih a cutom of Parliament, the Houe of Commons has juridiction over its own members; that the whole has power over individuals; and that this power has been exercied ometimes in imprionment, and often in expulion.

That uch power hould reide in the Houe of Commons in ome caes, is inevitably neceary, ince it is required by every polity, that where there is a poibility of offence, there hould be a poibility of punihment. A member of the Houe cannot be cited for his conduct in Parliament before any other court; and therefore, if the Houe cannot punih him, he may attack with impunity the rights of the people, and the title of the King.

This exemption from the authority of other courts was, I think, firt etablihed in favour of the five members in the long parliament. It is not to be conidered as an uurpation, for it is implied in the principles of government. If legilative powers are not co-ordinate, they ceae in part to be legilative; and if they be coordinate, they are unaccountable; for to whom mut that power account, which has no uperiour?

The Houe of Commons is indeed dioluble by the King, as the nation has of late been very clamorouly told; but while it ubits it is co-ordinate with the other powers, and this co-ordination ceaes only when the Houe by diolution ceaes to ubit.

As the particular repreentatives of the people are in their public character above the control of the courts of law, they mut be ubject to the juridiction of the Houe, and as the Houe, in the exercie of its authority, can be neither directed nor retrained, its own reolutions mut be its laws, at leat, if there is no antecedent deciion of the whole legilature.

This privilege, not confirmed by any written law or poitive compact, but by the reitles power of political neceity, they have exercied, probably from their firt intitution, but certainly, as their re inform us, from the 23d of Elizabeth, when they expelled a member for derogating from their privileges.

It may perhaps be doubted, whether it was originally neceary, that this right of control and punihment, hould extend beyond offences in the exercie of parliamentary duty, ince all other crimes are cognizable by other courts. But they, who are the only judges of their own rights, have exerted the power of expulion on other occaions, and when wickednes arrived at a certain magnitude, have conidered an offence againt ociety as an offence againt the Houe.

They have therefore diveted notorious delinquents of their legilative character, and delivered them up to hame or punihment, naked and unprotected, that they might not contaminate the dignity of Parliament.

It is allowed that a man attainted of felony cannot it in Parliament, and the Commons probably judged, that not being bound to the forms of law, they might treat thee as felons, whoe crimes were in their opinion equivalent to felony; and that as a known felon could not be choen, a man o like a felon, that he could not eaily be ditinguihed, ought to be expelled.

The firt laws had no law to enforce them, the firt authority was contituted by itelf. The power exercied by the Houe of Commons is of this kind, a power rooted in the principles of government, and branched out by occaional practice; a power which neceity made jut, and precedents have made legal.

It will occur that authority thus uncontrolable may, in times of heat and contet, be oppreively and injuriouly exerted, and that he who uffers injutice, is without redres, however innocent, however mierable.

The poition is true but the argument is ueles. The Commons mut be controlled, or be exempt from control. If they are exempt they may do injury which cannot be redreed, if they are controlled they are no longer legilative.

If the poibility of abue be an argument againt authority, no authority ever can be etablihed; if the actual abue detroys its legality, there is no legal government now in the world.

This power, which the Commons have o long exercied, they ventured to ue once more againt Mr. Wilkes, and on the 3d of February, 1769, expelled him the Houe, for having printed and publihed a editious libel, and three obcene and impious libels.

If thee imputations were jut, the expulion was urely eaonable, and that they were jut, the Houe had reaon to determine, as he had confeed himelf, at the bar, the author of the libel which they term editious, and was convicted in the King’s Bench of both the publications.

But the Freeholders of Middleex were of another opinion. They either thought him innocent, or were not offended by his guilt. When a writ was iued for the election of a knight for Middleex, in the room of John Wilkes, Eq.; expelled the Houe, his friends on the ixteenth of February choe him again.

On the 17th, it was reolved, that John Wilkes, Eq.; having been in this Seion of Parliament expelled the Houe, was, and is, incapable of being elected a member to erve in this preent Parliament.

As there was no other candidate, it was reolved, at the fame time, that the election of the ixteenth was a void election.

The Freeholders till continued to think that no other man was fit to repreent them, and on the ixteenth of March elected him once more. Their reolution was now o well known, that no opponent ventured to appear.

The Commons began to find, that power without materials for operation can produce no effect. They might make the election void for ever, but if no other candidate could be found, their determination could only be negative. They, however, made void the lat election, and ordered a new writ.

On the thirteenth of April was a new election, at which Mr. Lutterel, and others, offered themelves candidates. Every me of intimidation was ued, and ome acts of violence were done to hinder Mr. Lutterel from appearing. He was not deterred, and the poll was taken, which exhibited for Mr. Wilkes, — — 1143 for Mr. Lutterel, — — 296 The heriff returned Mr. Wilkes, but the Houe, on April the fifteenth, determined that Mr. Lutterel was lawfully elected.

From this day begun the clamour, which has continued till now. Thoe who had undertaken to oppoe the minitry, having no grievance of greater magnitude, endeavoured to well this deciion into bulk, and ditort it into deformity, and then held it out to terrify the nation.

Every artifice of edition has been ince practied to awaken dicontent and inflame indignation. The papers of every day have been filled with the exhortations and menaces of faction. The madnes has pread through all ranks and through both exes; women and children have clamoured for Mr. Wilkes, honet implicity has been cheated into fury, and only the wie have ecaped infection.

The greater part may jutly be upected of not believing their own poition, and with them it is not neceary to dipute. They cannot be convinced, who are convinced already, and it is well known that they will not be ahamed.

The deciion, however, by which the maller number of votes was preferred to the greater, has perplexed the minds of ome, whoe opinions it were indecent to depie, and who by their integrity well deerve to have their doubts appeaed.

Every diffue and complicated quetion may be examined by different methods, upon different principles; and that truth, which is eaily found by one invetigator, may be miffed by another, equally honet and equally diligent.

Thoe who inquire, whether a maller number of legal votes can elect a repreentative in oppoition to a greater, mut receive from every tongue the ame anwer.

The quetion, therefore, mut be, whether a maller number of legal votes, hall not prevail againt a greater number of votes not legal.

It mut be conidered, that thoe votes only are legal which are legally given, and that thoe only are legally given, which are given for a legal candidate.

It remains then to be dicued, whether a man expelled, can be o diqualified by a vote of the Houe, as that he hall be no longer eligible by lawful electors.

Here we mut again recur, not to poitive intitutions, but to the unwritten law of ocial nature, to the great and pregnant principle of political neceity. All government uppoes ubjects, all authority implies obedience. To uppoe in one the right to command what another has the right to refue is aburd and contradictory. A tate o contituted mut ret for ever in motionles equipoie, with equal attractions of contrary tendency, with equal weights of power balancing each other.

Laws which cannot be enforced, can neither prevent nor rectify diorders. A entence which cannot be executed can have no power to warn or to reform. If the Commons have only the power of dimiing for a few days the man whom his conti can immediately end back, if they can expel but cannot exclude, they have nothing more than nominal authority, to which perhaps obedience never may be paid.

The repreentatives of our ancetors had an opinion very different: they fined and imprioned their members; on great provocation they diabled them for ever, and this power of pronouncing perpetual diability is maintained by Selden himelf.

Thee claims eem to have been made and allowed, when the contitution of our government had not yet been ufficiently tudied. Such powers are not legal, becaue they are not neceary; and of that power which only neceity jutifies, no more is to be admitted than neceity obtrudes.

The Commons cannot make laws, they can only pas reolutions, which, like all reolutions, are of force only to thoe that make them, and to thoe only while they are willing to oberve them.

The vote of the Houe of Commons has therefore only o far the force of a law, as that force is neceary to preerve the vote from loing its efficacy, it mut begin by operating upon themelves, and extends its influence to others, only by conferences ariing from the firt intention. He that tarts game on his own manor, may purue it into another.

They can properly make laws only for themelves: a member, while he keeps his eat, is ubject to thee laws; but when he is expelled, the juridiction ceaes, for he is now no longer within their dominion.

The diability, which a vote can uperinduce to expulion, is no more than was included in expulion itelf; it is only a declaration of the Commons, that they will permit n longer him whom they thus cenure to it with them in Parliament; a declaration made by that right which they necearily poes, of regulating their own Houe, and of inflicting punihment on their own delinquents.

They have therefore no other way to enforce the entence of incapacity, than that of adhering to it. They cannot otherwie punih the candidate o diqualified for offering himelf, nor the electors for accepting him. But if he has any competitor, that competitor mut prevail, and if he has none, his election will be void; for the right of the Houe to reject, annihilates with regard to the man o rejected the right of electing.

It has been urged, that the power of the Houe terminates with their eion; ince a prioner committed by the Speaker’s warrant cannot be detained during the reces. That power indeed ceaes with the eion, which mut operate by the agency of others, becaue, when they do not it, they can employ no agent, having no longer any legal exitence; but that which is exercied on themelves revives at their meeting, when the ubject of that power till ubits. They can in the next eion refue to re-admit him, whom in the former eion they expelled.

That expulion inferred excluion, in the preent cafe, mut be, I think, eaily admitted. The expulion and the writ iued for a new election were in the ame eion, and ince the Houe is by the rule of Parliament bound for the eion by a vote once paed, the expelled member cannot be admitted. He that can be admitted, cannot be elected, and the votes given to a man ineligible being given in vain, the highet number for an eligible candidate becomes a majority.

To thee concluions, as to mot moral, and to all political petitions, many objections may be made. The perpetual ubject of political diquiition is not abolute, but comparative good. Of two ytems of government, or two laws relating to the ame ubject, neither will ever be uch as theoretical nicety would deire, and therefore neither can eaily force its way againt prejudice and obtinacy; each will have its excellencies and defects, and every man, with a little help from pride, may think his own the bet.

It eems to be the opinion of many, that expulion is only a dimiion of the repreentative to his contituents, with uch a tetimony againt him as his entence may comprie; and that if his contituents, notwithtanding the cenure of the Houe, thinking his cafe hard, his fault trifling, or his excellencies uch as overbalance it, hould again chue him as till worthy of their trut, the Houe cannot refue him, for his punihment has purged his fault, and the right of electors mut not be violated.

This is plauible but not cogent. It is a cheme of repreentation, which would make a pecious appearance in a political romance, but cannot be brought into practice among us, who ee every day the towering head of peculation bow down unwillingly to groveling experience.

Governments formed by chance, and gradually improved by uch expedients, as the ucceive dicovery of their defects happened to ugget, are never to be tried by a regular theory. They are fabricks of diimilar materials, raied by different architects, upon different plans. We mut be content with them as they are; hould we attempt to mend their diproportions, we might eaily demolih, and difficultly rebuild them.

Laws are now made, and cutoms are etablihed; thee are our rules, and by them we mut be guided.

It is uncontrovertibly certain, that the Commons never intended to leave electors the liberty of returning them an expelled member, for they always require one to be choen in the room of him that is expelled, and I ee not with what propriety a man can be rechoen in his own room.

Expulion, if this were its whole effect, might very often be deirable. Sedition, or obcenity, might be no greater crimes in the opinion of other electors, than in that of the freeholders of Middleex; and many a wretch, whom his colleagues hould expel, might come back perecuted into fame, and provoke with harder front a econd expulion.

Many of the repreentatives of the people can hardly be aid to have been choen at all. Some by inheriting a borough inherit a eat; and ome it by the favour of others, whom perhaps they may gratify by the act which provoked the expulion. Some are afe by their popularity, and ome by their alliances. None would dread expulion, if this doctrine were received, but thoe who bought their elections, and who would be obliged to buy them again at a higher price.

But as uncertainties are to be determined by things certain, and cutoms to be explained, where it is poible, by written law, the patriots have triumphed with a quotation from an act of the 4th and 5th of Anne, which permits thoe to be rechoen, whoe eats are vacated by the acceptance of a place of profit. This they wiely conider as an expulion, and from the permiion, in this cae, of a re-election, infer that every other expulion leaves the delinquent entitled to the ame indulgence. This is the paragraph.

“If any peron, being choen a member of the Houe of Commons, hall accept of any office from the crown, during uch time as he hall continue a member, his election hall be, and is hereby declared to be void, and a new writ hall iue for a new election, as if uch peron o accepting was naturally dead. Nevertheles uch peron hall be capable of being again elected, as if his place had not become void as aforeaid.”

How this favours the doctrine of readmiion by a econd choice, I am not able to dicover. The tatute of 30 Ch. II. had enacted, That he who hould it in the Houe of Commons, without taking the oaths and ubcribing the tet, hould be diabled to it in the Houe during that Parliament, and a writ hould iue for the election of a new member, in place of the member o diabled, as if uch member had naturally died.

This lat claue is apparently copied in the act of Anne, but with the common fate of imitators. In the act of Charles, the political death continued during the Parliament, in that of Anne it was hardly worth the while to kill the man whom the next breath was to revive. It is, however, apparent, that in the opinion of the Parliament, the dead-doing lines would have kept him motionles, if he had not been recovered by a kind exception. A eat va , could not be regained without expres permiion of the ame tatute.

The right of being choen again to a eat thus vacated, is not enjoyed by any general right, but required a pecial claue, and olicitous proviion.

But what reemblanee can imagination conceive between one man vacating his feat, by a mark of favour from the crown, and another driven from it for edition and obcenity. The acceptance of a place contaminates no character; the crown that gives it, intends to give with it always dignity, ometimes authority. The commons, it is well known, think not wore of themelves or others for their offices of profit; yet profit implies temptation, and may expoe a repreentative to the upicion of his contituents; though if they till think him worthy of their confidence, they may again elect him.

Such is the conequence. When a man is dimied by law to his contituents, with new trut and new dignity, they may, if they think him incorruptible, retore him to his eat; what can follow, therefore, but that when the Houe drives out a varlet with public infamy, he goes away with the like permiion to return.

If infatuation be, as the proverb tells us, the forerunner of definition, how near mut be the ruin of a nation that can be incited againt its governors, by ophitry like this. I may be excued if I catch the panick, and join my groans at this alarming criis, with the general lamentation of weeping patriots.

Another objection is, that the Commons, by pronouncing the entence of diqualification, make a law, and take upon themelves the power of the whole legilature. Many quotations are then pro to prove that the Houe of Commons can make no laws.

Three acts have been cited, diabling members for different terms on different occaions, and it is profoundly remarked, that if the Commons could by their own privilege have made a diqualification, their jealouy of their privileges would never have admitted the concurrent anction of the other powers.

I mut for ever remind thee puny controvertits, that thoe acts are laws of permanent obligation: that two of them are now in force, and that the other expired only when it had fulfilled its end. Such laws the Commons cannot make; they could, perhaps, have determined for themelves, that they would expel all who hould not take the tet, but they could leave no authority behind them, that hould oblige the next Parliament to expel them. They could refue the South Sea directors, but they could not entail the refual. They can diqualify by vote, but not by law; they cannot know that the entence of diqualification pronounced to-day may not become void to-morrow, by the diolution of their own Houe. Yet while the ame Parliament its, the diqualification continues unles the vote be recinded, and while it o continues, makes the votes, which freeholders may give to the interdicted candidate, ueles and dead, ince there cannot exit, with repect to the ame ubject at the ame time, an abolute power to chue and an abolute power to reject.

In 1614, the attorney-general was voted incapable of a eat in the Houe of Commons, and the nation is triumphantly told, that though the vote never was revoked, the attorney-general is now a member. He certainly may now be a member without revocation of the vote. A law is of perpetual obligation, but a vote is nothing when the voters are gone. A law is a compact reciprocally made by the legilative powers, and therefore not to be abrogated but by all the parties. A vote is imply a reolution, which binds only him that is willing to be bound.

I have thus punctiliouly and minutely perued this diquiition, becaue I upect that thee reaoners, whoe buines is to deceive others, have ometimes deceived themelves, and I am willing to free them from their embarrament, though I do not expect much gratitude for my kindnes.

Other objections are yet remaining, for of political objections there cannot eaily be an end. It has been oberved, that vice is no proper caue of expulion, for if the wort man in the Houe were always to be expelled, in time none would be left. But no man is expelled for being wort, he is expelled for being enormouly bad; his conduct is compared, not with that of others, but with the rule of action.

The punihment of expulion being in its own nature uncertain, may be too great or too little for the fault.

This mut be the cae of many punihments. Forfeiture of chattels is nothing to him that has no poeions. Exile itelf may be accidentally a good; and indeed any punihment les than death is very different to different men.

But if this precedent be admitted and etablihed, no man can hereafter be ure that he hall be repreented by him whom he would chooe. One half of the Houe may meet early in the morning, and match an opportunity to expel the other, and the greater part of the nation may by this tratagem be without its lawful repreentatives.

He that ees all this, ees very far. But I can tell him of greater evils yet behind. There is one poibility of wickednes, which, at this alarming criis, has not yet been mentioned. Every one knows the malice, the ubtilty, the indutry, the vigilance, and the greedines of the Scots. The Scotch members are about the number ufficient to make a houe. I propoe it to the conideration of the Supporters of the Bill of Rights, whether there is not reaon to upect, that thee hungry intruders from the North, are now contriving to expel all the Englih. We may then cure the hour in which it was determined, that expulion and excluion are the fame. For who can gues what may be done when the Scots have the whole Houe to themelves?

Thus agreeable to cutom and reaon, notwithtanding all objections, real or imaginary; thus conitent with the practice of former times, and thus conequential to the original principles of government, is that deciion by which o much violence of dicontent has been excited, which has been o dolorouly bewailed, and o outrageouly reented.

Let us however not be educed to put too much confidence in jutice or in truth, they have often been found inactive in their own defence, and give more confidence than help to their friends and their advocates. It may perhaps be prudent to make one momentary conceion to falehood, by uppoing the vote in Mr. Lutterel’s favour to be wrong.

All wrong ought to be rectified. If Mr. Wilkes is deprived of a lawful eat, both he and his electors have reaon to complain; but it will not be eaily found, why, among the innumerable wrongs of which a great part of mankind are hourly complaining, the whole care of the Public hould be transferred to Mr. Wilkes and the freeholders of Middleex, who might all ink into non-exitence, without any other effect, than that there would be room made for a new rabble, and a new retailer of edition and obcenity. The caue of our country would uffer little; the rabble, whenceoever they come, will be always patriots, and always Supporters of the Bill of Rights.

The Houe of Commons decides the diputes ariing from elections. Was it ever uppoed, that in all cafes their deciions were right? Every man whoe lawful election is defeated, is equally wronged with Mr. Wilkes, and his condiments feel their diappointment with no les anguih than the freeholders of Middleex. Thee deciions have often been apparently partial, and ometimes tyrannically oppreive. A majority has been given to a favourite candidate, by expunging votes which had always been allowed, and which therefore had the authority by which all votes are given, that of cutom uninterrupted. When the Commons determine who hall be contituents, they may, with ome propriety, be aid to make law, becaue thoe determinations have hitherto, for the ake of quiet, been adopted by ucceeding Parliaments. A vote therefore of the Houe, when it operates as a law, is to individuals a law only temporary, but to communities perpetual.