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Common Sense Addressed to the Inhabitants of America

Thomas Paine · 1776

21,373 words · about 1 h 30 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Language
English
Published
1776
Length
21,373 words · about 1 h 30 min
Sections
4 reader sections
Text
Digital text
Rights
Public domain

 

Contents (4)
  1. Front matter under 1 min
  2. Introduction to the Third Edition about 1 min
  3. Common Sense about 1 h 5 min
  4. Appendix about 23 min

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Front matter

'

ADDRESSED TO THE

'

Introduction to the Third Edition

'

P the entiments contained in the following pages, are not yet ufficiently fahionable to procure them general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a uperficial appearance of being right, and raies at firt a formidable outcry in defence of cutom. But the tumult oon ubides.—Time makes more converts than reaon.

As a long and violent abue of power is generally the means of calling the right of it in quetion (and in matters too which might never have been thought of, had not the ufferers been aggravated into the enquiry) and as the King of England hath undertaken, in his own right, to upport the Parliament in what he calls theirs; and as the good people of this country are grievouly oppreed by the Combination, they have an undoubted privilege to enquire into the pretenions of both, and equally to reject the Uurpation of either.

In the following heets, the author hath tudiouly avoided every thing which is peronal among ourelves. Compliments as well as cenure to individuals make no part thereof. The wie, and the worthy, need not the triumph of a pamphlet; and thoe whoe entiments are injudicious, or unfriendly, will ceae of themelves, unles too much pains are betowed upon their converion.

The caue of America is in a great meaure the caue of all mankind. Many circumtances hath, and will arie, which are not local, but univeral, and through which the principles of all lovers of mankind are affected, and in the event of which their affections are intereted. The laying a country deolate with fire and word, declaring war againt the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature hath given the power of feeling; of which clas, regardles of party cenure, is the

R.

Common Sense

E.

Of the Origin and Deign of Government in general, with concie Remarks on the English Constitution.

S writers have o confounded ociety with government, as to leave little or no ditinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickednes; the former promotes our happines poitively, by uniting our affections; the latter negatively, by retraining our vices. The one encourages intercoure, the other creates ditinctions. The firt is a patron, the lat a puniher.

Society in every tate is a bleing, but government even in its bet tate is but a neceary evil; in its wort tate an intolerable one: For when we uffer, or are expoed to the ame mieries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnih the means by which we uffer. Government, like dres, is the badge of lot innocence; the palaces of Kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of Paradie: For were the impules of concience clear, uniform and irreitably obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the cae, he finds it neceary to urrender up a part of his property, to furnih means for the protection of the ret; and this he is induced to do, by the ame prudence which in every other cae advies him, out of two evils to chooe the leat. Wherefore, ecurity being the whole deign and end of government, it unanwerably follows, that whatever form thereof appears mot likely to enure it to us, with the leat expence and greatet benefit, is preferable to all others.

In order to give a clear and jut idea of the deign and end of government, let us uppoe a mall number of perons ettled in ome equetered part of the earth, unconnected with the ret; they will then repreent the firt peopling of any country, or of the world. In this tate of natural liberty, ociety will be their firt thought. A thouand motives will excite them thereto; the trength of one man is o unequal to his wants, and his mind o unfitted for perpetual olitude, that he is oon obliged to eek aitance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the ame. Four or five united would be able to raie a tolerable dwelling in the midt of a wildernes, but one man might labour out the common period of life without accomplihing any thing; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Dieae, nay even mifortune, would be death; for though neither might be mortal, yet either would diable him from living, and reduce him to a tate in which he might rather be aid to perih, than to die.

Thus neceity, like a gravitating power, would oon form our newly arrived emigrants into ociety, the reciprocal bleings of which would uperede, and render the obligations of law and government unneceary, while they remained perfectly jut to each other: But as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they urmount the firt difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common caue, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other: And this remines will point out the neceity of etablihing ome form of government, to upply the defect of moral virtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a tate-houe, under the branches of which the whole colony may aemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their firt laws will have the title only of Regulations, and be enforced by no other penalty than public di-eteem. In this firt Parliament every man by natural right will have a eat.

But as the colony encreaes, the public concerns will encreae likewie, and the ditance at which the members may be eparated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occaion as at firt, when their number was mall, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their conenting to leave the legilative part to be managed by a elect number choen from the whole body, who are uppoed to have the ame concerns at take which thoe have who appointed them, and who will act in the ame manner as the whole body would act, were they preent. If the colony continue encreaing, it will become neceary to augment the number of the repreentatives, and that the interet of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found bet to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part ending its proper number: And that the elected might never form to themelves an interet eparate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often; becaue as the elected might by that means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be ecured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themelves. And as this frequent interchange will etablih a common interet with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally upport each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of King) depends the trength of government, and the happines of the governed.

Here then is the rie and origin of government; namely a mode rendered neceary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the deign and end of government, viz. Freedom and Security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with how, or our ears deceived by ound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or interet darken our undertanding, the imple voice of nature and reaon will ay, 'tis right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature which no art can overturn, viz. that the more imple any thing is, the les liable it is to be diordered, and the eaier repaired when diordered; and with this maxim in view I offer a few remarks on the o much boated contitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and lavih times in which it was erected, is granted. When the world was over-run with tyranny, the leat remove therefrom was a glorious recue. But that it is imperfect, ubject to convulions, and incapable of producing what it eems to promie, is eaily demontrated.

Abolute governments (though the digrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that they are imple; if the people uffer, they know the head from which their uffering prings; know likewie the remedy; and are not bewildered by a variety of caues and cures. But the contitution of England is o exceedingly complex, that the nation may uffer for years together, without being able to dicover in which part the fault lies; ome will ay in one and ome in another, and every political phyician will advie a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long-tanding prejudices, yet if we will uffer ourelves to examine the component parts of the Englih contitution, we hall find them to be the bae remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with ome new Republican materials.

Firt.—The remains of Monarchical tyranny, in the peron of the King.

Secondly.—The remains of Aritocratical tyranny, in the perons of the Peers.

Thirdly.—The new Republican materials, in the perons of the Commons, on whoe virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two firt, by being hereditary, are independent of the people; wherefore in a contitutional ene they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the tate.

To ay that the contitution of England is a union of three powers, reciprocally checking each other, is farcical; either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To ay that the Commons is a check upon the King, preuppoes two things:

Firt.—That the King is not to be truted without being looked after, or, in other words, that a thirt for abolute power is the natural dieae of Monarchy.

Secondly.—That the Commons, by being appointed for that purpoe, are either wier or more worthy of confidence than the Crown.

But as the ame contitution which gives the Commons a power to check the King, by with-holding the upplies, gives afterwards the King a power to check the Commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills; it again uppoes that the King is wier than thoe, whom it has already uppoed to be wier than him. A mere aburdity!

There is omething exceedingly ridiculous in the compoition of Monarchy; it firt excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act in caes where the highet judgment is required.—The tate of a King huts him from the world, yet the buines of a King requires him to know it thoroughly: Wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally oppoing and detroying each other, prove the whole character to be aburd and ueles.

Some writers have explained the Englih contitution thus; the King, ay they, is one; the People another; the Peers are an houe in behalf of the King; the Commons in behalf of the People; but this hath all the ditinctions of an houe divided againt itelf; and though the expreions be pleaantly arranged, yet when examined they appear idle and ambiguous: And it will always happen, that the nicet contruction that words are capable of, when applied to the decription of omething which either cannot exit, or is too incomprehenible to be within the compas of decription, will be words of ound only, and though they may amue the ear, they cannot inform the mind: For this explanation includes a previous quetion, viz. How came the King by a power which the People are afraid to trut, and always obliged to check? Such a power could not be the gift of a wie people, neither can any power which needs checking be from God: Yet the proviion which the contitution makes, uppoes uch a power to exit.

But the proviion is unequal to the tak; the means either cannot or will not accomplih the end, and the whole affair is a felo de e: For as the greater weight will always carry up the les, and as all the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains to know which power in the contitution has the mot weight, for that will govern: And though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phrae is, check the rapidity of its motion, yet o long as they cannot top it, their endeavours will be ineffectual: The firt moving power will at lat have its way, and what it wants in peed is upplied by time.

That the crown is this overbearing part in the Englih contitution needs not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole conequence merely from being the giver of places and penions is elf-evident; wherefore, though we have been wie enough to hut and lock a door againt abolute Monarchy, we at the ame time have been foolih enough to put the Crown in poeion of the key.

The prejudice of Englihmen in favour of their own government, by King, Lords and Commons, aries as much or more from national pride than reaon. Individuals are undoubtedly afer in England than in ome other countries: But the will of the King is as much the law of the land in Britain as in France, with this difference, that intead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the more formidable hape of an act of Parliament. For the fate of Charles the firt hath only made Kings more ubtile—not more jut.

Wherefore laying aide all national pride and prejudice in favour of modes and forms, the plain truth is, that it is wholly owing to the contitution of the People, and not to the contitution of the Government, that the Crown is not as oppreive in England as in Turkey.

An enquiry into the contitutional errors in the Englih form of government, is at this time highly neceary; for as we are never in a proper condition of doing jutice to others, while we continue under the influence of ome leading partiality, o neither are we capable of doing it to ourelves while we remain fettered by any obtinate prejudice. And as a man who is attached to a protitute is unfitted to chooe or judge of a wife, o any prepoeion in favour of a rotten contitution of government will diable us from dicerning a good one.

Of Monarchy and hereditary Succession.

M being originally equals in the order of creation, the equality could only be detroyed by ome ubequent circumtance. The ditinctions of rich and poor may in a great meaure be accounted for, and that without having recoure to the harh ill-ounding names of oppreion and avarice. Oppreion is often the conequence, but eldom or never the means of riches; and though avarice will preerve a man from being neceitouly poor, it generally makes him too timorous to be wealthy.

But there is another and greater ditinction, for which no truly natural or religious reaon can be aigned, and that is, the ditinction of Men into Kings and Subjects. Male and female are the ditinctions of nature—good and bad the ditinctions of Heaven; but how a race of men came into the world o exalted above the ret, and ditinguihed like ome new pecies, is worth enquiring into, and whether they are the means of happines or of miery to mankind.

In the early ages of the world, according to the cripture chronology, there were no Kings; the conequence of which was, there were no wars; it is the pride of Kings which throws mankind into confuion. Holland, without a King, hath enjoyed more peace for this lat century, than any of the Monarchical governments in Europe. Antiquity favours the ame remark; for the quiet and rural lives of the firt Patriarchs hath a happy omething in them, which vanihes away when we come to the hitory of Jewih Royalty.

Government by Kings was firt introduced into the world by the Heathens, from whom the children of Irael copied the cutom. It was the mot properous

invention the devil ever et on foot for the promotion of idolatry. The Heathens paid divine honours to their deceaed Kings, and the Chritian world hath improved on the plan, by doing the ame to their living ones. How impious is the title of acred Majety, applied to a worm, who in the midt of his plendor is crumbling into dut!

As the exalting one man o greatly above the ret cannot be jutified on the equal rights of nature, o neither can it be defended on the authority of cripture; for the will of the Almighty, as declared by Gideon and the Prophet Samuel, expresly diapproves of government by Kings. All Anti-Monarchical parts of cripture have been very moothly gloed over in Monarchical governments, but they undoubtedly merit the attention of countries which have their governments yet to form. Render unto Cæar the things which are Cæar's," is the cripture doctrine of Courts, yet it is no upport of a Monarchical government; for the Jews at that time were without a King, and in a tate of vaalage to the Romans.

Near three thouand years paed away, from the Moaic account of the creation, till the Jews, under a national deluion, requeted a King. Till then, their form of government (except in extraordinary caes where the Almighty interpoed) was a kind of Republic, adminitred by a judge and the elders of the tribes. Kings they had none, and it was held inful to acknowledge any being under that title but the Lord of Hots. And when a man eriouly reflects on the idolatrous homage which is paid to the perons of Kings, he need not wonder that the Almighty, ever jealous of his honor, hould diapprove of a form of government which o impiouly invades the prerogative of Heaven.

Monarchy is ranked in cripture as one of the ins of the Jews, for which a cure in reerve is denounced againt them. The hitory of that tranaction is worth attending to.

The children of Irael being oppreed by the Midianites, Gideon marched againt them with a mall army, and victory through the divine interpoition decided in his favour. The Jews, elate with ucces, and attributing it to the generalhip of Gideon, propoed making him a King, aying, "Rule thou over us, thou and thy on, and thy on's on." Here was temptation in its fullet extent; not a Kingdom only, but an hereditary one: But Gideon in the piety of his oul, replied, "I will not rule over you, neither hall my on rule over you; the Lord shall rule over you." Words need not be more explicit; Gideon doth not decline the honor, but denieth their right to give it; neither doth he compliment them with invented declarations of his thanks, but, in the poitive tile of a Prophet, charges them with diaffection to their proper Sovereign, the King of Heaven.

About one hundred and thirty years after this, they fell again into the ame error. The hankering which the Jews had for the idolatrous cutoms of the Heathens, is omething exceedingly unaccountable; but o it was, that laying hold of the miconduct of Samuel's two ons, who were entruted with ome ecular concerns, they came in an abrupt and clamorous manner to Samuel, aying, "Behold thou art old, and thy ons walk not in thy ways, now make us a King to judge us, like all the other nations." And here we cannot but oberve that their motives were bad, viz. that they might be like unto other nations, i. e. the Heathens; whereas their true glory laid in being as much unlike them as poible. "But the thing dipleaed Samuel, when they aid give us a King to judge us; and Samuel prayed unto the Lord, and the Lord aid unto Samuel, hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they ay unto thee, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. According to all the works which they have done, ince the day that I brought them up out of Egypt even unto this day, wherewith they have foraken me, and erved other Gods; o do they alo unto thee. Now therefore hearken unto their voice; howbeit, protet olemnly unto them, and hew them the manner of the King that hall reign over them," i. e. not of any particular King, but the general manner of the Kings of the Earth, whom Irael was o eagerly copying after. And notwithtanding the great ditance of time, and difference of manners, the character is till in fahion. "And Samuel told all the words of the Lord unto the people, that aked of him a King. And he aid this hall be the manner of the King that hall reign over you: He will take your ons, and appoint them for himelf, for his chariots and to be his horemen, and ome hall run before his chariots." (This decription agrees with the preent mode of impreing men.) "And he will appoint him captains over thouands and captains over fifties, and will et them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvet, and to make his intruments of war, and intruments of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be confectioneries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers." (This decribes the expence and luxury as well as the oppreion of Kings.) "And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the bet of them, and give them to his ervants. And he will take the tenth of your eed, and of your vineyards, and give them to his officers and to his ervants." (By which we ee that bribery, corruption, and favouritim, are the tanding vices of Kings.) "And he will take the tenth of your men ervants, and your maid ervants, and your goodliet young men, and your aes, and put them to his work: And he will take the tenth of your heep, and ye hall be his ervants, and ye hall cry out in that day becaue of your King which ye hall have choen, and the Lord will not hear you in that day." (This accounts for the continuation of Monarchy; neither do the characters of a few good Kings, which have lived ince, either anctify the title, or blot out the infulnes of the origin; the high encomium given of David takes no notice of him officially as a King, but only as a Man after God's own heart.) "Nevertheles the people refued to obey the voice of Samuel, and they aid nay but we will have a King over us, that we may be like all the nations, and that our King may judge us, and go out before us and fight our battles." Samuel continued to reaon with them, but to no purpoe; he et before them their ingratitude, but all would not avail, and eeing them fully bent on their folly, he cried out, "I will call unto the Lord, and he hall end thunder and rain (which then was a punihment, being in the time of wheat harvet) that ye may perceive and ee that your wickednes is great which you have done in the ight of the Lord, in asking you a King. So Samuel called unto the Lord, and the Lord ent thunder and rain that day, and all the people greatly feared the Lord and Samuel. And all the people aid unto Samuel, pray for thy ervants unto the Lord thy God, that we die not; for we have added unto our sins this evil, to ask a King." Thee portions of cripture are direct and poitive. They admit of no equivocal contruction. That the Almighty hath here entered his protet againt Monarchical government is true, or the cripture is fale. And a man hath good reaon to believe, that there is as much King-craft as Priet-craft in with-holding the cripture from the public in Popih countries; for Monarchy in every intance is the Popery of Government.

To the evil of Monarchy we have added that of Hereditary Succeion; and as the firt is a degradation and leening of ourelves, o the econd, claimed as a matter of right, is an inult and impoition on poterity. For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could have a right to et up his own family in perpetual preference to all others for ever; and though himelf might deerve ome decent degree of honors of his cotemporaries, yet his decendents might be far too unworthy to inherit them. One of the tronget natural proofs of the folly of hereditary right in Kings is, that nature diapproves it, otherwie he would not o frequently turn it into ridicule, by giving mankind an As for a Lion.

Secondly, as no man at firt could poes any other public honors than were betowed upon him, o the givers of thoe honors could have no power to give away the right of poterity; and though they might ay "we chooe you for our head," they could not, without manifet injutice to their children, ay that "your children and your children's children hall reign over ours for ever;" becaue uch an unwie, unjut, unnatural compact might (perhaps) in the next ucceion, put them under the government of a rogue or a fool. Mot wie men, in their private entiments, have ever treated hereditary right with contempt; yet it was one of thoe evils, which when once etablihed is not eaily removed; many ubmit from fear, others from upertition, and the more powerful part hares with the King the plunder of the ret.

This is uppoing the preent race of Kings in the world to have had an honorable origin; whereas it is more than probable, that could we take off the dark covering of antiquity, and trace them to their firt rie, that we hould find the firt of them nothing better than the principal Ruffian of ome retles Gang, whoe avage manners or pre-eminence in ubtilty obtained him the title of Chief among Plunderers; and who by increaing in power, and extending his depredations, overawed the quiet and defenceles to purchae their afety by frequent contributions. Yet his electors could have no idea of giving hereditary right to his decendents, becaue uch a perpetual excluion of themelves was incompatible with the free and unretrained principles they profeed to live by. Wherefore hereditary ucceion, in the early ages of Monarchy, could not take place as a matter of claim, but as omething caual or complimental; but as few or no records were extant in thoe days, and traditionary hitory tuffed with fables, it was very eay, after the lape of a few generations, to trump up ome upertitious tale, conveniently timed, Mahomet-like, to cram hereditary right down the throats of the vulgar. Perhaps the diorders which threatened, or eemed to threaten, on the deceae of a leader, and the choice of a new one (for elections among ruffians could not be very orderly) induced many at firt to favour hereditary pretenions; by which means it happened, as it hath happened ince, that what at firt was ubmitted to as a convenience, was afterwards claimed as a right.

England ince the conquet hath known ome few good Monarchs, but groaned beneath a much larger number of bad ones; yet no man in his enes can ay, that their claim under William the Conqueror is a very honorable one. A French Batard landing with an armed banditti, and etablihing himelf King of England againt the conent of the natives, is in plain terms a very paltry racally original.—It certainly hath no divinity in it. However it is needles to pend much time in expoing the folly of hereditary right; if there are any o weak as to believe it, let them promicuouly worhip the As and the Lion and welcome. I hall neither copy their humility, nor diturb their devotion.

Yet I hould be glad to ak how they uppoe Kings came at firt? The quetion admits but of three anwers, viz. either by lot, by election, or by uurpation. If the firt King was taken by lot, it etablihes a precedent for the next, which excludes hereditary ucceion. Saul was by lot, yet the ucceion was not hereditary, neither does it appear from the tranaction there was any intention it ever hould. If the firt King of any country was by election, that likewie etablihes a precedent for the next; for to ay, that the right of all future generations is taken away by the act of the firt electors, in their choice not only of a King, but of a family of Kings for ever, hath no parallel in or out of cripture but the doctrine of original in, which uppoes the free-will of all men lot in Adam: And from uch comparion, and it will admit of no other, hereditary ucceion can derive no glory. For as in Adam all inned, and as in the firt electors all men obeyed; as in the one all mankind were ubjected to Satan, and in the other to Sovereignty; as our innocence was lot in the firt, and our authority in the lat; and as both diable us from reauming ome former tate and privilege, it unanwerably follows that original in and hereditary ucceion are parallels. Dihonorable rank! inglorious connexion! yet the mot ubtile ophit cannot produce a juter imile.

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