Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences

Front matter

DISCOURSE

ON THE

METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON,

Translator's Preface

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

With respect to the Tract, of which a translation is here presented, it may be proper to state, that what refers strictly to its matter has been reserved for the Introduction.

It may be necessary, however, here to mention, that the Discourse on Method is possessed of a twofold value and interest; firstly, on account of the doctrines which, viewed in itself, the Tract contains; and, secondly, from its being the general introduction to the works of Descartes, which, as is well known, were the means of eliciting the intense philosophical activity of the last two centuries, of determining the current of this activity, and of raising those problems with which philosophical schools continue at this hour to grapple.—The Translator would consider that an important end had been promoted were the present translation of the Method to aid in fixing the attention of those interested in philo- sophical pursuits on the other works of its great Author.

It is hoped, moreover, that the Method may prove a somewhat suitable accompaniment to the Logic of the Port-Royal. These treatises possess each, indeed, a separate utility: and, though the end sought by each is different, the realization of the ends of both is necessary to perfect knowledge. For while the practical end of Logic is the right ordering of the matter of thought, the end of the Discourse on Method is mainly to manifest the reality, and determine the sphere of knowledge and the latter process does not yield in importance or necessity to the former.

With reference to the translation, it is proper to state that, though the French work has been taken as the basis, the Translator has not considered himself bound to adhere, in every instance, to its text. The first, or French edition has, indeed, been carefully compared throughout with the Latin; and, as this edition is declared by Descartes to have been revised by himself, and to contain amendments on the original from his own hand, the preference has been accorded to it in all cases in which it has appeared to the Translator that the meaning is more perfectly given.

The Translator is not aware of the existence of any previous English version of the Method.

The Translator willingly takes this opportunity of acknowledging his great obligations to Professor Macdougall. To his minute revision of the translation numerous improvements are due.

Edinburgh, October 1850.

Introduction by the Translator

INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.

The Discourse on Method principally contains two things:—

1. An account of the Philosophical Method of its author.

2. A summary of the Chief Results of the Method.

To these I propose to advert in their order; but chiefly to the former, because, in the first place, a special reference to the Method itself is mainly relevant in an introduction to the Discourse on Method, and because, in the second place, a formal though general discussion of the results of the Cartesian Method must far exceed the limits of the present introduction. Certain of the prominent results of the Method will, however, fall to be noticed as illustrative of the characters of the Method itself: and certain of the more general relations of Descartes to succeeding philosophers will be indicated in conclusion.

OF THE METHOD OF DESCARTES.

The Method of Descartes has a preliminary, the character of which it is necessary precisely to ascertain.

The preliminary to the Method is Doubt. This leads us to inquire, in the first place, into the nature of the Cartesian Doubt.

I. Doubt in general, and the Cartesian doubt in particular, is equivalent simply to the absence of any decision, whether affirmative or negative, respecting the relation of the subject and predicate of a judgment. Doubt is thus the suspension of the act of the faculty of judgment, in so far as the determination of the joining or disjoining of the terms of a proposition is concerned. This suspension arises in the absence of grounds adequate to determine either certain affirmation or nega- tion; and passes away whenever the mind is determined either to join or disjoin, to include or exclude, with certainty. Thus far of doubt in general, and of the Cartesian doubt in particular.

In it is necessary to state farther, that the Cartesian doubt embraced within its sphere all the judgments and beliefs that were due to education and authority. Of these Descartes made a surrender, under certain conditions and reservations to be found stated in the Method (Part III.): which, however, scarcely affect the generality and immediateness of the doubt.

But doubt, suspension of judgment, is with Descartes not an end in itself; it is not that for which, as with the Sceptic, the activity of the faculties of knowledge is put forth, and which is itself for no other end. On the contrary, doubt is with Descartes singly a means, and the end of the Cartesian doubt is the end of the Cartesian Method, viz., Certainty. In this respect is the Cartesian doubt distinguished from the sceptical, the end of which is not the certainty of affirmation and negation, but continual doubt, and thence permanent indifference and indisturbance.

The Cartesian doubt, therefore, in so far as preliminary to the Cartesian Method, is simply equivalent to a resolution to accept such truths as the philosopher might determine to fall within the sphere of Philosophy, on their own evidence, and on that alone.

Such is the nature and end of the Cartesian doubt. The manner in which Descartes avails himself of doubt to accomplish the end of his Method, will be noticed in detail when we come to show how he manifests the reality of knowledge.

From what has been said of the Cartesian doubt its legitimacy is manifest. Doubt of this nature, though perhaps not in an unlimited generality and immediacy, is even obligatory as a means to knowledge, if we would not take our opinions on trust.

But, in the second place, it may be proper at this stage to show what the Cartesian doubt, viewed in its general aspect, involves, in respect of the Principle of Truth and Certainty.

II. This is manifestly the denial of the jurisdiction of authority in the sphere of the true and the false. Descartes doubted, withheld his assent from the judgments bequeathed to him by education and authority, that he himself might determine which, and how many of these were true. By this act he implicitly asserted a right to decide upon the truth or falsity of what authority had laid down, and, therefore, the superiority to authority of another principle in the sphere of truth. This new principle was none other than Human Thought itself,—thought unfettered except by its own laws,—the intelligence acting within the limits prescribed to it by its own nature and constitution. But to proclaim free reflection as a principle superior to authority in the search after causes or reasons, was to proclaim the independence of philosophy,—to affirm that the deliverances of human thought were superior to the decrees of the Church. By his doubt, therefore, did Descartes challenge the propriety, and consummate the ruin of that philosophy known as Scholastic, whose foundations for the last two centuries had been gradually giving way, and chiefly under the influence of independent physical research. Under Scholasticism the human mind had other laws than its own,—thought was subordinated to authority, at first absolutely, then partially, and the whole activity of the mind was limited to the deduction of conclusions from principles which authority furnished. But in the new and pure philosophy of Descartes, the mind was set free to seek alike its principles and conclusions; authority was subordinated to thought. In this respect, what Bacon accomplished in Britain, Descartes accomplished on the Continent.

But, in the third place, it is not enough that the mind be disenthralled, and permitted to go in search of principles in independence of authority; care must be taken that liberty do not degenerate into license. After the Cartesian preliminary, it was possible that the mind might be carried away by the mere pleasure of activity; and, as the degree of activity is higher, and consequently the pleasure, in proportion to the absence of impediment or of rule, the danger of the mental activity setting at nought all limits, or of mind acting without rule, was great. Hence the need of a fixed or regular philosophical procedure as the only guarantee of reaching truth and certainty, hence, in a word, the need of a Method. This leads us to inquire more particularly into the nature of Method.

III. On this point we have an explicit declaration by Descartes himself, which is at once brief and comprehensive. "By Method (he says) I understand rules certain and easy, such as to prevent any one, who shall have accurately observed them, from ever assuming what is false for what is true, and by which, with no effort of mind uselessly consumed, but always by degrees increasing science, a person will arrive at a true knowledge of all those things which he will be capable of knowing."—(Reg. ad direct. ingenii—Reg. iv.)

In accordance with this declaration, it is manifest that procedure by a Method is a fixed procedure, for it is a procedure according to rule. It is thus opposed to procedure by chance or at random.

Such procedure supposes, it is plain, the previous determination of some end which in thus proceeding we design, and exclusively design, to realize. Procedure by Method, as a procedure in accordance with certain rules, which we have laid down with a view to the realization of an end, is therefore a reflective procedure.

As a Method is thus a sum of precepts, the observance of which is calculated to enable us to realize a given end, it is plain that the kind and character of the precepts of which a method is the sum will be determined by the kind and character of its end: hence Methods will differ according to their ends. The character of philosophical Method will therefore be determined by the nature of the end of Philosophy.

Now, Philosophy or Science is possible, and is necessary, because of our possession of faculties of knowledge: hence the end of philosophy is the end of these faculties, that is, is Knowledge. Again, as we only really know when we know a thing as it is, that is, when our knowledge is true, the end of philosophy of science may be said to be Truth: hence philosophical or scientific Method will be a procedure so regulated as to enable the seeker to reach Truth.

It is thus that Descartes makes True Knowledge (vera cognitio), or Truth, the end of philosophical or scientific Method.

The mind, in proceeding by Method, while it manifests, likewise concentrates its activity. It seeks through the action of the faculties of knowledge specially directed, more perfect knowledge than is passively afforded in the spontaneous presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The activity of the faculties of knowledge is concentrated on objects, and is only manifested in accordance with certain rules. The cognitive power, by being thus limited to a determinate channel, is prevented from being wasted or thrown away in irregular exercise. The activity of the mind is subordinated to the realization of a given end; the mind itself has another rule than its own impetuosity. Descartes, therefore, to reach truth, and for the right conduct of the mind, that is, to prevent it from wasting its powers in capricious activity, instituted a Method.

Such is the end, and such the need of Method. It will be necessary, however, in the fourth place, to show more particularly the nature of the Method of Descartes; and, first, of the Method in its prior half.

IV. The end of philosophical procedure is, as we have seen, True Knowledge, or Truth.

Truth refers exclusively to judgments. A judgment is true when what we include within certain limits is really therein included, and when what we exclude is really therefrom excluded. The end of philosophical method in general is, therefore, the determination of real inclusions and exclusions.

We must distinguish, however, between Method that is instituted merely for the purposes of Science, and that instituted for the ends of Philosophy Proper.

The end of Scientific Method in general is, the determination of individual truths in this and that matter, the elaboration of these into classes, and the binding them up into system.

The end of the Method of Philosophy Proper, as this is laid down by Descartes, is twofold; for it is to find by reflection, the Ultimate Ground of the Truth of the judgments of Science; and likewise of our Assurance of the truth of these judgments.

Descartes thus seeks to establish and vindicate the reality of knowledge; and that by connecting, in the way of consequence, the whole series of subordinate truths, that is, the whole truths of Science with the ultimate truths, or truth, if such exist: and likewise by discovering the ground of our assurance of individual truths through the discovery of the ground of our certainty in the highest truth.

The determination of such truths or truth is, according to Descartes, to be reached by Analysis. The Philosophical Procedure of Descartes is thus, in the first instance, Analytic.

Analysis, in general, consists in the resolution of the complex into the simple and constituent.

The principal object of the Analysis of Descartes is to be found in our notions and judgments. The end of Descartes is to reach Principles or Reasons. In pursuance of this end, he proceeds always from the judgment of the truth of which he is uncertain, and seeks to find whether the other judgments, which the one in question involves, are true, and through these to determine the truth of the proposition from which he starts. Such is the nature of his general procedure.

The matter of our knowledge, viewed in the light of this Analysis, is not considered with reference to the purposes of classification (lang|la|non in quantum ad aliquod genus entis refertur), but with reference to its capability for consequence; to the relation of the determining and determined (in quantum unæ ex aliis cognosci possunt). The knowledge sought is thus, when reached, obtained through other knowledge, or by means of other truth.

The Analysis of Descartes thus manifestly supposes doubt as its essential preliminary; for, as the end of the Analysis is to manifest truth, it is plain, since we have recourse to it, that truth is concealed,—that we are in ignorance, need determining reasons; in a word, are in doubt. On the hypothesis that knowledge by Method is possible, it is plain that there must be some knowledge, or truth, which is superior to doubt, and capable of affording other knowledge, or truth whose certainty is dependent on the higher knowledge, that is, on principles.

In accordance with the nature of his instru- ment, the whole Philosophy of Descartes is but an attempt to find the Principles or Principle which, as absolutely ultimate in the order of Analysis, and, therefore, absolutely primary in the order of the reverse process, that is, of Syn- thesis, affords the conditions and possibility of Philosophy, or of Methodical Knowledge. In other words, Descartes seeks that truth, which, itself contained in no higher, contains, or at least affords the condition of our reaching, all other truths.

Now the ultimate principles or principle must, as ultimate, be self-evidencing, that is, stand in need of no proof, or higher knowledge as its guarantee; and the degree of its evidence must be such as to determine in the knower absolute and indestructible assurance. The first truth must, therefore, be approached through the High- est Certainty.

Again, as the absolutely certain is wholly superior to doubt; as of such doubt in truth is impossible, Descartes makes Doubt the means of manifesting the Ultimate Truth, by constituting it the regulative principle of his Analysis.

Descartes thus not only commences with a general doubt. He likewise proceeds to truth through doubt; and that by proposing to determine the limits of doubt. He seeks to discover how far doubt is possible, of what it is impossible; that is, whether there be any knowledge of which we possess an absolute certainty.

Such is the Method of Descartes in its prior half. It will be necessary, however, now to develop its application, to show how Descartes essays to construct Philosophy, or the Science of Reasons.

Proceeding by Doubt, Descartes finds it possible to doubt of the truth of the presentations of Sense, and of the contents of Memory; and likewise even of the demonstrations of Mathematics. Such afford no absolute assurance.

But though it be possible to doubt whether anything exists as it is presented, or existed as represented in Memory, it is impossible to doubt of the existence of the presentations and representations themselves; and as these presentations and representations, in so far as we are conscious of them, are modes of our thought, it is impossible to doubt of the fact of Thought or Thinking.

But why is it impossible to doubt of the existence of thought? Because, replies Descartes, to doubt is to think. Hence in doubting itself we think; let us doubt as we will we never escape thinking.

But in affirming the fact of our thought, or thinking, and in being necessitated to affirm it, we affirm and are necessitated to affirm the fact of Self-Existence. This fact is, according to Descartes, above proof, as it is above doubt: our consciousness of it is the first or fundamental, as it is an absolute and indestructible, certainty. The place which this consciousness occupies in Cartesianism, as its cardinal point, demands for it special attention; while the diversity of opinions concerning the nature of the Cartesian expression in which the knowledge is embodied necessitates a special statement on the subject.

To simplify the question, we must consider that there are, as there can only be, two opinions regarding the nature of the famous Cartesian principle.

Descartes, in the expression "Cogito, Ergo Sum," must either be held to deduce the knowledge of self-existence from a higher (more general) knowledge, as, e.g., What thinks, is, phænomenon implies a substance, or simply to affirm the fact, that is, to announce it as a knowledge immediately evident. If the former alternative be true, it is manifest that this knowledge is no longer primary, is no longer fundamental, since there is a knowledge (viz., that from which it is inferred) which is re- latively prior. If the latter be correct, this knowledge is a first principle; it is not inferred from any higher knowledge.

Now that this knowledge is mediate, or inferential, Descartes has repeatedly and explicitly denied. It is, therefore, according to Descartes, immediate and underived. But though incapable of proof, it is yet competent to show how the fact is arrived at, or supposed to be found, in the way of Reflective Analysis.

To place the whole matter in a clear light, we have, in the first place, to attend to the following points. It ought to be considered:—

1. That Existence is as nothing to us where it is not manifested in some determinate Manner. In thinking anywhat as existing, we must think it existing in this or that Mode or Manner: of Existence apart from the Mode in which it appears to us, we have no positive, or immediate knowledge.

2. Again, that, as in thinking a thing existing we must think it existing in this or that mode, so we cannot think of a determinate Mode of existence, without at the same time and in the same indivisible act of thought, thinking that Somewhat of which this Mode is a manifestation, exists. Wherefore:—

3. That Self, that "I" in existing for self, for me, exists only in this or that Mode: and likewise that in appearing to me in this or that Mode it to the extent of its appearance or manifestation exists, or is thought existent.

4. That Self as the Subject of, or Existence underlying certain acts or modifications which exist only in so far as we are conscious of them, is not known to us as existing unless through these; and likewise, that we cannot know, or be conscious of, any modification or act without knowing that Self to the extent to which we are conscious exists.

Now the First Principle of Descartes, as expressed in the famous Cogito, Ergo Sum, is merely a particular case, a concrete or determinate exemplification of these universal laws of thought. It is not an inference from these, but they are, so to speak, derived from it: for universal laws, though potentially prior, are actually posterior in the order of knowledge, to the particular cases in which they are discovered to us under a concrete form. Laws or principles that are necessary and of universal extent are, according to truth and the doctrine of Descartes, revealed to us in particular cases and in contingent matter, and are evolved out of these not certainly by elaboration, but by analysis, that is, they are found not made.

That the first principle of Descartes is of such a character and no other,—is indeed a particular exemplification of these universal principles,—and no inference, may be made manifest by briefly considering it. Thus, in the first place, when Des- cartes, in the expression Cogito, Ergo Sum, says, I think, or, I am thinking; he says likewise, I exist, or, I am existing. These affirmations are, in truth, identical. They are contemporaneous, and stand in no relation of subordination. I am thinking is precisely equivalent to I am existing, as it matters not whether we seem to proceed from thinking to existing, or from existing to thinking, for in the one knowledge is given the other: in knowing that I think, I know that I exist, and in knowing that I exist, I know that I think; that is, am conscious of some determinate act manifested by me. The expression, Cogito, Ergo Sum, is, therefore, not an enthymeme with the suppressed major (sumption), what thinks, is: but a simple affirmation of the identity in the sphere of self-consciousness of thought and being.

Nor, in the second place, is the existence of self as the subject of thought inferred from the higher knowledge, every Quality supposes a Substance, but affirmed: self and existence are not first sundered or found apart, and then conjoined through some third knowledge, which is higher, more general, and, therefore, inclusive, but immediately known and affirmed in conjunction, and by the same indivisible act (simplici mentis intuitu), in which we know and affirm the existence of thought. We do not even come to know that self, or a subject of thought exists, through thinking that thought is a quality, for this were virtually to have recourse to the general principle that quality supposes a substance; and besides, to have already determined that there is a subject of thought, it being impossible to know that a particular mode of consciousness is a quality, unless we already know that there is a subject of thought. By this process we could only reach the knowledge sought by first taking it for granted in order to prove or establish it. Thus far of what Descartes does not do. What he does is simply to affirm that in knowing the fact of thought, in thinking, or in being conscious in this or that mode, I know also the existence of a determinate something of which this thought is an act, and which it supposes: and this something is Self, or I To suppose that the thinking subject can only be known in as far as it is logically deduced from the higher principle of substance and phænomenon, is to betray an ignorance of the order in which we know, nay, of the condition under which we acquire this more general knowledge; for it is impossible to affirm by a reflective act that every phænomenon implies a substance, every act a subject, until we have first, and, without reflection, affirmed that this or that phænomenon has a substance, and then by reflection affirmed that this or that phænomenon must have a substance. Universal principles are at first given in particular forms—in this or that matter, and it is only by reflection that their necessity and universality become apparent.

These things manifest, it is plain, in the third place, that as of the fact of thinking we possess an absolute and indestructible assurance, so also do we possess a similar assurance of the fact of our existence. To think for self is to exist, and, as in thinking there is given a subject of thought, of the existence of self,—of this subject we have an absolute assurance. It is thus that Descartes holds it to be as impossible to doubt of self-existence as of the fact that we think; for, when I doubt whether I exist, I think, and thus even because I doubt of my existence, I, to the extent of this doubt, exist. Were I not existing when I supposed I was not, I should thus not exist by supposition, and yet exist because I supposed. The certainty of our existence is thus not dependent on the certainty of the existence of God, or on the certainty that God is no deceiver, for, even though deceived, though compelled to think and determine falsely, we think, are conscious; that is, exist. This certainty is the fundamental one; the basis and ground of all knowledge and science; the ultimate point on which Descartes, trusting to the potency of thought, seeks to raise the superstructure of science.

Thus far of the nature of the Cartesian Doubt, and its solution. But Descartes does not rest here. From finding somewhat that is above doubt, he proceeds to inquire into the grounds of its certainty, and therefore into the last ground of our assurance of the truth of all individual judgments. He thus seeks the Criterion of truth, or "that through which we may be assured that we possess truth," and through which, therefore, knowledge in its perfection, is possible, and is alone possible. The criterion of truth is to be regarded as the positive or final element in the Cartesian Method; for, besides now superseding doubt as the regulative principle of the Cartesian Analysis, it is likewise constituted the regulative principle of the Cartesian Synthesis.

There thus falls to be considered, in the fifth place, the Cartesian Criterion of truth.

V. According to Descartes, certainty, or assurance is not identical with the criterion of truth. The latter, or that through which we know that we possess truth, is the ground or source of certainty, or assurance: but as we must possess certainty before we can seek its ground or source, it is plain that, in the order of knowledge, assurance or the supposition that we possess truth is prior to our discovery of the ground of certainty, or the criterion of truth.

Hence it is that Descartes does not seek to discover, in the first instance, the criterion of truth, but only some judgment absolutely certain and indubitable: in other words, he allows the faculties of knowledge to spring into activity and form a product, that is, to affirm their own credibility, before he essays to determine that condition of cognitive activity, the consciousness of which is certainty. Descartes thus essays to determine not what must be the criterion of truth, but to discover what is, or by analysis to find that element in a knowledge, on the consciousness of which, all doubt disappears. This procedure is in perfect harmony with the nature and conditions of his instrument, Reflection, which does not create, but simply reveals or exposes to view what is already existent; and thus always supposes the previous existence of matter on which to act,—of some spontaneous mental activity.

This brings us to the Cartesian Criterion of truth itself. This is, in general, the clearness and distinctness of the thought: by this, that a thing is clearly and distinctly thought, do we know that the thing is as we think it. Descartes, it ought, however, to be mentioned, connects his criterion of truth with the perfection of Deity.

There is a single principle upon which the criterion as well as the other elements of the Cartesian Method depend,—a principle through which the whole Method is led up to unity. In accordance with this view, the criterion falls to be considered in subordination to this grand principle, and illustrative of it.

The principle of which the whole Cartesian Method, from its fundamental to its most remote character, is but a manifestation and development in a variety of forms, is, that with a view to truth and certainty, to the realization of the end of Philosophy, there must be accorded to the thinker the perfect, that is, the free and full, action of the faculties of knowledge. The high generality of this principle secures to the Cartesian Method, in each and all of its precepts, perfect unity But this requires illustration, and, in its development, will be found the proof of the principle.

With a view to the illustration of the statement we must refer, in the first instance, to what has been said concerning the nature of Method in general. Method in science seeks a more perfect, because more determinate, knowledge than is passively afforded in the spontaneous and disorderly presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The mind, in proceeding methodically, asserts the superiority of its activity to its passivity, in that what is presented is, by an act of will, arrested for examination by the faculties of knowledge. Philosophical Method in general is thus, as has been said, the manifestation of the cognitive activity in accordance with certain rules. This activity is the condition of philosophical or scientific knowledge.

But if activity of mind be the condition of philosophical knowledge, it is manifest that the most perfect activity will best secure this knowledge, that is, the end of Method. Or since man is capable of knowledge, only in so far as he possesses certain faculties of knowledge; and as man only actually knows, in so far as he exerts these faculties, it is manifest that man will better or more perfectly know, in proportion to the absence of hinderances to the manifestation of the acts of his faculties; and that the most perfect knowledge will be realized through the least impeded action of the powers of knowledge.