Tully's three books of offices, in English ...

Preface

XHE Author of this book is so well known, that it would be altogether needless to give any account of him in this place. As for the book itself, it has always been looked upon as one of the most perfect pieces of his writings, and one of the noblest systems of moral precepts that has ever been left us by the ancient heathens; and not without reason : there appears all along in it so great a love and concern for virtue, which he recommends to his son with ,all imaginable earnestness; so deep a sense of the obligations to honesty, and aversion for every thing that is contrary to it ; such an admirable inclination for the virtues of plainness, truth, and sincerity, and such a generous contempt of all shuffling, mean, and underhand dealings ; such piety towards his native country, and hearty concern for the calamities it groaned under, and withal so much hatred and detestation for those men, who had been the causes of its misfortunes ; and, in a word, so many excellent rules of life, with reference to our duty either to God or men, and to those in their several capacities and relations, whether of kindred, friends, or benefactors, as have justly recommended it to the esteem of all the worlds and given it the first place among the eminent and most celebrated writings of this kind. The scope and design of it in his own words is, to lay

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down some directions and precepts of good living, according to which upon all occasions men ought to govern their lives and actions ; so that whatever state of life a man is in, whether public or private, of governor or governed, of prosperity or adversity, old age or youth, he will here find rules how he ought to demean himself in any of those capacities ; and will be told what that is, which the dignity and excellence of his own nature require in regard to himself; and what the several sorts of alliance or society among men demand, in relation to other people : so that while other parts of learning and knowledge are most times confined either to certain ages, certain times, or certain places, this is of general and universal use; it is (as our author says upon another subject) necessary for youth as well as old age; it directs in prosperity as well as in adversity ; it is a delight to us at home, and a companion for us abroad; pernoctat nobiscum, peregrinatur 9 rusticatur.

It was principally designed for the use of his own son, whom he had sent to Athens for the benefit of study, while all things were in disorder and confusion at Rome, after Pompey's defeat in the Pharsalian field: but he tells us he has purposely framed it in such a manner, as that it might be equally serviceable to all other people. The time of its writing was after Caesar's murder, when Mark Antony and his adherents had got the power into their hands, and Cicero (as he complains at the beginning of the third book) was by wicked arms driven away from the city, and forced to betake himself to his private retirements. At this time he thought to have gone to Athens to his son, and was accordingly on his journey, when he was called back again by the

PREFACE. v

loud cries of his country, as he intimates in the conclusion of this discourse, and explains more at large in the beginning of his first Philippic. He returned to Rome upon this recal, but found things very different from what he expected, when he came thither; hereupon he withdrew himself to his houses in the country, resolving to wait for some fitter opportunity of being serviceable to the Republic. From this retirement he sent these precepts in writing to his son, which he designed to have given him by word of mouth, had he arrived at Athens. The method he proceeds in is this which follows : after a short discourse by way of preface to his son, and fixing the right notion of the subject he is to treat about, he endeavours to beget in him a love of honesty, by representing it as amiable and commendable in itself, and agreeable to the nature and reason of mankind. He divides it into four parts or general heads, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which are usually called the four cardinal virtues, and discourses in order upon eveiy one of them, with all their several species or branches, and the vices that stand in opposition to them. And this he does, not in a dry and scholastical manner, by enquiring nicely wherein the strict nature of the several virtues consists, and which of their opposite vices they are nearest to, (which my Lord Bacon somewhere very ingeniously observes, is like a master's setting a boy a copy to write after, without ever shewing him how he should make his letters,) but by laying down such rules under each of these heads, as may direct men in the practice of the duties required of them. Afterwards he compares them with one another, and shews in what order they are to be performed by us : as justice, for example, * a3 vr PREFACE,

before knowledge, fortitude, &c. All these virtues,. when taken together, make up the general notion of honestum ; and when taken separately, are so many branches or distinct members of it.

But seeing something else beside virtue or honesty is necessarily requisite, or at least useful and convenient for our well-being here ; such as are the comforts and conveniences of life, viz. riches, glory, honour, success in business, &c. which are all comprehended under the notion of the word profit : therefore in the second book he endeavours to shew how these are to be obtained : and having made it appear, that all the advantages men enjoy, and the evils they endure, are principally owing to men themselves ; from thence he infers, that the way whereby we may obtain the former, and avoid the latter, is to procure the endeavours of men on our side, so as to have them ready to assist us upon occasion. This he shews can be done no oth§r way, than by performing those duties which honesty requires of us : viz. by prudence and wisdom, by justice and integrity in pur words and actions, whereby men are drawn to place their trust and confidence in us; (where also he particularly shews, that pretending and hypocrisy, can never get a man any lasting honour ;) by kindness and beneficence, courtesy and affability, which beget in men a love and affection toward us : and lastly, by fortitude, contempt of money, &c. which are virtues that draw men to wonder and admiration, and make them think us persons that really deserve to be promoted.

But because riches, honours, power, and the like, which seem to be a profit and advantage to us, may often interfere with virtue and duty, which really are such; therefore in the third book he endeavours to shew, how a good mai*

PREFACE. vii

ought to carry himself in such a case ; and makes it appear, that riches, honours, kingdoms, and empires, arc far from being truly an advantage to any man, whenever they are gotten by unlawful means ; and that no honest man would do any thing that is contrary to conscience or honesty, though sure to obtain even the whole world by it. All which he builds upon this foundation, that the goods of the soul, viz. virtue and honesty, are, if not the only, yet infinitely the greatest goods; (which is a principle allowed of by all the wiser philosophers;) from whence it must follow, that whoever parts with these upon the account of any riches, or other seeming advantage, be it never so great, must needs be a loser; for he forfeits a greater for the sake of a less good, and in hopes of getting a seeming, deprives himself of a real interest. Here "he goes over each of the virtues mentioned in the first book, and proves that nothing can be a man's true profit, though it should bring him all the appearing advantages in the world, and though he w T ere sure to keep it secret from the eyes of all men, and even the gods themselves, that is contrary to the duties of prudence and justice, of fortitude and moderation. In a word, here are rules for the government of our lives in relation to God, our neighbours, and ourselves, such as are deservedly admired in a heathen, and might have well become even a Christian writer : he tells us, that to procure the favour of the former, Ave must live a religious and holy life : that, as to the second, there is an alliance or society between all mankind, whereby each particular is obliged to do his best towards promoting the happiness and welfare of the whole body, and rather to die than do another any injury : that, as to ourselves, we should always consider the dignity viii PREFACE.

and excellence of our reasonable nature, and take care that we never be guilty of any action, that may any wise stain or unbecome its honour : this, as he goes on, will quickly teach us, how base a thing it is to dissolve in luxury, softness, &c. — Thus have 1 endeavoured to present the reader with a general view of this incomparable treatise : should I proceed to tell him, that some of the most eminent writers in the world have owed great part of their credit to it : that the Sandersons, Grotius's, Puffendorfs, &c. are particularly obliged to it for their skill in determining moral cases, perhaps he might think me rather zealous, than impartial, in my account of it ? though I can assure him it is no more than what is strictly true. The first of those great persons (as the writer of his life tells us) had it all by heart; and how much use the two latter have made of it, I leave those to judge who have been conversant with their writings. But the book can much better recommend itself by its own true value, than I can do by any thing I am able to say of it ; thither therefore I shall refer the reader for his farther satisfaction, after I have told him, in a few words, what has been attempted in this new translation. I have endeavoured to express what I conceived to be the sense and meaning of the author, in as full and comprehensive words as I was able, attending all along to the principal scope and design of his discourse^ rather than to the particular words and expressions. I have taken care, however, to let none of his words escape, without giving the sense of them in our own language : so far from that, that I rather expect to be condemned, on the other hand, for explaining some of them a great deal too much, and spending a line perhaps, or more, in that which the author expressed in but

PREFACE. I*

one single word : but whoever considers the nature of the Latin tongue, and our author's way of writing, especially in this book, will easily perceive that it was necessary for me to do so, otherwise the English would have been almost as hard to be understood as the Latin : for the truth of which I refer the reader to Chap, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii. Book I. not to name innumerable other places. I have had a peculiar eye all along, to the method of the discourse, and the connection or dependence of one part of it upon another ; which, because it is oftentimes very obscure, I have generally added the distinguishing terms of first, second, &c. and where that could not be done, have sometimes added a line perhaps, to shew how he passes from one thing to another. As to some things, tj^at are of little or no consequence toward understanding the author, as if I have translated carta, dinner ; hominis honorati et principis, a gentleman or a person of honour; convivium, sitting at a table, and over a glass of wine, &c. or if, in a philosophical discourse as this is, I have sometimes made use of an unusual word ; I suppose they will be counted not unwarrantable liberties, but such as are commonly taken by translators. If in the main, I have hit upon the true sense and meaning of my author, and expressed it in such clear and intelligible terms, as may make the reader see what is the force of his arguments, the reasonableness of his precepts, the fitness of his several illustrations and examples, with those other virtues which have rendered this book so deservedly famous ; I have obtained what I principally designed by this attempt.

The design of the notes is chiefly to point out the author's method,, and explain some passages ia him that seemed more obscure than the rest ;

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if the reader find fault, that some of them regard rather the Latin than the English, and others seem trivial and inconsiderable ; I desire he would take notice, that I would not have the English thrust out the Latin, but rather promote and facilitate the reading of it ; and that I did not design to make notes for men of learning, (by whom I am fitter to be taught myself,) but rather for the young and less-knowing sort of people.

I have gone according to that division of chapters, which is usually received, because the book has been quoted according to it, and to have made any alteration would but have bred confusion ; though otherwise I think it is the most ignorant and ridiculous one that was ever made, except in some other of our author's writings. I have put before each chapter a summary of what is contained in it ; and to the whole have subjoined an index, referring to all the principal matters that are mentioned in the book. In a word, I have not wilfully omitted any thing, as far as was possible in so small a volume, (for I did not design to write a large commentary, or play the critic upon my author,) that seemed necessaiy or useful toward a full explication of this excellent discourse. I have made some use of Sir R. L'Estrange's English, and especially Mr. Du B.'s French translation; which I gratefully acknowledge. I have followed that sense which to me seemed most agreeable to the author's design, without finding fault with the interpretations of other people, or speaking ill of those who have not been of my mind ; and if I have been mistaken myself in any thing, (as I do not question but I many times have,) I desire the reader to use the same candour and forgiveness toward me ; that, as I think, I have given nobody any just cause of complaint, so I may

PREFACE. xi

not have any myself from other people. In fine, ( am sure my design was commendable; the success of it I must leave to the reader's judgment; I shall only say, that as I look for no honour from any thing I can do, more especially of this nature; so I hope that however I may expect a pardon.

TULLY'S OFFICES.

Chap. I

<Cfcero exhorts his Son, a young student at Athens, not to forget his Latin, though he was in a Greek University ; but to mix the studies of both those languages, and also learn to write both as a Philosopher and an Orator. To this purpose he advises him to read his Works, as having equally written in each of those kinds, which none of the Grecians had ever done. But he modestly adds, that he thinks they could have done it, but that they applied themselves wholly to one of them.

DEAR SON MARCUS,

JL HOUGH after a year's study under Cratippus 4 , and that at such a place as Athens b , you ought to have

» The most noted Peripatetic philosopher of that age, a familiar acquaintance of Cicero, and by him often equalled to the greatest of the ancients. He was of Mitylene, the chief city in the island Lesbos, and there taught for some time. Afterwards he removed to Athens, where Cicero among others entrusted his son with him. See Famil. Episl. lib. xvi. epist. 21.

b The most celebrated city in the world for politeness and literature ; whither all the great men of antiquity resorted for learning: where Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Sophocles, and innumerable others, the greatest wits of the world, in old time flourished ; therefore by our author in his first Book De Orat. c. iv. called, The Inventress of all Arts. His son then being at such a place, and under such a master, he expects he should have made a suitable improvement.

B abundantly furnished yourself with knowledge in the doctrines and rules of philosophy; having had the advantage of so eminent a master to supply you with learning, and a city that affords you such excellent examples : yet I should think it convenient for you (which is a method I took for my own improvement) always to mingle some Latin with your Greek in the studies of eloquence, as well as philosophy, that you may be equally perfect in both those ways of writing, and make yourself master of either language d . For the furtherance of which, I am apt to imagine, I have done no inconsiderable service to our countrymen -, so that not only those who do not understand Greek, but even the learned themselves, will confess, that by reading my works, they have mended their styles, and somewhat improved their reason and judgments.— Wherefore I am willing that you should learn indeed of Cratippus, the greatest philosopher of the present age, and learn of him too as long as you desire it 5 and so long I think it is your duty to desire it, as you find yourself sufficiently benefited by it^/but withal, I would have you to read my writings, which very little differ from those of the Peripatetics ; for both* we c Not of persons then living only, but of those also that were dead and gone ; nothing so bringing to our remembrance the virtues and learning of great men, as being in the places where they once flourished ; which is one great advantage of a public education.

d Utriusque orationis may mean either the two languages of Latin and Greek, or the two kinds of style that are proper, one for the bar, and the other for philosophical discourses. 1 have taken both senses into the translation.

« So I understand the word utrique to mean both the Academics of whom Cicero, and the Peripatetics of whom Cratippus, was. These two sects at first were almost one and the same, as appears from several places of Cicero; [see book iii. ch. 4. and Academic. Qumt, book i. ch. 4.] Xenocrates, the chief author of the former, and Aristotle of the latter, being each of them scholars to the incomparable Plato, who was hearer of the wise Socrates. The Academics therefore and Peripatetics were both of them followers not of Socrates only.

chap. Ii OFFICES. 3

and they profess ourselves followers, not of Socrates only, but of Plato likewise. As for the matters contained in them, use your own judgment with freedom and impartiality, for I lay no manner of restraint upon you : your improvement in the Latin is what I chiefly desire, which I am confident must follow from a careful perusal of them. Nor let any one think that 1 am vain and pretending when I speak thus : for, allowing to some others the precedence in philosophy, should I assume to myself what is the part of an orator, viz. to speak suitably f , methodically, and handsomely upon any subject, seeing 1 have spent my whole life in that study, I think it is no more than what I might reasonably and fairly lay claim to. I cannot but very earnestly desire you therefore, my dear Cicero, to read my books with care and diligence y not my Orations only, but these pieces also that concern philosophy, which are now of a bulk almost equal to them ;Vfor though in the former there is more of the force and power of eloquence, yet is the smooth and even style of the latter by no means to be neglected. And of all the Grecians, I find not one that has employed his pen in both these kinds ; and been at once successful in the language of the bar, and this other more gentle

(for that almost all the philosophers were,) [See Cic. de Orat. iii. 16, 17 J but of Plato too, and so were very nearly allied to each other.

f Apte, distincte, &c. The word apte properly denotes the conformity of our style to the subject we are handling-, and is called by our author in other places, Apte ad rerum dignitatem dicere ; and he tells us, that those men may be said to speak apte, Qui ita moderantur Orationem, ut rerum et personarum dignitates ferunt, which I think answers to our English word suitably. See QuintiL Institute lib. xi. c. 1. Distincte refers to the method of a discourse, and is opposed to confusedness : ornate to the figures and ornaments of rhetoric. So that these three words seem indifferently well to comprehend the whole business of an orator ; which is, Invenire prceclare, inventa dispones, disposita exornare ; to invent what is suitable and proper for the subject, to put it into a good method, and to giv* it the ornaments of eloquence, &c,

BOOK Iv and easy style of philosophical discourses 5 unless Demetrius Phalereus^ may be reckoned for one, who is subtle enough in his disputes of philosophy, but, xnethinks, in his oratory, wants that spirit and vehemence that is requisite; however, has so much of sweetness in him, that one might know he had been TheophrastusV h scholar. Whether 1 have had any better success in both these ways, must be left to the judgment of others to determine : I can only say that I have attempted them both. And it is my opinion, that if ever Plato 1 had undertaken to plead, he would have been a most copious and powerful orator ; and if Demosthenes k had studied and discoursed of those f A Peripatetic born at Phalerum, a small town on the seacoast of Attica, from whence he had his name. He was ten years governor of Athens, in which time he was honoured with three hundred statues. Being afterwards driven out by Demetrius Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus, Alexander the Great's captain, he fled to Ptolemy, king of Egypt, by whom he was set over the famous Alexandrian library, which contained in it (as some write) 700,000 volumes. He persuaded that prince to get the Old Testament translated into Greek, which is what we now call the translation of the Seventy. Most of his works are lost. See our author De Legg. lib. ii. c. 26. lib. Hi. c. 6\

b A noble philosopher of the Peripatetic sect, scholar first of Plato, and afterwards of Aristotle, whom he succeeded in his school. He was son of one Melantes, a fuller, and born at an obscure place of the isle of Lesbos, named Eresus, whence he himself is called Eresius. His first name was Tyrtamus, that of Theophrastus being afterwards given him by Aristotle for his divine eloquence. He was mightily admired by Cicero, who used to call him his delight, and is often commending him for the sweetness of his style. Several of his works are still remaining, one of the chief of which is his Characters.

1 An incomparable philosopher, born at Athens, who travelled over great part of the world for knowledge ; he is often mentioned, and in several places translated by Cicero, who follows him very much in his philosophical writings. His works still remain, which are so excellent, as to have justly gained him the name of the divine Plato.

* The most famous Greek orator that ever was, son of a blacksmith in Athens, and scholar to Plato. His works an* still extant. See his life in Plutarch.

chap. ii. OFFICES. 5

things, which he learnt of Plato, he would have done it with a great deal of ornament and majesty. The same I think true of Isocrates and Aristotle 1 ; each of which, pleased with his own way of writing, neglected to cultivate and improve the other'".

CHAP. II.

The reasons why he writes upon this subject. The general ztse and importance of it. All philosophers have handledit; though some, by their false notions of happi* ness and misery, utterly pervert it. What seels they are that have a right to lay doivn any rules or precepts concerning it. He designs in this work to follow the Stoics principally. The subject of a discourse ought first to be defined, before we begin to say any thing upon it*

XjUT having resolved to write something at present, and a great many others hereafter to you, I thought I could begin upon no better argument, than that which is fittest for your age, and most becoming my authority as a father; for, of all those useful and important subjects, which philosophers have handled so largely and accurately, the precepts they have delivered about offices or duties™, seem of the largest extent

1 Isocrates was a notable teacher of rhetoric, and Aristotle a most eminent philosopher in the famous city of Athens ; both of them very well known by their works, which are still, the greatest part of them, remaining". "?

m That is, Isocrates never tried how he could succeed in philosophical discourses, nor Aristotle in orations.

■ Ojjicium in our author, which I beg leave to render either office or duf.y y signifies especially two things ; sometimes the duty or obligation itself, as when he says, Peregrini officium est, It is the duty of a stranger, i. e. He is obliged to do so or so, &c. At other times, the action whereby that duty is performed, as when he divides officio,, virtues, into media and perfectay ordinary and complete ones ; so officio, justitiet, UheralU tatis, &c. are the actions of those virtues j which may be worth observing through the whole work.

b3 and comprehension; for they take in every part of our lives, so that whatever we go about, whether of public or private affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether considered barely by ourselves, or as we stand in relation to other people, we lie constantly under an obligation to some duties : and as all the virtue and credit of our lives proceed from the due discharge of this ; so all the baseness and turpitude of them result from the non-observance of the same. Now, though this be a subject which all philosophers have employed themselves about, (for, who ever dared to assume that name without layingdown some instructions about duty?) yet have some sects of them given such accounts of man's happiness and misery, as destroy the very being of virtue and honesty. For he that makes any thing his chiefest good, wherein justice or virtue does not bear a part, and sets up profit, not honesty,- for the measure of his happiness; as long as he acts in conformity with his own principles, and is not over-ruled by the mere dictates of reason and humanity, can never do the offices of friendship, justice, or liberality. Nor can he ever be a man of courage, who thinks that pain is the greatest evil ; or he of temperance, who imagines pleasure to be the sovereign good. Which things are all so obvious and plain, that one would think they could never stand in need of a dispute:

• He means chiefly the Epicureans, who made man's happiness to consist in pleasure, and his misery in pain, which is indeed to subvert the very foundations of honesty. For seeing there is nothing that men will not do, for the obtaining their chief good, and avoiding the greatest evil, it necessarily follows, that (as long as they act consistently with their principles) these men will betray their friends, break their oaths, or do any thing in the world, rather than forego any pleasure, or endure any pain. Therefore he has reason to say, They never can do the duties of friendship , &c. For certainly, if I count pleasure my greatest good, I shall rather part with my honesty than that; and if I reckon pain the greatest of evils, I will xather lose a friend, be unmerciful or unjust, than ever undergo it. The same may be said of those that place their happiness in riches, honours, &c. and their ruisery in the contraryc See Tusc, Quasi, ii. 6\ chap. ii. OFFICES. 7

however, I have largely discoursed upon them in another work p. These sects therefore, unless they are resolved to be inconsistent with themselves, ought wholly to abstain from speaking any thing about duties; nor indeed can any constant, unalterable, rational rule3 of them at all be given, unless it be by those who go upon this principle, That it is virtue alone 1 , or at least that chiefly, which ought to be desired for its own sake. So that only the Stoics', Academies*, and Peripatetics*, have a right to lay down any rules upon this subject: for as to the opinion of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus%