Cicero's Three books of offices, or moral duties : also his Cato Major, an essay on old age; Lælius, an essay on friendship; Paradoxes; Scipio's dream; and Letter to Quintus on the duties of a magistrate

Front matter

GIFT or Jo H mC. Aye ^:>^

I

HARPER'S CLASSICAL LIBRARY.

Preface

The present volume comprises the most popular moral treatises of Cicero. In preparing an edition adapted to the wants of the student, the editor has addressed himself to two principal objects. The first, to produce a close and faithful translation, avoiding on the one hand, the freedom of Melinoth's elegant paraphrase, and on the other, the crudeness and inaccuracy of the so-called literal translation of Cockman ; the second, to present the opinions of modern moralists, chiefly of our own country, in juxtaposition with those of Cicero, that the reader may be enabled to estimate the changes which have passed over the human mind in relation to these subjects, and perceive how far these changes have been occasioned by the promulgation of the Christian religion.

A subsidiary design has been to show, by parallel passages, to what extent the writings of modern moralists have been tinctured with the thoughts of the Koman philosopher; and to point out particular instances in which their arguments and illustrations are identical.

In briefly sketching the subjects of the following treatises, we shall for the most part adopt the observations of Dunlop, in his " History of Koman Literature." The first, and most important treatise, is

The Offices, or three books of " Moral Duties." Of these the first two are supposed to be chiefly derived from a lost work of Paneetius, a Greek philosopher, who resided at Rome in the second century before Christ. In the Jirsi book he treats of what is virtuous in itself, and shows in what manner our duties are vi PREFACE.

founded in morality and virtue, in the right perception of truth, justice, fortitude, and decorum, which four qualities are referred to as the constituent parts of virtue, and the sources from which all our duties are derived. In the second book, the author enlarges on those duties which relates to utility, the improvement of life, and the means of attaining wealth and power. This division of the work relates principally to political advancement, and the honorable means of gaining popularity, among which are enumerated generosity, courtesy, and eloquence. Thus far Cicero had, in all probability, closely followed the steps of Panaetiu?. Garve, in his commentary on Moral Duties, remarks that, when Cicero comes to the more subtle and philosophic parts of his subject, he evidently translates from the Greek, and that he has not always found words in his own language to express the nicer distinctions of the Greek scliools. The work of Panaetius, liowever, was left imperfect, and did not comprise the third part of the subject, namely, the choice and distinction to be made when virtue and utility were opposed to each other. On this topic, accordingly, Cicero, in the third book, was left to his own resources ; the discussion, of course, relates only to the subordinate duties, as the true and undoubted Jionestum can never be put in competition with private advantage, or be violated for its sake. As to the minor duties the great maxim inculcated is, that nothing should be accounted useful or profitable but what is strictly virtuous ; and that, in fact, there ought to be no separation of the principles of virtue and utility. Cicero enters into some discussion however, and lays down certain rules to enable us to form a just estimate of both in cases of doubt, where seeming utility comes into competition with virtue.

The author has addressed the work to his son, and has represented it as written for his instruction. "It is," says Kelsall, " the noblest present ever made by a parent to a child." Cicero declares that he intended to treat in it of all the duties, but it is generally considered to have been chiefly drawn up as a manual of political morality, and as a guide to young Romans of his son's age and rank, which might enable them to attain political eminence, and tread with innocence and safety " the slippery steeps of power *

PREFACE. vii

The Dialogue ox Feiexdship is addressed with peculiar propriety to Atticus, who, as Cicero tells him in his dedication, can not fail to discover his own portrait in the delineation of a perfect friend. Here, as elsewhere, Cicero has most judiciously selected the persons of the dialogue. They were men of eminence in the state, and, though deceased, the Romans had such veneration for their ancestors, that they would listen with the utmost interest even to the imaginary conversation of a Scaivola or a Laelius. The memorable and hereditary friendship which subsisted between Laslius and the younger Scipio Africanus, rendered the former a suitable example. To support a conversation on this delightful topic, Fannius the historian, and Mucins Scaivola the augur, both sons-in-law of Laelius, are supposed to pay a visit to their father immediately after the sudden and suspicious death of Scipio Africanus. The recent loss which Laelius had thus sustained, leads to an eulogy on the inimitable virtues of the departed hero, and to a discussion on the true nature of that tie by which they had been so long connected. Cicero, in early youth, had been introduced by his father to Mucins Scaevola, and, among other interesting conversations which he thus enjoyed an opportunity of hearing, he was one day present while Scsavola related the substance of the conference on Friendship, which he and Fannius had held with Laelius a few days after the death of Scipio. Many of the ideas and sentiments which Laelius uttered are declared by ScsBvola to have originally flowed from Scipio, with whom tiio nature and laws of friendship formed a favorite topic This, perhaps, is not entirely a fiction, or merely asserted to give the stamp of authenticity to the dialogue.

The Treatise on Old Age is not properly a dialogue, but a continued discourse delivered by Cato the censor at the request of Scipio and Laelius. It is undoubtedly one of the most interesting pieces of the kind which have descended to us from antiquity ; and no reader can wonder that the pleasure experienced in its composition, not only, as he says, made him forget the infirmities of old age, but even rendered that portion of existence agreeable. In consequence of the years to which Cicero had attained at the time of its composition, and the circumstances in which he was then placed, it must indeed have been composed with peculiar viii PREFACE.

interest and feeling. It was written by him when he was sixty-three, and is addressed to his friend Atticus (who had nearly reached the same age), with a view of rendering their accumulating burdens as light as possible. In order to give his precepts the greater force, he represents them as delivered by the elder Cato, in the eighty-fourth year of a vigorous and useful old age, on the occasion of Leshus and the younger Scipio expressing their admiration at the wonderful ease with which he still bore the weight of years. Ibis affords the author an opportunity of entering into a full explanation of his ideas on the subject, his great object being to show that by internal resources of happiness the closing period may be rendered not only supportable but comfortable. He enumerates those causes which are commonly supposed to constitute the infelicity of advanced age under four general heads : that it incapacitates from mingling in the affairs of the world ; that it produces infirmities of the body • that it disqualifies for the enjoyment of sensual gratifications; and that it brings us to the verge of death. Some of these disadvantages he maintains are imaginary, and for any real pleasures of which old men are deprived, he shows that many others more refined and elevated may be substituted. The whole work is agreeably diversified, and illustrated by examples.

The Paradoxes contain a defense of six peculiar opinions or paradoxes of the Stoics, something in the manner of those which Cato was wont to promulgate in the senate. These are, that what is morally right (honeatum) is alone good ; that the virtuous can want nothing for complete happiness ; that there are no degrees either in crimes or good actions ; that every fool is mad ; that the wise alone are wealthy and free ; and that every fool is a slave. The Paradoxes, indeed, seem to have been written as an exercise of rhetorical wit, rather than as a serious disquisition in philosophy, and each is personally applied to some individual.

The narrative, entitled SciPio's Dream is put into the montli of the younger Scipio Africanus, who relates that, in his youth, when he first served in Africa, he visited the court of Massinissa, the steady friend of the Romans, and particularly of the Cornelian family. During the feasts and entertainments of the day, the conversation turned on the words and actions of the first great

PREFACE. ix

Scipio. His adopted son having retired to rest, tlie shade of the departed hero appeared to him in a vision, and darkly foretelling the future events of his life, encouraged him to tread in the paths of patriotism and true glory ; announcing the reward provided in heaven for those who have deserved well of their country.

The circumstances of time and place selected for this dream, as well as the characters introduced, have been most felicitously chosen ; and Cicero has nowhere more happily united sublimity of thought with brilliant imagination.

The letter. Ok the Duties of a Magistrate, is one of the most remarkable of the kind that has ever been penned. It was addressed by Cicero to his brother Quintus, on the occasion of his government in Asia being prolonged to a third year. Availing liimself of the riglits of an elder brother, as well as of the authority derived from his superior dignity and talents, Cicero counsels and exhorts him concerning the due administration of liis province, particularly with regard to the choice of his subordinate officers, and the degree of trust to be reposed in them. He earnestly reproves him, but with much fraternal tenderness and affection, for his irritability of temper ; and concludes with a beautiful exhortation to strive in all respects to merit the praise of his cotemporaries, and bequeath to posterity an unsullied name.

Contents

PAGB

Preface ..... v

Offices, or Moral Duties, Book 1 1

BOOK I. My Son Marcus

I. Although, as you have for a year been studying under Cratippus, and that, too, at Athens, you ought to be well furnished with the rules and principles of philosophy, on account of the pre-eminent reputation both of the master and the city, the one of which can improve you by his learning, the other by its examples ; yet as I, for my own advantage, have always combined the Latin with the Greek, not only in philosophy but €ven in the practice of speaking, I recommend to you the same method, that you may excel equally in both kinds of composition. In this respect, indeed, if I mistake not, I was of great service to our countrymen ; so that not only such of them as are ignorant of Greek learning, but even men of letters, think they have profited somewhat by me both in speaking and reasoning.

Wherefore you shall study, nay, study as long as you desire, under the best philosopher of this age — and you ought to desire it, as long as you are not dissatisfied with the degree of your improvement ; but in reading my works, which are not very diflferent from the Peripatetic — because we profess in common to be followers both of Socrates and Plato — as to the subject-matter itself, use your own judgment; but be assured you will, by reading my writings, render your Latin style more copious. I would not have it supposed that this is said in ostentation ; for, while I yield the superiority in philosophy to many, if I claim to myself the province peculiar to an orator — that of speaking with propriety, perspicuity, and elegance — I seem^ since I have spent my life in that pursuit, to lay claim to it with a certain degree of right.

Wherefore, my dear Cicero, I most earnestly recommend that you carefully peruse not only my Orations, but even my philosophical works, which have now nearly equaled them in extent ; for there is in the former the greater force of language, but you ought to cultivate, at the same time, the equable and sober style of the latter. And, indeed, I find, that it has not happened in the case of any of the Greeks, that the same man has labored in both departments, and pursued both the former — that of forensic speaking — and the latter quiet mode of argumentation ; unless, perhaps,^ Demetrius Phalereus may be reckoned in that number — a refined reasoner, a not very animated speaker, yet of so much sweetness, that you might recognize the pupil of Theophrastus. How far I have Bucceeded in both, others must determine; certain it is that I have attempted both. Indeed, I am of opinion that Plato, had he attempted forensic oratory, would have spoken with copiousness and power ; and that had Demosthenes retained and repeated the lessons of Plato, he v^ould have delivered them with gracefulness and beauty. I form the same judgment of Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom was so pleased with his own pursuit that he neglected that of the other.

n. But having resolved at this time to write to you somewhat, and a great deal in time to come, I have thought proper to set out with that subject which is best adapted .to your years and to my authority. For, while many subjects in philosophy, of great weight and utility, have been accurately and copiously discussed by philosophers, the most extensive seems to be what they have deHvered and enjoined concerning the duties of mankind ; for there can be no state of life, amid public or private affairs, abroad or at home — whether you transact any thing with yourself or contract any thing with another — that is without its obligations. In the due discharge of that consists all the dignity, and in its neglect all the disgrace, of life.

This is an inquiry common to all philosophers; for where is the man who will jiresume to style liimself a philosopher, and lay dowa no rules of duty? But there are certain

CHAP. It. CICERO'S OFFICES. 8

schools which pervert all duty by the ultimate objects of good and evil which they propose. For if a man should lay down as the chief good that which has no connection with virtue, and measure it by his own interests, and not according to its moral merit ; if such a man shall act consistently with his own principles, and is not sometimes influenced by the goodness of his heart, he can cultivate neither fiiendship, justice, nor generosity. In truth, it is impossible for the man to be brave who shall pronounce pain to be the greatest evil, or temperate who shall propose pleasure as the highest good.*

1 Cicero thus enters briefly but definitely into the most vexed, and yet the roost fundamental, question of ethics : "What is that which constitutes human conduct morally right or wrong ? In doing so, he plainly avows his own conviction that this great distinction is not dependent upon the mere expediency or inexpediency of the supposed conduct. The many eminent moral philosophers of modem times, and especially of our own country, may be comprehensively divided into the two classes of those who maintain, and those who oppose, the principle thus enunciated by Cicero. A very condensed view of the leading philosophers of these schools will not be uninstructive.

The most celebrated of the earlier opponents of the principle laid down by Cicero was Hobbes, of Malmesbury, who flourished in the J 7th century. His system takes no account of moral emotions whatever. He makes pure selfishness the motive and end of all moral actions, and makes religion and morals alike to consist in passive conformity to the dogmas and laws of the reigning sovereign.

Perhaps the best reply to this latter notion was given by Cicero himself, in his treatise, '*I)e Legibus:" — "The impulse," he says, "which directs to right conduct, and deters from crime, is not only older than the ages of nations and cities, but coeval with that Divine Being who sees and rules both heaven and earth. Nor did Tarquin less violate that eternal law, though in his reign there might have been no written law at Rome against such violence ; for the principle that impels us to right conduct, and warns us against guilt, springs out of the nature of things. It did not begin to be law when it was first written but when it originated, and it is coeval with the Divine Mind itself"

The most noted cotemporary opponents ofthese views were Cudworth and Dr. Clarke ; the sum of whose moral doctrine is thus stated in Mackintosh's "Progress of Ethical Philosophy: — "Man can conceive nothing without, at the same time, conceiving its relation to other things. He must ascribe the same law of perception to every being to whom he ascribes thought. He cannot, therefore, doubt that all the relations of all things to all must have always been present to the Eternal Mind. The relations in this sense are eternal, however recent the things may be between whom they subsist. The whole of these relations constitute truth ; the knowledge of them is omniscience. These eternal different relations of things involve a consequent eternal fitness or unfitness in the applica-

Though these truths are so self-evident that they require no philosophical discussion, }^t they have been treated by me elsewhere. I say, therefore, that if these schools are

tion of things one to another, with a regard to which the will of God alwa3's chooses, and which ought likewise to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings. These eternal dififerences make it fit and reasonable for the creatures so to act ; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation on them so to do, separate from the will of God, and antecedent to any prospect of advantage or reward."

This system professes to base all morals upon pure reason, as applied to the fitness of things. A single passage from the work of Sir James Mackintosh points out the fallacy it involves. " The murderer who poisons by arsenic acts agreeably to his knowledge of the power of that substance to kill, which is a relation between two things as much as the physician who employs an emetic after the poison, acts upon his belief of the tendency of that remedy to preserve life, which is another relation between two things. All men who seek a good or bad end by good or bad moans, must alike conform their conduct to some relation between their actions as means, and their object as an end. All the relations of inanimate things to each other are undoubtedly observed as much by the criminal as by the man of virtue."

Lord Shaftesbury, a little later, made a considerable advance in ethical philosophy, by placing virtue in the prevalence of love for the system of which we are a part, over the passions pointing to our individual welfare ; and still further, by admitting an intrinsic power in all, of judging of moral actions by a moral sense. In his general principles Leibnitz, to a great extent, concurs : though the latter appears to have lost himself in a refinement of the selfish system, by considering the pleasure connected with the exercise of this virtuous benevolence as the object in the view of the benevolent man.

Malebranche places all virtue in " the love" of the universal order, as it eternally existed in the Divine reason, where every created reason contemplates it.

The metaphysician of America, designated by Robert Ilall, "that prodigy of metaphysical acumen," Jonathan Edwards, places moral excellence in the love to being (that is, sentient being) in general. This good will should bo felt toward a particular being — first, in proportion to his degree of existence ("for," says he, "that which is great has more existence, and is further from notliing, than that which is little"); and, secondly, in proportion to the degree in which that particular being feels bonovolenco to others.

With the 18th century arose a far higher system of morals, under the ftuapices of tiio celebrated Dr. Butler. lie makes coxscience the ruling moral power in tlie complex constitution of man, and makes its dictates the grand criterion of moral rightness and wrongncss. A few of his own words will explain the essence of his system. " ilan," says he, "from hia make, constitution, or nature, is, in the strictest and most proper sense, n law to himself; he hath the rule of right within, and what is wanting is that ho honestly attend to it Conscionce docs not only offer

CHAP. ir. CICERO'S OFFICES. 5

self-consistent, they can say nothing of the moral duties. Neither can any firm, permanent, or natural rules of duty be laid down, but by those who esteem virtue to be solely,

itself to show us the waj we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide — ^the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature. It, therefore, belongs to our condition of being. It is our duty to walk in that path, and to follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." — "Butler's Sermons," Serm. 3.

With David Hume, who was cotemporary with Butler, the principle against which Cicero protests assumes a systematic character. The doctrine of the utility of actions, as that which constitutes them virtuous, was set forth with the whole force of his genius and eloquence. How far Dr. Paley acquiesces in the principles of Hume, and how far, on the other hand, he may seem to have been a disciple of Butler, wiU be seen by two brief passages in his " Moral and Political Philosophy." A comparison of the two, and especially a consideration of his attribution of an abstract moral character to actions, will reveal the grand defect of Paley 's ethical system. The most masterly refutation of that system that ever appeared is to be found in the ethical work of Jonathan Dymond, in which an irrefragable superstructure of practical morals is built, chiefly on the foundation of Dr. Butler. The former of the passages referred to is as follows: — "We conclude that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures ; and this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, ' that the method of coming at the will of G-od, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.' So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." The second is as follows : — " Actions, in the abstract, are right or wrong according to their tendency ; the agency is virtuous or vicious according to his design.'' — " Paley's Moral philosophy," book 1, chaps. 5, and 6.

A still later philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, however, is the great apostle of the principle of expediency as the foundation of ethics His theory, also, as the basis of moral obligation, may be learned by two characteristic passages : — " Nature has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong ; on the other, the chain of causes and effects are fastened to their throne." — " Bentham's Introd. of Morals," vol. 1. c. 1. And again : — " But is it never then, from any other consideration than that of utility that we derive our notions of right and wrong? I do not know; I do not care. Whether moral sentiment can be originally conceived from any other sense than a view of utility, is one question : Whether, upon examination and reflection, it can, in point of fact, bo persisted in and justified on any other ground, by a person reflecting within, is another. Both are questions of speculation ; it matters not, comparatively, how they are decided." — Id. vol. 1, c. 2.

In conclusion, the two most enlightened philosophers of modern times, or by those who deem it to be chiefly, desirable for its own sake. The teaching of duties, therefore, is the pecuHar study of the Stoics, of the Academics, and the Peripatetics ; because the sentiments of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus, have been long exploded. Yet even those professors would have been** entitled to have treated upon the duties of men, had they left us any distinction of things, so that there might have been a path open to the discovery of duty. We shall, therefore, upon this occasion, and in this inquiry, chiefly follow the Stoics, not as their expositors, but by drawing, as usual, fi'om their sources, at our own option and judgment, so much and in such manner as we please.' I therefore think proper, as my entire argument is on moral obligation, to define what a duty is, a definition which I am surprised has been omitted

Dugald Stewart and Dr. Thomas Brown, have returned to the principle thus simplj laid down by Cicero, in repudiation of the Epicurian theory, that expediency, or its tendency to produce happiness, is the moral criterion of actions, and have supported it by an unexampled array of profound and ingenious argument and eloquent illustration. A single reconciling principle maybe given in the words of Dugald Stewart: — " An action may be said to be absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed ; or, in other words, when it is such as, with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlightened and well-informed understanding, he would have performed. An action may be said to be relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good, whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not. According to these definitions, an action may bo riglit in one sense and wrong in another — an ambiguity in language, which, how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals. It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent ; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests and to the welfare of society. And it is only so far as relative and absolute rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of virtue." — " Outlines of Moral Philosophy," part 2, sec. 6.

A similar truth is enunciated by Sir Tliomas Brown, in his " Christian Morals," first published in 1716: — "Make not the consequence of virtue the ends thereof Bo not beneficent for a name or cymbal of applause, nor exact and just in commerce for the advantages of trust and credit, which attend the reputation of true and punctual dealing; for these rewards, though unsought for, plain virtue will bring with her. To have otljcr by-ciids in good actions sours laudable performances, which must liavo deeper roots, motives, and instigations, to give them the stamp of virtuos." — "Christian Morals," part 1, sec. 10.

• Cicero, though generally adopting tho principles of the Stoics, still professes himself on Eclectic philosopher, culling from all systems what

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by Panaetius ; because every investigation wliicli is rationally undertaken, concerning any subject, ought to set out with a definition, that it may be understood what is the subject of discussion.

IIL All questions concerning duty are of two sorts. The first relates to the final good; the second consists of those rules which are to regulate the practice of life in all its relations.^ Examples of the former are as follows: — Whether all duties are perfect in themselves ? Whether one duty is of more importance than another ? together with other questions of the same nature. Now the rules for moral duties relate, indeed, to the final good ; but it is not so perceptible that they do, because they seem chiefly to refer 4o the regulation of ordinary life, and of them we are to treat in this book.

But there is another division of duty : for one is called a mean duty, the other a perfect duty, K I mistake not, the complete or perfect duty is the same with what we call a direct one, and by the Greeks is called xaTo^^w.i/a. As to that duty which is mean they call it xa^ijxoi', and they thus define those terms. Whatever duty is absolute, that they ■call a perfect duty ; and they call that duty, for the per-

appeared to 'bear most distinctly the stamp of truth, but not submitting to the authority of any. Horace makes a similar profession respecting himself —

First Epist. — Fu-st Book, lines 14, 15.

"The Roman orator," says Sir. J. Mackintosh, "though in speculative •questions he embraced that mitigated doubt which allowed most ease and freedom to his genius, yet in those moral wrirings where his heart was most deeely interested, followed the severest sect of philosophy, iind became almost a Stoic." — "Progress of Ethical Philosophy."