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A critical and exegetical commentary on the book of Leviticus

James G. Murphy · 1872 · Scanned text · Free in the US

133,424 words · about 9 h 21 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
James G. Murphy
Language
English
Published
1872
Length
133,424 words · about 9 h 21 min
Sections
6 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (6)

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Preface

In the present state of man, human reason, if without bias and without revelation, would arrive at three inevitable conclusions : I am guilty, God is holy, and therefore I am doomed to die. It would be easy to put these three propositions into the form of a regular syllogism, of which the last would be the legitimate conclusion. They contain the sum of all natural theology ; and it is obvious that they constitute a philosophy of despair.

There is a whole class of the most important truths involved in these few statements. It is well to bring some of these distinctly before the mind. That human reason is under a manifold bias, different in different men and circumstances, and extremely difficult to escape, is a proposition that will not be denied by any one at all conversant with the history of opinion in philosophy and religion. The degree in which certain threads of pure revelation have been woven into the manyfigured texture of the imagination, and have influenced the course of reason on questions of the highest moment to man, has not been so fully considered or freely conceded ; and it is impossible here to do more than indicate this important point. Yet notwithstanding the acknowledged existence of prejudice, even on the loftiest themes, it is a settled conviction with us, that intellect is indestructible as long as the soul endures, and that reason has the power of cognising first principles, ascertaining elementary facts, and drawing legitimate conclusions, if the wilful vagrancy of the fancy were kept in check. This is the first postulate of all human philosophy, without the admission of which all further pursuit of knowledge is hopeless and unprofitable.

Having adopted the postulate that reason, if true to itself, is a faculty by which knowledge may be acquired, we are prone to investigate the highest problem of man — his moral relation to God, and are led at length to the three fundamental propositions already given. At first sight some will object to their meagreness, others to their comprehensiveness. Let them at all events be put to the test of a thorough and impartial examination. Our business here is to do no more than elucidate them so far that their meaning may not be mistaken. The first proposition affirms two things — that man is of a moral nature, and that when this moral nature is developed he is conscious of sin and guilt ; and it implies that right reason is capable of discovering these facts. These conclusions have been all more or less debated by some ; yet they are what we hold to be the finding of reason on this question.

The second proposition affirms the moral nature of God, and along with this the perfection of that nature ; and involves the idea and the existence of the Creator of all things. Many will hesitate long before they accept these momentous averments, with all that they imply, as the actual or possible deliverance of reason at its best estate from the ordinary sources of intuition, experience, or logical sequence. But the longer we meditate on this transcendent theme the more fully shall we be convinced that they are the probable, if not demonstrable, result to which all the expatiations of human reason inevitably lead.

The third proposition asserts that the doom of sin is death, and that I, being guilty of sin, am doomed to die. This is the conclusion following from the premises already stated, and, like every other conclusion, is simply the evolution of that which is involved in the previous facts. It raises the question of the meaning of death, and of its counterpart, life, and of the general principles of administrative justice on the part of the Moral Governor of the universe. But there is nothing in all this which reason is not competent to investigate, if it have already achieved the results involved in the premises of this argument. Having arrived at this unavoidable conclusion, reason has no more that it can do. By the inexorable logic of facts it has been compelled to draw a dark picture of human destiny. It is not able to cast a single ray of hope on the gloomy scene. Thus ends the book of fallen nature.

On this dark ground we open the book of revelation. It also, we find, contains three cardinal articles of faith, which are the counterparts of the propositions of reason, though in a different order. The fundamental utterance of revelation is, that God is merciful. This unfolds itself into three elements of evangelical truth : God pardons, redeems, and sanctifies. All this is more fully conveyed in the three following sentences : the Father in mercy appoints an atonement and accepts the returning penitent ; the Son makes the required atonement by fulfilling all righteousness and dying for sinners ; the Holy Spirit sanctifies the soul, begetting in it faith in Jesus Christ and repentance toward God. We may set these over against the former three propositions thus, God is holy ; but he is also merciful : I am doomed to die ; but the Word made flesh has died for me : I am guilty of sin ; but the Holy Spirit comes with these glad tidings to quicken me to repentance. This is the sum and substance of all revealed religion ; and it is plain that it forms the only basis of a philosophy of hope.

These elements of the theology of revelation involve a long series of truths of the utmost moment and interest to man. Antecedent, however, to the entertainment of any or all of these doctrines is the question of revelation itself, with the kindred topics of creation, miracle, inspiration, and prophecy. Dr. Kalisch in a long dissertation on " Theology of the Past and the Future," prefixed to his Commentary on Leviticus, renounces creation, miracle, prayer, revelation, inspiration, and prophecy, and in consistency with these views denies the existence of types in the Old Testament. He therefore naturally remarks ; " It is not sufficient to appeal from the letter of the Bible to its spirit ; indeed, the one kills, but even the other is no longer life and truth to us. The spirit of the Bible is not the spirit of our times ; it is not the light that illumines our path, or points to our goal." It is not surprising that a Jew should write thus, when we consider the precursors he has had among the philosophers and divines of the Christian as well as of the Jewish church, whose interpretation of Scripture he has rashly taken for the letter and the spirit of the Bible. As a natural result of this bewilderment he has betaken himself for guidance and comfort to reason, unaided reason, developing itself successfully in science and philosophy, and proudly sitting in judgment on the Bible as one of the curious products of the ancient mind.

No thinking man will venture to undervalue reason. The progress it has made in the mathematical and experimental sciences, and in their thousandfold application to the arts of life proclaims its power. But its scope, however comprehensive, is limited to intuition, experience, and inference. It cannot by any telescope or microscope of its own invention go beyond these. It cannot look even on the heart of man, much less can it penetrate the thoughts and intents of God. In this field of inquiry the utmost that I can descry is the momentous syllogism, I have sinned against the holy God; he that has sinned against him is doomed to die; I am therefore doomed to death. All that is not involved in this lies beyond the horizon of reason. If Dr. Kalisch had once fairly faced the cheerless and solitary prospect which is presented by this farthest step of reason in the line of man's moral relation with God he would have been slow to hand us over to Baruch Spinoza, and other masters or vaunters of reason, however splendid in intellect or unimpeachable in morals. At this dark abyss without revelation reason can only stand aghast.

Many of those who are in doubt about a written revelation will demur to the account here given of the testimony which reason has to offer with respect to the relation of God with man. Some will affirm that it is overstated ; others that it is understated. We have at present, it is obvious, no pressing concern with those who think it is overstated, inasmuch as the less reason can testify, the more our need of revelation. But those who think it is understated assure themselves that reason suggests, if it does not vouch, that, there is mercy with God. If reason actually vouched for all that this implies, the need of revelation, it must be confessed, would not be great. This is the

3 PKEFACE.

turning-point of the whole question. And the nearer we draw to it, the more sensible we become that it is the most grave and serious theme that can engage the attention of man. Now it is impossible for us to get over the conviction that reason, so far from even hinting at mercy, feels itself constrained to yield unreservedly to the full demand of justice. For it must be borne in mind, that mercy, to be at all to the present purpose, must involve the forgiveness of sin. Now it is most willingly agreed that the sight of suffering, that is presumably the suffering of an innocent being, will awaken pity in the Divine bosom. But on the altogether different question whether the Most High will or can forgive sin, reason can only be silent. All that it can positively asseverate is, that sin deserves its doom, and that justice requires that the punishment be adequate to the offence. If I wrong my neighbor, he has a right to redress. And he that is in authority is bound not only to enforce the right, but to vindicate the law by condign punishment. Reason can go no further. I cannot say that my neighbor must or ought or will pardon me. I can by no means say that the magistrate is at liberty to pardon me without redressing my neighbor.

Whence, then, comes the conception of pardon that so readily suggests itself to the mind in this awful predicament ? Simply, we submit, from the voice of revelation, a revelation as early as the fall, entwining itself with the memories of the race, descending as a tradition from father to son, and cherished as a fountain of hope in the valley of the shadow of death. But apart from all revelation, reason could only assure us of the sentence of death upon the sinner ; and we know not whether imagination could even suggest the possibility of pardon. But even if it could, the bare suggestion would be of no avail for our light or peace against the inevitable doom pronounced by reason upon the guilty. Only a plain and palpable attestation could give comfort to the mind. Hence the line is clear to us that marks off the distinct spheres of reason and revelation in the matter of our relation to God. Reason, at the most, can only tell us of justice and doom. Revelation, when its voice is heard at all, speaks of mercy and peace. Hence also appears to us the absolute necessity of revelation, if hope is ever to have a place in the breast of the fallen.

When a revelation from heaven is made, however, reason has as much to do with it as with any other matter that comes within its ken. First, it acknowledges its possibility. If my fellow-man can tell me of the thoughts and feelings that are within his heart, much more can my Maker unveil to me the purpose of mercy that has lain hid within his breast. I ask not the mode of doing so. He who made me after his own image has, I question not, divers manners of making known to me his mind. Next, reason hears, understands, and estimates the credibility of the revelation. All these processes we hold and admit to be quite competent to right reason. Again, when a revelation comes to be written, it affords still further exercise for reason. We then have the best means not only of preserving it, but of judging of its value and its authority. A written revelation gives rise to the questions of the inspiration and of the canon of Scripture.

The possibility of a revelation involves the wider possibility of a miracle, and this of creation and prophecy. A logical mind, accepting revelation, will be found accepting with equal

10 PKEFACE.

readiness all these kindred facts, not perhaps in the popular, but at all events in the scriptural sense. On the other hand, he who rejects revelation will feel himself bound in consistency to reject the miracle in all its phases. This single point of revelation, then, divides thinking men into two sharply defined classes, those who acknowledge the miraculous in the scriptural sense, and those who repudiate it in some other assumed sense. It is fitting to express the divergence in this modified form, because the reasoning of one truly thoughtful man is not, and cannot be, in direct antagonism with that of another.

To guard against misconception it is necessary to observe that the inspiration of the Scriptures must be, by the very nature of. the thing, verbal, simply because the Scripture to which this property is ascribed consists of words. Dean Alford, than whom few men, if any, in the British Empire are more deserving of thanks from the churches for his labors in the field of New Testament exposition, distinguishes verbal and plenary inspirations as two diverging theories, and gives a definition of the former, on the ground of which he rejects it as unworthy and destructive of the credibility of the Gospels. We regret that he has taken this course, which we think unworthy of his discrimination and his candor. "We adhere to the phrase " verbal inspiration, " but we must decline to adopt his definition of it. Verbal inspiration is simply the inspiration of a writing, which of necessity consists of words. We agree with this eminent expositor, that "We must take our views of inspiration, not from a priori considerations, but entirely from

THE EVIDENCE FURNISHED BY THE SCRIPTURES THEMSELVES. Now

one express part of the evidence furnished by Scripture is that " Scripture," that is, the written document composed of words, is " given by inspiration of God." We take shelter under this statement, and refuse to be dislodged from it on the insufficient ground that certain advocates, or certain opponents, of the doctrine have given an untenable or unscriptural definition of it. The question of the inspiration of the Scriptures is not merely who are inspired, but what is inspired.

As the evidence of a miracle rests ultimately on the testimony of the senses, so it is with the canon of Scripture. We are inconsiderately looking for too much, when we expect preternatural evidence of a preternatural event. The supernatural must, in the long run, come to our knowledge by natural evidence. To come to the case in point, the last books or book of revelation must be received on the evidence of sense or testimony. For if this evidence were miraculous, it would itself be a part of the canon, and would need its own natural attestation. Hence it is contrary to sound sense to demand inspired evidence of the last contribution made to the volume of inspiration. The Israelites had natural evidence merely, the evidence of experience and testimony to the Divine revelation given to Moses for their instruction. Incidentally we have preternatural evidence, the evidence of the New Testament, for the canon of the Old Testament. But we have simply natural evidence, that of credible testimony, for the canon of the New Testament. And it would be well for us always to bear in mind that, in the nature of things, this is all we can have, unless and until there be a third Testament containing an inspired voucher for the second. This evidence of sense is all we need to have, as it would be all we should still have for another instalment of revelation, if it were to come.

Though reason can formulate the sum total of its own conelusions concerning the relation of man to God, it cannot prescribe, but only accept, the form in which the matter of revelation will come from God. But when it has the volume of revelation before it, it falls within its province to apprehend and to exhibit the substance of the Divine communication in a sentence or system. The sentence is, " There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared." The system has been already given in its most condensed shape : The Father pardons, the Son propitiates, the Spirit purines. The first of these three propositions involves the other two. Because it is the Father's purpose to remit sin, he sends his Son to redeem and his Spirit to regenerate. The first has two seemingly insurmountable obstacles to encounter. How can God, being just, forgive sin ; and, how can man, being evil, return to God ? The former is overcome by the atonement, in which the Son of God becoming man obeys the law and dies the death, that the sinner who trusts in him with penitent heart may escape death and enter into life. The latter is overcome by the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, who by the gospel makes the sinner aware of the mercy of the Father and the mediation of the Son, and willing to lean on the Saviour and return to the Fountain of mercy. These three fundamental articles of faith manifestly involve two others of co-ordinate importance, the trinity of persons in the Godhead and the incarnation of the Eternal Word. These may be called the five cardinal points of revelation. The questions of predestination and freeagency lie on the common ground of reason and faith, or of observation and revelation.

To make our way clear, it is expedient to make a few remarks on some of these points. Pardon is by its very nature free : " Freely by his grace.'' as the Scriptures almost pleonastically express it. Yet pardon is in effect bound by two indispensable conditions, first that the Mediator satisfy the law for the offender, and next that the offender, relying on the Mediator, return to the Father. Propitiation implies expiation, the latter denoting the payment of the penalty due to sin, the former including also, and chiefly, the performance of the obedience due to the law. Purification is a process begun in the new birth and continued in the new life. As long as there is a remnant of sin or of the old man we must present the petition "Forgive us our debts," and plead for acceptance the merits of the Substitute. Incarnation involves not only death on account of sin, but resurrection Unto life on account of righteousness. The revelation of the three persons or relatives in the essentially one God unfolds to us the possibility of salvation. None but the essentially Divine can pardon, redeem, or regenerate ; and yet the Forgiver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier must be relatively or personally different.

The Book of Leviticus is the figurative exhibition of the way of salvation. It is the central book of the Pentateuch. After the history of the whole human race in relation with God given in the Book of Genesis and, the growth of the seed of Abraham into a free and holy nation recorded in the Book of Exodus, we have in this highly remarkable and singularly interesting book the first full and particular development of the way of salvation for man, in a series of symbolic forms suited to the primeval stage of the human race, and fitted to edify the infant people of God, unfold to their mind and conscience the first principles of reconciliation with God and renovation after his image, and prepare them for the coming of the substance of all these shad-.

ows in the fulness of time. Nothing can exceed the interest of this book for the age in which it made its appearance ; and the attentive study of it will contribute much to the confirmation and comfort of us who live in the light of the gospel which it foreshadows, after the advent of the Mediator whom it represents.

Dr. Kalisch, in his Introduction to this book, has a section on its " illogical arrangement," which he founds upon a crude and superficial digest of its contents. It is the easiest thing in the world to make a book appear illogical. We have only to misapprehend the author's principle of arrangement, and the thing is done. Many an author suffers from this sort of treatment on the part of the critic. The more faithful he is to his real plan, the more incongruous will his work appear to the critic who sees no plan in it, or imagines a wrong one. He applies the wrong key, which is sure not to fit. He pronounces the lock out of order ; but it is the key that is wrong, not the lock. Dr. Kalisch has not been at the pains to discover the true principle of arrangement in the Book of Leviticus. It will appear, when due attention is paid to the structure of the book, that the order of its various topics is the very best that could be devised by an author who had a series of distinct communications intrusted to him, not to work into a treatise, but simply to arrange in a book.

The book treats of propitiation and purification. Propitiation involves the priest who mediates and the offering which makes atonement. Besides the priest and the offering that come between, are the almighty, eternal, holy Creator and the fallen creature, between whom they come. It is requisite, for the sake of clearness, to direct our attention to each of these important objects in turn.

The most holy and wise God alone determines what is the nature of the mediation between himself and his fallen creatures, what are the characteristics and functions of the Mediator, and what is the special significance of each kind of offering. It is not of the slightest consequence, therefore, for the illustration of these matters, what were the manners and customs of other nations concerning the worship of the Deity ; as they only contain some traces of revealed truth mingled up with a mass of human error. For any certain information, therefore, concerning the priests and their functions, the offerings and the import of their several kinds, and the feelings and intentions with which the worshippers came forward to present them, we must have recourse to the Scriptures which are handed down to us as the revelation of God concerning the mode of his worship.

The priest has two functions to discharge — the offering of sacrifice, and the making of intercession. In the former of these functions, he has two parts only to perform ; the application of the blood and the burning of the fat, the flesh, or the memorial of the oblation or meat-offering. These two parts are expressive of expiation and propitiation, or the payment of the penalty and the performance of the righteousness due by the transgressor. It is not necessary to dwell on these, as they will receive their illustration from the explanation of the various offerings.

The various kinds of offerings described in the first five chapters have tasked the ingenuity of expositors from the earliest times ; and much depends on the elucidation of their true meaning for the right understanding of the book itself, and of the way of salvation for the lost family of man which the Bible unfolds. It is manifest that there are three primary and stated offerings, and two secondary and occasional. The former are the burnt-sacrifice, the oblation, and the sacrifice of peace, expressing atonement, the benefit of atonement, and the enjoyment of this benefit ; the latter, the sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering, expressing the expiation and the satisfaction for an occasional sin of inadvertence. This is the result of a careful and patient examination of their nature and import

The burnt-sacrifice represents the great propitiation for sin, to be offered up once only on behalf of a sinful world. This is manifest from the description of it. It is " for the acceptance " of the worshippers ; it is " accepted for him to atone for him"; and it is " a fire-offering of a sweet smell unto the Lord." The blood that expiates is sprinkled on the altar ; and the burning of the whole upon the altar is the symbol of a full propitiation. The oblation sets forth the fruit of righteousness, which is life. For bread is the staff of life. The memorial of it is burnt by the priest upon the altar, as " a fire-offering of a sweet smell unto the Lord." This denotes a propitiation, which is made by fulfilling all righteousness. It presupposes expiation by the blood of the burnt-sacrifice. The sacrifice of peace includes the three stages, the blood of expiation, the fat of propitiation, and the feast of communion, in which the benefits of redemption are actually received and enjoyed by the worshipper. Subordinate and occasional are the sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering. They express the application of the great propitiation to the inadvertent sins that are committed by the children of God after repentance and adoption ; the former giving prominence to the punishment due for the wrong done, and the latter to the redress due for the right left undone. According to the circumstances, the one or the other is used, or both arc offered for the same offence.

The prominent feeling that animates the worshipper is different, according to the nature of the offering. In the burnt-sacrifice he comes to express his faith in God and in the divinely appointed propitiation for sin ; in the oblation his acknowledgement of the blessings of life ; and in the sacrifice of peace the joy of salvation which fills his soul when he partakes of those blessings. The re-awakening of faith and hope after the sorrow and self-condemnation of inadvertent sins prompts to the sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering. Hence it appears that the motives which these offerings, in their diversity and mutual relationship, call forth, afford a fine illustration of the process of salvation in the inner man. To lay the hand upon the head of the burnt-sacrifice for the first time, represents the turning-point in the history of the soul. % In that representative act is set forth, in a figure, the act of being born of God and adopted into his family, by which sanctification is begun and justification takes place. Justification has two sides, a negative and a positive ; it includes the pardon of sin in us, and the acceptance of righteousness for us. These have their corresponding two sides in the atoning sacrifice, which embraces, not only the payment of the penalty, but the performance of the righteousness due to the law of heaven. The same two-sidedness comes out in the definition of the burnt-sacrifice, makes itself very distinct in the sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering, and appears in the two parts the priest has to perform in the offering of sacrifice.

To present the oblation alone, or in conjunction with the sacrifice proper, in which there is the shedding of blood, is practically to acknowledge the good works or righteousness of the mediator as the meritorious ground of the blessings of the life that now is and of that which is to come. The same principle applies to the offering of the first-fruits, which is a confession that the fruits of the earth are the gift of God on the ground of a merit not our own. Hence we perceive that the oblation presupposes, even when it is not immediately preceded by, the sacrifice of propitiation. This is the ultimate ground on which it is accepted, and the benefits which it symbolizes are realized. To partake of the feast on the sacrifice of peace, is to celebrate, not merely the blessings of salvation, but our actual enjoyment of them in fellowship with our heavenly Father. This is a divinely instituted emblem of the Christian living with Christ. It is the symbolic expression of the fact that, " if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." There is, however, another aspect of" the experience of a Christian which is presented in the following verse : " If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Hence the singular aptitude of the sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering to express the application of the atonement which our humiliating experience requires us to make even after we have with penitent heart laid our hand upon the head of the great atoning sacrifice. The traces of the old man betray themselves in us, which need a fresh sprinkling of the blood of atonement, and a long and persevering effort for their complete obliteration. These are the sins of inadvertence, more or less grave, which mar the spiritual beauty and wound the conscience of the child of God. The sin-sacrifice and the trespass-offering thus symbolize the fresh application of the blood of sprinkling, which the sin-vexed soul has to make, whilo humbly confessing the easily-besetting sin which ho has not yet been able entirely to lay aside, and uttering the often needful supplication, "forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." In this twofold form of offering for sin, as has been already said, the Christian expresses his regret for walking in any respect after the flesh, and his longing to walk in all respects after the Spirit.

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