University sermons : sermons delivered in the chapel of Brown University

Preface

The following sermons, as the title-page indicates, were delivered in the college chapel on Sabbath afternoons, before the officers and students of Brown University. With the exception of the tenth and fourteenth sermons, they were all originally prepared for this religious service. Having been written at various intervals, during a period of four years, in preparing them for the press, they have been so arranged as to form something like a series of discourses on what I suppose to be the most important doctrines of the gospel. The sermons on the revolutions in Europe were written immediately after the accounts were received of the events to which they relate, and are added because they treat of subjects at present of universal interest.

It has been the design of the author, in making this selection from the discourses which he has delivered to his pupils, to present a plain exhibition of the

IV PREFACE.

way of salvation by Christ. He publishes them, in the hope that, by the blessing of God, they may be the means of directing the attention of the young to the importance of personal religion.

Brown University, Nov. 15, 1848.

Contents

SERMON I.

THEORETICAL ATHEISM.

Text. — " The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God." — Psalm liii. 1 1

Part I

Text. — " For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." — Romans iii. 23. — "I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you." — John v. 42 31

SERMON IV.

THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. LOVE TO GOD.

Part II

Text. — "Even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind." — Romans i. 28 47

SERMON V.

THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. LOVE TO MAN.

Text. — " And the second is like unto it, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." — Matthew xxii. 36 65

a*

VI CONTENTS.

SERMON VI.

THE FALL OF MAN.

Text. — " By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." — Romans v. 19 80

SERMON VII.

JUSTIFICATION BY WORKS IMPOSSIBLE.

Text. — " Therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be

justified in his sight." — Roma?is iii. 20 94

SERMON VIII.

PREPARATION FOR THE ADVENT OF THE MESSIAH.

PART I.

Text. — " When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son." — Galatians iv. 4. — " The world by wisdom knew not God." — 1 Corinthians i. 21 106

SERMON IX.

PREPARATION FOR THE ADVENT OF THE MESSIAH.

PART II.

Text. — "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low ; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." — Isaiah xl. 3, 4 122

SERMON X.

THE WORK OF THE MESSIAH.

Text. — " God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law." — (lalatiatis iv. 4, 5 137

CONTENTS. Vll

SERMON XI.

THE WORK OF THE MESSIAH.

PART II.

Text. — " Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivitycaptive, thou hast received gifts for men, yea, for the rebellious also, that the Lord God might dwell among them." — Psalm lxviii. 18 157

SERMON XII.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

Text. — " A man is justified by faith, without the works of the law." — Romans iii. 28 173

SERMON XIII.

A DAY IN THE LIFE OF JESUS OF NAZARETH.

SERMON XIV.

THE FALL OF PETER.

Text. — " And when he thought thereon, he wept." — Mark xiv. 72. . 202

SERMON XV.

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST.

Text. — "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also that shall believe on me through their word ; that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." — John x\ii. 20, 21 220

SERMON XVI.

THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.

Text. — "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also that shall believe on me through their word ; that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." — John xvii. 20, 21 237

Vlll CONTENTS.

SERMON XVII.

THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE.

Text. — " Render therefore unto Cocsar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." — Matthexo xxii. 21 253

SERMON XVIII.

THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE.

PART II.

Text. — " Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's,

and unto God the things that are God's." — Matthew xxii. 21 265

SERMON XIX.

THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE.

Part III

Text. — " Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's,

and unto God the things that are God's." — Matthew xxii. 21.... 278

SERMON XX.

THE RECENT REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE.

TAUT I.

Text. — "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. Blessed are all they that put their trust in him." — Psalm ii. 10 — 12 204

SERMON X X 1 .

THE RECENT REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE.

Tr.XT. — "Be wi<c now, therefore, O ye kin--; be instructed, ve judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. K£si the Son, lesl he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. Blessed are all they that put their trust in him." — Psalm ii. 10— 13 312

" The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."

Psalm liii. 1.

It is scarcely possible for us to converse, even for a few moments, with another human being, without instinctively forming an opinion respecting his intellectual capacity. Although we may be unable definitely to express the reason for our judgments, yet every one has formed for himself a standard by which he estimates the ability of others. We readily and often rashly assign to the men whom we meet a place among the ordinary, the distinguished, or the highly gifted ; or among the inferior, the weak, or the very weak in intellect. These differences, however, may all exist within the normal conditions of the human understanding. We sometimes, however, meet with a man whose mind does not obey those laws which govern the operations of ordinary intelligence. We find ourselves in the presence of one with whom we can hold but partial and imperfect communion. We perceive that the being before us does not form his judgments in the same manner as the rest of mankind. He will believe, for instance, with unquestioning confidence, an assertion which to other men seems absurd. He will, on the other hand, refuse his assent to the plainest statement of fact, and hold out unconvinced against an accumulation of evidence of which a tithe would satisfy a man of sober understanding. A person of this character, I think, we always designate as a fool.

But this is not the only form in which folly exhibits itself. 1

We sometimes observe men who are convinced of tbi istence of a physical or a moral law, and yet act as if that

which they believe to be true they certainly knew to be false. An idiot, though he may have been burned by the 6re, will immediately expose himself to the danger of being burned a^ain. He will learn wisdom neither from observation nor experience. Thus also we see men, for the sake of a momentary gratification, deliberately do an act which must work the wreck of character and the loss of reputation, and subject them through life to the gnawings of unavailing ren Thus the inebriate surrenders himself to a habit which he knows to be destructive of all peace of mind, and which must render him inevitably both loathsome and contemptible. Thus also we sometimes observe a young man, endowed with promising abilities, for whom parents and friends are making innumerable sacrifices, before whom the path to honorable distinction is plainly set open, basely squandering his time, associating with the frivolous, the reckless, and the profli and choosing for his portion poverty, remorse, and contempt, instead of affluence, conscious rectitude, and elevated standing. When we see men thus acting in deliberate defiance of the dictates of their own understanding, and in direct opposition to their clearly apprehended interests, I believe we always refer them to the class of fools. Though endowed with the power of forethought, they act as though they were deprived of it ; and hence we number them with those on whom the power of forethought has never been bestowed. The former of these classes may be denominated ; ! , and the latter practi-

cal, fools.

It is, however, to be remarked, that the element of folly does not, by necessity, pervade the whole intellectual character. There seem to exist, in this respect, what may, perhaps, not inappropriately be denominated mental idiosyncrai The man not unrrequently, on some subjects, reasons and '•udges like other men, while, upon pther subjects, h to the charge of incorrigible folly. In some cases, he may respect the precepts of practical wisdom, while in others he seems surrendered up to the dominion of hopeless fatuity.

Whatever may be the manner in which folly is displayed, the feelings with which we contemplate it are marked with sufficient distinctness. Where a man is a hopeless idiot, we pity him. The finger of God has touched him, and we are bound, by every tie of brotherhood, to treat him with thoughtful commiseration. When, however, we behold folly of a mixed character, — when a man is endowed with intelligence, and acts as if he were an idiot, — I think we are conscious of a veiy different emotion. The man can see some things clearly enough, while other things, equally evident, he utterly refuses to see. He will believe what he chooses, though it be ever so destitute of proof, while he refuses to believe that which displeases him, though established on the most irrefragable evidence. We cannot but believe that his state of mind is owing to some hidden and by no means commendable bias, and we can contemplate him neither with respect for his intellect nor confidence in his integrity.

The same sentiments, in most respects, are awakened by the exhibition of practical folly. If an idiot, who has never been able to appreciate the relation of cause and effect, throws himself a second time into the fire, from which, at imminent peril to ourselves, we have rescued him, we pity his sad calamity. But when a man possessed of a reasonable soul acts again and again in opposition to his acknowledged and most vital interests ; when he sacrifices all that renders life a blessing for a contemptible gratification ; when, in defiance of the plainest dictates of his understanding, he repeatedly calls down upon himself the direct penalties of inexorable law, — we may, it is true, pity him, but our pity is mingled with feelings nearly allied to contempt.

Indeed, I do not remember any emotions more universal than those with which we contemplate the intellectual character of our fellow-men. We admire, nay, we almost venerate, a powerful understanding united to vast reach of thought, and clear-sighted, steadfast continuity of purpose. The very fact that we hold intellectual fellowship with a mind thus endowed creates within us, at times, an emotion akin to that of sublimity. On the contrary, as universal and deep-seated ii the disgust awakened within us by striking exhibitions either of theoretical or practical folly. I do not know but we fed an emotion of self-esteem arising even from the contempt with which we never fail to regard it. Nay, " 'tis not in folly not to scorn a fool." The theoretical fool laughs at the practical fool. The practical fool despises the theoretical fool. Thus human nature, whether wise or unwise, bears testimony to the estimation in which this attribute is held throughout the universe of God.

Such, then, is the nature of the epithet by which the pen of inspiration designates the intellectual character of him who denies the existence of a God. It declares him to be a fool. Observe also the force of the expression. It does not make this affirmation solely of him who unblushingly avows his atheism, but even of him who cherishes it in the solitude of his own bosom — " The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God." Let us, then, during the remainder of this discourse, attempt to illustrate the truth of this sentiment of inspiration.

From what I have already said, it will at once appear that the denial of the existence of God may be either theoretical or practical. It is theoretical when we affirm that no such being as God exists. It is practical when, professing to believe that he exists, we act in all respects as though we believe that he did not exist. In the present discourse, we shall treat of the first of these errors.

I have already Intimated that theoretical folly may DtfUlifest itself in two forms, either in thai of absurd cedulity, or of a'^ml incredulity. I think that in the denial (if the existence ofGod both of those elements of folly may be discovered.

1. It is surely an evidence of absurd credulity to believe an assertion, respecting any subject whatever, when no evidence is brought forward to sustain it; and especially when, from the necessity of the case, the evidence, if it did exist, is beyond the reach of the human understanding. There have frequently appeared impostors, who have affirmed that they should never die. Men have been found, who, without any evidence, have believed their assertions. Has not the whole world united in declaring them to be absurdly credulous ? Have they not always been believed to be, so far as this subject was concerned, fools, on whose judgment, in future, no reliance could safely be reposed ? Men have frequently predicted that, on a particular day, the world would be burned up, and they have found persons who believed that such would be the fact, simply on the ground of these predictions. Mankind have laughed at them as credulous simpletons, merely because, hi a matter of importance, they believed an assertion unsupported by the shadow of evidence. Suppose that, on the ground of your affirmation, you could make a man believe that molten lava would not consume him, and that, relying on your declaration, he resolved to throw himself into the crater of a volcano ; in what estimation would you hold his understanding ? Or suppose that it were asserted that eveiy star in the firmament is a glorified spirit, placed there to gaze forever on the events transpiring on this little earth. Were a man to believe this assertion, sustained by no evidence — nay, where, if the assertion were true, the evidence is infinitely beyond the reach of the human faculties, — could we believe him to be in possession of a sound understanding ? We see, then, in general, that with the exception of intuitive propositions, the human mind, in the proper exercise of its faculties, can never believe, unless through the medium of evidence, and that, if it believe any assertion without evidence, we always consider it to be absurdly credulous.

Now, the atheist declares to us that there is no God.

What is the proof of his assertion ? By what syllogism does

he demonstrate it ? What is his major, and what is his minor

premise ? He tells us that he has never seen, nor felt, nor

1* heard God ; and, therefore, that God does not exist. But does nothing exist on earth which has never manifested itself either to his senses or to his consciousness? How does he know but, among the truths which have thus far escaped his notice, one may be the existence of God ? Has he lived forever, and been present from eternity, throughout the immensity of space? Where was he when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy ? How does he know but that God may have existed where and when he was not ? On this subject, I take pleasure in introducing to your notice a remarkable passage from Foster's Essays — a volume of such inestimable value, that no young man should consider his education truly commenced, unless he has given it an attentive and thorough perusal.

" The wonder then turns on the immense intelligence by which a man could know that there is no God. What ages and what lights are requisite for this attainment ! This intelligence involves the very attributes of divinity, while a God is denied. For, unless this man is omnipresent, unless he is at this moment in every place in the universe, he cannot know but there may be in some place, manifestations of a Deity, by which even he would be overpowered.- If he does not know absolutely every agent in the universe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himself the chief agent in the universe, and does not know what is so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be, that there is a God. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be a God. If he does not know every thing that may have been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by a God. Thus, unless he knows all things, — that is, precludes the idea of another Deity by being one himself, — he cannot know that the being whose existence lie rejects does not exist. But he must know that he does not exist, else he deserves equal contempt and compassion, for the temerity with which he avows his rejection and acts accordingly."

Such, then, my brethren, is the absurdity of the assertion that there is no God. It is an assertion not only unsustained by evidence, but one, the truth of which could not be certainly known, unless the assertor were himself endowed with the attributes of the Deity. In a word, I think that any one who reflects for a moment upon the fewness and feebleness of the faculties of man, and then upon the boundlessness of the universe, must be convinced, that the assertion that God does not exist, involves within itself all the elements of the most revolting absurdity.

I have, thus far, endeavored to show that atheism is absurd in its credulity. I shall next attempt to show that it is equally absurd in its unbelief. Not only does it believe without the shadow of evidence, nay, where evidence is by necessity impossible, but it disbelieves a proposition of which the evidence is interwoven with the very structure of the human understanding.

Before entering upon this part of our subject, allow me to suggest a single explanation. I am not about to prove to you the existence of God, as though it were to you a matter of doubt. You need no such proof. You all believe this all-important truth, and no illustration of mine could render it more evident. The belief in a First Cause, a superintending Providence, is one of the ideas common to our race, as soon as the mind is quickened into even incipient activity. So necessarily is this belief generated among the first forms of human knowledge, that it presses through the thick covering of ignorance which commonly overspreads our faculties when man is unenlightened by revelation. The mind of the creature needs the idea of a Creator, and it will associate this idea with the sun, the moon, or the planets, nay, with four-footed beasts and creeping things, rather than live destitute of a belief which is demanded by the necessities of our intellectual nature. It is not, then, my design to prove to you the existence of a God, but to illustrate to you the process by which the belief in his existence has become universal. In doing this, I hope also in another r exhibit to you the absurdity of atheism.

1. In the first place, the ideaof power, of cause and en%

the universal and spontaneous suggestion of the human intelligence. It springs up unbidden and irrepressible from the perception of a change. We eannot conceive of a change without being conscious immediately of the notion of a cause by

which it was effected. This law of the human mind is universal, and its operation may be as readily perceived in the of a child as of a philosopher. You may easily make the experiment for yourselves. Remove a child's toy from one room to another, and he will instantly ask you who did it. This change of its place immediately suggests to him the idea of a cause. Tell him that no one did it, that it took p without the exertion of any sufficient power, and see if you can make him believe you. Let him burn his hand in the fire, and see if you can induce him to repeat the experiment His own infantile intelligence has attained the conviction that like causes produce like effects, and no argument can possibly eradicate it. But suppose it were othem tpose that

you observed a child to be entirely destitute of this suggestion, that the notion of cause and effect never seemed to govern its conduct, but that it would place its hand in a flame as often as an opportunity occurred, without being able to arrive at the notion that the fire was the cause of its pain. You would decide at once that the child was an idiot ; and you would not be mistaken. You see that a human mind cannot he deprived of this suggestion, without losing an essential element of its original intelligence.

The truth which 1 wish to illustrate was forcibly taught bv Dr. Beattie, when he wished t<» impress upon his sen the of the existence of God. Tracing the letters of the child's name in the fresh mould of the garden, lie sowed in the lines some ordinary seeds. Very BOOO the son discovered his own name distinctly growing out of the ground, and demanded of his father the cause of it. Dr. Beattie at first told him it was produced by chance ; but the child would not believe it, nor could he be persuaded by all his father's ingenuity that it was not the work of some intelligent agent. From this incident, he was taught the idea of a universal cause. I think that every one who reflects upon this occurrence will declare that this child, in insisting upon the necessity of a cause, spoke the language of human nature.

Now, we are encompassed on every side by changes springing up around us in infinite variety. Every season of the year, eveiy month, every day, and every night, nay, every hour, is crowded with them in numbers without beginning and without end, and every one, when we reflect upon it, by the constitution of our minds, suggests to us the idea of a cause. The necessity of this idea is, therefore, pressed upon us, by the very constitution of our minds, as soon as we begin to observe the changes continually occurring in the universe around us.

2. Secondly, when we examine this notion of cause and effect, we perceive that at first it is satisfied with observing the relation of antecedent and consequent combined with the idea of power. It is not long, however, before the mind proceeds farther, and asks not only for a cause, but for a sufficient cause. The child of Dr. Beattie could not be made to believe that the wind and the rain had by accident deposited the seeds -in the order in which he perceived them. He knew that this must have been done by a cause that knew his name, and could spell it, and form the letters of which it was composed. Until such a cause could be suggested, his mind could not rest satisfied. So, when we are asked what causes the growth of vegetation, we reply, heat and moisture, the rain and the sunshine. At first, this explanation may seem satisfactory ; but soon the elements of our intelligence require us to proceed a step farther. We observe the innumerable forms of beauty and utility springing up every where around us ; we examine the wonderful laws by which eveiy process of vege tation is governed; we trace the relations existing between the vegetable and animal kingdoms : we pursue our inquiries into the higher ranks of being, and learn the habitudes, the instincts, the uses of brutes, and the faculties, the intelligi and the development of man. We at once conclude that our first conception of cause is wholly inadequate to account for the changes which we perceive. The drop of water and the beam of sunlight could never in strictness be the cause of the matchless beauty with which the earth is overspread. We cannot ascribe to senseless matter a power infinitely transcending that of the highest human intelligence. The most profound philosopher would be pronounced insane were he to attempt the formation of a blade of grass ; and can we ascribe to brute matter the power to subject the elements of nature to complicated and mysterious law, or to create the blushing loveliness of spring or the rich abundance of autumn ? We at once determine that, hidden behind these visible antecedi there must exist an adequate cause, an intelligent power, competent to the production of all these changes, and to which all that we see is, from necessity, subordinate. We are thus led to conceive of an underived and absolute cause. When the mind arrives at this idea, it rests satisfied. It demands nothing more ultimate. The mind of the creature reposes upon the conception of a self-existent, all-powerful, and all-wise Creator, and it is henceforth at rest.

3. But, supposing that we have arrived at the notion of underived causation, the question may still be asked. May several independent causes originate the changes which taking place around us? This question is readily answered by examining the facts in the case. Every thing that we behold is manifestly a part of one universal whole. Every law is found to be in perfeel harmony with every other law. Were the various forces which regulate the motions of our Bys) in the smallest degree modified, universal ruin would en Every thing teaches us that the universe, with all itBchaj is nothing more than the realization of one inception.

This fact excludes the idea of a multiplicity of causes, and teaches us, that the cause of causes, the absolute causation, is every where one and the same. We thus arrive at the idea of a universal cause, a sufficient reason why all things are, and why they are such as they are ; that is, of a Creator infinite in power and unsearchable in wisdom.

4. When we reflect upon human conduct, we find that we always connect the outward act with the spiritual disposition, or intention, from which it proceeds. Observing them in this light, we perceive in every action the quality of right or virtue, or of its opposite wrong or vice. We know that the constitution of the moral beings around us is similar to our own. We refer their outward manifestations to their appropriate spiritual dispositions, and hence, from their actions, we judge men to be either virtuous or vicious. Virtue we cannot but esteem and venerate ; vice we cannot but despise and abhor. These, I think, must be universally considered as the proper judgments of all moral intelligences. Let us now refer these obvious principles to our judgments respecting the first and universal cause. We observe by our own experience that our virtuous actions are always followed by happiness and that self-approbation which is, in itself, an exceeding great reward. We, on the contrary, observe that vicious actions are followed by pain and remorse, and a fearful looking-for of judgment. We observe that the same consequences follow the correspondent actions of others. We trace the vicissitudes of nations, and observe that they are regulated by the same law. We see that, irrespective of all human power and human foresight, nay, in despite of all the wisdom of man, virtue is indissolubly connected with happiness, and vice with misery. Here, then, is an order of sequence established, and it must have been established by the universal, the all-pervading cause. Here, then, we behold the perpetual acting of the Almighty ; and from it we learn the moral attributes which compose his character. We thus are taught that he loves virtue and abhors vice, and we conclude that his moral, like his natural, attributes are infinite. We thus arrive at the conception of an Almighty Cause who is infinitely holy. Thus our intellectual and moral natures unite in ascribing to the Creator every perfection of which we can conceive in an infinite degree. Such, it seems to me, is the result to which the unbiased faculties of the human mind would naturally arrive.