The elements of moral science

Preface

In presenting to the public a new treatise upon Moral Science, it may not be improper to state the circumstances which led to the undertaking, and the design which it is intended to accomplish.

When it became my duty to instruct in Moral Philosophy, in Brown University, the text-book in use was the work of Dr. Paley. From many of his principles I found myself compelled to dissent, and, at first, contented myself with stating to my classes my objections to the author, and offering my views, in the form of familiar conversations, upon several of the topics which he discusses. These views, for my own convenience, I soon committed to paper, and delivered, in the form of lectures. In a few years, these lectures had become so far extended, that, to my surprise, they contained, by themselves, the elements of a different system from that of the text-book which I was teaching. To avoid the inconvenience of teaching two different systems, I undertook to reduce them to order, and make such additions, as would render the work in some measure complete within itself. I thus iv

PREFACE.

relinquished the work of Dr. Paley, and, for some time, have been in the habit of instructing solely by lecture. The success of the attempt exceeded my expectations, and encouraged me to hope, that the publication of what I had delivered to my classes, might, in some small degree, facilitate the study of moral science.

From these circumstances the work has derived its character. Being designed for the purposes of instruction, its aim is, to be simple, clear, and purely didactic. I have rarely gone into extended discussion, but have contented myself with the attempt to state the moral law, and the reason of it, in as few and as comprehensive terms as possible. The illustration of the principles, and the application of them to cases of ordinary life, I have generally left to be performed by the instructer, or by the student himself. Hence, also, I have omitted every thing which relates to the history of opinions, and have made but little allusion even to the opinions themselves, of those from whom I dissent. To have acted otherwise, would have extended the undertaking greatly beyond the limits which I had assigned to myself ; and it seemed to me not to belong to the design which I had in view. A work which should attempt to exhibit what was true, appeared to me more desirable than one which should point out what was exploded, discuss what was doubtful, or disprove what was false.

In the course of the work, I have quoted but few authorities, as, in preparing it, I have referred to but few books. 1 make this remark in

PREFACE.

V no manner for the sake of laying claim to originality, but to avoid the imputation of using the labors of others without acknowledgment. When I commenced the undertaking, I attempted to read extensively, but soon found it so difficult to arrive at any definite results, in this manner, that the necessities of my situation obliged me to rely upon my own reflection. That I have thus come to the same conclusions with many others, I should be unwilling to doubt. When this coincidence of opinion has come to my knowledge, I have mentioned it. When it is not mentioned, it is because I have not known it.

The author to whom I am under the greatest obligations is Bishop Butler. The chapter on Conscience is, as 1 suppose, but little more than a development of his ideas on the same subject. How much more I owe to this incomparable writer, I know not. As it was the study of his sermons on human nature, that first turned my attention to this subject, there are, doubtless, many trains of thought which I have derived from him, which I have not been able to trace back to their source, as they have long since become incorporated with my own reflections. The article on the Sabbath, as is stated in the text, is derived chiefly from the tract of Mr. J. J. Gurney, on the same subject. Entertaining those views of the Sacred Scriptures, which I have expressed in the work itself, it is scarcely necessary to add here, that I consider them the great source of moral truth ; and that a system of ethics will be true just in proportion as it 2* vi

PREFACE.

develops their meaning. To do this has been my object; and to have, in ever so humble a manner, accomplished it, I shall consider as the greatest possible success.

It is not without much diffidence, that I have ventured to lay before the public a work on this important subject. That something of this sort was needed, has long been universally confessed. My professional duty led me to undertake it ; and I trust that the hope of usefulness has induced me to prepare it for publication. If I have not been so happy as to elucidate truth, I have endeavored to express myself in such a manner, that the reader shall have as little trouble as possible in detecting my errors. And if it shall be found, that I have thrown any light whatever upon the science of human duty, I shall have unspeakable cause for gratitude to that Spirit, whose inspiration alone teacheth man understanding. And my cause for gratitude will scarcely be less, should my failure incite some one, better able than myself to do justice to the subject, to a more successful undertaking.

Brown University, April, 1835.

TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

A second edition of the Elements of Moral Science having been demanded, within a much shorter period than was anticipated, I have given to the revisal of it all the attention which my avocations have permitted.

The first edition, owing to circumstances which could not be foreseen, was, unfortunately, in several places inaccurate in typographical execution. I have endeavored, I hope with better success, to render the present edition, in this respect, less liable to censure. In a few cases, single words and modes of expression have also been changed. I have, however, confined myself to verbal corrections, and have, in no case that I remember, intentionally altered the sense.

Having understood that the work has been introduced, as a text-book, into some of our highest seminaries of education, I hope that I viii

PREFACE.

may be forgiven, if I suggest a few hints as to the manner in which I suppose it may be most successfully used for this purpose.

1 . In the recitation room, let neither instructer nor pupil ever make use of the book.

2. Let the portion previously assigned for the exercise, be so mastered by the pupil, both in plan and illustration, that he will be able to recite it in order, and explain the connection of the different parts with each other, without the necessity of assistance from his instructed To give the language of the author is not, of course, desirable. It is sufficient that he give the idea. The questions of the instructer should have respect to principles that may be deduced from the text, practical application of the doctrines, objections which may be raised, &c.

5. Let the lesson which was recited on one day, be invariably reviewed on the day succeeding.

4. As soon as any considerable progress has been made in the work, let a review from the beginning; be commenced. This should comprebend, for one exercise, as much as had been previously recited in two or three clays ; and should be confined to a brief analysis of the argument, with a mere mention of the illustrations.

5. As soon as the whole portion thus far recited, has been reviewed, let a new review be

PREFACE.

ix commenced, and continued in the same manner ; and thus on successively, until the work is completed. By pursuing this method, a class will, at any period of the course of study, be enabled, with the slightest effort, to recall whatever they have already acquired ; and when the work is completed, they will be able to pursue the whole thread of the argument, from the beginning to the end ; and thus to retain a knowledge, not only of the individual principles, but also of their relations to each other.

But the advantages of this mode of study are not confined to that of a more perfect knowledge of this or of any other book. By presenting the whole field of thought at one view before the mind, it will cultivate the power of pursuing an extended range of argument ; of examining and deciding upon a connected chain of reasoning ; and will, in no small degree, accustom the student to carry forward in his own mind a train of original investigation.

I have been emboldened to make these suggestions, not in the least because I suppose the present work worthy of any peculiar attention from an instructer, but simply because, having been long in the habit of pursuing this method, and having witnessed its results in my own classes, I have thought it my duty to suggest it to those w ho are engaged in the same profession with myself. Other instructers may have succeeded better with other methods. I have succeeded best with this.

X

PREFACE .

At the suggestion of some of his friends, the author has it in contemplation to prepare a small abridgment of the present work, in duodecimo, for the use of schools and academies. It will be published as soon as his engagements will permit.

Brown University, September, 1835.

PLAN OF THE WORK.

AND

Chapter Seventh. Of Natural Religion, 116

SECTION I.

Of the Manner in which we learn our Duty by the Light of Nature, 116

From general consequences, 117

Objection considered, 120

SECTION II.

How far we may learn our Duty by the Light of JYature i .... 124

Knowledge acquired in this manner, 124

Motives which it presents, 125

CHAPTER FOURTH. Page

OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH, 180

Original institution of the Sabbath, 180

The Mosaic Sabbath, 183

The Christian Sabbath, 185

The day to be observed, 185

The manner of its observance, 188

Duty of magistrates in respect to it, ...... 190

Part Second. Duties To Man

DIVISION FIRST. RECIPROCITY.

DIVISION SECOND. BENEVOLENCE.

DIVISION FIRST.

RECIPROCITY.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED, AND THE DUTIES OF

RECIPROCITY CLASSIFIED, 192

Nature of human equality, 192

Subject illustrated, 193

Teaching of the Scriptures, 196

Classification of the duties of reciprocity, 200

CLASS FIRST.

JUSTICE AND VERACITY.

OF JUSTICE.

Chapter First. Personal Liberty, 202

SECTION I.

Physical Liberty, '. 203

Intellectual liberty, = 204

Religious Liberty, 206

Exceptions, 207 xvi

CONTENTS.

SECTION IT.

Page.

Modes in which personal Liberty may be violated, 208

By the individual, as in domestic slavery, 208

Its nature and effects, 209

Doctrine of the Scriptures, 211

Duties of masters, 215

Duties of slaves, 216

Personal liberty violated by society, 217

Violation of physical liberty, 218

Violation of intellectual liberty, 219

Violation of religious liberty, 226

Chapter Second. Justice As It Respects Property, 230

SECTION I.

Definition, 230

On what the right of property is founded, 230

Modes in which the right of property may be acquired, 233

SECTION II.

Modes in which the Right of Property may be violated by the Individual, 237

Without consent,— 1. Theft. 2. Robbery, 238

By consent fraudulently obtained, 239

(a.) Where no equivalent is offered, 239

(6.) Where the equivalent is different from what it purports to

1. Where the equivalent is material, and the transfer perpetual, 239 The law of buyer and seller, 239

2. When the transfer is temporary, 244

Interest or loan of money, 245

Loan of other property, 248

Insurance, , 250

3. Where the equivalent is immaterial, 251

Of master and servant, 251

Of principal and agent, 252

Of representatives, 254

CHAPTER THIRD. Nature of the obligation, 260

Violated by weakening the moral restraints of men, 262

Violated by exciting their evil dispositions, 263

CONTENTS. Xvii

CHAPTER FOURTH. Page

Nature of the obligation, 267

Giving publicity to bad actions, 269

Unjust conclusions respecting character, 270

Assigning bad motives unnecessarily, 271

Ridicule and mimicry, 272

Our duty to reveal the bad actions of others, 275

Our duty to promote the ends of public justice, 275

Our duty to protect the innocent, and for the good of the offender, 275

Duty of historians, 276

Duty of the public press, 277

OF VERACITY.

CH^TER FIRST.

VERACITY OF THE ?AST A0^lESENT, 279

Law of veracity, * 279

What it forbids, 280

Necessity of such a law, 282

CHAPTER SECOND. Of promises, 285

Their intention and obligation, 285

When promises are not binding, , , 286

Of contracts, 287

CHAPTER THIRD. The theory of oaths, . . « 291

Lawfulness of oaths, 293

Interpretation of oaths, 294

Different kinds of oaths, 294

CLASS SECOND.

DUTIES WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

SEXES, 296

CHAPTER FDaST.

GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY, 298

What this moral law forbids, 298

What it commands, — exclusive union, 299

union for life, . . . , 301

Precepts of religion on this subject, 303

H xviii

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER SECOND. Page

The nature of the contract, 306

Duties imposed by the contract, 309

Chastity, 309

Mutual affection, 311

Mutual assistance,, 311

Relation of parties as to authority, 312

CHAPTER THIRD. Relation of the parties to each other, 315

Duties of parents, 317

Support or maintenance, . . . 317

Physical education, 318

Intellectual education, 319

Moral education, 323

Rights of parents, 325

Duration of these rights, 325

Of instructers, 326

CHAPTER FOURTH. Duties of children, 328

Obedience, 328

Reverence, 330

Filial affection, 331

Necessary maintenance, , 331

Rights of children, 331

Duration of these rights and obligations, 332

Duties of pupils, 332

CLASS THIRD.

DUTIES OF MAN AS A MEMBER OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 335

SECTION I. Nature of the contract, , 336

Manner in which governed, 338

Limits of the power of a majority, 338

Durability of corporations, 339

CONTENTS. Xix SECTION II.

Page.

Civil society an institution of God, 342

Conclusions from the above, 344

Of the nature and limitations of civil society, 346

Of what is esseutial to civil society, 347

The compact entered into by the individual and society, 349

Of the accidental modifications of civil society, 352

Chapter Fourth. Benevolence To The Injurious . . , 393

Injury committed by an individual against an individual, 393

Injury committed by an individual against society, 395

Injury committed by a society against a society, 396

Of war, 397

NOTE.

Duties to Brutes, 401

Book First. Theoretical Ethics

THEORETICAL ETHICS.

Chapter First. Of The Origin Of Our Notion Of The Moral Quality Of Actions

SECTION I.

OF MORAL LAW.

Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is the Science of Moral Law.

The first question which presents itself is, What is moral law? Let us inquire, first, what is law; and, secondly, what is moral law.

By the term law, I think, we generally mean a form of expression, denoting either a mode of existence, or an order of sequence.

Thus, the first of Sir Isaac Newton's laws, namely, that every body will continue in a state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless compelled by some force to change its state, denotes a mode of existence.

The third law of motion, that, to every action of one body upon another, there is an equal and contrary reaction, denotes an order of sequence ; that is, it declares the general fact, that, if one event occurs, the constitution of things under which we exist, is such, that the other event will a'lso occur.

OF MORAL LAW.

The axioms in Mathematics are laws of the same kind. Thus, the axiom, "if equals be added to equals, the wholes will be equal," denotes an order of sequence, in respect to quantity.

Of the same nature are the laws of Chemistry. Such, for instance, is the law that, if soda be saturated with muriatic acid, the result will be common salt.

Thus, also, in Intellectual Philosophy. If a picture of a visible object be formed upon the retina, and the impression be communicated, by the nerves, to the brain, the result will be an act of perception.

The meaning of law, when referring to civil society, is substantially the same. It expresses an established order of sequence between a specified action, and a particular mode of reward or of punishment. Such, in general, is the meaning of law.

Moral Philosophy takes it for granted that there is in human action a moral quality ; that is, that a human action may be right or wrong. Every one knows that we may contemplate the same action as wise or unwise ; as courteous or impolite ; as graceful or awkward ; and, also, as right or wrong. It can have escaped the observation of no one, that there are consequences distinct from each other, which follow an action, and which are connected, respectively, with each of its attributes. To take, for instance, a moral quality. Two men may both utter what is false ; the one intending to speak the truth, the other intending to deceive. Now, some of the consequences of this act are common to both cases, namely, that the hearers may, in both cases, be deceived. But it is equally manifest, that there are also consequences peculiar to the case in which the speaker intended to deceive ; as, for example, the effects upon his own moral character, and the estimation in which he is held by the community. And thus, in general, moral philosophy proceeds upon the supposition that there exists in the actions of men a moral quality, and that there are certain sequences connected by our Creator with the exhibition of that quality.

OF MORAL LAW.

A moral law is, therefore, a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions, and their results.

Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is the science which classifies and illustrates moral law.

Here it may be worth while to remark, that an order of sequence established, supposes of necessity an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a universal cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of His , y enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is just as invariable as an order of sequence in physics.

Such being the fact, it is evident, that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions, will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor can these consequences be eluded or averted, any more than the sequences which follow by the laws of gravitation. What should we think of a man who expected to leap from a precipice, and, by some act of sagacity, elude the effect of the accelerating power of gravity ; or, of another, who, by the exercise of his own will, determined to render himself imponderable? Every one who believes God to have established an order of sequences in morals, must see that it is equally absurd, to expect to violate, with impunity, any moral law of the Creator.

Yet men have always flattered themselves with the hope that they could violate moral law, and escape the consequences which God has established. The reason is obvious. In physics, the consequent follows the antecedent, often immediately, and most commonly after a stated interval. In morals, the result is frequently long delayed ; and the time of its occurrence is always uncertain, Hence, because sentence against an evil work is

OF MORAL ACTION.

not executed speedily, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil. But time, whether long or short, has neither power nor tendency to change the order of an established sequence. The time required for vegetation, in different orders of plants, may vary ; but yet wheat will always produce wheat, and an acorn will always produce an oak. That such is the case in morals, a heathen poet has taught us,

Hor. Lib. 3. Car. 2.

A higher authority has admonished us, Be not deceived ; God is not mocked ; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs.

SECTION II.

WHAT IS A MORAL ACTION?

Action, from actum, the supine of the Latin verb ago, I do, signifies something done ; the putting forth of some power.

But under what circumstances must power be put forth, in order to render it a moral action ?

1. A machine is, in common conversation, said to be powerful. A vegetable is said to put forth its leaves, a tree to bend its branches, or a vine to run towards a prop ; but we never speak of these instances of power, as actions.

2. Action is never affirmed, but of beings possessed of a will ; that is, of those in whom the putting forth of power is immediately consequent upon their determination to put it forth. Could ,we conceive of animate beings, whose exertions had no connection with their will, we should not speak of such exertions as actions.

OF MOUAL ACTION.

3. Action, so far as we know, is only affirmed of beings possessed of intelligence ; that is, who are capable of comprehending a particular end, and of adopting the means necessary to accomplish it. An action is something done; that is, some change effected. But man effects change, only by means of stated antecedents. An action, therefore, in such a being, supposes some change in view, and some means employed for the purpose of effecting it.

We do not, however, affirm this as essential. Suppose a being so constituted as to be able to effect changes without the use of means; action would then not involve the necessity of intelligence, in the sense in which it is here explained. All that would be necessary, would be the previous conception of the change which he intended to effect.

4. All this exists in man. He is voluntary and intelligent, capable of foreseeing the result of an exertion of power, and that exertion of power is subject to his will. This is sufficient to render man the subject of government, He can foresee the results of a particular action, and can will, or not will, to accomplish it. And other resuits can be connected with the action, of such a nature, as to influence his will in one direction or in another. Thus, a man may know that stabbing another will produce death. He has it in his power to will or not to will it. But such other consequences may be by society connected with the act, that, though on many accounts he would desire to do it, yet, on other and graver accounts, he would prefer not to do it. This is sufficient to render man a subject of government. But is this all that is necessary to constitute man a moral agent ; that is, to render him a subject of moral government ?

May not all this be affirmed of brutes ? Are they not

voluntary, and even, to some extent, intelligent agents ?

Do they not, frequently, at least, comprehend the relation

of means to an end, and voluntarily put forth the power

necessary for the accomplishment of that end ? Do they

not manifestly design to injure us, and also select the 3 #

OF MORAL ACTION.

most appropriate means for effecting their purpose ? And can we not connect such results with their actions, as shall influence their will, and prevent or excite the exercise of their power? We do this, whenever we caress or intimidate them, to prevent them from injuring us, or to excite them to labor. They are, then, subjects of government, as truly as man.

Is there, then, no difference between the intelligent and voluntary action of a brute, and the moral action of a man ? Suppose a brute and a man both to perform the same action ; as, for instance, suppose the brute to kill its offspring, and the man to murder his child. Are these actions of the same character ? Do we entertain the same feelings towards the authors of them ? Do we treat the authors in the same manner, and with the design of producing in them the same result ?

I think no one can answer these questions in the affirmative. We pity the brute, but we are filled with indignation against the man. In the one case, we say there has been harm done, in the other, injury committed. We feel that the man deserves punishment : we have no such feeling towards the brute. We say that the man has done wrong ; but we never affirm this of the brute. We may attempt to produce in the brute such a recollection of the offence, as may deter him from the act in future ; but we can do no more. We attempt, in the other case, to make the man sensible of the act as wrong, and to produce in him a radical change of character ; so that he not only would not commit the crime again, but would be inherently averse to the commission of it.

These considerations are, I think, sufficient to render it evident, that we perceive an element in the actions of men, which does not exist in the actions of brutes. What is this element ?

If we should ask a child, he would tell us that the man knows better. This would be his mode of explaining it.

But what is meant by knowing better ? Did not the brute and the man both know that the result of their action would be harm ? Did not both intend that it should

OF MORAL ACTION.

be harm ? In what respect, then, did the one know letter than the other ?

I think that a plain man or a child would answer, the man Jcnew that he ought not to do it, and that the brute did not ~know that he ought not to do it ; or he might say, the man knew, and the brute did not know, that it was wrong ; but whatever terms he might employ, they would involve the same idea. I do not know that a philosopher could give a more satisfactory answer.

If the question, then, be asked, what is a moral action ? we may answer, it is the voluntary action of an intelligent agent, who is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought, from what he ought not, to do.

It is, however, to be remarked, that, although action is defined to be the putting forth of power, it is not intended to be asserted, that the moral quality exists only where power is actually exerted. It is manifest, that our thoughts and resolutions may be deserving either of praise or of blame ; that is, may be either right or wrong, where they do not appear in action. When the will consents to the performance of an action, though the act be not done, the omniscient Deity justly considers us as either virtuous or vicious.

From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, in the actions of men, an element which does not exist in the actions of brutes. Hence, though both are subjects of government, the government of the one should be constructed upon principles different from that of the other. We can operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and hope of reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this manner, but, also, by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong ; and by the use of such means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment which treat men as we treat brutes, are as un philosophical as they are thoughtless, cruel and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal jurisprudence, which have in view nothing more than the infliction of pain upon the offender. The leading object

IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION DO WE of all such systems should be to reclaim the vicious. Such was the result to which all the investigations of Howard led. Such is the improvement which Prison Discipline societies are laboring to effect.

And it is worthy of remark, that the Christian precept respecting the treatment of injuries, proceeds precisely upon this principle. The New Testament teaches us to love our enemies, to do good to those that hate us, to overcome evil with good ; that is, to set before a man who does wrong, the strongest possible exemplification of the opposite moral quality, right. Now, it is manifest, that nothing would be so likely to show to an injurious person the turpitude of his own conduct, and to produce in him self-reproach and repentance, as precisely this sort of moral exhibition. Revenge and retaliation might, or might not, prevent a repetition of the injury to a particular individual. The requiting of evil with good, in addition to this effect, has an inherent tendency to produce sorrow for the act, and dislike to its moral quality ; and thus, by producing a change of character, to prevent the repetition of the offence under all circumstances hereafter.

Section III

IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION DO WE DISCOVER ITS MORAL QUALITY ?

In a deliberate action, four distinct elements may be commonly observed. These are —

1. The outward act, as when I put money into the hands of another.

2. The conception of this act, of which the external performance is the mere bodying forth.

3. The resolution to carry that conception into effect

4. The intention, or design, with which all this is done. Now, the moral quality does not belong to the exter-